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PHILOSOHY OF RELIGION

Relation of Philosophy with Religion

Religion is primarily said to be a set of beliefs, a belief in some unseen power i.e. God who
is controlling the world and a belief in life after that. Philosophy of religion is concerned
with much the same issues, but where Theology uses religious works, like the Bible, as its
authority, philosophy likes to use reason as the ultimate authority.

What is Religion?

According to the philologist Max Mller, the root of the English word religion, the Latin
religio, was originally used to mean only reverence for God or the gods, careful pondering
of divine things, piety . It is a strong faith in supernatural spirit or God. Several thinkers
defined religion via various definitions and according to their tradition.

Some definitions are given below

Mathew Arnold: Religion is nothing but morality touched with emotions.

Immanuel Kant: Religion is the recognition of all our duties as divine commandments.
Sri Aurobindo: The inmost essence of religion is the search for God and finding the God.
William James: Religion is the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their
solitude.

We can say that religion is a belief in a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness
and a desire to come into harmonious relation. Religion emphasizes the pursuit of some
higher values which cannot be explained with the help of natural laws.

Characteristics of Religion
Every religion gets its start from the teachings of a particular prophet.
Every relation has its own scripture which is the sacred book for its followers who regards
every part of its text as final authority.
Every religion propagates a special mode of worship, fixes up a place of worship and sets
up an order of priests for management of religious affairs.
Every religion preaches a definite way of life and outlook based on a special philosophy of
life which is different from one religion to another.
Religion of basis of confidence and morality.
Religion is based on emotions and beliefs.
Religion is the basis of virtues.
Religion is an inspiration of happiness and peace.

Religion and the world religions

Sigmund Freud (18561939), one of the great psychologists of the twentieth

century, wrote that religion is comparable to a childhood neurosis.
If this is so, the world is filled with something like five billion neurotic individuals.
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there are roughly two billion Christians, consisting of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and
Orthodox; there are well over a billion Muslims, close to 80 percent of whom are Sunni and
20 percent Shiite; there are over a billion Hindus; roughly 350 million Buddhists
(Theravada and Mahayana); approximately 350 million adherents of the Chinese traditions
of Confucianism and Daoism; about 300 million adherents of African traditional religions
(Animists, Shamanists, etc.); 25 million Sikhs; 14 million Jews; 7 million Bahai; 4 million
Jains, and the list goes on.
And the religious traditions are not limited to geographic regions. Western religions have
migrated East and Eastern religions have traveled West.
As a case in point, Diana Eck Director of the Pluralism Project at Harvard University has
pointed out that the formerly Christian country of the United States has now become the
most religiously diverse nation in the world, with millions of adherents of Eastern as well as
Western religions.
Worldwide, nonreligious people are clearly in the minority, making up only about 15
percent of the worlds population.

No doubt, religion is ubiquitous.

Nevertheless, attempting to offer a definition of religion which captures all and only what
are taken to be religions is notoriously difficult.
Central to some religions is a personal God and other spiritual entities; for other religions,
there is no God or spirits at all.
Some religions view the eternal, personal existence of the individual in an afterlife as
paramount to understanding Ultimate Reality and much more important than temporary
earthly existence.
Others see what we do in this life as fundamental, with little if any consideration of the
hereafter. Other differences among the religions abound.

But as diverse as religions are, several components seem to be central to the world
religions: a system of beliefs, the breaking in of a transcendent reality, and human attitudes
of ultimate concern, meaning, and purpose.
Given these three elements, the following perhaps captures what most take to be the
essence of the concept of religion: a religion involves a system of beliefs and practices
primarily centered around a transcendent Reality, either personal or impersonal, which
provides ultimate meaning and purpose to life.

Relationship between Philosophy and Religion

Both religion and philosophy are normative in nature.

Religion and philosophy are complementary.
Philosophy is helpful in the development of religion.
Philosophy interprets assumptions of religion.
Religion broads the scope of philosophy.
Both make man optimistic.
Philosophy and Religion are related as theory and Practice.
Philosophy renders Religion more intelligible by explaining it.
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Religion provides religious data to Philosophy.

Religion can complete the philosophical explanation of life.

Difference between Philosophy and Religion

When we discuss the difference between philosophy and religion, the following points
should be noted:
The aim of Philosophy and Religion are different.
The problems of Philosophy are different from those of Religion.
The attitudes of Philosophy are different from that of Religion.
The methods of Philosophy and Religion are different.
The activities of Philosophy and Religion are different.
The nature of conclusion obtained from Philosophy and Religion are different.
The effect of philosophy and religion on the individual and society is different.

It is sometimes said that the study of philosophy being critical is likely to disturb our
religious beliefs. This should not lead us into forgetting the intimate relation of philosophy
and religion. Philosophy may be disturbing especially if the religious creed is narrow. But if
it is broad and simple, philosophy strengthens it. Bacon said that a little philosophy
inclined mens mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy brings mans mind to religion.
Indeed, philosophy should help us to our fundamental religious beliefs on a solid
intellectual foundation and so relieves us of much perplexity and doubt.

What is Philosophy of Religion?

Philosophy is the most critical and comprehensive thought process developed by human
beings.
It is quite different from religion in that where Philosophy is both critical and
comprehensive, Religion is comprehensive but not necessarily critical.
Religion attempts to offer a view of all of life and the universe and to offer answers to most ,
if not all, of the most basic and important questions which occur to humans all over the
planet.
The answers offered by Religion are not often subject to the careful scrutiny of reason and
logic.
Indeed many religious beliefs defy logic and seem to be unreasonable.
Religion has its basis in belief. Philosophy , on the other hand, is a critic of belief and belief
systems.
Philosophy subjects what some would be satisfied in believing to severe examination.
Philosophy looks for rational explications and justifications for beliefs.
Philosophy has its basis in reason.

Theology deals with thinking about religious beliefs in a rational manner but it presumes
faith.
Theologians employ reason to make their beliefs appear more clearly and to wherever
possible have beliefs satisfy the dictates of reason.
Theologians begin with a set of beliefs as foundational or fundamental and in some sense
not subject to possible disbelief or to truly critical analysis.
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Philosophers examine, indeed they look for, all assumptions and suppositions of any
system of thought or belief.
For philosophers there are no ideas to be accepted on faith.
Philosophy of Religion is rational thought about religious issues and concerns without a
presumption of the existence of a deity or reliance on acts of faith.
Philosophers examine the nature of religion and religious beliefs.
Philosophers in the West have focused on ideas related to the existence and nature of the
deity because that idea is central to the religions of the West.
Western Philosophy of Religion has centered on arguments or proofs for the existence of
god and explications of apparent inconsistencies in the description of the nature of god.
In the last century philosophers around the world have refocused their examinations onto
the nature of religious beliefs, religious language and the religious mindset.
Indeed, some philosophers have entered into critical reflection and dialogue on the nature
or essence of religion itself.
In this course we will approach religion in both the traditional manner and in the more
contemporary fashion as well.
We will examine the issues related to the existence and nature of the deity and it will
consider the nature of religious belief.

We will also take note of the findings of modern and contemporary science in its
examination into religious phenomena.
in the end it is hoped that awareness of the productions of scientists and philosophers will
put us in a better position to understand the nature of religion, its essence.
Philosophy is about thinking critically about religion in all of its aspects.
Thinking critically about religious beliefs might indicate that they are flawed in a number of
ways:
inconsistent, contradictory, without evidence to support the basic claims
This does not mean that philosophy attempts to disprove religious beliefs. Philosophy has
come to reveal that religious beliefs are just that beliefs and not empirical claims.
Religious language is not ordinary language and certainly not scientific language.
Philosophy helps us to understand this.

What is Philosophy of Religion

Philosophy of religion is the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It
includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of
religious adherents. (INTERNET ENCYCLPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY)

philosophy of religion is, "the philosophical examination of the central themes andconcepts
involved in religious traditions. ( Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Philosophy of religion, discipline concerned with the philosophical appraisal of human

religious attitudes and of the real or imaginary objects of those attitudes, God or the gods.
The philosophy of religion is an integral part of philosophy as such and embraces central
issues regarding the nature and extent of human knowledge, the ultimate character of
reality, and the foundations of morality.(Encyclopdeia Britannica)
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Philosophy of religion is the application of the philosophical method to the subject matter
of religion.
Accordingly, it is the rational study of the meaning and justification of fundamental
religious claims, particularly about the nature and existence of God (or the Transcendent).
(New World Encyclopedia)

Distinctive identity of philosophy of religion

By its very nature, the philosophy of religion stands midway between theology, with its
inherently dogmatic and normative character, and the empirical disciplines known as
religious studies: psychology of religion, sociology of religion, history of religion, among
others. Unlike the former, the philosophy of religion does not have as its aim to defend or
even explain a particular set of beliefs.
Unlike the latter, it seeks to do more than describe and analyze religion as an external
phenomenon.
The philosophy of religion has been distinguished from theology by pointing out that, for
theology, "its critical reflections are based on religious convictions".
Also, "theology is responsible to an authority that initiates its thinking, speaking, and
witnessing ... [while] philosophy bases its arguments on the ground of timeless evidence."

Philosophy of Religion is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the

philosophical study of religion, including arguments over the nature and existence of
God, religious language, miracles, prayer, the problem of evil, and the relationship
between religion and other value-systems such as science and ethics. It is often regarded
as a part of Metaphysics, especially insofar as it is interested in understanding what it is for
something to exist, although arguably it also touches on issues commonly dealt with
in Epistemology, Ethics, Logic and the Philosophy of Language.

It asks such questions as "Are there sound reasons to think that God does (or does not)
exist?", "If there is a God, then what is he like?", "What, if anything, would give us good
reason to believe that a miracle has occurred?", "What is the relationship between faith and
reason?", "Does petitionary prayer make sense?"
It does not ask "What is God?", as that would assume the existence of God, and that God
has a knowable nature, which is more the territory of theology (which usually considers
the existence of God as axiomatic, or self-evident, and merely seeks
to justify or support religious claims).

Philosophy of religion is currently a major field of study, and the range of topics
encompassed within it is considerable.
Nevertheless, its scope is fairly narrow, for philosophy of religion is simply the
philosophical reflection on religious ideas.
The terms philosophical reflection and religious ideas need elucidation. Philosophical
reflection in this context includes the careful analyses of words, reasons and evidences for
claims, hypotheses, and arguments.
These analyses themselves include fundamental issues about the nature of reality
(metaphysics) and the way in which we come to know things (epistemology).
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Regarding these fundamental issues, philosophy of religion and, indeed, philosophy itself
have taken new directions in recent times.
While philosophical reflection on religious ideas has been occurring for centuries, even
millennia, it underwent a momentous setback in the early-to-mid twentieth century
through the work of the logical positivists.
Logical positivists held, among other things, that for a claim to be true and meaningful it
must be empirically verifiable.
As religious claims were for the most part taken to be empirically unverifiable,
philosophical reflection on religious themes was widely considered to be a specious
endeavor and religious ideas were often taken to be meaningless.
However, due to the work of a number of leading philosophers who were responding to
positivism and defending the philosophical viability of religious beliefs philosophers such
as John Hick and Alvin Plantinga by the 1970s the field began to take a significant turn.
Today, philosophy of religion is flourishing and it is not uncommon to see philosophy
journals, anthologies, and monographs devoted exclusively to religious themes.
By the phrase religious ideas I mean the primary issues and concepts which have been
discussed and debated within the religious traditions throughout the centuries, including
for example the existence and nature of God or Ultimate Reality; conflicting truth claims
among the different religious traditions; the relation between science and religion;
creation; nirvana; and salvation, among other topics.
It is important to note that these are not just abstract and ethereal concepts discussed and
debated among ivory-tower theologians and philosophers.
To the contrary, they are fundamental issues in the life and thought of those in living
traditions traditions which have deep, existential meaning and ongoing significance for
much of contemporary humanity
Philosophy of religion has a rich and diverse history.
As the timeline demonstrates, the history of philosophy of religion has been a global
enterprise which can be demarcated by four historical time periods: the ancient world, the
medieval world, the modern world, and the contemporary world.

The philosophy of religion as a distinct discipline is an innovation of the last 200 years, but
its central topicsthe existence and nature of the divine, humankinds relation to it, the
nature of religion, and the place of religion in human lifehave been with us since the
inception of philosophy.

Philosophers have long critically examined the truth of and rational justification for
religious claims, and have explored such philosophically interesting phenomena as faith,
religious experience, and the distinctive features of religious discourse.

The second half of the twentieth century was an especially fruitful period, with
philosophers using new developments in logic and epistemology to mount both
sophisticated defenses of, and attacks on, religious claims.
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The expression philosophy of religion did not come into general use until the nineteenth
century, when it was employed to refer to the articulation and criticism of humanity's
religious consciousness and its cultural expressions in thought, language, feeling, and
practice.

Historically, philosophical reflection on religious themes had two foci:

first, God or Brahman or Nirvana or whatever else the object of religious thought,
attitudes, feelings, and practice was believed to be, and,

second, the human religious subject, that is, the thoughts, attitudes, feelings, and practices
themselves. The first sort of philosophical reflection has had a long history.

In the West, for example, discussions of the nature of God (whether he is unchanging, say,
or knows the future, whether his existence can be rationally demonstrated, and the like)
are incorporated in theological treatises such as Anselm's Proslogion and Monologion,
Thomas Aquinas's Summas, Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed, and al-Ghazali's
Incoherence of the Philosophers.

They also form part of influential metaphysical systems like Plato's, Plotinus's, Descartes',
and Leibniz's. Hindu Vedanta and classical Buddhism included sophisticated discussions of
the nature of the Brahman and of the Buddha, respectively.

Many contemporary philosophers of religion continue to be engaged with these topics

The most salient feature of this sort of philosophy of religion is its attempts to
establish truths about God or the Absolute on the basis of unaided reason.

Aquinas is instructive. Some truths about God can be known only with the help of
revelation.

Examples are his triune nature and incarnation.

Other truths about him, such as his existence, simplicity, wisdom, and power, are included
in his end revelation to us but can also be known through reason.

And Aquinas proceeds to show how reason can establish them. What we would today call
philosophy of religion (or natural theology) is thus an integral part of his systematic
theology.

Early modern philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke are only incidentally
concerned with purely theological issues, but they too insist that some important truths
about God can be established by purely philosophical reflection.
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The notion that we should accept only those religious beliefs that can be established by
reason was not commonly expressed until the later part of the seventeenth century,
however, and not widely embraced until adopted by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.

The consequences of the new commitment to reason alone depended on whether

important religious truths could be established by natural reason.

Deists believed that they could. Human reason can prove the existence of God and
immortality and discover basic moral principles. Because these religious beliefs are the
only ones that can be established by unaided human reason, they alone are required of
everyone.

They are also the only beliefs needed for religious worship and practice. Beliefs wholly or
partly based on some alleged revelation, on the other hand, are needless at best and
pernicious at worst.

Others, such as Hume, adopted a more skeptical attitude toward reason's possibilities.

In their view, reason is unable to show that God exists or that any other important
religious claim is significantly more probable than not.

The only proper attitude for a reasonable person to take, therefore, is disbelief (atheism) or
unbelief (agnosticism).

The result of this insistence on reason alone was thus that religion either became
desiccated, reduced to a few simple beliefs distilled from the rich traditional systems that
had given life to them, or ceased to be a live option.

Reaction was inevitable, and took two forms.

One was a shift from theoretical to practical (moral) reason. Kant, for example, was
convinced that theoretical or speculative reason could neither prove nor disprove God's
existence or the immortality of the soul.

Practical reason, on the other hand, provided a firm basis for a religion lying within the
boundaries of reason alone. The existence of God and an afterlife can't be established by
theoretical reason. A belief in them, however, is a necessary presupposition of morality.

Others, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, shifted their attention from intellectual belief and
moral conduct to religious feelings and experience. In their view, the latter, and not the
former, are the root of humanity's religious life.
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Both approaches were widely influential in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The
first fell into neglect with the waning of philosophical idealism in the first half of the
twentieth century, although interest in it has recently resurfaced.

The second has continued to be attractive to many important philosophers of religion.

Philosophy of religion was comparatively neglected by academic philosophers in the

first half of the twentieth century.

There were several reasons for this.

One was the widespread conviction that the traditional proofs were bankrupt. Believers
and nonbelievers alike were persuaded that Hume and Kant had clearly exposed their fatal
weaknesses.

Another was the demise of nineteenth-century idealism. The twentieth-century heirs of

the German and Anglo-American idealists (Hastings Rashdall, W. R. Sorley, A. C. Ewing, and
A. E. Taylor, among others) had many interesting things to say about God, immortality, and
humanity's religious life. But their views increasingly fell on deaf ears as analytic
philosophy replaced idealism as the dominant approach among English-speaking
academics. (The process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead and his followers emerged as an
alternative to idealism and analytic philosophy that could accommodate religious interests.

It was never more than a minority viewpoint, however, and finds itself today in much the
same position that philosophical idealism was in in the early part of the twentieth century;
its demise too seems immanent.)

This is not to say that nothing of interest to philosophers of religion was transpiring
during this period.

Five developments were especially important.

The first was the impact of theologians like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich on
philosophers interested in religion.

The second was the influence of religious existentialism, including both the rediscovery of
Sren Kierkegaard and the work of contemporaries like Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber.

A third was the renewal of Thomism by Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and others

A fourth was the rise of religious phenomenology; Rudolf Otto and others tried to
accurately describe human religious experience as it appears to those who have it.
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Finally, philosophers who were sympathetic to religious impulses and feelings yet deeply
skeptical of religious metaphysics attempted to reconstruct religion in a way that would
preserve what was thought to be valuable in it while discarding the chaff.

Thus, John Dewey suggested that the proper object of faith isn't supernatural beings but
the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and actions, or the active relation
between these ideals and the forces in nature and society that generate and support
them. In Dewey's view, any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and
in spite of threats of personal loss because of a conviction of its general and enduring value
is religious in quality.

After a half century of comparative neglect, analytic philosophers began to take an interest
in religion in the 1950s.

Their attention was initially focused on questions of religious language. Were sentences
like God forgives my sins used to express factual claims, or did they instead express the
speaker's attitudes or commitments? If those who uttered them did express factual claims,
what kind of claims were they? Could they be empirically verified or falsified, for example,
and, if they could not, were they really cognitively meaningful?

What was unanticipated was that the young analytic philosophers of religion who were
being trained during this period were to become responsible for a resurgence of
philosophical theology that began in the mid-1960s and continues to dominate the field in
English-speaking countries today.

The revival was fueled by a comparative loss of interest in the question of religious
language's cognitive meaningfulness (it being generally thought that attempts to show that
religious sentences do not express true or false factual claims had been unsuccessful), and a
conviction that Hume's and Kant's allegedly devastating criticisms of philosophical
theology did not withstand careful scrutiny. On the positive side, developments in modal
logic, probability theory, and so on offered tools for introducing a new clarity and rigor to
traditional disputes.

Three features of the revival are especially noteworthy.

The first was a renewed interest in the scholastics and in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century philosophical theology.

There were at least two reasons for this.

One was the discovery that issues central to the debates of the 1960s and 1970s had
already been examined with a sophistication and depth lacking in most nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century discussions of the same problems.
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The other was the fact that a significant number of analytic philosophers of religion
were practicing Christian or Jewish theists. Figures such as Aquinas, Scotus, Maimonides,
Samuel Clark, and Jonathan Edwards were attractive models for these philosophers for two
reasons.

There is a broad similarity between the philosophical approaches of these medieval and
early modern thinkers and contemporary analytic philosophers: precise definitions, careful
distinctions, and rigorous argumentation are features of both.

In addition, these predecessors were self-consciously Jewish or Christian; a conviction of

the truth or splendor of Judaism or Christianity pervades their work. They were thus
appealing models for contemporary philosophers of religion with similar commitments.

A second feature of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is the wide array of

topics it addresses.

The first fifteen years or so of the period in question were dominated by discussions of
issues traditionally central to the philosophy of religion:

Is the concept of God coherent?

Are there good reasons for thinking that God exists?

Is the existence of evil a decisive reason for denying God's existence?

However, beginning in the 1980s, a number of Christian analytic philosophers turned their
attention to such specifically Christian doctrines as the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the
Atonement.

Most of the articles and books on these topics were attempts to show that the doctrines in
question were coherent or rational.

But some were more interested in the bearing of theological doctrines on problems
internal to the traditions that include them.

Marilyn Adams, for example, has argued that Christian martyrdom and Christ's passion
have important implications for Christian responses to the problem of evil, and Robert
Oakes has made similar claims for the Jewish mystical doctrine of God's withdrawal
(tzimzum).

Still other analytic philosophers of religion have tried to show that theism can cast light on
problems in other areas of philosophythat it can give a better account of the logical
features of natural laws, for example, or of the nature of numbers, sets, and other
mathematical objects, or of the apparent objectivity of moral claims.
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A third characteristic of recent philosophy of religion is its turn toward epistemology.

Medieval and seventeenth-century philosophical theology exhibited a feature that has been
insufficiently appreciated since the eighteenth century and is especially prominent in
Augustine and Anselm: its devotional setting.

Anselm's inquiry, for instance, is punctuated by prayers to arouse his emotions and stir his
will. His inquiry is a divine human collaboration in which he continually prays for
assistance and offers praise and thanksgiving for the light he has received. His project as a
whole is framed by a desire to contemplate God or see God's face.

Anselm's attempt to understand what he believes by finding reasons for it is largely a

means to this end.

Several hundred years later, Blaise Pascal argued that although the evidence for the truth of
the Christian religion is ambiguous, it is sufficient to convince those who seek God or have
the living faith in their hearts.

Reflection on the work of predecessors like these suggests two things.

The first is that the aim of philosophical theology is not, primarily, to convince
nonbelievers of the truth of religious claims but, rather, self-understanding: to enable the
believer to grasp the implications of, and reasons for, his or her religious beliefs. The
project, in other words, is faith in search of understanding.

The second is that a person's attitudes, feelings, emotions, and aims have an important
bearing on his or her ability to discern religious truths.

C. Stephen Evans, for example, has suggested that faith may be a necessary condition of
appreciating certain reasons for religious belief. I have argued that a properly disposed
heart may be needed to grasp the force of evidence for theistic belief.

Common to much recent religious epistemology is a rejection of any form of evidentialism

that insists that religious beliefs are reasonably held only if they are supported by evidence
that would convince any fair-minded, properly informed, and intelligent person regardless
of the state of his or her heart.

As its history indicates, the aims of philosophers of religion can be quite diverse.
Arguments are sometimes employed apologetically. For example, Samuel Clarke and
William Paley attempted to construct proofs that would convince any fair-minded and
intelligent reader of God's existence and providential government of human affairs.

These proofs had begun to lose their power to persuade educated audiences by the end of
the eighteenth century, however, and so Friedrich Schleiermacher and others turned to
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religious feelings (a sense of absolute dependence or of the unity of all things in the
infinite) to justify religion to its cultured despisers. But although Schleiermacher thought
that the heart and not the head is religion's primary source, the aim of his argument was
still apologetic.

Yet philosophy of religion can have other purposes.

Theistic proofs, for example, have been used to persuade nonbelievers of the truth
of theism. But, as we have seen, they can also be used devotionally, and this is sometimes
their primary purpose.

Thus, Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali (which can be roughly translated as A bouquet of

arguments offered to God) has three purposes: to convince unbelievers, to strengthen the
faithful, but also to please Siva by presenting it as an offering at his footstool.

Regardless of the success Udayana's arguments may or may not have had in achieving his
first two goals, they have value as a gift offered to God; their construction and presentation
is an act of worship.

Philosophy of religion is sometimes part of a larger philosophical project.

For example, for Hegel, religion is the self-representation of Absolute Spirit in feeling and
images. As such, it is a stage in a historical process that culminates in philosophy (i.e., in
Hegel's philosophy!).

Descartes provides another example. His Meditations introduce ontological arguments for
God's existence to help resolve skeptical doubts raised earlier in the text.

Philosophy of religion can also be part of the so-called Enlightenment project.

Religious beliefs, institutions, and practices are critically examined in an attempt to
eliminate those that can't survive the scrutiny of impartial reason.

Hume's Dialogues and The Natural History of Religion and Kant's reflections on religion
and morality are examples.

The hermeneutics of suspicion practiced by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud is an extension of

the same project. According to these thinkers, religion is an expression of false
consciousness. Its beliefs, feelings, and practices lack rational support and rest on motives
that cannot be consciously acknowledged without destroying their credibility.

Finally, philosophy of religion can be an attempt to make sense of, or account for,
religion, and not a reflection on its object (God, Nirvana, and the like).
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George Santayana's interpretation of religion as a kind of poetry, a feelingful contemplation

of ideal forms, is an example;

Hume's Natural History of Religion is another. As these examples indicate, attempts of this
sort are seldom neutral.

Santayana, for instance, takes naturalism for granted, and Hume is independently
convinced that historical religions are not only irrational but morally and socially
pernicious.

Wittgensteinians, on the other hand, insist that their attempts to make sense of religion are
an exception to this rule; their project, they claim, is to simply understand religion, not
judge it.

Until quite recently, philosophy of religion has been somewhat myopic. Since the only
religions with which Western philosophers have been intimately acquainted are Judaism
and Christianity (and, to a lesser extent, Islam), it is not surprising that they have focused
their attention on theism. (Discussions of mysticism have proved one noteworthy
exception.)

Increased knowledge of Asian and other traditions has made this attitude seem
unduly parochial.

There is no intrinsic reason, however, why the tools of analytic or continental philosophy
can't be profitably applied to non-Western doctrines and arguments, and good work is
currently being done in this vein by Stephen Phillips, Paul Williams, Steven Collins, Gerald
Larson, and a number of others.

Paul Griffiths, for example, has suggested that perfect being theology (the attempt to
explore the implications of the concept of a reality greater than which none can be thought)
can be deployed to explain (and criticize) the emergence of doctrines of the cosmic Buddha
in the Mahayana traditions.

Work of this sort is essential because a defense of one's favored religion's perspective
should include reasons for preferring it to its important competitors.

The Western doctrine of creation ex nihilo, for instance, should be compared with the
Visistadvaitin notion that the world is best viewed as God's body.

Again, because the Buddhist's claim that everything is impermanent is logically

incompatible with the assertion that God is eternal and unchanging, both theists and
Buddhists need to attend to the views of each other.
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Another weakness of contemporary philosophy of religion is that the analytic and

continental traditions have developed in comparative isolation from each other.

This is due to several factors.

For one thing, analytic philosophers of religion are usually trained and housed in
departments of philosophy, and most of the best departments in English-speaking
countries are dominated by analytic philosophy.

Continental philosophers of religion, on the other hand, are often (although not always)
trained and housed in departments of religion or theology. Their interests, too, are
different.

Analytic philosophers of religion have tended to focus on God or the religious object and on
the rational credentials of claims about it.

Continental philosophy of religion has tended to focus on religion and the human subject; it
has also been more concerned with religion's ethical implications, especially its bearing on
oppression and liberation.

The isolation of the two traditions is unfortunate because each needs what the other has to
offer.

Analytic philosophers of religion, for instance, need to take the hermeneutics of suspicion
seriously, for, as Merold Westphal has said, they have been largely blind to the cognitive
implications of finitude and sin.

As a result, they have usually ignored the ideological uses and abuses of theistic
metaphysics and the ethical issues this raises.

The critiques of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Jacques Derrida, and contemporary feminists can
and should alert analytic philosophers of religion to these perils.

Continental philosophers of religion, on the other hand, too often ignore questions of truth
and rational adequacy.

This is unfortunate for two closely related reasons.

The first is ethical: we fail to respect the men and women whose beliefs and practices we
examine if we don't treat their claims to truth and rational superiority with the same
seriousness that they do.

The second is this: if Christianity, say, or Buddhism is true, it matters infinitely. So if either
is a live possibility, a deeply serious concern with its truth or falsity, its reasonableness or
unreasonableness, is the only rational option. Inattention or indifference to the truth and
 16

rational credentials of the traditions one examines is a clear indication that one doesn't
take them as live possibilities, and hence doesn't invest them with the same importance or
seriousness that their adherents do.

There are some indications that analytic and continental philosophers of religion are
beginning to learn from each other. One can only hope that this trend increases in the
future.

list of philosophers of religion.

Aristotle Jose Faur J.P. Moreland
Peter Abelard Antony Flew David ibn Merwan al-
Jacob Abendana Aruni Mukkamas
Joseph ben Abraham Pavel Florensky Moses Narboni
Adi Shankara Solomon ibn Gabirol Robert Cummings Neville
Isaac Alfasi Hai Gaon David Nieto
Jacob Anatoli Saadia Gaon Friedrich Nietzsche
Anselm of Canterbury Gersonides Plato
St. Thomas Aquinas Al-Ghazali William Paley
Augustine of Hippo Fethullah Gulen Bahya ibn Paquda
Avicenna Eugene Halliday Alvin Plantinga
AJ Ayer Johann Georg Hamann Robert M. Price
Basava Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Yiyah Qafi
Jedaiah ben Abraham Hegel Vasily Rozanov
Bedersi John Hick Friedrich Schleiermacher
Walter Benjamin David Hume John Duns Scotus
Boethius William James Adi Shankara
Sergei Bulgakov Jeshua ben Judah Isaac ben Sheshet
Isaac Canpanton Isaac Nathan ben Hoter ben Shlomo
Isaac Cardoso Kalonymus Huston Smith
Isaac Orobio de Castro Immanuel Kant Solomon
G. K. Chesterton Sren Kierkegaard Vladimir Solovyov
Stephen R.L. Clark David Kimhi Baruch Spinoza
Confucius Isaac ibn Latif Walter Terence Stace
William Lane Craig Yeshayahu Leibowitz Melville Y. Stewart
Joseph Solomon Leon of Modena Emanuel Swedenborg
Delmedigo Aleksei Losev Richard Swinburne
Jacques Derrida Salomon Maimon Samuel ibn Tibbon
Mircea Eliade Maimonides Paul Tillich
Aaron ben Elijah Karl Marx Lao Tzu
Epicurus Elia del Medigo Joseph ibn Tzaddik
Shem-Tov ibn Falaquera Dmitry Merezhkovsky Said Nursi

FORMS OF RELGIOUS BELIEFS

The main forms of religious belief are:

 17

1. THEISM

Theism is the belief in the existence of one or more divinities or deities (gods), which are
both immanent (i.e. they exist within the universe) and yet transcendent (i.e. they
surpass, or are independent of, physical existence). These gods also in some
way interact with the universe (unlike in Deism), and are often considered to
be omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.

The word "theism" was first coined in English in the 17th Century to contrast with
the earlier term Atheism. "Deism" and "theism" changed meanings slightly around 1700,
due to the increasing influence of Atheism: "deism" was originally used as a synonym for
today's "theism", but came to denote a separate philosophical doctrine (see Deism).

Theism incorporates Monotheism (belief in one God), Polytheism (belief in many gods)
and Deism (belief in one or more gods who do not intevene in the world), as well
as Pantheism (belief that God and the universe are the same thing), Panentheism(belief
that God is everywhere in the universe but still greater and above the universe) and many
other variants (see the section on Philosophy of Religion). What it does not include
is Atheism (belief that there are no gods) and Agnosticism (belief that it
is unknown whether gods exist or not).

The Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) as well

as Hinduism, Sikhism, Baha'i and Zoroastrianism, are all theistic religions.

Types of Theism

Classical Theism refers to traditional ideas of the major Monotheistic religions such
as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam which hold that God is an absolute, eternal, all-
knowing (omniscient), all-powerful (omnipotent) and perfect being who is related to the
world as its cause, but is unaffected by the world (immutable), as well as
being transcendent over it.

The doctrines of Classical Theism are based on the writings of Holy Scripture such as
the Tanakh, the Bible or the Qu'ran, although there is also a debt to Platonic and Neo-
Platonic philosophy, and thus synthesizes Christian thought and Greek philosophy. To a
large extent it was developed during the 3rd Century by St. Augustine (heavily influenced
by Plotinus), who drew on Platonic Idealism to interpret Christianity, and was extended
by St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th Century after the rediscovery of the works of Aristotle.

Open Theism, also known as Free Will Theism, is a recent theological movement which
attempts to explain the practical relationship between the free will of man and
the sovereignty of God, contrary to Classical Theism which holds that God
fully determines the future. It argues, among other things, that the concepts of
omnipresence and immutability do not stem from the Bible, but from the subsequent
 18

fusion of Judeo-Christian thought with the Greek philosophy of Platonism and Stoicism,
which posited an infinite God and a deterministic view of history.

2. MONOTHEISM

Monotheism is the belief in the existence of one deity, or in the oneness or uniqueness of
God. It is a type of Theism, and is usually contrasted with Polytheism (the belief in multiple
gods) and Atheism ( the absence of any belief in gods). The Abrahamic faiths
(Judaism, Christianity and Islam), as well as Plato's concept of God, all affirm
monotheism, and this is the usual conception debated within Western Philosophy of
Religion.

The word "monotheism" is derived from the Greek ("monos" meaning "one" and "theos"
meaning "god"), and the English term was first used by the English philosopher Henry
More (1614 - 1687).

History of Monotheism

The earliest monotheistic religions can be traced back to the Aten cult in ancient Egypt,
the Nasadiya Sukta from the Vedic period of India, and Ahura Mazda, the one uncreated
Creator of Zoroastrianism. There are also monotheistic denominations within Hinduism,
including Vedanta, Vaishnavism, Shaivism, Shaktism, and Smartism.

The Torah (or Hebrew Bible), which was created between the 13th Century and 4th
Century B.C., is the source of Judaism, and in turn provided the basis for
the Christian and Islamic religions (these three together being known as the Abrahamic
faiths). Jews, Christians and Muslims would probably all agree that God is an eternally
existent being that exists apart from space and time, who is the creator of the universe,
and is omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), omnibenevolent (all-good
or all-loving) and possibly omnipresent (all-present). The religions, however, differ in the
details: Christians, for example, would further affirm that there are three aspects to God
(the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit).

More recently, Sikhism is a distinctly monotheistic faith that arose in northern

India during the 16th and 17th Centuries, and the Baha'i faith, a religion founded in 19th
Century Persia, has as its core teaching the one supernatural being, God, who created all
existence.

Philosophical monotheism, and the associated concept of absolute good and evil,
emerged in classical Greece, notably with Plato and the subsequent Neo-Platonists (who
developed a kind of theistic monism in which the absolute is identified with the divine,
either as an impersonal or a personal God).

Types of Monotheism
 19

Exclusive Monotheism:
The belief that there is only one deity, and that all other claimed deities
are distinct from it and false. The Abrahamic religions, and
the Hindu denomination of Vaishnavism (which regards the worship of anyone
other than Vishnu as incorrect) are examples of Exclusive Monotheism.
Inclusive monotheism:
The belief that there is only one deity, and that all other claimed deities are
just different names for it. The Hindu denomination of Smartism is an example of
Inclusive Monotheism.
Substance Monotheism:
The belief (found in some indigenous African religions) that the many gods are
just different forms of a single underlying substance.
Pantheism:
The belief in one God who is equivalent to Nature or the physical universe, or that
everything is of an all-encompassing immanent abstract God.
Panentheism:
The belief (also known as Monistic Monotheism), similar to Pantheism, that the
physical universe is joined to, or an integral part of, God, but stressing that God
is greater than (rather than equivalent to) the universe.
Deism:
A form of monotheism in which it is believed that one God exists, but that this
God does not intervene in the world, or interfere with human life and the laws of
the universe. It posits a non-interventionist creator who permits the universe to
run itself according to natural laws.
Henotheism:
The devotion to a single god while accepting the existence of other gods,
and without denying that others can with equal truth worship different gods. It
has been called "monotheism in principle and polytheism in fact".
Monolatrism (or Monolatry):
The belief in the existence of many gods, but with the consistent worship of
only one deity. Unlike Henotheism, Monolatrism asserts that there is only one god
who is worthy of worship, though other gods are known to exist. This is really
more Polytheism than Monotheism.
Misotheism:
The belief that a God exists, but is actually evil. The English word was coined
by Thomas de Quincey in 1846. Strictly speaking, the term connotes an attitude of
hatred towards God, rather than making a statement about His nature.
Dystheism:
The belief that a God exists, but is not wholly good, or possibly even evil (as
opposed to eutheism, the belief that God exists and is wholly good). There are
various examples of arguable dystheism in the Bible.

3. PANTHEISM

Pantheism is the view that God is equivalent to Nature or the physical universe - that
they are essentially the same thing - or that everything is of an all-
 20

encompassing immanent abstract God. Thus, each individual human, being part of the
universe or nature, is part of God. The term "pantheism" was coined by the Irish
writer John Toland in 1705.

Some pantheists accept the idea of free will (arguing that individuals have some
choices between right and wrong, even if they likely have little conception of the greater
being of which they are a part), although Determinism is also widespread (particularly
among naturalistic pantheists - see below). Some pantheists also posit a common
purpose for nature and man, while others reject the idea of purpose and view existence as
existing "for its own sake". Although Schopenhauer claimed that pantheism has no ethics,
pantheists maintain that pantheism is the most ethical viewpoint, pointing out that any
harm done to another is doing harm to oneself, because what harms one harms all.

The concept has been discussed as far back as the time of the "Upanishads" of Vedic
Hinduism, and the philosophers of Ancient
Greece (including Thales, Parmenides and Heraclitus) as well as in Kabalistic Judaism.
The Biblical equation of God to acts of nature, and the definition of God within the New
Testament itself, has led to the establishment of some Christian panthistic movements,
from early Quakers to later Unitarians. In the 17th Century, there was something of a
resurgence, and Spinoza in particular is credited with belief in a kind of naturalistic
pantheism.

Types of Pantheism

Classical Pantheism:
This is the form of pantheism that equates existence with God without attempting
to redefine or to minimize either term. It believes in
a personal, conscious and omniscient God, and sees this God as uniting all true
religions. In many ways, classical pantheism is similar to Monism, in that it
views all things, from energy to matter to thought to time, as being aspects of an all-
embracing personal god. It is distinct primarily because of its simplicity and its
compatibility and inclusive attitude towards other world faiths. Classical Pantheism
is represented by many religious traditions including Hinduism and Kabbalistic
Judaism.
Biblical Pantheism:
This form of pantheism (vehemently condemned by many traditional Christians)
argues that some pantheistic aspects are expressed in the writings of the Bible. The
Biblical equation of God to acts of nature, and the definition of God within the New
Testament itself, all provide the basis of appeal to this belief system.
Naturalistic Pantheism:
This is a form of pantheism that holds that the universe,
although unconscious and non-sentient as a whole, is nevertheless a meaningful
focus for mystical fulfillment. Thus Nature is seen as being God only in a non-
traditional, impersonal sense. Critics have alleged that this constitutes an
intentional misuse of terminology, and an attempt to justify Atheism (or some kind
of spiritual naturalism) by mis-labelling it as pantheism. Naturalistic pantheism is
 21

based on the relatively recent views of Baruch Spinoza (who may have been
influenced by Biblical Pantheism) and John Toland, as well as contemporary
influences.
Cosmotheism:
This is a small and controversial movement started in the late 18th Century to
express the feeling was that God is something created by man and did not
exist before man, and is perhaps even an end state of human evolution,
through social planning, eugenics and other forms of genetic engineering. Among
others, H. G. Wells subscribed to a form of Cosmotheism.
Pandeism:
This is a kind of naturalistic pantheism, holding that the universe is an
unconscious and non-sentient God, but also that God was previously a conscious
and sentient force or entity that designed and created the universe. Thus,
according to pandeism, God only became an unconscious and nonsentient God
by becoming the universe. This is a sort of synthesisof pantheism and Deism.
Panentheism:
This belief has features in common with pantheism, such as the idea that the
universe is a part of God, although Panentheism argues that God is greater than
nature alone and so the physical universe is just a part of His nature.

4. PANENTHEISM

Panentheism, (also known as Monistic Monotheism), is the belief, similar to Pantheism,

that the physical universe is joined to God, but stressing that God is greater than (rather
than equivalent to) the universe. Thus, the one God is synonymous with the material
universe and interpenetrates every part of nature (as in Pantheism), but
timelessly extends beyond as well. The universe is part of God, but not all of God.

The Neoplatonism of Plotinus (in which the world itself is a God) is to some extent
panentheistic with polytheistic tendencies, and philosophical treatises have been written
on it in the context of Hinduism for millennia (notably in the "Bhagavad Gita" and
the "Shri Rudram"). Many North American and South American Native religions are
panentheistic in nature, and some elements of panentheism arise in Hasidic
Judaism and Kabbalah, some Sufi orders of Islam, and Eastern and Eastern
Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Christianity.

However, the word "panentheism" (which can be translated as "all in God") was not coined
until 1828, by the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (17811832), in
an attempt to reconcile Monotheism and Pantheism, and this conception of God influenced
New England Transcendentalists such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, and was popularized
by Charles Hartshorne(1897 - 2000) in his development of process theology in the 20th
Century, and has also been adopted by proponents of various New Thought beliefs.

Types of Panentheism
 22

Strong Panentheism:
This refers to the complete identity of God and the cosmos, as opposed to just
God's presence in it, and therefore comes very close to Pantheism. The laws of
nature, then, are not something essentially autonomous, which God must
sometimes manipulate in order to make his will effective, but are part of his will.
Weak Panentheism:
This refers only to the presence of God in the cosmos, as opposed to
some identity between them. The laws of nature, therefore, have
an autonomous status that makes them equivalent to something that is outside of
God.
Panendeism:
This is a composite of Deism and Panentheism. It holds that, while the universe
is part of God, it operates according to natural mechanisms without the need for
the intervention of a traditional God, somewhat similar to the Native American
concept of the all-pervading Great Spirit.

5. DEISM

Deism is a form of Monotheism in which it is believed that one God exists, but that this
God does not intervene in the world, or interfere with human life and the laws of the
universe. It posits a non-interventionist creator who permits the universe to run itself
according to natural laws.

Deism derives the existence and nature of God from reason and personal experience,
rather than relying on revelation in sacred scriptures (which deists see
as interpretations made by other humans and not as an authoritative sources) or on
the testimony of others. This is in direct contrast to Fideism (the view that religious belief
depends on faith or revelation, rather than reason). It can maybe best be descibed as
a basic belief rather than as a religion in itself, and there are currently no established
deistic religions.

Deists typically reject supernatural events (e.g. prophecy, miracles, the divinity of Jesus,
the Christian concept of the Trinity), and they regard their faith as a natural religion as
contrasted with one that is revealed by a God or which is artificially created by humans.
They do not view God as an entity in human form; they believe that one cannot access God
through any organized religion or set of rituals, sacraments or other practices; they do
not believe that God has selected a chosen people (e.g. Jews or Christians) to be the
recipients of any special revelation or gifts; and, given that they view God as having left his
creation behind, prayer makes no sense to them, except perhaps to express
their appreciation to God for his works.

History of Deism

The roots of Deism lie with Heraclitus and Plato, but it gained popularity with the natural
theologists of 17th Century England and France, who rejected any special or
 23

supposedly supernatural revelation of God. Isaac Newton's discovery of universal

gravitation explained the behaviour both of objects here on earth and of objects in the
heavens and promoted a world view in which the natural universe is controlled by laws of
nature. This, in turn, suggested a theology in which God created the universe, set it in
motion controlled by natural laws, and thren retired from the scene.

The first use of the term "deism" in English dates back to the early 17th Century (earlier
in France). Lord Herbert of Cherbury(1583 - 1648) is generally considered the "father of
English deism" and his book "De Veritate" (1624) the first major statement of deism.
Deism flourished in England between 1690 and 1740, and then spread to France, notably
via the work of Voltaire, to Germany and to America. Although not himself a deist, John
Locke's "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1690) marks a major turning
point in the history of deism, and a theory of knowledge based on experience replaced the
earlier one of innate ideas, culminating in Matthew Tindal's "Deist Bible" (1730).

During the 18th Century, Deism's converts included Voltaire, Michel de Montaigne (1533
- 1592), Rousseau and Maximilien Robespierre (1758 - 1794) in France, and several of
the founding fathers of the United States of America. With the critical the writings
of David Hume and Immanuel Kant though, Deism's influence started to wane as the 18th
Century progressed.

Variants of Deism

Pandeism is the belief that God preceded the universe and created it, but is
now equivalent to it - a composite of Deism and Pantheism. Pandeism holds that
God was a conscious and sentient force or entity that designed and created the
universe, which operates by mechanisms set forth as part of the creation. God thus
became an unconscious and non-responsive being by becoming the universe.
Panendeism is a composite of Deism and Panentheism. It holds that the universe
is part of God, but not all of God, and that it operates according to natural
mechanisms without the neeed for the intervention of a traditional God, somewhat
similar to the Native American concept of the all- pervading Great Spirit.
Polydeism is the belief that multiple gods exist, but do not intervene with the
universe - a composite of Deism and Polytheism.

6. Misotheism:
The belief that a God or gods exist, but that they are actually evil. The English word
was coined by Thomas de Quincey in 1846. Strictly speaking, the term connotes an
attitude of hatred towards the god or gods, rather than making a statement about
their nature.
7. Dystheism:
The belief that a God or gods exist, but that they are not wholly good, or possibly
even evil (as opposed to eutheism, the belief that God exists and is wholly
good). Trickster gods found in polytheistic belief systems often have a dystheistic
nature, and there are various examples of arguable dystheism in the Bible.
 24

8. Ditheism (or Duotheism):

The belief in two equally powerful gods, often, but not always,
with complementary properties and in constant opposition, such as God and
Goddess in Wicca, or Good and Evil in Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. The
early mystical religion Gnosticism is another example of a ditheistic belief of sorts,
due to their claim that the thing worshipped as God in this world is actually an evil
impostor, but that a true benevolent deity worthy of being called "God"
exists beyond this world
9. POLYTHEISM

Polytheism is the belief in, or worship of, multiple gods (usually assembled in
a pantheon). These gods are usually distinct and separate beings, and are often seen
as similar to humans (anthropomorphic) in their personality traits, but with additional
individual powers, abilities, knowledge or perceptions. Common deities found in
polytheistic beliefs include a Sky god, Death deity, Mother goddess, Love goddess, Creator
deity, Trickster deity, Life-death-rebirth deity and Culture hero.

Animism, Shamanism and Ancestor Worship do not necessarily contrast with

polytheism, but are other perspectives on ethnic or traditional religious
customs compatible (and typically co-occurring) with polytheism.

The term "polytheism" (from the Greek "polus" meaning "many" and "theos" meaning
"god"), is attested in English from the 17th Century (later than "atheism" but earlier than
"theism").

Types of Polytheism

Hard Polytheism:
The belief, prevalent in mythology, in many gods and goddesses which appear
as distinct and independent beings, often in conflict with one another. Examples
are the ancient Sumerian, Egyptian, Greek and Roman mythologies, as well as Norse,
Aztec and Yoruba mythologies. Another example of hard polytheism
is Euhemerism, the postulate that all gods are in fact historical humans.
Soft Polytheism:
The belief (similar to inclusive monotheism) in many gods and goddesses which
are considered to be manifestations or "aspects" of a single God, rather than
completely distinct entities. This view sees the gods as being subsumed into a
greater whole, as in most forms of Hinduism and some New Age currents of Neo-
Paganism.
Henotheism:
The devotion to a single god while accepting the existence of other gods,
and without denying that others can with equal truth worship different gods. It
has been called "monotheism in principle and polytheism in fact".
Monolatrism (or Monolatry):
The belief in the existence of many gods, but with the consistent worship of
 25

only one deity. Unlike Henotheism, Monolatrism asserts that there is only one god
who is worthy of worship, though other gods are known to exist.
Kathenotheism:
The belief that there are many gods, but only one deity at a time should be
worshipped, each being supreme in turn.
Ditheism (or Duotheism):
The belief in two equally powerful gods, often, but not always,
with complementary properties and in constant opposition, such as God and
Goddess in Wicca, or Good and Evil in Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism. The
early mystical religion Gnosticism is another example of a ditheistic belief of sorts,
due to their claim that the thing worshipped as God in this world is actually an evil
impostor, but that a true benevolent deity worthy of being called "God"
exists beyond this world.
Misotheism:
The belief that gods exist, but that they are actually evil. The English word was
coined by Thomas de Quincey in 1846. Strictly speaking, the term connotes an
attitude of hatred towards the god or gods, rather than making a statement about
their nature.
Dystheism:
The belief that gods exist, but that they are not wholly good, or possibly even evil
(as opposed to eutheism, the belief that God exists and is wholly
good). Trickster gods found in polytheistic belief systems often have a dystheistic
nature, and there are various examples of arguable dystheism in the Bible.

10. Animism:
The belief that souls inhabit all or most objects (whether they be animals, vegetables
or minerals). Animistic religions generally do not accept a sharp distinction
between spirit and matter, and assume that this unification of matter and spirit
plays a role in daily life. Early Shintoism was animistic in nature, as are many
indigenous African religions. Shamanism(communication with the spirit world)
and Ancestor Worship (worship of deceased family members, who are believed to
have a continued existence and influence) are similar categories.

11. Atheism (or non-theism) is the belief that gods do not exist, or a complete
rejection of Theism or any belief in a personal god or gods (the latter also known
as antitheism). It can cover a range of both religious and nonreligious attitudes.
Many atheists tend toward secular philosophies such as Humanism and Naturalism.

The term "atheism" (from the Greek "godless") originated as an insult applied to any
person or belief in conflict with established religion, the first English usage dating back
to the 16th Century. In common use, it merely indicates a disbelief in God, rather than
an active denial of the existence of any gods. With the spread of freethought, scientific
skepticism and criticism of religion, the term began to gather a more specific meaning and
 26

was first used to describe a self-avowed belief in late 18th Century Europe, and is now
increasingly used as a self-description by atheists.

Several religions, including Confucianism, Taoism, Jainism and some varieties

of Buddhism, either do not include belief in a personal god as a tenet of the religion, or
actively teach non-theism.

History of Atheism

In Ancient Greece, the 5th Century B.C. philosopher Diagoras is often credited as the "first
atheist" and strongly criticized all religion and mysticism. Atomists such
as Democritus attempted to explain the world in a purely materialistic way, without
reference to the spiritual or mystical. Epicurus disputed many religious doctrines, including
the existence of an afterlife or a personal deity and, while he did not rule out the
existence of gods, he believed that if they did exist they were unconcerned with
humanity. Skeptics like Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus held that one should suspend
judgment about virtually all beliefs.

During the Middle Ages, Scholasticism and orthodoxy in religious thought was at its
height, and Atheism was a very uncommon, even dangerous, doctrine, although William of
Ockham went so far as to assert that the divine essence could not
be intuitively or rationally apprehended by human intellect. By the time of
the Renaissance (15th - 16th Centuries), more skeptical inquiry was beginning
and Niccol Machiavelli, Leonardo da Vinci, Bonaventure des Priers and Franois
Rabelais all criticized religion and the Church during this time.

In 17th and 18th Century Europe, Deism increased in popularity and criticism of
Christianity became increasingly frequent, but it was only towards the end of the 18th
Century that Atheism began to be openly espoused by individuals such as Jean
Meslierand Baron d'Holbach, and the Empiricist David Hume began to undermine the
metaphysical basis of natural theology.

By the mid-19th Century, many prominent German philosophers (including Ludwig

Feuerbach, Arthur Schopenhauer, Karl Marxand Friedrich Nietzsche) were denying the
existence of deities and were strongly critical of religion.

In the 20th Century, atheistic thought found recognition in a wide variety of

other broader philosophies, such
as Existentialism, Objectivism, Humanism, Nihilism, Logical Positivism and Marxism, as
well as the Analytic Philosophy, Structuralism, Naturalismand Nominalism movements
they gave rise to. Bertrand Russell emphatically rejected belief in God, and Ludwig
Wittgenstein and A. J. Ayer, in their different ways, asserted
the unverifiability and meaninglessness of religious statements.

New Atheism is a social and political movement that began in the early 2000s in favor of
atheism and secularism. It has been largely promoted by a handful of popular radical
 27

atheist writers, including the so-called "Four Horsemen of the Non-Apocalypse": Richard
Dawkins (1941 - ), Christopher Hitchens (1949 - 2011), Sam Harris (1967 - ) and Daniel
Dennett (1942 - ). The movement advocates the view that "religion should not simply be
tolerated but should be countered, criticized and exposed by rational argument
wherever its influence arises".

Types of Atheism

Implicit Atheism is the absence of belief in one or more gods, without a conscious
rejection of it. This may apply to someone who has never thought about belief in gods,
or never been exposed to theistic ideas, or, some would argue, also to newborn
children. Explicit Atheism, on the other hand, is where someone makes a positive
assertion, either weak or strong, regarding their lack of belief in gods.

Another distinction is sometimes made between strong (or positive) atheism

and weak (or negative) atheism. Strong atheism is a term generally used to describe
atheists who accept as true the proposition "gods do not exist". Weak atheism refers to
any type of non-theism which falls short of this standard, and which can therefore be
considered to also include Agnosticism.

A third distinction can be made between practical (or pragmatic) atheism,

and theoretical (or contemplative) atheism. In practical atheism (also known
as apatheism), individuals live as if there are no gods and explain natural phenomena
without resorting to the divine. This may be from an absence of religious motivation; an
active exclusion of the problem of gods and religion from intellectual pursuit and practical
action; indifference and lack of interest in the problems of gods and religion; or
just ignorance or a lack of any idea about gods. Theoretical atheism, on the other hand,
explicitly posits arguments against the existence of gods, and actively responds to the
common theistic arguments (see the section on Philosophy of Religion).

Arguments for Atheism

Some atheists argue a lack of empirical evidence for the existence of deities and are
skeptical of all supernatural beings, while others argue for Atheism
on philosophical, social or historical grounds.

Among the arguments for atheism are:

Epistemological arguments:
Various arguments claim that people cannot know God or determine the
existence of God (arguably equivalent to Agnosticism).
The rationalistic agnosticism of Kant only accepts knowledge deduced
with human rationality, and holds that gods are not discernible as a matter of
principle, and therefore cannot be known to exist. Skepticism asserts that
certainty about anything is impossible, so one can never know the existence of
God. Logical Positivism asserts the meaninglessness or unintelligibility of
 28

basic terms such as "God" and statements such as "God is all-powerful". Non-
cognitivism holds that the statement "God exists" does not express
a proposition and is therefore nonsensical or cognitively meaningless.

Metaphysical arguments:
Absolute metaphysical atheists subscribe to some form of Physicalism, which
explicitly denies the existence of non-physical beings. Relative metaphysical
atheists maintain an implicit denial of a particular concept of God based on
the incongruity between their individual philosophies
and attributes commonly applied to God, such as transcendence, personal
aspect, unity, etc.

Psychological, sociological and economical arguments:

Some thinkers, including the anthropologist Ludwig Feuerbach and the
psycologist Sigmund Freud, have argued that God and other religious beliefs
are human inventions, created to fulfill various psychological and emotional
wants or needs. Marxists like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the Russian
anarchist and revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin have argued that belief in God
and religion are social functions, used by those in power to oppress and
enslave the working classes.

Logical and evidential arguments:

Logical atheism holds that the various conceptions of gods, such as the personal
god of Christianity, are ascribed logically inconsistent qualities(such as
perfection, omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, transcendence,
personhood, etc). Epicurus is credited with first expounding the problem of
evil (the problem of reconciling the existence of evil or suffering in the world
with the existence of a god - see the section in Philosophy of Religion), although
a similar argument is also attributed to Siddhartha Gautama, the founder
of Buddhism.

Anthropocentric arguments:
Axiological (or constructive) atheism favors humanity as the absolute source
of ethics and values, and permits individuals to resolve moral
problems without resorting to God. Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre and Freud all used
this argument to some extent to convey messages of liberation, full-
development, and unfettered happiness.

12. AGNOSTICISM
 29

Agnosticism is the belief that the nature and existence of gods is unknown and
inherently unknowable due to the nature of subjective experience. Technically, this
position is strong agnosticism: in popular usage, an agnostic may just be someone who
takes no position, pro or con, on the existence of gods, or who has not yet been able to
decide, or who suspends judgment due to lack of evidence one way or the other (weak
agnosticism).

Agnosticism maintains that the nature and attributes of God are beyond the grasp of
man's finite and limited mind. Agnostics generally claim either that it is not possible to
have absolute or certain knowledge of the existence or non-existence of God or
gods, or that, while individual certainty may be possible, they personally have no
knowledge. In both cases this involves some form of skepticism.

The earliest professed agnostic was Protagoras, although the term itself (from the Greek
"agnosis" meaning "without knowledge") was not coined in English until the 1880s by T. H.
Huxley.

Types of Agnosticism

Strong Agnosticism:
This is the view (also called hard agnosticism, closed agnosticism, strict
agnosticism, absolute agnosticism or epistemological agnosticism) that the
question of the existence or non-existence of God or gods is unknowable by reason
of our natural inability to verify any experience with anything but
another subjective experience.
Mild Agnosticism:
This is the view (also called weak agnosticism, soft agnosticism, open
agnosticism, empirical agnosticism, or temporal agnosticism) that the existence
or non-existence of God or gods is currently unknown but is not
necessarily unknowable, therefore one will withhold judgment until more
evidence becomes available.
Pragmatic Agnosticism:
This is the view that there is no proof of either the existence or non-existence of
God or gods.
Apathetic Agnosticism:
This is the view that there is no proof of either the existence or non-existence of
God or gods, but since any God or gods that may exist appear unconcerned for the
universe or the welfare of its inhabitants, the question is largely academic any way.
Agnostic Theism:
This is the view (also called religious agnosticism) of those who do not claim
to know of the existence of God or gods, but still believe in such an existence.
Agnostic Atheism:
This is the view of those who claim not to know of the existence or non-existence of
God or gods, but do not believe in them.
Ignosticism:
This is the view that a coherent definition of "God" must be put forward before the
 30

question of the existence or non-existence of God can even be meaningfully

discussed. If the chosen definition is not coherent, the ignostic holds the Non-
Cognitivist view that the existence of God is meaningless or empirically
untestable. A. J. Ayer, Theodore Drangeand other philosophers see
both atheism and agnosticism as incompatible with ignosticism on the grounds
that atheism and agnosticism accept "God exists" as a meaningful
proposition which can be argued for or against.

Support for Agnosticism

Some of the most important agnostic philosophers are Protagoras, T. H. Huxley, Robert
Ingersoll and Bertrand Russell, but many more public figures have been self-confessed
agnostics, including Charles Darwin, Albert Einstein, Milton Friedman, Carl Sagan and Mark
Twain.

The Greek Sophist Protagoras was probably the earliest agnostic. He professed that the
existence of the gods was unknowable in the 5th Century B.C.

Huxley was responsible for creating the terms "agnostic" and "agnosticism" to sum up his
own position on Metaphysics. His agnosticism was a response to the clerical intolerance of
the 1860's as it tried to suppress scientific discoveries which appeared to clash with
scripture.

Ingersoll, known as "The Great Agnostic", was an influential American politician in the late
19th Century, and a strong supporter of Freethought (the philosophical viewpoint that
holds that beliefs should be formed on the basis of science and logic and not be influenced
by emotion, authority, tradition or dogma). He popularized and justified the agnostic
position, which he summed up in his 1986 lecture "Why I Am An Agnostic".

Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian" and "Am I An Atheist Or An Agnostic?" are

considered classic statements of agnosticism. He was careful to distinguish between
his atheism as regards certain types of god concepts, and his agnosticism as regards some
other types of superhuman intelligence. Though he generally considered himself an
agnostic in a purely philosophical context, he said that the label "atheist" conveyed a
more accurate understanding of his views in a popular context.

13. HUMANISM

Humanism is a broad category

of ethical, metaphysical, epistemological and political philosophies in which human
interests, values and dignity predominate. It has an ultimate faith in humankind,
believes that human beings possess the power or potentiality of solving their own
problems, through reliance primarily upon reason and scientific method applied with
courage and vision.
 31

Rather than being a specific doctrine on its own, Humanism is more a general life
stance or attitude that upholds human reason, ethics and justice, and is a component of a
variety of more specific philosophical systems, and is incorporated into some religious
schools of thought. It is an optimistic attitude to life whose ultimate goal is human
flourishing (see the section on Eudaimonism), doing good and living well in the here and
now, and leaving the world better for those who come after.

As an ethical doctrine, it affirms the dignity and worth of all people and their ability to
determine right and wrong purely by appeal to universal human qualities,
especially rationality. It searches for truth and morality through human means in
support of human interests, and focuses on the human capacity for self-determination. It
endorses universal morality (Moral Universalism) based on the commonality of
the human condition.

As a metaphysical doctrine, Humanism believes in a naturalistic metaphysics or attitude

toward the universe that considers all forms of the supernatural as myth, and
regards Nature as the totality of being, and as a constantly changing system of matter and
energy which exists independently of any mind or consciousness. It rejects the validity
of transcendental justifications, such as a dependence on belief without reason,
the supernatural, or texts of allegedly divine origin.

It considers faith an unacceptable basis for action, and holds that it is up to humans to find
the truth, as opposed to seeking it through revelation, mysticism, tradition or anything
else that is incompatible with the application of logic to the observable evidence. It is
therefore generally compatible with Atheism and Agnosticism, but does not require these,
and can be compatible with some religions. It is an ethical process, not a dogma about
the existence or otherwise of gods. To some extent, it supplements or supplants the role
of religions, and can be considered in some ways as "equivalent" to a religion.

As an epistemological doctrine, it supports scientific skepticism (i.e. it questions the

veracity of claims lacking empirical evidence) and the scientific method (the collection of
data through observation and experimentation, and the formulation and testing
of hypotheses).

As a political philosophy, Humanism emphasizes individual freedom and responsibility,

human values and compassion, and the need for tolerance and cooperation, and it
rejects authoritarian beliefs. It affirms that we must take responsibility for our own
lives and the communities and world in which we live.

The term "humanism" was coined in 1808, based on the 15th Century Italian term
"umanista", which was originally used to designate a teacher or student of classic
literature.

History of Humanism p
 32

Humanist thought can be traced back to the time of Gautama Buddha (563 - 483 B.C.)
in ancient India, and Confucius (551 - 479 B.C.) in ancient China, although the term
"humanism" is more widely associated with Western Philosophy.

In ancient Greece, Thales, who is credited with creating the maxim "Know thyself" in the
6th Century B.C., is sometimes considered a proto-Humanist. Xenophanes of
Colophon (570 - 480 B.C.), Anaxagoras, Pericles (c. 495 -
429 B.C.), Protagoras, Democritus and the historian Thucydides (c. 460 - 375 B.C.) were all
instrumental in the move away from a spiritual morality based on the supernatural, and
the development of freethought (the view that beliefs should be formed on the basis
of scienceand logic, and not be influenced by emotion, authority, tradition or dogma).

Many medieval Muslim thinkers pursued humanistic, rational and scientific discourses in
their search for knowledge, meaning and values, and were open to the humanistic ideas
of Individualism, Skepticism and Liberalism. Certain aspects of Renaissance
Humanism has its roots in the medieval Islamic world.

Renaissance Humanism was a movement in Europe, roughly covering the 15th and 16th
Centuries. The revival of the study of Latin and Greek, and the resultant interpretations
of Roman and Greek texts, affected the whole cultural, political, social and literary
landscape of Europe. Humanists were opposed to the dominant Scholastic philosophy of
the day (derived from St. Thomas Aquinas), and this opposition revived a classical
debate which referred back to Plato and the Platonic dialogues. Renaissance Humanists
promoted human worth and individual dignity, and believed in the practice of
the liberal arts for all classes. Such Renaissance thinkers as the Italian poet Francesco
Petrarch (1304 - 1374), the Dutch theologian Erasmus, the English philosopher Sir
Thomas More, the French writer Francois Rabelais (c. 1494 - 1553), and the Italian
scholar Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463 -1 494) can all be considered early
Humanists.

In the 19th and 20th Centuries, various organizations were founded to promote humanist
principles, including the Humanistic Religious Association (formed in 1853), the British
Humanist Association (1896), the American Humanist Association(1941) and
the International Humanist and Ethical Union (1952).

Types of Humanism

Secular Humanism: The branch of Humanism that rejects theistic religious belief
and adherence to belief in the existence of a supernatural world. Secular
Humanists (who are often scientists and academics) generally believe that following
humanist principles leads to secularism (which asserts the right to be free from
religious rule and teachings), on the basis that supernatural beliefs cannot be
supported using rational arguments, and therefore the supernatural aspects of
religiously associated activity should be rejected. The term "humanism" in
general usually refers to Secular Humanism as a default meaning.
 33

Religious Humanism: The branch of Humanism that considers itself religious, or

embraces some form of Theism, Deismor supernaturalism, without necessarily
being allied with organized religion. It is often associated with artists, scholars in
the liberal arts and liberal Christians (especially Unitarian Universalists, Quakers,
Anglicans and Lutherans). Religious Humanists feel that Secular Humanism is
too coldly logical and ignores the full emotional experience that makes humans
human.
Renaissance Humanism (often known as Classical Humanism or
simply Humanism): The initial flowering of humanist thought in the 15th and 16th
Centuries, in opposition to the dominant Scholastic philosophy of the day.
Renaissance Humanists promoted human worth and individual dignity, and
believed in the practice of the liberal arts for all classes.
Post-Humanism (or Posthumanism): A late 20th Century philosophy which
attempts to bring Renaissance Humanism up to date in a modern technological
world, and to counter the allegations of speciesism (discrimination in favour of one
species, usually the human species, over others) and anthropocentrism (the belief
that human beings and human society are, or should be, the central focus of
existence) which have been levelled at Humanism.
Educational Humanism: A current in education which began to dominate school
systems in the 17th Century. It held that the studies that develop human
intellect are those that make humans "most truly human". It was based on the
concept of faculty psychology (which views the mind as a collection of separate
modules or distinct intellectual faculties, such as the analytical, the mathematical,
the linguistic, etc), which has been largely discredited in the 20th Century.
Marxist Humanism: A branch of Marxism that primarily focuses on Marx's earlier
writings, (especially the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" of 1844 in
which he develops his theory of alienation), as opposed to his later works, which
are considered to be concerned more with his structural
conception of capitalist society.
Integral Humanism: The political philosophy developed by the Jana
Sangh movement in India in the 1960s, in opposition to Western political
philosophies which it sees as preoccupied with materialism and over-looks of
the social well-being of the individual. It sees both Capitalism and Socialism as
essentially flawed, and as stimulating greed, class antagonisms, exploitation and
social anarchy.

ARGUMENTS FOR ATHEISM

Though the history of the philosophy of religion has been dominated by attempts to prove
the existence of God, there also exist a number of arguments that seek to disprove theism.
 34

These range from a priori arguments that the concept of God is logically incoherent, to a
posteriori arguments that the world is not the way that it would be if God existed

Arguments for Atheism:

The Presumption of Atheism,

The Problem of Evil,
Problems with Divine Omnipotence (including the paradox of the stone),
Problems with Divine Omniscience,
Problems with Divine Justice,
Problems with Immortality,
Problems with Original Sin,
Problems with Petitionary Prayer,
The Argument from Autonomy,
The Psychogenesis of Religion,
Religion and Memetics.

PRESUMPTIONS OF ATHEISM
Although many atheist philosophers have offered arguments against the existence of God,
some have thought that it is not necessary to do so in order to establish the rationality of
atheism. There is, it is argued, a presumption of atheism; because of the nature of theism,
we ought to be atheists unless we are presented with strong evidence for theism, even if we
do not have any specific arguments for atheism.

There are two types of atheism: weak and strong.

Weak atheism is defined negatively as the absence of belief in God.
Strong atheism is defined positively as the belief that God does not exist.

The presumption of atheism argument comes in two forms,

one relating to weak atheism and
the other to strong atheism.

The Presumption of Weak Atheism

Some weak atheists argue that atheism is the default position because he who asserts must
prove. Theists make the positive claim that God exists. Weak atheists do not make the
positive claim that God does not exist, but merely withhold their assent from the theists
claim that God does exist. According to the weak atheist, because it is the theist that makes
an assertion, it is the theist that bears the burden of proof. He who asserts must prove, and
so unless the theist can offer some convincing argument for Gods existence, the weak
atheist will be justified in his atheism.
 35

The Presumption of Strong Atheism

The same argument does not apply to the strong atheist. The strong atheists position is
just as assertive as that of the theist. The theist asserts that God exists; the strong atheist
asserts that God does not exist. In the hands of the strong atheist, the presumption of
atheism argument must therefore be reformulated. The strong atheist cannot point to the
tentativeness of his position as a reason why he need not offer an argument for it. Instead,
some strong atheists point to the ordinariness of their position as fulfilling this role.

Strong atheism, it is argued, coheres with our observations of the world around us; it does
not go beyond our experiences. Theism, on the other hand, makes extraordinary claims
about spiritual beings, a heavenly realm, and the imminent resurrection of the dead. These
claims, unlike those of the strong atheist, are extraordinary, i.e. they do not fit with our
everyday experiences, and they are therefore to be disbelieved except in the face of
extraordinary evidence.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The problem of evil (or argument from evil) is the problem of reconciling the existence of
the evil in the world with the existence of an omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-
powerful) and perfectly good God. The argument from evil is the atheistic argument that
the existence of such evil cannot be reconciled with, and so disproves, the existence of such
a God.

Christianity claims both that God created the world and that he sustains it. Christianity
claims that God knows all things and is capable of all feats. Christianity claims that God is
perfectly good, and wants only the best for his Creation. If each of these claims is true,
though, then it is difficult to see why God allows the evil in the world to persist. The evil in
the world thus appears to be at least strong and perhaps even conclusive evidence that at
least one of these central claims of Christianity is false.

This discussion will distinguish between four different forms of the argument from evil:

the argument from imperfection,

the argument from natural evil,
the argument from moral evil, and
the argument from unbelief.
Though each of these arguments presents a different problem for the theist to explain, a
different reason for believing that atheism is true, each shares a common form.
 36

The four arguments are, of course, mutually consistent, and so can be and often are
proposed together.

Each of the four arguments from evil begins with the claim that if God existed then the
world would reach a certain standard. The standard anticipated differs between the
different forms of the argument, each argument claiming that the evil named in its title
imperfection, natural evil, moral evil and unbelief respectively would not exist in a world
created and sustained by God.

In each of the arguments this claim is supported by an appeal to Gods nature. If God exists,
it is said, then he is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent. As such, it is suggested, God
would know how to bring it about that the world met the anticipated standard, would be
able to bring it about that that the universe met the anticipated standard, and would want
to bring it about that the universe met the anticipated standard. If God knew how to, were
able to, and wanted to do a thing, though, then surely he would do that thing. If God existed,
then, it seems that he would bring it about that the world met the standard anticipated by
the proponent of the argument from evil.

The next step in each of the arguments from evil is the claim that the world does indeed
contain the evil named, that the world does not reach the standard that it would reach if
God existed. The four arguments thus claim respectively that the universe is imperfect, that
it contains natural evil, that it contains moral evil, and that it contains unbelief. Each
argument concludes from its respective claim that God does not exist. The argument from
evil can, then, be represented as having the following structure:

The Argument from Evil

(1) If God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good.
(2) If God were omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good then the
world would not contain evil.
(3) The world contains evil.
Therefore:
(4) It is not the case that God exists.

Some attempts to solve the problem of evil are general, applying equally to all of its forms.
It is sometimes argued, for instance, that God is not morally good, and so that the first
premise of the argument from evil is false. The third premise has also been questioned;
there are some that deny that evil exists. If either of these solutions is successful, then all
forms of the argument from evil fail.
 37

Most attempts to solve the problem of evil, however, question the second premise of a
specific form of the argument.

THE ARGUMENT FROM IMPERFECTION

The argument from imperfection is one form of argument from evil. The argument from
evil is the argument that the existence of evil in the world is strong, and perhaps even
conclusive, evidence that God does not exist. The argument from imperfection is the form
of the argument from evil that concentrates specifically on the imperfection of the world,
taking the fact that the world could have been better as proof that it was not created by
God.

The first task for an advocate of the argument from imperfection is to establish that if God
created the world then the world would be perfect. This at least appears to follow from
Gods perfection.

The goodness of a creator is proportional to the goodness of that which he creates. A

carpenter who makes a fragile table with uneven legs is a bad carpenter. A carpenter who
makes a strong and beautiful table is better.

As God is a perfect Creator, then, so Gods creation must also be perfect. If God created this
world, it seems, then this must be the best of all possible worlds.

Against this line of thought, objectors argue that there is no best possible world, that every
possible world could be improved in some respect, and so that the idea that a perfect
Creator would necessarily create a perfect world is false.

The second task for an advocate of the argument from imperfection is to establish that the
world is not perfect. This claim, of course, is highly plausible; there are many ways in which
it might be thought that the world might have been better. The world might, for example,
have contained fewer wars, or fewer unpleasant diseases, or fewer destructive volcanic
eruptions. The world, the advocate of the argument from imperfection will maintain,
contains multiple defects, each of which establishes at least the imperfection of its Creator,
and probably the non-existence of God.

If it is accepted both that if God existed then the world would be perfect, and that the world
is not perfect, then it must also be accepted that God does not exist.

The argument from imperfection can therefore be summarized as follows:

The Argument from Imperfection
(1) If God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent.
(2) If God were omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent then the world would not contain
 38

imperfections.
(3) The world contains imperfections.
Therefore:
(4) It is not the case that God exists.

IS THERE A BEST POSSIBLE WORLD?

The argument from imperfection is the argument that if God existed then the world would
be perfect, that the world isnt perfect, and so that God doesnt exist. The claim that if God
existed then the world would be perfect rests on the fact that God is conceived of by theists
as being a perfect Creator.

A perfect Creator, the argument from imperfection suggests, is one that creates a perfect
world. One that creates an imperfect world is therefore an imperfect Creator. This
imperfect world, therefore, even if it was made by some Creator, was not made by God as
he is conceived of by theists. The God of theism, therefore, does not exist.

One response to the argument from imperfection is to deny that there is such a thing as a
best possible world. If there is no best possible world, then even a perfect Creator would
not create the best possible world, in which case it would not follow from the fact that a
given world is imperfect that that world was not created by a perfect Creator. Specifically, it
would not follow from the fact that this world is imperfect that it was not created by God.
The argument from imperfection would have been defeated.

The claim that there is no best possible world, that the idea of a perfect world is incoherent,
is at least plausible. Although there are better and worse possible worlds, for any world
that we can imagine we can imagine a way of making it better. We could for instance,
increase the number of happy people contained by that world. As there is no intrinsic
maximum number of happy people in the world, there is no world for which it is not
possible to increase the number of happy people that it contains.

Further, increasing the number of happy people in a world always makes that world better.
It is therefore true of every world that it could be improved, and so true of no world that it
is the best possible world. Thus far, the defense against the argument from imperfection
appears to be on solid ground.

The concern with this defense against the argument from imperfection is that it proves not
only that the idea of a best possible world is incoherent, but also that the idea of a perfect
Creator is incoherent. If this is the case, then the fact that there is no possible world not
only rebuts the argument from imperfection but also disproves the existence of God. For if
 39

God is conceived of as a perfect Creator and if the idea of a perfect Creator is incoherent,
then the existence of God is impossible.

If the theist is to answer the argument from imperfection by denying that the concept of a
best possible world is coherent, therefore, then he must find some way of explicating the
concept of a perfect Creator that is not dependent upon the concept of a best possible
world.

THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURAL EVIL

The problem of natural evil is a specific form of the problem of evil, the problem of
reconciling the existence of evil with the existence of God. If God is all-knowing, benevolent,
and all-powerful, then why does he allow evil to occur?

There are two kinds of evil in the world: moral and natural; both appear to exist in
abundance.
Moral evils are those evils that are freely inflicted upon humankind by humankind:
deceit, murder, theft, etc.; they result from the choices of free agents.
Natural evils are those evils that occur as the result of natural processes:
earthquakes, forest fires, tsunamis, etc. The problem of natural evil is thus the problem of
explaining why God allows this latter kind of evil to occur.

The most common response to the problem of evil is the defense that holds that God
rightly chose to create humankind free, and that evil is the result of our abuse of that
freedom. Evil is not Gods fault; it is ours.

This defense applies only to moral evil; natural evil does not result from the choices of free
agents, and so cannot be justified in this way. Natural evil therefore poses a greater threat
to belief in God than moral evil.

Two generic responses to the problem of evil question its fundamental assumptions.
The first denies that God is morally good, casting doubt on whether he would
prevent evil if he were able to;
the second denies that evil exists, casting doubt on whether there is a problem to
solve at all.

The Free-Will Defense and Natural Evils

There is, however, an alternative response to the problem of natural evil, associated with St
Augustine, that grants that evil exists but denies that any of it is natural. If this position can
be maintained, then it will be possible to extend the free-will defense to cover not only
those evils usually categorized as moral evils, but also those usually categorized as natural.
 40

The defense works by suggesting that so-called natural evils such as earthquakes,
epidemics, etc. are the work of demonic forces, fallen angels. They are, it is suggested, no
less the result of free will than evils normally classified as moral. This defense thus
effectively denies the existence of natural evils, holding that all evils result from the choices
of free agents, and so that all evils are moral.

Natural Evil is a Punishment for Sin

Another attempt to solve the problem of natural evil sees such evil as a just punishment for
sin inflicted upon us by God. We cannot complain about natural evils, on this view, because
we deserve all that we get. Natural evil, unpleasant though it may be, belongs in the world;
it makes the world more just.

The chief difficulty with this view is that nature is a crude instrument of retribution; it often
smites hardest those that have sinned least. The argument may succeed in casting some
doubt on the supposition that a good God would eliminate all suffering; Gods benevolence
and his justice may exist in tension, and a benevolent God may sometimes will just
punishment. It does not, however, explain the unequal distribution of natural evil that we
observe.

Good Cannot Exist Without Evil

Perhaps a more robust approach to resolving the problem of natural evil is that which
holds that it is necessary for the universe to contain some evil in order for it to contain
some good. Good and evil, according to this position, are relative terms, like up and down
or past and future; one cannot have one unless one has both. If this is correct, if it is
impossible for one to exist without the other, then perhaps God was justified in creating a
world containing evil because it was only by doing so that he could create a world
containing good.

Evil Makes Higher-Order Goods Possible

Even if the previous suggestion is resisted, a similar argument might be proposed, holding
that evil is necessary in order for certain types of good to exist. Specifically, the existence of
evil allows for goods that oppose evil, opening up possibilities for bravery, for compassion,
and for mutual dependence, for example. These higher-order goods could not exist
otherwise. A world without suffering would lack such goods as these, and would therefore
be inferior.

THE ARGUMENT FROM MORAL EVIL

 41

Moral evil is evil that is willfully inflicted upon the world by free moral agents. The problem
of moral evil is the problem of reconciling the existence such evil with the existence of an
omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God. Surely if such a God existed, it is argued, he
would prevent such evil from occurring.

This specific form of the generic argument from evil can be summarized as follows:

The Argument from Moral Evil

(1) If God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent.
(2) If God were omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent then the world
would not contain moral evil.
(3) The world contains moral evil.
Therefore:
(4) It is not the case that God exists.

By far the most common response to the argument from moral evil is the free-will defense.

The free-will defense is the argument that as moral evil results from the choices of free
moral agents its existence is consistent with the existence of God.

The argument works in two ways.

First, it holds that as moral evil is caused by the choices of free moral agents, God is
not responsible for moral evil.
Second, it holds that as it is more important that free moral agents do exist than it is
that moral evil does not exist, God did well in creating such agents even though he knew
that they might choose to abuse their freedom.

A second counter to the argument from moral evil makes use of some of the principles
of the moral argument for Gods existence. If God does not exist, this counter goes, then
there would be no moral standards; everything would be permitted. If that were the case,
though, then there could be no moral evil, for there would be no moral laws that could be
violated. The fact that moral evil exists, then, far from disproving the existence of God,
actually proves it. Just as the theist faces the problem of reconciling the existence of evil
with the existence of God, the problem of evil, then, so the atheist faces the problem of
reconciling the existence of morality with the non-existence of God, the problem of
morality.

THE FREE WILL DEFENSE

 42

The free-will defense is a defense of theism against the argument from moral evil.

The argument from moral evil is the argument that the existence of moral evil is
inconsistent with, and so disproves, the existence of God. (Moral evil is simply evil resulting
from the free actions of moral agents.)

The argument from moral evil has the following form:

The Argument from Moral Evil

(1) If God exists then he is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent.
(2) If God were omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent then the world
would not contain moral evil.
(3) The world contains moral evil.
Therefore:
(4) It is not the case that God exists.

Like all forms of the argument from evil, the key premise of the argument from moral evil is
the second. Is it the case that if God were omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent then the
world would not contain moral evil? If so, then the argument from moral evil appears to be
sound; there is little else in the argument that admits of dispute.

In order to refute the argument from moral evil, then, the theist must show that it is not
necessarily the case that if God were omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent then the
world would not contain moral evil. Under what circumstances, though, for what reason,
might such a God allow such evil?

Theists almost invariably meet this question with the free-will defense. Moral evil is caused
by the free choices of moral agents, they argue. Free agency, though, is a good thing; a
world containing free agents is far better than either a world containing only automata or a
world containing no conscious beings at all. An omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent
God would therefore create a world containing free agents, and in doing so would run the
risk of allowing moral evil to enter into the world.

The first way in which the free-will defense works, then, is by distancing God from the
moral evil in the world. Moral evil is not brought about by God, the free-will defense argues,
but by free agents. God is therefore not the author of moral evil, and so is not responsible
for it.

This conclusion might be criticized, however, in the following way: Even if it is the free
agents that perpetrate moral evils that are directly responsible for them, God does seem to
bear at least some indirect responsibility for them. After all, God created the free agents,
 43

knowing full well the risk that he was running in doing so, and is therefore at least partly to
blame for their abuses of their freedom. God it can be argued, is guilty of negligence in
creating free agents, even if not of actually perpetrating any moral crimes himself.

The second way in which the free-will defense works is in justifying the existence of moral
evil by justifying Gods creation of free agents. The existence of moral evil, the free-will
defense argues, is a consequence of the existence of a greater good: free will. Without free
will there could be no moral goodness; a world without free agents would be morally void.
The good that is the existence of free moral agents, it is suggested, therefore outweighs the
bad that is the existence of moral evil, and God therefore did well in creating free agents
even though he knew that some of them would commit moral evils.

Some have criticized this line of defense by arguing that the good that is the existence of
free moral agents does not outweigh the bad that is the existence of moral evil. Consider
the scale on which moral evil has occurred even in recent history; this is a high price to pay
for freedom; is it too high a price?

Others have thought that the free-will defense fails because God could have created free
agents without risking bringing moral evil into the world. There is nothing logically
inconsistent about a free agent that always chooses the good. There are, then, among all of
the possible free agents that God might have created, some free agents that would always
have chosen the good. Why, it is sometimes asked, did God not create those free agents,
leaving the others uncreated?

A further criticism of the free-will defense imagines a human being using it to justify his
failure to intervene to prevent a crime from being committed. If one of us were able to
prevent a brutal murder, but instead allowed it to take place, then we could not justify our
inaction using the free-will defense. If we were to say that although we could have
prevented the murder, we thought it best to protect the free-will of the murderer by
allowing him to carry out his plan, then we would be judged to have made a moral error.
Why, if this argument would be unacceptable coming from a human being, should we think
it any more acceptable coming from God?

THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

The argument from moral evil attempts to use the existence of moral evil to disprove the
existence of God.
If there were a God, it is argued, then he would prevent such evil; that he does not do so
therefore proves that he does not exist.
 44

An increasingly popular response to this argument is to turn it back against the atheist,
arguing that moral evil not only does not disprove Gods existence, it in fact proves it. The
very existence of a moral standard, this argument runs, presupposes the existence of God.
There can only be moral evil, then, which involves the violation of a moral standard, if there
is a God.

The argument from moral evil is thus taken to be self-refuting. Though it concludes that
God does not exist, it is suggested, it tacitly assumes that he does, and so contradicts itself.
Just as the theist faces the problem of reconciling the existence of evil with the existence of
God, the problem of evil, then, so the atheist faces the problem of reconciling the
existence of a moral standard with the non-existence of God.

There are several reasons for thinking that there can be no moral standards without God.
These are set out in the section on the moral argument for Gods existence.
It is worth noting that it is not only theists that have thought that morality is dependent
upon God.

Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, the atheist existentialist, quoted (or rather misquoted) with
approval Dostoyevsky as saying, If God did not exist, everything would be permissible.
In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre expresses his dismay at the secular moralists who
reject God but leave morality unchanged; much of Sartres philosophy, in fact, is about
working out the consequences of the denial of Gods existence and the lack of objective
values that, in his opinion, that entails.

THE ARGUMENT FROM UNBELIEF

The argument from unbelief (or nonbelief) is a specific form of the argument from evil
developed by Theodore Drange. The type of evil the existence of which is taken to be
evidence against the existence of God by this form of the argument from evil is the evil of
unbelief.

If God exists and is as Christianity takes him to be, the argument from unbelief suggests,
then he wants us all to believe both in his existence and in the gospel. For Christianity holds
that God cares deeply for each of us, and that it is of vital importance that we so believe;
according to Christianity, our eternal fate depends on whether or not we believe in God and
trust in the cross for salvation.
Further, the argument continues, if the Christian God exists then he knows how to bring it
about that we all have these beliefs. For Christianity holds that God is omniscient, and so
knows for each of us what evidence it would take to convince us of these things.
Finally, advocates of the argument note, if the Christian God exists then he is able to bring it
about that we all have these beliefs. For Christianity holds that God is omnipotent;
 45

whatever evidence it would take to convince us of these things, Christianity says, God can
give us.

According to Christian theism, then, God wants to, knows how to, and is able to cause
everyone to believe in his existence and in the gospel. There are people, however, who
believe in neither of these things. Gods failure to make himself known, it seems, can only
be explained by the hypothesis that he does not exist.

The Argument from Unbelief

(1) If God exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent.
(2) If God were omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent then the world
would not contain unbelief.
(3) The world contains unbelief.
Therefore:
(4) It is not the case that God exists.

There are several possible responses to the argument from unbelief. That most often given,
is the argument that faith is valuable, and that divine hiddenness makes faith possible.

DIVINE HIDDENNESS MAKES FAITH POSSIBLE

the argument from unbelief takes the existence of unbelievers as evidence against Christian
theism. If Christianity is true, according to this argument, then God knows how to, wants to,
and is able to convince everyone of his existence. Christianity is thus seen to conflict with
divine hiddenness. That God remains hidden from many of us, that he has not taken the
steps necessary to cause all to believe in him, seems to be evidence against Christianity.
A natural response to this argument appeals to the importance of faith, and to the necessity
of uncertainty for faith. Faith is traditionally seen by Christianity as a virtue. Arguably,
though faith is only possible if the evidence for Gods existence leaves room for doubt.
Gods hiddenness is thus explained as a necessary means of bringing about a great good,
faith.

There are several different ways of understanding the relationship between faith and
reason, but on the traditional Thomist conception of faith, irresistible evidence makes faith
impossible. This is because, on this view, one of the conditions that a belief must satisfy if it
is to constitute faith is that it must be voluntary; faith can only result when we choose to
believe. If our evidence is utterly convincing, though, irresistible, then choice is impossible;
we are compelled to believe. Given utterly convincing evidence for Gods existence, then,
faith would be impossible.
 46

This gives the theist a way of answering the argument from unbelief. Faith is a virtue, but is
only possible if the evidence for Gods existence is imperfect, resistible. God therefore has
reason to give us only imperfect evidence of his existence, to remain at least partially
hidden from us. If our evidence for Gods existence is resistible, though, then it is possible,
even likely, that some will resist it, that there will be unbelievers. Even if God exists and is
as Christianity portrays him, then, we would expect there to be some unbelievers.

There are several difficulties with this response to the argument from unbelief. The
Thomist conception of faith is contentious, as it rests on the idea that belief is voluntary,
which many doubt. Many philosophers think that we cannot choose what to believe at all,
and so that faith of the kind that Aquinas describes is impossible. It is also unclear why it is
that faith, on the Thomist conception, is such a good thing. Is it not better to know
something for certain than it is to speculate on uncertain evidence? Would it not be better,
then, if God did away with faith and gave us all knowledge of his existence by revealing
himself fully.

IS GOD GOOD?

The argument from evil (in all its forms) begins with an assumption about Gods nature: if
God exists, it assumes, then he is omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful) and
perfectly good. Omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness are, according to the
argument from evil, a part of the concept of God.

It is only if God is conceived of in this way that the existence of evil poses a threat to belief
in God. For if God were not all-knowing then evil might exist due to Gods ignorance either
or it or of how to prevent it, if God were not all-powerful then evil might exist due to Gods
inability to prevent it, and if God were not perfectly good then evil might exist due to Gods
willingness to permit it. A simple way to resist the argument from evil, then, is to deny that
God possesses all of these attributes.

This response to the argument from evil is simple, but it is also, to most theists, deeply
unattractive. That God is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good is a pretty
fundamental part of theism. For many, a theism saved at the expense of abandoning one of
these divine attributes isnt worth saving.

Not all have thought along these lines, however. Brian Davies, a philosopher and Christian
(specifically, a Dominican friar), has argued that the argument from evil errs in its
assumption that God is perfectly good. God is perfectly good, according to Davies, but not in
the sense that gives rise to the problem of evil. If Davies is correct, then almost all
discussion of the problem of evil rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Gods nature.
 47

The argument from evil assumes that God is perfectly morally good. If Gods perfect
goodness were of another kind than moral goodness, then it would be perfectly consistent
with his allowing evil to occur.

There are many different types of goodness and perfection; what makes for a perfect wife is
very different to what makes for a perfect racehorse, for example. When we describe
something as good, what properties we are attributing to it will depend on what kind of
thing it is. To describe something as good is to to say that it is a good example of a
particular kind of thing, that it possesses those properties that things of that kind should
possess. The conditions for goodness are thus relative to what kind of thing something is.

The conditions for being a good God, though, according to Davies, have nothing to do with
moral goodness, because God is the wrong kind of thing to be described as morally good.
Moral goodness is to do with fulfilling ones duties, acting in the way that one ought to act.
God, though, has all authority over Creation; he has no duties; there is no way that he ought
to act. To describe God either as morally good or as morally bad is therefore a mistake,
according to Davies; God is an amoral being. Gods perfection, then, does not imply moral
goodness, and so does not entail that he will prevent evil from occurring.

DOES EVIL EXIST?

The problem of evil rests on two eminently plausible background assumptions: that if God
exists then he is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good, and that evil exists in the
world. It is on the remaining premise, which states that if God existed then evil would not
exist, that most discussion of the problem of evil focuses. The background assumptions are
usually granted.

There are, however, two responses to the problem of evil that do not grant the eminently
plausible background assumptions. The first is the denial that God is morally good. The
second is the denial that evil exists.

To most of us, the existence of evil appears to be undeniable. There is widespread suffering
in the world. We have all experienced some amount of pain, both physical and emotional;
evil confronts us all. Some, however, have sought to deny the reality of evil, and so to
eliminate the problem of explaining how evil can exist in a world governed by God.

Christian Scientists are among those that teach that evil is an illusion. The movements
founder, Mary Baker Eddy, wrote, Sin, disease, whatever seems real to material sense, is
unreal. Suffering, on this view, may appear to surround us, but this only an appearance.
 48

It is difficult, however, to dismiss all evil as illusory. If it appears to me that I am racked

with disease, but that appearance is merely illusory, then it is nevertheless a painful
illusion. Even if the disease is no evil because it does not exist, the appearance of disease
remains an evil. Objective suffering may, perhaps, coherently be dismissed as illusory, but
subjective suffering cannot be.

Far more promising than the dismissal of evil as illusory is the Augustinian and Thomist
view that it is nothing more than a privation of good. According to this view, evil is not a
positive thing that is out there in the world, but merely an absence of good. God therefore
cannot be blamed for bringing evil into existence; evil is not a thing and so was not brought
into existence. The idea that the world contains evil (i.e. certain privations of good) can
thus be reconciled with the idea that it was created by a God who would not create evil; it is
only the good in the world that was created, the bad is merely an absence of good.

Even if this account of evil were accepted, however, it would not completely resolve the
problem of evil. For it may still be asked why God neglected to create those goods that are
found to be lacking in the world. Even if evil is simply an absence of good, there is a tension
between this absence of good and the existence of a Creator that knows how to, is able to,
and wants to create all goods. The problem of evil, then, in some form at least persists.

PROBLEM WITH DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE

Omnipotence is a part of the concept of deity; God, if he exists, is omnipotent. It is

sometimes argued, however, that the concept of omnipotence is paradoxical, logically
incoherent, and so that it is logically impossible that there be any being that is omnipotent.
This position, if it can be sustained, precludes the existence of God.

The argument that the concept of omnipotence is paradoxical is best introduced by

presenting the theist with a dilemma. Any one of a variety of questions e.g. Can God create
a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? or Can God create a law that binds himself? It might
be posed in order to introduce this dilemma.

For each of these questions, God, if he exists, will either be capable or incapable of
performing the feat described. The atheistic argument is that either alternative forces the
conclusion that God is not omnipotent. The argument, constructed using the first of the
questions above, therefore has the following structure:

The Paradox of Omnipotence

(1) God either can or cannot create a rock that is so heavy that he cannot lift it.
(2) If God can create a rock that is so heavy that he cannot lift it, then God is
not omnipotent.
 49

(3) If God cannot create a rock that is so heavy that he cannot lift it, then God
is not omnipotent.
Therefore:
(4) God is not omnipotent.
(5) If God exists then he is omnipotent.
Therefore:
(6) God does not exist.

The controversial premises of this argument are the second and the third. Proponents of
the argument defend these premises in the following way. If God can create a rock that is so
heavy that he cannot lift it, then there is something that he cannot do, namely lift the rock
in question. If God cannot create a rock that is so heavy that he cannot lift it, then there is
something that he cannot do, namely create such a rock. Either way, then, there is
something that God cannot do, and if there is something that he cannot do then he cannot
be omnipotent.

One response the paradox of omnipotence is to attempt to dissolve the problem. GB Keene
argued that statements such as God cannot create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it,
despite their superficial linguistic structure, affirm rather than deny Gods power.

The most common theistic response to the problem, however, rests on the thought
that omnipotence is limited by logical possibility. An omnipotent being, it is suggested, is
one that can bring about any logically possible state of affairs. The existence of a rock so
heavy that God cannot lift it, though, is arguably a logically impossible state of affairs. Gods
inability to create such a rock, it is claimed, therefore does not count against his being
omnipotent.

DISSOLVING THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE

The paradox of omnipotence presents the theist with the question Can God create a rock
so heavy that he cannot lift it? This question, it is suggested, cannot be answered in a way
that is consistent with Gods omnipotence. If it is affirmed that God can create a rock so
heavy that he cannot lift it then it must be conceded that God lacks the power to lift that
rock. If it is denied that God can create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it then it must be
conceded that God lacks the power to create that rock. Either way, then, it must be
conceded that there is some power that God lacks, that God is not all-powerful.

One theistic response to this argument is offered by GB Keene. Keene argues that the
negative answer to the question Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? is
consistent with divine omnipotence. That is, Keene suggests that a being that is unable to
create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it might nevertheless be omnipotent.
 50

Keene does this by noting that the negative answer to the question can be phrased in a
number of ways: God cannot create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it, There is no rock
such that God can create it but cannot lift it, and Any rock that God can create, God can
lift, for example. Each of these statements is logically equivalent; they all say exactly the
same thing.

The negative answer to the question Can God create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it?
appears inconsistent with divine omnipotence only because of its grammatical form. It is
only because this answer begins God cannot that it appears to deny a power to God. The
alternative ways of phrasing the negative answer to the question show that this is a mere
linguistic appearance. Though God cannot create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it
appears to deny that God possesses a certain ability, namely the ability to create a certain
rock, Any rock that God can create, God can lift clearly attributes to God a wide-ranging
ability, namely the ability to lift any rock that he can create. It affirms, rather than denies,
Gods power.

OMNIPOTENCE AND LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE ROCKS

The paradox of omnipotence presents the theist with the question Can God create a rock
so heavy that he cannot lift it? This question, it is argued, cannot be answered in a way that
is consistent with Gods omnipotence. If it is affirmed that God can create a rock so heavy
that he cannot lift it then it must be conceded that God lacks the power to lift that rock. If it
is denied that God can create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it then it must be conceded
that God lacks the power to create that rock. Either way, then, it must be conceded that
there is something that God cannot do, that God is not omnipotent.

The most common theistic response to this problem is to argue that God cannot create a
rock so heavy that he cannot lift it, but that this is entirely consistent with his being
omnipotent. Omnipotence, it is suggested, is the ability to bring about any logically possible
state of affairs.

The existence of a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it, it is suggested, is a logically
impossible state of affairs. Omnipotence, though, does not entail the ability to bring about
logically impossible states of affairs, and Gods omnipotence is therefore consistent with his
being unable to create such a rock. The theist thus answers the question Can God create a
rock so heavy that he cannot lift it? in the negative, but nevertheless maintains that God is
omnipotent.

The distinction between logically possible and logically impossible acts has to do with the
idea of self-contradiction. An act the description of which is self-contradictory is a logically
impossible act. All other acts are logically possible.
 51

Creating a square circle, for example, is a logically impossible act. Something is square only
if it has exactly four sides. Something is a circle only if it has exactly one side. No object can
have both exactly four sides and exactly one side. The idea of a square circle is thus self-
contradictory, and so the act of creating a square circle is a logically impossible act.

For a being to be omnipotent, then, that being must be able to perform such feats as
creating the universe, stilling the Sun in the sky, and restoring the dead to life, but need not
be able to create square circles or know that which is false.

The theistic response to the paradox of omnipotence based on the idea that omnipotence is
limited by logical possibility rests on the claim that it is logically impossible to create a rock
so heavy that God cannot lift it. God, of course, is conceived of as a being who can lift any
object, no matter how heavy; there is no rock so heavy that God cannot lift it, and there
could be no rock so heavy that God cannot lift it. The existence of a rock that cannot exist, of
course, is a self-contradiction, a logical impossibility. Creating such a rock, then, is not the
kind of feat that a being must be able to perform if he is to be omnipotent. Gods inability to
create such a rock would not, it seems, compromise his omnipotence.

PROBLEMS WITH DIVINE OMNISCIENCE

Christian theists claim that God is omniscient, i.e. all-knowing. The doctrine of divine
omniscience, though, faces several philosophical objections; there are a number of
arguments in the philosophy of religion that purport to demonstrate that God cannot
possibly know everything. These include arguments that the doctrine of divine omniscience
is logically incoherent, that it is inconsistent with the further Christian doctrine of divine
impeccability (i.e. the doctrine that God cannot sin), and that it is refuted by the fact of
human freedom.

If any of these arguments is successful, then the doctrine of divine omniscience as it is

usually taught will require at least modification, and possibly abandonment. Further, if
being omniscient were thought to be a part of what is involved in being God, then these
arguments against the doctrine of divine omniscience might even constitute proofs of
atheism, of the non-existence of God. Four problems with divine omniscience are worthy of
mention.

The first problem is the paradox of omniscience which is derived from Cantors proof
that there is no set of all sets. Omniscience, it is said, entails knowledge of the set of all
truths. Cantors proof, however, demonstrates that there is no such set. As there is no such
set, it is argued, there can be no omniscient being.

The second problem is the problem of experiential knowledge. Here the argument is that
there are certain facts knowledge of which can only be acquired through certain
 52

experiences. knowledge of what it is like to sin, for instance, can only be acquired by
sinning and that some of these experiences, and so some of these items of knowledge, are
such that they cannot be had by God.

The third problem is that of reconciling freedom and foreknowledge, specifically the
existence of divine foreknowledge with the existence of human freedom. If God knows all of
our future actions, then the future is fixed, but if the future is fixed, it seems that there is
nothing that we can do to change it. The ability to determine our future actions, though, is
what constitutes human freedom. Divine foreknowledge, then, seems to preclude the
possibility of our being free agents.

The fourth problem is the problem of middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is knowledge
of what free agents would have done had the world been other than it is. As the agents are
free, their choice of action cannot be determined by the state of the world, and so cannot be
calculated on that basis. As middle knowledge concerns counterfactual situations, however,
neither can their choice of actions be known by observation of the future. With the two
possible sources of knowledge ruled out, it seems that middle knowledge is an
impossibility.

EXPERIENTIAL KNOWLDEGE

The second type of argument commonly advanced against the doctrine of divine
omniscience is the problem of experiential knowledge. This is that there appear to be
certain kinds of knowledge that can only be acquired by having certain kinds of
experiences. One can only learn what it is like to sin by experiencing sin first-hand; one can
only learn what it is like to feel malice by experiencing malice first-hand; one can only learn
what it is like to be ignorant and powerless by experiencing ignorance and impotence first-
hand.

Some of these experiences, such as those listed above, are of a kind that cannot be had by
God. God cannot sin, or feel malice, or lack power. If, though, there are facts that can only be
known through experience, and God cannot have the experiences by which those facts can
be known, then God cannot know those facts. In that case, the doctrine of divine
omniscience will have been disproven.

The Problem of Experiential Knowledge

(1) There are some items of knowledge that can only be acquired through experience.
(2) Some of the experiences through which items of knowledge that can only be acquired
through experience are acquired are such that they cannot be had by God.
(3) If some of the experiences through which items of knowledge that can only be acquired
through experience are acquired are such that they cannot be had by God, then there are
some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God.
Therefore:
 53

(4) There are some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God.
(5) If there are some items of knowledge that cannot be acquired by God then it is not the
case that God is omniscient.
Therefore:
(6) It is not the case that God is omniscient.
FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE

The argument from foreknowledge is an argument that divine omniscience, or more

specifically divine foreknowledge, is inconsistent with human freedom.

The argument begins with a consideration of the consequences of God knowing everything.
If God knows everything then he knows every act that each of us is going to perform in the
future.

If God knows every act that each of us is going to perform in the future, though, then it is
not possible for any of us not to perform those acts. For if it were possible for any of us not
to perform those acts then it would be possible for us to bring it about that that which God
knows is false. Knowledge, of course, by definition, is knowledge of the truth; one cannot
know that which is false. The idea that that which God knows could be false is therefore
absurd.

Because Gods omniscience entails knowledge of all of our future acts, therefore, it also
entails that it is impossible for any of us not to perform those acts.

The argument continues with a consideration of freedom. Freedom, it seems, consists

precisely in the ability not to do that which we do, in there being a plurality of acts each of
which it is possible for us to choose to perform. If one does not have this ability to choose,
i.e. if there is no plurality of acts that it is possible for one to choose to perform, then one
cannot be free. If Gods omniscience entails that it is impossible for any of us not to perform
those acts that we are going to perform, therefore, then it also entails that none of those
acts will be free.

For those that believe that human beings can and do perform acts freely and will continue
to do so, the argument from foreknowledge can easily be pressed into service as an
argument against the existence of God. For if the existence of an omniscient god is
inconsistent with any of our future acts being free, as the argument from foreknowledge
appears to demonstrate, then the existence of one free future act entails the non-existence
of an omniscient god. Omniscience, though, is a part of the Christian conception of God. If
no omniscient god exists, then God does not exist.
 54

The argument from foreknowledge, presented as an argument against the existence of God,
may therefore be formalized as follows:

The Argument from Foreknowledge

(1) A necessary condition for an acts being free is that it is possible for the agent that is
going to perform the act not to perform it.
(2) If God knows that an agent is going to perform an act, then it is not possible that
the agent is not going to perform it.
Therefore:
(3) If God knows that an agent is going to perform an act, then it is not the case that
that act is free.
(4) If an omniscient God exists, then if an agent is going to perform an act then God
knows that that agent is going to perform that act.
Therefore:
(5) If an omniscient God exists, then if an agent is going to perform an act then it is
not the case that that agent is going to perform that act freely.
(6) There is an agent that is going to perform an act freely.
Therefore:
(7) It is not the case that an omniscient God exists.

One possible concern with the argument from foreknowledge is that it appears to
equivocate between different senses of possible. The possible in (1), arguably, does not
have the same meaning as the possible in (2). The possible in (1) appears to mean
possible given everything that is logically prior to the agents decision to perform the act.
The possible in (2) appears to mean possible given everything that is logically prior to
Gods knowledge that the agent will perform the act. If there is some significant difference
between the senses of possible used in (1) and (2), of course, then the argument will fail.
A demonstration that Gods knowledge that the agent will perform the act entails that it is
impossible in one sense and in another sense (1) that the agents will not perform the act is
not a demonstration that it is impossible in some other sense that sense in (2)is that the
agent will not perform the act. If the argument from foreknowledge equivocates on senses
of possible in this way, then, then (3) will not follow from (1) and (2).

An alternative response to the argument from foreknowledge invokes the argument from
future facts. The argument from foreknowledge purports to demonstrate that divine
omniscience is inconsistent with future human freedom. What appears to be inconsistent
with future human freedom, though, is not the existence of a being that knows facts about
the future, but the existence of those facts about the future whether they are known by any
being or not. The argument from foreknowledge can, it seems, be stripped of all references
to God knowing the future without losing any of its force. What remains after this process is
an argument that there are no truths about the future, a counter-intuitive conclusion. If this
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argument is unsound, if there are facts about the future, then the argument from
foreknowledge must also be unsound. If this argument is sound, if there are no facts about
the future, though, then Gods knowing all facts would not threaten human freedom;
premise (4) of the argument from foreknowledge would be false. Either way, then, the
argument from foreknowledge fails.

PROBLEM WITH DIVINE JUSTICE

Christianity claims that God is just. Setting universalism (i.e. the theory that all are
ultimately saved, that none go to hell) and annihilationism (i.e. the theory that those who
do not go to heaven do not go to hell either, but rather are annihilated) aside, Christianity
also claims that at the end of ones life one either enjoys an eternity in heaven or suffers an
eternity in hell. These claims, it is often argued, conflict. How can a just God treat human
beings in this way?

The argument is most naturally cast as a problem relating to the proportionality of justice.
Just rewards and just punishments are proportional to whatever it is that is being
rewarded or punished. The just punishment for murder is greater than the just punishment
for slander because murder is a greater crime that slander.

Whatever it is that determines whether one is rewarded in heaven or punished in hell Be it

faith, works, or a combination of the two is something that comes in degrees. One can have
more faith or less faith, more good works or less good works.

In order for the rewards and punishments for faith or works to just, then, these rewards
and punishments must admit of degrees. One with greater faith or greater works deserves
better than one with lesser faith or lesser works, and a just system must recognize this;
people must be rewarded or punished to greater and lesser degrees.

Heaven and hell, though, are both all or nothing affairs; they do not admit of degrees: if one
is admitted to heaven, then one receives an infinitely great reward; if one is condemned to
hell then
one receives an infinitely great punishment. On the Christian system, then, there is nothing
between an infinitely great reward and an infinitely great punishment. There is no
sensitivity to degrees of virtue or of sin.

Gods policy of sending some to heaven and some to hell, then, seems to be inconsistent
with his treating us justly. If the Christian view of the afterlife is correct, then God cannot be
just.

THE PROBLEMS WITH IMMORTALITY

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The idea of immortality is central to many religions. Indeed, one of the central questions
that religions seek to answer is that concerning what happens to us when we die.
According to the Christian tradition, the dead will eventually be raised, judged, and either
punished for misdeeds or declared righteous and welcomed into heaven. It is notoriously
difficult, however, to make sense of the idea of life after death on which this teaching rests.
If we cannot make sense of it, then this will undercut an important element of Christianity.

Reconstitutionalism

One theory of immortality is reconstitutionalism. According to this view, a person is

completely annihilated at death, but can (and will) be recreated at a later date, at the
Resurrection.
Reconstitutionalism avoids any scientifically suspect commitments to the existence of an
immaterial soul that exits the body at death. The main difficulty that its advocates face is
that of explaining why we should think that the person created at the Resurrection is the
same person that previously died.

Two people can be identical in all respects without being the same person. Identical twins,
for instance, which are physically identical, are nevertheless two people rather than one.
Two identical twins could, theoretically, be identical not only physically, but in all respects
except identity; they could have identical personality traits, and even lead lives where they
do precisely the same things. The twins would still, however, be two rather than one. This
shows that the mere fact that two people are identical does not entail that they are one and
the same.

Suppose that reconstitutionalism is true, that each of us will die, and that God will
subsequently recreate us. Our resurrected counterparts will be like us in all respects. As
has been seen, though, it is possible for someone to be like us in all respects without
actually being us; our resurrection counterparts could simply be our twins. Why, then,
should we think that our resurrection counterparts are anything more than perfect replicas
of us? Why think that they actually are us?

Augustine, a reconstitutionalist, anticipated this objection to his theory. Augustines

response to the objection was to suggest that personal identity is grounded in physical
continuity, and that God will make our resurrection counterparts by reassembling precisely
the pieces of matter of which we are made.

One problem with Augustines defence of reconstitutionalism is that the matter in the
universe is recycled. What was once a part of Aristotle might have become a part of
Aquinas. When God resurrects the two of them, into which resurrection body will this
matter be placed?
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Dualism
The alternative to reconstitutionalism rests on Cartesian dualism; the only way to make
sense of immortality, it seems, is to hold that we are distinct from our physical bodies, and
so that when our physical bodies die, we ourselves live on.

This approach, however, does not completely resolve the difficulties associated with
Christian eschatology and the idea of the resurrection of the dead. In the Christian dualist
tradition, the afterlife is an embodied afterlife; the dead are to be reunited with their
bodies, albeit in a glorified state. The question as to what body will be raised therefore
remains: will it be a replica, or the real thing? If the real thing, then at what age? And what
of the matter that has participated in several peoples bodies?

A further problem with the dualist account of immortality is that it seems to make a
mockery of death and resurrection. If Cartesian dualism is true, then in death no one dies;
all that happens is that an immaterial soul is stripped of its body. Similarly, if dualism is
true, then in resurrection no one is raised; all that happens is that an immaterial soul is
restored to the body that it once inhabited. According to dualism, death and resurrection
are things that happen to bodies, but not to people, and so are far less significant than is
usually thought.

PROBLEMS WITH ORIGINAL SIN

The doctrine of the Fall offers a reconciliation of the imperfection of the world and the
perfection of its Creator. Gods creation was originally good, according to this doctrine, but
then the first man, Adam, sinned. As a result of this Fall, sin entered the world, and now all
suffer the affliction of original sin.

This doctrine is an important part of the Christian tradition: not only does it exonerate God
from responsibility for the existence of evil, it also grounds the idea that sin is universal
and so that every one of us is in need of salvation. The doctrine of original sin does a lot of
theological work.

There are at least three varieties of fall-theory, three ways in which original sin can be
understood.

First, it can be understood in terms of inherited guilt;

second, in terms of inherited corruption;
third, in terms of individual falls.

Each of these forms of the doctrine, though, has its problems; it is very difficult to make
sense of original sin, to explain it in plausible terms. It may be that the doctrine, despite its
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traditional importance, must be abandoned. If this is the case, then it is a massive blow to
Christianity, and so a powerful weapon in the armory of the atheist.

INHERITED GUILT

Analyses of the doctrine of original sin in terms of inherited guilt hold that we are guilty of
Adams sin and so that we can justly be punished for it. They tend to fall into three
categories:
theories that speak in terms of guilt by identification,
those that speak in terms of guilt by participation, and
those that speak in terms of guilt by association.

GUILT BY IDENTIFICATION
At the time of the development of the various versions of the doctrine of original sin, there
was a live debate regarding the origin of souls. Each person was believed to have their own
soul, but where this soul came from was a point of contention.

Creationists held that as a new person developed in the womb, so a new soul was created.
They were opposed by Traducianists, who believed that a new child began life with a part
of his or her fathers soul. This latter view provides the basis for an explanation of the Fall
and original sin.

According to Traducianists, there was a time when there was just one soul, that of Adam.
When Adam sinned, this soul was corrupted. All human souls that have come into existence
since have not been created from nothing, but rather are cuttings from Adams corrupted
soul. In this sense, we are thought to have been Adam at the time of the first transgression,
and so are also thought to be guilty of that sin and subject to just punishment for it.

Though this view has its place in the history of the doctrine of original sin, it has not aged
well, due to its reliance on a strange form of dualism involving divisible souls.

GUILT BY PARTICIPATION

One of the less plausible attempts to ground the theory that we are guilty for Adams sin in
the Garden of Eden is based on the most literal understanding of seminal identity. This
view rests on the idea that each of us is grown from a seed of our father, a view related to
the mistaken belief that the mother is effectively a vessel for the developing child,
contributing little to it herself.
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According to this view, the seed from which each of us grew was in our father, and the seed
from which he grew was in his father, and so on. The first man, Adam, therefore contained
the whole human race within him. In a sense, we were all present in the Garden of Eden.

According to this rather common explanation, historically speaking, of our guilt for the Fall,
there is no question of imputing someone elses guilt to us. As we were all in Adam in Eden,
we all sinned with Adam in Eden, and so as he became tainted with sin so we also became
tainted with sin. To be clear: this is not because we are to blame for Adams sin, but because
we all collectively sinned; we were all in the Fall together. This is why the Fall was not just
Adams, but the whole of humanitys, and why we face the consequences of and bear the
guilt for it.

If a refutation of this view is necessary, then one way of developing it would go like this:
Guilt is not a property of bodies, but a property of persons. This is why if I were to donate a
lung to someone in need of one, there would be no question as to whether I or they are
liable for my library fines. This is also why it is futile to exact posthumous retribution on
the corpses of criminals: the person is no longer there. It is people, not bodies, that are
liable for library fines, or subject to punishment for crimes.

The theory above, though, holds each of us accountable for the Fall because of the (alleged)
presence of our bodies in Adam in Eden. Even if our bodies were present in Eden, though,
we, as persons, were not. Our bodies were, at that time, incapable of making the free
decisions that ground moral responsibility, and we therefore cannot have participated in
(or be responsible for) Adams sin.

GUILT BY ASSOCIATION

One theory of the Fall suggests that Adam was our representative in Eden, and that we
therefore share the guilt for his sin. There are, however, some very natural questions that
can be raised here: what authority Adam had to represent us and how he came by that
authority is mysterious; we might also doubt whether the notion of representation on
which the theory relies makes any sense at all.
The analogy of the government of a democracy representing its electorate has been offered
in an attempt to elucidate the representation by Adam of all of humanity. When a
government acts, it acts for the people. When a government declares war, it is the whole
country, not just parliament, that enters into battle.

This analogy, though, is not especially helpful. It is reasonable to think that the
governments power to represent its citizens, such that it has, is grounded in the consent of
the majority of the electorate, yet none of us consented to be represented by Adam. If the
authority were not grounded in consent, then a ruling despot would be acting for his
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people just as much as a ruling president. This, though, would be in breach of the principle
that we can only be held responsible for things that we control. The people of a despotic
regime, unlike those of a democracy, have no control over who rules them, and so cannot
be held responsible for their ruler. Whatever the means by which Adam is thought to have
gained the authority to act for us, then, it is not the means by which a democratically
elected government gains the power to represent its people; Adam was not elected.

More importantly, even governments do not have the degree of power of representation
that must be attributed to Adam to make sense of our inheriting his guilt in this way. When
elected officials act badly we feel angry. If, though, elected officials represent us as this
theory holds that Adam represented us, then we ought not to feel anger but shame, for we
share the responsibility for the actions of our governors.

The only real alternative to this foundation for the notion of representation is the idea that
Adam was a representative sample of mankind, that as he sinned, so it was demonstrated
that each one of us would also have sinned had we been in Adams place. Strictly speaking,
this theory does not transfer one sin to many people, but instead convicts each of us of our
own hypothetical sin. As we would sin, given the chance, we stand convicted as if we had
done so. Again, though, this is problematic. A hypothetical sin is not a sin at all, and we
cannot be condemned for what we have not done.

INHERITED CORRUPTION

Accounts of in terms of inherited corruption hold that although we cannot be held guilty for
Adams sin, we nevertheless suffer the consequences of it. Adams sin led to our corruption,
and this is the sense in which we inherit his sin.

Physical Heredity

One way of cashing out this account of the Fall is in terms of physical hereditary. On this
view, the first sin brought about a change in the first man, corrupting his nature, and this
corruption is then passed on through the generations. What is worse, this corruption
predisposes each of its recipients to sin, leading Adams rebellion to be repeated time after
time.

On some versions of this theory, the corruption itself justifies Gods wrath towards us; on
others, Gods wrath is justified only by the sins that this corruption leads us to commit. On
this latter view, Adams sin is seen as the cause of our sinfulness, but Gods wrath is seen as
directed at our own individual sinfulness, rather than that of Adam. It therefore avoids the
problems associated with the idea of .
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The main problem with this account is that sinfulness is an acquired characteristic, but that
acquired characteristics are not inherited. Inheritance is a genetic process, but sin is not in
the genes and so cannot be passed on by this means.

Social Heredity

On an alternative account, social rather than physical heredity is the means by which
Adams sin is transmitted to us. On this view, Adams sin merely set a trend, a bad example.
Each of us who follows this example does so on his own head. Again, this account holds that
Adams sin is a cause of our sinfulness, but that we too play an active role in original sin by
choosing to commit the sins for which we are condemned; Adam is a bad influence, but
nothing more.

The main difficulty with this view is that social heredity appears to be too weak a process
to explain the widespread nature of sin. Although children do imitate their parents to some
degree, not all children imitate their parents in every degree. There is no guarantee that an
example such as Adams will be emulated by all, and so this form of the doctrine of original
sin fails to explain universal sinfulness, and so fails to ground the universal need for
salvation that is so central to Christianity.

INDIVIDUAL FALLS

If the account of the Fall in Genesis is not to be taken literally, but allegorically, then the
question arises: what is the Genesis account an allegory of? Several answers to this
question according to which each of us commits our own original sin have been proposed.

One such account was developed by Origen. Origen suggested that souls sinned to varying
degrees in a previous existence, and the extent of their sin determined the form of their
incarnation. Those who sinned most fell furthest, becoming demons.
Those who sinned least are now angels. We humans are somewhere between the two in
our sinfulness.

Alternatively, understood original sin as a sinful choice of the noumenal self, an a temporal
evil impulse.

Whether theories along these lines can be accommodated within orthodox Christian
theology is questionable, but they do offer alternative ways of understanding original sin
that avoids certain problems associated with traditional accounts.

PROBLEMS WITH PETETIONARY PRAYER

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Petitionary prayer is a fundamental element of Christian practice. It is taught by the

Church, and it is taught by the Bible; it is uncontroversial: Christians ought to pray. Indeed,
one would probably feel inclined to question the rationality of anyone who believed that
there is an omnipotent deity on his side, and yet did not request assistance from that deity
in times of need. How petitionary prayer is supposed to work, though, is difficult to say.
Arguably, this fundamental element of Christianity doesnt make sense.

There is certainly something very strange about the idea of God changing his mind. As God
is omniscient, every decision that he makes he makes in light of all of the facts; there cannot
arise any new information that God failed to take into account that might cause him to
revise his decision. God, then, should never change his mind.

This means that telling God of our needs and asking him to meet them is a waste of time;
God is fully aware both of our needs and of our desires, and will have taken them into
account in making his original decision. Whatever decision he has made, whether it is in
our favor or not, we should not question; our judgment as to what God should do will
surely be inferior to his, and so we should let him get on with doing what he is going to do.

It therefore seems that Christians ought not to pray petitionary prayers. Prayers of worship
and adoration are understandable, of course, but requests for divine intervention seem to
be futile; whatever God is going to do he will do, whatever he is not he will not. Our prayers
wont change that.

THE ARGUMENT FROM AUTONOMY

The argument from autonomy is the argument that the existence of morally autonomous
agents is inconsistent with the existence of God, and so that the fact that morally
autonomous agents do exist disproves the existence of God.

The argument begins with the assumption that God, if He exists, is worthy of worship, an
assumption that will be granted by all traditional theists.

The argument proceeds by asking what it is that being worthy of worship entails,
suggesting that a being worthy of worship is entitled to our unconditional obedience.
Again, the suggestion that God is entitled to our unconditional obedience sits well with
much Christian theism.
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Moral agents, however, the argument continues, cannot be required to give unconditional
obedience to any agent. Moral agency, it is suggested, requires autonomy, and so the idea of
a moral duty to give up ones autonomy is incoherent; in giving up ones autonomy one
would cease to be a moral agent so would cease to have moral duties at all. We cannot,
therefore, have a duty of unconditional obedience to any agent, and in a world that is
populated by moral agents there can therefore be no being that is worthy of worship.

This world, though, is populated by moral agents, and so this world is one in which there
can be no God.

The Argument from Autonomy

(1) If God exists then he is worthy of worship.
(2) If God is worthy of worship then we owe him unconditional obedience.
(3) It is not possible that we owe anyone unconditional obedience.
Therefore:
(4) It is not possible that God is worthy of worship.
Therefore:
(5) It is not possible that God exists.

ARGUMENTS FOR AGNOSTICISM

Agnosticism is the view that knowledge of whether or not God exists is unattainable, that
we cannot be justified in believing either that God does exist or that he does not.

There are two approaches to arguing for this view:

first, it can be argued that knowledge of Gods existence is unattainable because no

evidence could ever justify religious belief;
second, it can be argued that knowledge of Gods existence is unattainable because
evidence of Gods existence is unattainable. One argument of each kind is considered here.

ARGUMENT FROM UNCERTAINTY

Many describe themselves as agnostics because they believe that certain knowledge is
impossible in religious matters. Whatever evidence there might be for or against the
existence of God, both Gods existence and Gods non-existence remain conceivable. If we
form a belief on uncertain evidence then we might turn out to be wrong. It is therefore
better for us to withhold our judgments, to remain agnostic.
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This argument is not especially persuasive. Though it is plausible to think that we cannot
ever attain certainty as to whether or not God exists, this is true of all matters; nothing can
be proved beyond all doubt. Descartes argument from error establishes this: I have made
errors of reasoning in the past, even concerning simple matters, and so can on no occasion
be certain that I am not in error again. In spite of this unavoidable uncertainty, we
nevertheless form beliefs. Why should we not do the same in matters of religion?

A more subtle version of the argument from uncertainty has an answer to this question:
because religion is so important. Religion matters, and that is why we ought to be
particularly careful in forming our religious beliefs.

The more important it is to be right about a matter, the more cautious we should be in
forming our beliefs. If a matter is of great importance, as religion is, then our evidential
standards concerning it should be set high, we should demand strong evidence before
settling on what we believe.

In fact, religion is of unquantifiable importance and there is nothing more important than
being right about the question of Gods existence. we should therefore set our evidential
standards infinitely high.

If this is correct, then the standard of evidence required for justified religious belief is so
high that it can never be satisfied; we can never have enough evidence to form beliefs about
such questions as whether God exists. In this way, the importance of religion works to
suggest that we can never have religious knowledge, that we ought to remain agnostic.

ARGUMENT FROM INCOMPREHENSIBILTY

There is a strong theistic tradition that holds that our ability to comprehend God is limited.
Our concepts are derived from our experiences, and our experiences are of flawed and
finite existence; we therefore lack the conceptual tools necessary to understand what God
is really like. God is incomprehensible to us.

According to this tradition, when we apply our human concepts to God, describing him in
terms that we have derived from our experience of the world, we must take great care. For
God is neither flawed nor finite, and so our standard categories of thought do not apply to
him. When we say that God is good, for example, we must remember that divine goodness
is not the same thing as human goodness. Because Gods being transcends our experiences
of the mundane, he transcends our understanding, and we can describe him only in
borrowed language which fails to accurately describe him.
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In stressing Gods incomprehensibility, the distance between his being and our categories
of thought, this tradition gives ammunition to the agnostic. To the extent that God is
beyond our understanding, knowledge of God is presumably also beyond our
understanding. The greater the distance between God and that which we have known, the
more difficult it will be to answer the question as to whether or not God exists. If God is
truly incomprehensible, then how can we affirm either theism or atheism?

Blaise Pascal, famous for his pragmatic argument for belief in God, Pascals Wager, offered
an argument for agnosticism along these lines. Though Pascal thought that belief in God
was justified because it is in our interests, he thought it impossible to establish Gods
existence by reason.

Pascal first argued for agnosticism concerning Gods nature:

We know that there is an infinite, and are ignorant of its nature. As we know it to be false
that numbers are finite, it is therefore true that there is an infinity in number. But we do
not know what it is. It is false that it is even, it is false that it is odd; for the addition of a unit
can make no change in its nature. Yet it is a number, and every number is odd or even (this
is certainly true of every finite number). So we may well know that there is a God without
knowing what He is. Is there not one substantial truth, seeing there are so many things
which are not the truth itself? [Blaise Pascal, Pensees, Section III]

Having argued that we cannot know Gods nature, Pascal then argued that this agnosticism
should be extended to the question of Gods existence:
We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we also are finite and have
extension. We know the existence of the infinite and are ignorant of its nature, because it
has extension like us, but not limits like us. But we know neither the existence nor the
nature of God, because He has neither extension nor limits. [Blaise Pascal, Pensees, Section
III]

This argument for agnosticism is, of course, ultimately set aside by Pascal. We can, he
suggests, believe in Gods existence by faith, and we can be justified in our faith on
pragmatic grounds. Nevertheless, his argument that our finitude prevents us from knowing
of Gods existence is independent of his pragmatic argument for belief in God, and is the
kind of argument that underpins much agnosticism.