80.

People v Canja, 86 Phil 518

Facts: For
having killed her husband Pedro Jongque, the appellant
Teopista Canja was convicted of parricide by the court of first
instance of Antique, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life,
plus indemnity of P2,000, and costs.

Declaring in her defense, Teopista swore that that night she

suddenly awoke when a man was strangulating her; that she
grabbed a piece of wood and gave the assailant two blows on the
face; that she thereby was able to free herself; that she then
lighted a lamp and found to her amazement that she had killed her
husband. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrob

Issue: WON Teopista is guilty.

Held: This self-defense version was correctly rejected. Firstly,

because the wounds found on the head of the dead man could not
have been the effect of two strokes with a blunt instrument. There
were eleven incised wounds. Secondly, because she never
mentioned the piece of wood to the chief of police, and there is
enough evidence that she signed the confession voluntarily, with full
knowledge of its contents. Thirdly, because she pleaded guilty at
the preliminary investigation on June 2, 1948. Fourthly, if the facts
had really happened as she relates, there is every reason to expect
that she had given the same explanation to her children, who would
undoubtedly have absolved her; and yet we have Exuperia declaring
against her mother, and openly resentful to her. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtu al law lib rary

After reading the record, we have no hesitation to affirm the verdict

of guilt. Our opinion arises not only from the view that her
explanation is non-acceptable, but from the convictions that her
declarations before the police chief and the justice of the peace in
Exhibit C reflected the true facts, and were uttered at a time when
the culprit overwhelmed by remorse had not yet had the
opportunity to yield to ideas evolved by the irresistible instinct of
self-preservation.chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

Appellant must be declared to have feloniously extinguished the life

of her husband. He may have been unworthy. He may have been a
rascal and a bully; but that is no excuse for murdering him. His
badness is not even a mitigating circumstance. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary ch
81. People v Manlapaz

Facts:

This is a rape case involving a thirteen-year-old, mentally retarded girl named Therese Endencia the
daughter of the spouses, Jerome Endencia and Teresita Encarnacion. They resided at 10 Padre
Burgos Street, near Aurora Boulevard, Project 4, Quezon City. Therese, who was born in Chicago,
Illinois, is a fair complexioned girl with mestiza features.

Residing in the same neighborhood in an apartment identified as 1021-M Aurora Boulevard, near the
Marian Bakery, also in Project 4, was a nineteen-year-old, unmarried boy, named Winston Manlapaz
who was studying electrical engineering in the University of the East. That apartment was about five
hundred meters away from the residence of Therese. Nearby, on Calderon Street, was a basketball
court.

Winston stayed in the apartment with his older sister, Bituin Manlapaz, 30, an employee of the
Universal Textile Mills at Barranca Marikina. He has mestizo features also, being the son of an
American mother and a Filipino father who lived in Uson, Masbate. Winston and Therese met at the
basketball court in November, 1972. They became friends. Therese came to know the residence of
Winston. She went there two or three times with her neighbor, Vicky, and her friend, Robin, a
teenager. She got acquainted with Winston's sister.

According to the prosecution, Winston had sexual intercourse with Therese in his apartment in the
afternoon of November 28 and 30, 1972. Winston denied that he had sexual intercourse with
Therese but that denial does not merit any credence. He admits that Therese was in his apartment
on those two afternoons. Whether the sexual intercourse was consumated by the use of force is not
clear since the only witness on that point is Therese hereof. Due to her mental handicap, she was
not able to give a coherent, clear and consistent narrative as to how she was ravished by Winston.

According to Mrs. Endencia since infancy, Therese has a speech impediment. She could not talk
when she was already two years old. As she grow older, she spoke in broken sentences. She was
enrolled in different schools but, as her mother noted, she could not cope or keep up with the other
children. Her parents were advised to enroll her in a special school.

The doctor found that Therese was no longer a virgin. Her hymen had two deep and healed
lacerations at the five and seven o'clock positions. Her vaginal orifice offered slight resistance to the
index finger and the virgin-sized speculum. The lacerations were more than a month old.

On January 12, 1973, at about eleven-forty in the morning, there was a confrontation in the police
headquarters between Therese and Winston. She identified Winston as the rapist (5054 tsn
November 26, 1973). Winstons admitted that there was such a confrontation. It should be stressed
that on that occasion Winston did not make any statement. He was silent (69-73 tsn September 9,
1974).

Manlapaz contends in this appeal (1) that the lower courts judgment is void, (2) that Therese was not
mentally retarded, (3) that her testimony should not be given credence, and (4) that the prosecution's
evidence is not sufficient to warrant conviction.
Issue: WON the prosecution's evidence is not sufficient to warrant conviction.

Held:

As to the merits of the case, we are convinced that Manlapaz had sexual intercourse with Therese
on the two occasions mentioned by her. That fact was ascertained from her by the police
investigator and by the medico-legal officer who examined her. It is noteworthy that Manlapaz did
not deny it at the confrontation in the police precinct. "He who remains silent when he ought to speak
cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent". (31 C.J.S. 494. See Sec. 23, Rule 130, Rules
of Court on admission by silence, which was applied in People vs. Phones, L-32754-5, July 21,
1978.) Although the testimony of Therese at the trial may be vitiated by contradictions and
inadequacies, due to her low intelligence, she, nevertheless, stuck steadfastly to her story that she,
to use her own words, had 4 made baby or had carnal intercourse with Manlapaz in the afternoon of
November 28 and 30, 1972.

Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve years
of age is raped because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse. "Las
mujeres privadas de razon, enjenadas, Idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado mental de
apreciar la ofensa que el culpable infiere a su honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir. Pero
no es condicion precisa que la carenmental que solo la disminuye, sim embargo, la jurisprudence es
discondante" (II Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975, pp. 538-9).

Appellant Manlapaz, taking advantage of Therese's mental deficiency and immaturity (she had
barely reached the age of puberty) and subordinating his wig to his concupiscence or animal
instincts, was able to have carnal intercourse twice with a ten-year-old girl who was not aware of the
disgrace and dishonorable consequences resulting from that immoral act.

The crime committed by the accused is simple rape. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in this case. The trial court properly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua [Arts. 63 and
335(2), Revised Penal Code].

Before article 335 was amended, simple rape was penalized by reclusion temporal or twelve years
and one day to twenty years. Republic Act No. 4111 raised the penalty for simple rape to reclusion
perpetua and made qualified rape a capital offense. Taking notice of the rampancy of sexual
assaults, ensuing from the lawlessness and deterioration of morals occasioned by the war, the
lawmaking body sought to deter rapists by increasing the penalty for rape.

After a judicious consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case, we believe that after
appellant Manlapaz had served a term of imprisonment consistent with the ends of retributive justice,
executive clemency may be extended to him in the discretion of the Chief Executive and Prime
Minister. A copy of this decision should be furnished the Minister of Justice.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed subject to the observation ' n the preceding paragraph as to the
application to this case of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. costs against the appellant.
82: people v estoista

Facts: Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through reckless imprudence
and illegal possession of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted of the first
offense and found guilty of the second, for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This
appeal is from that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional questions. The constitutional
question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection that the penalty
from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.

As to the facts. The firearms with which the appellant was charged with having in his possession
was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son
lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was
partly covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in the plantation
100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima
a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not
perceived by the accused.

The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was with the accused at the
time of the accidental killing.

Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the accident, February 10, 1949, his son told him that
there were wild chickens on the plantation "scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he might
shoot them; that Bruno told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over to
Alberto who is a "sharp-shooter" and "shoots better," and walked about 20 meters behind the young
man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto when the latter fired and accidentally wounded their
servant.

The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I told my father about the said
wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me to shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot
it."

Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son's statements at the
Constabulary headquarters on the same morning of the shooting, and sworn to by them before the
justice of the peace soon after.

Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went to hunt for wild rooster;" that "later on my son
Alberto came to inform me that he had accidentally hit our laborer;" Queried "who was with Alberto
when he went out hunting," Bruno replied, " He was alone."

Issue: Does this evidence support conviction as a matter of law?

It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense as to include "carries" and
"holds." This has to be to is the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils, the same
perils to public security, which the Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of
the possession can have no bearing whatever. "Ownership of the weapon is necessary only insofar
as the ownership may tend to establish the guilt or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in
the United States, where the right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the federal and many state
constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely restricting the carrying of deadly
weapons, and the power of state legislatures to do so has been upheld.

The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not susceptible of exact definition,
and opinions on the degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation
vary. The rule laid down by United States courts rule which we here adopt is that temporary,
incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon. A typical example of such possession
is where "a person picks up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment, or to
shoot at some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; C.J., 22)

Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or carrying of his father's gun was not
incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his father's sight and control, he carried the
gun for the only purpose of using it, as in fact he did, with fatal consequences.

The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty authorized by Republic Act No.
4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years.
However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent
would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be furnished to the
President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the imprisonment herein
imposed be reduced to six months. the appellant will pay the costs of both instances.
85 People v Olaes

Facts: Defendant-appellant Eugenio Olaes, together with Cosme Isip and Bienvenido Dayuta, who where
then at large and five other men, unidentified and also at large, were accused of the crime of attempted
robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Olaes was the only
one who stood trial, after which he was found guilty of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide

Issue: The facts in this case as established by the evidence and found by the trial court are the following:
Between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m. of November 9, 1954, Bus No. 64 of the Laguna Transportation Company,
driven by one Feliciano Limosnero, with one conductor, left the town plaza of Bian, Laguna, bound for
Manila. Among the passengers were Mariano Inobio, a resident of Bo. Almanza, Las Pias, Rizal, Maria
Argame and Elena Loyola. When the bus reached the curve in Bo. Almanza, Las Pias, a man later identified
by passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or carbine, suddenly appeared on the right side of the
road and signalled the bus to stop. Limosnero, taking him for a prospective passenger, applied his brakers
and slowed down, but before the vehicle could come to a complete stop, seven other men, also carrying
guns, such as, garands or carbines, emerged from the left side of the road. Isip shouted, "Para, pasok!" The
appearance of these armed men on both sides of the road must have affected the equanimity of Limosnero
on the wheel, and he must have the forgotten to press the clutch with his foot, resulting in the engine
stalling or stopping. Probably convinced that the eight men were not passengers but were bent on holding-
up the bus and robbing the passengers, Limosnero started the engine and sped away from the place despite
the shouts of the men on both sides of the road for him to stop. Those men immediately commenced firing
at the bus which was riddled with bullets.

One of the shots grazed the head of Limosnero. Another shot hit passenger Maria Argame on the back, the
slug penetrating the abdominal wall and entering the abdominal cavity. Still another shot struck passenger
Elena Loyola on the shoulder, fracturing her right clavicle. When the bus was out of range of the guns of the
eight men on the road and they had ceased firing, passenger Inobio on rising from his prone position in the
bus, saw driver Limosneros wound on the head, which was bleeding profusely, the blood dimming his
vision, and so he took over the wheel. On reaching Zapote, an inspector of the Laguna Transportation
Company took over the wheel from Inobio and drove the bus straight to the Las Pias Municipal Building
where the incident and shooting was reported to the police. Thereafter, the same bus, with a police officer,
drove straight to Manila and to the Philippine General Hospital. Maria Argame was pronounced dead on
arrival. The fracture of the right clavicle of Elena Loyola necessitated an operation, which was performed,
and she was confined in the hospital for about twenty days, after which she was discharged, though she was
not completely recovered, to continue treatment at home. The expert testimony on her condition is that if
she had not been given prompt medical attention, she would have died from her wound, Driver Limosnero
was treated at the same hospital for his head would and was released, but treatment was continued by the
bus company for about a month.

During the trial, passenger Inobio, star witness for the Government, told the court that he clearly identified
the person standing on the right side of the road, who signalled the bus to stop and who cried out "Para
pasok!" as Cosme Isip. Inobio also said that among the seven ammend men who emerged from the left side
of the road and who fired at the bus when it sped away, he saw and clearly identified defendant-appellant
Olaes, because he is a barriomate, both of them being residents of Bo. Almanza, Las Pias, and that Olaes
was then carrying a gun, either a garand or carbine.
Held: WON Eugenio Olaes is guilty.

After a careful study of the case, we fully agree with the trial court that defendant Eugenio Olaes is guilty.
However, it will be remembered that the charge against him was for attempted robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide. Under this charge, as the Solicitor General well said, he may not be convicted of
consummated robbery with homicide as the trial court did. Moreover, we agree with the prosecution that
inasmuch as no overtacts pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof have been established, the killing
of one passenger and the wounding of two others should be considered as plain murder, frustrated murder,
and physical injuries respectively.

The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and in band, there being more than
three armed men in the group of malefactors, attended the commission of the crimes. The aggravating
circumstance of in band may be considered to qualify the act of killing of Maria as murder, and the wounding
of Elena as frustrated murder. The evidence for the defense was to the effect that appellant surrendered to
the authorities when he found out that he was wanted by the constabulary. This was not refuted by the
prosecution and so, it can be regarded as a fact. This mitigating circumstance will compensate the other
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The penalty for murder which is reclusion temporal in its maximum
degree to death, should therefore be imposed in its medium period, namely reclusion perpetua, so that in
the result, we agree with the trial court as to the penalty imposed by it.

As to the physical injuries, the evidence shows that the period within which the injuries on the head of
Limosnero were treated was less than 30 days, for which reason, the offense as to him should be considered
as less serious physical injuries. For this, appellant is hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto
mayor.

Where the crime charged was for attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide, the defendant
may not be convicted of consummated robbery with homicide. Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there
were no overt acts pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof have been established, the killing of one
passenger and the wounding of two others should be considered as plain murder, frustrated murder, and
physical injuries, respectively.
105. US v Basa, 7Phil 89

Facts:

The municipality of Gasan, on the Islands of Marinduque advertised for proposals to furnish the municipality
with street lamps. The defendant, in answer to such advertisement, submitted a proposition in writing by
which he agreed to furnish the municipality the lamps at a price therein named. He was at that time a
member of the municipal council.

Issue:

WON Section 28 punishes an attempt to commit this crime.

Held:

Section 28 does not punish an attempt to commit this crime. In offenses created by acts of the Commission,
the last paragraph of article 3 of the Penal Code relating to attempts to commit crimes is not applicable.

Section 28 of the Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"(a) No municipal officer shall be directly or indirectly interested in any contract work, or cockpits,
or other permitted games and amusements or business of the municipality, or in the purchase of
any real estate or any other property belonging to the corporation.

"(b) Any officer violating the provisions of this section shall, upon a two-thirds vote of all the
members of the council, be removed from office; and, upon trial and conviction in a court of
competent jurisdiction, shall be imprisoned for not less than six months and not more than two
years."cral

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the defendant is acquitted of the complaint, with the costs
of both instances de oficio.

After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let
the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for execution. So ordered.

The last paragraph of article 3 of the Penal Code relating to attempts to commit crimes is not applicable to
crimes defined by laws of the Commission.
106. People v Hernandez, 49 Phil 980

Facts: The defendant is accused of the crime of rape, the information alleging "that on or about the
26th day of February, 1925, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of force and by intimidating one Conrada Jocson with killing
her with a knife which said accused held in his hand should she not accede to his wish, did then and
there lie with and have carnal knowledge of said Conrada Jocson, a girl under 12 years of age. That
in the commission of the crime the following aggravating circumstances existed to wit: (1) The
accused is the husband of the grandmother of said Conrada Jocson and (2) the crime was
committed with grave abuse of confidence, inasmuch as the offended and the accused living in the
same house."

The defendant is a man 70 years of age and the offended party is a child of 9 years, the
granddaughter of the defendant's wife. There can be no question as to the defendant's guilt. The
evidence shows that he and the offended party were living in the same house and that taking
advantage of the absence of the other inhabitants of the house, he had intercourse with the child by
force and violence. He admits that he did so, but maintains that he was intoxicated at the time and
did not know what he was doing. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is, however, to
the effect that he did not show any signs of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime or
immediately afterwards.

The court below found the defendant guilty of frustrated rape and sentenced him to suffer ten years
and one day of prision mayor. In holding that the crime was frustrated, the court seems to have been
of the opinion that there can be no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen.

Issue: WON the the defendant guilty of the consummated crime of rape

Held: In the present case the physician who examined the offended party immediately after the
commission of the crime found the labia and the opening of the vagina inflamed together with an
abundance of semen, though the hymen was intact. It also appears from the evidence that the
defendant lay on top of the child for over fifteen minutes and continued his efforts of penetration
during that period; the child testifies that the defendant succeeded in a partial penetration and that
she felt intense pain. In these circumstances, the crime must be regarded as consummated.

The judgment appealed from is therefore modified by finding the defendant guilty of the
consummated crime of rape and, in view of the aggravating circumstances mentioned in the
information, the penalty imposed upon the defendant is hereby increased to seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. In all
other respects the judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.