Methodology of Comparative Legal Research Law and Method BJu Tijdschrifteng

12/19/2017 MethodologyofComparativeLegalResearchLawandMethodBJuTijdschriften
DOI:10.5553/REM/.000010
MethodologyofComparativeLegalResearch
MarkVanHoecke
Aanbevolenciteerwijzebijditartikel
MarkVanHoecke,'MethodologyofComparativeLegalResearch',LaMdecember
2015,DOI:10.5553/REM/.000010
Researchersgeteasilylostwhenembarkingoncomparativelegalresearch.
Themainreasonbeingthatthereisnoagreementonthekindof
methodologytobefollowed,norevenonthemethodologiesthatcouldbe
followed.1Moreover,almosteverythingthatwasmoreorlessestablishedin
theareaofcomparativelawoverthelastcenturyhasbeenincreasingly
criticizedduringthelastfewdecades:theconceptoflegalfamily,the
possibilityofcomparisonitself,theobjectofcomparison,etc.
Ontheotherhand,comparingdomesticlawwiththewaythesameareahas
beenregulatedinoneormorecountrieshasbecomealmostcompulsoryin
doctrinallegalresearch.Alsoinlegalpractice,globalizationandmost
notablyEuropeanizationinvolvecomparativeresearch.
Howshouldacomparativeresearchercopewiththisapparentparadox?
Inthispaper,anattemptismadetoworkoutamethodologyfor
comparativelegalresearch,whichgoesbeyondthefunctionalmethodor
methodologicalscepticism.Thestartingpointistheideathatweneeda
toolbox,notafixedmethodologicalroadmap,andthatalotofpublished,
butlargelyunnoticed,researchoutsideruleandcaseorientedcomparative
lawoffersvaryingapproaches,whichcouldusefullybeappliedin
comparativeresearch.Basically,itistheaimoftheresearchandthe
researchquestionthatwilldeterminewhichmethodscouldbeuseful.2
Moreover,differentmethodsmaybecombined,astheyarecomplementary
andnotmutuallyexclusive.Thispaperfocusesonscholarlycomparative
legalresearch,notontheuseofforeignlawbylegislatorsorcourts,but,of
course,themethodologicalquestionsandanswerswilllargelyoverlap.
1Whycompare?
Dooruwgebruikvanonzewebsitesgeeftuaanakkoordtegaanmethetgebruikvancookiesoponzewebsites.Voormeer
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informatieklikhier.
https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/RENMD1400001 1/40
Attheendofthenineteenthcenturyandearlytwentiethcentury,inFrance,
RaymondSaleillesandotherssawcomparativelawmainlyasaninstrument
forimprovingdomesticlawandlegaldoctrine,asawaytorenovatingthe
fossilizedapproachofthestilldominatingExegeticSchooltotheCivilCode
anditsinterpretation(Saleilles1911,p.22).3
Bytheendofthetwentiethcentury,manylegalscholarsinEurope
consideredcomparativelawtobethenecessaryinstrumentfora(desirable)
harmonizationoflawwithintheEU.
Hence,accordingtothecircumstances,theremaybedifferentaimsand
divergingreasonsforcomparinglegalsystems.
Inageneralway,PatrickGlennhasansweredthisquestionunderthe
headingAimsofComparativeLaw.4Helists(a)comparativelawasan
instrumentoflearningandknowledge5(informationonthelawelsewhere
andabetterunderstandingthereof),(b)comparativelawasaninstrument
ofevolutionaryandtaxonomicscience(commonevolutions,diachronic
changes,legalfamilies),(c)contributingtoonesownlegalsystem
(understandingitbetter,includingtheresistanceofitstraditions,improving
it,usingitasameansforinterpretingtheconstitution),and(d)
harmonizationoflaw.However,Glennstronglycriticizesmuchofthe
ideologythatunderliestraditionalcomparativelawandlargelystilldoes
today.Thereistheconstructivistbeliefintheuseofforeignlawforones
own,otherwisenicelyprotected,nationallegalsystem,orinharmonizing
lawbeingjustatechnicalmatter,orintaxonomiesofcoherentlegal
families.ThereisalsoalotofWesternimperialisminwhatWilliam
TwininghascalledtheCountryandWesternapproachofcomparativelaw
(Twining2007,p.6989).Nevertheless,eveninamoreopen,pluralistand
lessconstructivistcomparativeresearch,thementionedaimsarestilllargely
valid,Glennconcludes.
Inconcretecomparativeresearchprojects,itistheaimoftheresearchand
theresearchquestionsthatwillimplysomeformofcomparativelaw(or
not).Iftheaimoftheresearchismakingsomepartofthedomesticlaw
morecoherentonemaywelldowithoutanyexternalcomparison.Iftheaim
istoharmonizethelaw,e.g.,withintheEU,comparingthelegalsystems
involvedisalreadyimpliedbythisaim,butalsotheapproachtobefollowed
ispartlydeterminedbyit,asthefocuswillbeonthecommonalities,onthe
commoncoreofthecomparedlegalsystemsandonthepossiblewaysof
erasingdifferences.
Whenonetriestoimproveonesownlegalsystem,beitasalegislatororas
ascholar,ithasbecomeobvioustolookattheothersideoftheborders.
However,importingrulesandsolutionsfromabroadmaynotworkbecause
ofadifferenceincontext.Hence,amorethoroughcontextualapproachmay
berequired.
Onemayalsowanttoinquiretowhatextentalegalevolutioninonesown
countryfindsparalleldevelopmentsinothercountries.Aparamount
exampleisthedevelopmentsinfamilylaw,mainlyinEurope,overthelast
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halfcentury(seee.g.,Antokolskaja2007BoeleWoelki,Dethloff&Gephart
informatieklikhier.
2014).
WhencomparingofficialstatelawinAfricancountrieswithlocalcustomary
law,onewillnoticethattheyshowatensionbetweentraditionand
modernity,betweenWesternlawonlyfollowedbyaneliteandAfricanlaw
asthelargemajorityofthepopulationperceiveit.Hence,an
anthropologicalapproachthatputsthelawincontextwillbenecessaryfor
explainingthistension,forunderstandingitandforfindingsolutionsforit.
Ifonesresearchquestionwouldbewhetherthepositionofthenotary
publicinsomecontinentalEuropeancountrycouldbeabolishedand
replacedbyacivilofficerorbyapractisinglawyer(advocate),itseems
ratherobvioustohavealookatthecommonlawcountrieswheresucha
specificprofessiondoesntexist.
Allscholarlyresearchimpliescomparisons.Scholarlylegalresearchoften
requirescomparingonesownlegalsystemtoanotherone.Here,wewill
focusoncomparingnationallegalsystems,asthisisthemostcommon
geographicallevelofcomparison.
2Choiceoflegalsystemstobecompared
Comparativeresearchisstillmainlyaboutcomparingnationallegal
systems,evenifdifferentformsofglobalization,suchasEuropeanization,
andanincreasingrecognitionofnonstatelaw,suchascustomarylaw,
religiouslaworunofficiallawmakingbyinternationalcompaniesare
challengingtheveryconceptoflegalsystem.Here,wearenotenteringinto
thatdiscussion(VanHoecke2014,p.4357).Inpractice,whenchoosing
nationallegalsystemstocomparewith,most(individual)researcherswill
makeachoiceonthebasisoftheirknowledgeoflanguages,whichexplains
whymostcomparativeresearchintheAngloSaxonworldisfocusingon
comparingcommonlawcountriesthatstilluseEnglishastheir(main)
officiallanguage.6Thismakescomparativeresearchinmostareasofthelaw
quiteeasy,asthewholeconceptualframeworkandtheolderhistoryofthe
commonlawisalsothesameforalllegalsystemscompared.However,such
researchmaybeusefulattheinformativelevel,forbusinessmenfor
instance,butisnotentirelyusefulinthecontextofbroaderscientific
research.
Increasingly,sometranslationsoflegaltextsinEnglishareavailablefor
mostcountriesallovertheworld.However,theytendtocoveronly
legislationanddonotalwaysfollowchangesmadetothelaw,sothatthey
mayrapidlybeoutdated.Thesamegoesforgeneralintroductionsin
English,tothelaworaspecificareaofit,ofindividualcountries.Itmaybe
desirabletousesuchinformationinsomecases,forinstanceasa
confirmationofwhathasbeenfoundelsewhere,butforathorough
comparativeresearchagoodreadingknowledgeofthelocallanguage7isan
absoluterequirement.EvenforalimiteduseofEnglishlanguage
publicationsonthelawofacountryofwhichtheresearchercannotreadthe
locallanguage,itishighlyrecommendedtocheckwhetheronesown
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interpretationiscorrectandwhethertherehavebeenanyrecentchangesin
informatieklikhier.
thatlaw,bycontactingalocalscholarwhospeaksEnglishoranother
languagetheresearchermasters.Forthis,awellelaboratednetworkof
colleaguesinthesameareaoflawisveryvaluable.
Evenwhenonesknowledgeoflanguageswillbetheprimereasonfor
choosingoreliminatingsomecountry,theresearchershouldbeabletogive
goodreasonswhyherchoiceisacceptablefromascholarlypointofview.
Forinstance,whenstudyingthedivisionbetweenpubliclawandprivate
law,itmakessensetofocusonFranceandontheUK,astheymaywellhave
themostopposedviewsonthematter.Thismaybeusedasastrong
argument,sothattheresearchermayleaveasideherinitialproblemthat
FrenchandEnglishmaybetheonlytwolanguagessheknows.
Forlargerprojects,aninternationalteam,thatmasterstogetherallrequired
languages,maybethesolution,ontheconditionthattheinternal
communicationwithinthegroupissufficientlyintenseandqualitatively
good.Everymemberoftheteamshouldbeabletodetecttherelevant
commonalitiesanddifferencesbetweenthestudiedlegalsystemsandtheir
contexts,and,moreover,beabletoexplainthemclearlytotheother
membersoftheteam.Inthecaseofsuchteamsthechoiceoflegalsystems
tobecomparedmaybebasedonmorerelevantcriteriathantheaccidental
(lackof)knowledgeoflanguagesofindividualresearchers.However,one
hastobeawarethatlackofsufficientunderstandingofforeignlegalsystems
mayarisefromanimperfectcommunicationwithintheteam.
Itisalsoriskytoinvolvelegalsystemswithlegalculturesoneisnotfamiliar
with,atleasttosomeextent,atthestartoftheresearchproject.Assume
thataresearchteamwantstosetupaworldwideresearchprojecton
divorce.Forthis,theydraftalengthyquestionnairewithallkindsof
questionsonthegroundsfordivorce,ontheprocedureandonthelegal
consequencesofeachtypeofdivorce.Afterthis,theycontacttheirnetwork
foransweringthosequestions.However,theresponsewillbelargelybiased
iftheybasedthequestionnaireonWesternlawonly.Indeed,itwillnottake
intoaccounttherepudiationofawifeunderIslamiclaw,whichsometimes
hasbeenequatedtodivorcebymutualconsentinEurope.Itwillnottake
intoaccounttraditionalmarriageinAfricancountries,wherelegislation
onlyregulatesofficial(andmonogamous)marriage,eveniftraditional
marriage,concludedaccordingtocustomarylaw,isaccepted.This
customarymarriagelargelydoesntincludetheconceptofdivorce,noris
thereaneedtodosoinviewofthe(unlimited)polygamysetup.Thismeans
that,beforesettingupalargecomparativeresearchprojectofthiskind,one
hastodefinedifferentlevelsofcomparison,onthebasisofsuchelements
andtheircorrectunderstanding.Onecannotstudydivorceinterculturally
withoutabroaderunderstandingofmarriage,oftheroleoffamilies,ofthe
generalattitudetodivorceineachofthecomparedsocieties.
Thewordingoftheresearchquestionwillbethemaincriterionforthe
choiceoflegalsystemstobecompared.
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If,forinstance,onewantstoinquiretowhatextentthelawoncontractsfor
informatieklikhier.
rentinghousesorflatscouldbeharmonizedwithintheEuropeanUnion,the
lawofthe28memberstateswillhavetobestudied.However,iftheworking
hypothesiswouldbethatsuchharmonizationisnotpossible,itmaysuffice
tostudytwolegalsystems,suchastheFrenchandtheEnglishone,ifone
mayprovethatharmonizationbetweenthosetwolegalsystemswouldbe
impossibleand,hence,anyharmonizationwithinthewholeoftheEU.
Ifonewouldliketostudytheroleofthekingorqueeninkingdoms
worldwide,orthewayfederalstatesareorganized,oneshouldinprinciple
involvealllegalsystemsthatarerelevantforthistopic.Inpractice,however,
amuchmorelimitedselectionofcountriesmaystillbequiterelevantand,
hence,suffice.Comparing,forinstance,justtheUSandGermanymayallow
togodeeperintothehistoricaldevelopmentswhichexplainthecurrent
situationandintothewaythesefederalstructuresworkinpractice.Ifone
wantstochallengetheconceptoffederalstateitself,acomparisonwiththe
structureoftheEuropeanUnionmaylookquiteattractive.
Anotherapproachmaybetolookfirstatthereasonsforamore
decentralizedorganizationofacountry:historicalcoincidence,makingthe
practicalorganizationofalargestatefeasible,livingtogetherofvarious
communitieswithdifferentlanguages,religions,and/orcultureswithinthe
samestate,etc.Ifonewantstoinquirehow,forinstanceafederalstructure,
orsomespecificpartsofit,hascontributedtoapeacefullivingtogetherof
peoplewithinthesamestate,itmaybemorerelevanttocompare,for
instance,Belgium,Canada,andNigeriathantheUSandGermany.
3Whathastobecompared?
Inthenineteenthcentury,associationsandjournalswerefoundedon
comparativelegislation.Atthattime,therewasafocusoncomparingrules
indifferentsocieties.8Lateron,moreattentionwaspaidtojudicial
decisionsandthewaylegalproblemsweresolvedinpractice.9Meanwhile,
manyauthorsoncomparativelawemphasizealsotheimportanceoftaking
intoaccountthesocioeconomicandhistoricalcontextofthelawwhen
carryingoutcomparativelegalresearch.
Wherehasthecomparativeresearchertolookforinforeignlegalsystems:
legislation,and/orcaselawand/ortheirentirecontext?Relevantlegislation
and(published)caselawmaybefoundrelativelyeasily.Inthefirstplace,in
doctrinalbooksandarticles(muchlessinItaly,however,wherelegislation
isoftendiscussedwithoutdirectreferencestocaselaw)and,formorerecent
monthsandyears,throughelectronicdatabases.Butwhattodowiththe
contextofthelaw?Occasionally,someexplanationsmaybefoundin
doctrinallegalwritings,butuntilnowthishasbeenratherexceptional.
Sometimesitwasexplainedwidelyintheinternationalpress,suchasthe
financialcrisisasthecontextandexplanationforsomedomesticand
Europeanchangesinregulationsofthefinancialsector.Sometimes,the
researchermaydiscoverhistorical,sociological,and/oreconomicliterature
onhertopicforacountryincludedinthecomparison,butthatisnot
obviouseither.Whereassomelimitedsocialscienceresearchmaybe
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feasiblewithinthecontextofonesownlegalsystem,forforeigncountries
informatieklikhier.
thiswill,asarule,beexcludedwithintheframeofresearchinlawcarried
outindividually.
Muchwilldependonthefocusofonesresearchandontheavailable
sources.Agoodbalancebetweenbothwillguaranteethefeasibilityofthe
researchdesign.Anoverlyambitiouslawincontextapproachforatopic
wherethereareinsufficientavailablesourceswillmaketheresearchplan
unrealisticwithinthecontextofcomparativelegalscholarship.
Inshort,comparingonlylegislationisriskywhenthereisnoinformation
availableonhowitworksinpractice,andsuchalimitedcomparisonisonly
acceptableforcountrieswhicharenotatthecoreofonescomparative
research.Forinstance,whencomparingonesdomesticlawwithGerman
law,theresearchermayaddthatthelegislationisthesameinSwitzerland
and/orinAustria,withoutmakingathoroughanalysisofthoselegal
systemsinrelationtothispoint.
Comparingcaselaw(andlegislation)willrequiresomeknowledgeofthe
historicalandsocioeconomiccontextthattranspiresfromtheavailable
sources.Whencomparingneighbouringcountries,theresearchermayhave
ageneralideaofhistoricaland/orsocioeconomicsimilaritiesand
differences.Fordifferences,somebetterinsightintothatcontextwillbe
required.Also,focusingonpracticalsolutionstolegalproblemsshouldnot
dissociatethelegalsolutionsfromtheirdoctrinalcontext,assomesolutions
maybeaccidentallysimilar,whichmayhidemoreimportantdifferencesat
theleveloftheconceptsusedandthesystemicbuildingofthatareaofthe
law.
Fullycomparinglawincontextwithinindividualresearchwillonlybe
possibleifoneisluckytofindsufficientrelevantsourcesandliteraturefor
eachofthelegalsystemstobecompared.
Otherwise,teamresearchwillberequired,preferablywithan
interdisciplinaryteam.Again,someroughunderstandingofdifferencesand
similaritiesbetweenthelegalsystems,andoftherelevantcontextfor
explainingthem,willbeaprerequisiteforsettinguptheresearchproject
andselectingnotonlythelegalsystemstobecompared,butalsothe
disciplinesrelevantforthecontextresearch.Whencomparingbankinglaw,
forinstance,onemayassumethateconomicsismostrelevantforexplaining
similaritiesanddifferences,butmaybehistoryand/orpsychologywould
eventuallyappeartobeevenmorerelevantforthespecificresearch
question.Withinterculturalcomparisons,apparentsimilarityof
(imported)legislation,e.g.,ontheequalityofmenandwomen,mayhidea
completelydifferentreality.Only(legal)anthropologicalresearchmay
revealandadequatelyexplainthis.Inallcases,however,comparisonshould
neverstopattheleveloflegislation,andevennotatthelevelofcaselaw,as
thesocialrealitymaybemoredifferentthansimilarrulessuggest(and
sometimesmoresimilarthandifferentruleswouldsuggest).Rulesmay
existonpaper,butarenotappliedinpractice.Absenceofcaselawonthe
mattermayhavedivergingexplanations:(a)everybodyfollowsthelaw(b)
thematterhasbeensettledforalongtime(e.g.,unchangedlegislationasto
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realestateformanydecades,ifnotcenturies)and,hence,thereare
informatieklikhier.
nowadaysfewdisputesthatendupincourtand/orthejudicialdecisionsare
notinterestingfromadoctrinalpointofviewandare,therefore,not
published(c)victimsofillegalpracticesdontdaretogotocourtbecauseof
strongsocialpressure(e.g.,incasesofrape)(d)problemsandconflictsare
(almost)alwayssolvedoutsidethelaworoutsideitsinstitutionsetc.Inall
thosecases,lackofsociologicalinquiriesmayleadtoacompletelydistorted
viewonthelawinaforeigncountry.Lawyersgenerallywillhaveabasic
understandingonthesepointsastotheirownlaw,butmostlynot,orat
leastnottothesameextent,astoforeignlegalsystems.
4Howdoesonecompare?
Comparativelawhasoftenbeencriticizedfornotfollowinganymethod
whencarryingoutcomparativeresearch.Indeed,comparatistsoftenactlike
touristswhovisitaforeigncityandnoticethatthingsaredifferent,beitto
someextentsimilartoo,comparedtotheirhometown.Aftertheirvisitthey
willbeabletodescribewhattheyhaveseentotheirfamilyandfriendsat
home,buttheywilllackamoregeneralframeworkused,forinstance,by
specialistsinarchitectureorarthistorianstodescribethesamesightsina
(very)differentway.Comparativeresearchersshouldbecomeprofessionals
ratherthanbetourists.However,thetheoreticalframeworkhistoriansand
architectsmaydisposeofisstilllargelylackingforcomparativelaw.
Whereaslegalscholarshavebeeneducatedwithafirmdoctrinalframework
fortheirownlegalsystem,theylacksuchanoverarchingframeworkfor
comparativeresearch.
Sometimescomparingisconsideredtobeamethodinitsownrightand
calledthecomparativemethodwithoutfurtherexplanationorconcrete
guidelines.Theonlymethodproposedincomparativeliterature,which
goesonestepfurther,isthesocalledfunctionalmethod.Itoffersone
concreteguidelineinthatitsuggeststofocuson(common)legalproblems
andlegalsolutionsinthecomparedlegalsystems,ratherthanonthe
(diverging)rulesanddoctrinalframeworks.However,someelementsfor
othercomparativemethodsmaybefoundintheliterature,mainlyinthe
areaoflegaltheory.Onthebasisofthesewritings,wemaydistinguishsix
differentmethodsforcomparativeresearch:thefunctionalmethod,the
structuralmethod,theanalyticalmethod,thelawincontextmethod,the
historicalmethodandthecommoncoremethod.Probablytheyconstitute
togetherthewholetoolboxforcomparativeresearch.
FollowingBerthelot,GeoffreySamuelhasdistinguishedsixdifferent
schemesofintelligibility:causal,functional,structural,hermeneutical,
actionalanddialectical.Theyare,accordingtoBerthelotandSamuel,tobe
identifiedasseparateepistemologicalreadingsinthatnotoneofthesixcan
bereduced,intermsofitsfundamentallogicalrelations,tooneofthe
others.10
Hereafter,wewilldiscussthefunctionalmethodandthestructuralmethod
inthecontextofcomparativeresearch,nexttotheanalyticalmethod,the
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historicalmethod,thelawincontextmethodandthecommoncore
informatieklikhier.
method.Thelattermethodsarenotmentionedamongthesixdistinct
schemesofintelligibilityinthecontextofthesocialsciencesingeneral,but
wemayseethemascombinationsoftwoormoreofthem.Causal
understanding,forinstance,hasapivotalroletoplaywithinthelawin
contextapproachandthehistoricalmethod.Hermeneutics,initsturn,is
vitaltoallcomparativemethods.
Thedifferentmethodsdiscussedhereafterarenotmutuallyexclusive.Itis
evenpossibletocombinealloftheminoneandthesameresearch.The
nameofthemethodpointstothespecificfeatureofthatapproach,without
excludingitscombinationwithanothermethod.
4.1Thefunctionalmethod
FollowingZweigertandKtzandtheirpopularintroductorybookon
comparativelaw,itisoftentaughtatuniversitiesthatthemethodof
comparativelawisthefunctionalmethod,optimisticallysupportedbythe
allegedconclusionthatrulesandconceptsmaybedifferent,butthatmost
legalsystemswilleventuallysolvelegalproblemsinasimilarway.11
Apartfromtheconclusionthatbothauthorsneverseemtohaveelaborated,
orevenapplied,thismethodthemselves,thefunctionalmethodandits
underlyingpraesumptiosimilitudinishaveincreasinglybeencriticizedin
recentyears.
RalfMichaels,summariseshiscriticalanalysisasfollows:
Inshort,thefunctionalmethodisatriplemisnomer.First,thereisnot
one(the)functionalmethod,butmany.Second,notallallegedly
functionalmethodsarefunctionalatall.Third,someprojectsclaiming
adherencetoitdonotevenfollowanyrecognizablemethod(Michaels
2006,p.342).12
Indeed,functionalismisusedinquitedivergingmeanings,servingrather
differentgoals:understandinglaw,comparing(tertiumcomparationis),
focusingonsimilarities(praesumptiosimilitudinis),buildingasystem(of
legalfamilies,forinstance),determiningthebetterlaw,unifyinglaw,
criticalappraisalofthelegalorders(Michaels2006,p.364380).This
varietyoffunctionalmethodspointstotheimportanceoftheresearchaim
andresearchquestionforchoosinganappropriatecomparativemethod.
Basically,whattheresearcherwillcompareandhow,largelydependsonthe
researchquestion(s)andresearchinterest.Themethodfollowedshould
servethatgoal.Theideabehindfunctionalismistolookatthewaypractical
problemsofsolvingconflictsofinterestaredealtwithindifferentsocieties
accordingtodifferentlegalsystems.Thisallowsustoperceivethose
problems(largely)independentlyfromthedoctrinalframeworkofeachof
thecomparedlegalsystems(Husa2011,p.221222).Manysocietal
problems,suchasaccidents,familyproblems,theft,murder,quarrels
betweenneighbours,etc.,aretobefoundinmost,ifnotall,societies.All
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societieshavesomeformoflawwhichhelpstosolvethoseproblems.Legal
informatieklikhier.
concept,legalrulesandlegalproceduresmaysometimesratherdiverge,but
stillthesolutionsgiventosomeproblemsmaybesimilarorevenidentical.
Inotherwords,thelegalsolutionmaybethesame,notwithstandingthe
divergingroadsusedtoreachthatsolution.Thefunctionalmethodis
lookingforsuchfunctionalequivalentsatthelevelofthesolutions.If,in
viewoftheresearchquestion,suchasWhichsolutionisgivenincountries
A,BandCtolegalproblemP?orWhichinstitutioninsystemBperforms
anequivalentfunctiontotheoneundersurveyinsystemA?(rc2006,
p.443).13onlytheresultcountsandifthislegalsolutionisthesameinthe
comparedcountries,thentheresearchermayconcludethatthelawisthe
sameinthosecountries.However,ifthefocusisonthewayinwhichthe
legalrulesanddoctrinalconstructionsoftherespectivelegalsystemssolve
thatlegalproblem,thefunctionalmethodisnotveryrelevant.
Moreover,insomecasessimilaroridenticalrulesintwocomparedlegal
systemsleadtodivergingresults.14Thisisakindoffunctionaldis
equivalence.Here,focusingontherulesonlywouldnotbeveryuseful.
Inthesamechapter,RalfMichaelsrightlypointstotheconclusionthatat
leastthreemaincurrentapproachesotherthanfunctionalismremain:
comparativelegalhistory,thestudyoflegaltransplants,andthe
comparativestudyoflegalcultures(Michaels2006,p.341).However,the
firstonehasastronghistoricaldimension,thelatterananthropological
one,andthestudyoflegaltransplantsasociologicalone,asitstudieshow
rulesandconceptsmay(not)workinadifferentsocioeconomic
environment(apartfromadifferentdoctrinalenvironment).Functionalism,
foritspart,isoftenusedwiththe(implicit)assumptionthatproblemsare
thesameeverywhere(theft,caraccident,failureofexecutingacontract,
etc.).Thismaybetrueinmanycasesincountrieswithasimilarhistorical
andsocioeconomicbackground(theWesternEuropeancountries,for
instance),buteventhennotinallcasesandcertainlynotinallcountries
andlegalculturesworldwide.Moreover,differentdoctrinalstructuresmay
createdifferentproblems,complicateorfacilitatethembeingsolved.
Hence,proponentsofthefunctionalmethodtrytolimitthecomparisonto
universalfacts,liketwocarshittingeachotheratacrossroad,leavingaside
whateverisdeterminedbythelocallaworlegalculture(Seeonthis:
Graziadei2003,p.108ff).However,inthiswaynotmuchmaybeleftfora
functionalcomparison.Indeed,functionalismcannotisolatethesolutionsto
practicalproblemsfromtheirdoctrinallegalframework(including
proceduralrules),anditcannotseparatethoseproblemsfromtheirsocio
economicandhistoricalcontext.
Initsmostcommonunderstanding,thefunctionalmethoddoesntcompare
primarilyrules,butsolutionstopracticalproblemswithconflicting
interests.Itistruethattherearerelativelyuniversalhumanattitudesto
certainsituations,suchastakingcareofchildren,respectingproperty
rights,executingcontractualobligations,compensatinginonewayor
anotherdamagescausedbyoneswrongfulconduct,andsoon.Hence,
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practicalsolutionstosimilarproblemsinthoseareasindifferentlegal
informatieklikhier.
systemswilloftenmoreconvergethanthelegalroadsusedtoreachthose
results.Canonlaw,forinstance,doesntencompassdivorce.Nowadays,all
countrieswithaChristiantraditionofferthepossibilityofdivorceintheir
legislation.Inpracticehowever,theRomanCatholicChurchisquiteflexible
astodeclaringamarriagevoid,whereasthisismuchmoredifficultinthe
statelegalsystems.Therearestillimportantdifferencesbetweenstatelaws
andcanonlaw,butthepracticalanswerstoproblematicmarriagesdiverge
lessthanthedifferencesindivorcelegislationwouldsuggest.Asaresult,the
functionalmethodhelpstheresearchertobroadenthescopeofher
research.Indeed,similarresultsareoftenreachedfollowingdifferentroads,
ortooharshconsequencesoftoostrictrulesareattenuatedbyothermeans.
Byfocusingonpracticalproblemsandtheirsolutions,onemaydiscover
thosedifferentlegalroads.Actually,lawisawaytostructurereality.
Differentculturesmayusedifferentwaystostructuresimilarrealities,but
partlytheyalsocreatedifferentrealities.
Hence,thefunctionalmethodhastobecomplementedbyothermethods.
Whatmakesfunctionalismeasierthantheothermethodslisted,isthatit
requiresalessthoroughanalysisofthebroaderculturalcontext,ifany,and,
hence,ismoreaccessibletotheaveragelegalresearcher.Itreducesthe
complexityofcomparinglegalsystemsinaveryattractivewayformost
researchers
Thepricepaidforitisthattheexplanatoryforceofresearchusingthe
functionalmethodismorereducedandthatmorecreativeworkcanbe
done,e.g.,incomparativelegalhistory,orusingthelawincontextmethod.
4.2Thestructuralmethod
Functionalismtypicallyappliesatthelevelofmicrocomparison.Froma
broaderperspectiveamorestructuralanalysisof(partsof)legalsystems
maybeused.Whendiscussingthisapproachinsocialsciencesingeneral,
butpresentingitasanalternativetothefunctionalmethodincomparative
law,GeoffreySamuelnotes:
Thisisagrilledelecturewherebytheobserverfocusesonthe
structureshiddenwithinthephenomenonbeingobserved.These
structurescanbelooseinthewaytheyinterrelate(forexampleplot
structuresinliterature)ortheycanbeacollectionofelementsthatform
asystem,thislatternotionbeingcharacterisedbythecreative
interactionoftheelementswithinatotalitythatcanbeidentifiedas
havingfrontiersandthusbeingindependent(Samuel2014,p.8182).
Whenelaboratingclassificationsoflegalfamilies,astructuralapproachhas
beenunderlyingthem.Differencesbetweenlegalsystemsatthelevelof
concreterulesbecomeirrelevantiftheyshareenoughstructural
commonalities,suchasRomanlawprinciplesandconceptsinprivatelaw,
toclassifythemasmembersofthesamelegalfamily,asopposedtoother
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legalsystemsandfamilieswhichdonotsharethosecommonalities.Of
informatieklikhier.
course,theselectionofthemostrelevantcriteriafordeterminingsimilar
structurespartlydeterminestheoutcome.
Example:assumeonewantstocomparelandlawworldwideandtotryto
classifythemintolegalfamilies.Theobviousstartingpointwillbetofollow
thetraditionaldistinctionbetweentheAngloSaxonandtheRomano
Germaniclegalfamilies.However,onemayprefertostartfromthe
distinctionbetweenpublicorratherprivatelawgoverningthematter:inthe
socalledsocialistorcommunistregimesinEasternEuropeduringseveral
decadesinthetwentiethcenturydisposingofmeansofproduction
(ownership)wasamatterofpubliclaw,whereasinmostothercountriesit
wasamatterofprivatelaw(mainlyownershiporrent).Fromanotherpoint
ofview,onemightconsiderthatabasicdistinctionistheonewherethe
stateownsallthelandandcitizenshavemorelimitedrightsthanfull
ownership,eveniftheymaybetheproprietorofthehousetheyhavebuilt
onit.Whenusingthiscriterion,itwouldbringtogethercountriessuchas
theUnitedKingdom(TheQueenownsallland),theDemocraticRepublic
ofCongo(citizensmayobtainaneternalconcessionontheland,
companiesandforeignersonlyaconcessionfor25years),andthePeoples
RepublicofChina(thestateownsallland,butnotnecessarilythebuildings
builtonit).Neverthelessthelegalsystemsofthosecountrieswouldntbe
consideredtobelongtooneandthesamelegalfamily,whenlookedatfrom
almostanyotherperspective.However,thereisnoobjectivereasonwhy
thiscriterionwouldbelessrelevantcomparedtoothercriteria.
Everythingdependsontheunderlyingtheory.Iftheworldwidedominant
paradigmacceptsthedistinctionbetweentheRomanoGermanicfamilyand
theAngloSaxonfamilyasthemostvitalone,thecriterionofthestate
ownershipoflandasopposedtofullprivateownershipmaystillbeuseful
fortheselectionoflegalsystemsforsomemicrocomparison,butitwillnot
beacceptedforclassifyinglegalsystemsworldwide.
Also,thetraditionallegalfamiliesclassificationsassumethatonespecific
criterionorstructuremaybeconsidereddecisiveforclassifyingthetotality
ofeachlegalsystemintooneandthesamefamily.However,asallthese
classificationsarebasedonprivatelawonly,itisobviousthatapubliclaw
classificationmayleadtoquitedifferentresults,againdependingonthe
criteriaused(kingdomorrepublic,federalorcentralizedstate,direct
electionsofthekeygoverningbodiesornot,stateswithorwithouta
constitutionalcourt,degreeofrespectofhumanrights,etc.).Withinprivate
law,onemayalsoarguethatitisnotpossibletomakeoneoverall
classification,butthatafurtherdistinctionhastobemade(familylaw,land
law,inheritancelaw,labourlaw,etc.).Ifthiswouldbeaccepted,itwould
throwadifferentlightonourexampleoftheownershipofland.Suddenly,
bringingtogethertheUK,CongoandChinaintoonelegallandlawfamily,
wouldntonlysoundreasonablebutevenquiteconvincing.
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informatieklikhier.
Structuralanalysesmaybemadeinmanydifferentways,onthebasisofa
largevarietyofdistinctionsandcriteria.Atthemostbasiclevelonecould
actuallyarguethatalllegalsystemsstructurallyhaveacommoncore,which
islinkedtothedefinitionoflawasanidentifiablesysteminanysociety.One
suchbasicdistinctiontypicalforalllegalsystemsisthepresenceof
(primary)rulesofbehaviourand,inaddition,secondaryrulesthatgovern
thecomingintobeingandtheapplicationofthoseprimaryrules(Hart1961,
p.7796).JosephRazhasarguedthat,atthelevelofthesecondaryrules,
thereissomeminimumcontentwhichiscommontoalllegalsystems:
Theminimumcontentandtheminimumcomplexityofalllegalsystems,
togetherwiththeprinciplesofindividuation,determinethenecessary
internalrelationsexistingineverylegalsystem,thatistheinternal
structurewhichisnecessarilycommontoalllegalsystems(Raz1980,
p.141).
Asaresult,itshouldbepossibletoidentifythosesecondaryrulesinevery
legalsystemandcomparethemastothecompetenceforlawmaking(who
hasthepowertomakelawortochangethelaw?)orforlegaladjudication
(whohasthepowerto(finally)decideabouttheapplicationofthelaw?).
Moreover,indevelopedlegalsystems,allthishastohappenthrough
specificprocedures.So,thequestionastotheproceduresforlawmaking
andfortheadjudicationofthelawarealsorelevantforalllegalsystems.Of
course,inmoreprimitivelegalsystemsthosefunctionsmaybemixedup
(e.g.,thechiefofthetribebeingbothcompetentformakinglawand
applyingit)andtheproceduresmaybeverylimited.Hence,thedegreeof
developmentofsuchproceduresandthedegreeofseparationbetweenlaw
makingandtheadjudicationofthelawmayofferacomparativecriterionfor
classifyinglegalsystemsattheleveloftheirsecondaryrules.
4.3Theanalyticalmethod
WellknownintheAngloSaxonlegalworld,butlessintherestoftheworld,
istheanalysisoftheconceptofrightbytheAmericanlawprofessorWesley
NewcombHohfeld(Hohfeld1919).Henoticedthattheconceptofrightis
usedinseveraldifferentmeanings.Itmaymeanaclaim,apower,a
liberty,orsomeotherlegalconcepts,whichhecallsimmunity(escaping
fromsomeoneelseslegalpower)andprivilege(anexceptiontoamore
generalprohibition).Thisrefinementoftheconceptofrightwasan
importantstepforwardinanalysingthedeepstructureoftheconceptof
rightandinclarifyingtheactualmeaningofthisword,asusedinseveral
differentcontexts.Moreover,andmostimportantly,hestudiedthelogical
relationbetweenthedifferentsubconceptsofrightandotherconcepts,
suchasdutyorliability.Forexample,ifonehastherighttodoA,there
canbenodutynottodoA.Hohfelddistinguishedlegalopposites(one
cannothaveatthesametimearightandnonrightonthesameobject,ora
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privilegeandadutyastothesamebehaviour)andlegalcorrelatives(when
informatieklikhier.
AhasarightagainstB,thenBhasacorrelativedutytowardsA)(Hohfeld
1919,p.36).
Here,wearemainlyinterestedintheanalyticalforceofsuchadistinction
forcomparativelaw.Manylegalconcepts,inalllegalsystems,containa
bundleofrightsofadifferentkind.Property,forinstance,includesa
claim(ofnoninterference),aliberty(touse)andapower(totransferthe
propertyrightspartlyorfully).Bylookingatthisdeeperlevelwemaybetter
distinguishdifferencesandcommonalitiesbetweenlegalsystemsasto
apparentlysimilarordifferentconcepts(e.g.,ownershipoflandvsfee
simpleabsoluteinpossession,easementvsservitude,mortgagevs
hypothque)usedineachlegallanguage.Abroadconceptsuchastrustin
theAngloSaxontraditionisunknowninContinentalEurope.15However,
uponacloserlook,itappearsthat,dependingonthecontext,rathersimilar
constructionsmaysometimesbediscoveredandcleardifferencesatother
times(e.g.,thepowerofthecreditorinsomecasestoseizemoneydirectly
withathirdperson,asifitwerehisproperty(imposedtrust),whichis
impossibleontheContinent).OnlyatthedeeperHohfeldianlevel,
adequatecomparisonbetweenthetrustandcontinentallegalconceptsand
constructionsbecomespossible.
BrouwerandHagebelievethat,byusingtheHohfeldiananalysis,oranother
ofthatkind,theprivatelawofthedifferentEuropeancountriescanbe
reconstructedintermsofalimitedsetofthesamebasicconcepts(Brouwer
&Hage2007,p.4).Accordingtothem,suchasetofbasicconceptsshould
allowforcorrectrepresentationsofthecontentsofprivatelawandrenderit
comprehensiveandnonredundant(Brouwer&Hage2007,p.7).
Characteristicofabasicconceptis,moreover,thatitcannotbespecifiedin
termsofother,moreelementaryconcepts(Brouwer&Hage2007,p.12).
ForBrouwerandHagethereareonlytwobasiclegalconceptsinprivate
law:dutyandcompetence(p.18ff).
Theabovementionedexamplesalsopointtotheconclusionthatitisnot
possibletodisconnectconceptsfromtherulesofthelegalsystemtowhich
theybelong.Thecontentofalegalconceptisdefinedbytheactualrules
governingthefieldcoveredbytheconcept,withinaparticularlegalsystem
ataspecificmomentoftime.However,sometimestheseareminor
differences,andsomecommoncoremaybedetected,withconceptssuchas
will,ownership,state,etc.Forthisreason,keFrndbergmadea
distinctionbetweenconceptsthataresystemdependentandconceptsthat
are(relatively)systemindependent(Frndberg1987,p.8891).He
proposedtoworkwithidealtypesofsuchconcepts.16Accordingto
Hedenius,asnotedbyFrndberg,asystemindependentdefinitionof
ownershipcontainstwoelements:protectionofpossessionandfreedom
ofdisposal.Theidealtypeofownership(inatechnicalsense,nota
normativeone)isonewithatotalprotectionofpossessionandanabsolute
freedomofdisposal(Hedenius1975,citedbyFrndberg1987,p.83ff).All
actualconceptsofownershipinthedifferentlegalsystemsmaybedefined
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onascaleofmoreorlessprotectionofpossessionandmoreorlessfreedom
informatieklikhier.
ofdisposal.CombinedwithaHohfeldiananalysis,thisapproachmay
probablyberefined,buttheideaofusingidealtypesincomparativelaw
shouldcertainlybefruitful.
Athoroughanalyticalapproachmay,eventually,offerinitsturnbuilding
blocksforastructuralcomparisonoflegalsystems.
In1973,AndrJeanArnaudpublishedhisEssaidanalysestructuraledu
Codecivilfranais.Inthisbook,ArnaudaimedatdecodingtheCode
Napolon,atdrawingitseuclediangeometry.Asregards,forinstance,the
lawofobligations,hediscernsjuralopposites,suchas
voluntary/involuntary,actionbasedonthelaw(legislation)oronanact
(e.g.,acontract),adutytogiveortodo(includingnottodo),adutytogive
athingortogivemoney,equilibriumornot,reciprocityornot,etc.(Arnaud
1973,p.94125).Whenrevealingthedeepstructureofthe(French)lawof
obligations,hefindsataxonomywith,asagrandtotal,32possibleoreven
imaginablerelations(Arnaud1973,p.122).17Arnaudconcludesthathis
oppositesdonotexactlycorrespondtotheofficialopposites,asusedinthe
Code(forexample:synallagmatic/unilateral,aleatory/commutative),but
thattheyofferaconceptualframeworkwhichisfundamentallyvalidforthe
lawof(civil)obligationsinanylegalsystem(Arnaud1973,p.121).Whether
thisiscorrecthasstilltobechecked,butatleastithastheadvantageof
offeringastructurebuiltonthebasisofananalyticalresearchinonelegal
systemwith,asaworkinghypothesis,itsvalidityforanylegalsystem.Ifthis
weretrue,evenonlypartially,thismightbeanimportantbuildingblockfor
themethodologyofcomparativelaw,asitisnotjustofferingconcepts,buta
wholestructurecoveringawholefieldoflaw,akindofTableofMendeleev
forthelawofobligations.
Themostambitiousattempttodeterminethelegalgrammaroflegal
systemsinviewoftheiranalyticalandstructuralcomparisonistobefound
intheworkofLeopoldPospisil(1971).Asananthropologistoflaw,hetried
toworkoutamodelthatcouldbeusedforcrossculturalcomparison,valid
forbothprimitivesocietiesanddevelopedmodernlegalsystems.Beingwell
awareoftheimportantroleofideologyinlaw,whichismostvisibleincross
culturalcomparison,heemphasizestheneedforacomparativeanalysisof
basicjuralpostulates,derivedfromthecultureanditsinstitutionsin
general,ontheonehand,andlegalvalues,abstractedfromtheiusas
impliedinlegaldecisions,ontheother(Pospisil1971,p.345).Atasecond
stage,heworkedoutananalysisintermsoflegalcorrelates,whichshould
presentthesubdivisionsofalegalconceptorfieldinalogical,systematic,
succinctandcompleteway.Again,theaimistogetabetterunderstanding,
atthisdeeperlevel,ofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesamongstdifferent
legalconceptsandregulations.Pospisil,forexample,hasthusstructuredall
differentformsofterrainownershipamongsttheKapaukutribeinPapua
NewGuineainthe1960s.Forthis,heusedopposites,suchasownedbyan
individualorownedbyagroup,moreorlessexemptfromcontrolby
others,limitationsornotofrightstotrespass.Someoftheoppositeshe
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described,however,areclearlyculturebound,suchastherighttogather
informatieklikhier.
frogsorhuntnonrats(Pospisil1971,p.295).Pospisilcalledthesystematic
setofsuchjuraloppositesthelegalgrammaroftheanalysedsystems
(Pospisil1971,p.346).
Onemaydoubtwhethersuchacompletemodelmaybeworkedoutfor
comparinglegalsystemsinquitedifferentculturalcontexts,butcombined
withthemethodsdiscussedinthispaperitmaybeusefulforunderstanding
verydifferentlegalrelationsandconceptualframeworksinothercultures
andfordeterminingthemostadequatelevelforcomparingratherdifferent
legalsystems.
4.4Thelawincontextmethod
Alllegalscholarswillagreethatcomparativeresearchcannotbelimitedto
pureblacklettercomparisonoflegalrules,conceptsorsystems.Even
domesticlegaldoctrinewillatleasttakeintoaccountthewaythelawworks
inpractice,asfarasittranspiresfromjudicialdecisions.Ontheotherhand,
lawincontextasamethodcannotbeisolatedfromtheothermethods.They
arecomplementaryandinterdependentforanadequateunderstandingof
thelaw.Whereassomeformsoftheanalyticalmethodcouldbecarriedout
atamoreabstract,conceptuallevel,ratherdisconnectedfromthe
underlyingsocialreality,thisisnotthecasewiththeotherwaysof
comparison.Thefunctionalmethodrefersalreadybydefinitiontoacontext:
whichsocietalproblemissolvedwithwhatkindoflegalconstruction?Ifa
societywantsitscitizenstoactresponsiblyandcarefully,soastoavoidto
createdamagestoothers,itmayusetortlaw,contractlaw,statutory
obligations,subjectiveorobjectiveliability,acceptpureeconomiclossor
not,etc.Indifferentlegalsystemsandsituationslegislators(orjudges)may
havechosendivergingmeanstoreachsuchanend.Inordertoguarantee
thepaymentofdamagestheymayhaveintroducedcompulsoryinsuranceor
otherwaysthatshouldleadtoabalancedredistributivejustice,asconceived
intheworldviewof(themajorityin)thatsociety.Hence,thefunctional
methodisatleasttosomeextentincludingalawincontextmethod.18
Fromseveralexamplesabove,itappearsthatthestructuralmethodand
mostoftheanalyticalmethodcannotbecarriedoutwithoutsomeminimum
lawincontextapproach,evenifinpracticeitisoftenmorehiddenthan
madeexplicit.
Thereisawholerangeofpossiblelawincontextmethodsofresearch.One
mayjustpointtosomegenerallyknowncontextelement,suchastheliberal
economicworldviewunderlyingtheEuropeanUniononemayusedata
fromhistorical,sociological,anthropological,psychological,etc.research,or
evencarryoutsuchresearchoneselfonemaysetupalarge
interdisciplinarycomparativeprojectinwhichseveralnonlegaldisciplines
arebroughttogether.Muchwilldependonthefocusoftheresearchandon
theavailableknowledgewiththeinvolvedresearchers,timeandfinancial
meanswhenchoosingthetypeandsizeofthelawincontextapproach.In
hislawincontextapproach,RodolfoSaccohasbeenfocusingonthelegal
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formants,onwhathasmadethelawasitis.Inthisapproachitisnotably
informatieklikhier.
thelegalcontextwhichseemstobemostimportant:constitutionaland
legislativerules,caselaw,andlegaldoctrine,butalsoimpliedpatternsand
otherhiddenelements,suchasworldviews,influencingthewaylawis
interpretedandhandled.Hecallsthemcryptotypes(Sacco1991,p.384
386):Somecryptotypesaremorespecific,othersmoregeneral.Themore
generaltheyare,thehardertheyaretoidentify.Inextremecasestheymay
formtheconceptualframeworkforthewholesystem(Sacco1991,p.386).
Thisconceptualframework,whichIhavecalledtheparadigmatical
framework(VanHoecke&Warrington1998,p.513520)indeedplaysa
decisiveroleinthewaylawisperceived,interpretedandapplied.
Puttinglawincontextaimsatunderstandingthelaw,asaforeignertothat
legalsystemand,hence,explainingwhythelawisasitis.Inevitably,this
impliesempiricalobservation.Thismayleadtogeneralexplanatory
propositions,asemphasizedbyJohnHenryMerryman,suchasdeveloped
legalsystemscontainproceduresforcontrollingadministrativelegality
(Merryman1999).Thesearehypothesesaboutmoreuniversal
characteristicsof(setsof)legalsystems.Theyshouldandcanbetested
againstempiricaldata.
The(different)institutionalcontextsinthecomparedcountriesorsocieties
playanimportantroleinexplainingapparentdifferencesinlawandlegal
practice.Forinstance,Adams,Weyers,andGriffithsshowedtowhatextent
thedifferenthealthcaresystemsinfluencethelegalpracticeconcerning
euthanasia(ormoreexactly,medicalbehaviourthatpotentiallyshortens
life)(Adams&Griffiths2012,p.293296).19ReferringtoKoenRaes,Koen
Lemmenspointedtotheimportanceoftaxlawasanexplanationfornon
pecuniarylossesbeingwidelycoveredinBelgianlaw(Lemmens2012,p.
324).
Itshouldbeclearthatcaselawisnotalwaysofferingacorrectpictureofthe
livinglawinasociety.When,forinstance,nocaselawcanbefoundatallin
somecountry,itmaymeanthatthelawhasbecomeobsolete,thatthe
underlyingsocietalproblemhasdisappeared,butalsothatearlierproblems
astotheinterpretationofthelawhavemeanwhilebeensettled,sothatcases
arenolongerbroughttocourt,aseverybody(oratleasttheircounsellors)
knowsperfectlyhowtoapplythelaw.Itmayalsomeanthataparallel
orderingisgoverningthecase,ratherthanthelaw(mafiaforinstance).
Courtsarethehospitalsofsocialordering.Onlyillcasescometocourt.The
healthyonesremaininvisibleintherecordsofjudicialdecisions.Foran
overallaccountoflegalreality,ananalysisofcourtdecisionsincomparative
researchshouldbecomplementedbysomelegalsociologicalresearch.
Legalsociology,inturn,cannotcoverallaspectsofrealityandshould,asfar
asneededaccordingtotheresearchquestions,besupplementedbylawand
economics,and/orlegalpsychologyand/orotherdisciplines.Researchers
willalwayshavetofindabalancebetweentheidealresearchdesign,onthe
onehand,andwhatisfeasibleunderthecurrentcircumstances,takinginto
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informatieklikhier.
accounttherestraintsastotime,moneyandavailableknowledge,onthe
other.
Thecurrentempiricallegalresearchapproach,whichhasbecomepopular
intheUSandisslowlygaininggroundinEuropeaswell,isakindofmodest
legalsociology,withouttheambitionofcreatinggrandtheories,butjust
aimingatcheckingimplicitassumptionsofthelawortheeffectand
efficiencyoflegislation.Itshouldbeobviousthatsuchempiricaltestingis
notonlyusefulbutverydesirableorevennecessary.Insomecasesa
broadercomparativescale,thattranscendsthebordersofonesinglelegal
system,mayoffermorereliableinformation,comparedtopurelydomestic
research.20
Empiricalinvestigationsincomparativeresearchwillbecarriedoutusing
oneormoreofthevaryingmethodsknowninthesocialsciences.Mainly
qualitativemethodswillbeused,butincreasinglyattemptsaremadetouse
quantitativemethodsinlegalresearch.21Herewecannotgointodetailon
thispoint.
4.5Thehistoricalmethod
Actually,thehistoricalmethodisjustonepartofthelawincontext
method,thecontextbeingherethehistoricaloriginsofthepresentday
laws,whicharecompared.Aspecificfeatureofthishistoricalapproachis
thatitsusecannotbeavoidedinanycomparativeresearch.Fully
understandingthelawasitfunctionstodayinsomesociety,isonlypossible
whenoneknowswhereitcomesfromandwhyitisasitistoday.Itisnot
accidentalthatalsoamonglegalhistorianscomparativelegalhistoryhas
becomequitepopularoverthelastdecadeorso.22
Forthecomparatist,informationandsourcesonlegalhistoryaregenerally
morereadilyavailablethanforotherformsoflawincontextapproaches.In
traditionallegaldoctrine,manybookswillincludesomehistoricalchapter
oratleasthistoricalreferencestotheoriginsofsomelegalconcepts,legal
rules,legalconstruction,etc.Ahistoricalstudywillinevitablyalsouse
sociological,economic,psychological,and/orothercontextdata.Inthisway
itmayencompass,onoccasion,afulllawincontextapproach.
Historicalcomparisonsmaynotonlyexplaintheoriginsandreasonsforthe
lawasitistodayinthatsociety,insomecasestheymayrevealthatsimilar
rulesorapproachestolawwefindinonelegalsystemhavebeenpresentin
anotherinthepast,whereasthecurrentlaworviewsinthelatterare
differenttoday.Differencesmaythenappeartobejustdifferencesinstages
ofdevelopmentoflegalsystems,ordifferencesastotheoutcomeofongoing
tensionsbetweentwooppositeviewswhichremainlatentinthecompared
societies,oneviewtakingpriorityinonesociety,atleastforsometime,
whereastheotherviewhasbecomedominantinanotherlegalsystem(a
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informatieklikhier.
littlelikethevictoriesandlossesofrightwingandleftwingpolitical
partiesinparliamentaryelectionsintheWesternworld).
Example:IncontractinterpretationitlookslikeEngland,Franceand
Germanyaretakingratherdivergingpositionsastowhatdeterminesthe
meaningofthecontract.InEnglanditis(only)thetextoftheagreement
thatcounts,inFrancethesubjectivewillofthecontractingparties,andin
Germanyanobjectivatedwill(whateachpartycouldreasonablyhave
understoodtheintentionoftheothercontractingpartywas).Ahistorical
research,however,revealsthatthe(French)subjectivewilltheorywas
dominantinGermanyinthesecondhalfofnineteenthcenturyandobtained
acentralpositioninEnglishlawinaboutthesameperiod,whilstamore
objectiveapproachtointerpretationbecamepopularamongFrenchlawyers
bytheendofeighteenthcentury.Actually,eachofthoseapproachesto
contractlawhappenstohaveheldastrongpositionineachofthose
countriesatsometimeinhistory.Itismainlyamatterofhistorical
coincidence,whichexplainsthedifferencesamongthecomparedlegal
systemsinamorerecentpast.23
Thehistoricalmethodmay,thus,asitappearsfromthisexample,reveal
othersimilaritiesand/ordifferencesatadeeperlevel,comparedtowhat
transpiresfromananalysisatthesurfacelevel.24
4.6Thecommoncoremethod
Bytheendofnineteenthcenturyandearlytwentiethcentury,underthe
influenceofthepositivesciences,comparativelawyerswantedtofindout
whichlegalconcepts,legalrulesandlegalinstitutionsallsocietieshadin
common.25Thisambitionwassoonreducedtothecivilizedcountriesat
thesamelevelofdevelopment,buteventhatprovedtobenotveryrealistic.
Hence,notmuchresearchresultscameout.
Inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,newinitiativesweretakenwith
theaimoffindingacommoncoreamonglegalsystemsinsomearea.New
wasthefocusonhowthedifferentlegalsystemsweresolvingcasesrather
thanontheirlegalrulesandconcepts.Thelargestresearchprojectwas
carriedoutatCornellUniversitybetween1957and1967,intheareaofthe
formationofcontracts.26
InEurope,thecreationanddevelopmentoftheEuropeanUniontogether
withtendenciestoharmonizelawwithintheEUstimulatedresearchinto
thecommoncoreoflawinEurope,tobeidentifiedwithineachofthe
memberstates.AsakindoffollowupoftheCornellproject,theTrento
CommonCoreProjectwassetupinItalybyUgoMatteiandMauro
Bussani.Itwasmoreambitious:Theambitionoftheworkinwhichweare
engagedhereinTrentoisaconsiderablebroadeningofthescopeofthe
Cornellproject.WeareseekingthecommoncoreofthebulkofEuropean
privatelaw,asdividedinthegeneralcategoriesofcontract,tortand
property.27
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TheIusCommuneCasebooksfortheCommonLawofEuropewerealsoset
informatieklikhier.
upinthenineties,inviewofuncoveringcommonprinciplesalready
underlyingexistinglawsandtoenablestudentsfromacrossEuropeand
beyondtostudythesameleadingcasesandmaterials.
AlsoinjudicialandlegislativepracticeattheEuropeanlevel,some
commoncorecomparativeresearchhasbeencarriedout(Pescatore1980
VanDerMensbrugghe2003).
So,lookingforthecommoncoreofmanyareasoflawisdoneinlegal
practice(Europeanadministration,legislationandcourtpractice),inlegal
educationandinlegalscholarship.Ofcourse,lookingforacommoncore
alsoendsupinpointingtodifferences.Moreover,theincreaseinmember
states,mostnotablyafter2004,whenitjumpedfrom15to25states,made
itincreasinglydifficulttoencompassallmemberstatesinsucharesearch,
sothatforinstancetheIusCommuneCasebooksaremainlyfocusingonthe
threemainlegalsystemsforprivatelaw,England,France,andGermany
(Bealeetal.2010,p.vii).
Thecommoncoremethodislargelybasedonthefunctionalmethod,to
someextentcombinedwiththelawincontextmethod.Whatisspecificto
thecommoncoremethodisthatonelooksforacommoncoreinviewofthe
(possible)harmonizationofacertainpartofthelaw.InEuropethisisa
dynamicprocess,bothtopdownthroughEuropeanrulesandjudicial
decisionsandbottomupthroughlegaleducationandlegalscholarship.
Thecommoncoremethodlooksforcommonalitiesanddifferencesbetween
legalsystemsinviewofthequestiontowhatextentharmonizationon
certainpointswouldbepossibleamongthecomparedlegalsystemsorthe
questionhowaEuropeanrule,forinstance,couldbeinterpretedinsucha
waythatitfitsbestthedifferentnationaltraditions.
5Levelsofcomparison
Levelsofcomparisonmaybedistinguishedinvariousways,comparinglaw
fromdifferentperspectives.Thelevelsonwhichthelawismadeand
practisedgeographically(e.g.,international,European,state,substate)will
assuchalsoinfluencethepossible,oratleastmostevident,levelsof
comparison.28
5.1Macroandmicrolevel
Themostclassicaloneisthedistinctionbetweenmacroandmicrolevel,
comparinglegalsystemsasdistinguishedfromcomparingmoreconcrete
rulesandlegalsolutionstosocietalproblemsindifferentlegalsystems.
ApeculiarcaseisthecomparisonofEUlawwithnationallaws.Asthe
structureofbothtypesoflegalsystem,andalsotheirunderlyingobjectives,
aredifferent,thiswillinfluencethemethodsforcomparison.
RenaudDehoussegaveasanexamplethedisintegrativeimpactofEUlaw
onnationalinsurancepolicies,causedmainlybythedivergingregulatory
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objectivespursuedateachlevel:marketintegrationfortheEU,regulation
informatieklikhier.
oftheinsurancemarketatthenationallevel(Dehousse1994,p.770).This
impliesthatthefunctional,structuralandanalyticalmethodshouldbe
carriedoutatadeeperlevel,wherethosemorefundamentaldifferences
betweenthecomparedlegalsystemsandregulationsaretakenintoaccount.
Also,thestructuralinterdependenceofbothlegalsystemspreventsthe
researcherfromcomparingthemasiftheywereseparateandindependent
units.Crosslevelcomparisons,arguesDehousse,shouldbeexplicitly
concernedwiththeirinteraction,andtrytoencompassthetwolevelswithin
onesingleanalysisandtheexerciseisindispensable:inacomplex
situation,theanalystcannotsimplyassumeadegreeofsimplicitythatno
longerexists(Dehousse1994,p.772).
Hence,thiswilloftenleadtoacombinationofdifferentmethodstobeused
insuchacrosslevelcomparison.Atypicalexampleisthecomparisonofthe
EUinstitutionsanddecisionmakingprocesseswiththetraditional
separationofpowersstructuresinthenationstates:parliament,
government,courts.Inordertounderstandthedifferencesonewillhaveto
analysethedivergingfunctionsofthoseinstitutionsatbothlevels
(functionalmethod),analysingthedifferentcompetencesofeachbodyin
ordertodrawafullpictureofsimilaritiesanddifferences(analytical
method)whilstalsoanalysingthewholeframeworkandtherelationsamong
thedifferentbodies(structuralmethod)and,finally,puttingallthisina
historicalperspective(historicalmethod).
5.2Underlyinggeneralandprofessionallegalcultures(ortraditions)
Also,locatedatadeeperlevelarecomparisonsastolegalculture29,legal
argumentation(Bomhoff2012),judicialdecisionmaking(Lasser2004),
stylesoflegalwriting,divergingapproachestolegalsources(MacCormick&
Summers1997Komarek2012)andtostatutoryinterpretation
(MacCormick&Summers1991)(e.g.,theuseoftravauxprparatoires),the
roleoflegaldoctrine,therespectiveroleofthelegalprofessions(e.g.,Van
Caenegem1987),theroleofforminlawinrelationtosubstance(Atiyah&
Summers1987).Suchcomparativeresearchhasastrongtheoretical
dimensionandtriestodrawthebackgroundagainstwhichlegalsystemsare
understoodandappliedbythoseworkinginthoselegalcultures.
Themethodsusedforcomparisonatthislevelwillmainlybeanalyticaland
historical,oftenrevealinghiddenworldviews,whichstronglyorientatethe
attitudetowardsthelaw.
Evenifsuchunderlyinglegalculturesandworldviewsarenotpartofthe
positivelawassuch,theymostlyhaveadecisiveinfluenceonthefinal
contentofthelawasappliedinpractice.30
5.3Lawinactionvslawinthebooks
Indeed,lawinactionmaybe(quite)differentfromlawinthebooks.Most
lawyersarewellawareofthisconclusion.Thatiswhyacomparisonatthe
levelofruleshastobecomplementedby,orinsomecasesstartedwith,a
Sluit
comparisonofjudicialdecisions.Insomecases,suchasveryrecent
informatieklikhier.
legislationorunavailabilityofothersourcesinalanguageonehasaccessto,
comparisonwillbelimitedtotheleveloflegislation.However,inany
substantiveresearchincomparativelaw,bothlegislationandcaselawwill
havetobestudied,as,inalllegalsystems,commonlawandcivillawalike,
theyarebothofdecisiveimportanceforknowingthelaw.31Thismayshow
howdivergingrulesanddoctrinalconstructionsmayleadtosimilar
decisionsorhowsimilarrulesand/ordoctrinalconstructionsmayleadto
divergingpracticalsolutions.Themainreasonforthisisthat,especiallyin
hardcases,judgesfirstseeadesirablesolutionforthecaseathand,which,
afterwards,theytrytoconstructonthebasisofthelegaltoolsavailable
withintheirlegalsystem.
However,thespecificdoctrinalconstructionsofalegalsystemand/or
underlyingparadigmaticviewsmayblockcertainoutcomesandfacilitate
otherones,asappears,forinstance,fromtheexampleoftheinterpretation
ofcontractsinsection5.4below.
5.4Surfacelevelvsdeeplevel
Amorethoroughlookatsuperficialsimilaritiesand/ordifferencesamong
legalsystemsmayrevealthatadequatecomparisonhas,indeed,totake
placeatadeeperlevelofdoctrinalconstructionorparadigmaticframework.
Actually,ErnstRabelconsideredittobetheaimofcomparativelawtogoto
thatdeeperlevelinordertogetatrueunderstandingofthelaw(Rabel
1924).
Example1:Internationalprivatelawrulesonjurisdiction
RalfMichaelshasshownhownotonlyrulesaredifferentintheUSand
Europeastodecidingwhichcourtshavejurisdictionwhenseveralcountries
maybeinvolved,butmoreover
theythinkdifferentlyabouthowtoapplyjurisdictionandtheyeventhink
differentlyaboutwhatjurisdictionis.AmericansandEuropeansdisagree
ontheanswersbecausetheydisagreeontherelevantquestions
(Michaels2006,p.2011).32
Forexample,
althoughterritorialityandstateboundariesarecentraltobothU.S.and
Europeanthinkingaboutjurisdiction,theyplaydifferentrolesineach
paradigm.InthedomesticU.S.paradigm,theroleofboundariesisone
ofdelimitation.Thepowerofacourtgoestothestatesboundaries,not
beyondthem.Itisfairtoforceadefendantintoacourtinthestatewith
minimumcontacts,butnotbeyonditsboundaries.()Bycontrast,the
roleofstateboundariesintheinternationalEuropeanparadigmisone
ofallocation:thelocusofaneventorapartydefinestheplacethathas
jurisdictioninamultilateralfashion(Michaels2006,p.1058). Sluit
informatieklikhier.
Thismeansthatanadequatecomparisonhastotakeplaceatthelevelofthe
underlyingparadigmsandnotonlyatthelevelsoflegislationorcaselaw.
Example2:Theinterpretationofcontracts
InFrance,theCourdecassationhas,formorethantwocenturies,
consideredtheinterpretationofcontractsamatteroffactnotoflawand,
hence,leftthistothelowercourts.Asaresult,itescapesthecontrolofthe
Courdecassation,whichonlycontrolsthecorrectapplicationofthelaw,
nottherealityoffacts.However,inordertobeabletocontrolsuch
interpretationsthiscourtworkedoutatheoryofdnaturationdelacte,
whichassumesthattextsmayhaveaclearmeaningontheirown,sothat
anydiverginginterpretationwouldbeincompatiblewiththerealmeaning
ofthistext.IfjudgesdepartfromthisobviousmeaningtheCourde
cassationwillquashthedecision.Frenchdoctrinallegalwriting
concentratesonthisproblemratherthanontheinterpretationmethodsand
reasoningbylowercourtsoutsidetherealmofanallegeddnaturationde
lacte.Nootherlegalsystemseemstohaveacomparableapproach,dueto
thelackofcassationandfullreconsiderationofthecaseortodifferent
theories(thereisnodenaturationtheoryinanyoftheothercountries
wheretheNapoleoniccodewasintroduced).
InGermany,discussionsarefocusingonthe,ratherdiverging,articlesinthe
civilcodeontheinterpretationofcontracts(157BGB)andofthe
declarationofwillforanylegalact(133BGB).
InEngland,theinterpretationofcontractsisnotasubjectinitsownright,
butisdiscussedinothercontextssuchasthequestiononwhethertherewas
consideration.However,theconceptofconsiderationisunknownincivil
lawcountriesandtypicallylinkedtothecommonlaw(business)conception
ofcontract.
Thismeansthatanycomparisonatthesurfaceleveloflegislation,caselaw
andlegaldoctrineisvirtuallyimpossibleormeaningless.Comparisonwill
havetobecarriedoutatadeeper(paradigmatic)levelofunderlyingviews
andtheoriesonmeaningandoninterpretation.33
Whencomparingthelawinradicallydifferentlegalcultures,itisobvious
thatmeaningfulcomparisonwillonlybepossibleatthedeeperlevelofthe
underlyingculturesandnotatthesurfacelevelofrulesandconcepts.Here,
surfacelevelcomparativelawinevitablyturnsintodeeplevelcomparative
lawandbecomesmainlylegalanthropology.
5.5Doctrinalframeworkvsunderlyinglegalculture
5.5.1Threebasicconceptualframeworksintheworld
Inprivatelaw,threeconceptuallegalframeworkshavebeenveryinfluential
worldwide:thecommonlaw34,theFrenchCodecivilandtheGerman
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
BrgerlichesGesetzbuch.Virtuallyalllegalsystemsofnationstatesuseone
ofthemoracombinationoftwoormoreofthem.
Throughcolonization,theEnglishcommonlawwasspreadoverNorth
America,AustraliaandNewZealand,partsofAfricaandAsia.InEurope,its
influencehasbeenlimitedtoWales,Irelandand,toalesserextent,
Scotland.Afterindependence,thelegalsystemsoftheLatinAmericanstates
werelargelybasedonRomanlawandFrenchcivillaw.Asfromthe
twentiethcentury,thiscontinenthasseenagrowinginfluenceofthe
commonlaw.
Theresultofthisisamosaicofhighlydiverselegalsystemswhich,
eveniflocatedinthecircleofthecivillawfamily,showaspecial
colorationwithitsownandparticularcharacteristics(Kleinheisterkamp
2006,p.300).
Ithasnotledtoconceptuallyrebuildingthelegalframeworkofcivillawin
theLatinAmericancountries,buttotransplantingpracticallegalsolutions
fromotherlegaltraditionswhereveritseemeduseful.
InAfrica,theformerFrench,BelgianandPortuguesecolonieslargely
inheritedtheCodeNapolon.OnlySouthAfricatakesaspecialposition
withitsinheritanceofRomanDutchlaw,combinedwithcommonlaw.
IntheIslamiccountries,partsofthecivillawprinciplesarederivedfrom
theQuran,butotherwise,formercolonizershavebeeninfluential,suchas
FranceintheMaghrebcountries.Othercountries,suchasTurkey,largely
importedaEuropeanCode(theGermanBGBinthiscase).
InRussia,after1991,legaldoctrinehadtoalargeextenttomakeanew
start,withinanewparadigmaticframework.Theneedforrapidlegislative
changesmadetheRussiandraftsmenlookforinspirationintheWestern
EuropeanCodes(Reid1998,p.43).BeforetheRussianrevolution,untilthe
midnineteenthcentury,mostlawprofessorswereGerman,thelanguageof
educationbeingLatinorGerman.Thelegaldoctrine,whichdeveloped
duringthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturyhadbeeneradicatedby
the1917communistRevolution.Untiltheearlyninetiesofthetwentieth
century,thecivillawwasfirstcompletelydominatedbycommunistideology
and,lateron,increasinglytriedtocombinetheseideologicalpremiseswith
somedegreeofmeetingtheneedsofsocialreality.Thishasledtoan
incoherentlegaldoctrine.35Moreover,partsofthetraditionalcivilian
matters,suchasgrantingaflatorevictionofaflat(bythepublic
authorities)weregovernedbyadministrativelaw,hencelimitingthescope
ofcivillaw.
AsforEastAsia,
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
[t]hemodernlegalsystemsofJapan,KoreaandChinawereonceall
shapedbythereceptionofWesternlegalmodels,albeittovarying
degreesandinavarietyofways(Kitagawa2006,p.259).
TheseWesternlegalmodelsweremainlyGerman.ThefirstChineseCivil
CodewasenactedundertheQinDynasty,in1911.Itwasdraftedby
Japaneseexperts,whotookovertheGermanCivilCode.Recentcodeson
ContractLaw(1999),PropertyLaw(2007)andtheLawofObligations
(2009)wereallmainlyinfluencedbyGermanlaw,withsomeelementsof
thecommonlaw.
ThecommonlawhasspreadoverpartsofAsiatoo,mostimportantlyin
India.
CentralandEasternEuropeancountriestookuptheRomanlawtradition
again,afterafewdecadesofcommunisminthesecondhalfoftwentieth
century.Moreover,inthe1990s,intheirdesiretojointheEuropeanUnion,
theywerekeentoadopt,asmuchaspossible,WesternEuropeanlawfor
modernizingtheirownprivatelaw.
TheNordiccountriesinEuropenevertookoverFrench,GermanorEnglish
law,buttheirdoctrinalframeworkhaslargelybeeninfluencedbyGerman
legalscholarship(Husa,Nuotio&Pihlajamki2007,p.9).
InEuropetoday,alllegalsystemsaremixedones.TheNetherlands,for
instance,startedwiththeCodeNapolonin1804andbasicallykeptitin
1838,whenenactingtheirBurgerlijkWetboek.Lateron,Germanlegal
doctrinehasbeenmoreinfluentialthanintheothercountriesthatfollowed
theCodeciviltradition.ThisresultedinanewBurgerlijkWetboekinforce
asfrom1992(mostpartshavingbeenfinishedmanyyearsbefore).Inthe
courseofthelastfewdecadesthereis,inTheNetherlands,anotable
influenceofAngloSaxondoctrine,bothEnglishandAmerican.
ThroughEUlaw,butalsoEuropeanHumanRightslaw,conceptsfrom
FrenchandGermanlegaldoctrinehaveenteredtheotherlegalsystems,
suchasthe(continental)goodfaithprincipleintheUKandIreland,orthe
(German)proportionalityprincipleintheothermemberstates.Ofcourse,
thisdoesntnecessarilyimplyasimilaruseorinterpretationofthese
principlesinthecountriestowhichtheytravel(seee.g.,Teubner1998,p.
1132).
5.5.2Withvaryingapplicationaccordingtothelocallegalculture
Conceptualframeworksareonething,thecontentofthelaw(values,
principles,rules)andtheattitudetowardsthelawareanother.
Ofcourse,conceptscannotbecompletelyisolatedfromrulesorfromtheir
underlyingprinciples.Property,marriage,leasing,contract,servitudeor
easement,havesomecommoncoreofmeaningallovertheworld,evenif
Sluit
differencesmaybesometimesquiteimportant(e.g.,acceptanceornotof
informatieklikhier.
homosexualmarriageorofpolygamousmarriage).However,thelarger
culturalframeworkmaygiveaquitedifferentcontent,forinstance,toarule
inCongo,whichhadbeenliterallycopiedfromtheBelgianCivilcode(e.g.,
rejectingmonogamy).JapanesecivillawisnotGerman,notwithstanding
theuseofGermandoctrine,asinformalrulesstillplayanimportantrole
whenitcomesto(not)applyingthelaw(Kitagawa2006,p.251253).
Also,withinthesamelegalsystem,oldtraditionsmaymakenewlawtobe
interpretedinsuchawaythatitblocksallchange.36
Thisdeeperleveloftheunderlyingculturaldifferencesisofutmost
importanceforcorrectlyjudgingsimilaritiesanddifferencesatthesurface
level,mostnotably,butnotexclusively,whenlegalsystemsfromstates
belongingtoratherdifferentculturaltraditionsarecompared.
6Tertiumcomparationis
Inordertocompare,ithasbeenemphasized,weneedatertium
comparationis.37Weshouldnotlookataforeignlegalsystemwiththeeyes
anddoctrinalframeworkofourownlegalsystem,buttrytotranscendit,by
usingexternalneutralelementsforcomparinglegalsystems:the
comparatistmusteradicatethepreconceptionsofhisnativelegalsystem
(Zweigert&Ktz1998,p.35).Indeed,describinglawisnotanobjective
activity,itdoesntofferpurefactseverybodywouldseeinthesameway,
likeaflowerascomparedtoatree,oradogascomparedtoacat.38Looking
atconcepts,rules,institutions,andthelikeinothersocietieswill,atleastat
afirststage,alwayshappenatthebackgroundofonesownlegalsystemand
doctrinalframework.Whatcomparatistsmainlywantedtoemphasizewith
thetertiumcomparationisistheneedtobeawareofthisbiasandtotryto
getoutofonesownconceptualframework.Whatthistertium
comparationiscouldbeandhowtofindit,remainslessclear.Shouldone
compareappleswithorangesbyreferencetobananas,ortopearsand
lemons?Ortoanabstractconceptoffruit?Whatcouldbethetertium
comparationiswhencomparingtherepudiationofawifeinIslamiclaw
withdivorceinWesternlaw?
Actually,whathasinitiallybeenawellfoundedwarningagainstbiasesin
comparativeresearchhas,erroneously,beenperceivedaspartof
comparativemethod.Thereisnoreasonwhycomparativeresearchshould
belimitedtolegalphenomenawithcommoncharacteristicsortolegal
systemsatthesamestageofdevelopment,asEsinrchasrightly
claimed(rc2006,p.443).Ascomparativelawhaslargelydeveloped
withtheaimofimprovingonesownlegalsystem,itisunderstandablethat
thiskindofresearchrequiredsomelevelofcomparabilityinordertobe
useful.However,comparativeresearchcarriedoutwithotheraims,suchas
understandingquitedifferentlegalcultures,cannotandshouldnotusesuch
conditions.
NilsJansenanalysedtheconceptsandmethodsofcomparisoninhistorical
linguisticsandcomparativereligionandconcluded,asforthelatter:
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
Thus,tertiacomparationiscannotbedefinedaspartofthemethod
comparisonmustremainopenfornewinsights.Nevertheless,asa
resultofsuccessfulcomparisons,thedisciplinehasperhaps
unconsciouslydevelopedacomparativesecondorderlanguage
describingtheconceptsthatconstitutethedifferentreligionsbeliefs.It
hasbecomehighlyusefulforanalysingthecomplexcommonalitiesand
differencesofreligionallinallitrepresentsalargebodyofcomparative
knowledge(Jansen2006,p.330).
Above,whendiscussingthemethodsofcomparativelegalresearch,wehave
seenhow,inmostcases,comparatistsfocusingonmethodologyhavetried
todevelopsucha,relativelyneutral,secondorderlanguagedescribingthe
conceptsthatconstitutethedifferentlegalsystems,evenifinapplied
comparativeresearchmostlyfirstorderlanguagesareused.
Insteadoflookingfortertiacomparationis,legalcomparatistsshould,
indeed,throughtheirresearch,developsuchacomparativesecondorder
language.39Actually,whatispresentedastertiumcomparationisis
sometimesinfactsuchasecondorderlanguage.40Itistruethatlegal
systemscanonlybecorrectlyunderstoodintheirownlanguage,fromtheir
owninternalperspective(Valcke2012,p.2248),butinorderfor
comparativelawtodevelopasadisciplinesomekindofsecondorder
language(s)willhavetobeworkedout.
Onlyincaseofharmonizationoflawanewcommon(firstorder)legal
languagehastobedeveloped.41
7Conclusion
Thecomparatistdisposesofapluralisttoolboxcontainingthefollowing
methodologicalopportunities:
Thefunctionalmethodislookingattheactualsocietalproblem
(e.g.,atrainaccident)andthewaythisissolvedindifferent
jurisdictions(mostnotablycompensatingthevictimsfortheir
damage)alongsimilarordifferentroads(e.g.,contractliabilityor
tortliability)andwithsimilarordifferentresults(e.g.,
compensationornotforpureeconomicloss).Thefocusisonthe
societalproblemandtheactualresultofthelegalapproachtothat
problem.
Theanalyticalmethodisanalysing(complex)legalconceptsand
rules(e.g.,ownership)indifferentlegalsystemsinsuchawaythat
commonpartsanddifferencesaredetected(claims,liberties,
competences,etc.).Theuseofidealtypesmakesitpossibletorank
thoselegalconcepts,rules,institutions,onascaleaccordingtothe
degreeoffittingwiththecorecharacteristicsoftheidealtype.
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
Thestructuralmethodisfocusingontheframeworkofthelaworof
theelementsreconstructedthroughananalyticalapproach.Thisis
notthestructureofeachofthecomparedlegalsystems,butjustone
wayoflookingatthem,whichprovestoberevealingforanswering
theresearchquestion.
Thehistoricalmethodwillalmostalwaysbeanecessarypartofthe
methodsused,forunderstandingdifferencesandcommonalities
amonglegalsystemsandfordeterminingtheirdegreeofbelonging
toadeeplyrootedtraditionorrathertoaccidentalhistoricalevents.
Thelawincontextmethodhasinevitablyalsoahistorical
dimensionbutfocusesonthelawscurrentsocietalcontext,
including,whereappropriate,culture,economy,psychology,
religion,etc.Itstudiesamuchbroadercontextwhencomparedto
thefunctionaloranalyticalmethodandimpliestheuseof(results
from)otherdisciplines.
Mostofthosemethodswillmaketheresearchermovefromasurfacelevelof
comparisontoadeeperlevel:divergingtypesofrightincludedincomplex
legalconcepts,rulesandinstitutions,underlyingworldviews,adetected
commonstructuralframeworkbehindapparentdifferences,elementsin
historythatareweakeningthestrengthofseeminglyopposedand
irreconcilableapproaches,etc.
Onemayalsodistinguishotherlevelsofcomparison,eachofthemimplying
theuseofsomemethod(s)ratherthanotherones.
Afirstdistinctionistheonebetweenmicroandmacrocomparison:studying
concretelegalproblemsorconcretelegalconcepts,rulesorinstitutions,as
comparedtoabroaderapproachasto,forinstance,theoverallorganization
ofthestate,ortheorganizationofsocialsecurity.
Aseconddistinctionistheonebetweencomparingthecontentofthelaw
versuscomparingdoctrinalframeworksrelativelyindependentlyfromthat
content(amoretechnicalcomparison).
Ithastoberepeated:thechoiceofmethodorlevelforcomparisonwill
mainlydependontheresearchquestion(s)guidingtheresearchproject.
Differentaimsoftenimplydifferentmethods,beitnotalways.Forinstance,
thedifferentaimsmentionedabove,insection1,ofimprovingdomesticlaw
inFrancebytheendofthenineteenthcenturywhencomparedto
harmonizationinitiativesintheEUbytheendofthetwentiethcentury,
basicallyhaveledtotheuseofsimilarmethods.Inbothcases,legalscholars
havebeenlookingforthebettersolution.AccordingtoLambert,scholarly
researchshouldbeabletoprovethesuperiorityofsomelegislationover
othersandshould,hence,bechosenasdroitcommunlgislatif(Lambert
1900,p.242also:Jamin2000,p.733751).Todaythebettersolution
approachis,explicitlyorimplicitly,underlyingmanycomparativelaw
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
researchprojects.Thisismostnotablythecasewheneconomicanalysisof
lawisusedwithinacomparativelawcontext.42
Arethemethodslistedabovetheonlypossibleones?Forinstance,what
aboutlegaltransplants?Legaltransplantsareratheranaimoraresult,not
acomparativemethodinitsownright.43Successfullegaltransplantswill
requirealawincontextmethod.Whatseemstoworkwellinanotherlegal
systemmayindeedfailtodosoinonesownlegalsystembecauseofa
differentcontext.TheimportofEuropeanfamilylawinmostAfrican
countriesduringcolonizationtimes,andkeptafterthat,isaclearexample
offailedtransplantsbecauseofaquitedifferentculturalcontext(Van
Hoecke2012).Hence,justcopyingforeignlawcouldhardlybeconsideredto
beamethod.Itisratherthetypicalexampleoflackofmethodin
comparativelaw.
Whataboutsocialsciencesmethodology?Alawincontextapproachmay
requiretheuseofatleastsomemethodsoftheusedsocialsciences
(historical,economic,political,sociological,anthropological,)unlessthe
relevantinformationisalreadyavailableinpublishedresearchresults.The
socialsciencemethodswillthenbeaninstrumentwithinthecontextofone
ofthechosencomparativemethods.Evenatthelevelofthesheer
descriptionofforeignlawonemay,forinstance,wanttogetafulland
correctviewofthelawasitworksinpracticebytakinginterviewsof
relevantstakeholdersandnotlimitoneselftoconsultinglegislation,
publishedcaselawandlegaldoctrine(orincaseonedoesntmaster
sufficientlythelocallanguage).However,itstillwillremainpartofa
descriptionofforeignlaw,whichinturnwillbepartofsomeofthe
mentionedmethodswithinthecontextofscholarlycomparativelegal
research.
Inthispaper,Ihavetriedtoidentifysixmethodswhichhavebeenusedin
comparativeresearch,inabroadsense,untilnowandwhichcannotbe
reducedtoeachother.Thisdoesntexcludethatothermethodsor
combinationofmethodswithothernameswouldbepossible,butforthe
timebeingtheseseemtocoverthewholecurrentmethodologyof
comparativelegalresearch.
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Sluit
Noten
informatieklikhier.
1ThischaoticandunscientificsituationhasbeenwelldescribedbyEsin
rc:Therearecomparativelawyerswhoseecomparativelawasa
sciencewithitsownseparatesphere.Otherscallcomparativelawmerelya
methodofstudyandresearchorevenatechnique.Someregarditbothasa
comparativemethodandacomparativescienceoflaw,orseein
comparativelawmorethanoneoftheseaspects.Itisimmediatelyobvious
thatthosewhoseecomparativelawasamethodonlydonottelluswhat
thatmethodis,leavingthisissueunansweredorveryvaguelycovered,and
thosewhothinkorfeelthatcomparativelawmustbemorethanamere
methoddonotseemtoagreeonwhatthissubjectmatteris.(rc2007,
p.62)
2Inthesamesense:Adams&Griffiths2012,p.279301rc2006,p.
450451.
3SeealsothedebateintheUSoncitingornotforeigncaselaw,whichinits
turnislocatedwithinthediscussionbetweenoriginalists(followingthe
historicalmeaningoflegaltexts)andevolutionalists(wantingtoadaptthe
texttochangedcircumstances)(Reed2008,p.253273).
4IntheElgarEncyclopediaofComparativeLaw(Glenn2006).Compare
thepurposesofcomparativelawresearchaslistedbyEsinrc(2007,p.
5356).
5Compare:Comparativelawislikeothersciencesinthatitsaimmustbe
theacquisitionofknowledge.Likeotherbranchesoflegalscience,itseeks
knowledgeoflaw(Sacco1991).SaccoisalsoreferringtoZweigertandKtz,
whointheirIntroductiontoComparativeLawuseasimilarwording(he
referstothepages1617ofthesecondeditionoftheGermanversionof
1984).
6Seeeg:FlanaganandAhern2011.Ofcourse,suchresearchhasitsvalue
andforthepurposeofthisarticle(judgescitingforeignlawasasourceof
persuasiveauthority)itevenmakessensetolimittheresearchtothe
countriesinvolved,asinmanycountriessupremecourtswillneverciteany
persuasiveauthority(eveniftheymayhaveusedit)butonlythelawthey
apply.However,theresultsofacomparisonamongCommonLawor
Englishlanguagecountriesmayonlycreateafalseimpressionof
universality.InthementionedarticlethesurveycoverscourtsfromBritain,
theCaribbean,Australia,SouthAfrica,Ireland,India,Israel,Canada,New
ZealandandtheUnitedStates,inotherwords,countriesfromall
continents.
7Incaseofindigenousorothercustomarylawswithanoraltraditionitwill,
ofcourse,havetobeasufficientaccesstothespokenlanguage.
8Theideawasalsotofindtheideallegislation.Itwasanapproachto
Sluit
comparativelawbasedonnaturallaw:consciouslyorunconsciously,it
informatieklikhier.
postulatesnaturallawoftheoldrationalisttype.Ittacitlyassumesthatfor
everydetailofeverylegislativeproblemthereisonerightuniversalrule,
whichthelawmakerisseekingtodiscoverandtoformulate.()Theexpert
oncomparativelegislationcombinestheinformationaffordedbythe
legislationoftheworldonanypointyoulikeandpullsouttheonerightrule
(Pound1936,p.57).
9InFrance,intheearly20thcentury,mostnotablyRaymondSaleillesand
EdouardLambertcriticizedtheworkoftheSocitdelegislationcompare,
whichsimplytranslatedforeignlegislationwithouttakingintoaccounthow
itworkedinpractice.Theseauthorsassumedthatreallifewastobefound
incaselaw(Saleilles1891,p.219).Lambertwasevenopposedtousing
socialsciences,whichwereatthattimenotsufficientlydevelopedtobeable
toofferenoughpreciseandusefulinformationforcomparativelaw
(Lambert1900,p.237).
10Samuel2014,p.81,withreferencestoBerthelot,2001,p.484,and
Berthelot1996,p.81.
11Thefunctionalapproachhadbeenintroducedtocomparativelawseveral
decadesearlier,partlyalongthelineoffashionablefunctionalisttrendsin
otherdisciplines.In1936,RoscoePounddefinedafunctionalcomparison
asthestudyofhowthesamethingmaybebroughtabout,thesame
problemmaybemetbyonelegalinstitutionordoctrineorpreceptinone
bodyoflawandbyanotherandquitedifferentinstitutionordoctrineor
preceptinanother(Pound1936,p.59).In1924,ErnstRabelnotedthat
solutionstocontractualproblemswerelargelythesameinEngland,France,
andGermany,notwithstandingquitedifferentlegalconstructionsofthat
field(Rabel1924).AccordingtoMicheleGraziadeithefunctionalmethod
wouldhaveitsrootsin19thcenturyinternationalprivatelaw(Graziadei
2003,p.103ff).MaxRheinstein,inhisturn,consideredEdouardLambert
tohavebeenthefirstconsciousexponentofthefunctionalapproach
around1900(Rheinstein193435,p.250).
12JaakkoHusa(2013)showshowfunctionalismincomparativelawhas
littletodowithfunctionalisminotherdisciplines.
13Shecallsthisthefunctionalinstitutionalapproachandthepreviousone
theproblemsolvingapproach,but,ofcourse,theyarejustthetwosidesof
oneandthesamecoin.
14Typicalexamplesmaybefoundinthecountries,suchasBelgium,which
keptortookovertheCodeNapolonafterNapoleonsdefeatin1815but
interpretedunchangedarticlesofthatcodeinadifferent,andsometimes
evenopposed,way,comparedtoFrance.
15Itisinterestingtonotethatafterseverallegislativeexperimentsin
Sluit
Russiainthe1990swiththeintroductionoftheconceptoftrustlawmakers
informatieklikhier.
andthemajorityofRussiancivillawacademicsrejectedtheAnglo
Americantrust(Zhdanov2006,p.182).Whatiscurrentlycalledthe
Russiantrustmanagementisacontractualobligationanddoesnthave
muchincommonwiththeAngloAmericantrust,whichisapropertylaw
concept(Zhdanov2006,p.182).
16FollowingMaxWeber.BrouwerandHagecallthemstereotype
concepts,followingtheterminologyproposedbyHilaryPutnam(Brouwer
&Hage2007,p.11).
17AlsoMarieLaureIzorchehasproposedtocomparelegalrelations,not
justlegalconceptsandlegalrules,firstlywithinalegalsystemandsecondly
betweenlegalsystems(Izorche2001,p.304311).
18rcseesthesociologicalapproachevenasavariationof,whatshe
calls,thefunctionalinstitutionalapproach(rc2007,p.52).
19Andmorethoroughlyin:Griffiths,Weyers&Adams2008.
20Seee.g.Meuwese&Versteeg2012.Astoempiricalresearchin
comparativelaw,seealsoinAdams&Bomhoff2012thecontributionsby
JulieDeConinck,FrederickSchauer,MauriceAdamsandJohnGriffiths.
21Includingincomparativeresearch,seethepreviousfootnote.Forabroad
andexcellentoverview,see:Siems2014,PartIIExtendingtheMethodsof
ComparativeLaw(p.95187)andmostnotablychapter7Numerical
comparativelaw(p.146187).
22Since2013withitsownjournalComparativeLegalHistory,published
withHart,Oxford.
23Foramoreelaborateanalysis:VanHoecke2004,p.81190.
24Forahistoricalanalysisofculturaldifferencesthatexplainthedifferent
approachestocommerciallawinEnglandandFrance,seeFoster2007,
mostnotablyatp.269277.
25E.g.,theworksofHermannPost(18391895):Post1876and1884.See
alsoLyall2008.
26Schlesinger1968(2volumes).Comparatistsfromthefollowingcountries
participatedinit:US,India,Australia,France,Germany,Italy,and
Switzerland.
27PresentationoftheprojectatthefirstgeneralmeetingonJuly6th,1995
athttp://www.commoncore.org/index.php?
view=article&catid=34%3Atheproject&id=46%3Atheprojectdeliveredat
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
thefirstgeneralmeetingonjuly61995(lastconsultedonJuly13th,
2014).SeealsoBussani&Mattei2000,p.2948.
28Foranoverviewofpossiblegeographicallevels,seeTwining2007,p.85
(Appendix1).
29Legalcultureisusedinabroadsense,encompassingtradition,usages,
worldview,paradigmaticallegalframeworksandanythingwhichisnotlaw
inthestrictsensebutinfluenceslegalthinking.
30See,e.g.,forexplainingadivergingapplicationofthesameEuropean
rulesinEnglandandItalybytheinfluenceoftraditionNebbia2000.
31When,acenturyago,RoscoePoundpublishedhisfamouspaperLawin
BooksandLawinAction(1910)hemainlycommented,sometimes
approving,sometimesdisapproving,onthewayjudges,publicprosecutors
andthepolicedeliberatelydidnotfollowthewrittenlaw.Heconsideredit
theworkoflawyerstomakelawinthebookssuchthatthelawinactioncan
conformtoit(p.86).
32HedefinestheAmericanparadigmasvertical,unilateral,domestic,and
politicalandtheEuropeanoneashorizontal,multilateral,international,
andapolitical.
33Foramorethoroughanalysis,seeVanHoecke2004,p.165195.
34Seeontheterritorialexpansionofthecommonlaw:McPherson2007,
ch.8,p.295325.
35See,mostnotablyastopropertylaw:Cameron1977.
36Seethe,alreadymentioned,exampleofdivergingapplicationofthe
sameEuropeanrulesinEnglandandItalybytheinfluenceoftradition,as
analysedinNebbia2000.
37TheconcepthasalreadybeenusedbyErnstRabelin1924:Rabel1924.
38Althougheventheseobjectsareonlyseeninthesamewaywithin
cultureswhoknowtheseobjects,wherecatsanddogsaredomesticated,etc.
Thewayweseethingsisalwaysdeterminedbyourownexperienceand
worldview.Hence,forhumanbeingstherearenoobjectivefacts
independentfromhumancultures.
39Here,Imnotgoingintothediscussiononthe(im)possibilityofcreating
ametalanguage(seeKjr2004).Everydisciplinedevelopsitsown
concepts.Thesesecondorderlanguagesare,ofcourse,notfulllanguages
likeEsperanto,butcoherentconceptualtoolkits.Inaway,Romanlaw
Sluit
informatieklikhier.
functionedintheMiddleAgesasasecondorderlanguageforinterpreting
localcustomarylaw.
40E.g.:Ihadbeenabletodeterminethroughpreviousworkthat
mismatchesbetweensubjectiveintentionandobjectivedeclaration,orthe
concerntoconsecrateyetalsodisciplinepartyintention,wereconsidered
legalissuesunderEnglishlawandFrenchlawalike.Thoseissuestherefore
arguablyprovidedappropriatetertiacomparationisforinvestigatingthe
EnglishandtheFrenchlawof,respectively,contractualmistakeand
contractualinterpretation,eventhoughtheymightproveinadequateforthe
purposeofinvestigatingotherareasofEnglishandFrenchcontractlaw
(Valcke2012,p.33).Thisshowshowasecondorderlanguagemaypartly
overlapwiththelegallanguagesofthecomparedlegalsystems.Also,it
showshowsomeconceptsmaybeusefulatametalevelforsomespecific
comparison,withouthavingsomebroader,letaloneuniversalvalidity.
41Foragoodoverviewoftheproblemsrelatedtosuchharmonizedlegal
language,seeDannemann2012.Seealso,inthesamevolume,the
contributionofClaesandDeVisser(2012,p.143169).
42Eventheideaofafreemarketforlegalconcepts,legalrules,legal
principlesandthelikeisnotneweither.ChristopheJaminquotesthe
FrenchscholarsBoissonadeandSaleilles,whoalreadyinthe19thcentury
talkedaboutarealinternationalbazar(ofideas)inthiscontext(Jamin
2000,p.748).
43Inlegaltheorythestudyoflegaltransplantsmaybeaway,amethodfor
researchonlegalchange(Graziadei2009).
Boomjuridisch
Sluit
informatieklikhier.

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