PROPERTY

COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

1. Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands GR No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

Facts:
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in
the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the
registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land
appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land in
question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila bay.
The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are part of
the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the land not
to be part of the public domain.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land

Ruling:
No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called
upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited
there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government,
specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a
land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of
national wealth.

2. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts:
2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The
wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's
death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left
his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his
adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their
conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's estate. The
will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property
is situated

Ruling:
Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated.
However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by
her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose
succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the
Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national
law of the testator.

3. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation
ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park,
contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken
in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace
is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public
cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation.
Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due
process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be
taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come
forward and not the police power of the state.

4. Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:

Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other
immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the
property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed
by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway,
therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the
custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the punlic street
and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way

Ruling:
Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use
and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum
absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner
in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of community life

5. German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989

Facts:
Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and alleged
that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their farmholdings
prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of their property
without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but
involved and prop)

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is
not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners
to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a
forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never
determines the actual title to an estate.

6. Lopez vs. Orosa and Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98

FACTS:

Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied lumber for the
construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k
thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, with
Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and building were mortgaged as counter-
security. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid amount for the materials and was able to get a
judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also,
he was able to obtain a materialman’s lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting
to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasn’t happy
because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since
the building and the land are inseparable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable?

HELD:

No. The contention that the lien embraces both the land and the building or structure adhering
thereto is without merit. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct
from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Article 415 of the new
Civil Code) could mean only one thing — that a building is by itself an immovable property.
Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building
is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is
adhered to belong to the same owner.

7. Associated Insurance and Surety Company vs. Iya, et al, 103 SCRA 972

FACTS:

Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty
Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond
subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in
favor of the surety
company. The spouses didn’t own yet the land on which the house was
constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to
purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed
a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was
compelled to pay. The spouses weren’t able to pay the surety company despite demands and
thus, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage
over the house and lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action
against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she
has a better right over the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the
surety company had a preferred right over
the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land wasn’t owned yet
by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building can be considered personal property?

HELD:

No. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land
on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A building certainly cannot be divested of its
character of realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To hold
it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in
confusion, for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made
dependent on ownership of the land, would create a situation where a permanent fixture
changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar,
as personal properties may be the only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel
mortgage covering said building is null and void.

8. Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648

FACTS:

The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and
situated in the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the house,
asserting that they are the rightful owners of the land. Failure
to restore the house and to deliver the materials by the defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that the court
hold them as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property?

HELD:

No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which
it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on
land belonging to another owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such
and the hence its character as immovable likewise ceases.

9. Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. And Williamson, 37 SCRA 644

FACTS:

Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company and
this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which
it was installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and
machinery sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company. Then Compania Agricola
Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building stood in favor of the machinery
company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the machinery company’s
ownership of the building.

On or about the date to which the chattel

mortgage was executed, Compania executed a real estate
mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate from the land.
This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the building. Upon failure
to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed.
The machinery company then filed a case, demanding that it be
declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial court held that it was the machinery
company which was the rightful
owner as it had its title before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of
Leung Yee’s certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the building in question is an immovable?

HELD:

The building made out of strong materials in which the machinery was installed is real property.
The mere fact that the parties dealt with it as separate and apart from the land (or as personal
property) does not change its character as real property. In this case, it follows that neither the
original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor
the annotation in the registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any legal effect.

10. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 SCRA 630

FACTS:

De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns
was built. She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner—purporting the
leasehold interest in the land and the ownership of
house. After such, the petitioner moved for its registration with the Register of Deeds, for
the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. After said
document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner caused the same to be
presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the
purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. Upon
examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion that it was not a chattel
mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal
property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this
ground only.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s position is tenable?

HELD:

No. The respondent’s duties, as a register of deeds, in respect to the registration of chattel
mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers
upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which
registration is sought as a chattel mortgage.
Generally, he should accept the qualification of the
property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for
registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee, leaving
the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for legal
determination. The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real
property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The articles state general doctrines, nonetheless, it
must not be forgotten that under given conditions, property may have
character different from that imputed to it in the said articles. It is
undeniable that the parties in a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that
which by nature would be real property.

11. Punsalan vs. Lacsamana, 21 SCRA 331

FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his
failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which
PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the
land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed
between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the
improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over
the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the
bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.

Petitioner’s complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action being
filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property.

ISSUE:
W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies.

HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood
is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable
property.

12. Prudential Bank vs. Panis 153 SCRA 390

FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real
estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the
lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the
building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To
secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties. The
Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later
on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was
extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The
respondent court held that the REM was null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid REM mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the belonging
to another.

HELD: A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging
to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only
mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a
building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a
mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as
immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage
on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the sales
patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is
evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was
issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.

13. Tumalad vs. Vicencio

FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their
house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan,
payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed
upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the
highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an
action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were
the proper owners.

ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties
can be subject of a chattel mortgage.

HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are
immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal
property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of
estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as
chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal
property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have
meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as
such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
14. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation vs Wennever Texttile Mills

FACTS:
To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and
assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To
secure the collection of receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials
and a machinery – Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer). Wearever defaulted thus the
properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff, after the restraining order was
lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer. The
CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether the dryer is an immovable property

HELD: NO. The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials
can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no
innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable
since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a
chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise.

15. Serg’s Products and Gaquiloy vs. PCI Leasing and Finance 338 SCRA 499

FACTS:
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the
seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI.
Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective
order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel
mortgage.

Issue: Whether or not the machineries become real property by virtue of immobilization.

HELD:
The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature.
Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly
stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise.

16. MANARANG AND MANARANG V. OFILADA AND ESTEBAN 99 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Manarang secured a loan from Esteban guaranteed by a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed
materials. Due to failure to pay the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. Before the sale of the property, Manarang
tried to pay for the property but the sheriff refused to accept tender unless there is payment for the publication of the
notice of sale in the newspapers. This prompted Manarang to bring this suit to compel the sheriff to accept payment.
He averred that the publication was unnecessary as the houses hold be considered as personal property per
agreement in the chattel mortgage, and the publication for notice of sale is unnecessary

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fact that the parties entering into a contract regarding a house gave
said property the consideration of personal property in their contract.

HELD:
Yes. There is no question that a building of mixed materials may be a subject of chattel mortgage, in which
case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The mere fact that a house was the subject of
chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties doesn’t make the said
house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale in public auction. It is real
property within the purview of Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture on
the land, which is real property.

17. NAVARRO VS. PINEDA

9 SCRA 631

FACTS:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro, to
secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the mother
while the chattel mortgage covered a
residential house. Due to the failure to pay the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for
the loan. On the second extension, Pineda executed a promise wherein in case of default in
payment, he wouldn’t ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal
demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of the
mortgages. The court
decided in his favor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to the
complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of chattel mortgage
for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.

HELD:
 Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may
be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document
of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity
Of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage.
Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a
chattel between the parties and that the validity of
the contract between them, has been recognized, it has been a constant
criterion that with respect to third
Persons, who are not parties to the contract, and especially in execution proceedings, the house
is considered as immovable property.

18. DAVAO SAWMILL V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935

FACTS:
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted was leased from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building which
housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on foundations
of cement.. The contract of lease stated that on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the
improvements and buildings introduced and erected by Davao sawmill shall pass to the exclusive
ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements
and buildings; which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements.

In another action, a writ of execution was issued against the company and the properties in
question were levied upon. The company assailed the said writ contending that the machineries
and accessories were personal in nature, hence, not subject to writ of execution. The trial judge
ruled in favour of the company.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal property

HELD
Yes, the subject properties are personal in nature.
Art.415 (NCC) provides that real property consists of (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry
or works. Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery only becomes immovable when
placed in a land by the owner of the property or land but not when so placed by a tenant or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
case at bar, the machinery is intended not by the owner of the land but by the saw mill company
for use in connection with its trade

19. TSAI V. CA
Gr. No. 120098, October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom), secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the
chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. PBCom
again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over
personal properties similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. During the execution of the
second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment. Upon EVERTEX's
failure to meet its obligation. PBCom, commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. PBCom leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the
factory, lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.

EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against PBCom,
alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom,
without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included
in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second contract which
is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal properties

HELD:
YES, the machineries and equipment are personal properties. The nature of the disputed
machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged does
not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. While
it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel
Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels. If the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real
estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically with
a listing of the machineries covered thereby.

Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties
from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel, where an
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as
security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.

20. MINDANAO BUS CO. V. CITY ASSESSOR DIGEST

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor
vehicles. Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and
blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement
platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and
repair equipment. Petitioner appealed on the ground that the same are not real properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and thus
subject to a realty tax
HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to the
assessment of real estate tax. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property
xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; f
HELD:

Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the
Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing
crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Moreover, from an
examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and other states we find that the
settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment of property and execution
of judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal
property.

On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops
are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to
mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof
shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be mortgaged
the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to
tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that
"growing crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion
hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section
450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in
said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase
"personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."

We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified
by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the
purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.

25. RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72

FACTS: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting of 2/3 interest
therein, to the Chinaman Sy Qui, the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said vessel; wherefore
this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in respect to the boat in question.
After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, suit having been brought in the justice of the
peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum of money, the
latter’s creditor Fausto Rubiso. Rubiso later acquired said vessel at a public auction sale and for
the sum of P55.45. The certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question was issued by
the sheriff on behalf of Fausto Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs, on 27 January
1915 and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915.

On 10 April 1915, the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that his clients
were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina, which had been in bad condition since 1914
and was stranded in Tingloy, Bauan, Batangas; and that Florentino E. Rivera took charge or
possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and refused to deliver
it to them, under claim that he was the owner thereof. After the hearing of the case and the
introduction of documentary evidence, the judgment of 6 September 1915, was rendered, , in
which the defendant and appellant was ordered to place at the disposal of the Fausto Rubiso the
pilot boat in litigation. No special finding was made for costs. The defendant appealed and moved
for a new trial. This motion was denied and appellant excepted.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with the costs against the appellant.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is
necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser’s rights may be maintained against
a third person

2. Whether or not the boat is a real property

HELD:

1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment solely
refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the two purchasers,
whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to enjoy the
protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the purchased boat, and this
latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for, pursuant to article 582 of the
said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded in the
commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be
considered canceled. 1awphil.net

The purchaser at public auction, Fausto Rubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition,
opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the defendant Rivera
who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person, who was directly affected
by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition.

2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the nature
and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the world commerce;
and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly identical with
those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.
26. PHIL. REFINING CO. VS. JARQUE, 61 PHIL 229

FACTS:

On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three
mortgages, denominated as “chattel mortgage” on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. The
first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith, while the third contains such.
The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN Brink (in what capacity the latter signed is
not disclosed) and was not registered in the customs house until 17 May 1932, or within the period
of 30 prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. A fourth mortgage
was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the
chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932, or again within the 30-day
period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.

A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that Francisco
Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, with the result that an assignment of all the properties of
the insolvent debtor, was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. The petition on the matter of
Jarque’s insolvency was granted. However, the judge declined to order the foreclosure of the
mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the
mortgages.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with costs against appellant

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the vessel is a personal property

2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a chattel mortgage on a vessel

HELD:

1. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.)
Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law, vessels
are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property.
Since the term “personal property” includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to
the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has heretofore been
accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. The only
difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personality is
that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the
register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be
entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a
vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.

2. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit of good
faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a
mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel
mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is
lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.

27. US vs. CARLOS 21 PHIL 553

FACTS:

Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court
issued a warrant of arrest. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he
did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied
only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away, hence
a movable property. Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him
to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cannot be stolen (how can
one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance
affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in declaring that electrical energy can be stolen?

RULING:

Yes. Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‘gas’ which can be stolen. However,
the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is
corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another other than the
owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of
science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used
jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

28. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364

FACTS:

The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at
Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services
discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to
leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The
prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

RULING:

Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable

merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.

29. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ

44 PHIL 933

FACTS:

The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity &
Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another
mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the
registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co.
entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala.
Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:

Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property.

RULING:
Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the
property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of movable properties in Article 414
of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.

30. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

384 SCRA 152

FACTS:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA
also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer is valid.

RULING:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

31. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS

281 SCRA 639

FACTS:
 Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which
was approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five
years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a
portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on
low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms
that frequently passed through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands
from his investigation, that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula and it was also mortgaged
to Co. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court and appellate
court decided in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land granted under patent which was later on leased and mortgaged
should be revert back to the ownership of the State it being a foreshore land.

HELD:

Yes, foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the
high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies
between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow
of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under
property of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code.

It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain. In accordance with
this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending patent application and
must be returned to the State.

32. LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

78 SCRA 130

FACTS:

Lanzar filed for application for registration of title over a parcel of land, to which the Director
of Lands objected to as the land in question, according to him, was part of the foreshore lands.
The trial court adjudicated the land to Lanzar as the said land wasn’t necessary for public utility
or establishment of special industries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.

HELD:

Yes, lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain; it cannot be appropriated nor can it be acquired by
prescription. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard services,
then the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estate adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof.

33. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

108 PHIL 335

FACTS:

Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said that he
acquired right to the mangrove through accretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ignacio has the right to declare that such land can be subject to registration
and does not anymore form part of the public dominion.

HELD:

No, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not necessary for purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries or for Coast Guard Service otherwise,
the property continues to be property of public dominion ,further, it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or service. If no
such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
domain. Under Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866. “lands added to the shores
by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.”
Since alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain, it is not open to acquisition
by adverse possession by private persons.

34. VILLARICA V. COURT OF APPEALS

309 SCRA 193

FACTS:

Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarica, filed an application for confirmation of the title over
a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilo’s father. Said application was opposed
by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the public domain as it is
within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for private appropriation. The trial
court dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the
certificate of title is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land still forms part of the public domain

HELD:

Yes, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in
question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not
introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise. Forest lands
cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesn’t ripen to a
registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. Thus, if
the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System.

35
36
37
38

39. Chiao Liong Tan vs CA Nov.19,1993 GR no.106251

Facts:

Petitioner claims that he is the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the fact that such was
registered in his name.Petitioner's brother private respondent averred that the vehicle was for
their family business use for the delivery of machinery to its customers.Prior to such dispute
private respondent asked Petitioner to look for a vehicle and give the latter P5,000 as down
payment,after a month private respondent himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140,000
although receipts for down payment as well as the payment of balance of the purchase price was
issued in the name of Petitioner.Allegations of private respondent has been corroborated by
witnesses.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner is the lawful owner of the vehicle?

Whether or not Petitioner action for Replevin proper?

Ruling:

The NCC recognizes cases of Implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus although
no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties,it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of
petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent.The principle
that a trustee who puts a Certificate of Registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by
relying on the registration is one of the well known limitations upon a title. A trust which derives
its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers,does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.

It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of
possession.Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing
more than the right of possession.However when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue
by the defendant's plea and by reason of this policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims
on the property in controversy,the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.

40. Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634

Facts:

The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally sourced
lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated them.The owners of
the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such vehicles.They succeed in the trial
court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.Petitioner
appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and therefore invalid.

Issue:

Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under custodia
legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State?

Ruling:

No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued
without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties.It
has been established that the DENR acted within its authority as provided by the applicable
law.Hence,its action is the action of the State.

41 . Sarmiento vs CA Nov.16,1995 GR no.116192

Facts:

The Private respondent owns a parcel of land adjacent to this lot is one wherein petitioner had a
house built on.Trying to cause relocation of her lot,Private respondent found out that petitioner
was encroaching on her property.When the latter talked to petitioner about constructing a new
fence, which will cover her true property,petitioner refused and threatened private respondent with
legal action.For fear of being sued,she sought judicial relief.Trial court decided in her
favor.Petitioner assailed that the issue was on ownership of the portion of land thus,the action
should have been an Accion Reivindicatoria and not forcible entry.

Issue:

Whether or not Accion Reivindicatoria the proper remedy?

Ruling:

Yes.The facts reveal that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer,but
essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an Accion Reivindicatoria on
the issue of ownership over the portion of the land. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
distinct actions.Private respondent cannot belatedly claim that Petitioner's possession of the
controverted portion was by mere tolerance.Complaint did not characterize Petitioner's alleged
entry on the land whether legal or illegal.Complainant admitted also the fact that the fence had
already pre-existed on the lot when she acquired the same.
42. Bongato vs Malvar 387 SCRA 327

Facts:

Private respondent spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner for alledging
unlawful entry in a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials thereon. Trial court
ordered Petitioner to vacate the lot and issued an order as to determine the location of the houses
involved in the civil cases the same with the one in criminal case for anti-squatting.Judge made a
warning that there will be no extension to be granted for the submission of the survey and failure
to do so would prompt the issuance of the writ of execution. Upon failure of petitioner to submit a
survey report,the judge ordered the return of the records of the case to the court of origin for
disposal.

Issue: Whether or not Forcible entry the proper action?

Ruling:

In Forcible entry ,one employs FISTS (fraud,intimidation,strategy,threat,stealth) to deprive

another physical possession of land or building thus,plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant. Sole question for
resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of the property.Neither a claim of juridical
possession nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from
taking cognizance of the case.Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession on de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

In the present case,the lower court lacked jurisdiction .First,the house of petitioner was actually
situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the
spouses.Second,house has been in existence prior to the alleged forcible
entry.Third,respondent's had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged
date of entry.

43. Cagayan De Oro Landless Residents vs CA 254 SCRA 220

Facts:

A lot in dispute was formerly classified as timber land until the time it was reclassified by the
government as public land. Petitioner were authorized to survey the land for subdivision into
residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceeding into the lot. Petitioner
intervened and said that instead of being paid through money it preferred acquisition of any
housing area of NHA.Upon learning of the annulment of the title over the same land NHA sought
the suspension of expropriation proceeding.Thereafter,SC finally resolved by annulling the title
and declaring the subject lot to be public land.The Bureau was furnished with the decision and
according to the investigation,members of the Petitioner was found settling in the land. A
presidential proclamation was then issued reserving entire subject land for a slum improvement
project of the NHA,leading to the rejection of the survey submitted by the Petitioner and the
demolition of settlement constructed by the members of Petitioner,and prompted the latter to file
a case for forcible entry on which trial court decided on its favor.During the pendency of the civil
case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land.The petitioner sought the execution
of the decision which was countered by a case for quieting of title by NHA.

Issue: Whether or not writ of injunction is proper in this case?

Ruling:

NHA was entitled to the Writ of Injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for forcible entry;
the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.As an extraordinary
remedy,injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.As such
injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously,as it effects the respective rights of the parties and only upon full conviction on the part
of the court of its extreme necessity.

44. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanueva’s parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of
land as security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for
registration by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land than
petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for other
purposes and remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently, the brothers were able
to secure reclassification of the land and the same was registered in their name as owners,
and they later sold the land to Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know of the
registration and filed a complaint, which was dismissed.

HELD:

Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the government
as part of the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest reserve until such
time it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. A
positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to
convert it into alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have
been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no disposable land to
speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior to the possession and cultivation in
good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or
timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription

45. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489
FACTS:

The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by EPZA
and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of the
documents executed as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by their
predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred by
prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of
title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all
persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance
based on fraud has already prescribed.

Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have already
prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied trust
applies only when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the
disputed property. In fact, they don’t even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so would
enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action.

Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully registered
in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once the property
has passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not
have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
46. IDOLOR V CA (351 SCRA 402)

FACTS:
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.

Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay whic
h resulted into a ―Kasunduang Pag-aayos‖ which noted that the petitioner shall pay within 90 d
ays and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to repurchase wit
hin one year without interest.

Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed a
n extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public auction
to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered.

After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220,
a complaint for annulment of Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a tempor
ary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently issued th
e TRO and the writ.

CA anulled the writ

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction
2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation

HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before a
n injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:

1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriff’s sale to redeem th
e property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.

There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same agre
ement as the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the extinguis
hment of the obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished.

47. Lucero vs. Luot

GR L-16995
October 28, 1968

Facts:
The movant-appellant (Lucero) and oppositors-appellants (Luot, et al) are parties in a land regist
ration proceedings. The land registration court awarded the subject property to Lucero and was
granted a writ of possession. The oppositors claim that there were defects in the reconstitution o
f records and that the motion was not under oath. However, the court claimed this was untenabl
e. It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to whom the subject property
was to be awarded, in accordance with Land Registration Act 496, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of posessesion should be awarded to Lucero

HELD: Yes, it should be awarded. It was in accordance with the law."the issuance of a writ of po
ssession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registere
d owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of prescription
as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..."
There would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful li
tigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for th
e purpose of securing the fruits of his victory."
We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person wh
o has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land
or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of r
egistration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedi
ngs. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the
issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possessi
on and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful c
laimant.

48. VENCILAO V. VANO

182 SCRA 492

FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of l
and in question.

On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for r
egistration of the subject parcel of land. A reconveyance case was filed against the
m by petitioners on the ground that they are true owners of thereof.

The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject
land. After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in
the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the petiti
oners.

Issue: WON a writ of possession may be issued against unlawful and adverse occupants in the l
and

HELD:Yes.
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the s
aid land registration case, as their names don’t appear in the amended application for registratio
n. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which began lo
ng before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they continued to pos
sess the land.

In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its re
gistration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of the
writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the
generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ of possession
may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration cas
e but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion th
ereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.

49. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS

177 SCRA 495

FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of the
ir parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and petition
er advised them to vacate but they refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued their de
velopment and construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry. The trial
court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.

Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the owner hi
mself

Held:
Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop th
e subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entr
y case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting p
rocess, and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title i
t presented, such evidence doesn’t responsively address the issue of prior actual possession rai
sed in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to th
e property, the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, v
iolence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession ev
en against the owner himself. Whatver may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in
favor priority in time, he
has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a pe
rson having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
50.
CAISIP V PEOPLE
36 scra 17

FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land kno
wn as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Bata
ngas. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is Roxa
s y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for forcible e
ntry which orders them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried out June 6,
1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix Caisip harve
sting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she was doing and to leave the p
remises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to help him shoo
her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the two police officers
, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to threaten her by drawi
ng their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Gloria’s neighbours caught sig
ht of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later turned over to the police on
duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also f
iled grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at her
- just in case sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self help.)
The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense?

RULING:
Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didn’t usurp or invade said lot. S
he had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have beco
me its co-possessor. Appellants didn’t repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physica
l invasion or usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a property o
n which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was fil
ed against them.

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