Ramos v Director of Lands

Facts: Petitioner Cornelio Ramos and his wife, Ambrosia Salamanca instituted proceedings to register a
tract of land which has a possessory information title registered by their predecessor-in-interest by virtue
of a Royal Decree from the Spanish Government. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands and
the Director of Forestry claiming that parcel 1, a portion of the subject tract of land, was not an acquired
good title and that it was forest land, respectively. It is contended that in order for petitioner to have a
valid claim on the land based on the Maura Law (or the Spanish Mortagage Law and the Royal Decree), it
must be shown that the land was cultivated for six years previously and that it must be agricultural land.
The lower court denied registration to the petitioner.

Issue: W/N petitioner can validly claim ownership over the tract of land which would entitle him
registration of such tract.
W/N there was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
petitioner
W/N the land was agricultural public land

Held: Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Although petitioner has cultivated only about
one fourth of the entire tract, the doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer that the actual
occupancy of a part of land described in the instrument giving color of title is sufficient to give title to the
entire tract of land. The general rule under such doctrine is that the possession and cultivation of a portion
of a tract of land under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not
in the adverse possession of another. As for the nature of the land occupied by Petitioner, whenever the
claims by a citizen and of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, and if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry must
submit convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural that for forest purposes where
great consideration would be given by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with
authority on forestry matters. Therefore, a mere formal opposition unsupported by satisfactory evidence,
as in the case at bar, will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Lower court decision is
reversed.

Director of Lands v CA

Facts: A petition for registration of titles was started by private respondent Teodoro Abistado, where he
was later substituted by his heirs upon his death, over a parcel of land under PD 1529, the Property
Registration Decree. Such petition was dismissed by the land registration court for want of jurisdiction for
failure to comply with the provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation despite that the applicants, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession for around 50 years. The notice was only published
in the Official Gazette. The CA reversed the dismissal of the case and ruled that failure to cause such
publication was merely procedural and did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. The CA held that although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also
mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court; that the other requirements of publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing and posting at the site and other conspicuous places were all complied with. Petitioner contends
that under Sec. 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette
and in a newspaper of general circulation to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court and to comply with
the notice requirement of due process, respectively.

Issue: W/N newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 23 of PD 1529 clearly provides that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, absent any publication
of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court cannot
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. This is impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement. A land registration
proceeding is a proceeding in rem and is validated essentially through publication since being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons who have rights to or interests
in the property in order for them to be given the notice and opportunity to oppose by showing cause why
the application should not be granted. The rationale behind the newspaper publication is due process and
the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation. There was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law.
The Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The application for land
registration was dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with. Decision of CA is reversed.

DBP v CA

Facts: Respondent spouses Pieda are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by a Homestead
Patent and an OCT. The Piedas mortgaged the subject land to petitioner DBP to secure an agricultural
loan. However, the Piedas failed to comply with the mortgage compelling DBP to extrajudicially foreclose
the same. DBP was then declared the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale issued in its
favor. The property foreclosed was subject to redemption within 5 years from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale. However, after expiration of the one-year redemption period, DBP consolidated its
title over the foreclosed property where a final deed of sale was executed and where DBP took possession
of the foreclosed property and appropriated the produce thereof. Three months after, the Ministry of
Justice issued an Opinion which declared that the lands covered by PD 27, which includes subject property,
may not be the object of foreclosure proceedings. Around four years after the registration of the
foreclosure sale, the Piedas offered to redeem the foreclosed property by offering partial payment which
was then accepted by DBP which issued a corresponding O.R. However, four months after such partial
payment, DBP sent the respondent spouses a letter informing them that pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer
to redeem and/or repurchase the subject property could not be favorably considered because said
property was tenanted. Subsequently, DBP cancelled its consolidated title in the subject property through
the Register of Deeds and restored the OCT of respondent spouses after it moved for nullification of the
foreclosure proceeding in pursuance of the Opinion of the Ministry of Justice. Meanwhile, the Piedas filed
the instant complaint averring that DBP in evident bad faith caused the consolidation of its title to the
parcel of land in question despite the 5-year redemption period expressly stated and that their offer to
redeem was made within such period of redemption. The RTC ruled in favor of Piedas while the CA
affirmed the same, where both lower courts held that since DBP was in bad faith when it unlawfully took
possession of the property and defied the express stipulation then the respondent spouses are entitled
to recover the fruits produced by the property valued at P216,000.

Issues: W/N DBP was in bad faith when it took possession of the property in dispute and therefore the
respondent spouses are entitled to the fruits during such period.
W/N the decision of the lower courts to award actual damages in the amount of P216,000 is
correct despite of evidence substantiating such award.

Held: A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Good faith is always presumed, and the burden of proof rests
upon him who alleges otherwise. It was then incumbent on the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was aware of
the flaw in its title i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure which they failed to do. Respondents argue that DBPs
bad faith stems from the fact that DBP consolidated title over the disputed property despite the statement
in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale that subject land had a five-year redemption period. However, the
redemption period of extrajudicially foreclosed land is provided under Sec 6 of Act No. 3135 which
provides for a one-year redemption. Thus, if no redemption is made within one year, the purchaser is
entitled as a matter of right to consolidate and to possess the property. Accordingly, DBPs act of
consolidating its title and taking possession of the subject property after the one-year redemption period
was in accordance with law. Moreover, it was in consonance with Section 4 of the mortgage contract
between DBP and the PIEDAS where they agreed to the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge
and to hold possession of the mortgage property in case of foreclosure. DBPs acts cannot therefore be
tainted with bad faith. It is also settled that the five-year period of redemption fixed in Section 119 of the
Public Land Law for homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure begins to run only from the day after the
expiration of the one-year redemption period allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure. Thus, DBPs
consolidation of title did not derogate from or impair the right of the PIEDAS to redeem the same under
C.A. No. 141. It may be argued that P.D. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed the
property. However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was put into question only after the
Opinion of the Ministry of Justice declared that said land could not be subject to foreclosure
proceedings. The Opinion of the Ministry of Justice was issued on July 5, 1978 or after DBP consolidated
its title on March 10, 1978. By law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may properly be the basis of good faith. Moreover, Jurisprudence shows that when a contract of sale
is void, the possessor is entitled to keep the fruits during the period when it held the property in good
faith. Good faith of the possessor ceases when an action to recover possession of the property is filed
summons is served. As DBP was served summons on June 30, 1982 or after the disputed land was no
longer in possession of DBP, since the foreclosure was declared null and void on February 22, 1982, then
any income collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and took possession of the property on May 30,
1978 up to February 22, 1982 belongs to DBP as a possessor in good faith since its possession was never
legally interrupted.

Lasam v Director of Lands

Petitioner Gabriel Lasam filed an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a total
area of 24,723,436 sqm described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the application. These 152 parcels
include the parcel No. 9 here involved. Numerous parties opposed the application on various grounds
such as that it is not supported by any title fit for registration and that the land sought to be registered is
public land, that the lands are forest lands, as well as adverse claims of ownership. The lower court, after
hearing, rejected all the oppositions filed, declared the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No.
9, as indicated in the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in his favor.
Lasams claim on parcel no. 9 is based on Exhibit L which purports to be an application, dated June 27,
1873, addressed by one Domingo Narag to the Alcalde Mayor, where Narag stated that he had been in
possession of the land above described and asked that informacion testifical be admitted. The informacion
testifical was had before the Alcalde Mayor and appears to have been approved the court. Lasam asserts
his father obtained the land by virtue of a debt owned by Narag to the former due to the latters candidacy
as gobernadorcillo; and that the fifth parcel mentioned in Exhibit L is the same parcel no.9 described in
Exhibit K. The Government contends that Exhibit L is not a valid title and does not confer ownership and
that even if it were valid, it does not cover so extensive an area as that appearing on the plan, Exhibit K.

Issue: W/N Lasam is entitled to the registration of parcel No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as
Exhibit L
W/N he is entitled to registration on the basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under
a claim of ownership during the time prescribed by law

Held: Although the lower court committed no error in receiving Exhibit L as evidence, its admission as
such does not necessarily entitle the applicant to the registration of the parcel claimed. It is apparent that
parcel No. 9 in Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described in document Exhibit L due to the fact that
while there may be partial identity as to boundaries on the east and west, such identity is lacking as to the
boundaries on the north and south. This discrepancy is accentuated by the admission of the applicant that
the parcel whose registration is sought is much smaller than that described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L.An
applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not
only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a
case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of
what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in
that title. Therefore, the evidence is lacking in certainty as to the particular portion occupied and the
extent thereof as even the area described by Exhibit L (15,000 hec) is more than that in Exhibit K (2,000
hec). Moreover, the doctrine of constructive possession cannot apply to the case at bar as the mere
planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is
not a mere fiction. Lasam cannot be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 15,000 hectares, although only
2 hectares were cultivated when such tract of land was transferred to Lasam. The fact, however, that he
is claiming only a portion of the land claimed by him to be included in his title, the further fact that
according to his own testimony he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry, the
discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax declarations, and the existence of numerous homesteaders and
claimants are significant and tend to show that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought
to be registered is not "such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for his
enjoyment.

Banco Espanol-Filipino v Peterson

Facts: Banco Espanol-Filipino and Francisco Reyes entered into a contract of loan where in order to secure
such loan, Reyes executed through a public instrument a mortgage as well as a pledge of a part of his
personal property in favor of plaintiff bank. The property pledged by Reyes included a stock or
merchandise consisting of wines, liquors, canned goods and other similar articles which were stored in
the warehouse of Reyes. In the aforesaid pledge, it was agreed by the bank and by Reyes that the goods
should be delivered to one Ramon Planas for safe-keeping, where Reyes turned over the same to Planas
by delivering to him the keys of the warehouse in which they were kept. Thereafter, Luis Ma. Sierra then
substituted Ramon Planas as depositary of the goods pledged by an appointment through a subsequent
agreement between the bank and Reyes. However, a judgment was secured by one Juan Planas against
Reyes and one Agtarao for payment of a sum of money, to which the judgment court issued an execution
order against the property of the defendants which included the goods pledged to plaintiff bank. As the
sheriff entered the warehouse where the pledged goods where kept and levied upon the same despite
the opposition of the bank and repeated demands to return the same, plaintiff bank instituted the present
action to declare the execution levied upon such personal property as illegal and the return of such
property or the value of such in satisfaction of the debt to plaintiff bank by Reyes. The lower court
dismissed the complaint by plaintiff bank on the grounds that there was a defect in the pledge executed
by the bank and Reyes as the debtor, Reyes, continued in possession of the property pledged, that he
never parted with said property, that neither the creditor nor the depositary appointed by common
consent of the parties were ever in possession of the property pledged, and that the contract was in fraud
of creditors.

Issue: W/N the contract of pledge entered into by plaintiff bank and Reyes to secure a loan is valid to
make the subsequent execution and levy of such pledged properties as illegal

Held: The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Code,
such as that the property was pledged to secure a debt, the date of the execution, the terms of the pledge,
and the property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property pledged was placed
in the hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of
an agent of the bank. From evidence, it appears that a third person, appointed by the common consent
of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct
supervision of an agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose, and it has not been shown that
the said Reyes continued in the possession of the goods after they had been pledged to the plaintiff bank.
Therefore, the contract in question was a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863 of the
Civil Code, it having been conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods
pledged through a depository and a special agent appointed by it, each of whom had a duplicate key to
the warehouse wherein the said goods were stored, and that the pledgee, itself, received and collected
the proceeds of the goods as they were sold. The fact that the said goods continued in the warehouse
which was formerly rented by the pledgor, Reyes, does not affect the validity and legality of the pledge, it
having been demonstrated that after the pledge had been agreed upon, and after the depository
appointed with the common consent of the parties had taken possession of the said property, the owner,
the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee being the only one authorized to do so
through the depositary and special agent who represented it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by
means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored being sufficient to show
that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties was legally placed in possession of
the goods. Moreover, no evidence was introduce to shows that the contract of pledge was fraudulent as
to the other creditors.

Tabuso v CA

Facts: Private respondents Heirs of Esteban Abad, represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Paghubasan,
obtained a favorable judgment in an action for declaration of ownership of an unregistered parcel of land.
The trial court ruled that abundant proof was presented establishing private respondents' ownership over
the lot and that possession of a portion of the lot by petitioners Andrea Tabuso and Renato Bismorte was
by mere tolerance given to petitioner Andreas father. Evidences considered were tax declarations in
private respondents' names for the years 1923 to 1982, a demand letter to vacate sent to petitioners who
had built a "barong barong " or a small house on the lot, a contract of lease executed by Nemesio Abad in
favor of Valentin Poblete, the deed of donation executed by Maria Montes in favor of Isabel Elaba who in
turn sold the land to Esteban Abad, and the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales, counsel of private
respondents who was presented by petitioners. Atty. Gonzales testified that on his personal knowledge,
private respondents are the owners of the lot in question, and that as owner of an adjacent lot, he
frequently visited his land and passed by the land in question. Moreover, the trial court dimissed the
evidences adduced by petitioners by ruling that sufficient evidence was presented to show that Petitioner
Tabuso is not a compulsory heir of Ignacio Montes, from whom she claims to have inherited the subject
lot, and that tax declarations in the name of Ignacio has been long revised. Petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals claiming that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land and questioned
the validity of the deed of donation. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this
recourse challenging factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: W/N Private respondents are the owners of the subject land despite not being in actual possession
of such land.

Prefatorily, it was held that parties are barred by laches for failure to assail the validity of the documents
executed 60 years ago, as well as that issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; that factual
conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirmed those of the trial courts are given great weight and
even finality. Moreover, the Court held that for a period of more than 60 years, private respondents have
been able to establish that they are the owners of the lot as they have been, for said period, in open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same. The Court emphasized the demand letter sent by
private respondents to the petitioners for them to vacate which shows an exercise of ownership, as well
as the fact that petitioners house is only a barong barong despite the size of the land of 11,927 sqm which
lends support to the claim that petitioners presence on the land was merely tolerated. Possession and
ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to
possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in
one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. Possessors in the
concept of owners may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On the other hand, those
who possess as mere holders acknowledge in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong. In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the property
by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because their stay is merely tolerated. Lastly, the claim of
petitioners that private respondents are not in actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides,
it is not necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to prove ownership of the same.
As found by both the trial and the appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by private
respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a
lease contract over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with ownership.

Gacos v CA

Facts: Eladio Gacos owned a 6,584 sqm unregistered parcel of land which he verbally adjudicated to his
three daughters, Petrona, Fortunata and Lucia. Petrona immediately took possession of her share and
sold part of such to Marcial Olaybal in 1948. Such transaction was consummated in a document written
in Spanish describing therein the land inherited by Petrona as containing an area of 2,720 sqm (2,242 was
the one eventually registered) which is the area of the whole parcel inherited by Petrona. Marcial then
took possession, measured it, and declared 866 sqm in his name in the tax declaration, which tends to
show that only 866 sqm was bought out of the inherited land. Before her death, Petrona Gacos, she
instructed Lucia, who administered the remaining portion of her property, to sell a small area on the east
for her funeral expenses and novena, which Lucia sold to Teodolfo Mendones the said portion containing
an area of 84 sqm. Teodolfo then sold the land to spouses Jesus and Merced Gabitos. In 1950, Marcial
sold his land to Rosario Gacos in 1950, who then sold the land to Arnulfo Prieto in 1973. However, the
deed of sale of the 1950 transaction did not specify the area sold, just the boundaries, which were in very
general terms. Due to this Rosario, and later on Arnulfo, took possession of the whole area of Petronas
original land of 2,242 sqm. When the children of Petrona became of age, they came back and started to
claim the remainder of their mothers land which they allege to be 2,242 sqm less 866 sold to Marcial in
and 84 sold to Teodolfo. The present controversy arose because Rosario claims that Petrona actually sold
the whole area to Marcial, his successor in interest. Moreover, Rosario Gacos and Arnulfo Prieto also claim
that because of their continued and undisturbed possession for 27 years of the subject land, whatever
rights respondents may have over the land have been barred by acquisitive prescription. The lower court
ruled in favor of the heirs of Petrona and held that only 886 sqm was the subject of the deed of absolute
sale between Petrona and Marcial. Thus, the appeal.

Issue: W/N Petitioners Gacos and Prieto have acquired the land in dispute by acquisitive prescription

Held: Prefatorily to settle the issue with regards to the contract of sale, the Court applied the provisions
found in Article 1372 (formerly Art. 1283) and Article 1378 (formerly Art. 1289) of the New Civil Code with
regards to the interpretation of contracts. Thus, because it is observed that the sale to Marcial was a sale
consummated in favor of a close relative, as Marcial was a nephew-in-law of Petrona, and in accordance
with the articles aforementioned then the said contract should be interpreted as "to effect the least
possible transmission of rights or interests." (Art. 1378). Moreover, Marcial himself stated in his tax
declaration that the area of his property is 866 sqm. Besides, Petrona Gacos could not have sold her entire
hereditary share as she and her four (4) minor children were then staying in the disputed land with her
sister Lucia, and if the entire hereditary share of Petrona was sold on March 13, 1948, as asserted by
petitioners Rosario and Arnulfo, then the eastern portion (Lot 2452) of her hereditary estate could not
have been sold to Teodolfo Mendones on February 22, 1949. Going to the issue of acquisitive prescription,
the Court held that possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be possession under claim of title or it must be adverse. Acts of possessory character performed by
one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in the concept of owner and such
possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
Even under ordinary acquisitive prescription of immovables and other real rights through adverse
possession of 10 years, the possession of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest of the unsold portion of
1,159 square meters cannot be characterized as adverse possession in good faith. As found by the trial
court and the CA, as early as April 26, 1949, petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, Rosario Gacos, knew
and recognized the sale by Lucia Gacos to Teodolfo Mendones of the eastern portion of the hereditary
estate of Petrona Gacos reportedly containing an area of 84 square meters. In the pacto de retro sale
between Lucia Gacos and Rosario Gacos involving the share of Lucia Gacos, Teodolfo Mendones is
mentioned as the boundary owner on the south. In fact, Encarnacion Prieto, mother of petitioners, signed
as a witness in the said pacto de retro sale, thus impliedly recognizing the ownership of the lot involved.
Peran v CFI

Facts: Alejandro Evasco acquired an unregistered parcel of land from his father, Jose, through an
extrajudicial partition the latter executed in favor of his five heirs. The private respondent of the case
being one of the children of the heirs of Jose Evasco. The subject parcel of land was passed on to numerous
individuals after Alejando solid such land up until it was later on acquired by Petitioner Angel Peran
through a purchase, declaring the same under his name in the Tax Declaration. Thereafter, petitioner
personally asked private respondents, Encarnacion Evasco and her common-law husband whose house is
erected on a 44sqm portion of the subject lot to remove the same and vacate the premises. However, due
to private respondents refusal, the petitioner instituted the present case for forcible entry and illegal
detainer. The private respondents, in their answer, alleged that they are the lawful possessors for more
than 20 years of the said portion which belonged to Jose Evasco, the grandfather of Encarnacion, and thus
petitioner has no right to eject them therefrom. The MCC rendered a decision in favor petitioner while
the CFI reversed the same on the grounds that the MCC had no jurisdiction as the one-year period has
elapsed since the cause of action accrued from the sale of the property by initial sale of Alejandro around
6 years ago and that since the only issue in an illegal detainer is physical possession, then whoever has
prior possession no matter in what character is protected by law. Hence the appeal.

Issue: W/N there was want of jurisdiction as the cause of action accrued during the initial sale and not
from the date of demand made by the petitioner upon the respondents
W/N in cases of illegal detainer, prior possession in whatever character is protected by law

Held: Since private respondents admit that the subject land was originally by Jose Evasco and since such
land had been partitioned to Alejandro, then respondent Encarnacion can lay no claim in the property
even as the grand-daughter of Jose Evasco. Respondents may have been in possession of the portion they
occupy prior to petitioner but they have not proved their title thereto, nor their right to possess the same.
A Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer action must be brought within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession. The one-year-period of limitation commences from the time of
demand to vacate, and when several demands are made, the same is counted from the last letter of
demand. Demand may either be personal or in writing. As the last demand to vacate was made in January
1979, and the ejectment suit having been instituted three months after, then the MCC acted well within
its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case. Private respondents' possession of their portion of the
property was by mere tolerance of petitioner's predecessors-in-interest, which, however, does not vest
in them a right which they can assert against petitioner. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this
becomes illegal when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor refuses to comply with such
demand. A possessor by tolerance is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. It is not necessary that
there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be filed against a
possessor by tolerance. Neither is prior physical possession of the property by petitioner an indispensable
requisite. Therefore, the ruling that "since the only issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action is the
physical possession of real property, possession de facto and not possession de jure, whoever has prior
possession, no matter in what character, is protected by law," is erroneous under the factual milieu
herein.

Macasaet v Macasaet

Facts: Petitioner Ismael Macaset is the son of respondents Vicente and Rosario, while Teresita is his wife.
The petitioners were occupying two parcels of land owned by his parents where they constructed their
residence and conducted their business. Thereafter, the parents sought the return of the properties to
their possession and instituted an ejectment suit against their son where they claimed that petitioners
were occupying the same by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, and that petitioners failed to pay the
agreed rentals. Petitioners on the other hand claim that respondents invited them to construct their
residence and business on the land so that they can all live near one another, that the petitioners can
employ his sister in the business and for him to help in resolving the problems of the family. Moreover,
petitioner claims that the respondents have a policy of allotting the land they owner as an advance grant
of inheritance for their children. The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents and held that the petitioners
were occupying the land by mere tolerance so that they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the
lots upon demand, that the claim of an advance inheritance cannot be sustained since successional rights
are inchoate, and disbelieved the allegation that the other parcel of land had been given as payment for
construction materials. The RTC upheld the ruling of the MTCC but applied Art 448 in relation to Articles
546 and 548 with regards to the rights involved in the building and the improvements. The CA also
sustained such findings but applied the provisions on lease with regards the building and improvements
upon the finding that the petitioners possession of the land by mere tolerance is comparable with that
of a lessee.

Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to possession over the subject lots
W/N petitioners are entitled to indemnity for the useful improvements made on the subject lots

Held: With regards the issue of possession, the Court held that petitioners occupation of the land was
made through an agreement rooted in parental love and the desire for solidarity expected between
Filipino parents and children. The circumstances of the case do not show possession by mere tolerance as
there was an implied agreement when the petitioners accepted the invitation of the respondents to
occupy the subject lots so that they can all live near one another and help resolve any family problems.
The duration of such agreement with no period being intended contained an implied resolutory condition
that being based on parental love, such agreement would end upon the dissipation of affection. After
petitioners received a notice to vacate, they thus lost the right to continued possession. Given their refusal
to heed the demand, ejectment became the proper remedy for respondents since possession which was
at once lawful, became unlawful. Moreover, the Court sustained the ruling the right to inherit is merely
inchoate and is vested only upon the parents demise. Lastly, petitioners failed to prove their allegation
that payment for the debts were made through a dation in payment. Thus, as the right of ownership
carries with it the right of possession, respondents have the right to recover possession of the properties
they own. With regards the appropriation of the improvements made, the Court held that when a person
builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448 where the general rule
is that this provision only applies to builders, sowers, or planters who believe themselves to be owners of
the land or, at least, have a claim of title to it and thus built, planted, or sowed in good faith. It does not
apply when the interest is merely that of a holder such as a mere tenant, agent, or usufructuary. However,
the Court has also applied the provision in special cases such as when the builder constructed
improvements with consent of the owner. Given the facts of the case, respondents invited petitioners to
occupy the lots and fully consented to the improvements introduced by the latter. As such, petitioners
are deemed to have been in good faith when they built structures on the lots. Consequently, respondents
have the right to appropriate as their own the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but
only after refunding the expenses of petitioners or paying the increase in value acquired by the properties
by reason thereof. They also have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its
value is considerably more than that of the structures in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

Wong v Carpio
Facts: Respondent Manuel Mercado acquired rights over the subject land located in Colonga, Sta. Maria,
Davao Del Sur from William Giger by virtue of a deed of sale with a right to repurchase. In 1972,
respondent began harvesting coconut fruits there and began paying taxes on the land for Giger. Although,
it must be noted that respondent went periodically to the land to make copra but never placed any person
on the subject land to watch it, nor did he reside on the land, as he is a businessman and storekeeper who
resides at another town, or put any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession. In July 1976,
Petitioner Wong bought the land from Giger and declared it for taxation purposes in his name. He tried
to get it registered but could not due to technicalities. Wong put laborers on the land and fenced the
boundaries. Mercado knew about the laborers in the land as early as August 1976 but he did not do
anything about it. It was only up until November 1976 did respondent Mercado he file a complaint for
forcible entry against Wong. The Municipal Court ruled in favor of petitioner and declared the same to be
in prior, actual, and continuous possession. The CFI the reversed the decision and ruled in favor of
Mercado where it found Mercado take have taken possession of the property at an earlier point in time.
The CA then certified the case to the SC as it involved pure questions of law. Petitioner claims that
respondent Mercado has not established prior possession, since the latters periodic visit to the lot to
gather coconuts may have been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner thereof and that a
person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert the same to copras may only be a hired
laborer with the contract of labor with the true owner of the property.

Issue: W/N the conclusion drawn by the CFI that respondent took possession of the property at an earlier
point in time is with factual and legal basis to consider petitioner Wong as an intruder for purposes of a
forcible entry

Held: The Court held that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of
a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
for acquiring such right, and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the
execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery
has not been effected. In the case at bar, it is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to
private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro and accordingly, the later sale a
retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment
the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession (Art. 538). Moreover, the mere act
of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Lastly, anent the award of rentals in favor of
private respondent, suffice it to say that although possession acquired in good faith does not lose this
character except from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing wrongfully, such interruption would automatically take place upon service of
summons. Thus, payment of rentals to the respondent must start from the service of the same.

Elane v CA

Facts: Private respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible entry for the eviction of petitioner
Gabriel Elane from a portion of a parcel of land which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to
private respondent by the Bureau of Forestry on August 16, 1961. Private respondent alleges that on
February 15, 1980, while visiting the property, he discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-
concrete building on a portion thereof, without his knowledge and consent. The order made by private
respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was ignored by the latter. When his demand letter of
March 1, 1980 to stop said construction was refused, private respondent filed an action for forcible entry.
In his answer, petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest Development
over a parcel of land as allegedly evidenced by a certification from the said bureau dated April 10, 1979;
that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land continuously and uninterruptedly
since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later replaced by a bungalow; and that the
land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real property taxes thereon paid by him for the
years 1970 to 1979. The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner and dismissed the complaint which was then
affirmed by the RTC. The CA reversed the same on appeal. Petitioner contends the ruling of the CA in
resolving the case by using the issue of priority of possession instead of the issue as to who is the legal
possessor of the lot subject of the litigation since the residence permit over the lot issued by the Bureau
of Forestry on August 16, 1961which was renewable every year, was not renewed after June 30, 1969,
although private respondent continued to pay rental fees for the land until 1973.

Issue: W/N the case must be resolved not on the basis of priority of physical possession but instead on
the basis of legal possession.

Held: The Court held that the decisive issue is priority of possession in an ejectment case until a competent
court in an appropriate case determines which of the contending parties has the better right of
possession. Under the facts aforementioned, private respondent has priority of possession over petitioner
whose entry into the subject lot may be reckoned only as of 1979. There is no merit in the suggestion that
petitioner was authorized by the Bureau of Forest Development to occupy the land by virtue of an alleged
permit issued by said bureau. A cursory examination of said document readily shows that it is a mere
certification that the lot claimed by petitioner is part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Nowhere is it stated therein that petitioner is allowed to take possession of the subject lot.
Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that private respondent was issued a residence permit way back in 1961
which entitled him to possession of the disputed land starting in the same year. Therefore, the expiration
of his residence permit is of no moment since the respondent remained in physical possession thereof for
it is not whether he has legal right to possess it that is in issue, rather it is whether he is in actual physical
possession of it that is decisive in a case of forcible entry. In sum, private respondent was in prior actual
and continuous possession of the contested lot since August 16, 1961; his sales application preceded that
of petitioner; his warehouse and gasoline station already existed long before petitioner took possession
of the parcel of land in question; and he has been paying taxes and rental fees thereon since 1968. Thus,
private respondents material possession must be protected from petitioners intrusion upon the disputed
premise which can be properly categorized as one effected through stealth; as the one-year prescriptive
period, from the time private respondent demanded petitioner to desist from such dispossession being,
being complied with, the action for forcible entry is proper and private respondent is preferentially
entitled to occupy the land

Cordero v Cabral

Plaintiffs inherited parcels of land upon the death of one Gregorio Ocampo, one of which is a riceland with
of around 4,303 sq.m. The plaintiff heirs took possession of the properties, but they found out that the
southern portion of the riceland was possessed by the defendants Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso
and Dalmacio Montaos. Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while her co-defendants
co-possessed the same as her tenants, so they refused to vacate the property despite several demands
made by the plaintiffs even after results of the verification and relocation of the parcel of land made in
the presence of the Cabrals representatives which showed that the subject land was indeed part of the
properties left by Gregorio. Thus, the plaintiff heirs instituted the present complaint against defendants
Cabral et al. to evict them as well as claims for damages due to unrealized profits and legal fees.
Defendants, in their answer, assert that their predecessors in interest were the real owners, and have
been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of that portion of land claimed by the
plaintiffs as well as that the inclusion of that portion claimed by the plaintiffs in the registration of their
property was obtained thru error or fraud by the original applicant, but was never possessed by him nor
by his successors in interest, as they have always openly recognized the ownership of said portion as
belonging to defendant Cabral and her predecessors in interest before her. The trial court ruled in favor
of the defendants and dismissed the complaint but its decision is unclear as to whether the disputed
portion is included in TCT 14513 of Gregorio. The CA on the other hand affirmed the same but also found
as a fact that the disputed portion is indeed part of the land registered in the name of plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest, Gregorio, and such title had become imprescriptible and therefore the plaintiffs
had the right to vindicate their ownership against anybody else. However, in sustaining the trial court, the
CA held, based on a statement made by the plaintiffs, that there existed an oral contract of sale between
Gregorio Ocampo and the defendants predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Rodriguez, even though the trial
court did not rule on such point nor did the defendants make any claim of such transaction, nor was even
the name of Antonio Rodriguez was mentioned in their answer.

Issue: W/N the CA erred when it rendered a decision based on a ground that was never raised nor
discussed in the trial court

Held: It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings. In the case at bar, the CA erred when it rendered a decision based on a ground which was not
litigated in the trial court and which could not have been raised on appeal. The supposed oral contract of
sale was never an issue as the same was not mentioned in the pleadings below, the decisions of the trial
court is silent on the matter and that the appeal made to the CA contained no assignments of error
regarding such issue. Moreover, the trial court also did not make any finding on the claims of defendants
that they and their predecessors in interest are the owners of the disputed land but the plaintiffs
erroneously or fraudulently included the same during registration. Therefore, the Court makes the
following conclusions, (1) the subject land is included in TCT 14513 issued to the predecessor in interest
of plaintifs, (2) the original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud,
(3) the CA erred when it ruled on an oral contract of sale and (4) since the defendants, by their own
admission, are in possession of the disputed land, and although there is no evidence that they were
possessors in bad faith, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the
complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of summons, they shall reimburse the fruits
received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received after such time in accordance to
Art. 549.

Gulla v Labrador

Respondent heirs of Alejandro Labrador filed an accion publiciana against petitioner spouses Gulla where
the complaint involved a 22,590 sqm lot covered by OCT P-13350 and a 562 sqm lot beside the titled
property. Petitioner spouses Gulla occupied a portion of the titled property and the 562 sqm lot within
the salvage area where they constructed a house and fenced its perimeter. Spouses Gulla claimed that
they had been in possession of their occupied part of land since 1984 and even had a tax declaration on
such occupied portion of the titled property and the adjacent 562 sqm lot under their names. Spouses
Gulla even filed an application for miscellaneous sales patent which was certified as alienable and
disposable land by their barangay officials. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Labradors and
ordered spouses Gulla to vacate the portion of the property covered by the title as well as the 562 sqm
lot within the salvage zone since the Labradors were able to establish ownership over the subject property
as evidenced by the title under their name. Moreover, since spouses Gulla were not the riparian owners
which is within the salvage zone, then they have no right to possess the same. The RTC then affirmed the
decision and applied article 440 on accession with regards the 562 sqm lot adjacent to the titled land of
the respondent heirs. On appeal to the CA, the petitioners assert that the 562 sqm lot is located within
the salvage zone and is therefore res nullius which could not be acquired by the Labradors through
accession under Article 440. The CA affirmed the same and applied Art. 440 where it declared that
although the Labradors are not the owners of the property within the salvage zone, they have a right to
use it more than the spouses Gulla.

Issue: W/N petitioner spouses Gulla are entitled to the possession of the 562 sqm lot which is located at
the foreshore and adjacent to the titled land of the respondents.

Held: The trial court, the RTC and the CA were one in ruling that the 562-square-meter property is part of
the public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not capable of registration. In fact, the land
is within the salvage zone fronting the China Sea as well as the property covered by OCT No. P-13350 in
the name of respondents. Article 440 of the New Civil Code states that the ownership of property gives
the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially which is, however, inapplicable in this case, considering that the 562
sqm lot is a foreshore land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary
flow of the tides. Such property belongs to the public domain and is not available for private ownership
until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use. Respondents thus have
no possessory right over the property unless upon application, the government, through the then Bureau
of Lands, had granted them a permit. There is no question that no such permit was issued or granted in
favor of respondents. This being the case, respondents have no cause of action to cause petitioners'
eviction from the subject property. The real party-in-interest to file a complaint against petitioners for
recovery of possession of the subject property and cause petitioner's eviction therefrom is the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, petitioners cannot be
required to pay any rentals to respondents for their possession. Thus the complaint is dismissed as regards
the 562 sqm lot but without prejudice to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take such
appropriate action for the recovery of said lot from petitioners.

Depra v Dumlao

Facts: Plaintiff-appellee Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land registered under TCT No. T-3087,
while defendant-appellant Agustin Dumlao owns an adjoining lot. Sometime in 1972, when Dumlao
constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of 34 sqm of Depra's
property. After the encroachment was discovered in a relocation survey of Depras lot made on November
2, 1972, his mother, Beatriz Derla, after writing a demand letter asking Dumlao to move back from his
encroachment, filed an action for Unlawful Detainer on February 6, 1973 against Dumlao in the Municipal
Court which found that Dumalo was a builder in good faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil Code,
ordered a forced lease between the two parties. From the foregoing judgment, neither party appealed,
however, Depra did not accept payment of rentals so that Dumlao deposited such rentals with the
Municipal Court. On July 15, 1974, Depra filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao before the
then CFI. Despite the opposition by Dumlao claiming res judicata, the RTC rendered a decision which found
the subject area as part of the property of Depra and is therefore entitled to possess the same. The CA
certified the same to the SC

Issue: W/N the case is barred by res judicata

W/N Depra is entitled to have the kitchen removed based on the decision that the 34 sqm is his.

Held: With regards the issue of res judicata, the decision of the Municipal Court, is null and void since the
judgment in a detainer case is effective in respect of possession only and such court overstepped its
bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", which like "forced co-ownership"
is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in real property, jurisdiction over which belongs
to CFI. its decision was null and void and cannot operate as res judicata to the subject complaint for
Queting of Title. Even assuming arguendo that the decision were valid, the rule on res judicata would not
apply due to difference in cause of action. In the Municipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation
of possession, while in the action to quiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership.

With regards, the issue regarding the removal of the kitchen the Court held that pursuant to Art. 448,
Depra has the option either to pay for the encroaching part of Dumlao's kitchen, or to sell the encroached
34 square meters of his lot to Dumlao. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building,
and to sell the encroached part of his land, as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that
manifestation is not binding because it was made in a void proceeding. However, the good faith of Dumlao
is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the CFI and it was thus error for the RTC to have ruled that Depra is
"entitled to possession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to
have the kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his
encroached land, Dumlao fails to pay for the same. In this case, Dumlao had expressed his willingness to
pay for the land, but Depra refused to sell. Thus, in accordance to that enunciated in Ignacio v Hilario.
Depra cannot, as refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the
building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. On the other hand, the owner of
the building, Dumlao, erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession
of the land until he is paid the value of his building in accordance to Art. 546 if the option of payment is
chosen by the owner of the land. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court is hereby set aside, and this
case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

Spouses del Ocampo v Abesia

Facts: Case involves a parcel of land with an area of only about 45 sqm. An action for partition was filed
by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the
proportion of 2/3 and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in
accordance with the agreement of the parties. The said commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a
sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court on May 29, 1976, recommending that the property
be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B
with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were
surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5
square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked
the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5
square meters of the land in question. The lower court ruled by holding that the plaintiffs cannot be
obliged to pay for the value of the portion of the defendant's house which has encroached an area of 5
sq. meters of the land allotted to them. The defendants cannot also be obliged to pay for the price of the
said 5 square meters. The rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the New Civil Code does
not apply to a case where one co-owner has built, planted or sown on the land owned in common as of
the opinion from numerous authorities including Manresa. The co-owner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. In the light of the foregoing
authorities and considering that the defendants have expressed their conformity to the partition that was
made by the commissioner as shown in the sketch plan attached to the commissioner's report, said
defendants have no other alternative except to remove and demolish part of their house that has
encroached an area of 5 sq. meters of the land allotted to the plaintiffs. The parties appealed to the CA
who then certified the same to the SC.

Issue: W/N the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code relating to a builder in good faith is applicable
when the property involved was owned in common.

Held: The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner
builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land
that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership. However, when, as
in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants
obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa
and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was
coownership if good faith has been established. Applying the afore-said provision of the Civil Code, the
plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of
indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may
oblige the defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked
for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon,
then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to
the plaintiffs upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court
shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house,
at their own expense, if they so decide.

Spouses Nugid v CA

Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lo where he built an apartment building. For failure to pay
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to the spouses
Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC, which upheld
the spouses title but declared that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was
affirmed by the CA and the SC. On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment, the Nuguids became
the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot. As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved
for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building. The trial court, relying upon Article
546[1][7] of the Civil Code, ruled that the Spouses Nuguid were to reimburse Pecson for his construction
cost, however, the spouses Nuguid were entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the
lot and improvements. The RTC also directed Pecson to pay monthly rentals as paid by the tenants
occupying the apartment units. Pecson duly moved for reconsideration, the RTC issued a Writ of
Possession, directing the sheriff to put the spouses Nuguid in possession of the subject property with all
the improvements thereon and to eject all the occupants therein. The CA then affirmed the order of
payment of construction costs but rendered the issue of possession moot on appeal. Frustrated by this
turn of events, Pecson filed a petition for review before the SC. On May 26, 1995, the Court handed down
the decision remanding the same to the trial court and pointing out that Art 448 is not apposite to the
case at bar where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later lost ownership of
the land by sale, but may, however, be applied by analogy; the current market value of the improvements
should be made as the basis of reimbursement; (3) Pecson was entitled to retain ownership of the building
and, necessarily, the income therefrom; (4) the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial
court's determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering Pecson to account for the rentals. The value
to be determined by the trial court shall be forthwith paid by Spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid to Pedro
Pecson otherwise the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the apartment building until
payment of the required indemnity. On the basis of this Courts decision, Pecson filed a Motion to Restore
Possession and a Motion to Render Accounting, praying respectively for restoration of his possession over
the subject 256-square meter commercial lot and for the spouses Nuguid to be directed to render an
accounting under oath, of the income derived from the subject four-door apartment from November 22,
1993 until possession of the same was restored to him. During the determination of the indemnity, the
lower court ruled, among others, that the spouses pay the sum of P1,344,00 as reimbursement of the
unrealized income of Pecson during the time the spouses held the same. The CA affirmed the same but
reduced the amount to P280,000 based on the current market value.

Issue: W/N the Nuguids should reimburse Pecson for the benefits derived from the apartment building
during the time they possessed the same.

Held: Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment
building, they could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full,
based on the current market value of the property. Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option,
either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or
to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith
is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right
of retention until full reimbursement is made. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures
devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt
reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been
reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property) for those
necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. Given the
circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of
retention for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable
and equitable. The petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the
respondent during said period, without paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his
construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay for such benefits.

Spouses Alviola v CA

Facts: On April 1, 1950, Victoria Tinagan purchased two parcels of land which Victoria and her son Agustin
Tinagan then took possession of. Sometime in 1960, petitioner spouses Editha Alviola and Porferio Alviola
built a copra dryer and put up a store in a portion of the land owned by Victoria Tinagan. Victoria and
Agustin died in the year 1975 and thus on March 29, 1988, the private respondents as wife and children
of Agustin filed an action for recovery of possession against the petitioners. In their answer, the
petitioners contend, among others, that they own the improvements in the disputed properties which are
still public land and they are rightful possessors by occupation of the said properties for more than twenty
years. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents declaring them to be
absolute owners of the land in question and ordering the petitioners to vacate and surrender the
possession of the premises in question to the private respondents. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition.

Issues: W/N the petitioner spouses Alviola owned the land in didspute and the improvements thereon
W/N the petitioners spouses Alviola were in bad faith in possessing the property

Held: Petitioners' claim that the disputed properties are public lands is a factual issue. The private
respondents adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership and possession of the two (2)
parcels of land on portions of which petitioners built the copra dryer and a store. Private respondents' tax
declarations and receipts of payment of real estate taxes, as well as other related documents, prove their
ownership of the disputed properties. Concededly, petitioners have been on the disputed portions since
1961. However, their stay thereon was merely by tolerance on the part of the private respondents and
their predecessor-in-interest. The evidence shows that the petitioners were permitted by Victoria Tinagan
to build a copra dryer on the land when they got married. Considering that the petitioners' occupation of
the properties in dispute was merely tolerated by private respondents, their posture that they have
acquired the property by "occupation" for 20 years does not have any factual or legal foundation.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, there was bad faith on the part of the petitioners
when they constructed the copra dryer and store on the disputed portions since they were fully aware
that the parcels of land belonged to Victoria Tinagan. And, there was likewise bad faith on the part of the
private respondents, having knowledge of the arrangement between petitioners and Victoria Tinagan
relative to the construction of the copra dryer and store. Thus, for purposes of indemnity, Article 448 of
the New Civil Code should be applied. However, the copra dryer and the store, as determined by the trial
court and respondent court, are transferable in nature. Thus, it would not fall within the coverage of
Article 448. As the noted civil law authority, Senator Arturo Tolentino, "To fall within the provision of this
Article, the construction must be of permanent character, attached to the soil with an idea of perpetuity;
but if it is of a transitory character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the builder must remove
the construction. The proper remedy of the landowner is an action to eject the builder from the land."
The private respondents' action for recovery of possession was the suitable solution to eject petitioners
from the premises. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Sarmiento v Agana

Facts: While private respondent Ernesto Valentino was still courting his wife, private respondent Rebecca
Lorenzo, the latter's mother told the couple that they could build a residential house on a lot of 145 sqm,
being Lot D of a subdivision in Paraaque. In 1967, Ernesto did construct a residential house on such parcel
of land at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. It was probably assumed that the wife's mother was the
owner of the subject parcel and that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred to the spouses.
However, it turned out that the subject land had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santos, Jr.
who, on September 7, 1974, sold the same to petitioner Sarmiento. Sarmiento asked Ernesto and his wife
to vacate, to which on April 21, 1975, he filed an Ejectment suit against them. Sarmiento submitted the
deed of sale of the subject land in her favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00, while Ernesto
testified on the then cost of the residential house which would be from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, such
figures were not questioned by Sarmiento. The Municipal Court found that private respondents had built
the house in good faith, and, disregarding the testimony of Ernesto, that it had a value of P20,000.00. It
then ordered Ernesto and wife to vacate the subject land after Sarmiento has paid them the mentioned
sum of P20,000.00. The Ejectment suit was then elevated to the CFI where, after the submission of
memoranda, said Court rendered a modifying Decision under Article 448 of the Civil Code. The CFI
required Sarmiento, within 60 days, to exercise the option to reimburse Ernesto and wife the sum of
P40,000.00 as the value of the house, or the option to allow them to purchase the parcel of land for
P25,000.00. As Sarmiento did not exercise any of the two options within the indicated period, Ernesto was
then allowed to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 with the Court as the purchase price for the subject land.
Thus, the current petition.

Issue: W/N the CFI was correct in the options given to Sarmiento based on Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
Held: The Court agrees that Ernesto and his wife were builders in good faith in view of the peculiar
circumstances under which they had constructed the house. As far as they knew, the subject landwas
owned by Ernesto's mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably
be expected to later on give them the subject parcel of land. The challenged decision of respondent Court,
based on valuations of P25,000.00 for the land and P40,000.00, based on the testimony of Ernesto, for
the house, cannot be viewed as not supported by the evidence. The provision for the exercise by
petitioner Sarmiento of either the option to indemnify private respondents in the amount of P40,000.00,
or the option to allow private respondents to purchase the land at P25,000.00, in our opinion, was a
correct decision. As enunciated in Ignacio v Hilario, the owner of the building erected in good faith on a
land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option,
under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the
building. But he cannot as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such
option only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. Therefore,
the decision of the CFI is affirmed.

Benitez v CA

Facts: On January 22, 1986, petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a parcel of land with
improvement from the Cavite Development Bank, covered by TCT No. 41961. Subsequently, private
respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought lot covered by TCT No. 40155. On September 18,
1986, they filed with the RTC against petitioners for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion
of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which private respondents sold
the encroached portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of P1,000.00/sqm. On July 17, 1989, private
respondents purchased still another property, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey
was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property was
occupied by petitioners' house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. Private
respondents then filed with the MTC a case for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of SanJuan
decided in favor of the respondents and ordered the petitioners to vacate and surrender possession of
the subject premises, as well as to pay respondents P930 a month until they finally vacate. The RTC
affirmed the same as well as the CA which held the petitioners to be builders in bad faith and hence they
cannot demand that respondents sell the disputed portion; what the law provides is that the builders in
bad faith can be ordered to dismantle said structure at their own expense. In the interim period that
petitioners' structure remains, they should pay reasonable rent until they remove the structure.

Issues: W/N the portion of the private respondents land encroached by petitioners house can be
recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana.
 W/N the petitioners have a pre-emptive right to purchase the encroached portion of the private
respondents land

Held: That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not negate
the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This
is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is
deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any
contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. Possession can also
be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession of
land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical
occupation is not always necessary. In the case at bar, considering that private respondents are unlawfully
deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof
was made within the one- year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. Moreover, Article
448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's
choice. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per
Article 450 of the Civil Code. This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing."
There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the
landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court.
Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the
petitioners' offer to buy the encroached land. Assailed resolution by the CA is affirmed.

Rosales v Castelltort

Facts: Petitioner-spouses Rosales owned a parcel of land in Los Baos, Laguna, which is designated as Lot
17 of the Subdivision Plan. They found out that a house was being constructed on their lot, without their
knowledge and consent, by Respondent Miguel Castelltort. As it turns out, Miguel Castelltort and his wife
Judith had purchased a parcel of land in the subdivision, Lot 16, of the same Subdivision Plan, from Lina
Lopez-Villegas (through her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas). However, after a survey by the geodetic
engineer Augusto Rivera, Rene Villegas had pointed out the wrong lot which was instead the lot of
Petitioner-spouses as the parcel of land that Miguel Castelltort and wife had purchased. The confusion in
the identification of Lot 16 was eventually traced to the error committed by geodetic engineer Augusto
Rivera's employees in placing stone monuments on petitioners' property, instead of on Lot 16, the lot sold
to Castelltort, based on the survey made by the engineer in 1992. Negotiations for settlement began
where Villegas offered a larger lot, then offered to pay the purchase price of the land of the petitioner-
spouses, with legal interest, or even use the same a collateral for a financial loan. However, Petitioner-
spouses rejected the offers and instead directed Castelltort to stop construction and demolish his house
that he built on their lot. Petitioner-spouses then filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and preliminary injunction against Miguel and Judith
Castelltort. Respondents Castellort, in their answer, asserted that they were builders in good faith.
Intervenor Lina, represented by her son Villegas, supported the assertion of respondents in that they even
consulted her before commencing and construction thereon, having relied on the technical description of
the lot sold to them, Lot 16, which was verified by the geodetic engineer. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners and ordered respondent Castellorts to surrender possession of the land to which the RTC ruled
out good faith due to the fact that no building permit was secured nor was there well-founded belief
having relied on a contract to sell. The CA, however, reversed such ruling by applying Art. 448 and
remanding the case to the lower court. The CA held that the RTC should have focused on the issue of
whether respondent built, in good faith, the subject house without notice of the adverse claim of the
appellees and under the honest belief that the lot which he used in the construction belongs to him; as
respondent relied on the title which the intervenor showed to him which, significantly, has no annotation
that would otherwise show a prior adverse claim. Thus, as far as respondent Miguel Castellort is
concerned, his title over the subject lot, as well as the title of the intervenor thereto, is clean and untainted
by an adverse claim or other irregularities. Moreover, the CA also held that respondent Miguel Castellort
did in fact apply for a building permit and managed to secure a temporary one, as well as the fact of fault
on the part of the geodetic engineer which caused the error made by respondent Castellorts negates the
presence of bad faith. Hence the appeal.

Issue: W/N Castelltorts are builders in good faith and therefore is entitled to protection under Art. 448

Held: A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that
by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Article
527 of the Civil Code provides that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on
the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. In the case at bar, Lot 16 was sold by Lina, through her
attorney-in-fact Villegas, to Castelltort and a certain Elizabeth Cruz. While prior to the sale, Castelltort
acted in the manner of a prudent man and went to the Registry of Deeds to procure a certified true copy
of the TCT. The certified true copy bore no annotation indicating any prior adverse claim on Lot 16. The
records indicate that at the time Castelltort began constructing his house on petitioners' lot, he believed
that it was the Lot 16 he bought and delivered to him by Villegas. As correctly found by the CA, both
parties having acted in good faith at least until August 21, 1995, the applicable provision in this case is
Article 448 of the Civil Code. Under the foregoing provision, the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the
land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good
faith shall pay reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the
court must fix the terms thereof. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as
the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.

Moreover, possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly
or wrongfully. The good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner. Therefore, Castelltort's good faith ceased on August 21, 1995 when petitioners personally
apprised him of their title over the questioned lot. As held by the CA, should petitioners then opt to
appropriate the house, they should only be made to pay for that part of the improvement built by
Castelltort on the questioned property at the time good faith still existed on his part or until August 21,
1995 with said part of the improvement pegged at its current fair market value. In view of the foregoing,
the commencement of Castelltort's payment of reasonable rent should start on August 21, 1995 as well,
to be paid until such time that the possession of the property is delivered to petitioners, subject to the
reimbursement of expenses, that is, if such option is for petitioners to appropriate the house. If the option
chosen by petitioners is compulsory sale, however, the payment of rent should continue up to the actual
transfer of ownership. Petition is dismissed and the CA ruling is affirmed with modifications.
Kilario v CA

Facts: Jacinto Pada was the owner of a parcel of land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte denominated
as Cadastral Lot. No. 5581. He died intestate and he left six children, namely: Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta as his compulsory heirs. During his lifetime, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada,
obtained permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When
Feliciano died, his son Pastor, continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner
Verona Pada- Kilario, one of Pastor's children, lived in that house since 1960. But then, sometime in 1951,
the heirs of Jacinto entered into an extrajudicial partition of his estate with most of the heirs represented
by their children. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Leyte, and it was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter Marie, that Cadastral Lot 5581 was allocated. When Ananias died, his
daughter Juanita succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property. On June 14, 1978, Juanita sold to
Engr. Ernesto Paredes the right of her father in Cadastral Lot No. 5881, and on November 17, 1993, Maria
Pada also sold the right of her father to private respondent Silverio Pada. Private respondent then
demanded from petitioner spouses Verona Pada and Ricardo Kilario to vacate the premises, but they
refused. On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment against
petitioner spouses. However, On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amado Pada, one of the heirs of Jacinto,
executed a Deed of Donation transferring to Verona their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581 which subsequently petitioners used as defense. After trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of petitioner spouses. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision.

Issues: W/N the donation made to petitioner spouses is valid despite the extrajudicial partition made
W/N the petitioner spouses are entitled to the portion of land they occupied and the
improvements introduced by them.

Held: The Court ruled that the belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, the heirs of Amador
Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after 44 years of never having disputed the validity
of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced
no legal effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property but
rather, a different parcel in Sto. Nio St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and another in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom,
Leyte. The donation made by the heirs to petitioners of the subject property, was void for they were not
the owners thereof. At any rate it was too late for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects
of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches had equally set in. Moreover, considering
that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew
that their occupation of the premises may be terminated at any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in
good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply
only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good
faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to donate
the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time the improvements
were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of ownership
that may or may not be realized. More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is
void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such,
petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.

Florentino v CA

Coronel v IAC

Facts: Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land registered
under his name against the private respondents. sserts that at the time he purchased the subject parcel
of land, Merlan et al. were already occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will" and that despite
demands to vacate the premises, they failed and refused to move out from the land. Merlan et al. denied
that Coronel was the owner of the whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots occupied by them form
part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from their
deceased father Gabriel Merlan. Gabriel Merlan was one of the three heirs of Bernabela Lontoc, the
original owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate. They assert that the Merlan brothers together with
their two brothers and a sister never sold their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody and that it was
actually their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions, and thus Coronels claim of ownership of
the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is fraudulent, void, and without effect. Moreover, the Merlans
have always been in open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot throughout the years
from the first sale by their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-A. It was found that the respondents never sold their
1/3 share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate, that what their co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was
their 2/3 share of the same lot, and therefore Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party
defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. Consequently,
there was a mistake when the TCT issued to Mariano Manalo covered the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open, peaceful and adverse
possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even after when the first sale of the lot took place. The first time
they knew about Coronel's claim over the whole lot was when they were served a copy of his complaint.
The CFI ruled in favor of the respondents Merlan et al which was then affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now
contends that the claim of respondents of their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot No. 1950-A, 25 years after
the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio Manalo and more than five (5) years after the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or laches since an
action for annulment should have been brought within four (4) years counted from the date of the
registration of the instrument, as well as that he is a purchaser in good faith.

Issues: W/N The claim of respondents Merlan et al. to the land in question has been barred by the statute
of limitations, or by estoppel by laches.
W/N Petitioner Coronel is a purchaser in good faith and is thus entitled to the land in question

Held: Private Respondents Merlan et al. as lawful possessors and owners of the lot in question, their cause
of action falls within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession
is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed possession over a period of more than 25 years gave them a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and the effect of his own title. If at all, the respondents' right to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to
annul the TCT accrued only when they were made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at
that time that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run against them.
In the same manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert their right over 1/3 of the disputed property
since the facts show that the respondents have always been in peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of
the subject lot, exercising ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only when the petitioner
tried to remove them by virtue of his torrens title covering the entire Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was
only at this point that the respondents knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A
of the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted. Moreover, notwithstanding the good faith of petitioner,
the Court applied equitable considerations and petitioner Coronel is bound to recognize the lien in favor
of the respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title of the
land of his predecessors-in interest since there was a mistake in the inclusion of the 1/3 undivided portion
of the respondents over Lot No. 1950-A.

Caragay Layno v CA

Facts: Based on a relocation survey, the disputed parcel of land is a 3732 sqm portion of a bigger parcel
of land with a total area of 8752 sqm covered by OCT No. 63 which is in the name of Mariano de Vera had.
When de Vera passed away, his widow filed an inventory of all the deceaseds properties, including a
parcel of land in the poblacion of Calasiao, Pangasinan containing 5,417 sqm more or less. Due to
discrepancy in the area mentioned in the inventory from that in the title, respondent, nephew of De Veras
widow, Salvador Estrada went to the property and discovered that the northwestern portion,
subsequently surveyed to be 3,732 sqm, was occupied by petitioner-spouses Layno. Estrada demanded
that the Laynos vacate the disputed portion since it was titled in the De Veras name, but petitioners
refused, claiming that the land belonged to them, and before them, to Julianas father. Estrada filed suit
for recovery of the disputed portion, whereas Juliana claimed that the disputed portion was fraudulently
or mistakenly included in the title, creating an implied/constructive trust in her favor. During the trial, it
was found that Juliana Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA, were first cousins, both orphans,
who lived together under one roof in the care of a common aunt. Moreover, to substantiate the claim of
fraud in the inclusion of the disputed parcel Juliana, an unlettered woman, declared that during his
lifetime, De Vera, and whom she regarded as a father as he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax
Declaration of her land purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota application; that
relying on her cousin's assurances, she acceded to his request and was made to sign some documents the
contents of which she did not ever know because of her ignorance. Thereafter, she discovered the
fraudulent inclusion only in 1966 when Estrada informed her and sought to eject them. The trial Court
ruled in favor of Estrada and ordered Juliana to vacate the disputed land while the CA affirmed in toto the
decision which held that the action for reconveyance has prescribed and that the title of De Vera has
become indefeasible. Thus, the appeal to the SC

Issue: W/N there was fraud in the inclusion of the disputed parcel of land in the OCT of Mariano de Vera
W/N the action by petitioner to seek reconveyance or to quiet title has prescribed

Held: The evidence discloses that the disputed parcel was originally possessed openly, continuously and
uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by Juan Caragay, the deceased father of Juliana, and had been
declared in his name under a Tax Declaration beginning with the year 1921. Tacking the previous
possession of her father to her own, they had been in actual, open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession in the concept of owner for about 45 years, until said possession was disturbed in 1966 when
Estrada informed Juliana that the disputed parcel was registered in Mariano de Vera's name. It is also to
noted that for 20 years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when the suit for recovery
of possession was instituted, neither the deceased de Vera up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his
successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the disputed parcel. Taking
together that de Vera had failed to assert any rights over the disputed parcel during his lifetime, nor did
he nor his successors-in-interest possess it for a single moment, and that Juliana had been in actual,
continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all, the inescapable inference is that it had
been erroneously included in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by the fact that deducting the area of
the disputed parcel from the area in the OCT where the difference closely approximates the area indicated
in the inventory of property of de Vera. Thus, as it has been held that mere possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the property
described therein for he does not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally
included since a Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who have never
asserted any right of ownership over it, then Juliana, whose property had been wrongfully registered in
the name of another and had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can properly seek its
reconveyance. Moreover, prescription cannot be invoked against Juliana for the reason that as lawful
possessor and owner of the disputed parcel, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks
to quiet title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in
one's possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over a period of 52 years gave her a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and the effect on her own title. Besides, under the circumstances, Juliana's right to quiet title, to seek
reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accused only in 1966 when she was made aware of a claim
adverse to her own. It was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said to have
commenced to run against her. Decision reversed.

Calaca v Pingol

Facts: The spouses Camilo Calacala and Conchita Calacala, predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners, are
the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT T-21204. To secure the provisional release of an
accused in a criminal case, the spouses offered their aforementioned parcel of land as a property bond in
said case. However, for failure of the accused to appear at his scheduled arraignment, the CFI ordered the
bond forfeited in favor of the government, and, following the bondman's failure for the accuse to appear,
rendered judgment against the bond in the amount of P3,500.00. Thereafter, the court issued a Writ of
Execution where a public auction of the subject parcel of land was then held at which respondent Republic
was declared as the winning bidder, to which a Certificate of Sale issued in its favor. Unfortunately, Camilo
and Conchita failed to redeem within 1 year the subject property. Subsequently, petitioner heirs of the
deceased spouses, claiming ownership of the land, filed with the RTC a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Cancellation of Encumbrance on TCT No. T-21204 against respondents Republic and Sheriff Juan C.
Marquez. The respondent interposed a Motion to Dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action and
prescription of petitioners' right to redeem. However, petitioners contend that when respondent Republic
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, it thereby hypothetically admitted
all the allegations therein, specifically the averment that despite the lapse of nineteen (19) years,
respondent did not secure the necessary Certificate of Final Sale and Writ of Possession and failed to
execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Petitioners thus submit that the Republic's rights over
the land in question had either prescribed, been abandoned or waived. Moreover, petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous possession of the subject land and paying the realty
taxes thereon. The trial court granted the Republic's motion to dismiss. Hence the petition.

Issue: W/N petitioners have a right to quiet their title to the subject parcel of land due to prescription of
the part of respondent
Held: An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. Under Article
476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, a cloud is thereby casts on the complainant's title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet Title must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He
need not be in possession of said property. Therefore, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are
wanting in this case. To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any
independent writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic's failure to secure the
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession
over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. For one,
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they had over land in question from the very
moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic's failure
to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest had over the same not only because no provision of law or rule of jurisprudence was cited but
also since prescription does not lie against the government nor could it be bound or estopped by the
negligence or mistakes of its officials and employees and with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute,
the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the
title that is already vested in the purchaser. Thus, since petitioners are not holders of any legal title over
the property subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of
an action to quiet title is miserably wanting. Moreover, petitioners never put in issue the validity of the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale duly registered on 5 October 1982, which would make the second requisite of
an action to quiet title likewise absent herein. Lower court is affirmed.

Pingol v CA

Facts: Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223. On 17 February 1969, he executed a "DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND" in favor of
Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public. The one-half portion, designated
as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties prepared a subdivision plan
which was approved by the Land Registration Commission. Francisco Donasco immediately took
possession of the subject lot and constructed a house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the
monthly installments but was able to pay only up to 1972. On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died and
left a balance of P10,161.00 on the contract price, however, Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession
of Donasco's heirs. On 19 October 1988, private respondent heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for
"Specific Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against petitioner
spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol and averred that after the death of their father, they offered to pay
the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated legal rate of interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter
rebuffed their offer and has "been demanding for a bigger and unreasonable amount, in complete
variance to what is lawfully due and payable." They further alleged that the defendants were committing
"acts of forcible entry and encroachment" upon their land and asked that a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued to restrain the defendants from the acts complained of. In their answer, petitioners basically
assert that the action has prescribed and that the contract was deemed cancelled due to the default in
payment. However, the plaintiffs pointed out that there is no provision in the deed of sale for its
cancellation in case of default in the payment of the monthly installments and invoked Article 1592 of the
New Civil Code. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the contract is a contract to sell, that failure of full payment cancelled the same, and assuming
arguendo their cause of action has prescribed. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision and ruled
in favor of private respondents, where it held that the contract was a contract of sale which reveals the
clear intention of Vicente Pingol to part with the ownership of the one-half portion of the land by way of
an absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the agreed price was not a ground for the cancellation of the
sale; and that the plaintiffs' action is imprescriptible since it is akin to an action to quiet title to property
in one's possession.

Issue: W/N the contract is a contract of sale which transferred ownership to private respondents
W/N the cause of action of private respondents has prescribed
Held: in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a
contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment
of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full
payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach
but an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. A
perusal of their agreement leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies a contract of sale. The plain
and clear tenor of the "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A
PARCEL OF LAND" is that "the VENDOR hereby . . . SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale
the one-half (1/2) portion . . . to the VENDEE . . . his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest." That the
vendor, petitioner Vicente Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve
his title thereto until the full payment of the price. It was previously held that where there is no stipulation
in the deed that title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor
is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer
fails to pay within a fixed period is a deed of sale. Moreover, the contemporaneous acts of the parties of
subdividing the lot and having it approved, of the vendee since the time of the sale in possessing the lot
and constructing improvements thereon would show that an absolute deed of sale was intended. The
contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the buyer
upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made
upon the execution of the deed of sale while the actual delivery was effected when the private
respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A. The delivery of the object of
the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the same and he cannot recover the title unless
the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code. With regards the
issue of prescription although the private respondents' complaint before the trial court was denominated
as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title That a cloud has been cast on the
title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the fact that the title had been transferred to them
by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners
adamantly refused to accept the tender of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly insisted
that their obligation to transfer title had been rendered ineffective. A vendee in an oral contract to convey
land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements
thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title
to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe
him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. As held in jurisprudence an action to quiet title to
property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Judgement affirmed.
Heirs of Olviga v CA

Facts: This case started as an action filed in the RTC by private respondent heirs of Cornelio Glor against
petitioner heirs of Jose Olviga for reconveyance of a parcel of land. The disputed parcel of land in the
1950s was still forest land when Eutiquio Pureza and his father cleared and cultivated it. When the area
was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands surveyed the same in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since
then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey but only with respect to a one-
half-hectare portion, where the protest is of public record in the Bureau of Lands. In said document,
Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2 hectare
portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey of Pureza's Lot 13. In 1960, Eutiquio
Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his application having been acted upon, he
transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelio Glor in 1961 where neither the homestead application of
Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the Director of Lands.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights
of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family, who were the real and actual occupants of the
land. With respect to such registration, the following were found by the lower courts, that since Cornelio
Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was unschooled, they failed to follow up
Pureza's homestead application over Lot 13 in the cadastral proceedings, that no notice of the cadastral
hearing on the land was posted as confirmed by the testimony of petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself and
that Jose falsely omitted in his answer mention of the fact that other persons were in possession of, and
claiming adverse interest in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza, the former
occupant who sold his interests to private respondents' parent, Cornelio Glor, which as a result the
registration made was declared as uncontested in the name of Jose Olviga. Moreover, it was also
established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga Olila, were not innocent purchasers for value of
the land from their father, and have never been in possession while he Glors and their predecessors-in-
interest, Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio Pureza, were the ones found to be in possession of the property.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of private respondents ordering petitioners to reconvey the land in
dispute where the CA affirmed the same. The lower courts based its ruling that although it held that the
action for reconveyance is based on an implied trust which prescribes in 10 years, it ruled that the cause
of action accrued only from the time the private respondents learned of such title.

Issue: W/N the action for private respondents for reconveyance of the disputed land has already
prescribed.

Held: With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action
for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the
point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property,
since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. In the case at bar,
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possession of the property since
1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse claim of petitioners, who in 1988 disturbed their possession. All the
issues are factual. Decision of CA is affirmed.

Titong v CA
Facts: The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The
RTC ruled in favor of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true
and lawful owners of the disputed land, which was affirmed by the CA. On the part of petitioner, he claims
ownership of an unregistered parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes
in his name. He claims that private respondents forcibly entered a portion of the land and began plowing
the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents on the other hand averred that the disputed
property formed part land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest. Pablo Espinosa.
It was testified that Espinosa was an adjoining owner of the land bounded in between by the old Bugsayon
river. It was asserted by petitioner that he instructed his tenant to change the course of the old river and
direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of petitioners property, thus converting
the old river into a Riceland. On the part of respondent, he claims that petitioner sold this property to
Espinosa which was thereafter sold to private respondent by the heirs of Espinosa, to which in all the
conveyances in-between, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those
appearing in the original Tax Declaration under petitioners name. He denied that petitioner had diverted
the course of the Bugsayon River. During the trial it was proved that two 2 surveys were made of the
disputed property where the first was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey
ordered by the lower court, to which there were certain discrepancies between the two surveys. Thus,
contrary to petitioners allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was
actually claiming 5.9789 hectares. On the other hand, the lot pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an
area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him.
Issue: W/N an action to quieting of title by petitioner would prosper
W/N petitioner has ownership of the disputed parcel of land
Held: the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly
dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under Art
476 where a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or interest in real
property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these
grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be
considered valid for the same action. Thus, since the complaint failed to allege that an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding beclouded the plaintiffs title over the property involved and where
petitioner merely alleged that the respondents forcibly entered the land and plowed the same, such acts
alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but not one for quieting of title.
Moreover, based on the issues and the records, the case is a boundary dispute which cannot be settled in
an action for quieting of title since the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property would be
tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole
issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes
a cloud upon the petitioners interest or title in and to said property. This can only be done in an
adversarial proceeding such as in the case of an action of forcible entry. Even assuming arguendo that the
case as a valid one for quieting of title, still it must fail since the findings of fact of the CA are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. The lower courts correctly ruled that when petitioner sold, ceded, transferred
and conveyed the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession
pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosas rights
of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. In the case
at bar, petitioners claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he has long abdicated his rights over
the land when he sold it to private respondents predecessor-in-interest. Moreover, the land may not also
be acquired by petitioners by acquisitive prescription since have not satisfactorily met the requirements
of good faith and just title. As aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiffs admitted acts of
converting the boundary line Bugsayon River into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof
were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore tantamount to bad
faith. Extraordinary acquisitive prescription may not also lie since petitioners alleged possession in 1962
up to September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned only 21 years.
Lastly, suffice it to say that although petitioner anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan
prepared upon his request, a survey under a proprietary title is not a conveyance and since it not a
conveyance, it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Therefore, petitioner cannot base his claim on the
survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer
only to a delineation of possession. Also, a tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence
of ownership, it is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. CA is affirmed.
Rumarte v Hernandez

Facts:

On September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo Rumarate and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for
reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title with damages against respondent heirs of the late
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed
and cultivated by his godfather, Santiago Guerrero who in 1929 orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No.
379 to Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the CFI recognizing Santiagos rights over Lot
No. 379. In 1960, Santiago executed an quit-claim ratifying the transfer of his rights over the said lot. In
1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, respondents' predecessors-
in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on
November 11, 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta. After the death of the spouses, respondents executed a deed of partition over the subject
lot and were issued new TCTs. Respondent Joaquin Hernandez testified that in 1964, he accompanied his
father Cipriano in inspecting the lot and thereafter only visited the land twice. He added that his siblings
had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it off due to the NPA.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that since the latter possessed the land
in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners thereof by acquisitive prescription after
the lapse of 10 years. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to respondents' parents in 1964, the former no
longer had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said respondents. The CA then
reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No. 379,
either by donation or acquisitive prescription and that even assuming that the property was truly donated
by Santiago to Teodulo said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation
which require the donation and the acceptance thereof be embodied in a public instrument The appellate
court thus surmised that since it was not established that Santiago donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it
follows that the latter also failed to prove that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the
concept of an owner, a vital requisite before one may acquire title by acquisitive prescription. Even
assuming arguendo the CA also held that his cause of action is now barred by laches because he filed an
action only in 1992 notwithstanding knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.

Issues: W/N petitioner spouses can claim ownership over the disputed parcel of land
W/N petitioners action to quiet title is barred by prescription
Held: In an action for quieting of title, the court determines the respective rights of the parties so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. For an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action as
provided by Art. 477; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy as provided by Art. 476. Moreover, it was held that title to real property refers to that upon
which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by
which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment
of the property. In the instant case, the Court finds that Teodulo's open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested him
and his heirs title over the said lot since when the conditions specified in the Public Land Act are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the public domain.
The proceedings only confirming such conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment
the required period of possession became complete. Although the oral donation in 1929 as well as the
1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the formalities of
donation, they nevertheless explain Teodulo and his family's long years of occupation and cultivation of
said lot and the nature of their possession thereof. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private
property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez
and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not acquire ownership over
Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their name are void. Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith since Santiago was not residing in Lot No.
379 at the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and maintain an 18-hectare
land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses to further inquire who was actually tilling
the luland. On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed
property. Rather it is respondents who are barred by prescription since from 1970 up to the filing of
petitioners' complaint in 1992, or after 22 years, respondents never bothered to assert any right over Lot
No. 379. Decision of CA reversed.