The Importance of being Conceptual

Author(s): Dale Jamieson

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Winter, 1986), pp. 117-
123
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 DALE JAMIESON

The Importance of Being Conceptual

AESTHETICIANSand conceptual artists have been colors, were willing to grant the request, but
courtingeach other. Aestheticiansoften adduce only if large fees were remittedin advance. The
conceptualpieces as counterexamplesto this or Brooklyn Museum, which regards itself as be-
that, or as illustrationsof some thesis or an- sieged by the communityin which it is located,
other.1 Conceptualists often quote Wittgen- refused Celender's request for "security
stein, Kant, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Wittgenstein, reasons." One featurewas sharedby almost all
and other philosophic notables. The words of the responses: they were so humorless,
"epistemology," "ontology," and "solips- standardized,and ponderous in tone that they
ism" are as ubiquitous in the corpus of the would have made any bureaucratproud.
conceptualistsas in the manifestos of the meta- A more subtle failure to understandis exem-
physicians.2 "Art After Philosophy" is even plified by the remarksof an Arforum reviewer
the title of one very influential conceptualist in 1974. The reviewer cites Celender's refer-
statement.3 ence to Ariforum as "Most Predictable Art
But before this marriageis consummated, it Journal" (in Celender's The Olympics of Art
should be made plain what exactly each partner [19741). The reviewerthen commentsthat "just
is getting. Here and now I shall performhalf of the fact my review finds itself on these pages
this needed task; I shall try to say what concep- does away with such a restricting classi-
tual art has to offer to aesthetics. My conclu- fication."4 But of course, the utter predict-
sion: very little. ability of its willingness to coopt criticism and
1. What is conceptual art? One way of ap- then to congratulateitself for doing so, is just
proaching this question is by considering the what made Ariforum the "Most PredictableArt
work of someone who is often classed as a Journal" in its halcyon days.
conceptual artist. The work of Don Celender Don Celender's work is fun and witty, but is
providesthe makingsof an especially illuminat- it conceptualart?And if it is, what does it mean
ing example. to say that it is? These questions will seem
Celender's work has been receiving critical trivial to some and gripping to others.
attention for about ten years. Some remarks Looking at the 10 years of reviews is quite
occur again and again and again. Celender's suggestive. The early reviews refer to Celender
work is fun. Celender's work is witty. as a conceptualist. Some refer to him as a
Celender's work satirizes the artworldin ways "Minnesota conceptualist." Around 1976, ex-
that its agents often fail to understand. The pressions like "quasi-conceptualist" begin to
documentation of Celender's Museum Piece creep into the discourse. And recently, neither
provides some good examples of this latter "conceptualist" nor "quasi-conceptualist"oc-
claim. cur with much frequency. What accounts for
In 1975 Celender wrote to more than seventy this shift in the language of the critics? One
museums around the world, requesting photo- explanation is this: Celender's work evolved
graphs of their loading docks. The Princeton from its conceptual origins through a quasi-
and Yale museums, true to their Ivy League conceptualphase, and is now located elsewhere
in the topology of the artworld. That's one
DALEJAMIESON is associate professor of philosophy at possible explanation.But here is one thatI think
the Universityof Colorado, Boulder. is more convincing: the shift in the critical
? 1986 The Journalof Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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118
vocabulary with respect to Celender's art re-
flects changes in the fads and fancies of the
artworldratherthan reflecting significantstylis-
tic changes in Celender's work. What I am
suggesting is that there has been no clear and
consistent use of the expression "conceptual
art" in the writings of the critics. Ratherthey
have used this expression as a buzzword much
as they have used "phenomenological," "ex-
istential," and "reductionist."To put the point
bluntly,the use of the expressionconceptualartis
largely to be explained by reference to mere
sociological factors, in the most pathological
sense of sociological.
2. The most convincingway to makethis case is
simply to display what some prominentcritics
have said about conceptual art. Here is one
example:
Conceptual art emphasized the elimination of the art
object.5
What is meant here by elimination? Consider
this. Stool pigeons are often "eliminated" in
gangster movies. At the opening credits the
stool pigeon exists. By the closing credits the
stool pigeon has been rubbed out. Perhapsthe
artobject is like the stool pigeon in this respect;
it has been rubbed out by the conceptualists.
This elegant explanation is implausible, how-
ever. There are at least three volumes chock-
full of descriptions of conceptual art objects.6
Postcards, electromagneticfields, and thoughts
have little in common with the art objects of
Rembrandtand Mondrian. Still they are ob-
jects, and there seems to be no reason to deny
that they are art objects.7 Furthermore,one
might argue that were there no conceptual art
objects there would be no conceptual art.
There are other difficulties in the exhibited
passage. We are told that conceptualart "em-
phasizes" the eliminationof the artobject. Is the
suggestionthatall art"eliminates"the artobject,
but only conceptualart "emphasizes"the "elim-
ination"?I hope not. The claim that conceptual-
ists "eliminate" the art object is nonsense; to
suppose that nonconceptualists"eliminate" the
art object as well, is nonsenseon stilts.
The same writer who tells us that "Concep-
tual Art emphasizes the elimination of the art
object" classes as conceptual, works that
present "the esthetic aspects of letters, words,
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JA M IES ON
language."8 How can conceptualists "empha-
size the elimination of the art object" and
present "the esthetic aspects of letters, words,
language"? Aren't letters and words objects?
Aren't letters and words, in some environ-
ments, art objects? Unfortunately,these remain
mysteries to the uninitiated.
3. Another influential writer tells us that
"Works of Idea Art [his name for conceptual
art]frequentlydid not exist as objects."9 On the
very next page he discusses what he takes to be
an example of a conceptual piece-Michael
Heizer's earthwork, Circumflexl/Isolated Mass.
The authordisplays a photographof this piece,
informingus that its dimensions are 120' x 1' x
1'. There is a dilemma here. Either this huge
configurationof earth is not an object, or it is
one of the "infrequent" conceptual pieces that
is an object. The former alternative is clearly
untenable. The author must believe that
Circumflex/Isolated Mass is one of the
"infrequent" conceptual pieces that is an ob-
ject. But this should give us pause. Why should
earthworks be classed as conceptual pieces?
And what putative criterion of the conceptual
would so class them?
4. Sometimes conceptualart is characterizedby
the attitudes or intentions or feelings of its
practitioners.Perhapsthe attitudesor intentions
or feelings of the earthworkersare of a piece
with those of the paradigmconceptualists. Our
authorwrites that conceptual artists "were en-
gaged in an emphatic rejectionof the commer-
cial and consumer aspects in art."10 Another
writer remarks that "the shift from object to
concept denotes disdain for the notion of
commodities."11Unfortunately,this account is
inadequateas a characterizationof the attitudes
or intentions or feelings of even the paradigm
conceptualists. As early as 1971, Barry,
Kosuth, and Hueblerexhibited underthe spon-
sorshipof Leo Castelli. In 1972 Walterde Maria
publisheda photographof his six dealers, along
with a statementthanking them for their work
on his behalf. Surely publishingphotographsof
one's dealers and exhibitingunderthe sponsor-
ship of Leo Castelli are inconsistent with "an
emphatic rejection of the commercial and con-
sumer aspects in art." The fact that de Maria's
gesture was widely viewed as a conceptual
piece hardlyhelps matters.Why not so construe
Castelli's promotion of Barry, Kosuth, and
The Importanceof Being Conceptual 119

Huebler? But then, Castelli would be the con- Three kinds of conceptual art can be distin-
ceptualist, and a very rich one at that. guished. In the first, the art object is impercep-
5. Sometimes we are told that "an essential tible but its existence is contingent on its
aspect of Conceptual Art is its self- perceptible expression. In the second, the art
reference."'2 The idea seems to be that object is imperceptibleand it has no perceptible
expression, but its existence is contingent on its
Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if apprehensionby some audience. In the third,
viewed within their context-as art-they provide no the artobject is imperceptible,it has no percep-
information whatsoever about any matter of fact. A tible expression, and it need not be apprehended
work of art is a tautology .. .13
by an audience.
8. The first kind of conceptual art, the kind in
But we are also told that "many conceptualists which the art object is imperceptible but its
attemptedto relate art activity to broad social, existence is contingent on its perceptible ex-
ecological, and intellectual concerns."14 How pression, was the first to be developed. Harry
can an art of self-reference, an art that provides Flynt, who coined the phrase "concept art" in
only "tautologies," be related to "broad so- 1962, wrote:
cial, ecological, and intellectual concerns"?
Unfortunately, these are more mysteries con-
signed to us by the critics. Concept art is first of all an artof which the materialis
Confusion is endemic in the literature of concepts, as the materialof music is sound. From the
philosophy of language we learn that a concept may as
conceptualart. Thatmuch is clear. But it is time well be thought of as the "intension of a name."15
to take a constructiveturn.
6. We should notice first that although, in form
and function, the expression "conceptual art" The philosophy of language to which Flynt
seems to resemble the expressions "medieval refers seems to be that associated with Rudolf
art," "German art," and " constructivistart," Carnap.Accordingto Carnap,most expressions
it is really quite different. "Medieval art" have an extension and an intension. Those
refers to art made in the medieval period, objects in the world to which an expression
"German art" to art made in Germany or by refers is its extension. The meaning of an
Germans, and "constructivistart" to art made expression, by virtue of which it refers, is its
in the constructivist style. But conceptual art intension.16 According to Flynt, conceptual
was neither made in the time, nation, nor style pieces are intensions. Consider an example of
of the Conceptual. How, then, does "concep- what he might mean.
tual" operate in the expression, "conceptual Suppose that the intension of "horse" is a
art"? conceptual piece, on Flynts view. Since the
7. One plausible view is that the word "con- intension of "horse" is an abstractentity, it is
ceptual" tells us about the epistemological and imperceptible.But had the word "horse''never
ontological status of certain artworks. On this been uttered, its intension would have never
view, conceptual artworksare different in kind existed. Thus, the existence of the intension of
from other artworks, and our means of appre- "horse" is contingenton its perceptibleexpres-
hending them are different also. In developing sion.
this idea I will focus on the epistemology of Flynt's views have been embraced in a
conceptual art ratherthan its ontology. slightly modified form by the British Art-Lan-
A survey of the art that has been called guage group, and by the American editor of
conceptual shows that most concerns the per- Art-Language,Joseph Kosuth. In an editorialin
ceptible, the imperceptible, and the relation the first issue of Art-Language,TerryAtkinson
between the perceptible and the imperceptible. considers whetheror not his editorial is itself a
Sometimes it is said that conceptual art con- conceptual piece. That it is seems to be his
cerns the relation between concepts and their conclusion. Kosuth makes the following re-
manifestations. And sometimes it does. Con- marks while discussing a piece that apparently
cepts are usually thought of as imperceptible; consists of a series of photostatsof a dictionary
their manifestations, as perceptible. definition of water.

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120
I didn't consider the photostat a work of art; only the
idea was art. The words in the definition supplied the
art information;just as the shape and color of a work
could be considered its art information.17
The necessity of a perceptibleexpression of an
imperceptibleart object has been arguedby the
Art-Language group and by Mel Bochner. In
1968 Lucy Lippard and John Chandler pub-
lished an article in Art International entitled,
"The Dematerializationof Art." The Art-Lan-
guage group objected to the title. They argued
that there is no dematerializedart, only art that
is directly material, and art that "produces a
materialentity as a necessary by-productof the
need to recordthe idea."18 Bochnerobjectedto
the name "conceptual art," arguing that "no
thought can exist without sustaining
support."19
The view, thatbits of languagein appropriate
contexts provide examples of imperceptibleart
objects whose existence is contingent on their
perceptible expressions, rests on certain views
concerninglanguageas well as on certainviews
concerning art. Bluntly put, it rests on what
Quine calls "the myth of the museum."20The
myth of the museum is the view that each word
has a meaning, and that the meaning is an
abstractentity. Quine argues forcefully against
such a view. If Quine is right in arguing that
there are no abstractentities that are meanings,
it would seem to follow that there are no
conceptualpieces of the sortthatKosuthandthe
Art-Language group have described, although
there might be other instances of this first kind
of conceptual art.
9. The second kind of conceptual art, the kind
in which the art object is imperceptibleand it
has no perceptible expression but its existence
is contingent on its apprehension by some
audience, is exemplified in the work of Adrian
Piper. Consider her discussion of Aretha
Franklinpiece, first version.
I listened to Aretha's version of "Respect" until I had
it completely memorized, and could hear the entire
song in my mind at will. Sometimes it "turned itself
on" without my willing it. However, the piece was
performedonly at those times when I did will it. The
piece consisted of my listening to the song in my mind
and simultaneouslydancing to it. I did a mixtureof the
Bugaloo, the Jerk, the Lindy, the Charlestonand the
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JAMIESON
Twist, with a high degree of improvisation.2'
The piece is imperceptible because, literally
speaking, no one hearsthe song; and the song is
an important, even crucial, part of the piece.
For if Piper would have performed the dance
she describesbut not while listening to Aretha's
version of "Respect," a different piece would
have resulted. But although Aretha Franklin
piece, first version is imperceptible, it does
have an audience. Piper is the audience. She
cannot avoid apprehendingthe piece while she
is performingit. She is simultaneouslythe artist
and audience.
10. The thirdkind of conceptualart, the kind in
which the art object is imperceptible,in which
it has no perceptibleexpression and it need not
be apprehendedby an audience, is best exem-
plified by sketching the developmentof Robert
Barry.
In 1967 Barry exhibited 2" x 2" "paintings"
that consisted of wall space enclosed by a
frame. He also exhibited very thin hanging
wires and nylon sculpturesthat were hung far
above the ground. They were extremely diffi-
cult to see and even harderto photograph. In
January, 1968, he exhibited several carrier
wave pieces, including 88mc Carrier Wave
(FM), and 1600kc Carrier Wave (AM). Carrier
waves are imperceptible, though they can be
enclosed in a room and their form is affected by
other objects in the room. Those who attended
the show interactedwith the carrierwave pieces
though they could not perceive them. The same
show included New York to Luxemburg CB
Carrier Wave. This piece consisted of a CB
carrier wave transmittedto Luxemburg on a
ham radio. In 1969 Barry constructed 0.5
MicrocurieRadiationInstallation, Barium 133.
This piece consisted of radioactive isotopes
buriedin CentralPark. Again, the audience and
others interactedwith the piece, though unable
to perceive it. In April, 1969, Barry executed
the Inert Gas Series, consisting in the release of
inert gases in a series of locations around Los
Angeles. Again, this series was imperceptible.
In May, 1969, Barryexecuted TelepathicPiece.
This piece consisted of a series of thoughtsthat
he attempted to communicate telepathically.
Barry's conceptual work peaked in June of
1969 when he executed an untitledpiece for the
Seattle Art Museum that he described in the
following way:
The Importanceof Being Conceptual
All the things of which I know but of which I am not at
this moment thinking-1I:36 P.M.; 15 June 1969.22
In the fall of 1969 Barry claimed that he had
executed pieces consisting of forgotten
thoughts, things in his unconscious, things not
communicable, things unknowable, things not
yet known.
11. Before bringingthis typology to bearon the
central question of what aestheticianscan learn
from conceptual art, some further reflections
are in order. Although conceptualart cannot be
usefully characterizedby the attitudesor inten-
tions or feelings of its practitioners, still it
should be rememberedthat in its early stages
conceptual art was a reaction against some
important changes occuring in the artworld
during the 1960s.
For the first time works by living American
artists were becoming objects of speculation,
like downtown real estate or next year's wheat
crop. As a result it seemed that artworkswere
increasingly valued as investments, ratherthan
as instrumentsof expression or objects of aes-
thetic appreciation. Many artists seemed to
cooperate with this shift by making pieces that
were eminently "collectable"; bland but attrac-
tive works that ignored the political and moral
frameworkin which they were embedded.
Kosuth and the Art-Language group re-
sponded by distinguishing artworksfrom their
documentations.Because theirpieces were con-
cepts ratherthanperceptibleobjects, they could
not be bought and sold. And what could be
exhibited in a gallery or museum was only the
documentation of a piece, and not the piece
itself. But the collectors, curators, and dealers
were unmoved by these metaphysical distinc-
tions. They bought and sold documentationsas
if they were the pieces which they documented;
and increasingly, with the collaborationof the
artists concerned. Where once there had been
the fetishism of the artwork,now there was the
fetishism of the documentation.For all intents
and purposes, everything remainedthe same.
AdrianPiper respondedby nudging artworks
from the category of objects towards the cat-
egory of events. One reason why Aretha
Franklinpiece, first version cannot be collected
is because it is a performance.And the natureof
the performance is such that it cannot
be adequately capturedby videotape and tape
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121
recorder.
Piper's work suggests an alternativeway of
viewing all of conceptual art. The view I have
developed is that conceptual art can be charac-
terizedby the ontology of the pieces so classed,
and our means of apprehendingthem. But it
might be suggested thatconceptualpieces could
just as well be viewed as performancesrather
than objects. For example, when Kosuth exhib-
ited a series of photostats of a dictionary defi-
nition of water, there were at least three possi-
ble candidatesfor what constitutedthe artwork.
The first was the photostats. The second was
Kosuth's exhibiting the photostats. The third
was the concept expressed by the photostats.
The first possibility is explicitly rejected by
Kosuth, and for good reason. If conceptual
works were just their documentation, they
would not be very interesting. The second
possibility views the artworkas a performance
or "gesture." This is an extremely interesting
view, but interestingas it is, I reject it for two
reasons. First, the same reasoning which might
lead us to think of conceptual works as perfor-
mances could just as well lead us to think of all
artworks as performances. Once we take this
point of view, we should be willing to say that
the artwork, Dance, was a performance by
Matisse which occurredin 1909. The painting,
which is mistakenlyconfused with the artwork,
is really just the documentationof the perfor-
mance. On this view conceptual art is not
different in kind from traditional art: in all
cases, the artworks are performances rather
than objects. These results show enough disre-
gard for common sense to make them implau-
sible. The second reason for rejecting this
interpretationis that it seems at odds with what
most conceptualistssay when they are thinking
most clearly. They seem to think that concep-
tual works are different, that they make original
statementsaboutthe ontological statusof the art
object. I have tried to take them at their word.
Before leaving this section we should note
one furtherstrikingfact aboutconceptualart:its
extreme reliance on theory. By way of example
consider again the work of RobertBarry. Barry
claims to have executed a piece consisting of
things not yet known. But what exactly is the
piece in question? If it truly consists in things
not yet known, then what makes it Barry'spiece
ratherthan yours or mine? After all, no one has
122
a monoply on things not yet known. Perhaps
what makes it Barry's piece is something he
does. But Barry does very little except say that
he has executed this piece. Is it sufficient for
executing something that one says that one has
executed it? The point is that even in order to
graspwhat the artworkin questionis, one needs
some theory about the nature of conceptual
artworks. Traditionalartworksare much more
autonomouswith respectto theory. Anyone can
look at The Potato-Eatersand know that it is an
artwork. We can draw our own conclusions,
however good or bad, warranted or unwar-
ranted, they might be. With conceptualpieces,
however, we do not even know whether we
should be looking or thinking without a theory
to guide our behavior.
12. Before drawing some conclusions from
what has been done let me say what has not
been attempted. I have not tried to give a
rigorous deductive argumentfor the superiority
of my epistemological-ontological account of
conceptual art over more pragmatic ones. Nor
have I attemptedto give a thoroughaccount of
what constitutes conceptual art. Such an ac-
count would distinguishconceptual art from its
relatives and near-neighbors:chance art, dada,
neo-dada, performance art, anti-art, and so
forth. It would also address the question of
quality in conceptual art more directly than I
have done. AlthoughI have had harshwords for
those who produce texts meant to enlighten us
about conceptualart, I have said little aboutthe
pieces themselves. Indeed, I find many of them
clever and engaging. At the same time it seems
obvious to me that there have been no great
conceptual artists. But this aside, please re-
memberthat my purposehas been only to show
that conceptual artists have little to teach
aestheticians, at least about aesthetic theory.
We would do well to remember,however, that
Rembrandt probably had very little to teach
aestheticians either; but then he also had the
good sense not to entitle any of his manifestos,
"Art After Philosophy."
13. We are now in a position to see why
conceptual art has little to offer aesthetic the-
ory. Of the three kinds of conceptual art that
have been distinguished, all, save one, have
been anticipatedby philosophers.
Considerthe first kind, the kind in which the
art object is imperceptiblebut its existence is
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JAMIESON
contingenton its perceptibleexpression. This is
Collingwood's view, not just about some art-
works, but aboutall of them. For Collingwood,
the artworkis imperceptible.In his words, "the
work of art proper is something not seen or
heard but something imagined."23 In another
place he writes of a work of art that its "only
place is in the artist's mind."24 At the same
time Collingwood insisted that the creation of
perceptible works is "necessarily connected
with the aesthetic activity, that is, with the
creationof the imaginativeexperience which is
the work of art."25 The examples that we
discussed of works of this first kind were also
anticipatedby Collingwood, as well as Croce
and Carritt.Collingwood once wrote that "the
aesthetic object can be identified with
language."26
The second kind of conceptual art, the kind
in which the art object is imperceptibleand it
has no perceptibleexpression, but its existence
is contingent on its apprehension by some
audience, was anticipatedby Croce. He taught
that all works of art are internally expressed
"intuitions." They are typically expressed ex-
ternallyas well, but they need not be. For every
work thereis an audience, for we are always the
audience for our own works.27
Some of Barry's pieces could not be ac-
counted for by Croce or Collingwood. Perhaps
what the conceptualists can teach us is that
forgottenthoughtsor things unknowablecan be
artworks. If that is all they have to teach us,
then conceptual art has very little to offer to
aesthetics.28
l The leading philosophicalchampionof conceptualart
is Timothy Binkley. See his "Piece: Contra Aesthetics,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35, vol. 3 (Spring
1977): 265-78; and his "Deciding About Art," in L.
Aagaard-Mogensen(ed.), Culture and Art (Atlantic High-
lands, N.J., 1976). Other leading aestheticianshave hinted
at the importanceof conceptual art.
2 See, for example, virtually any issue of Art-Lan-
guage.
3 By Joseph Kosuth, reprintedin G. Battcock (ed.),
Idea Art (New York, 1973).
4 Francis Naumann, Artforum73 (February, 1974):
102.
5 Meyer, Conceptual Art (New York, 1972), p. xiii.
6 Ibid., Battcock; also L. Lippard, Six Years: The
Dematerializationof the Art Object (New York, 1972).
7 See Timothy Binkley's discussion on p. 95 of his
"Deciding About Art."
8 Meyer, p. xiv.
The Importanceof Being Conceptual
9 Battcock, p. 1.
10 2.
Ibid., p.
l Meyer, p. xx.
12 Ibid, p. viii.
'3 Kosuth, p. 83.
14 Battcock, p. 2.
15 H. Flynt, "Concept Art," reprinted in R. Kos-
telanetz (ed.), Esthetics Contemporary(Buffalo, 1978), p.
411.
16 See R. Carnap,Meaning and Necessity (University
of Chicago Press, 1956), especially section 9.
17 Arthur Rose, "Four Interviews," reprinted in
Battcock, p. 145.
18 The quotationis from a letter from the Art-Language
group to Lucy Lippard,excerpted in Lippard,pp. 43-44.
19 M. Bochner, "Excerpts From Speculation
(1967-1970]," reprintedin Meyer, p. 50.
20 For more on the myth of the museum, see Willard
Van OrmanQuine, Wordand Object (MIT Press, 1960).
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123
21 A. Piper, Talkingto Myself: The Ongoing Autobiog-
raphy of an Art Object (Barin,Italy, 1974), p. 59. In my
discussion of Piper there is a studied type/token ambiguity
that is of no consequence for present purposes.
22 In Lippard., p. 112.
23 R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford
University Press, 1972), p. 142; first published in 1938.
24 Ibid., p. 130.
25
Ibid., p. 305.
26 R. G. Collingwood, "Review of L. A. Reid, A Study
in Aesthetics," Philosophy 7 (1932): 325. It should be
noted, however, that Collingwood had a somewhat non-
standardconception of language.
27 See the first three chaptersof his Aesthetic, translated
by D. Ainslie (New York, 1955).
28 I am indebted to Noel Carroll, Douglas F. Stalker,
and especially John A. Fisher for their comments on earlier
drafts, and much helpful discussion.