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G.R. No.

110592; January 23, 1996

PEOPLE VS. VELASCO

FACTS:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was
appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling shabu,
in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. 6425).

Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco was
caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more
decks were found in her pockets.

Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against her
since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly,
appellant questions the RTCs jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her
possession.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired
through a warrantless arrest.

2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when
done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be
arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be justified
under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust
team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.

2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425,
agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu
involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision
correccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken from the medium of
prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2)

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months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the
range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.

R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows
that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.
Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.
RTCs jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the new
legislation.

At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over
the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court
(RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425
before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement
of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of
inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.

Sanchez v. DemetriouCruz, J. | November 9, 1993 | Arrest (generally)

SUMMARY:
Mayor Sanchez was accused of being involved in the crimes of rape and killing. An invitation to
the preliminaryinvestigation was served on him, and it is by virtue of that invitation that he was
taken to Camp Vicente Lim for questioning, and itwas found out that he was the perpetrator of
the act. Formal charges were subsequently filed. Petitioner assails validity of arrest inthe form of
invitation. Court held that original arrest (invitation) was illegal, but subsequent issuance of
warrant cures its defect.

DOCTRINE:
Filing of charges and the issuance of corresponding warrant of arrest against a person invalidly
detained will curedefect of detention

FACTS:
On July 28, 1993, pursuant to the request of the PresidentialAnti-Crime Commission, the Panel
of State Prosecutors of theDepartment of Justice conducted a preliminary investigationwith
regard to the charges to be filed against several persons,including petitioner Mayor Antonio
Sanchez. Petitioner, alongwith others, was alleged to be involved in the killing of oneAllan
Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmienta.Petitioner was not present during the
preliminary investigation but was represented by his counsel, instead.Thereafter, he was served
an invitation on August 13, 1993 tothe investigation in Camp Vicente in Laguna. At
theconfrontation, he was identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPOIII Vivencio Malabanan,
who both executed confessionsimplicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and

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the killing of Gomez. He was then put on arrest status and was taken to DOJ. Following the
hearing, warrant of arrestwas issued by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas in connection withthe cases
for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, ofR.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards forPublic Officials and Employees) Sanchez was forthwith takento the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame. Respondent prosecutors filed complaint in RTC Manila for the
crime ofspecial complex crime of rape with homicide for the rape andkilling of Sarmienta,
aggravated with the killing of Gomez.Subsequently, warrant of arrest was served to six other
accused.

ISSUE/S:

WON the arrest of Mayor Sanchez was valid


YES
RULING/RATIO:
August 13, 1993 illegal detention (invitation constituted aninvalid arrest) was cured by
subsequent issuance of a validwarrant of arrest.Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court defines
arrest as thetaking of a person into custody in order that he may be boundto answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual
restraint ofthe person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to thecustody of the person
making the arrest.Application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,required.

It is enough that there be an intent on the part ofone of the parties to arrest the other and
an intent onthepart of the other to submit, under the belief andimpression that submission
is necessary.. Invitationcamefrom a high-ranking military official and the investigation
ofSanchez was to be made at a military camp. Command or anorder of arrest that the petitioner
could hardly he expected todefy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he wentwithout
protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only)with the officers who had come to fetch him.
Note that underR.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation"are applicable
even to a person not formally arrested butmerely "invited" for questioning.
Petitioner was right when he contended that such arrest wasnot under those included in valid
warrantless arrest underSection 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court because only thetestimonies
were relied upon regarding the identifcation of petitioner, so that arresting officer had
no personal knowledgenor were present during the commision of the crime. Neither ithas just
been committed because arrest took place 46 daysafter the crime was perpetrated. However,
even if the originalarrest was illegal, the RTC later on acquired jurisidticonon his person
by virtue of the warrant issued to him andco-accused.
Even on the assumption that no warrant wasissued at all, the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdictionover the person of the petitioner.
Filing of charges, and theissuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against aperson
invalidly detained will cure the defect of thatdetention or at least deny him the right to be
releasedbecause of such defect.
Other points:
1. There were seven informations charging seven separatehomicides because the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of
thespecial complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, therewill be as many crimes of rape

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with homicide as there arerapes committed.2.Petitioners contention that he wa not accorded
roght to present counter-affidavit was negated by the fact that hiscounsel manifested that his
client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit. And despite the reminder reminder

from the court that he could still present such, he still did not do so.
SAAVEDRA vs DOJ

FACTS:
Owners of Pine Philippines, Inc. (PPI) and respondent Gregorio Ramos, sold their
shares of stock to petitioner Saavedra. AMemorandum of Agreement, which
contained an automatic rescission clause, was executed to evidence the
transaction.Petitioner withheld payment for the reason that sellers failed to comply
with their warranties, however the balance wasdeposited in escrow to be released
once the warranties were complied with.Petitioners filed in behalf of PPI a verified
civil complaint for damages against private respondent alleging that he
(petitionerwas the President and principal stockholder of the company. Respondent
questioned petitioners capacity to sue in behalf ofPPI claiming that petitioner
ceased to be its president when the sale of PPI stocks was automatically
rescinded.After executing a document entitled Rescission of MoA, Ramos filed a
case with the SEC praying that the rescission bedeclared valid and legal. During
the pendency of the case in SEC, private respondent filed a criminal case for
perjury againstpetitioner alleging that petitioner perjured himself when he declared
in the verification of the complaint that he was thePresident of PPI. In his answer,
petitioner contended that since the issues of ownership and automatic rescission
were still pending unresolvedin the SEC, there was no basis to charge that he
asserted a falsehood in claiming to be President. Despite this, Provincialfiscal
found a prima facie case for perjury against him. Petitioner sought a review with
the DOJ, which also upheld the findingof probable cause for perjury.
ISSUE:
W/N DOJ should have deferred the proceedings since the issue was still pending
with the SEC.
HELD:
YES. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not
determine a controversy involving a question whichis within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal having been placed within its special competence. In such
cases thejudicial process is suspended pending referral to the administrative body
for its view on the dispute.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan, Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO and VILLA
SURATOS
G.R. No. 88232 February 26, 1990

Facts:
Alma T. Aggabao filed with the RTC, an information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage. Upon
being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty. During the trial,
private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the RPC is punishable with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which is equivalent to
imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,
and not of the RTC
The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the RTC
has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable
penalty on the concubine has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years.

Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction after the prosecution has rested its case and the defense has started
to present its evidence.
2. whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime
of concubinage.

RULING
1. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this
case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did not
fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss

2. That a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts. This is so because in the scale of penalties outlined in Art.
71, destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of
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1948 [Republic Act No. 296], crimes punishable with arresto mayor are within the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that crimes punishable with destierro
are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its conclusion that
destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and therefore cognizable by the inferior
courts.
(Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993)

Facts:

Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed
at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash
bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but
she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional
release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it
issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she
made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would
be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order
considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been
arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold departure order was also
issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the hold
departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.

Issues:

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any
motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

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Held:

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for
the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court
therebyacquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The
voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplishedeither by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion
to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of


respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash
Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in
the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Santiago cannot
now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively
estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of
the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she
filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the


presiding courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that
she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studiesabroad.
We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice
of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the
hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of

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respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the


orders and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herselfamenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally
be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with
pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same
courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

People vs. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613

FACTS:
Mayor Leroy Brown of Basilan City and several detectives
were
charged with murder for the killing of Yakan Aw
a l i n T e b a g . Mayor Brown ordered his men to arrest
and detain Tebag! "He was also subjected to severe
torture during the course of his investigation held at a
Police substation which later resulted to his death. The
Mayor and his men then brought him to a nearly isolated
field to make it appear that Tebag had been killed during an
encounter.

Issue:
Wa.s the offense was committed in relation to their Public
office?

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Decision:
Yes. The offense was committed in relation to their Public
Office.While Public Office is not an element of the crime of
murder, the
offense charged in the amended informa
t i o n i s intimately connected
with their respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, thoug
h i m p r o p e r o r irregular of their official functions. Indeed
they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co -defendants
of M a y o r B r o w n o b e y e d h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s b e c a u s e h
e w a s t h e i r superior officer as Mayor of Basilan City.

People Vs. Santiago

FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy
by striking himwith an automobile that he was driving. Santiago
was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence,
Santiago does not agree with the courts sentence,questioning the
constitutionality of act no. 2886 amending order no. 58 stating
thatall prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the
U.S... Act no. 2886stating that all prosecutions for public offenses
shall be in the name of thePhilippine islands.

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ISSUE:
Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the
constitution of thestate?
HELD:
NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the
constitution of thestates, but it is left in the hand of the legislature,
so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.It is limited
to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its provision
theeffect of law in criminal matters.In pursuance of the
constitution of the US each state has the authority, under itspolice
power rule to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules
of criminalprocedure. The delegation to our government needs no
demo, the crimes committed w in ourterritory even before sec 2
of general orders no.58 was amended, were prosecutedand punish
jurisdiction .Act no. 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was
filed may 10 1920. The silenceof congress regarding those laws
amendatory of the said general orders must beconsidered as an act of
the approval.

PEOPLE V. REPIROGA
17 May 2001
Facts
:A was a member of the Philippine Army. A complaint was filed before the
Officeof the Provincial Prosecutor charging A with murder. The Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor c o n d u c t e d a p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n a
n d l a t e r r e c o m m e n d e d t h e f i l i n g o f a n information.
Issues
: Should the preliminary investigation be conducted by an
authorized military officer
before any information could be filed against AFP members? Does the
authorityto file charges against him lies within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman?
Held
:No. There is nothing in Art. 71 of CA 408 that exclusively vests the
authority on amilitary officer to conduct preliminary investigation in cases
involving members of theAFP. It simply mentions an investigating officer
who shall examine available witnessesrequested by the accused, without
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reference to his being a military officer. Given the foregoing, the contention of
A that the authority to file charges againsthim lies within the jurisdiction of
the Office of the Ombudsman cannot be upheld. Under AO 8, the power of
the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation over a militarycase
may be exercised together with any provincial or city prosecutor or his
assistantssince all prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman
prosecutors. It is only in theprosecution of cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan where the Ombudsman enjoysexclusive control and
supervision.

MANANTAN V. CA
350 SCRA 387 (Jan. 2001)
Facts:
A was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. A was
acquitted.Complainant appealed the civil aspect of the judgment. CA found
A civilly liable. Acontended that this amounted to double jeopardy.

Issue:
Whether A was placed in double jeopardy.

Held:
No. For double jeopardy to exist, the ff. elements must be established: (a) a 1st
jeopardy must have attached prior to the 2nd; (2) the 1st
jeopardy must have terminated;and (3) the 2nd jeopardy must be for the same offense
as the first. In this case, what waselevated to the CA was the civil aspect of the criminal
case. A was not charged a new with a 2nd offense identical to the 1st. There was no
2nd jeopardy to speak of; As claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Sapiera vs CA
Sapiera vs Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999]

FACTS:
Petitioner Remedios Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, was issued by one Arturo de
Guzman checks as payment for purchases he made at her store. She used said
checks to pay for certain items she purchased from the grocery store of Ramon
Sua. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for
payment the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already
closed. Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both
failed to pay the value of the checks. Petitioner was acquitted in the charge of estafa
filed against her but she was found liable for the value of the checks.

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ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable for the value of the checks even if she signed the subject
checks only for the identification of the signature of Arturo de Guzman.

RULING:
Petitioner is liable for the value of the checks. As she (petitioner) signed the subject
checks on the reverse side without any indication as to how she should be bound
thereby, she is deemed to be an unqualified indorser thereof. Every indorser who
indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course that, on
due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, according to its tenor, and that if it
be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay
the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled
to pay it.

Yakult Phils. v. CA
G.R. No. 91856, October 5, 1990
Gancayco, J.

Facts:
In 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de
la FuenteStreet, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by
Yakult Philippines anddriven by its employee, Larry Salvado. The latter was
charged with the crime of recklessimprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in
an information that was filed with the thenCity Court of Manila. In 1984, a complaint for
damages was filed by Roy Camaso representedby his father, David Camaso,
against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision
wasr e n d e r e d i n t h e c i v i l c a s e o r d e r i n g d e f e n d a n t s Y a k u l t a n d S a l v a d
o t o p a y j o i n t l y a n d severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses
for medical services and hospital bills,attorneys fees and the costs of the suit.
Issue:
whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper evenif
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action
Held:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions When a criminal action
isi n s t i t u t e d , t h e c i v i l a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i s i m p l i e
d l y instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civilaction,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil actionprior to the criminal
action.
xxx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence an
d u n d e r circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make

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such reservation. T h e c i v i l a c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f c i v i l l i a b i l i t y i s i m p l
iedly instituted with thecriminal action unless the offended party wai
ves the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. It is also provided that the
reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording
theoffended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In this case,
the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it
separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action. However, thecivil action in this case was filed in court before the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the
judge presiding on the criminal case was dulyinformed, so that in the disposition of the
criminal action no damages was awarded.

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF


APPEALS
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.

FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its
owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI)
figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in
Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in
the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging
the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and
Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner
SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a
motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as
actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)

ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?

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2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a
criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the
criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private
prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.

RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution
of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that
view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil
Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum
that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for
this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules
concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words
of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt
from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the
same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC
merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe
the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.

Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220

Facts:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the Big Bang Sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and

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private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not
state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuelas act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since
the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners filing of the complaint
is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine
qua non for the employers subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion
praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the
private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.

Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Contrary to the theory
of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.
(2) No. The term physical injuries in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code.
It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted
homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted,
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with
reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part

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of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B.


DAWAY, in his capacityas Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents. (G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21,
2004)

Facts:
The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes
Manufactuirng Corporation,allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment
product using the trademark Caterpillar to the prejudice of Caterpillar,
Inc., private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case
withthe RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the offense chargedcontending that the case should be filed with the
MTC because violation of unfair competition is penalized with
imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.
Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation
of intellectual propertyrights?

Ruling of the Court:


The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair
competition shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate
jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplatedin Section 163 of
IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of
theTrademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement
of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and
false description or representation, is lodged with theCourt of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law
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and IPC inrelation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall
prevail. Actions for unfair competitiontherefore should be filed with the
RTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO


BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y
CORDOVA
236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with
rape before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-
3217). He was convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992, at the National
Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in
a resolution dated May 20, 1992.

Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?

Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto insenso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding

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the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.

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