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12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 1023

Journal of International Economic Law
December, 2009

General Article


Susy Frankel [FNa1]

Copyright © 2009 by Oxford University Press; Susy Frankel

A World Trade Organization (WTO) non-violation complaint is one where an agreement has
not been breached, but the complainant alleges an expected benefit under the agreement has been
abrogated. When the TRIPS Agreement came into force non-violation complaints were not
available for TRIPS disputes. This position was to be reviewed. Non-violation complaints remain
unavailable for TRIPS disputes. In the early days of TRIPS the exclusion of non-violation
disputes seemed rational because of the unique nature of TRIPS, among WTO agreements. The
TRIPS Agreement requires members to implement minimum standards of intellectual property
protection in their national laws. Members therefore have to provide at least that level of
protection. If they do not do so a violation complaint could be initiated. Consequently, it was not
logical to look for any notion of expected benefit beyond the wording of the minimum standards.
However, TRIPS permits members to have greater standards and many members have agreed to
higher standards through free trade agreements. These TRIPS-plus standards have arguably
undermined expected benefits that should flow from TRIPS, especially for users of intellectual
property rights. This article discusses the utility of making non-violation disputes available for
TRIPS disputes from the perspectives of both the users and owners of intellectual property
rights. This analysis includes a discussion of whether TRIPS-plus free trade agreements
undermine expected benefits of the TRIPS Agreement and should thus be the subject of a non-
violation dispute.

The level of intellectual property protection that achieves trade liberalization, and encourages
development and technology transfer, is a central issue in intellectual property from an
international economic law perspective. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) [FN1] provides for minimum standards of intellectual
property law that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreed to. [FN2] Many
WTO members tried to negotiate higher standards than were eventually agreed and they now

have higher levels of protection in their laws than those set out in the TRIPS Agreement and
consequently, for those Members, the TRIPS Agreement is a floor rather than a ceiling. The
TRIPS Agreement sets the agreed minimum standards and members are obliged to enact laws
that at least comply with those standards. The result is a number of differing intellectual property
laws at national level. The differences between national laws can lead to disputes between
members as to whether, or not, a law is compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition to the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards, the requirements of other
multilateral agreements may also be incorporated into a member's law. The most significant
multilateral intellectual property body outside of the WTO is the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). [FN3]
As well as multilateral minimum standards, national intellectual property laws may also
reflect intellectual property standards agreed in bi-lateral or free trade agreements (FTAs). Since
the TRIPS Agreement came into force in 1995, members have entered into a steadily growing
number of FTAs with intellectual property chapters. [FN4] The intellectual property chapters of
*1025 these agreements vary in scope. [FN5] Many of the FTAs, however, include what are now
commonly called TRIPS-plus provisions. These provide for intellectual property protection
above the minimum standard that the TRIPS Agreement requires.
In many instances TRIPS-plus standards in FTAs have not been truly negotiated, but rather
have come about through something close to coercion. In particular, many of these agreements
are entered into between parties of unequal economic power and the 'smaller' party is seeking
other trade benefits and so will agree to TRIPS-plus standards in order to obtain those other
benefits. The USA and the EU, in particular, have 'template' intellectual property chapters, which
are 'non-negotiable' in exchange for other trade concessions. [FN6] There is much debate over
whether 'high' levels of protection are effectively forced on developing nations, when such levels
of protection are not necessarily of direct or immediate economic benefit. [FN7] These factors
create questions as to whether TRIPS-plus FTAs are legitimate. This article analyzes whether
these intellectual property chapters can be legitimate when they do not recognize the express and
implied parameters of the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement.
An important aspect of the TRIPS Agreement is the availability of the WTO dispute
settlement system to hear disputes about violations of all WTO Agreements, including the TRIPS
Agreement. [FN8] The complainant in *1026 such a dispute usually alleges that there has been a
violation of, and consequently a nullification and impairment of, one or more articles of the
WTO agreements. In relation to the GATT [FN9] and GATS, [FN10] but not the TRIPS
Agreement, members can bring what are known as non-violation complaints. [FN11] A
complainant in a non-violation complaint alleges that, although a specific article of an agreement
has not been breached, an expectation of an agreed benefit arising from the agreement has been
nullified or impaired. [FN12]
There has been discussion, but no firm resolution, about whether non-violation disputes
should be available under the TRIPS Agreement. [FN13] This discussion took place even though
the role for non-violation disputes, about GATT and GATS, is unsettled because the parameters
of nonviolation disputes are not well defined. [FN14] Some commentators even suggest that non-
violation disputes are inherently inappropriate in the WTO rules-based system. [FN15]
*1027 Even though it is not possible to bring a TRIPS Agreement non-violation dispute, the
non-violation dispute criteria provide a useful method through which to assess the legitimacy of
TRIPS-plus FTAs. This is because a non-violation analysis requires an assessment of members'
expectations about the scope of benefits arising from the agreement at issue. In this article I use

this approach to analyze the relationship between the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement and the
purposes of TRIPS-plus FTAs.
The TRIPS Agreement has many purposes. Its fundamental objective is to bind its members
to obligations to protect intellectual property rights. TRIPS also has other purposes, which
compete with and therefore require balancing against the protection of intellectual property.
These include the interests of third parties to use and access intellectual property, and the goals
of technology transfer and dissemination. [FN16] The preamble to the TRIPS Agreement and its
articles entitled 'principles' and 'objectives' provide some guidance about the object and purpose
of the Agreement, [FN17] which are important for dispute settlement over alleged breaches of
the Agreement. [FN18]
The purposes of the TRIPS Agreement are expressed through its framework and structure.
The TRIPS Agreement fundamentally differs from other international intellectual property
agreements in its objectives. This is because it is part of the WTO agreements and as such it has
trade-related purposes. Trade-related purposes are not found in any other multilateral intellectual
property agreements. [FN19] The trade related purposes are not only to protect intellectual
property rights, but to also make sure that intellectual property rights do no themselves operate as
unacceptable trade barriers. [FN20]
*1028 The core of TRIPS sets out a series of minimum legal standards that allow members
some autonomy over how they implement those standards in their national intellectual property
law. How much autonomy members have over the detail of their domestic law may depend on
the particular article involved. Some articles of the Agreement function like maximum standards
in that they specify what should not be protected. An example is the idea/expression dichotomy
in copyright which is codified as: [FN21]
Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of
operation or mathematical concepts as such.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, [FN22] in the context of
compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical patents, recognized the principle of national autonomy in
enacting minimum standards in domestic law. It declared that members may define for
themselves what amounts to a national health-related emergency. [FN23] Article 27 of TRIPS,
which defines the subject matter of patents, is implemented in very different ways in members'
national laws. When it comes to the scope of subject matter of patents there is much dispute over
whether the TRIPS Agreement requires certain types of patents. [FN24] Conversely, some
TRIPS articles allow little flexibility, such as the requirement that members protect computer
programs as literary works in copyright law. [FN25] This does not give members scope to
protect computer programs as another category of copyright work. [FN26] They must protect
computer programs as literary works. [FN27] The degree of autonomy that members do or do not
have lies at the core of any controversies over interpretation of some aspects of the TRIPS
An inevitable consequence of minimum standards of intellectual property, rather than
harmonized detail, is disputes over compliance with those minimum standards. Some disputes
involve complaints that one member's law is not in compliance with and has consequently
violated the TRIPS *1029 Agreement. Other disputes over the TRIPS Agreement are played out,
not in the dispute settlement arena, but rather in the TRIPS Council discussions about the scope
of the TRIPS Agreement. Because of differences in national intellectual property laws and the
difficulties in progressing multilateral negotiations, both within and outside the WTO, members
use FTAs to deepen harmonization of intellectual property obligations at least between the FTA

Section IV discusses the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. discusses what non-violation disputes might look like from the viewpoint of users of intellectual property rights. Rather. In the case of owners of intellectual property rights the expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement will be protection. [FN30] I suggest. In the case of users it might be freedom from over-protection. therefore. however. That structure is a combination of minimum standards and some national autonomy over how those minimum standards are implemented. in light of its object and purpose. Section V discusses the ways in which international intellectual property norms are created through TRIPS- plus FTAs.parties. On the one hand. some developing countries consider that the levels of intellectual property protection. in part. Section III discusses how more extensive protection is applied on a non-discrimination. [FN32] In particular. [FN31] Also. They did not expect to be pressured into entering FTAs that increased standards. Section II discusses the relationship between minimum standards and more extensive protection under the TRIPS Agreement. *1030 I do not dispute that the TRIPS Agreement allows for WTO members to provide higher levels of intellectual property protection. but mostly through the expansion of TRIPS-plus FTAs. This has meant that potential non-violation disputes have largely been considered as a device for intellectual property owners to increase protection. as mentioned above. which they reasonably expected that they would provide. On the other hand. To date. although. [FN28] A complainant in a non-violation dispute must allege that it has been deprived of a reasonably expected benefit. The primary questions I explore are: (a) how TRIPS-plus FTAs are removing degrees of flexibility over the implementation of intellectual property law at domestic level. through increased multilateral negotiations to provide higher levels of protection. This article. basis. members cannot bring non-violation disputes about the TRIPS Agreement. Concerns about over-protection of intellectual property rights have arisen. This creates even more differences in the levels of intellectual property protection that WTO members have at national level and even more disagreements over the appropriate levels of intellectual property protection. This includes discussion of what non-violation disputes about the TRIPS Agreement might look like. I analyze whether an effect of TRIPS-plus FTAs is to nullify and impair the benefits and expectations that members have. the USA is the major proponent of allowing non-violation disputes for TRIPS. its structure and the benefits that can be expected from it. Some of these disagreements are framed in terms of what members can expect from the TRIPS Agreement. the optional nature of the ability to increase protection is itself a purpose of the TRIPS Agreement that should be maintained. that providing higher levels of protection ought to have limits consistent with the wording of the TRIPS Agreement. Sections VI and VII assess the role of non-violation disputes in the TRIPS Agreement context. An understanding of these fundamental concepts is important as FTAs should not undermine the Agreement's negotiated object and purpose. I assess potential non-violation disputes brought by members from an owner of intellectual property rights' viewpoint. which flow from the negotiated and agreed structure of the TRIPS Agreement. developed countries have treated the ability to have increased intellectual property standards as without limits. particularly an MFN. the ability to provide higher levels of protection does not equate to an unchecked right to coerce higher levels of protection through FTAs. how users could use non-violation to argue that increased standards through TRIPS-plus FTAs are a non-violation of the TRIPS . and (b) whether that erosion of flexibility is consistent with the agreed structure and framework of the TRIPS Agreement. should not be higher than the TRIPS Agreement level for at least some time. [FN29] Using the non-violation dispute criteria.

MINIMUM STANDARDS AND 'MORE EXTENSIVE PROTECTION' The TRIPS Agreement. substantive law international intellectual property agreements have this structure. but directly affect TRIPS Agreement requirements. Most. Many countries have sound and smell marks and some FTAs require protection of these sorts of trade marks. for example. Section IX offers some conclusions. In this way minimum standards provide for a degree of harmonization. figurative elements and combinations of colours'. but those minimums do not deeply harmonize the law to the extent of prescribing the wording to be used in domestic statutes. numerals. [FN33] provide minimum legal standards and allow for members to provide increased levels of protection. correctly or incorrectly. but rather was about strengthening the boycott on Cuba.Agreement. [FN36] If a law is within the scope of the TRIPS Agreement coverage. The European approach to the database example is that because the TRIPS Agreement does not require protection of data EU database protection need not be subject to national treatment. It simply requires that the selection and arrangement of databases that are intellectual creations are protected. [FN35] Whether a law is treated as within the scope of intellectual property protection that the TRIPS Agreement requires or outside of that scope is important. *1031 II. [FN37] *1032 As the TRIPS Agreement has minimum standards. but that is arguably not correct. as ways to avoid national treatment obligations. What is greater or outside of the Agreement is not always straightforward to identify. The Europeans treat the database unfair extraction right. but as part of copyright law which seems to be the situation now in Australia. Such marks are clearly the same category of protection as those required to be protected under the TRIPS Agreement. as outside the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement. for example. In that sense one could say that sound and smell marks are outside the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. Some aspects of TRIPS can be affected by non-intellectual property laws. Challenges can be made to laws that are not designated intellectual property laws. [FN39] Another example that illustrates the difficulty of defining the TRIPS Agreement boundaries is the requirements of trade mark protection. The alternative argument is that it ought to be subject to national treatment because protecting data from unfair extraction is a greater level of database protection than the TRIPS Agreement requires. The TRIPS Agreement primarily requires that members provide the minimum levels of protection through relevant intellectual property legislation. and other international agreements on intellectual property. [FN38] This issue becomes particularly difficult when countries protect data not as a sui generis unfair extraction right. letters. if not all. Sui generis regimes. [FN34] The minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement prescribe the level of protection rather than the exact wording of the law. are used. as a condition of registration. [FN41] . outside of the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. it is subject to national treatment and MFN. The TRIPS Agreement requires protection of trade marks that are 'words including personal names. any greater standards of protection in a member's law should also be subject to national treatment and MFN. that signs be visually perceptible' and such marks are not visually perceptible. concerned a US law that was not primarily a trade mark law. Section VIII discusses the overlap of violation and non-violation disputes in the TRIPS Agreement context. [FN40] The TRIPS Agreement does not require protection of smell and sound marks because it states that 'members may require. This means that there will be differences in laws at national level and in effect different ways to comply with the minimum standards. because the Agreement does not require the protection of data. The Havana Club dispute.

[FN48] Third. national treatment and most-favored nation (MFN). although permissible. the mere fact that something is a higher standard than the minimum standards of the TRIPS Agreement does not necessarily mean that the higher standard is compliant with the Agreement. implement in their law more extensive protection'. and also freedom over the type of laws. the members of the TRIPS Agreement have agreed to the minimum standards and national autonomy over implementation of standards. Therefore. III. for example. an increased standard must not contravene these non-discrimination provisions. Whatever method is chosen to implement the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards WTO members' laws will also differ because of the possibility that Members will provide increased standards. That approach is a structural feature of the TRIPS Agreement which forms part of the overall object and purpose of the Agreement. There are three important features of article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 'provided that the protection does not contravene the agreement'. must not contravene any such structural parts of the Agreement. article 1 permits the provision of more extensive protection 'provided that protection does not contravene the provisions of the Agreement'. The combination of the ability to have greater levels of protection. allows members to choose whether to protect new plant varieties by patent or a sui generis plant variety rights system. [FN50] National treatment provisions . The freedom over implementation includes the detail and scope of any laws. More extensive exceptions are most likely to result in an overall level of protection that is below the minimum standard required. members are free to determine the appropriate method of implementation of the TRIPS Agreement standards in their legal system. 'MORE EXTENSIVE PROTECTION' AND NON-DISCRIMINATION As mentioned above. [FN49] Freedom for WTO members to choose the method of implementation of TRIPS Agreement standards is an important recognition of some flexibility of the Agreement and consequent national autonomy that article 1 allows. [FN43] This is important because it contemplates the possibility that some extra protection might contravene the Agreement. other structural parts of the TRIPS Agreement are the non- discrimination principles. Thus. but shall not be obliged to. creates a likelihood of differing intellectual property laws at national level. [FN45] That is. Increased standards. is primarily directed to the non-discrimination principles. *1033 Second. and the freedom for all members to implement domestic laws in a manner appropriate to them. However. The TRIPS Agreement. For example. which sets up the possibility of more extensive protection. the minimum standard for duration of a patent is 20 years. First. *1034 provided that they meet the minimum standards. These principles function to ensure that. minimum standards structure can create disharmony. [FN44] The non-discrimination provisions are a structural part of the Agreement. where national laws differ. national treatment and MFN. The phrase. they affect every part of the Agreement. Without the national treatment principle the minimum standards framework would almost certainly result in discrimination at domestic level. Thus. [FN47] Also of note is that article 1 refers to more extensive protection not more extensive exceptions. [FN46] Any increase of that term in any member's law must be provided on a non-discriminatory basis to all members of the WTO. private right holders from all members receive equal protection domestically. members 'may. [FN42] Quite obviously this means that providing more extensive protection is optional.

are found in other substantive law intellectual property agreements, but the addition of MFN is a
new occurrence with the TRIPS Agreement. [FN51] The TRIPS Agreement does not have an
MFN exemption for FTAs entered into after 1995. [FN52] The absence of this exemption has
had the primary effect of MFN driving the increase of intellectual property protection. The
combination of the TRIPS Agreement minimum legal standards and the absence of an MFN
exemption have not only allowed for, but have, through this relatively unrestricted framework,
encouraged an increase in intellectual property protection through intellectual property chapters
in FTAs. A complexity to *1035 this is the different manner in which MFN operates in the
TRIPS Agreement than in the GATT context. [FN53]
As TRIPS does not have an MFN exemption then any domestic law changes will be provided
on an MFN basis. What that means is that all foreigners will be treated the same by any
member's domestic law. In order to have similar increases in multiple countries, each country
will need to change its domestic law also. This is one reason why the USA and the EU, in
particular, enter into intellectual property chapters in FTAs, with the same or similar clauses,
with a number of different countries. Each FTA is needed to require members to change their
own domestic intellectual property law. If enough countries change their law to a higher standard
then the higher standard has the potential to become the international norm. The wave of
countries increasing copyright term to 70 years is an example of this. Also, if nationals of
country A are able to obtain better protection in country B then this could provide an incentive
for nationals of country A to lobby country A's government to increase protection.
If there was no MFN clause in the TRIPS Agreement that alone would not prevent the rising
tide of increased intellectual property standards. However, if national intellectual property laws
only applied increased standards to FTA parties, based on an MFN exemption, this might slow
down the rising tide of increasing intellectual property standards. Such a conclusion, however, is
necessarily speculative, particularly as not all members of the WTO take the approach,
exemplified by the EU, of exempting protection from national treatment where the protection is a
so-called 'non-TRIPS' protection or has a treaty based exception from national treatment, such as
copyright term.
The required term of copyright protection under the TRIPS Agreement is life plus 50 years.
If a member provides a greater term for copyright, then that member does not need to apply that
term to foreigners on national treatment basis, because there is a specific exemption from
national treatment in the Berne Convention. [FN54] The relevant Berne Convention provision is
incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement. [FN55] The EU takes advantage of this national treatment
exception and only gives the longer term to nationals from countries that also have the longer
term at domestic law. This is known as reciprocity, rather than national treatment. The USA,
unlike the EU, does not discriminate between countries that provide the longer term *1036 and
those that do not. Rather the USA provides its extended 70 year term on a national treatment
basis. [FN56]
Whether an increased standard created at national law and expanded through FTAs becomes
an international norm may also depend on the type of increase that is at issue. The EU has
provided both increased copyright term and the unfair extraction right on a reciprocity rather
than national treatment basis. Many countries have adopted the increased term and the USA, for
example, has included it in its FTAs with others. The same is not true for the unfair extraction
right which has not been so widely taken up. [FN57]
Members who pursue increasing levels of intellectual property protection act as though the
minimum standards framework means that there is nothing preventing standards being increased

indefinitely. The approach that any increase is legitimate in all circumstances is, however, too
simplistic or formalistic. [FN58] It ignores the many questions that arise as to whether increased
standards are necessarily consistent with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.
[FN59] Such increases are not necessarily trade enhancing. I have argued elsewhere that it is
particularly important in the absence of an MFN exemption for FTAs, as GATT and GATS
expressly have, that intellectual property chapters in FTAs ought at least to be consistent with the
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN60]

Each substantive minimum of the TRIPS Agreement has the purpose of providing whatever
that minimum standard is. Additionally, the TRIPS Agreement has some general provisions that
are grouped together in Section I, under the heading 'General Provisions and Basic Principles'
These include the provisions that provide for non-discrimination, establish the minimum
standards framework, autonomy over the implementation of those standards and the option to
have or not have more extensive protection. Other general provisions include the objectives and
principles of the *1037 TRIPS Agreement. All of these general provisions are structural because
they are intended to affect the whole of the Agreement and, as such, they overarch the object and
purpose of individual standards of protection in the other parts of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN61]
Any interpretation exercise that assesses the object and purpose of the Agreement must first
look at the words of the treaty in their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose.
The preamble is relevant to interpreting the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. It
refers to the 'need' to protect intellectual and property as well the need to 'ensure that measures
and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade'. The preamble also states, 'Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and
technological objectives'.
The objectives, in article 7, seek to explain the balance, which is always inherent in
intellectual property at domestic level, between users and owners or producers. [FN63] In
international intellectual property the users and producers tension is manifested as a balance
primarily between the developed and developing countries. [FN64] Article 7, therefore, states the
objective that protecting intellectual property should promote among other things, the transfer
and dissemination of technology.
The principles, in article 8, address ways to achieve this balance. Article 8 provides that
members can have exceptions in their laws to protect public health and 'to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to *1038 their socio-economic and technological
development'. [FN65] These sorts of exceptions are the major way in which WTO members can
develop policies in intellectual property that reflect their economic needs. [FN66]
These objectives and principles are notoriously difficult to interpret in a practical way
because they enshrine competing objectives. The WTO panel in Canada-Pharmaceuticals [FN67]
stated that these principles could not be used to undermine the express wording of other parts of
the Agreement. [FN68] However, the centrality of the objectives and principles of the TRIPS
Agreement was underscored in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, which expressly recognized the importance of the objectives and principles to
interpreting the whole agreement. [FN69]

An analysis of what members could reasonably expect from the wording and structure of the
TRIPS Agreement is also illustrative of its object and purpose. However, it is important not to
stray from the wording of the agreement for this analysis. The Appellate Body made it clear in
India-Patents [FN70] that the Panel had erred in suggesting that legitimate expectations could be
found beyond the wording of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN71] *1039 The Appellate Body
considered that the Panel had erred because it had elided the violation and non-violation dispute
aspects of GATT to reach its conclusion. Such an elision could not be correct in the TRIPS
Agreement context because non-violation disputes were not available. [FN72]
The object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement should be reflected in intellectual property
chapters of FTAs. If it is not, then the WTO members should not condone, including by
complicit inaction, the expansion of TRIPS- plus FTAs. The next section discusses whether the
norm-pushing effect of TRIPS-plus FTAs have the effect of undermining aspects of the object
and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement.

The TRIPS Agreement minimum standards are enacted in domestic law and then applied
within a member on a national treatment and MFN basis. [FN73] The minimum standards in the
TRIPS Agreement have become the baseline of the international norms of intellectual property
protection. International intellectual property norms are also created through other international
agreements such as the WIPO agreements. WIPO agreements, that were negotiated post-TRIPS,
should not be regarded as TRIPS Agreement norms, rather they add to what might be described
as international intellectual property norms. [FN74]
FTAs also have a role in creating international norms. A single FTA cannot constitute an
international intellectual property norm, but multiple *1040 FTAs, with similar provisions may
start to have that effect. [FN75] This proposition is verified as it is the open policy of the United
States that increased bilateral and FTA intellectual property standards will support its position to
increase intellectual property standards globally. [FN76]
The absence of an MFN exception has a role in supporting this cross border flow of
intellectual property norms. Even if an FTA or bilateral arrangement is only between two parties,
it affects other nations whose nationals are entitled to intellectual property protection in those
jurisdictions that are party to the FTA. Also, the dispute settlement process may take into
account FTA panel decisions. [FN77] The flow of intellectual property norms from intellectual
property chapters in FTAs is not necessarily easy to track and measure, but the flow undoubtedly
does and will continue to occur.
The TRIPS Agreement provides that members may, but are not obliged to, provide more
extensive protection. However, there are two broad limitations to this general proposition. First,
as discussed above, increased protection must comply with the TRIPS Agreement. [FN78] Also,
international law allows nations to make international commitments with other nations, provided
such commitments do not contravene other international obligations of those nations. [FN79]
As well as requiring domestic implementation of TRIPS-plus standards the sting in the tail of
TRIPS-plus agreements is how such agreements eliminate aspects of the structure of the TRIPS
Agreement with regard to the relationship between minimum standards and national autonomy
over implementation of those standards. One might say that countries that enter into these
agreements consent to eliminate this structure, but this is not dispositive. There is frequently an
imbalance of power in such negotiations and countries enter into intellectual property protections
that are not in their interests. They enter into such chapters because of the other trade benefits in

which says that members may. particularly its object and purpose. [FN80] *1041 Also. There is a difference between TRIPS-plus standards that expand protection of aspects of the covered categories of the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus standards that introduce new and properly sui generis subject matter. [FN87] However. The violation occurs when multiple FTAs have that approach and new norms develop without consensus. [FN83] The likely response from those pursuing increased standards is that the minimum standards really just meant minimum standards and anything above that is legitimate. therefore. many developing countries seem to have believed or perhaps hoped that the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards would be the limits of the protections they would be obliged to provide. such as traditional knowledge. The marriage of trade and intellectual property has made a significant difference in two ways. the unchecked proliferation of TRIPS-plus standards has run roughshod over and effectively ignored the real meaning of the structural provisions. If an FTA does prescribe deeper harmonization in details of domestic law in a TRIPS-covered area. then that deeper harmonization changes the minimum standards approach. such protection may or must be negotiated elsewhere and there is no flow back effect to other TRIPS members without their express agreement. Therefore. TRIPS-plus FTAs need to be brought into check and that increased harmonization of intellectual property rights through increased pressure via FTAs is not legitimate in the agreed international intellectual property framework. The second is that the object and purpose of TRIPS is different from other intellectual property agreements because of the trade setting. This even more problematic if the detailed harmonization comes about through bilateral pressure which is not only impacts those under pressure. However. *1042 The violation is about the system and how intellectual property chapters in FTAs are used to increase standards. but that is too narrow an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. The mere fact that the TRIPS Agreement allows increased standards is an analytically simplistic argument. Without express negotiation as to harmonization. increased minimum standards should not be used to achieve that either directly or indirectly through FTAs. but are not obliged to. The structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement ought to temper the FTA ratchet-up. [FN85] As a qualification I note that as not all TRIPS provisions are the same. [FN86] As the TRIPS Agreement does not speak to traditional knowledge matters. provide more extensive protection. and also the reality of how laws are made at domestic level. [FN81] I suggest. It might be described as a formalistic interpretation [FN84] that also ignores the other parts of the Agreement. the TRIPS-plus FTAs are not the same as pre-TRIPS bilaterals.the FTA as a whole. The first is that more is at stake when negotiating a trade-related FTA and consequently the coercive effect to increase intellectual property protection is much more effective when trade and intellectual property are mixed. Such a violation is different from the kind of violations where disputes can be brought to the DSB alleging that a member's law violates the agreement. The relationship with trade places limitations on increased . question whether increased intellectual property protection through FTAs is legitimate. but also other members of the WTO. that the proliferation of TRIPS-plus standards may cumulatively amount to a systemic violation of the TRIPS Agreement structure and purpose. These TRIPS-plus intellectual property chapters in FTAs are therefore contrary to article 1. therefore. I. [FN82] Increased standards that violate the structural provisions of TRIPS Agreement should not be permitted. not all increases are problematic. Increases in international intellectual property protection have occurred through bilateral agreements long before the TRIPS Agreement was created.

[FN96] The measure at issue must have damaged the competitive position of the imported product concerned. (b) the application of another contracting party of any measure. VI. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND NON-VIOLATION DISPUTES A. [FN91] During this period the Agreement provides that the Council for *1044 TRIPS 'shall examine the scope and modalities for complaints of [this] type'. which were predominantly 'intellectual property only' until the 1980s.. particularly there is no 'connection between tariff concessions and expectations therefrom'. Other members consider such complaints are inappropriate.protections. [FN90] This moratorium was initially for 5 years. Non-violation disputes can be brought in relation to GATT and GATS... an alternative approach to my systemic violation argument is that non-violation disputes might be used to check increased standards where the formation of those standards erodes an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement. whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement . Various members of the WTO are in favour of such disputes being available.. These are known as non-violation disputes because there is not a violation of the exact words of the agreement. This suggests that TRIPS-plus FTAs are not the legitimate forum for changes to the TRIPS Agreement. This limitation on increased standards was not present in pre-TRIPS agreements. even if the letter of the agreement has not been breached. The combination of the coercive effect and the flow of norms from other members' TRIPS-plus FTAs results in some members having lost the benefit of not being obliged to have increased standards. Yet members of the TRIPS Agreement should be able to benefit from the standard of intellectual property protection being the international norm unless other norms are freely negotiated. but there is a moratorium in relation to such disputes and the TRIPS Agreement. Non-Violation in General GATT permits members to bring a dispute against another member even if there is not a breach of the wording of the agreement: [FN89] If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the agreement is being impeded as a result of: . [FN92] This process of examination continues. [FN88] I acknowledge that a difficulty with the argument that there has been a systemic violation of the TRIPS Agreement is that the letter of the TRIPS Agreement has arguably not been breached because there is literal or formalistic compliance. [FN93] Some FTAs allow for the parties to bring non-violation disputes against each other. [FN98] Activism cases do not meet these criteria. [FN94] Cho has grouped GATT non-violation reports into 'restraintism' and 'activism' cases. Those limitations are that the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement ought to be compatible with the overall WTO goal *1043 of liberalizing trade. Therefore. [FN99] Cho therefore called these 'independent mode' cases because the complainant did not take issue with a specific . The central criteria for a successful non-violation claim is that a benefit from a negotiated agreement is nullified or impaired. [FN97] Cho describes cases that meet these criteria as supplementary mode cases because they 'seem to fill in a legal gap'. In order to consider this further it is necessary to look at what non- violation disputes are and examples of what TRIPS non-violation disputes might look like. [FN95] In relation to the restraintism cases a complainant must show that the measure at issue was not reasonably anticipated at the time the GATT tariff concession was negotiated.

Cho was critical of the independent mode cases and considered it surprising that some proponents of non-violation cases have suggested they be used in newly emerging areas. B. The non-violation procedure. The FTA negotiations process has been very costly and detrimental to many developing countries and the WTO does not provide a mechanism for developing countries to defend themselves against these pressures. [FN105] One fear is that developing countries will have to fight too many disputes in the WTO and that this will be a drain on resources.tariff. . Either the protection was required or it was not. Cho points out the nebulous nature of that obligation. but the agreement does not extend to protection of E because the parties could not agree on E. Since the TRIPS Agreement came into force. It would not be legitimate for a party to assume that it might also benefit from E as a result of the agreement. animal or plant life or health. by other means. A complaint that a benefit has been eroded. could benefit from the non-violation *1046 process as it may provide a rules- based response to the growing and unsustainable pressure to increase intellectual property protection. I argue. primarily of the USA. to increase intellectual property protections. but the wording of the agreement has not been breached. in order to meet national policy objectives. [FN103] Many TRIPS Agreement provisions are equally. labeled for convenience A. immediately looks like adding to the agreement even if such complaints are allowed. is that the use of non-violation disputes might bring a more robust approach to application and interpretation of the structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. where members may. regulate the supply of services. makes it appear inappropriate for non-violation disputes. nebulous. [FN101] One might ask what the hope is? In the TRIPS Agreement context the 'hope'. the push for increased standards takes place in the FTA arena. Why Non-Violation Disputes are not Available under the TRIPS Agreement The structure and nature of the TRIPS Agreement. In the case of intellectual property disputes some non-violation disputes might really amount to an attempt to stretch the meaning of the minimum standards. This is because there could not be any expected benefits other than *1045 the protection required by the minimum standards. impeded the objectives of the agreement. [FN102] One of the difficulties with all non-violation disputes is that they run the possibility of falling foul of this requirement. A similar difficulty potentially arises in GATS Agreement cases. Say that there is an international agreement for related areas of intellectual property. B. as an agreement of minimum standards. When interpreting an agreement the WTO dispute settlement rules require that panels and the Appellate Body do not add to agreements. C and D. but rather interpret the existing words of the agreement. particularly those with little negotiating power. This is not a concern that should be treated lightly and has perhaps been a concern with the WTO dispute settlement process generally. could very well provide the necessary 'defence' to these pressures. [FN100] He refers to the use of so-called independent mode cases as providing 'a source of hope'. but rather alleged that the party has. if not more. however. A simple example demonstrates the core of this difficulty. particularly provisions allowing exceptions such as the ability to exclude inventions from patentability on the basis of ordre public or human. with proper rules governing it. Developing countries. [FN104] The main reason that developing countries have been opposed to the use of non-violation disputes for the TRIPS Agreement is that they believe such disputes would be used as a tool.

to illustrate that the unchecked use of intellectual property chapters in FTAs is not only a violation of the structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. but forming rules around TRIPS Agreement non-violation should help control this. Also. One aspect of such rules ought to be that the test of loss of 'any benefit . the minimum standards prescribe the level of protection rather than the exact wording of the law. Violation disputes which analyse the wording.. It is important. in India-Patents.imbalanced FTA negotiations. ought to be the first set of tools used to interpret that grey area. An objective assessment is a method of controlling non- violation disputes from becoming a renegotiation tool. without the non-violation type criteria. the lines between areas of intellectual property law. was wrong. being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective . This means that there will be differences in laws at national level and in *1047 effect different ways to comply with the minimum standard. some grey areas where members and the system might benefit from non-violation disputes.. C. in light of the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. but this does not mean that Panels will decide cases incorrectly. non-violation ought to recognize that there are broad expectations arising from the general provisions of the Agreement. the Appellate Body still found against India. Second. My use of the non-violation formula is not to suggest the Appellate Body. A complainant's subjective view of loss is not sufficient. The use of non-violation disputes about the TRIPS Agreement would not require a connection to a specific tariff because the TRIPS Agreement is not about tariffs. As discussed above. The objective view would assess whether the expected benefit was a reasonable expectation based on the actual agreement. These grey areas arise through a combination of features of the TRIPS Agreement. to note that in India-Patents. however. Non-violation will be particularly useful in the minimum standards framework because. in a way that is different from a violation dispute. the Appellate Body analysis was correct. As discussed above. First. To be sure some parties may bring bad cases. Rather it may give the opportunity for reports to better reflect the nature and structural provisions of the TRIPS Agreement as a balance between the intellectual property 'haves' and 'have-nots'. within or outside of the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. however.. Rather the connection ought to be to a category of protection in relation to which the TRIPS Agreement requires its members to enact minimum standards in relation to. at this stage in the life of the TRIPS Agreement. why non-violation disputes have. because non-violation complaints were and still are not available for TRIPS disputes. become important so that the scope of the Agreement is tested in a rules-based forum rather than in the power. There are. That dispute was brought in the early days of dispute settlement and the TRIPS Agreement. that is a Vienna Convention interpretation might show . This means that a party who tried to negotiate for more than they eventually achieved cannot use non- violation to say that it expected more. are not always so clear. being impeded' is objectively assessed. Why Non-Violation Disputes Might Now be Appropriate for the TRIPS Agreement Nearly 15 years of operation have shown that there are many grey areas in the TRIPS Agreement. but potentially an actionable non-violation of some substantive legitimate expectations arising from the TRIPS Agreement. Disputants may attempt to misuse non-violation. My approach here is to show two things that are quite different from the issues discussed in India-Patents. Non-violation recognizes that even though there is literal compliance with a standard..

At international level some WTO members are recognized as predominantly owners of intellectual property rights and others are recognized predominantly as users. The legal basis of intellectual property rights is important because the underpinnings of the rights can assist in defining the appropriate contours of the rights. Underlying some of the arguments against the use of non-violation complaints in the TRIPS Agreement context is that intellectual property rights are private negative rights and therefore inherently unsuitable to the principles of non-violation. [FN112] Even though intellectual property rights are private rights WTO disputes are not about a particular individual's private right. Allowing non-violation disputes would provide a way for members to test the parameters of the agreement in an analytical rules-based environment.compliance. Human rights treaties. [FN113] Because the TRIPS Agreement is part of the WTO 'bargain' about trading relationships the expectation of intellectual . *1048 VII. [FN108] In order to examine the utility of non-violation disputes further. WHAT A TRIPS AGREEMENT NON-VIOLATION DISPUTE MIGHT LOOK LIKE A. but members' obligations to provide those private rights in their domestic laws. The TRIPS Agreement cannot be renegotiated in dispute settlement and panels are not authorized to do anything other than interpret the agreements. there has. in fact. rather than in potentially coercive FTA 'negotiations'. Owners and Users as Complainants There are two broad categories of benefits that WTO members might expect from the TRIPS Agreement. even if that protection is provided through a negative rights property framework. and the stronger party can simply assert that their interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement is correct. which are often predominantly users of intellectual property. [FN106] but disputes do serve the purpose of allowing members to test their interpretations of the agreement and removes the difficulty of members being judge of their own cause. where there is *1049 an obligation on states to provide authors protection or protection of social and cultural rights. which looks for the loss of a positive benefit. are examples. The United States and the European Union are major owners of intellectual property by comparison to many small or developing countries. [FN107] Being judge in one's own cause is particularly problematic in FTA negotiations. One is the benefits that intellectual property right owners may expect and the other is what users of intellectual property might expect. At national level intellectual property rights are usually considered to be negative rights. The benefits that intellectual property owners might expect pose different issues from the benefits that users of intellectual property might expect. [FN109] At national level there will be both users and owners of intellectual property rights. [FN111] Generally an intellectual property owner cannot expect anything more than the rights that a particular domestic law grants them. The existence of those positive obligations can give a correlative right to individuals to claim protection of the rights. been an erosion of a reasonably expected benefit under the TRIPS Agreement. which are not characterized by freedom of contract and state autonomy. however. [FN110] Even though intellectual property rights at national level are predominantly negative property rights. the next part discusses who potentially may bring non-violation disputes and what they might look like. That is they provide the owner with the exclusive right to exclude third parties. international agreements impose on their member countries positive obligations to provide protection. where there is a power imbalance between negotiating parties.

reasonably expected benefits of the TRIPS Agreement. Examples of Potential Non-Violation Disputes The Secretariat Note of the TRIPS Council's discussion of non-violation complaints sets out some examples of what non-violation complaints could look like. but this does not give individuals the right to make use of intellectual property works. who could bring them and what they might achieve. the TRIPS Agreement creates positive rights for Members to reasonably expect protection. This example is apposite for discussion because many countries have extended their copyright term beyond the TRIPS Agreement minimum. [FN114] In sum. Members who provide that protection should legitimately expect to benefit from the ability not to be obliged to provide 'more extensive protection'. Rather. from the net-users' perspective. to bring disputes. and national autonomy over implementation of TRIPS and whether or not to provide more extensive protection. the TRIPS Agreement creates rights to protect intellectual property. except under license. including what they might be about. However. [FN115] One of these is that: [FN116] Member A may grant a very large increase in the term of copyright protection which could effectively nullify or impair benefits that Member B was expecting to enjoy at the time of negotiations and thereafter nationals of Member B may have invested in the production of separate works. but they may be an avenue for Members. and embodies the objectives of *1050 technology transfer and dissemination. who are predominantly users. Fair uses of intellectual property works are a public good required as part of the overall justifications for the scope of intellectual property protection. when considered in the international agreement context. assuming that the moratorium is removed. The expectation not to provide greater protection and to be able to use TRIPS flexibilities could be the subject of a non-violation dispute. However.property protection and the resulting trade benefit is not a negative right. say movies or plays based on or using that work and expecting it to be in the public domain. For the most part no one user of an intellectual property right. These are the positive obligations between Member states that have been and may be the subject of violation disputes. if they do not wish to do so. [FN117] *1051 Such a complaint is not a violation complaint as the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement have been met and exceeded. has defined rights in the same way owners do. As discussed above. I acknowledge that such disputes may be hard to win and that they ought to be hard to win. The TRIPS Agreement does not transform negative rights into positive rights of expectation for the benefit of individual intellectual property owners or users. include transfer and dissemination of technology. but that cannot be a reason not to have them for appropriate cases. It is in this context that non-violation complaints may prove useful. Therefore users might need to be cautious about alleging there are expected benefits arising from any national intellectual property laws. B. degrees of flexibility and that other Members adhere to the structural provisions of the Agreement. it provides Members with the right to expect intellectual property protection for their nationals in other member states. Because there is a moratorium on non-violation complaints the complaint could not be brought as a non-violation complaint. Non-violation disputes under the TRIPS Agreement would not be available only for Members who are predominantly owners of intellectual property rights. the real question is whether such a complaint is realistic in light . With this in mind the next section looks at examples of non-violation disputes. but a positive obligation between member states.

However. . that expected trade benefit will now probably disappear because the European Commission plans. to restrict those imports. which are very protectionist and do not generally facilitate trade. at that time. in particular its structure of minimum standards and allowance of national autonomy over the method of implementation of those standards and whether or not to increase those standards. There is no dispute that first use pharmaceuticals must be patentable to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. but a non-violation complaint raises some different issues. New uses of known pharmaceuticals were not always patentable. even in the developed world. Many Members have expected some European sound recordings to fall into the public domain and people based in those Member states may have planned to reproduce the sound recordings or to use them to create new copyright works. It cannot be a rational interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that members froze their intellectual property laws as at 1995 as. [FN124] Countries are not able to exclude patents on the basis of subject matter alone. [FN120] Australia permitted certain types of parallel imports until it agreed. which prescribes the subject matter of patent law.of the object and purposes of the TRIPS Agreement. A country cannot. at the time of writing. [FN121] Therefore members should be allowed national autonomy over parallel importing rules and cannot claim that these may not change in other members from time to time. Can there now be a legitimate complaint about the continued extension of copyright term? A violation complaint is unlikely to succeed because the TRIPS Agreement has been literally complied with. provided that they are new. that does not mean that Members should reasonably expect copyright term to be indefinitely extended. differences have emerged over whether TRIPS compliance requires second and subsequent uses of known pharmaceuticals to be patented. in an FTA with the USA. for example. in all fields of technology. The TRIPS Agreement does not require members to either allow or prohibit parallel imports of copyright products. Should member states who supplied the Australian parallel import market be permitted to complain that a benefit it expected in trade has been removed? This example has the difficulty that parallel importing rules in copyright are ostensibly outside of the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. at that time. [FN125] However. to extend the term of copyright protection in sound recording to 70 years. involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application'. [FN118] In any event. One example is the extension of term for sound recordings in the EU. [FN119] *1052 Parallel importing rules provide another example of a user's potential non-violation complaint. These different issues are important as they address the trading relationship between members of the WTO. [FN122] Interpretation of article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN123] Disputes over the scope of patent and other intellectual property subject matter are some of the hardest disputes to resolve because the subject matter of intellectual property law and the consequent interpretation of existing laws are continuously evolving in a way to ensure that existing laws can capture new technologies as patentable inventions. However. WTO members should be allowed to dispute the legitimacy of escalating copyright terms. many countries had ongoing programs of intellectual property law reform and there were international negotiations over various aspects of international intellectual property underway and planned. Despite the prohibition of blanket subject matter discrimination. These disputes are about the scope of article 27's requirements in relation to patents for pharmaceuticals. It provides that 'patents shall be available for any inventions. whether products or processes. in the area of copyright term. is another example. many members' laws were TRIPS-plus. disputes over the patentability of pharmaceuticals still exist. have a blanket rule that patents are not available for pharmaceuticals.

India might complain that the direct and indirect pressure. and is. The violation question asks if *1054 article 27 is breached. however. no international norm over the patentability of second and subsequent uses of known pharmaceuticals [FN138] it would be a misuse of the *1055 treaty interpretation to suggest that there is. it is impossible to say that there is any international consensus that could create an international norm. [FN126] were patented. India and some other developing countries regard such patents as being for incremental inventions and therefore resulting in the evergreening of a patent for a pharmaceutical substance. through the effect of FTAs. Indeed. Novartis unsuccessfully challenged India's refusal to grant such a patent in relation to the pharmaceutical. Broadly. The Madras Court did not rule on the TRIPS Agreement argument. rather it decided it did not have jurisdiction over the issue. thus eliminating the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN134] This results in different countries having different approaches to what is an inventive step. The non-violation question asks if a member has a complaint. does not allow patents for second and subsequent uses of known compounds unless there is 'an enhancement of the known efficacy' [FN128] of the substance. often called Swiss claims. could it be advantageous to bring a non-violation claim in relation to India's law? In my view. an inventive step is something that is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. to protect second use pharmaceuticals is a nullification and . such a complaint about the scope of subject matter in article 27 and India's law should not be successful for the same reasons that the violation complaint should not succeed. on the basis that there was no new efficacy. [FN136] As there is no harmonized norm of inventive step and only a minimum standard. the use is new. [FN133] This silence means that members must implement their own definitions of inventive step. These types of patents. and therefore novelty and inventive step could not be established.because the *1053 pharmaceutical was known. [FN131] The relevant issue here is whether there is any basis for arguing that India's approach to inventive step is a violation or a non-violation nullification and impairment of the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement should not be interpreted to say that there is harmonization of this sort of patent law detail because that would be filling a gap that the parties have not agreed. Beyond this. even if the article is not breached. [FN132] The TRIPS Agreement is silent on the definition of inventive step. [FN137] Because at the time of the TRIPS Agreement. There must be limits to the autonomy that members have in defining inventive step. There can be no expected benefit of a common standard of inventive step. the perceived need for greater harmonization of patent law and international negotiations aimed at that recognizes the lack of consensus. known as Gleevec. on the basis that although the pharmaceutical compound itself is not necessarily new. National definitions should presumably not be so demanding that nothing could be patentable. however. [FN130] Among Novartis' submissions was that the Indian law did not comply with article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN129] Before the Madras High Court. [FN135] The diversity arises from how inventive step is assessed. there was. However there would be advantages in allowing non-violation complaints over this issue. [FN139] If a violation complaint in these circumstances is as unlikely to succeed. and now. because an expected benefit of the agreement or the attainment of an objective cannot be realized. as I suggest. only a new form of a known substance. regarding the level of or meaning of inventive step. [FN127] India. This Indian law is effectively a definition of inventive step for some types of inventions. in developed countries. that for an invention to be patentable it must involve an inventive step. it cannot be established that India has breached article 27.

these FTA provisions are cumulatively *1056 contrary to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries. but hope falls short of a legally enforceable expectation. The advantage of either non-violation complaint. and is eroding for India. Additionally. directly and via TRIPS-plus FTAs creating new norms. The complainant should argue that the web of TRIPS-plus FTAs. To suggest that the parties intended that article 27 would result in the same things being patentable everywhere in the world suggests a level of harmonization that is not a reasonable interpretation of the wording of article 27.' [FN144] In the TRIPS Agreement context a mutually a satisfactory adjustment is a peculiar concept. or impede the attainment of objectives'. In the face of that division. to the mutual advantage of producers and users . The remedy for TRIPS-plus FTAs. Members can and do delineate the details of patent systems according to their economic circumstances and the need to do so is hardly unexpected. Some Members and private right holders may have hoped. which suggests the negotiations were in some way coercive.. I suggest that a non-violation complaint. could succeed. Those countries have done so against their own national interest. brought against the USA and possibly also the EU. I suggest that such a non-violation complaint against India should lose because there was and is international division over the patenting of new uses of known pharmaceuticals. On the one hand. rather than in the power-imbalanced international FTA negotiation. and even attempted to negotiate. is that the issues would be decided in a rules-based forum. This is because several countries have been pressured through non-negotiable template FTAs into protecting second use pharmaceuticals. but it is placed under continuous pressure. which are inconsistent with the object and purpose of TRIPS.. If TRIPS-plus FTAs are found to be a non-violation nullification and impairment of the object and purpose of TRIPS then the measure that needs to be withdrawn will be found in the complainant's law not the respondent's. discussed above. An erosion of a member's expected benefit not be obliged to change its laws to protect second use pharmaceutical patents has occurred. the ability to not be obliged to provide more extensive protection and consequently legitimate expectations under the TRIPS Agreement are defeated. [FN142] Whether a Member decides to bring a complaint may in part depend on the remedy available.'. India has not changed its law to protect second use pharmaceutical patents. [FN140] On the other hand. If non-violation disputes are introduced in the TRIPS Agreement. Remedies for Non-Violation Disputes If a non-violation dispute is successful because 'a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under.. C. Such protection is not contributing to the 'promotion of innovation . to change its laws. [FN141] Also.impairment of an expected benefit under the TRIPS Agreement.. would be to curb future analogous FTAs and to allow a members to withdraw the increased protection that thwarts its legitimate TRIPS expectations. there will need to . the parties' intentions or any expected benefits arising from TRIPS. 'However in such cases the panel or the Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually satisfactory adjustment. It has always been known in defining inventive step that members are able to enact their own legislation. that this was so. has eroded for some countries. a panel should not conclude that it was a reasonably expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement that all Members would provide patents for second use pharmaceuticals. which require protection of new uses of known pharmaceuticals. While a tariff might be mutually adjusted that does not make much sense for an intellectual property law. [FN143] of the TRIPS Agreement there is no obligation to withdraw the measure.

a relative term. So it is difficult to interpret the TRIPS Agreement to mean that a particular threshold number is too high. [FN151] General differences between WTO members' court systems are recognized in the TRIPS Agreement. [FN149] The scope of criminal liability and remedies for copyright infringement was an area over which there was little international agreement both in the Uruguay Round leading to the TRIPS Agreement and subsequently. the enforcement must be effective against commercial infringement. Thus. the Panel concluded that the USA did not make out its case that the criminal thresholds prevented China from . The essence of the USA's case was that China's thresholds for criminal infringement in copyright law rendered the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement to provide criminal offences for infringement ineffective in some circumstances. Using Violation because Non-Violation is not Available It is advantageous to bring a violation complaint. [FN145] Indeed. [FN150] Consequently the enforcement related minimum standards. [FN152] This means that intellectual property is not a special case. [FN153] There was considerable room to argue that China's thresholds were reasonable in the circumstances of the conditions in China. Aspects of the dispute between the USA and China demonstrate this and provide a good illustration of the relationship between violation and nonviolation nullification and impairment in the TRIPS Agreement context. including those *1058 specifically about criminal liability and enforcement. [FN148] China reduced the level of the relevant thresholds from 1000 to 500 shortly before the USA requested a Panel. The Panel in the China-TRIPS Enforcement report recognized the importance of this provision and noted that even so there is still an obligation on China to provide the enforcement measures required under the TRIPS Agreement. Using Vienna Convention principles [FN155] of interpretation. Indeed the USA uses them. because in a violation dispute reliance on the agreement is assumed and once there is an established breach of the agreement it is also assumed that there has been injury. however. For a number of years the USA and China had been in discussions over enforcement of intellectual property rights in China. It is. [FN147] The USA eventually requested the establishment of a WTO panel over several alleged breaches of the TRIPS Agreement by China. in preference to a non-violation complaint. 'Effective' in this context is. One complaint related to the thresholds of infringing copies that would give rise to a criminal level of infringement of copyright in China. in a non-violation dispute a complainant needs to demonstrate reliance and causality of the *1057 injury. possible to recast non-violation disputes as violation disputes. VIII. Members are more likely to bring a violation complaint if they can. which provides that none of the enforcement obligations create obligations that the parties provide a system of intellectual property enforcement that is distinct from its general criminal law. The device of using thresholds for criminal liability is common. [FN146] The USA brought a violation complaint against China about various aspects of China's copyright and trademark laws. because non-violation disputes have not been available this may have already occurred. but this 'recasting' should not succeed. at best. [FN154] However. are not prescriptive and rather leave a lot of scope for differing national laws. By comparison. THE OVERLAP OF NON-VIOLATION AND VIOLATION DISPUTES A. including its progressive improvement of measures for enforcement and the state of criminal law in general.be a framing of how these appropriate remedies can be achieved in view of the unique nature of the TRIPS Agreement among WTO agreements.

Bringing such a complaint would have meant that in addition to treaty interpretation methods of the Vienna Convention. [FN157] Given the lack of detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more of a non-violation complaint. this does not mean that it should not be brought.fulfilling its obligations to provide criminal enforcement for counterfeiting and piracy activities on a commercial scale. The relevant provisions in the TRIPS Agreement simply provide a broad and *1059 undetailed requirement that there be enforcement. but also the context through which a member came to that provision. Rather a more robust discussion of the meaning of the enforcement provisions should be encouraged because a properly reasoned decision would have likely shown that the US threshold argument was untenable because it had tried to negotiate more detailed enforcement provisions. Even if. however. Such analysis should not be feared. cannot be said to be the meaning of the provisions. at issue in a dispute. [FN160] They give the example of the extension of copyright term. [FN162] but the US Supreme Court upheld the extension of term. the Panel decision could have more robustly considered what benefits members could expect from the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. which was part of a package that included the exemption from liability of the playing of non-dramatic musical works in certain restaurants and bars. the non-violation complaint would lose. What if the USA had been able to bring this as a non-violation compliant? A non-violation complaint should reach the same result as the Panel did in the violation complaint. Where a domestic *1060 intellectual property law is arrived at through negotiated trade- offs Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie suggest that: [FN159] challenges to the side-effects that . This is a type of non-violation complaint that is feared. in my view. but had failed and so cannot afterwards claim an expected benefit of more detail. [FN163] As the authors note.. a provision may be reached through trade-offs at a national level and the authors suggest that it is too great an interference in national autonomy for those trade-offs to be 'unwound' at international level. sometimes aspects of the negotiated package are found outside intellectual property law and in those circumstances non-violation complaints may be useful. [FN158] Another aspect of robustness for dispute settlement that non-violation complaints might bring is the possibility of looking at exactly how and why a domestic law.. measures have on intellectual property rights are more naturally categorized as non-violation complaints because they frustrate the objectives of the Agreement rather than breach specific obligations. Until there is a proper international agreement over such issues the WTO dispute settlement body should not be used to fill the gaps. In particular. but it is also the type of non-violation complaint that should not be successful because there is not the kind of expected benefit that a non-violation complaint should address. A non-violation claim in assessing expected benefits would not rewrite those intentions. is correct because the United States seemed to hope to read into the enforcement provisions a level of detail that was not there and. [FN161] The WTO found that the musical works exemption was a violation of the TRIPS Agreement. because the level of benefit that the USA wished to claim was not something that could be construed as an expected benefit arising from the words of the Agreement which show the intention of the parties. . [FN156] The result. The essence of what the USA was really complaining about was that a benefit it expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels of enforcement. The authors suggest that the WTO dispute settlement system needs to take into account not just the intellectual property provision at issue before it. therefore. was reached.

[FN166] Therefore. the grant of an intellectual property right is not an affirmative right to use. it cannot be supposed that members of the WTO. unlike other WTO Agreements. Market access issues. Non-Violation Disputes and Laws that are not Primarily Intellectual Property Laws Another area in which non-violation disputes may be important for intellectual property is where non-intellectual property measures affect the TRIPS Agreement minimum standards. In the TRIPS Council discussion on non-violation complaints. consented to not allow other laws to affect intellectual property products. must be dealt with in the negotiated disciplines of GATT and GATS. As mentioned above. [FN165] The non-violation question is whether or not the ban nullifies and impairs an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement. but pharmaceuticals cannot be sold in many countries without regulatory approval. Indeed. This response must be correct. other technological protection mechanisms to control territorial or time-related uses of copyright works and charging different prices in different markets. There are many examples: Patents can be granted for pharmaceuticals. Also. [FN167] is not a market access agreement. which it considers have large carbon footprints. Region coding and technological protection mechanisms have received intellectual property style protection through .' [FN169] The problem is identifying the loss of benefit in the TRIPS Agreement context. in order to prevent the sale of products. even if they relate to intellectual property products. enacts a law banning advertising of trademarks that encourage the purchase of products associated with distant lands. but rather a right to exclude others. but safety standards must be met. it could not be said that there was loss of an expected benefit. the relationship between the WTO agreements is perhaps an ideal area for non-violation complaints because WTO members may 'mix-up' the disciplines in order to achieve certain goals. Intellectual property law. [FN171] Examples include region coding of DVDs. [FN170] If such a tax on goods occurred it would be appropriate to consider if the tax violates the GATT and if there was a breach of a tariff binding or a non-discrimination provision. when agreeing to the TRIPS Agreement. including their trademarks. from the TRIPS Council documents. whether or not the product is made locally or otherwise. Examples might be the ban of 'Fiji Water' or 'New Zealand Natural' ice cream sold in the USA. on its own. It is questionable and arguably not a reflection of the intention of the parties if the TRIPS Agreement is interpreted so that it is used as a back door to GATT and GATS related market access or non-discrimination issues. One of the examples is 'A Member could ban all advertising of cigarettes. particularly as such a ban already existed in some jurisdictions at the time of the Agreement. there are some limited examples of these potential sorts of complaints. Additionally.B. does not control market conditions and the TRIPS Agreement. An example might be where country A. [FN168] However. Another relevant example. for health reasons'. trademark law and other intellectual property law has always been subject to other laws. Patents can be granted for electrical products. [FN164] On the face of it this ban complies with the TRIPS Agreement. A Council member responded *1061 to the example that such a ban could have been anticipated at the time of the Agreement. is where a Member applies a high tax 'on certain goods with intellectual property rights whose use is deleterious to the environment. The possibility that intellectual property goods might be highly taxed in some places is widely *1062 known and practised. intellectual property right owners use all sorts of methods beyond mere intellectual property rights in order to exploit their intellectual property. and it is not a guarantee that any sales will be unregulated or even successful.

These exist in some developed and developing countries. [FN179] There have been no agreed WTO. in relation to the sale and distribution of pharmaceuticals. GATS and the TRIPS Agreement. that it is arguable that TRIPS Agreement Members can not use other laws. has a number of provisions. address competition concerns of this nature. [FN172] However. [FN176] The FTA between Australia and the United States (AUSFTA). which might frustrate some types of exploitation of intellectual property rights. where the exploitation of intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement is frustrated by means that fall short of a violation of GATT or GATS. it may also be unrealistic that every nuance could be dealt with in this way. The difficulties with non-violation disputes are noted. [FN174] it is important that the legitimate expectations resulting from that Agreement are met. both in and between GATT. This suggests. C. to the extent that a purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is the trading relationship between its members. Rather. over and above its intellectual property provisions. that relate to the marketing and sale of pharmaceuticals. rules on competition. these difficulties create sufficient parameters to guard against their misuse. certain government subsidization of pharmaceutical sales. An example is price controls over pharmaceuticals. It cannot be said that either of these sorts of examples are an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement. there ought to be redress. and as the above *1063 examples show not easy to win. via dispute settlement rather than by negotiation. [FN177] There are provisions that effectively require Australia to limit. however. It therefore seems that the uses of non-violation disputes might well be appropriately limited in a way that is not detrimental either to the integrity of the TRIPS Agreement or to WTO developing countries and least developed country members who have found the TRIPS Agreement standards hard to comply with and may fear that non-violation disputes would make that worse. However. or other international. Mechanisms to Control Non-Intellectual Property Law's Effect on Intellectual Property Members seeking to control the effects of other laws on intellectual property rights have used a variety of ways to do so. Non-violation disputes are difficult to bring. Undoubtedly non-violation disputes should not be used to fill the gaps. Multilateral negotiation over these gaps is theoretically the ideal method of progress. they were used before that protection was put in place. and to potentially remove. Charging differential prices in markets has been and is a way in which businesses have exploited the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. Protection of technological protection mechanisms are not an expected benefit of the TRIPS Agreement because they are outside the scope of the Agreement and the international protection was established after intellectual property rights owners had used them for some time. This might mean that. The TRIPS Agreement does not. but I do not conclude that they are dispositive of whether or not such disputes should be allowed in the TRIPS Agreement context. This can be through negotiated packages within their own jurisdictions [FN175] or between jurisdictions in FTAs. In some jurisdictions such controls may raise competition law issues. [FN180] Although *1064 intellectual property rights brush up against and in some jurisdictions incorporate laws against anticompetitive . therefore. [FN178] The existence of these provisions in AUSFTA is an express recognition that the TRIPS Agreement does not control these things.international negotiations independent of the TRIPS Agreement. however. [FN173] The charging of different prices is an exploitation of intellectual property rights rather than a required minimum standard of an exclusive right of the TRIPS Agreement. for example.

These disciplines must include rules about how the expected benefit criteria of a non-violation dispute must be an objective assessment. as expressed in its terms. parts of the TRIPS Agreement implicitly recognize the distinct role of non-intellectual property laws. In neither situation can it be said that Members of the WTO have had a choice over whether or not to apply 'more extensive protection'. with one small exception. The ability to exclude inventions from patentability on the grounds of ordre public. an in-depth framing of rules to provide for appropriate remedies will need to occur.practices. in a rules-based forum. equally other laws should not be permitted to erode the minimum standards in the Agreement. The erosion of this choice conflicts with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement and so is more than just a violation of Article 1. Yet the TRIPS Agreement frames this as a *1065 choice. as agreed to by its members. as discussed above. primarily FTA-based. CONCLUSION Non-violation disputes have been thought of as potentially a tool for the interests of intellectual property owners to increase the protection of the TRIPS Agreement beyond its wording. it could not logically be concluded that the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. are frustrated by such measures. Non-violation disputes may provide a means to provide some limitations on excessive. rather than a subjective approach that can be shown to be one party's unsuccessful negotiating position or wish-list. but also the way in which TRIPS-plus norms can affect those outside of such TRIPS-plus FTAs. is qualified by the requirement that members must not exclude something from patentability simply because its exploitation is illegal. This is particularly important in light of the evident difficulties that developing countries. [FN181] While countries with pharmaceutical industries may consider that price control mechanisms are frustrating. Because violation cases are required to have a formalistic interpretation non-violation offers a more robust approach to analysing the expected benefits that reflect the intentions of the parties and the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. In addition to the lack of express provisions addressing competition concerns. . in particular. be possible to dispute the trade effects of intellectual property. to control competition related issues. IX. which provide more extensive levels of protection without Members always freely choosing that more extensive protection. face in keeping up with intellectual property protection as it increases. the TRIPS Agreement does not have express provisions. increases in intellectual property standards. but still require members to provide intellectual property protection. have an independent body analyse the expected benefits of any one party from the TRIPS Agreement. There must be an objective assessment. Disciplines around the use of non-violation complaints about the TRIPS Agreement must also be developed. They also are potentially a tool for users of intellectual property to challenge TRIPS- plus FTAs. but also potentially a non-violation of the Agreement. If non-violation disputes are introduced for the TRIPS Agreement there will need to be a careful distinction set out between violation and non-violation cases. Although the TRIPS Agreement should not be interpreted to expand the minimum standards that it sets out. Also. [FN182] As the TRIPS Agreement is about minimum intellectual property standards in trade then it should. Non-violation complaints may provide a way in which both net-owners and net-users of intellectual property can. for example. This lack of choice is in part because of the coercive manner in which many of these TRIPS-plus FTA chapters have been negotiated.

5 June 1992. many multilateral bodies that have agreed on some intellectual property standards.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. The surge in RTAs has continued unabated since the early 1990s. more extensive protection is not necessarily beneficial.Div. see WTO. provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.htm> accessed 21 March 2009. Article 1. Many of these agreements. free trade agreements (FTAs) and partial scope agreements account for over 90%. although not all. [FN1].org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e. 31 ILM 818. [FN2]. New Zealand.wto. Lionel Bentley and Susan Corbett for comments on draft and my research assistant Jessica Lai. implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice. [FN4]. 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking'. while customs unions account for less than 10%. Victoria University of Wellington. those currently being negotiated. available at http://www.int. [FNa1]. but shall not be obliged to. done at Rio de Janeiro. those signed but not yet in force. 300 RTAs were notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994.cbd.' [FN3]. There are. 1198 (1994). contain intellectual property chapters. 'Is nullification and impairment of the TRIPS Agreement possible 'as the result' of TRIPS-plus agreements?'. should be a progressive process that happens at the right pace and is the direct result of multilateral agreement. Thanks also to Rochelle Dreyfuss. UNEP/Bio. however. <http://www. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). non-violation disputes should not be used as a means to renegotiate the TRIPS Agreement.nz. I presented an earlier version of this article. 205 agreements were in force. E-mail: susy. (2004) 29 Yale J Intl L 1. and those in the proposal stage. At that same date. if it is to occur./N7-INC5. at the Inaugural conference of the SIEL in Geneva 2008.ac. Members may. 'Regional Trade Agreements'. and 58 under Article V of the GATS. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). rather than through the backdoor of TRIPS-plus FTAs. For a general discussion of the various international fora in which intellectual property issues are discussed see. Annex 1C. Professor of Law. 15 April 1994. An example is the Convention on Biological Diversity. Although greater harmonization is potentially beneficial to trade. 22 under the Enabling Clause. rather they should be used to recalibrate it so as to enable developing countries to realize their side of the TRIPS Agreement bargain. If we take into account RTAs which are in force but have not been notified. 33 ILM 1197. My thanks to the organisers of that conference. we arrive at a figure of close to 400 RTAs which are scheduled to be implemented by 2010. Harmonization. Of these.frankel@vuw. Some 380 RTAs have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to July 2007. . Of these RTAs. Jane Ginsburg. Similarly. The WTO states on its website that 'Regional Trade Agreements' (RTAs) have become in recent years a very prominent feature of the Multilateral Trading System. Laurence R Helfer.

at 5 noting that intellectual property chapters in both US and EU FTAs are often the same. 1867 UNTS 187. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). Therefore I focus on non-violation complaints. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). [FN8]. Despite the passing of 5 years the moratorium on non-violation complaints continues.2-3 of the TRIPS Agreement states: '2. Some may have very limited IP chapters. 15 April 1994. Subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 shall not apply to the settlement of disputes under this Agreement for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge University Press. Annex 1B. HR Doc. and approved recommendations shall be effective for all Members without further formal acceptance process. 'TRIPS-plus' and 'TRIPS-superplus'. UN Doc. [FN11]. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article 6. [FN7]. but that the US and EU approaches are different from each other. article XX. Challenges to Multilateral Trade: The Impact of Bilateral Preferential and Regional Trade Agreements (Kluwer Law International. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). Any decision of the Ministerial Conference to approve such recommendations or to extend the period in paragraph 2 shall be made only by consensus. 3. such as an agreement to have TRIPS standards.' [FN12]. IIA Monitor No. No.[FN5]. Situation complaints are rarely used and have not been suggested as relevant in the TRIPS context. Others may have extensive TRIPS-plus provisions. During the time period referred to in paragraph 2. [FN10]. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. where I describe these chapters as 'TRIPS equivalent and a little bit extra'. Article XXIII of GATT provides for non-violation and situation complaints. 'The Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs'. 1869 UNTS. See generally Keith E Maskus and JH Reichman (eds). and submit its recommendations to the Ministerial Conference for approval. See 'Intellectual Property Provisions in International Investment Arrangements'. see Susy Frankel. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1. (Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters). [FN13]. Cambridge 2005). 15 April 1994. in Ross Buckley and others (eds).' [FN9]. 1588. Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 183. 33 ILM 1153 (1994). 103-316. the Council for TRIPS shall examine the scope and modalities for complaints of the type provided for under subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 made pursuant to this Agreement. 1 (2007). Annex 1A. The Netherlands 2008). [FN6]. .

The need for the objectives and principles to be recognised in dispute settlement was underscored in the Doha Declaration. and make recommendations to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference [in Cancún 2003]. 'Declaration on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns'. Other commentators consider that such disputes are potentially important because they enable the disputants not to be their own judge in contentious trade relationships. [FN19]. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention). Sungjoon Cho. continue its examination of the scope and modalities for [non-violation] complaints . 'WTO Application of "the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law" to Intellectual Property' (2006) 46 Virginia Intl L Rev (2006) (WTO Application of Customary Rules).See WTO 4th Ministerial Conference. 828 UNTS 305. ibid. [FN15]. and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade'. See also discussion below in Section IV. Member States directed that '[t]he TRIPS Council . 24 November 2004. [FN21]. IP/C/W/349/Rev. Revision'. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights... see Susy Frankel. see Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: TRIPS. 24 July 1971 (Paris text).. [FN18]. [FN14]. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. (TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues). adopted on 20 November 2001 (Doha Declaration on Public Health). see eg those cited in Cho. members will not initiate such complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.. 14 July 1967 (Stockholm text). para 11(1). 'Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. See also discussion below in Section IV.1. [FN17]. See TRIPS Agreement. Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. These multilateral agreements do not have trade purposes. 102 Stat 2852 and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention). [FN16]. which are incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. in the meantime. fn 42. Although panels have not always paid attention to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement as a whole. See also WTO.' No resolution of the issue was reached at the Cancún Ministerial Conference and no agreement has subsequently been reached. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. adopted on 14 November 2001 at Doha. 'GATT Non-Violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process' (1998) 39 Harv Intl LJ 311. para 5a. The absence of the connection with trade was one factor that motivated the inclusion of intellectual property in successive GATT negotiating rounds and ultimately in the Uruguay round that culminated in the TRIPS Agreement. WT/MIN(01)/17. 'Non-violation and Situation Complaints--Summary Note by the Secretariat. where the preamble states. . 1161 UNTS 3. 'Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health'. and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights. The Berne Convention and the Paris Convention. are administered by WIPO. [FN20]. Ibid. It is agreed that.

Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. 'Enough is Enough--The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection' <http://papers. [FN30]. .'. to negotiate multilaterally or bilaterally. in the long or short term. but only member states have standing before the WTO. Maximums will. 36 ILM 65 (adopted by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference). [FN31]. designs and models shall be protected . See discussion below in Section VII.. Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse Khan suggest that the solution may be intellectual property maximums.. For example. By comparison. Right holders can lobby their governments to bring disputes on their behalf. as the authors acknowledge. [FN28]. as defined by the Berne Convention. above n 18. Article 2.. above n 18. A major difficulty with the growing number of FTAs is the impact these agreements have on the multilateral negotiation process. Doha Declaration on Public Health. some members also protect computer programs as patents. As the TRIPS Agreement allows for greater levels of protection. Doha Declaration on Public Health. This article is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.[FN22]. Members of the TRIPS Agreement are the WTO members. [FN27].cfm? abstract_id=1326429> accessed 21 March 2009.. [FN25]. which provides: '. The difficulties with TRIPS maximums are that they risk being out of date and requiring renegotiation whenever there are major technological developments. Copyright works are protected in categories. it shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the extent of the application of their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs and models. also eliminate some of the national policy autonomy that members have to create their own exceptions. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally some multilateral negotiations were underway when the Uruguay Round was concluded such as those resulting in the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT) (adopted 20 December 1996) 2186 UNTS 28542. [FN32].ssrn. literary and artistic works. [FN24]. para 5 c. see Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse Khan. [FN26]. confers rights on private right holders. see also above n 2. [FN29]. the requirement to protect industrial designs leaves flexibility as to whether members provide such protection through copyright law or by other means. [FN23]. as well as the conditions under which such works.com/sol3/papers. Domestic intellectual property law that is required under the Agreement. See Article 2(7) of the Berne Convention. however. which provides for TRIPS-plus copyright protection. Article 9(1). This article is not primarily concerned with this issue of whether it is better.

the High Court of Australia (its highest court) held that industrious collection of telephone directory data in electronic form was sufficiently original to amount to originality for copyright purposes. [FN39]. Geographical Indications. of which parts are incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. [FN42].97. International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford University Press. 'Ontwerp EG-richtlijn databanken'. see Burton Ong. [FN43]. citing H Cohen Jehoram. Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. I am grateful to Rochelle Dreyfuss for suggesting this example to me. UK 2008) 229. [FN34]. WTO Appellate Body Report. See also a discussion over the scope of minimum rights and national treatment in Ricketson and Ginsburg (n 34) para 6. [FN41]. [FN35]. Protection of Undisclosed Information and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices in contractual licenses. Some commentators have argued that such protection is nevertheless industrial property and ought to be subject to the national treatment obligations of the Paris Convention. Broadly. WT/DS176/AB/R (adopted 1 February 2002). For a discussion of trade mark provisions in FTAs. see Article 3 of the TRIPS .doc> accessed 21 March 2009. Industrial designs. See Article 1(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. Cheltenham. is the principle that foreign nationals must be treated the same as domestic nationals. the term "intellectual property" refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Section II.[FN33]. 55 IPR 1 (HCA 2002). Layout- designs (Topographies) of Integrated circuits. 'Intellectual Property Rights in Data?' (1997) 50 Vanderbilt L Rev 51.' [FN37]. set out at above n 2. New York 2006). Ibid. Trademarks. For a discussion of minimum standards in the Berne Convention. Patents. in the intellectual property context. A Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar. [FN38]. IER 1992/5.' The categories by heading in Section II are: Copyright and related Rights. Trademark Law. at 133. see generally Sam Ricketson and Jane C Ginsburg. Article 1(2) of the TRIPS Agreement states: 'For the purposes of this Agreement. See also JH Reichman and P Samuelson.ivir. 'The Trademark Law Provisions of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements' in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds). See P Bernt Hugenholtz. United States--Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 1988 (Havana Club). national treatment. Other agreements of most relevance are the Berne and Paris Conventions. [FN40]. 'Implementing the European Database Directive' <http:// www. [FN36]. [FN44]. Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement requires protection of intellectual creations. In Desktop Marketing Systems v Telstra Corporation Limited. See Article 10(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. set out at above n 36.nl/publications/hugenholtz/PBH-HCJ-LIB.

I am grateful to Lorand Bartels for pointing out this parallel in EPAs to me. 448. [FN47]. . [FN48]. rather than incorporating the MFN exemption. 'Diversifying Without Discriminating Complying with the Mandate of the TRIPS Agreement' (2007) 13 Michigan Telecommunications Technology L Rev 445. MFN is the principle that Members must treat nationals of one country the same as nationals of another country. The TRIPS Agreement Drafting History and Analysis (3rd edn. Article 9(1). Exceptions to national treatment are found in Article 3(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. the Caribbean and the Pacific. See Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement for copyright three-step test. That is a member who extends copyright term need not apply that term to nationals of member states that do not provide the extended term. Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss. See Council Directive 2006/116/EC. see Daniel Gervais. [FN50].Agreement. above n 5. Copyright. See eg European Directive on copyright term which only provided the extended 70-year term to nationals from countries that also provide that extended term. incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. [FN51]. GATT FTAs have an MFN exemption. but not patent term extension can be applied on a material reciprocity basis rather than a national treatment basis. so that the greater liberalization is confined to the FTA members. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement. on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights. so that all foreign nationals receive equal treatment. For copyright works duration is for the life of the author plus 50 years (or 50 years where term is not calculated from the life of the author but from the making of the copyright work). [FN52]. [FN45]. Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement provides an MFN exception for agreements in existence at the time of the WTO agreements' coming into force 'provided that such agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other Members'. [FN49]. [FN53]. Article 7. (Diversifying Without Discriminating). see Article 7(8) of the Berne Convention. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. An emerging exception to this is the FTAs between the European Union and developing countries in Africa. which are being provided on an MFN basis. known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Article 17(3)(b) of the TRIPS Agreement. The drafting history shows that an MFN exception was discussed in the Brussels draft. London 2008) 187 and Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters. Members may extend the TRIPS Agreement requirements for patent and copyright term. Sweet & Maxwell. OJ 2006 L372/49. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement requires patent protection for a term of 20 years. Any exception would have to be compliant with what are known as the three-step tests. Article 17 for trade mark three-step test and Article 30 for patent three-step test. [FN46]. see Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.

[FN54]. There may be some issues about which parts of the developed world disagree and one 'side' is allied with the developing world. 112 Stat 2827 (1998). 96-8 (TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking). WTO Application of Customary Rules. 17 United States Code (USC) §302. [FN61]. 'TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking'. There are of course exceptions to this developed versus developing divide. New York 2008). 36 Case Western Reserve J Intl L 95 (2004). 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 17 January 1980) (Vienna Convention). I adopt here usage of 'formalistic' from Graeme B. rather than the package of arrangements which led to the particular provision at issue.' The WTO has accepted that the Vienna Convention embodies the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. [FN57]. The use of the Vienna Convention arises from the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. [FN56]. Annex 2 (1994) 1869 UNTS 401. paras 17. Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN55]. See Copyright Act of 1976. Silke von Lewinski. [FN63]. Another matter relevant to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is that it is a WTO covered agreement and as such has a trade related purpose. incorporating Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention. The debate on geographical indications is an example. above. above. to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare. as amended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. [FN58]. provides: 'The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. The European Union's desire to increase the scope of geographical indication protection under the TRIPS Agreement is . n 18. entitled 'Objectives'.' [FN64]. [FN62]. Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 3(2) of the DSU requires that the WTO agreements be interpreted 'in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss who describe the WTO dispute settlement panel approach to interpretation of the agreement as formalistic because of the way panels look at isolated provisions. 1115 UNTS 331 (adopted 23 May 1969). and to a balance of rights and obligations. (DSU). [FN59]. See n 47. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. Pub L No. International Copyright Law and Policy (Oxford University Press. See Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss. 105-298. effective from 27 October 1998. [FN60]. 15 April 1994.155-7.

provides: 1. stated at part V. and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development. 99. [FN68]. 'The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times' (2000) 3 J World Intellect Property 493 and TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. London 2002). entitled 'Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement' when interpreting 'the text of the TRIPS Agreement. WTO Appellate Body Report. adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition. [FN69]. Ibid para 5. Doha Declaration on Public Health. Any exceptions under the Agreement must comply with what is known as the three- step-test.12. WT/DS50/AB/R (adopted 16 January 1998) part V. [FN66]. see Daniel Gervais. The Appellate Body stated that 'The Panel . 2. 'The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on Economic Development' in Peter Yu (ed. WT/DS114/R (adopted 17 March 2000). The Appellate Body considered this was not correct. Members may. The Panel in India-Patents. For a discussion of Canada-Pharmaceuticals see Robert Howse. ibid. above n 58. but have some similar interests with developing countries because they are so-called 'net-users' of intellectual property like many developing countries. [FN71]. Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age (Praeger Perspectives. Appropriate measures. [FN70]. [FN67].supported by some developing countries and opposed by the United States and many other developed countries. See Articles 13. provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.' For a general discussion of the Doha Declaration on Public Health. In giving its reasons the Appellate Body outlined the difference between violation and non-violation nullification and impairment disputes under GATT. 'In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. WTO Panel Report. small developed countries often have similar policies to larger developed countries. in its objectives and principles. entitled 'Principles'. each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed. 104 and 112. 17 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. in formulating or amending their laws and regulations. provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. Article 5. above n 18. entitled 'Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement'. India--Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India-Patents). Canada--Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada- Pharmaceuticals). may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology. in particular those laying down the principle of the protection of conditions of competition flowing from multilateral trade agreements'. the legitimate expectations of WTO Members concerning the TRIPS Agreement must be taken into account. as well as standards of interpretation developed in past panel reports in the GATT framework.). Also. in particular. [FN65].

com/sol3/papers. see Articles 3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN75]. 413. perhaps perversely. FTA dispute settlement may not take account of WTO standards.misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. erred in finding the WCT was a helpful contextual guide because the WCT was not yet in force. 'Multilateralising TRIPS-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?' <http://papers. [FN79]. see WTO Application of Customary Rules. 'TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends' <http://papers. The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself. 'WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property Norms' <http:// papers. I thank by colleague Alberto Costi for pointing me to these references. [FN74].pdf> accessed 4 August 2009 (Bilateralism in Intellectual Property). [FN76].cfm?abstract_id=947767> accessed 21 March 2009. See Section II above. see Ruth Okediji. . report commissioned by Oxfam GB as part of its Cut the Cost of Medicines Campaign < http://www.twnside. Also. United States--Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act (United States--Section 110 (5)). 'Bilateralism in Intellectual Property'.com/sol3/papers. above. WT/DS160/R (adopted 27 July 2000) para 6. This should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. [FN73]. Article 2(2). [FN80]. The Panel misunderstands the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. [FN78]. Peter Drahos.ssrn. Jean Frederic Morin. WTO Panel Report.ssrn.com/assets/english/bilateralism.maketradefair. 'The Bilateral Web of Trade Dispute Settlement' <http:// www.com/sol3/papers. above n 18. the same idea is found in the UN Charter.org. See Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (GA Resolution 2625 (XXV)).ssrn. [FN77]. For a discussion of WTO consultations with WIPO on international intellectual property norms. The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties.' [FN72].sg/title2/FTAs/DisputeResolution/TheBilateralWebOfTradeDisputeSettlement P> accessed 24 August 2009. There are some national treatment and MFN exceptions. But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended.70. See.cfm?abstract_id=1338902> accessed 22 March 2009. eg Bryan Christopher Mercurio. See n 11.cfm?abstract_ id=1276464> accessed 21 March 2009.14. see Peter Drahos. States have a duty to fulfil in good faith their international obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law.

for example. where the author states at page 1: During the period that . [FN90]. WTO or . Sharon Sheffield. the European Community and Japan) saw TRIPS as setting only minimum obligations. [FN89]. [FN86]. [FN88]. see TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking.S. above n 75. For those of you who think bilateralism is a bad thing. Agriculture/AER-771 87. There is disagreement over whether many FTAs in general comply with the GATT and GATS provisions that permit them. [FN82]." It was always clear at all stages of the TRIPS negotiations that the principal players (the United States. contend that it is premature to harmonise some details of patent law.. and Regional Trade Agreements'. 'Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights: Beyond TRIPS Agreements and Intellectual Property Chapters of FTAs' (2006) 14 Michigan State J Intl L 259. there is an absence of an express FTA-allowing provision. above. First.gov/publications/aer771/aer771l. Regional Trade Agreements and U.usda. above n 75. Nevertheless. Trade Representative (USTR) makes the point: "What happens if we fail [to obtain TRIPS]? I think there are a number of consequences to failure.. [FN83]. [FN84]. See also Article XXIII(3) of the GATS. Additionally. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss describe the dispute settlement interpretation as formalistic. [FN85]. < http://www. eg US Department of Agriculture. GATT. [FN87]. Article XXIII(b) of the GATT. will be an increase in bilateralism. see Jerome H Reichman and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss.pdf> accessed 22 March 2009. there were suggestions that if developing countries agreed to TRIPS the United States would ease off negotiating intellectual property standards bilaterally. See n 13. developing countries might reasonably have expected the . 88-9.ers. The following statement in 1989 from the Director for Intellectual Property at the Office of the U. above n 58. Ibid 97-101. In the 1980 the USA linked its bilateral investment programs with intellectual property rights. see. Bilateralism in Intellectual Property. 'Agriculture.. see Bilateralism in Intellectual Property. . See generally Mindahi Crescencio Bastida-Muñoz and Geraldine A Patrick. TRIPS was being negotiated (1986-1993). In the TRIPS Agreement context.. such pressured and premature harmonization will probably not be sustainable.S. a bad thing will come about. Ricketson and Ginsburg (n 34) 1. Rochelle Dreyfus and Jerome Reichman..29. WIPO in some cases to become the principal fora for the negotiation of new intellectual property standards. 'Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting A Substantive Patent Law' (2007) 57 Duke LJ 85.[FN81]..

Cho (n 14) 320 citing Armin Von Bodsanady.[FN91]. Cho (n 14) 316-17. See eg US and Chile FTA. Article 3(2) of the DSU. New York 2005) 514. see TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. Gail E Evans. [FN102]. [FN105]. [FN100].. Articles 27(2) and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 64(3) of the TRIPS Agreement. [FN97]. Article 64(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. which provides: '. [FN99]. [FN101]. [FN108]. above n 13. The Regulation of International Trade (3rd edn. 6 June 2003. at 102..' [FN107]. [FN96]. [FN104]. Routledge. An additional benefit of using the WTO is that there is a flow-on effect of the results of dispute settlement into the negotiations of the TRIPS Council and potentially even other international intellectual property negotiations. [FN94]. London. Cho (n 14). Article 3(2) of the DSU. 18 May 2004. [FN92]. Cho (n 14) 317. . 'The Non-Violation Procedure of Article XXIII. [FN95]. 'A Preliminary Excursion into TRIPS and Non-Violation Complaints' (2000) 3 J World Intellect Property 867. 42 ILM 1026 (2003). [FN106]. Cho (n 14) 319. and United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). The idea that non-violation disputes prevent member's being judge of their own cause is mentioned in Michael J Trebilcock and Robert Howse. It is exactly because of this nebulous nature of some provisions that different countries have different laws. [FN93]. Cho (n 14) 319. Article 21(2)(c). GATT-Its Operations Rationale' (1992) 6 Journal World Trade 95. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. This is the equivalent of a causation element.22. Article 22(2)(c). [FN103]. Cho (n 14) 316. 43 ILM 1248. The views of members of the WTO are summarized in the TRIPS Council discussion. [FN98].

the right to authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their copyright works'. Members may also reasonably expect that in some circumstances what the Agreement does not require be protected can be freely used.. Laurence R. 'The Political Economy of Trademark Dilution'. see Article 11 of the TRIPS Agreement. countries with other approaches to copyright tend to characterize such uses as permitted acts. Additionally it is not clear that there is a positive right to benefit from the public domain.. Initially trade marks gave a right to use the mark in relation to registered categories of goods or services and infringement occurred in certain defined circumstances. the TRIPS Agreement states '. The language of negative rights is found in the TRIPS Agreement. Rather that which is not illegal to use may be used. The rental right.[FN109]. like all copyright exclusive rights.. to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from . In the EU. Internet infringements have brought to a head issues about whether the trademark is property that ought to be protected in all circumstances or whether protection is limited to defined categories that may not include some internet uses. while US- style fair use is sometimes characterized as a user right in copyright law.. [FN111]. 132.. 13. Examples include the International Convenant on Economic. 'A patent shall confer on its owner the . providing the right 'to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific. 1016. [FN110]. In relation to rental rights in computer programs and film. for example. article 15(1)(b) and (c) (adopted 16 December 1966).. for instance.'. such international obligations may give private right holders seeking protection in some jurisdictions a positive right to require protection from the state even if the legal mechanism behind the right is a negative property right. see Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. literary or artistic production of which he is the author'. [FN115]. users are free to use that which is not otherwise protected by intellectual property. 993 UNTS 3. in Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis (eds). Social and Cultural Rights. there has been a successful claim to a human right of property for trade mark protection. rather than rights of use. above n 13. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. Many jurisdictions may not consider that users have rights as such.. . 'Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?' (2003) 5 Minnesota J L Sci Technol 47 and Laurence R Helfer. 5. Private right interests may lobby their governments to bring certain cases.. See generally Clarissa Long. above n 40. Rather. is a right to prohibit others rather than a right to undertake such rental themselves. In recent years the scope of trademark protection has expanded to protect marks from dilution effects... a Member shall provide . exclusive rights . [FN112]. Also. A much disputed area of intellectual property law is how far trade mark law should go. 'Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property' (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 971. Another example is found in the requirements for patents. For example. For discussion of this and other human rights treaties in the intellectual property context see. [FN114]. see discussion in Helfer 'Toward a Human Rights Framework'. Helfer. [FN113].

under negotiation at the time the TRIPS Agreement was entered into. or 70 years where the term is not calculated using 'life'. To exclude pharmaceuticals. 'Never Forever: Why Extending the Term of Protection for Sounds Recordings is a Bad Idea' (2008) 30 Eur Intellect Property Rev 174. [FN124]. were. Interestingly in the relevant TRIPS Council document there is no response or analysis of this example. 'Address by Professor Lionel Bentley to the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament'.cipil. subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. Nadine Klass and others. and Natali Helberger and others. [FN119].cipil.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009. [FN125]. The EU. [FN126].uk/policy_documents/gowers_cipilreport.[FN116].ac. University of Cambridge. above n 58. for example. See TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. WCT and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. See TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. USA and Australia are all countries that have increased the term for the life of the author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement.cam. [FN120].uk/Address%20to%20the%20European%20Parliament. [FN121].' [FN122]. 98-9. Although as parallel importing restrictions prevent the free flow of goods it is questionable why WTO members are allowed to create such barriers to trade.htm> accessed 21 March 2009.law. which is contrary to article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement. S. [FN118]. [FN117]. <http:// www. 4 November 2008. 36 ILM 76 (1997) (adopted by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference). 'Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to Term of Copyright in Sound Recordings' <http:// www. eg from patentability would be to exclude on the basis of subject matter alone. Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement.law.eu/internal_market/copyright/term-protection/term-protection_ wn. 20 December 1996. 'Statement of the Max Plank Institute for Intellectual Property. whereas there are some brief responses in relation to other examples. A Swiss type patent claim is a claim for the use of a known substance in the manufacture of a medicament for the therapeutic and/or prophylactic treatment of a medical . above n 13. The original proposal was an extension of term to 95 years.cam. Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law. For discussion of the proposal see European Commission. Competition and Tax Law Concerning the Commission's Plans to Prolong the Protection Period for Performing Artists and Sound Recordings' (2008) 39 Intl Rev Intellect Property Competition Law 586. [FN123]. Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement. Treaty Doc.europa. 'Term of Protection' < http://ec.ac. 105-17.pdf> accessed 14 April 2009.

'the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process. 'Lord Cooke and Patents: The Scope of "Invention"' (2008) 39 Victoria Univ Wellington L Rev 73. [FN134]. Union of India' (2008) 23 Berkeley Technol L J 281. Also of note is that the parameters of inventive step will often be a combination of statute and case law in common law countries. because the substance or the composition in the claim already forms part of the prior art. [FN131]. The original Swiss claim was for a second use of a known pharmaceutical. see Article 27 footnote of the TRIPS Agreement. Broadly. machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 'Trials and TRIPS-ulations: India Patent Law and Novartis AG v. See generally Allessandra Acuri and Rosa Castro. [FN128]. patent have been granted for subsequent uses and for new dosages.ssrn. [FN127]. 'Effect of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry' (2008) 11 J World Intellect Property 404. s 3(d). Novartis AG v Union of India (2007) 4 Madras LJ 1153. and Linda L Lee. See generally Rebecca Eisenberg. [FN130]. TRIPS gives its Members some leeway to tailor their laws to local needs. Swiss claims are rationalised on the basis that novelty is not completely abandoned as there is a 'novel' use. There must be some conceptual boundary otherwise the treaty provision would be . [FN133]. s 7. see Acuri and Castro. [FN132]. Law Ethics 717. India. see also Rnjnish Kumar Rai.condition. 'The Problem of New Uses' (2005) 5 Yale J Health Policy. above n 83. 'Admittedly.' See also pages 98-9 and the discussion of tying inventive step to a nation's economic goals.com/sol3/papers. Swiss type claims are designed to circumvent prohibitions on patenting methods of medical treatments and are also an exception from the absolute rule of novelty. 'How Innovative is Innovative Enough? Reflections on the Interpretation of Article 27 TRIPS from Novartis v India' <http://papers. see generally Susy Frankel. states can presumably supply their own definitions of 'inventive step' and determine for themselves the technological scope of patent protection. For example. Reichman and Dreyfuss. For a discussion of the case. state. the supposed rationale behind allowing Swiss claim patents is a reward for investment made to find new uses. 97. A footnote records that inventive step is synonymous with non-obviousness. Since then.cfm?abstract_ id=1159821> accessed 21 March 2009. For the non-violation criteria see above Section VI A. 92-4.' [FN129]. The Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005. [FN135]. provides that the following are not patentable inventions. ibid.

[FN146]. For a summary of the US position. Dreyfuss and Andreas F Lowenfeld. For further discussion of how members could do even more diversifying and be TRIPS compliant.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_file908_ 11061. above n 135. see also discussion in Reichman and Dreyfuss. [FN144]. Ibid. Article 3(2) of the DSU. There is an ongoing negotiation at WIPO for a harmonization of substantive patent law treaty. 'Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together' (1997) 37 Virginia J Intl L 275. [FN137]. see above n 129. see Frederick M Abbott. see Diversifying Without Discriminating. [FN136]. above n 45.ustr. Acuri and Castro analyse the differences in patentability as resulting from different welfare effects of patents in light of the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement. See also JH Reichman (1997) 'From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement'. WT/DS362/R (adopted 26 January 2009). Article 26(1)(c) of the DSU. [FN139]. above n 83. [FN142]. [FN143]. 282-304. 88-9. 'WTO Case Challenging Weaknesses in China's Legal Regime for Protection and Enforcement of Copyright and Trademarks' <http:// www. WTO Panel Report. see Office of the United States Trade Representative. [FN140]. See Rochelle C. [FN147]. [FN141]. where the authors suggest this is an area where the WTO dispute settlement process should show deference to developing country standards of inventive step. at 10. Article 7. China--Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (China-TRIPS Enforcement). 29 New York Univ J Intl L Politics 11. If there was any international norm created through TRIPS then it would not be necessary to provide for protection for second and subsequent use of pharmaceutical patents in FTAs. Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld. [FN138]. TRIPS Agreement. 'Towards a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism' (2005) 8 J Intl Econ L 77. Another potential non-violation complaint for India might be that it reasonably expected that it would be able to retain its generic pharmaceutical industry. .pdf?ht=> accessed 21 March 2009.meaningless and such an interpretation would not be consistent with the principles of treaty interpretation. [FN145].

Vienna Convention n 62 above. Copyright Act of 1976. in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale. forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. see Yoshifumi Fukunaga. 'Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards Agreements' (2008) 23 Berkeley Technol LJ 867. [FN154]. Article 41:1. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in general. As a result. remedies available shall also include the seizure. [FN155].[FN148].' [FN152]. In appropriate cases. 17 United States Code (USC) §506(a)(1)(B). Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights. [FN149]. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse. nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. 10 April 2007. . [FN150]. Request for Consultation by the United States. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. 19 United States Code (USC) §2319.' [FN153]. [FN151]. Yoshifumi Fukunaga suggests that the type of dispute that looks at ineffectiveness of remedies falls into a special category of types of TRIPS disputes. WT/DS362/1. China--Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (China-TRIPS Enforcement). the requirements for enforcement of intellectual property rights in the TRIPS Agreement are minimum standards which are more akin to stating general principles rather than setting out details of enforcement. the introductory provision to the enforcement articles of the TRIPS Agreement. China-TRIPS Enforcement (n 146). including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. Article 41(5) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general. punished under Crimes and Criminal Procedures. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent. requires that: Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement. consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.

105. 'Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body' <http://www. Also where the side- effect is health-related or a matter of national security the TRIPS Agreement anticipates such exceptions to protection.' Such a ban would not violate this provision because the trademark is not banned only its advertisement.ustr/assets/Document_Library/Fact_ Sheets/2008/asseet_upload_file760_15084. [FN164].htm> accessed 21 March 2009. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. However. 118. 'Anti- Competitive Trade Agreement (ACTA)' <http://wwww. [FN166]. 537 US 186 (US Sup Ct 2003). and WTO. [FN157]. See. if the TRIPS Agreement enforcement provisions could be interpreted to prefer one legal system's approach to enforcement over another. although it creates legitimate expectations.wto.pdf> accessed 21 March 2009. Particularly GATT and GATS. above n 58. 239 F 3d 372. human. Arguably. [FN160]. [FN162].[FN156]. WTO Panel Report. [FN159]. [FN163]. Also. it would be unnecessary for substantive enforcement measures to be negotiated in other forums such as the Anti-Competitive Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations. Eldred v Ashcroft. and Margot Kaminski. compensation is paid to the EU. above n 13.org/english/thewto_ e/whatis_edist1_e. WT/DS160/R. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. animal and plant life or health and matters of ordre public. adopted 27 July 2000. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. however. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking.wto.thm> accessed 21 March 2009. above n 58. 'The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)' (2009) 34 Yale J Intl L 247. eg Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement. United States--Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act. [FN158]. for the US national the bargain remains in place because the music exemption remains on the statute book and therefore can be utilised by US bars and restaurants.ord/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_ e. [FN165]. China-TRIPS Enforcement (n 146). above n 13. which allows exceptions to patentability for the protection of the environment. [FN161]. 'Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes' <http://www. above n 58. [FN167]. 103-9. see United States Trade Representative. . Article 15(4) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'The nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the trademark. In any event. a panel report would only be guidance. For a general discussion of the role of Panel and Appellate Body reports see WTO. It does not bind members who are not parties to the dispute or indeed formally create binding precedent.

National treatment or MFN violations should be analysed under the appropriate agreement. in Maskus and Reichman (eds). [FN172]. As the authors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss point out. Attempts have been made but no agreement reached. Owners of intellectual property rights charge different prices for products in different jurisdictions.org. Changes to domestic laws as a result of FTAs can also require domestic 'package deals' in order to pass the legislation. Annex 2-C. [FN178].2 of AUSFTA. such as those subject to censorship laws in some jurisdictions. 17(10)(1)(a) and (c). [FN179]. and Third World Network. [FN174].pdf> accessed 21 March 2009. After all it is an agreement of the World Trade Organization and therefore the trading relationship between members should be core to its interpretation. Articles 17(9)(6).[FN168]. [FN169]. and 17(10)(2) and (4) of AUSFTA.eipa.twnside. [FN177]. 'Competition Policy and the WTO: Is There a Need for a Multilateral Agreement?'. [FN170]. TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking. Similarly it is also known that there may be restrictions on the sale of some intellectual property products. Each agreement has its own non-discrimination principles. see Sanoussi Bilal and Marcelo Olarreaga.it/documenti/archivioceradi/osservatori/intellettuale/Gangi1. above n 7.archivioceradi. above n 13. . [FN173]. Members of the TRIPS Agreement could not agree on the principles of exhaustion and intellectual property rights and this is recorded.pdf> accessed 22 March 2009.sg/title/1889-cn. 'Minimal Standards for Patent Related Anti-Trust Law Under TRIPS'. "Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on 'Competition Policy"' <http://www. The territorial nature of intellectual property rights makes this possible. [FN175]. TRIPS Council Summary of Non-Violation Issues. [FN171]. these 'package deals' are not necessarily recognised at international level. 'Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights' < http:// www. [FN180]. For a discussion of the nexus between antitrust law and intellectual property law see Mark D. See Massimiliano Gangi. [FN176]. Other market conditions will also determine price.eu/files/repository/product/20070814174713_98w02. 17(9)(8)(b). See the WCT. above n 58. see Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement.luiss. owners often contract between themselves to supply goods only in some countries and not in others.htm> accessed 21 March 2009. Janis. European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper 98/W/02 <http:// www. Indeed.

namun pengadu menuduh manfaat yang diharapkan berdasarkan perjanjian telah dibatalkan. itu tidak logis untuk mencari gagasan apapun mengenai manfaat yang diharapkan melampaui kata-kata dari standar minimum. END OF DOCUMENT (c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. Susy Frankel ABSTRAK Sebuah Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO) non-pelanggaran keluhan adalah satu di mana kesepakatan tidak dilanggar. Artikel ini membahas utilitas untuk membuat non-pelanggaran sengketa perselisihan tersedia untuk TRIPs dari perspektif baik pengguna dan pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual. TRIPS memungkinkan anggota untuk memiliki standar lebih besar dan banyak anggota telah sepakat untuk standar yang lebih tinggi melalui kesepakatan perdagangan bebas. terutama bagi pengguna hak kekayaan intelektual. Oleh karena itu anggota harus menyediakan setidaknya tingkat perlindungan. the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality. animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. Posisi ini adalah untuk ditinjau. US Gov. 2009 Umum Pasal * 1023 MENANTANG PERJANJIAN TRIPS-PLUS: UTILITAS POTENSI NON- PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN Susy Frankel [FNa1] Hak Cipta © 2009 oleh Oxford University Press. Akibatnya. antara perjanjian WTO. Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan anggota untuk menerapkan standar minimum perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dalam hukum nasional mereka. provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. including to protect human. Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement provides limited control of anti-competitive practices in licenses. [FN182]. L. Ini TRIPS- plus standar memiliki manfaat yang diharapkan bisa dibilang merusak yang harus mengalir dari TRIPS.[FN181].Pada hari-hari awal TRIPS pengecualian non- pelanggaran sengketa terlihat rasional karena sifat unik dari TRIPS. Analisis ini termasuk diskusi tentang apakah TRIPS-plus perjanjian perdagangan bebas yang diharapkan melemahkan manfaat dari . Non-pelanggaran keluhan tetap tersedia untuk sengketa TRIPS.Jika mereka tidak melakukannya pengaduan pelanggaran bisa dimulai. Int 'l Econ. No Claim to Orig. Namun. HANYA UNTUK PENGGUNAAN PENDIDIKAN 12 J.' [emphasis added]. 1023 Jurnal Hukum Ekonomi Internasional Desember. Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 'Members may exclude from patentability inventions. Works. Ketika Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan non-pelanggaran keluhan tidak tersedia untuk perselisihan TRIPS.

anggota telah menandatangani sejumlah yang terus berkembang FTA dengan bab kekayaan intelektual. nasional hukum kekayaan intelektual juga dapat mencerminkan standar kekayaan intelektual yang disepakati dalam perjanjian perdagangan bilateral atau bebas (FTA). yang 'non-negotiable "dalam pertukaran untuk konsesi perdagangan lainnya. [FN7] Faktor-faktor ini membuat pertanyaan apakah TRIPS-plus FTA yang sah. apakah. PENDAHULUAN Tingkat perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang mencapai liberalisasi perdagangan. Yang paling signifikan multilateral kekayaan intelektual di luar tubuh WTO adalah Organisasi Kekayaan Intelektual (WIPO). [FN6] Ada banyak perdebatan mengenai apakah 'tinggi' tingkat perlindungan secara efektif dipaksakan pada negara-negara berkembang. Perjanjian TRIPS menetapkan standar minimum yang telah disepakati dan anggota diwajibkan untuk memberlakukan undang-undang yang setidaknya memenuhi standar tersebut. [FN5] Banyak FTA. termasuk Perjanjian TRIPS. melainkan telah datang sekitar melalui sesuatu yang dekat dengan paksaan. Perjanjian TRIPS adalah lantai bukan langit-langit. [FN2] Banyak anggota WTO berusaha untuk menegosiasikan standar yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan mereka akhirnya setuju dan sekarang mereka memiliki tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi dalam hukum mereka daripada yang ditetapkan dalam Perjanjian TRIPS dan akibatnya. . Artikel ini menganalisis apakah pasal-pasal kekayaan intelektual dapat sah ketika mereka tidak mengakui mengekspresikan dan parameter tersirat dari objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Secara khusus. banyak dari perjanjian ini ditandatangani antara pihak kekuatan ekonomi yang tidak setara dan 'kecil' pihak mencari keuntungan perdagangan lainnya sehingga akan setuju untuk TRIPS-plus standar untuk memperoleh manfaat lainnya. adalah isu sentral dalam kekayaan intelektual dari perspektif hukum internasional ekonomi. bagaimanapun. persyaratan dari perjanjian multilateral lainnya juga dapat dimasukkan ke dalam hukum anggota. Hasilnya adalah sejumlah perbedaan hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional. Dalam banyak kasus TRIPS-plus standar di FTA belum benar-benar dinegosiasikan. Selain Perjanjian TRIPS standar minimum. hukum adalah sesuai dengan Perjanjian TRIPS. termasuk apa yang sekarang biasa disebut TRIPS- plus ketentuan. dan akibatnya pembatalan dan kerugian. [FN4] Bab-bab kekayaan intelektual * 1025 perjanjian ini bervariasi dalam ruang lingkup. ketika tingkat seperti perlindungan belum tentu manfaat ekonomi secara langsung atau segera. atau tidak. [FN8] Para pengadu dalam * 1026 seperti perselisihan biasanya menuduh bahwa telah terjadi pelanggaran.Perjanjian TRIPS dan dengan demikian harus menjadi subyek sengketa non-pelanggaran. telah bab kekayaan intelektual 'template'. Ini memberikan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual di atas standar minimum yang Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan. untuk para Anggota. Perbedaan antara hukum nasional dapat menyebabkan perselisihan antara anggota. Sejak Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan pada tahun 1995. khususnya. dan mendorong pengembangan dan transfer teknologi. Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa. Perjanjian tentang Trade-Related Aspek Hak Kekayaan Intelektual (TRIPS Agreement) [FN1] menyediakan standar minimum hukum kekayaan intelektual bahwa anggota Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO) sepakat untuk. Sebuah aspek penting dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah ketersediaan dari sistem penyelesaian sengketa WTO untuk mendengar perselisihan tentang pelanggaran dari semua Perjanjian WTO. [FN3] Serta standar minimum multilateral. * 1024 I.

Tujuan mendasar adalah untuk mengikat anggotanya untuk kewajiban untuk melindungi hak kekayaan intelektual. [FN18] Tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS diekspresikan melalui kerangka dan struktur. mengakui prinsip otonomi nasional dalam memberlakukan .satu atau lebih artikel dari perjanjian WTO. tetapi juga memastikan bahwa hak kekayaan intelektual tidak melakukan sendiri beroperasi sebagai hambatan perdagangan tidak dapat diterima.Hal ini karena itu adalah bagian dari perjanjian WTO dan karena itu memiliki tujuan yang terkait dengan perdagangan. [FN20] * 1028 Inti dari TRIPS menetapkan serangkaian standar hukum minimum yang memungkinkan anggota beberapa otonomi atas bagaimana mereka menerapkan standar-standar dalam hukum intelektual properti nasional mereka. Ini termasuk kepentingan pihak ketiga untuk menggunakan dan mengakses properti intelektual. [FN11] Seorang pelapor dalam keluhan non-pelanggaran menuduh bahwa. Beberapa artikel fungsi Perjanjian seperti standar maksimal dalam bahwa mereka menentukan apa yang tidak boleh dilindungi. Contohnya adalah dikotomi ide / ekspresi dalam hak cipta yang dikodifikasikan sebagai: [FN21] Perlindungan hak cipta meliputi expressions dan tidak meliputi ide. Berapa banyak anggota otonomi memiliki lebih detail dari hukum nasional mereka mungkin tergantung pada artikel tertentu yang terlibat. yang bersaing dengan dan karena itu memerlukan keseimbangan terhadap perlindungan hak milik intelektual. dan tujuan transfer teknologi dan diseminasi. [FN13] Diskusi ini berlangsung meskipun peran untuk non-pelanggaran sengketa.[FN16] Pembukaan Perjanjian TRIPS dan artikel yang berjudul 'prinsip' dan 'tujuan' memberikan beberapa petunjuk tentang objek dan tujuan dari Persetujuan ini. Perjanjian TRIPS fundamental berbeda dari yang lain perjanjian properti internasional intelektual dalam tujuannya.Perdagangan tujuan terkait tidak ditemukan dalam multilateral kekayaan intelektual lainnya. [FN22] dalam konteks lisensi wajib untuk paten farmasi. Hal ini karena analisis non-pelanggaran memerlukan penilaian harapan anggota tentang ruang lingkup manfaat yang timbul dari perjanjian pada masalah. Dalam kaitannya dengan GATT [FN9] dan GATS. Pada artikel ini saya menggunakan pendekatan ini untuk menganalisis hubungan antara tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS dan tujuan TRIPS-plus FTA. metode kerja atau konsep matematis sejenisnya. Deklarasi Doha pada Perjanjian TRIPS dan Kesehatan Masyarakat. Perjanjian TRIPS telah berbagai tujuan. tentang apakah pelanggaran non- sengketa harus tersedia di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. TRIPS juga memiliki tujuan lain. prosedur. GATT dan GATS tentang. tetapi tidak ada resolusi yang tegas. [FN17] yang penting untuk penyelesaian sengketa dugaan pelanggaran Perjanjian. non-pelanggaran kriteria sengketa menyediakan metode yang berguna yang akan digunakan untuk menilai legitimasi TRIPS-plus FTA. [FN12] Telah ada diskusi. harapan dari manfaat yang timbul dari perjanjian yang disepakati telah dibatalkan atau terganggu. meskipun artikel tertentu dari sebuah perjanjian tidak dilanggar. [FN19] tujuan dagang yang terkait tidak hanya untuk melindungi hak kekayaan intelektual. anggota dapat membawa apa yang dikenal sebagai non- pelanggaran keluhan. kurang tenang karena parameter sengketa nonviolation tidak didefinisikan dengan baik. [FN14] Beberapa komentator bahkan menunjukkan bahwa non-pelanggaran sengketa secara inheren tidak tepat dalam sistem berbasis peraturan WTO.[FN15] * 1027 Meskipun tidak mungkin untuk membawa Perjanjian TRIPS non-pelanggaran sengketa. [FN10] tetapi tidak Perjanjian TRIPS.

anggota tidak dapat membawa non-pelanggaran sengketa tentang Perjanjian TRIPS. Ini menyatakan bahwa anggota dapat menentukan sendiri berapa jumlahnya ke keadaan darurat nasional yang berhubungan dengan kesehatan.standar minimum dalam hukum domestik. tidak boleh lebih tinggi daripada tingkat Perjanjian TRIPS untuk setidaknya beberapa waktu. saya menganalisis apakah efek TRIPS-plus FTA adalah untuk meniadakan dan merusak manfaat dan harapan bahwa para anggota telah. Pertanyaan utama saya menjelajahi adalah: (a) bagaimana TRIPS-plus FTA menghapus derajat fleksibilitas atas . beberapa artikel TRIPS memungkinkan fleksibilitas kecil. Hal ini bahkan menciptakan lebih banyak perbedaan dalam tingkat perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang anggota WTO memiliki tingkat nasional dan perselisihan bahkan lebih atas tingkat yang tepat dari perlindungan kekayaan intelektual.[FN24] Sebaliknya. Struktur yang merupakan kombinasi dari standar minimum dan beberapa otonomi nasional atas bagaimana standar-standar minimum diimplementasikan. Perselisihan lain atas Perjanjian TRIPS yang dimainkan. yang mendefinisikan subyek paten. bukan detail yang harmonis.[FN25] ini tidak memberikan ruang lingkup anggota untuk melindungi program komputer sebagai kategori lain dari pekerjaan hak cipta. Dalam kasus pengguna mungkin kebebasan dari over-perlindungan. negara-negara maju telah memperlakukan kemampuan untuk meningkat standar kekayaan intelektual sebagai tanpa batas. Di satu sisi. [FN29] Menggunakan non-pelanggaran kriteria sengketa. Kekhawatiran tentang over-perlindungan hak kekayaan intelektual muncul. Beberapa perbedaan pendapat dibingkai dalam hal apa anggota dapat harapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Dalam hal pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS akan perlindungan. yang mengalir dari struktur dinegosiasikan dan disepakati dari Perjanjian TRIPS. sebagaimana disebutkan di atas. seperti persyaratan bahwa anggota melindungi program komputer sebagai karya sastra dalam hukum hak cipta. Di sisi lain. beberapa negara berkembang menganggap bahwa tingkat perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. [FN28] Seorang pelapor dalam sengketa non-pelanggaran harus menuduh bahwa ia telah kehilangan keuntungan yang diharapkan cukup. anggota menggunakan FTA untuk memperdalam harmonisasi kewajiban kekayaan intelektual setidaknya antara pihak-pihak FTA. tapi kebanyakan melalui perluasan TRIPS-plus FTA. Mereka tidak berharap akan dipaksa memasuki FTA yang meningkatkan standar. adalah sengketa kepatuhan terhadap standar minimum. melalui perundingan multilateral meningkat untuk memberikan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi. Sebuah konsekuensi tak terelakkan dari standar minimum kekayaan intelektual. baik di dalam dan di luar WTO. diimplementasikan dengan cara yang sangat berbeda dalam hukum nasional anggota. [FN26] Mereka harus melindungi program komputer sebagai karya sastra. [FN27] Tingkat otonomi yang anggota lakukan atau tidak memiliki terletak pada inti dari setiap kontroversi interpretasi dari beberapa aspek dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN23] Pasal 27 TRIPS. di bagian. Beberapa sengketa melibatkan keluhan bahwa hukum salah satu anggota tidak sesuai dengan dan akibatnya telah melanggar Perjanjian TRIPS * 1029. melainkan dalam TRIPs Dewan diskusi tentang ruang lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. meskipun. yang mereka cukup diharapkan bahwa mereka akan menyediakan. Karena perbedaan dalam hukum nasional kekayaan intelektual dan kesulitan dalam kemajuan negosiasi multilateral. Ketika datang ke ruang lingkup subyek paten ada banyak sengketa apakah Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan jenis tertentu paten. bukan di arena penyelesaian sengketa.

[FN32] Secara khusus. bagaimana pengguna dapat menggunakan non-pelanggaran berpendapat bahwa standar ditingkatkan melalui TRIPS-plus FTA pelanggaran non-Perjanjian TRIPS. Untuk saat ini. membahas apa yang non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin terlihat seperti dari sudut pandang pengguna hak kekayaan intelektual. dan perjanjian internasional lainnya pada kekayaan intelektual. dalam terang objek dan tujuan. Bagian V membahas cara-cara di mana norma-norma internasional kekayaan intelektual diciptakan melalui TRIPS-plus FTA. tetapi langsung mempengaruhi persyaratan TRIPS Agreement.Saya menilai potensi pelanggaran non- sengketa yang dibawa oleh anggota dari sudut pandang pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual '.pelaksanaan hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat domestik. Beberapa aspek TRIPS dapat dipengaruhi oleh non-undang-undang hak intelektual. Ini berarti bahwa potensi non-pelanggaran sengketa sebagian besar telah dianggap sebagai alat untuk pemilik properti intelektual untuk meningkatkan perlindungan. struktur dan manfaat yang dapat diharapkan dari itu. [FN36] Jika hukum adalah dalam lingkup cakupan Perjanjian TRIPS. jika tidak semua. sifat opsional kemampuan untuk meningkatkan perlindungan sendiri merupakan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS yang harus dipertahankan. [FN33] menyediakan standar hukum minimum dan memungkinkan anggota untuk menyediakan peningkatan tingkat perlindungan. khususnya dasar MFN. substantif hukum perjanjian internasional kekayaan intelektual memiliki struktur ini. Rezim sui generis. [FN35] Apakah hukum diperlakukan sebagai dalam lingkup perlindungan kekayaan intelektual bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan atau di luar lingkup yang penting. khawatir hukum AS yang tidak terutama hukum merek dagang. melainkan adalah tentang memperkuat boikot terhadap Kuba. Amerika Serikat adalah pendukung utama yang memungkinkan non- pelanggaran perselisihan TRIPs. * 1031 II. oleh karena itu. misalnya. STANDAR MINIMUM DAN 'perlindungan yang lebih ekstensif' Perjanjian TRIPS. adalah tunduk pada perlakuan nasional dan MFN. tetapi mereka minimum tidak mendalam mengharmonisasikan hukum untuk tingkat resep kata-kata yang akan digunakan dalam undang-undang domestik.Pemahaman tentang konsep-konsep fundamental yang penting sebagai FTA tidak boleh merusak objek Perjanjian yang dinegosiasikan dan tujuan. [FN34] Standar minimum dari Perjanjian TRIPS meresepkan tingkat perlindungan daripada kata-kata yang tepat dari hukum. [FN30] saya sarankan. Artikel ini. Bagian IX menawarkan beberapa kesimpulan. Ini berarti bahwa akan ada perbedaan dalam hukum di tingkat nasional dan dengan cara yang efek yang berbeda untuk memenuhi standar minimum. Bagian VIII membahas tumpang tindih sengketa pelanggaran dan non-pelanggaran dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. Sebaliknya. Kebanyakan. Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan anggota terutama memberikan tingkat minimum perlindungan melalui undang- undang properti intelektual yang relevan. Dengan cara ini standar minimum menyediakan tingkat harmonisasi. bahwa menyediakan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi seharusnya memiliki batasan konsisten dengan kata-kata dari Perjanjian TRIPS. bagaimanapun.Bagian IV membahas obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Bagian VI dan VII menilai peran non-pelanggaran sengketa dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. Sengketa Klub Havana. kemampuan untuk menyediakan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih tinggi tidak sama dengan hak dicentang untuk memaksa tingkat yang lebih tinggi perlindungan melalui FTA. Bagian II membahas hubungan antara standar minimum dan perlindungan yang lebih luas di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. Ini termasuk diskusi tentang apa yang non-pelanggaran perselisihan tentang Perjanjian TRIPS mungkin terlihat seperti. dan (b) apakah bahwa erosi fleksibilitas yang konsisten dengan struktur disepakati dan kerangka Perjanjian TRIPS.. di luar persyaratan dari Perjanjian . Bagian III membahas bagaimana perlindungan yang lebih luas diterapkan pada non-diskriminasi. * 1030 Saya tidak membantah bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS memungkinkan untuk anggota WTO untuk menyediakan tingkat yang lebih tinggi perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. [FN31] Juga. Tantangan dapat dibuat undang-undang yang tidak ditunjuk hukum kekayaan intelektual.

Perjanjian TRIPS. * 1033 Kedua. benar atau salah. [FN39] Contoh lain yang menggambarkan kesulitan menentukan batas-batas Perjanjian TRIPS adalah persyaratan perlindungan merek dagang. [FN44] non-diskriminasi merupakan bagian struktural dari Persetujuan ini. digunakan. sebagai syarat pendaftaran. karena Perjanjian tidak memerlukan perlindungan data. Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan perlindungan merek dagang yang "kata-kata termasuk nama pribadi. * 1034 asalkan mereka memenuhi standar minimum. standar minimum struktur dapat menciptakan ketidakharmonisan. Ungkapan.[FN43] Hal ini penting karena merenungkan kemungkinan bahwa beberapa perlindungan ekstra yang mungkin bertentangan dengan Perjanjian. anggota Perjanjian TRIPS telah sepakat untuk standar minimum dan otonomi nasional atas penerapan standar.Namun. tapi itu bisa dibilang tidak benar. misalnya. standar minimum untuk durasi paten adalah 20 tahun. 'yang disediakan bahwa perlindungan tersebut tidak bertentangan dengan perjanjian'. sebagai cara untuk menghindari kewajiban perlakuan nasional. yang menyiapkan kemungkinan perlindungan yang lebih luas. dan juga kebebasan di atas jenis hukum. Sebagai contoh. Orang-orang Eropa memperlakukan ekstraksi database yang tidak adil yang tepat. memungkinkan anggota untuk memilih apakah untuk melindungi varietas tanaman baru dengan hak paten atau varietas tanaman sui generis sistem hak-hak. menciptakan kemungkinan yang berbeda hukum kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional. Tanda tersebut jelas kategori perlindungan yang sama seperti yang dibutuhkan untuk dilindungi di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN46] Setiap kenaikan istilah bahwa dalam hukum setiap anggota harus diberikan atas dasar non-diskriminatif bagi semua anggota WTO. mereka mempengaruhi setiap bagian dari Perjanjian ini. unsur figuratif dan kombinasi warna '. Ada tiga fitur penting dari pasal 1 dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN38] Masalah ini menjadi sangat sulit ketika negara-negara melindungi data tidak sebagai hak ekstraksi sui generis tidak adil. Ini hanya mensyaratkan bahwa pemilihan dan pengaturan database yang kreasi intelektual dilindungi. Kombinasi kemampuan untuk memiliki tingkat perlindungan yang lebih besar. setiap standar perlindungan yang lebih besar dalam hukum anggota juga harus tunduk pada perlakuan nasional dan MFN. anggota dapat. sebagai di luar lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN45] Artinya. Pertama. Standar meningkat. standar meningkat tidak harus bertentangan ini non-diskriminasi. huruf. angka. Banyak negara memiliki suara dan tanda bau dan beberapa FTA membutuhkan perlindungan dari macam merek dagang. Oleh karena itu.Pengecualian yang lebih luas yang paling mungkin untuk menghasilkan tingkat keseluruhan perlindungan yang di bawah standar minimum. dan kebebasan untuk semua anggota untuk menerapkan hukum domestik dengan cara yang sesuai untuk mereka.TRIPS. Apa yang lebih besar atau di luar Perjanjian ini tidak selalu mudah untuk mengidentifikasi.Pendekatan Eropa untuk contoh database adalah bahwa karena Perjanjian TRIPS tidak memerlukan perlindungan perlindungan basis data yang tidak perlu Uni Eropa dikenakan perlakuan nasional. Jadi.Pendekatan itu adalah fitur struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS . fakta bahwa sesuatu adalah standar yang lebih tinggi dari standar minimum dari Perjanjian TRIPS tidak berarti bahwa standar yang lebih tinggi sesuai dengan Perjanjian. [FN49] Kebebasan untuk anggota WTO untuk memilih metode pelaksanaan standar Perjanjian TRIPS merupakan pengakuan penting dari beberapa fleksibilitas dari Perjanjian dan otonomi nasional konsekuen bahwa artikel 1 memungkinkan. misalnya. [FN47] Juga untuk dicatat adalah bahwa pasal 1 mengacu pada perlindungan yang lebih luas tidak pengecualian yang lebih luas. Argumen alternatif adalah bahwa hal itu harus tunduk terhadap pengobatan nasional karena melindungi data dari ekstraksi tidak adil adalah tingkat perlindungan yang lebih besar database dari Perjanjian TRIPS membutuhkan. Dalam arti bahwa seseorang dapat mengatakan bahwa suara dan bau menandai berada di luar lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. bahwa tanda-tanda secara visual jelas 'dan tanda visual tersebut tidak jelas. [FN40] Persetujuan TRIPs tidak memerlukan perlindungan tanda bau dan suara karena menyatakan bahwa "anggota mungkin memerlukan. [FN41] Apapun metode yang dipilih untuk menerapkan standar minimal hukum Perjanjian TRIPS anggota WTO juga akan berbeda karena kemungkinan bahwa Anggota akan menyediakan standar meningkat. terutama diarahkan ke prinsip-prinsip non-diskriminasi. perlakuan nasional dan paling disukai bangsa (MFN). tetapi sebagai bagian dari hukum hak cipta yang tampaknya menjadi situasi sekarang di Australia. anggota bebas menentukan metode yang tepat pelaksanaan Perjanjian TRIPS standar dalam sistem hukum mereka. tidak boleh bertentangan bagian-bagian struktural seperti Perjanjian. [FN48] Ketiga. meskipun diperbolehkan. [FN37] * 1032 Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki standar minimal. namun tidak wajib. menerapkan dalam hukum mereka perlindungan yang lebih luas '. Kebebasan selama pelaksanaan termasuk detail dan ruang lingkup hukum. [FN42] Cukup jelas ini berarti bahwa memberikan perlindungan yang lebih luas adalah opsional. Dengan demikian. pasal 1 memungkinkan penyediaan perlindungan yang lebih luas 'yang disediakan bahwa perlindungan tidak bertentangan dengan ketentuan-ketentuan dari Persetujuan'.

[FN56] Apakah standar meningkat diciptakan pada hukum nasional dan diperluas melalui FTA menjadi norma internasional mungkin juga tergantung pada jenis kenaikan yang menjadi masalah. tidak membedakan antara negara-negara yang menyediakan * jangka panjang 1036 dan mereka yang tidak. Pendekatan yang meningkatkan apapun yang sah dalam segala situasi. [FN59] peningkatan tersebut belum tentu meningkatkan perdagangan. tidak seperti Uni Eropa. perlindungan membebaskan dari pengobatan nasional dimana perlindungan adalah perlindungan yang disebut 'non-TRIPS' atau memiliki berdasarkan perjanjian pengecualian dari perlakuan nasional. Hal yang sama tidak berlaku untuk hak ekstraksi tidak adil yang belum begitu banyak diambil. mendorong peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui bab-bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA. III. dicontohkan oleh Uni Eropa. Kombinasi dari Perjanjian TRIPS standar hukum minimum dan tidak adanya pengecualian MFN tidak hanya diperbolehkan. terlalu sederhana atau formalistik. [FN54] Para Berne yang relevan Konvensi ketentuan yang tergabung dalam Perjanjian TRIPS. dengan sejumlah negara yang berbeda. Dalam rangka untuk memiliki peningkatan serupa di beberapa negara. Apa itu artinya adalah bahwa semua orang asing akan diperlakukan sama oleh hukum domestik setiap anggota. jika warga negara A dapat memperoleh perlindungan yang lebih baik di negara B maka ini bisa memberikan insentif bagi warga negara A ke negara melobi Sebuah pemerintah untuk meningkatkan perlindungan.Gelombang negara-negara meningkatkan jangka waktu hak cipta sampai 70 tahun adalah contoh dari ini. bukan perlakuan nasional. [FN55] Uni Eropa mengambil keuntungan dari ini pengecualian perlakuan nasional dan hanya memberikan jangka panjang untuk warga negara dari negara-negara yang juga memiliki jangka panjang di hukum domestik. [FN52] Tidak adanya pembebasan ini memiliki efek utama mengemudi MFN peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. Uni Eropa telah menyediakan baik jangka waktu hak cipta meningkat dan hak ekstraksi tidak adil pada timbal balik daripada dasar perlakuan nasional. [FN50] Nasional ketentuan pengobatan ditemukan di lain perjanjian hukum kekayaan intelektual substantif. Jika negara-negara cukup banyak perubahan hukum mereka ke standar yang lebih tinggi maka standar yang lebih tinggi memiliki potensi untuk menjadi norma internasional. di mana hukum nasional berbeda. Ini dikenal sebagai timbal balik. bagaimanapun. melalui kerangka kerja yang relatif terbatas. Namun. Jika tidak ada klausul MFN dalam Perjanjian TRIPS itu saja tidak akan mencegah gelombang pasang meningkat standar kekayaan intelektual. Istilah diperlukan perlindungan hak cipta di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS hidup ditambah 50 tahun. khususnya. tetapi penambahan MFN adalah kejadian baru dengan Perjanjian TRIPS.Saya telah menyatakan di tempat lain bahwa sangat penting dalam ketiadaan pengecualian MFN untuk FTA. Setiap FTA diperlukan untuk mengharuskan anggota untuk mengubah hukum properti intelektual dalam negeri sendiri. GATT dan GATS sebagai telah . [FN53] Sebagai TRIPS tidak memiliki pengecualian MFN maka setiap perubahan hukum domestik akan disediakan secara MFN. pemegang hak pribadi dari semua anggota menerima perlindungan yang sama di dalam negeri. karena ada pengecualian khusus dari pengobatan nasional dalam Konvensi Berne. [FN51] Persetujuan TRIPs tidak memiliki pengecualian MFN untuk dimasukkan ke FTA setelah 1995.yang merupakan bagian dari objek keseluruhan dan tujuan Perjanjian. Amerika Serikat. bagian struktural lain dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah prinsip-prinsip non-diskriminasi. [FN58] Ini mengabaikan banyak pertanyaan yang muncul. jika hukum kekayaan intelektual nasional hanya diterapkan standar meningkat kepada pihak FTA. masuk ke bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA. tetapi. telah termasuk dalam FTA dengan orang lain. Banyak negara telah mengadopsi istilah meningkat dan Amerika Serikat. seperti jangka waktu hak cipta. Prinsip-prinsip ini berfungsi untuk memastikan bahwa. dengan klausul yang sama atau mirip. terutama karena tidak semua anggota WTO mengambil pendekatan. adalah selalu spekulatif. Juga. "Lebih luas PERLINDUNGAN 'DAN NON-DISKRIMINASI Sebagaimana disebutkan di atas. maka anggota tersebut tidak perlu menggunakan istilah itu untuk orang asing atas dasar perlakuan nasional. Seperti kesimpulan. Ini adalah salah satu alasan mengapa Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa. bagaimanapun. setiap negara akan perlu mengubah hukum nasionalnya juga. berdasarkan pengecualian MFN. Sebuah kompleksitas * 1035 ini adalah cara yang berbeda di mana MFN beroperasi di Perjanjian TRIPS daripada dalam konteks GATT. Jika anggota memberikan istilah yang lebih besar untuk hak cipta. ini mungkin memperlambat pasang naik meningkatkan standar kekayaan intelektual. Sebaliknya Amerika Serikat menyediakan diperpanjang 70 tahun pada istilah dasar perlakuan nasional. [FN57] Standar Anggota yang mengejar peningkatan tingkat tindakan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual seakan kerangka standar minimum berarti bahwa tidak ada yang mencegah ditingkatkan tanpa batas. misalnya. Tanpa prinsip perlakuan nasional kerangka standar minimum akan hampir pasti mengakibatkan diskriminasi di tingkat domestik. apakah standar meningkat adalah selalu konsisten dengan obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. perlakuan nasional dan MFN.

[FN69] Sebuah analisis dari apa anggota bisa diharapkan dari kata-kata dan struktur Perjanjian TRIPS juga ilustrasi objek dan tujuannya. bahwa bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA harus setidaknya harus konsisten dengan obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN63] Dalam kekayaan intelektual internasional dan ketegangan produsen pengguna dimanifestasikan sebagai keseimbangan terutama antara negara maju dan berkembang.[FN64] Pasal 7. [FN62] Pembukaan yang relevan untuk menafsirkan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. mereka melindungi dgn lengkungan obyek dan tujuan dari standar individu perlindungan di bagian lain dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN60] IV. termasuk tujuan perkembangan dan teknologi '. oleh karena itu. yang secara tegas mengakui pentingnya tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip untuk menafsirkan perjanjian secara keseluruhan. Hal ini mengacu pada 'kebutuhan' untuk melindungi intelektual dan properti serta kebutuhan untuk 'memastikan bahwa langkah-langkah dan prosedur untuk menegakkan hak kekayaan intelektual sendiri tidak menjadi hambatan perdagangan yang sah'. Tujuan. antara pengguna dan pemilik atau produsen. Badan Banding menegaskan di India-Paten [FN70] bahwa Panel . OBYEK DAN TUJUAN PERJANJIAN TRIPS Setiap minimal substantif dari Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki tujuan memberikan apapun yang standar minimum. [FN61] Setiap latihan interpretasi yang menilai objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian yang pertama harus melihat kata-kata perjanjian dalam konteks mereka dan dalam terang objek perjanjian dan tujuan. [FN66] Tujuan-tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip yang sangat sulit untuk menafsirkan dengan cara yang praktis karena mereka mengabadikan tujuan yang bersaing. [FN68] Namun demikian. Panel WTO di Kanada-Farmasi [FN67] menyatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip ini tidak dapat digunakan untuk merusak kata-kata tegas dari bagian lain Perjanjian. otonomi atas pelaksanaan tersebut standar dan pilihan untuk memiliki atau tidak memiliki perlindungan yang lebih luas. berusaha untuk menjelaskan keseimbangan. Prinsip-prinsip. di bawah 'Ketentuan Umum dan Prinsip Dasar' judul ini meliputi ketentuan-ketentuan yang menyediakan untuk non-diskriminasi. dalam pasal 8. "Menyadari tujuan kebijakan publik yang mendasari sistem nasional untuk perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. dalam pasal 7. Pasal 8 menyatakan bahwa anggota dapat memiliki pengecualian dalam undang-undang mereka untuk melindungi kesehatan masyarakat dan untuk mempromosikan kepentingan publik dalam sektor sangat penting untuk * 1038 pembangunan sosio-ekonomi dan teknologi '. Perjanjian TRIPS memiliki beberapa ketentuan umum yang dikelompokkan bersama dalam Bagian I. Selain itu. alamat cara untuk mencapai keseimbangan ini. Pembukaan juga menyatakan. yang selalu melekat pada kekayaan intelektual di tingkat domestik. sentralitas tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip Perjanjian TRIPS digarisbawahi dalam Deklarasi Doha pada Perjanjian TRIPS dan Kesehatan Masyarakat. transfer teknologi dan diseminasi teknologi. Ketentuan umum lainnya termasuk tujuan dan prinsip-prinsip Perjanjian TRIPS 1037 *. negara tujuan yang melindungi kekayaan intelektual harus mempromosikan antara lain. penting untuk tidak menyimpang dari kata-kata perjanjian untuk analisis ini.tegas. dengan demikian. Namun. Semua ketentuan-ketentuan umum bersifat struktural karena mereka dimaksudkan untuk mempengaruhi seluruh Perjanjian dan. [FN65] Ini macam pengecualian adalah cara utama di mana anggota WTO dapat mengembangkan kebijakan kekayaan intelektual yang mencerminkan kebutuhan ekonomi mereka. membangun kerangka kerja standar minimum.

V. bukan mereka menambah apa yang mungkin digambarkan sebagai norma-norma internasional kekayaan intelektual. hukum internasional memungkinkan negara-negara untuk membuat komitmen internasional dengan negara lain.Pertama. tetapi aliran niscaya dilakukan dan akan terus terjadi. INTERNASIONAL MELALUI PENCIPTAAN Norm FTA Standar Perjanjian TRIPS minimum diundangkan dalam hukum domestik dan kemudian diterapkan dalam anggota pada perlakuan nasional dan dasar MFN. termasuk dengan tidak bertindak terlibat. tapi ini tidak perwatakan. hal itu mempengaruhi negara-negara lain yang warga negara berhak atas perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dalam yurisdiksi yang pihak FTA. memberikan perlindungan lebih luas.Bahkan jika FTA atau pengaturan bilateral hanya antara dua pihak. [FN74] FTA juga memiliki peran dalam menciptakan norma-norma internasional. [FN78] Juga. Seperti penghilangan bunyi dlm percakapan yang tidak dapat benar dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS karena non-pelanggaran sengketa tidak tersedia. WIPO perjanjian. Ada . Norma-norma internasional kekayaan intelektual juga dibuat melalui perjanjian internasional lainnya seperti perjanjian WIPO. [FN75] proposisi ini diverifikasi karena merupakan kebijakan terbuka dari Amerika Serikat yang meningkat FTA bilateral dan standar kekayaan intelektual akan mendukung posisi untuk meningkatkan standar kekayaan intelektual global. tapi beberapa * 1040 FTA. Sebuah FTA tunggal tidak dapat merupakan suatu norma properti internasional intelektual. yang dinegosiasikan pasca TRIPs. [FN72] Tujuan dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS harus tercermin dalam bab-bab kekayaan intelektual FTA. peningkatan perlindungan harus sesuai dengan Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN71] * 1039 Badan Banding menganggap bahwa Panel telah keliru karena telah elided pelanggaran dan aspek-aspek non-pelanggaran sengketa GATT untuk mencapai kesimpulan. [FN76] Tidak adanya pengecualian MFN memiliki peran dalam mendukung aliran lintas batas norma kekayaan intelektual.[FN77] Aliran norma kekayaan intelektual dari bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA tidak selalu mudah untuk melacak dan mengukur. seperti didiskusikan di atas. perluasan TRIPS-plus FTA. Orang mungkin mengatakan bahwa negara-negara yang masuk ke dalam persetujuan perjanjian untuk menghilangkan struktur ini. proses penyelesaian sengketa dapat mempertimbangkan keputusan panel rekening FTA. dengan ketentuan yang sama mungkin mulai memiliki efek itu. [FN73] Standar minimum dalam Perjanjian TRIPS telah menjadi dasar dari norma-norma internasional perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. namun tidak berkewajiban untuk. asalkan komitmen tersebut tidak bertentangan dengan kewajiban internasional negara-negara lain.telah keliru dalam menunjukkan bahwa harapan yang sah dapat ditemukan di luar kata-kata dari Perjanjian TRIPS. maka anggota WTO tidak boleh memaafkan. tidak harus dianggap sebagai norma-norma Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN79] Serta membutuhkan penerapan domestik TRIPS-plus standar sengatan di ekor TRIPS-plus perjanjian adalah bagaimana perjanjian tersebut menghilangkan aspek struktur Perjanjian TRIPS berkaitan dengan hubungan antara standar minimum dan otonomi nasional atas pelaksanaan standar-standar . Jika tidak. Bagian berikutnya membahas apakah efek norma- mendorong dari TRIPS-plus FTA memiliki efek merusak aspek-aspek dari objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Juga. Perjanjian TRIPS memberikan bahwa anggota mungkin. ada dua keterbatasan luas untuk ini proposisi umum.Namun.

[FN83] Para kemungkinan respon dari orang-orang mengejar standar meningkat adalah bahwa standar minimum benar-benar hanya berarti standar minimum dan apa pun di atas yang sah. maka harmonisasi lebih dalam perubahan pendekatan standar minimum. Fakta bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS memungkinkan standar meningkat merupakan argumen analitis sederhana. [FN82] Peningkatan standar yang melanggar ketentuan-ketentuan struktural Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya tidak diizinkan. [FN80] * 1041 Juga. Namun. TRIPS-plus FTA perlu dibawa ke memeriksa dan bahwa harmonisasi peningkatan hak kekayaan intelektual melalui tekanan yang meningkat melalui FTA tidak sah dalam kerangka properti setuju intelektual internasional. terutama objek dan tujuannya.[FN81] Saya sarankan. oleh karena itu. Tanpa mengungkapkan negosiasi untuk harmonisasi. Ini TRIPS-plus bab kekayaan intelektual dalam FTA karena itu bertentangan dengan pasal 1. namun tidak berkewajiban untuk. . seperti pengetahuan tradisional.sering ketidakseimbangan kekuatan dalam negosiasi tersebut dan negara-negara masuk ke dalam perlindungan kekayaan intelektual yang tidak dalam kepentingan mereka. Ada perbedaan antara TRIPS-plus standar yang memperluas perlindungan aspek kategori tertutup Perjanjian TRIPS dan TRIPS-plus yang memperkenalkan standar baru dan benar sui generis subyek. perlindungan tersebut mungkin atau harus dinegosiasikan di tempat lain dan ada aliran tidak kembali efek untuk anggota lain tanpa persetujuan TRIPs mengungkapkan mereka. Jika FTA tidak meresepkan harmonisasi lebih dalam rincian hukum domestik di daerah TRIPS-tertutup.Aku. Seperti pelanggaran berbeda dari jenis pelanggaran di mana sengketa dapat dibawa ke DSB menyatakan bahwa hukum anggota melanggar perjanjian. bahwa proliferasi TRIPS-plus standar secara kumulatif dapat mencapai suatu pelanggaran sistemik dari struktur Perjanjian TRIPS dan tujuan. karena itu.[FN85] Sebagai kualifikasi saya perhatikan bahwa tidak semua ketentuan TRIPs adalah sama.[FN86] Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS tidak berbicara hal-hal pengetahuan tradisional. Ini bahkan lebih bermasalah jika harmonisasi rinci terjadi melalui tekanan bilateral yang tidak hanya dampak mereka di bawah tekanan. tidak semua kenaikan yang bermasalah. peningkatan standar minimum tidak boleh digunakan untuk mencapai yang baik secara langsung atau tidak langsung melalui FTA. banyak negara berkembang tampaknya telah percaya atau mungkin berharap bahwa standar Perjanjian TRIPS minimum akan menjadi batas-batas perlindungan mereka akan diwajibkan untuk memberikan. Ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya marah FTA ratchet up. tetapi juga anggota lain dari WTO. Oleh karena itu. yang mengatakan bahwa anggota mungkin. Mereka masuk ke dalam bab-bab seperti itu karena manfaat perdagangan lainnya dalam FTA secara keseluruhan. pertanyaan apakah perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui peningkatan FTA adalah sah. * 1042 pelanggaran adalah tentang sistem dan bagaimana kekayaan intelektual bab dalam FTA digunakan untuk meningkatkan standar. Ini dapat dijelaskan sebagai interpretasi formalistik [FN84] yang juga mengabaikan bagian lain dari Perjanjian ini. tapi itu terlalu sempit interpretasi dari Perjanjian TRIPS. dan juga kenyataan tentang bagaimana hukum dibuat di tingkat domestik. Pelanggaran terjadi ketika beberapa FTA memiliki pendekatan itu dan norma-norma baru berkembang tanpa konsensus. proliferasi tidak terkendali dari TRIPS-plus standar telah menjalankan mempersulit pemenuhan dan efektif mengabaikan arti sebenarnya dari ketentuan struktural. memberikan perlindungan lebih luas.

Oleh karena itu. bahkan jika surat perjanjian tidak dilanggar.Hubungan perdagangan dengan keterbatasan tempat pada perlindungan meningkat.. apakah atau tidak bertentangan dengan ketentuan-ketentuan Persetujuan ini ..Non-pelanggaran sengketa dapat dibawa dalam kaitannya dengan GATT dan GATS. [FN87] Namun. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa TRIPS-plus FTA tidak forum yang sah untuk perubahan Perjanjian TRIPS.Dalam rangka untuk menganggap ini lebih lanjut perlu untuk melihat apa non-pelanggaran sengketa dan contoh dari apa TRIPS non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin terlihat seperti. (B) penerapan pihak lain kontrak ukuran apa pun. Namun anggota Perjanjian TRIPS harus dapat manfaat dari standar perlindungan kekayaan intelektual menjadi norma internasional kecuali norma- norma lain yang bebas dinegosiasikan. Non-Pelanggaran di Umum GATT memungkinkan anggota untuk membawa sengketa terhadap anggota lain bahkan jika tidak ada pelanggaran terhadap kata-kata perjanjian: [FN89] Jika pihak kontraktor harus mempertimbangkan bahwa keuntungan yang diperoleh secara langsung atau tidak langsung berdasarkan Perjanjian ini sedang ditiadakan atau terganggu atau bahwa pencapaian suatu tujuan perjanjian sedang terhambat sebagai akibat dari: . Yang kedua adalah bahwa obyek dan tujuan TRIPS berbeda dari yang lain perjanjian kekayaan intelektual karena pengaturan perdagangan.Peningkatan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual internasional telah terjadi melalui kesepakatan bilateral jauh sebelum Perjanjian TRIPS diciptakan. pendekatan alternatif untuk argumen pelanggaran sistemik saya adalah bahwa pelanggaran non-sengketa dapat digunakan untuk memeriksa standar meningkat dimana pembentukan standar tersebut mengikis manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. tapi ada moratorium dalam kaitannya dengan sengketa tersebut dan Perjanjian TRIPS. Kombinasi dari efek koersif dan aliran norma-norma dari anggota lain 'TRIPS-plus hasil FTA di beberapa anggota kehilangan keuntungan tidak wajib memiliki standar meningkat. TRIPS-plus FTA tidak sama dengan pra-TRIPS bilateral. VI.. Pernikahan properti perdagangan dan intelektual telah membuat perbedaan yang signifikan dalam dua cara. Ini dikenal sebagai non-pelanggaran sengketa karena tidak ada pelanggaran dari kata-kata yang tepat dari perjanjian tersebut. Yang pertama adalah bahwa lebih banyak dipertaruhkan ketika negosiasi terkait perdagangan FTA dan akibatnya efek koersif untuk meningkatkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual jauh lebih efektif bila perdagangan dan kekayaan intelektual dicampur. Keterbatasan pada standar meningkat tidak hadir dalam pra-perjanjian TRIPs.. [FN90] moratorium ini awalnya selama 5 tahun. PERJANJIAN TRIPS DAN NON-PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN A. Kriteria utama untuk klaim non-pelanggaran yang sukses adalah bahwa manfaat dari kesepakatan yang dinegosiasikan batal atau terganggu. Mereka keterbatasan adalah bahwa obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS harus kompatibel dengan tujuan WTO keseluruhan * 1043 dari liberalisasi perdagangan. [FN91] Selama periode Perjanjian ini memberikan bahwa Dewan TRIPs * 1044 'wajib mempelajari lingkup dan . [FN88] Aku mengakui bahwa kesulitan dengan argumen bahwa telah terjadi pelanggaran sistemik dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa surat Perjanjian TRIPS telah dibilang tidak dilanggar karena ada kepatuhan harfiah atau formalistis. yang didominasi 'kekayaan intelektual hanya' sampai 1980- an.

melainkan menyatakan bahwa partai memiliki. adalah bahwa penggunaan non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin membawa pendekatan yang lebih kuat untuk aplikasi dan interpretasi dari ketentuan-ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS. tidak akan sah untuk pihak untuk menganggap bahwa hal itu juga mungkin manfaat dari E sebagai hasil dari perjanjian. membuatnya tampak tidak pantas untuk non-pelanggaran sengketa. Kesulitan serupa berpotensi muncul dalam kasus Perjanjian GATS. Sebuah keluhan yang menguntungkan telah terkikis. [FN102] Salah satu kesulitan dengan semua non-pelanggaran sengketa adalah bahwa mereka menjalankan kemungkinan busuk jatuh dari persyaratan ini. [FN97] Cho menjelaskan kasus yang memenuhi kriteria sebagai kasus modus tambahan karena mereka tampaknya untuk mengisi celah hukum '. Hal ini karena tidak akan ada manfaat yang diharapkan selain * 1045 perlindungan yang diperlukan oleh standar minimum. C dan D. B. melainkan menafsirkan kata-kata yang ada perjanjian. [FN93] Beberapa FTA memungkinkan untuk pihak untuk membawa sengketa pelanggaran non-terhadap satu sama lain. Entah perlindungan yang diperlukan atau tidak. Dalam kasus sengketa kekayaan intelektual beberapa pelanggaran non-sengketa mungkin benar-benar jumlah yang upaya untuk meregangkan arti dari standar minimum. [FN100] Dia mengacu pada penggunaan apa yang disebut kasus modus independen sebagai menyediakan "sumber harapan '. dengan cara lain. terutama tidak ada 'hubungan antara konsesi tarif dan harapan darinya'. Sebuah contoh sederhana menunjukkan inti dari kesulitan ini. diberi label untuk kenyamanan A. tapi perjanjian tidak mencakup perlindungan E karena para pihak tidak dapat menyetujui E. [FN98] kasus Aktivisme tidak memenuhi kriteria ini. [FN103] Banyak ketentuan-ketentuan Perjanjian TRIPS sama- .Mengatakan bahwa ada kesepakatan internasional untuk bidang terkait kekayaan intelektual. mengatur penyediaan layanan. tetapi kata-kata perjanjian tidak dilanggar. Berbagai anggota WTO mendukung perselisihan tersebut yang tersedia. menghambat tujuan perjanjian. dalam rangka memenuhi tujuan kebijakan nasional. [FN99] Cho karena itu disebut kasus ini 'modus mandiri' karena pengadu tidak mengambil masalah dengan tarif tertentu. saya berpendapat. [FN101] Orang mungkin bertanya apa harapan adalah? Dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS yang 'harapan'. Mengapa non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan tidak tersedia di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS Struktur dan sifat dari Perjanjian TRIPS. B. Ketika menafsirkan kesepakatan aturan penyelesaian sengketa WTO mengharuskan panel dan Badan Banding tidak menambah perjanjian. [FN92] Proses pemeriksaan terus berlanjut. segera terlihat seperti menambahkan kesepakatan bahkan jika keluhan seperti itu diperbolehkan. Cho menunjukkan sifat samar-samar kewajiban itu. [FN96] Ukuran pada masalah harus merusak posisi kompetitif dari produk impor yang bersangkutan. sebagai suatu perjanjian standar minimum. [FN95] Dalam kaitannya dengan kasus-kasus restraintism pengadu harus menunjukkan bahwa ukuran persoalan adalah tidak cukup diantisipasi pada saat konsesi tarif GATT dinegosiasikan.Anggota lain mempertimbangkan pengaduan tersebut tidak tepat.modalitas untuk keberatan dari [ini] ketik'. di mana anggota dapat. Cho penting dari kasus modus independen dan menganggapnya mengejutkan bahwa beberapa pendukung non-pelanggaran kasus telah menyarankan mereka dapat digunakan di daerah- daerah yang baru muncul.[FN94] Cho telah dikelompokkan GATT non-pelanggaran laporan ke 'restraintism' dan 'aktivis' kasus.

Tampilan subjektif Sebuah pelapor kerugian tidak cukup. namun. Untuk memastikan beberapa pihak dapat membawa kasus-kasus buruk. terutama dari Amerika Serikat. Namun. Prosedur non-pelanggaran. Berselisih mungkin mencoba untuk menyalahgunakan non-pelanggaran. Saya menggunakan rumus non-pelanggaran tidak menyarankan Badan Banding. menjadi terhambat 'secara obyektif dinilai. Sejak Perjanjian TRIPS diberlakukan. khususnya ketentuan yang memungkinkan pengecualian seperti kemampuan untuk mengecualikan dari paten penemuan atas dasar hewan ketertiban umum atau manusia. Badan Banding masih menemukan melawan India. tanpa non-pelanggaran kriteria jenis. bisa sangat baik memberikan 'pertahanan' yang diperlukan untuk tekanan-tekanan. Hal ini penting. [FN104] Alasan utama bahwa negara-negara berkembang telah menentang penggunaan non- pelanggaran sengketa untuk Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa mereka percaya perselisihan tersebut akan digunakan sebagai alat.. Pendekatan saya di sini adalah untuk menunjukkan dua hal yang sangat berbeda dari isu-isu yang dibahas di India-Paten. Ini berarti bahwa pihak yang mencoba untuk bernegosiasi untuk lebih dari mereka akhirnya dicapai tidak dapat menggunakan non- pelanggaran untuk mengatakan bahwa hal itu lebih diharapkan. untuk dicatat bahwa di India-Paten. jika tidak lebih. Ini bukan masalah yang harus dianggap enteng dan mungkin telah menjadi perhatian dengan proses penyelesaian sengketa WTO pada umumnya. Proses negosiasi FTA telah sangat mahal dan merugikan banyak negara berkembang dan WTO tidak menyediakan mekanisme bagi negara-negara berkembang untuk membela diri terhadap tekanan ini. dorongan untuk standar meningkat terjadi di arena FTA.sama. Negara-negara berkembang. Melainkan dapat memberikan kesempatan untuk laporan untuk lebih mencerminkan sifat dan ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS sebagai keseimbangan antara 'kaya' kekayaan intelektual dan 'si miskin'. adalah salah. yang dibatalkan atau terganggu atau bahwa pencapaian tujuan setiap . Kedua. Pandangan objektif akan menilai apakah manfaat yang diharapkan adalah ekspektasi yang wajar berdasarkan perjanjian yang sebenarnya. bisa mendapatkan keuntungan dari pelanggaran non-* 1046 proses karena dapat memberikan respon aturan berbasis tekanan tumbuh dan berkelanjutan untuk meningkatkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. pada tahap ini dalam kehidupan Perjanjian TRIPS. atau kehidupan atau kesehatan tumbuhan. samar-samar.[FN105] Salah satu ketakutan adalah bahwa negara-negara berkembang harus berjuang terlalu banyak perselisihan di WTO dan bahwa ini akan menguras sumber daya. di India- Paten.. karena non-pelanggaran keluhan dan masih tidak tersedia untuk perselisihan TRIPs.Pertama.. terutama mereka dengan kekuatan negosiasi kecil. untuk menggambarkan bahwa penggunaan dicentang bab kekayaan intelektual . dengan aturan yang tepat yang mengatur itu. mengapa non-pelanggaran perselisihan. Penilaian obyektif adalah metode mengendalikan non-pelanggaran sengketa dari menjadi alat negosiasi ulang.. analisis Badan Banding benar. untuk meningkatkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. Salah satu aspek dari aturan tersebut seharusnya bahwa ujian kehilangan 'manfaat apapun . Perselisihan yang dibawa pada hari-hari awal penyelesaian sengketa dan Perjanjian TRIPS. menjadi penting sehingga lingkup Persetujuan ini diuji dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan daripada dalam kekuasaan-seimbang negosiasi FTA. tapi ini tidak berarti bahwa Panel akan memutuskan kasus-kasus salah. tetapi membentuk aturan di sekitar Perjanjian TRIPS non-pelanggaran harus membantu kontrol ini. Seperti dibahas di atas.

non-pelanggaran harus mengakui bahwa ada harapan yang luas timbul dari ketentuan-ketentuan umum Persetujuan ini. Pelanggaran perselisihan yang menganalisis kata- kata. standar minimum meresepkan tingkat perlindungan daripada kata-kata yang tepat dari hukum. namun. tidak selalu begitu jelas. Membiarkan non-pelanggaran sengketa akan menyediakan sebuah cara bagi anggota untuk menguji parameter perjanjian dalam lingkungan berbasis aturan analitis. dengan cara yang berbeda dari sengketa pelanggaran.Sebagaimana dibahas di atas. [FN106] tetapi perselisihan melakukan melayani tujuan memungkinkan anggota untuk menguji interpretasi mereka perjanjian dan menghilangkan kesulitan hakim anggota yang sebab mereka sendiri. Pemilik dan Pengguna sebagai Pengadu .Non-pelanggaran akan sangat berguna dalam kerangka standar minimum karena. Juga. harus set pertama alat yang digunakan untuk menafsirkan bahwa wilayah abu-abu. Mengapa non-Pelanggaran Sengketa Sekarang Mungkin Cocok untuk Perjanjian TRIPS Hampir 15 tahun beroperasi telah menunjukkan bahwa ada daerah abu-abu banyak di Perjanjian TRIPS. APA PERJANJIAN NON-PELANGGARAN TRIPS SENGKETA mungkin terlihat seperti A. bagian selanjutnya membahas yang berpotensi dapat membawa non-pelanggaran sengketa dan apa yang mereka dapat terlihat seperti. * 1048 VII. Ini wilayah abu-abu muncul melalui kombinasi fitur dari Perjanjian TRIPS. garis antara bidang hukum kekayaan intelektual. Namun demikian. di mana ada ketidakseimbangan kekuatan antara pihak-pihak yang bernegosiasi. pada kenyataannya. daripada dalam berpotensi memaksa 'negosiasi' FTA. beberapa daerah abu- abu dimana anggota dan sistem akan manfaat dari non-pelanggaran sengketa.Ini berarti bahwa akan ada perbedaan dalam hukum di tingkat nasional dan dalam * 1047 cara efek yang berbeda untuk memenuhi standar minimum. Penggunaan non-pelanggaran perselisihan tentang Perjanjian TRIPS tidak memerlukan koneksi ke tarif spesifik karena Perjanjian TRIPS bukan tentang tarif. Sebaliknya koneksi harus ke kategori perlindungan dalam kaitannya dengan mana Perjanjian TRIPS mengharuskan anggotanya untuk memberlakukan standar minimum dalam kaitannya dengan. [FN107] Menjadi hakim dalam menyebabkan sendiri sangat problematis dalam perundingan FTA. Non-pelanggaran mengakui bahwa meskipun ada kepatuhan literal dengan standar. ada. di dalam atau di luar lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. dalam cahaya dari objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS.dalam FTA tidak hanya merupakan pelanggaran ketentuan struktural dari Perjanjian TRIPS. yang tidak ditandai dengan kebebasan kontrak dan otonomi negara. C. yang merupakan interpretasi Konvensi Wina mungkin menunjukkan kepatuhan. dan pihak yang lebih kuat hanya dapat menyatakan bahwa penafsiran mereka dari Perjanjian TRIPS benar. [FN108] Dalam rangka untuk memeriksa utilitas non-pelanggaran sengketa lebih lanjut. menjadi erosi manfaat cukup diharapkan di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak dapat dinegosiasi ulang dalam penyelesaian sengketa dan panel tidak berwenang untuk melakukan apa pun selain menafsirkan perjanjian. tetapi berpotensi yang ditindaklanjuti non-pelanggaran beberapa harapan yang sah substantif yang timbul dari Perjanjian TRIPS.

dan . mana ada * 1049 kewajiban pada negara untuk memberikan perlindungan penulis atau perlindungan hak- hak sosial dan budaya.[FN111] Umumnya pemilik kekayaan intelektual tidak bisa mengharapkan sesuatu yang lebih dari hak- hak bahwa hukum dalam negeri tertentu hibah mereka. untuk membawa perselisihan. Anggota yang memberikan perlindungan yang sah harus berharap memperoleh manfaat dari kemampuan untuk tidak berkewajiban untuk memberikan 'perlindungan lebih luas'. Perjanjian TRIPS menciptakan hak untuk melindungi kekayaan intelektual. Itu adalah mereka menyediakan pemilik dengan hak eksklusif untuk mengecualikan pihak ketiga. tetapi kewajiban anggota untuk memberikan hak-hak pribadi dalam hukum domestik mereka. Manfaat yang pemilik properti intelektual mungkin mengharapkan menimbulkan isu yang berbeda dari manfaat yang pengguna kekayaan intelektual harapkan. bahkan jika perlindungan yang diberikan melalui suatu kerangka kerja hak milik negatif. Ini adalah kewajiban positif antara negara anggota yang telah dan mungkin menjadi subyek sengketa pelanggaran. Seperti dibahas di atas. ia menyediakan Anggota dengan hak untuk mengharapkan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual bagi warga negaranya di negara-negara anggota lainnya. Pada tingkat internasional beberapa anggota WTO terutama diakui sebagai pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual dan lain-lain diakui terutama sebagai pengguna. Sebaliknya. tetapi suatu kewajiban positif antara negara anggota.Ada dua kategori luas dari manfaat yang anggota WTO harapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. yang sering didominasi pengguna kekayaan intelektual. jika mereka tidak ingin melakukannya. Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa adalah pemilik utama dari kekayaan intelektual jika dibandingkan dengan negara-negara kecil atau berkembang. yang umumnya pengguna.[FN113] Karena Perjanjian TRIPS merupakan bagian dari 'murah' WTO tentang hubungan perdagangan harapan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual dan manfaat perdagangan yang dihasilkan bukan merupakan hak negatif. Pada tingkat nasional hak kekayaan intelektual biasanya dianggap hak-hak negatif. [FN112] Meskipun hak kekayaan intelektual pribadi hak perselisihan WTO tidak tentang hak pribadi individu tertentu. tetapi mereka mungkin jalan bagi Anggota. [FN109] Pada tingkat nasional akan ada baik pengguna dan pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual. Harapan untuk tidak memberikan perlindungan yang lebih besar dan dapat menggunakan fleksibilitas TRIPs bisa menjadi subjek sengketa non-pelanggaran. [FN110] Meskipun hak kekayaan intelektual di tingkat nasional sebagian besar adalah hak kekayaan negatif. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak mengubah hak negatif menjadi hak positif dari harapan untuk kepentingan individu pemilik kekayaan intelektual atau pengguna. Dasar hukum hak kekayaan intelektual sangat penting karena dasar-dasar hak-hak dapat membantu dalam mendefinisikan kontur sesuai hak. yang terlihat atas hilangnya manfaat positif.Perjanjian hak asasi manusia. adalah contoh. Non-pelanggaran sengketa di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS tidak akan tersedia hanya untuk Anggota yang sebagian besar adalah pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual. Adanya kewajiban positif dapat memberikan hak korelatif untuk individu untuk mengklaim perlindungan hak-hak. Salah satunya adalah manfaat yang pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual dapat mengharapkan dan yang lain adalah apa yang pengguna kekayaan intelektual harapkan. perjanjian internasional memaksakan pada negara-negara anggota mereka kewajiban positif untuk memberikan perlindungan. Mendasari beberapa argumen terhadap penggunaan non-pelanggaran keluhan dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS adalah bahwa hak kekayaan intelektual adalah hak-hak negatif pribadi dan karena itu inheren tidak cocok dengan prinsip-prinsip non-pelanggaran.

Karena ada moratorium non-pelanggaran keluhan keluhan ini tidak dapat dibawa sebagai keluhan non-pelanggaran. [FN118] Dalam hal apapun. dengan asumsi bahwa moratorium dihapus. Namun. Perjanjian TRIPS menciptakan hak-hak positif bagi Anggota untuk cukup mengharapkan perlindungan. tetapi ini tidak memberikan individu hak untuk memanfaatkan karya kekayaan intelektual. B. [FN114] Singkatnya. telah mendefinisikan hak dengan cara yang sama pemilik lakukan. termasuk apa yang mereka mungkin tentang.mewujudkan tujuan * 1050 transfer teknologi dan diseminasi. Menggunakan Wajar karya kekayaan intelektual adalah barang publik diperlukan sebagai bagian dari pembenaran keseluruhan untuk lingkup perlindungan kekayaan intelektual. undang-undang banyak . termasuk transfer dan diseminasi teknologi. katakanlah film atau bermain berdasarkan atau menggunakan yang bekerja dan mengharapkan untuk berada dalam domain publik. Contoh Pelanggaran Potensi Non Perselisihan Catatan Sekretariat Dewan TRIPS diskusi yang non-pelanggaran keluhan menetapkan beberapa contoh dari apa yang non-pelanggaran keluhan bisa terlihat seperti. Untuk sebagian besar tidak ada pengguna salah satu hak kekayaan intelektual. pada waktu itu. khususnya struktur standar minimum dan tunjangan otonomi nasional atas metode pelaksanaan yang standar dan apakah atau tidak untuk meningkatkan standar-standar. yang bisa membawa mereka dan apa yang mungkin mereka capai. Oleh karena itu pengguna mungkin perlu berhati-hati tentang dugaan diharapkan ada manfaat yang timbul dari setiap hukum kekayaan intelektual nasional. Hal ini tidak bisa menjadi interpretasi rasional dari Perjanjian TRIPS bahwa anggota membekukan undang-undang kekayaan intelektual mereka seperti pada tahun 1995 sebagai. pertanyaan sesungguhnya adalah apakah seperti keluhan realistik mengingat objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. dari perspektif net-pengguna. Namun. banyak negara memiliki program yang sedang berlangsung reformasi hukum kekayaan intelektual dan ada negosiasi internasional atas berbagai aspek properti internasional berlangsung intelektual dan direncanakan. ketika dipertimbangkan dalam konteks perjanjian internasional. [FN115] Salah satunya adalah bahwa: [FN116] Seorang anggota dapat memberikan peningkatan yang sangat besar dalam jangka waktu perlindungan hak cipta yang efektif bisa meniadakan atau merusak manfaat yang B Anggota mengharapkan untuk menikmati pada saat negosiasi dan kemudian negara B Anggota mungkin telah diinvestasikan dalam produksi karya yang terpisah. diharapkan cukup manfaat dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN117] * 1051 seperti keluhan tidak pengaduan pelanggaran sebagaimana persyaratan dari Perjanjian TRIPS telah terpenuhi dan terlampaui. dan otonomi nasional selama pelaksanaan TRIPS dan apakah atau tidak untuk memberikan perlindungan yang lebih luas. tapi itu tidak dapat menjadi alasan untuk tidak memiliki mereka untuk kasus-kasus yang sesuai. Ini adalah dalam konteks bahwa non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin berguna. Contoh ini adalah tepat untuk diskusi karena banyak negara telah memperpanjang jangka waktu hak cipta mereka di luar minimum Perjanjian TRIPS. Dengan pemikiran ini bagian berikutnya melihat contoh-contoh non-pelanggaran sengketa. kecuali di bawah lisensi. Aku mengakui bahwa perselisihan tersebut mungkin sulit untuk menang dan bahwa mereka harus sulit untuk menang. derajat fleksibilitas dan bahwa Anggota lainnya mematuhi ketentuan-ketentuan struktural Perjanjian.

melibatkan langkah inventif dan dapat diterapkan dalam industri'. dalam FTA dengan Amerika Serikat. di daerah istilah hak cipta. [FN124] Negara tidak dapat mengecualikan paten atas dasar materi pelajaran saja. pada saat menulis.Dapatkah ada sekarang menjadi keluhan yang sah tentang perpanjangan jangka waktu hak cipta terus? Keluhan pelanggaran tidak mungkin berhasil karena Perjanjian TRIPS telah harfiah dipenuhi.Jenis paten. memiliki aturan selimut yang paten untuk obat-obatan tidak tersedia. di negara . [FN126] yang dipatenkan. Tidak ada perselisihan bahwa obat-obatan penggunaan pertama harus dipatenkan untuk mematuhi Perjanjian TRIPS.Namun. Sebuah negara tidak dapat. Ini menyediakan bahwa 'paten harus tersedia untuk setiap penemuan. sering disebut klaim Swiss. untuk membatasi impor mereka. itu tidak berarti bahwa Anggota cukup harus mengharapkan jangka waktu hak cipta untuk selamanya diperpanjang. [FN120] Australia diizinkan jenis tertentu impor paralel sampai disepakati. apakah produk atau proses.anggota 'yang TRIPS-plus. misalnya. perbedaan telah muncul mengenai apakah TRIPS kepatuhan membutuhkan menggunakan kedua dan berikutnya obat-obatan diketahui dipatenkan. Meskipun pelarangan diskriminasi selimut materi pokok. Perselisihan ini tentang ruang lingkup persyaratan pasal 27 dalam kaitannya dengan paten untuk obat-obatan.[FN119] * 1052 aturan mengimpor Paralel memberikan contoh lain potensi keluhan pengguna non- pelanggaran. Salah satu contoh adalah perpanjangan istilah untuk rekaman suara di Uni Eropa. Baru ini menggunakan obat-obatan yang dikenal tidak selalu dipatenkan. perselisihan paten obat-obatan masih ada. Namun. [FN123] Perselisihan lingkup paten dan lainnya materi intelektual properti subjek adalah beberapa perselisihan paling sulit untuk menyelesaikan karena subyek hukum kekayaan intelektual dan interpretasi akibat hukum yang ada terus berkembang dengan cara untuk memastikan bahwa hukum yang ada dapat menangkap teknologi baru sebagai penemuan dipatenkan. [FN121] Oleh karena itu anggota harus diizinkan otonomi nasional atas aturan impor paralel dan tidak bisa mengklaim bahwa ini tidak dapat berubah pada anggota lain dari waktu ke waktu. tetapi keluhan non-pelanggaran menimbulkan beberapa masalah yang berbeda. asalkan baru. dalam semua bidang teknologi. pada waktu itu. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak mengharuskan anggota baik membolehkan atau melarang impor paralel produk hak cipta.[FN125] Namun. Banyak Anggota diharapkan beberapa rekaman suara Eropa jatuh ke dalam domain publik dan orang-orang yang berbasis di negara- negara Anggota dapat telah merencanakan untuk mereproduksi rekaman suara atau menggunakan mereka untuk membuat karya cipta baru. Anggota WTO harus diizinkan untuk sengketa legitimasi istilah hak cipta meningkat. yang sangat proteksionis dan umumnya tidak memfasilitasi perdagangan. karena * 1053 farmasi dikenal. bahkan di negara maju. adalah contoh lain. untuk memperpanjang jangka waktu perlindungan hak cipta dalam rekaman suara untuk 70 tahun. [FN122] Interpretasi pasal 27 dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Haruskah negara anggota yang memasok pasar paralel impor Australia diizinkan untuk mengeluh bahwa manfaat itu diharapkan dalam perdagangan telah dihapus? Contoh ini memiliki kesulitan yang mengimpor aturan paralel dalam hak cipta seolah-olah di luar lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. yang mengatur subyek hukum paten. Isu-isu yang berbeda adalah penting karena mereka mengatasi hubungan dagang antara anggota WTO. perdagangan yang menguntungkan diharapkan sekarang mungkin akan menghilang karena rencana Komisi Eropa. dan karena itu hal baru dan inventif langkah tidak dapat didirikan.

Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya tidak ditafsirkan untuk mengatakan bahwa ada harmonisasi semacam ini detail paten hukum karena itu akan mengisi celah yang para pihak tidak setuju. adalah mustahil untuk mengatakan bahwa ada konsensus internasional yang dapat menciptakan norma internasional. India dan beberapa negara berkembang lainnya seperti menganggap paten sebagai untuk penemuan tambahan dan karenanya mengakibatkan evergreening sebuah paten untuk suatu zat farmasi. seperti keluhan tentang ruang lingkup materi yang dibahas dalam undang-undang pasal 27 dan India tidak akan berhasil untuk . tidak ada norma internasional atas paten penggunaan kedua dan berikutnya dari obat- obatan dikenal [FN138] itu akan menjadi penyalahgunaan penafsiran perjanjian 1055 * untuk menunjukkan bahwa ada. Pertanyaan non-pelanggaran bertanya apakah anggota memiliki keluhan. melainkan memutuskan tidak memiliki yurisdiksi atas masalah ini. [FN137] Karena pada saat Perjanjian TRIPS. tidak dapat ditetapkan bahwa India telah melanggar pasal 27. bagaimanapun. [FN130] antara pengajuan Novartis 'adalah bahwa hukum India tidak sesuai dengan pasal 27 dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN136] Karena tidak ada norma harmonis langkah inventif dan hanya standar minimum. [FN133] keheningan Ini berarti bahwa anggota harus menerapkan definisi mereka sendiri langkah inventif. dan. [FN139] Jika pengaduan pelanggaran dalam keadaan adalah sebagai tidak mungkin untuk berhasil. bahkan jika artikel tersebut tidak dilanggar. Ini hukum India secara efektif definisi langkah inventif untuk beberapa jenis penemuan. mengenai tingkat atau makna dari langkah inventif.Memang. bisa itu menguntungkan untuk membawa klaim non-pelanggaran dalam kaitannya dengan hukum India? Dalam pandangan saya. ada. langkah inventif adalah sesuatu yang tidak jelas bagi orang yang ahli dalam bidang ini. bagaimanapun. karena manfaat yang diharapkan dari perjanjian atau pencapaian dari suatu tujuan tidak dapat direalisasikan. atas dasar bahwa tidak ada keberhasilan baru. [FN132] Perjanjian TRIPS diam pada definisi langkah inventif. [FN127] India. seperti yang saya sarankan. Di luar ini. bahwa untuk sebuah penemuan yang akan dipatenkan harus melibatkan langkah inventif. Harus ada batas-batas otonomi yang anggota memiliki dalam mendefinisikan langkah inventif. kebutuhan yang dirasakan untuk harmonisasi hukum paten dan negosiasi internasional yang bertujuan yang mengakui kurangnya konsensus. hanya sebuah bentuk baru dari substansi yang dikenal.Secara umum. Pengadilan Madras tidak menutup kemungkinan pada argumen Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN134] Hal ini menyebabkan di negara-negara yang berbeda memiliki pendekatan yang berbeda dengan apa yang merupakan langkah inventif. dan sekarang. [FN135] Keragaman muncul dari bagaimana langkah inventif dinilai. atas dasar bahwa meskipun senyawa farmasi itu sendiri belum tentu baru. yang dikenal sebagai Gleevec. [FN129] Sebelum Pengadilan Tinggi Madras. tidak memungkinkan paten untuk menggunakan kedua dan selanjutnya senyawa yang dikenal kecuali ada 'suatu peningkatan kemanjuran dikenal' [FN128] dari substansi. [FN131] Masalah relevan di sini adalah apakah ada dasar untuk berargumentasi bahwa pendekatan India untuk langkah inventif adalah pelanggaran atau pembatalan non-pelanggaran dan penurunan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Novartis berhasil menantang penolakan India untuk memberikan seperti paten dalam kaitannya dengan farmasi. Pertanyaan pelanggaran bertanya apakah * 1054 pasal 27 dilanggar. sehingga menghilangkan ruang lingkup Perjanjian TRIPS. menggunakan yang baru.maju. Definisi nasional mungkin tidak boleh terlalu menuntut apa-apa yang bisa dipatenkan.

bisa berhasil. adalah bahwa masalah akan diputuskan dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan. India mungkin mengeluh bahwa tekanan langsung dan tidak langsung. dan mengikis untuk India. saya sarankan bahwa seperti pelanggaran non-keluhan terhadap India harus kalah karena ada dan divisi internasional atas hak paten penggunaan obat-obatan baru dikenal. [FN141] Juga. kemampuan untuk tidak berkewajiban untuk memberikan perlindungan lebih luas dan harapan yang sah akibatnya di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS dikalahkan.Anggota dapat dan melakukan melukiskan rincian sistem paten sesuai dengan keadaan ekonomi mereka dan kebutuhan untuk melakukannya adalah tidak terduga. dibahas di atas. bukan dalam negosiasi FTA daya seimbang internasional. Pengadu harus berpendapat bahwa web TRIPS-plus FTA. tapi berharap jatuh pendek dari harapan kekuatan hukum. dan bahkan mencoba untuk bernegosiasi.'. Selain itu. maksud para pihak atau manfaat yang diharapkan timbul dari TRIPS . untuk mengubah hukum-hukumnya. Keuntungan baik keluhan non-pelanggaran. panel tidak harus menyimpulkan bahwa itu adalah manfaat cukup diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS bahwa seluruh Anggota akan memberikan hak paten untuk obat-obatan digunakan kedua. untuk melindungi obat-obatan menggunakan kedua adalah pembatalan dan gangguan dari manfaat yang diharapkan di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. membawa melawan Amerika Serikat dan mungkin juga Uni Eropa. telah terkikis untuk beberapa negara. Pengikisan keuntungan anggota diharapkan tidak diwajibkan untuk mengubah hukum untuk melindungi hak paten penggunaan kedua farmasi telah terjadi. Ini selalu dikenal dalam mendefinisikan langkah inventif bahwa anggota dapat memberlakukan undang-undang mereka sendiri.. India tidak mengubah hukum untuk melindungi hak paten penggunaan kedua farmasi. [FN140] Di sisi lain. [FN142] Apakah Anggota memutuskan untuk membawa keluhan mungkin sebagian tergantung pada obat yang tersedia. bahwa ini begitu. Untuk menunjukkan bahwa para pihak dimaksudkan bahwa pasal 27 akan menghasilkan hal yang sama sedang dipatenkan mana- mana di dunia menunjukkan tingkat harmonisasi yang bukan merupakan penafsiran yang wajar dari kata-kata dari pasal 27. yang membutuhkan perlindungan penggunaan baru dari obat-obatan dikenal.... saya sarankan bahwa pengaduan pelanggaran non-. yang menunjukkan negosiasi dalam beberapa cara koersif.alasan yang sama bahwa keluhan pelanggaran seharusnya tidak berhasil. ketentuan- ketentuan FTA kumulatif * 1056 bertentangan dengan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS untuk negara-negara berkembang. melalui efek FTA. Tidak ada manfaat yang diharapkan dari standar umum langkah inventif. C. Di satu sisi. Beberapa Anggota dan pemegang hak pribadi mungkin berharap. langsung dan melalui TRIPS-plus FTA menciptakan norma-norma baru. Namun akan ada keuntungan dalam memungkinkan non-pelanggaran keluhan atas masalah ini. tetapi ditempatkan di bawah tekanan terus-menerus. Negara-negara telah melakukannya bertentangan dengan kepentingan nasional mereka sendiri. Hal ini karena beberapa negara telah ditekan melalui non-negotiable FTA template ke dalam melindungi farmasi menggunakan kedua. Perlindungan tersebut tidak memberikan kontribusi bagi promosi 'inovasi . untuk saling menguntungkan produsen dan pengguna . Dalam menghadapi divisi yang. remedies untuk Non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan .

Sementara tarif mungkin saling disesuaikan yang tidak masuk akal untuk sebuah hukum kekayaan intelektual. Tumpang tindih NON-PELANGGARAN DAN PELANGGARAN PERSELISIHAN A. dalam preferensi untuk keluhan non-pelanggaran. Jika non- pelanggaran sengketa yang diperkenalkan dalam Perjanjian TRIPs. Inti dari kasus Amerika Serikat adalah bahwa ambang Cina atas pelanggaran pidana dalam hukum hak cipta diberikan persyaratan dari Perjanjian TRIPS untuk memberikan tindak pidana atas pelanggaran tidak efektif dalam beberapa keadaan. Anggota lebih cenderung untuk membawa pengaduan pelanggaran jika mereka bisa. VIII. bagaimanapun. Satu keluhan terkait dengan ambang melanggar akan memberikan salinan yang naik ke tingkat pidana pelanggaran hak cipta di Cina. akan mengekang FTA analog masa depan dan untuk memungkinkan anggota untuk menarik peningkatan perlindungan yang thwarts harapan sah TRIPS. Jika TRIPS-plus FTA ditemukan untuk menjadi penghapusan non-pelanggaran dan gangguan dari objek dan tujuan dari TRIPS maka ukuran yang harus ditarik akan ditemukan dalam hukum pelapor bukan responden. tapi ini 'membentuk kembali' tidak harus berhasil. karena non-pelanggaran sengketa belum tersedia ini mungkin sudah terjadi. [FN143] dari Perjanjian TRIPS tidak ada kewajiban untuk menarik mengukur. karena dalam ketergantungan sengketa pelanggaran perjanjian diasumsikan dan sekali ada pelanggaran mapan perjanjian juga diasumsikan bahwa telah terjadi cedera. [FN145] Memang. Obat untuk TRIPS-plus FTA.[FN146] Amerika Serikat membawa pengaduan pelanggaran terhadap Cina mengenai berbagai aspek hak cipta China dan hukum merek dagang. Selama beberapa tahun Amerika Serikat dan Cina telah dalam diskusi selama penegakan hak kekayaan intelektual di Cina.[FN149] Ruang lingkup tanggung jawab kriminal dan obat untuk pelanggaran hak cipta merupakan daerah di mana ada sedikit perjanjian internasional baik dalam Putaran Uruguay yang .Dengan demikian. Menggunakan Pelanggaran Non-Pelanggaran karena tidak Tersedia Hal ini menguntungkan untuk membawa pengaduan pelanggaran. [FN148] Cina mengurangi tingkat ambang batas yang relevan 1000-500 sesaat sebelum Amerika Serikat meminta suatu Panel. akan ada harus menjadi framing bagaimana pengobatan yang tepat dapat dicapai mengingat sifat unik dari Perjanjian TRIPS antara perjanjian WTO.Jika sengketa non-pelanggaran ini berhasil karena 'mengukur telah ditemukan untuk meniadakan atau merusak manfaat di bawah. atau menghambat pencapaian tujuan'." [FN144] Dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS yang saling memuaskan penyesuaian adalah sebuah konsep yang aneh."Namun dalam kasus seperti panel atau Badan Banding harus merekomendasikan bahwa Anggota yang bersangkutan membuat penyesuaian yang saling memuaskan. Sebagai perbandingan. yang tidak konsisten dengan obyek dan tujuan TRIPS. dalam sengketa non-pelanggaran pengadu perlu menunjukkan ketergantungan dan kausalitas dari cedera 1057 *. mungkin untuk menyusun kembali non-pelanggaran sengketa sebagai sengketa pelanggaran. Aspek sengketa antara Amerika Serikat dan Cina menunjukkan hal ini dan memberikan gambaran yang baik tentang hubungan antara pelanggaran dan pembatalan nonviolation dan gangguan dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN147] Amerika Serikat akhirnya meminta pembentukan panel WTO atas tuduhan pelanggaran beberapa Perjanjian TRIPS oleh Cina. Hal ini.

Ini adalah jenis pengaduan pelanggaran non-yang dikhawatirkan. [FN157] Mengingat kurangnya detail di ketentuan penegakan argumen AS benar-benar lebih dari keluhan non-pelanggaran. Menggunakan prinsip-prinsip Konvensi Wina [FN155] penafsiran. keluhan non-pelanggaran akan kehilangan.Memang Amerika Serikat menggunakan mereka. [FN150] Akibatnya penegakan standar minimum yang terkait. ini tidak berarti bahwa itu tidak boleh dibawa. benar karena Amerika Serikat tampaknya berharap untuk membaca ke dalam ketentuan penegakan tingkat detail yang tidak ada dan. karenanya. Sampai ada perjanjian internasional yang tepat atas masalah-masalah seperti sengketa WTO penyelesaian tubuh tidak boleh digunakan untuk mengisi kesenjangan. Inti dari apa yang Amerika Serikat benar-benar mengeluh tentang adalah bahwa manfaat itu diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah tingkat yang lebih baik dari penegakan hukum. tetapi juga jenis pelanggaran non-keluhan yang seharusnya tidak berhasil karena tidak ada jenis manfaat yang diharapkan bahwa pengaduan pelanggaran non-harus alamat.Jadi sulit untuk menafsirkan Perjanjian TRIPS berarti bahwa sejumlah tertentu ambang terlalu tinggi. Perangkat menggunakan ambang untuk tanggung jawab pidana umum. [FN154] Namun. dalam pandangan saya. [FN152] Ini berarti bahwa properti intelektual bukan kasus khusus.Ketentuan yang relevan dalam Perjanjian TRIPS hanya menyediakan persyaratan luas dan 1059 * undetailed bahwa ada penegakan hukum. Sebuah klaim non- pelanggaran dalam menilai manfaat yang diharapkan tidak akan menulis ulang niat mereka. karena tingkat manfaat yang Amerika Serikat ingin untuk mengklaim bukan sesuatu yang dapat ditafsirkan sebagai manfaat yang diharapkan timbul dari kata-kata Perjanjian yang menunjukkan maksud dari para pihak. [FN156] Hasilnya. Sebaliknya diskusi yang . [FN151] Perbedaan umum antara sistem pengadilan anggota WTO diakui dalam Perjanjian TRIPS. Bahkan jika.mengarah ke Perjanjian TRIPS dan selanjutnya. tidak preskriptif dan agak meninggalkan banyak ruang untuk berbeda hukum nasional. istilah relatif. termasuk perbaikan progresif langkah-langkah untuk penegakan hukum dan negara hukum pidana pada umumnya. 'Efektif' dalam konteks ini. Panel dalam laporan Penegakan TRIPS China mengakui pentingnya ketentuan ini dan mencatat bahwa meskipun demikian masih ada kewajiban di China untuk menyediakan penegakan tindakan yang diperlukan di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS. penegakan harus efektif terhadap pelanggaran komersial. Bagaimana jika Amerika Serikat telah mampu membawa ini sebagai compliant non- pelanggaran? Sebuah keluhan non-pelanggaran harus mencapai hasil yang sama seperti Panel lakukan dalam pengaduan pelanggaran. di terbaik. Analisis tersebut tidak harus ditakuti. tidak dapat dikatakan sebagai arti dari ketentuan. keputusan Panel bisa memiliki lebih kokoh dianggap apa manfaat anggota bisa berharap dari ketentuan penegakan Perjanjian TRIPS. termasuk yang * 1058 khusus tentang tanggung jawab pidana dan penegakan hukum. Panel menyimpulkan bahwa Amerika Serikat tidak membuat keluar kasusnya bahwa batas kriminal mencegah Cina dari memenuhi kewajibannya untuk menyediakan penegakan pidana untuk kegiatan pemalsuan dan pembajakan pada skala komersial. yang mengatur bahwa tidak ada kewajiban penegakan menciptakan kewajiban pihak-pihak yang menyediakan sistem penegakan kekayaan intelektual yang berbeda dari hukum umum pidananya. Membawa seperti keluhan akan berarti bahwa di samping metode penafsiran perjanjian Konvensi Wina. [FN153] Ada ruang yang cukup untuk menyatakan bahwa Cina adalah ambang batas yang wajar dalam situasi kondisi di China. bagaimanapun.

. tercapai. tetapi juga konteks di mana anggota datang ke ketentuan itu. tidak dapat dianggap bahwa para anggota WTO.. setuju untuk tidak memungkinkan hukum lain untuk mempengaruhi produk properti intelektual. ketika menyetujui Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN165] Pertanyaan non-pelanggaran adalah apakah atau tidak melarang membatalkan dan merusak manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN160] Mereka memberikan contoh perpanjangan jangka waktu hak cipta. merek dagang dan hukum kekayaan intelektual lain selalu tunduk pada hukum lainnya. Selain itu. [FN161] WTO menemukan bahwa pembebasan karya musik adalah pelanggaran dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Salah satu contoh adalah 'A Member bisa melarang semua iklan rokok. Ada banyak contoh: Paten dapat diberikan untuk obat-obatan. Memang. Tanggapan ini harus benar. Seorang anggota Dewan menanggapi * 1061 ke contoh bahwa larangan seperti itu dapat diantisipasi pada saat Perjanjian.[FN166] Oleh karena itu. Dalam pembahasan Dewan TRIPS non-pelanggaran keluhan. B. Non-Pelanggaran Perselisihan dan Hukum yang tidak Terutama Hukum Kekayaan Intelektual Daerah lain di mana non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin penting untuk properti intelektual dimana non-intelektual properti mempengaruhi langkah-langkah standar minimal Perjanjian TRIPS.lebih kuat dari makna ketentuan penegakan harus didorong karena keputusan benar beralasan akan kemungkinan menunjukkan bahwa argumen ambang AS bisa dipertahankan karena telah mencoba untuk menegosiasikan ketentuan penegakan lebih rinci. termasuk merek dagang mereka. [FN158] Aspek lain dari kekokohan penyelesaian sengketa bahwa non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin membawa kemungkinan melihat bagaimana dan mengapa sebuah undang-undang domestik. pada masalah dalam suatu perselisihan. tetapi gagal sehingga tidak bisa setelah mengklaim manfaat yang diharapkan dari lebih terinci. kadang-kadang aspek dari paket negosiasi ditemukan di luar hukum kekayaan intelektual dan dalam situasi non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin berguna. tindakan terhadap hak kekayaan intelektual yang lebih alami dikategorikan sebagai non-pelanggaran pengaduan karena mereka menggagalkan tujuan dari Persetujuan daripada kewajiban pelanggaran tertentu. Secara khusus. ketentuan dapat dicapai melalui trade-off pada tingkat nasional dan penulis berpendapat bahwa itu adalah terlalu besar intervensi dalam otonomi nasional bagi mereka yang trade-off untuk menjadi 'dibatalkan' di tingkat internasional. karena alasan kesehatan'. yang merupakan bagian dari paket yang mencakup pembebasan kewajiban dari bermain non-dramatis karya musik di beberapa restoran dan bar. Paten dapat diberikan . tidak bisa mengatakan bahwa ada kehilangan manfaat yang diharapkan. Apabila suatu * 1060 negeri hukum kekayaan intelektual tiba di melalui negosiasi trade-off Dreyfuss dan Dinwoodie menunjukkan bahwa: [FN159] tantangan terhadap efek samping yang . [FN163] Sebagai catatan penulis. terutama sebagai larangan tersebut sudah ada dalam beberapa wilayah yurisdiksi pada saat Perjanjian. ada beberapa contoh terbatas dari jenis potensi keluhan. namun obat- obatan tidak dapat dijual di banyak negara tanpa persetujuan peraturan. [FN162] tetapi Mahkamah Agung AS menguatkan perpanjangan masa. Para penulis berpendapat bahwa sengketa WTO sistem penyelesaian perlu mempertimbangkan tidak hanya penyediaan kekayaan intelektual pada masalah sebelumnya. [FN164] Pada wajah itu larangan ini sesuai dengan Perjanjian TRIPS.

[FN172] Namun. pemberian suatu HAKI bukan hak afirmatif untuk menggunakan. harus ditangani dalam disiplin negosiasi GATT dan GATS. mekanisme perlindungan lainnya menggunakan teknologi untuk mengendalikan wilayah atau waktu-terkait karya cipta dan pengisian harga yang berbeda di pasar yang berbeda. [FN167] bukan kesepakatan akses pasar. yang dianggap memiliki jejak kaki karbon yang besar. dan itu bukan jaminan bahwa setiap penjualan akan diatur atau bahkan sukses. Juga. tidak mengontrol kondisi pasar dan Perjanjian TRIPS. sendiri. [FN173] Pengisian harga yang berbeda adalah eksploitasi hak kekayaan intelektual daripada standar minimal yang diperlukan merupakan hak eksklusif Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN168] Namun. Tidak dapat dikatakan bahwa salah satu dari macam contoh adalah manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN171] Contohnya termasuk pengkodean wilayah DVD. Contoh mungkin larangan 'Air Fiji' atau es krim 'New Zealand Natural' dijual di Amerika Serikat. namun standar keselamatan harus dipenuhi. untuk mencegah penjualan produk.[FN170] Jika seperti pajak atas barang terjadi akan sesuai untuk mempertimbangkan jika pajak melanggar GATT dan jika ada pelanggaran mengikat tarif atau ketentuan non-diskriminasi. apakah produk tersebut dibuat lokal atau sebaliknya. hubungan antara perjanjian WTO mungkin daerah yang ideal untuk non-pelanggaran keluhan karena anggota WTO dapat 'campuran-up' disiplin untuk mencapai tujuan tertentu. pemilik HAKI menggunakan segala macam metode melampaui sekedar hak kekayaan intelektual untuk mengeksploitasi kekayaan intelektual mereka. baik dalam dan antara GATT. melainkan hak untuk menyingkirkan orang lain. Masalah akses pasar. mereka digunakan sebelum perlindungan yang diberlakukan. Harga diferensial pengisian di pasar telah dan merupakan cara di mana perusahaan telah mengeksploitasi sifat teritorial hak kekayaan intelektual. memberlakukan hukum yang melarang iklan merek dagang yang mendorong pembelian produk yang berhubungan dengan negeri-negeri jauh. tidak seperti Perjanjian WTO lainnya. Sebagaimana disebutkan di atas. melalui penyelesaian . Contoh lain yang relevan. Daerah coding dan mekanisme perlindungan teknologi telah menerima perlindungan kekayaan intelektual melalui gaya negosiasi internasional independen dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Hal ini dipertanyakan dan bisa dibilang bukan merupakan cerminan dari maksud para pihak jika Perjanjian TRIPS ditafsirkan sehingga digunakan sebagai pintu belakang untuk akses pasar GATT dan GATS terkait atau masalah non-diskriminasi. GATS dan Perjanjian TRIPS. Perlindungan mekanisme perlindungan teknologi bukan merupakan manfaat yang diharapkan dari Perjanjian TRIPS karena mereka berada di luar lingkup Persetujuan dan perlindungan internasional didirikan setelah pemilik hak kekayaan intelektual telah menggunakan mereka untuk beberapa waktu. Kemungkinan bahwa barang-barang kekayaan intelektual mungkin sangat dikenakan pajak di beberapa tempat secara luas * 1062 dikenal dan dipraktekkan. bahkan jika mereka berhubungan dengan produk properti intelektual. Tidak diragukan lagi pelanggaran non-perselisihan tidak boleh digunakan untuk mengisi kesenjangan. adalah di mana seorang Anggota menerapkan pajak yang tinggi 'atas barang tertentu dengan hak kekayaan intelektual yang penggunaannya merusak lingkungan.untuk produk listrik. dari dokumen-dokumen Dewan TRIPs. Sebuah contoh mungkin di mana negara A. Hukum kekayaan intelektual. " [FN169] Masalahnya adalah mengidentifikasi hilangnya manfaat dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS.

[FN176] FTA antara Australia dan Amerika Serikat (AUSFTA). misalnya. [FN177] Ada ketentuan yang efektif memerlukan Australia untuk membatasi. Mekanisme ke Control Efek Non-Intelektual Property Law di Kekayaan Intelektual Anggota berusaha untuk mengontrol efek dari undang-undang lain pada hak kekayaan intelektual telah menggunakan berbagai cara untuk melakukannya. C. [FN178] Adanya ketentuan dalam AUSFTA merupakan pengakuan menyatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS tidak mengontrol hal-hal ini. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak memiliki ketentuan-ketentuan mengungkapkan. subsidi pemerintah tertentu dari penjualan farmasi. Namun. [FN181] Sementara negara-negara dengan industri farmasi dapat mempertimbangkan bahwa harga mekanisme kontrol membuat frustasi. Oleh karena itu tampaknya bahwa menggunakan non-pelanggaran sengketa mungkin akan tepat terbatas dalam cara yang tidak merugikan baik untuk integritas Perjanjian TRIPS WTO atau negara-negara berkembang dan kurang berkembang negara anggota yang telah menemukan standar TRIPS Agreement sulit untuk mematuhi dan mungkin takut bahwa non- pelanggaran sengketa akan membuat yang buruk. yang mungkin menggagalkan beberapa jenis eksploitasi hak kekayaan intelektual. dan berpotensi menghapus. kesulitan-kesulitan ini membuat parameter cukup untuk menjaga terhadap penyalahgunaan mereka. dalam kaitannya dengan penjualan dan distribusi obat-obatan. dengan satu pengecualian kecil. karenanya. namun masih memerlukan anggota untuk memberikan perlindungan kekayaan . mungkin juga tidak realistis bahwa setiap nuansa dapat ditangani dengan cara ini. Ini menunjukkan. di mana eksploitasi hak kekayaan intelektual di bawah Perjanjian TRIPS yang frustrasi dengan cara yang jatuh pendek dari pelanggaran dari GATT atau GATS. atau internasional lainnya. Ini ada di beberapa negara maju dan berkembang.sengketa bukan oleh negosiasi. dapat dikatakan bahwa Perjanjian TRIPS Anggota tidak dapat menggunakan undang-undang lain.Kesulitan dengan non-pelanggaran sengketa dicatat. Sebaliknya. aturan tentang persaingan. tidak bisa secara logis disimpulkan bahwa tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. [FN179] Tidak ada WTO disepakati. yang frustrasi oleh langkah-langkah tersebut. Ini mungkin berarti bahwa. untuk mengendalikan isu persaingan terkait. Dalam beberapa yurisdiksi kontrol tersebut dapat mengangkat isu-isu hukum persaingan. Namun. sejauh bahwa tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS adalah hubungan perdagangan antara anggotanya. Ini bisa melalui paket dinegosiasikan dalam yurisdiksi mereka sendiri [FN175] atau antara yurisdiksi di FTA. [FN180] Meskipun * 1064 hak kekayaan intelektual menyenggol dan dalam beberapa yurisdiksi hukum yang menentang praktek menggabungkan anti persaingan. memiliki sejumlah ketentuan. bagaimanapun.Non-pelanggaran sengketa sulit untuk membawa. Negosiasi multilateral atas kesenjangan ini secara teoritis metode yang ideal kemajuan. dan sebagai contoh di atas * 1063 menunjukkan tidak mudah untuk menang. alamat kekhawatiran persaingan alam ini. Perjanjian TRIPS tidak. Selain kurangnya ketentuan mengungkapkan menangani masalah persaingan. yang berhubungan dengan pemasaran dan penjualan obat-obatan. harus ada ganti rugi. bagian dari Perjanjian TRIPS implisit mengakui peran yang berbeda non-hukum kekayaan intelektual. yang disepakati oleh anggotanya. [FN174] adalah penting bahwa harapan yang sah yang dihasilkan dari Perjanjian yang terpenuhi. Contohnya adalah harga kontrol atas obat-obatan. tapi saya tidak menyimpulkan bahwa mereka perwatakan apakah atau tidak perselisihan tersebut harus diperbolehkan dalam konteks Perjanjian TRIPS. dan di atas ketentuan kekayaan intelektual.

intelektual. [FN182] Sebagai Perjanjian TRIPS adalah tentang standar minimum kekayaan intelektual dalam perdagangan maka harus. yang memberikan tingkat perlindungan yang lebih luas tanpa Anggota selalu bebas memilih bahwa perlindungan yang lebih luas. kualifikasi oleh persyaratan bahwa anggota tidak boleh mengecualikan sesuatu dari paten hanya karena eksploitasi adalah ilegal. Disiplin-disiplin harus mencakup aturan tentang bagaimana kriteria manfaat yang diharapkan dari sengketa non-pelanggaran harus menjadi penilaian yang obyektif. terutama FTA berbasis. Mereka juga berpotensi menjadi alat bagi pengguna kekayaan intelektual untuk menantang TRIPS-plus FTA. Harus ada penilaian yang obyektif. sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam ketentuan- ketentuannya. perlindungan lebih luas tidak selalu menguntungkan.Dalam situasi tidak bisa dikatakan bahwa Anggota WTO memiliki pilihan mengenai apakah atau tidak untuk menerapkan 'perlindungan yang lebih luas'. Erosi ini konflik pilihan dengan obyek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS dan lebih dari sekedar pelanggaran Pasal 1. memiliki badan independen menganalisis manfaat yang diharapkan dari pihak satu dari Perjanjian TRIPS. jika terjadi. misalnya. tetapi juga berpotensi non-pelanggaran terhadap Perjanjian. mungkin untuk sengketa efek perdagangan kekayaan intelektual. Kurangnya pilihan adalah sebagian karena cara pemaksaan di mana banyak dari TRIPS-plus bab FTA telah dinegosiasikan. Meskipun harmonisasi lebih besar berpotensi menguntungkan untuk perdagangan. Harmonisasi. bukan pendekatan subjektif yang dapat ditampilkan tidak berhasil satu posisi partai negosiasi atau ingin daftar. Namun frame Perjanjian TRIPS ini sebagai pilihan * 1065. harus menjadi proses progresif yang terjadi pada kecepatan yang tepat dan merupakan akibat langsung dari . Karena kasus pelanggaran wajib memiliki interpretasi non-pelanggaran formalistik menawarkan pendekatan yang lebih kuat untuk menganalisis manfaat yang diharapkan yang mencerminkan niat dari para pihak dan objek dan tujuan dari Perjanjian TRIPS. Jika non-pelanggaran sengketa yang diperkenalkan untuk Perjanjian TRIPS akan ada perlu perbedaan hati ditetapkan antara pelanggaran dan non-pelanggaran kasus. seperti dibahas di atas. Hal ini sangat penting mengingat kesulitan jelas bahwa negara-negara berkembang. tetapi juga cara di mana norma TRIPS-plus dapat mempengaruhi orang-orang luar seperti TRIPS-plus FTA. menghadapi sesuai dengan perlindungan kekayaan intelektual untuk meningkatkan. KESIMPULAN Non-pelanggaran sengketa telah dianggap sebagai berpotensi menjadi alat untuk kepentingan pemilik properti intelektual untuk meningkatkan perlindungan dari Perjanjian TRIPS melampaui pengkalimatannya. dalam sebuah forum berbasis aturan. Juga. Kemampuan untuk mengecualikan dari paten penemuan atas dasar ketertiban publik. Non- pelanggaran sengketa dapat menyediakan sarana untuk memberikan beberapa batasan yang berlebihan. membingkai mendalam aturan untuk memberikan pengobatan yang tepat akan perlu terjadi. Meskipun Perjanjian TRIPS seharusnya tidak ditafsirkan untuk memperluas standar minimum yang menetapkan. peningkatan standar kekayaan intelektual. IX. khususnya. sama hukum lainnya tidak boleh diizinkan untuk mengikis standar minimum dalam Perjanjian. Non-pelanggaran keluhan mungkin menyediakan cara yang baik bersih-pemilik dan bersih- pengguna kekayaan intelektual dapat. Disiplin seputar penggunaan non-keluhan tentang pelanggaran Perjanjian TRIPS juga harus dikembangkan.

E-mail: susy. daripada melalui backdoor dari TRIPS-plus FTA. melainkan mereka harus digunakan untuk mengkalibrasi ulang itu sehingga memungkinkan negara-negara berkembang untuk menyadari sisi mereka tawar-menawar Perjanjian TRIPS. Saya disajikan versi sebelumnya dari artikel ini.kesepakatan multilateral. Lionel Bentley dan Susan Corbett untuk komentar pada naskah dan penelitian asisten saya Jessica Lai. [FNa1]. 'TRIPS-plus dari perjanjian? "Pada konferensi Pelantikan dari SIEL di Jenewa 2008. non- pelanggaran sengketa tidak boleh digunakan sebagai alat untuk menegosiasikan Perjanjian TRIPS.ac. Jane Ginsburg. Saya terima kasih kepada penyelenggara konferensi itu. 'Apakah pembatalan dan gangguan dari Perjanjian TRIPS mungkin' sebagai hasil. Profesor Hukum. Terima kasih juga kepada Rochelle Dreyfuss. Demikian pula. Selandia Baru. .frankel @ vuw.nz. Victoria University of Wellington.