Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt

Author(s): Samuel Weber

Source: Diacritics, Vol. 22, No. 3/4, Commemorating Walter Benjamin (Autumn - Winter,
1992), pp. 5-18
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/465262
Accessed: 10/11/2008 13:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Diacritics.

http://www.jstor.org
TAKING EXCEPTION
TO DECISION:
WALI'ER BENJAMIN AND
CARL SCHMITT

SAMUELWEBER

... as in the epigramabove an engravingdepicting a stage on which there stand,

to the left, a buffoonand, to the right, a prince: "Whenthe stage is empty,fool
and king will no longer countfor anything."
-Walter Benjamin,The Origin of GermanTragicDrama

In December 1930 WalterBenjaminsends the following letter to Carl Schmitt:

EsteemedProfessor Schmitt,

Youwill receive any day nowfrom thepublishermy book The Originof the German
MourningPlay. Withthese lines I would like not merelyto announceits arrival, butalso
to express myjoy at being able to send it to you, at the suggestionof Mr.AlbertSalomon.
Youwill veryquicklyrecognizehow muchmybook is indebtedto youfor itspresentation
of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenthcentury. Perhaps I may also say, in
addition, that I have also derivedfrom your later works, especially the "Diktatur,"a
confirmationofmymodesof researchin thephilosophyofartfromyours in thephilosophy
of the state. If the reading of my book allows thisfeeling to emerge in an intelligible
fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to you will be achieved.

Withmy expression of special admiration

Yourvery humble
WalterBenjamin [GS 1: 3.8871

Thisletteris notto be foundin thetwo volumesof Benjamin'sCorrespondence,published

in 1966. The esteem thatBenjaminexpressedfor the eminentpolitical thinkerwho, just
a few yearslater,was to publishtexts suchas "DerFiihrerschiitztdas Recht"("TheFiihrer
Protectsthe Law") (1934) and "Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaftim Kampfgegen den
jiidischen Geist" ("GermanJurisprudencein Its Struggle against the Jewish Spirit")
(1936) hardlyfits the picturethatBenjamin'stwo editors and formerfriends, Gershom
Scholem and Theodor Adomo, intended to make known to a broad audience. As
understandableas theirdecision to exclude thisletteris, it nonethelessexpressesa malaise
thatis relatedto the way in which thefigureof WalterBenjamintendsto resistanyattempt
at univocalclassificationor straightforward evaluation. It is as thoughthe fact thathe had
been able to admireand drawinspirationfrom the work of a Catholicconservativewho

diacritics / fall-winter 1992 diacritics 22.3-4: 5-18 5

was soon to become a conspicuous member of the Nazi party could only muddy and
confuse the meaning of an oeuvre thatboth Adorno and Scholem, whatevertheir other
differencesaboutit might be, agreedwas of exemplarysignificance. It is as thoughthe
acknowledgmentof a debt amountedto a generalidentificationandthus,in view of later
developments,to a moral contaminationof Benjaminby Schmitt.
Sucha malaiseis palpablein theremarkof Rolf Tiedemann,who is to be creditedwith
publishingthe letter to Schmittin the critical apparatushe assembledfor the edition of
Benjamin's Collected Writingsthathe edited. The letter,he remarks,is "denkwiirdig,"
althoughhe does not sayjust whatsortof thoughtsit mightelicit or deserve[GS 1: 3.887].
One response that is often encounteredin this context traces Benjamin's interest in
Schmittback to the critiqueof liberal,parliamentarydemocracysharedby both. But this
explanation,as evident and as accurateas it may be, hardlysuffices to accounteitherfor
the "debt"mentionedby Benjaminin his letter,or for the mannerin which it manifests
itself in his book. Rather,the workof Schmittfiguresin thatbook for at least two related
but very distinctreasons. Firstof all, the "playof mourning"at work in the Trauerspiel
and above all the characterof its "origin"both imply a certainrelationshipto historyand
to politics.' Second, and more specifically, Benjamin encounters the question of
sovereigntynot simplyas a themeof Germanbaroquetheater,butas a methodologicaland
theoreticalproblem:as we shall see, accordingto Benjaminevery attemptto interpretthe
Germanbaroquerisks succumbingto a certainlack of sovereignty. Let us examinejust
how these two factorshelp to explain Benjamin'srecourseto Schmitt.
The German baroque mourning play has as its "true object" and "substance"
"historicallife as representedby its age." But the relationshipbetween the Trauerspiel
and historyis far from a one-way street: if baroquetheateris concernedprimarilywith
history,this historyis in turnconstruedas a kindof Trauerspiel.This is why Benjamin's
formulation,here as elsewhere,mustbe readas rigorouslyas possible: The "trueobject"
of baroque drama is not just "historicallife" as such, but rather"historicallife as
representedby its age [das geschichtliche Leben wie es jene Epoche sich darstellte]"
[Origin62/Ursprung51]. The primaryrepresentationandrepresentativeof historyin the
baroqueage, however,is the sovereign: "TheSovereignrepresentshistory. He holds the
course of history in his hand like a scepter"[65].
Benjamin'sinsistence on the historicalsubjectmatterof Trauerspielthus leads him
necessarilyto the questionof political sovereigntyandits relationto history. But it is not
merely the thematicaspectof his subjectthatleads Benjaminto examinethe questionof
sovereigntyandhence to the theoriesof Schmitt. Inhis letter,Benjaminwritesthathe has
foundin Schmitt's worksa "confirmation"of his own style of research,"meine[n]eigenen
Forschungsweisen."JustwhatBenjaminmightbe referringto becomes clearerif we turn
to the beginning of the first chapterof his book, "Trauerspieland Tragedy." Benjamin
begins his study properwith a notion elaboratedin the "Epistemo-CriticalPrologue":
namely, thatthe "conceptualization"of a philosophicalinvestigationsuch as the one he
proposes must be "directedtowards the extreme [die notwendige Richtung aufs Ex-
treme]"[57/45].
In thus foregroundingthe constitutiveimportanceof a "turntowardthe extreme"in
the process of "philosophicalconceptualization,"Benjaminplaces himself squarelyin a
traditionthatgoes backat least to Kierkegaard's essay on Repetition;butthe text in which
this mode of thinkingimpressed itself most profoundlyupon Benjaminwas probably
Schmitt'sPolitische Theologie[Political Theology],the firstchapterof which concludes
by insisting on the significance of "theextremecase":

1. I have discussed the historicalityof Benjamin'snotion of Ursprung,as elaboratedin his

"Epistemo-CriticalPrologue" to this book, in "Genealogy of Modernity: History, Myth and
Allegory in Benjamin'sOriginof the GermanMourningPlay" [MLN 106 (1991) esp. 467-74].

6
 Precisely a philosophy of concrete life must not withdrawfrom the exception
and the extremecase, but must be interestedin it to the highest degree. The
exceptioncan be more importantto it than the rule, not because of a romantic
ironyfortheparadox,butbecause theseriousnessof an insightgoes deeperthan
the clear generalizations inferredfrom what ordinarily repeats itself. The
exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the
exceptionproves everything: it confirmsnot only the rule butalso its existence,
which derives onlyfrom the exception. [15]

In the "Epistemo-CriticalPrologue"(ErkenntniskritischeVorrede)to the Trauerspiel

book, where Benjaminseeks to elaboratethe premisesandimplicationsof his readingof
the Germanbaroquetheateras an "idea,"it is precisely to the "extreme"thathe appeals
in order to indicate just how the "idea" distinguishes itself from the subsumptive
generalityof the concept:

The idea is best explained as the representationof the context in which the
uniqueand extreme[Einmalig-Extreme]standsalongside its counterpart.It is
thereforeerroneousto understandthe mostgeneral referenceswhichlanguage
makesas concepts, insteadof recognizingthemas ideas. It is absurdto attempt
to explain the general as the average. Thegeneral is the idea. The empirical,
on the other hand, can be all the moreprofoundlyunderstoodthe more clearly
it is seen as an extreme. [35]

Whatis characteristicof the Einmalig-Extremeis, as Schmittexplicitly states,thatit is a

"borderlinenotion": it is situated at the extremity of what is familiar, identically
repeatable,classifiable; it is the point at which the generallyfamiliaris on the verge of
passing into somethingelse, the point at which it encountersthe other,the exterior. To
thinkthe "idea"as a configurationof singularextremes(Einmalig-Extreme)is to construe
its being as a function of thatwhich it is not.
Suchpassagesindicatehow Benjamin's modeof investigation,his Forschungsweise,
is indebtedto thatof Schmitt: both sharea certainmethodologicalextremismfor which
the formationof a concept is paradoxicallybut necessarilydependentupon a contactor
an encounter with a singularity that exceeds or eludes the concept. This singular
encountertakes place in and as the "extreme"and it is the readiness to engage in this
encounter,according to Benjamin, that distinguishes "philosophicalhistory"from art
history,literaryhistory,or any otherform of historythatpresupposesthe givenness of a
generalconcept underwhich the phenomenait addressesare to be subsumed:

Philosophical history, the science of origin, is theform which, in the remotest

extremesand the apparentexcesses of theprocess of development,reveals the
configurationof the idea-the sum total of all possible meaningfuljuxtaposi-
tions of such opposites. The representationof an idea can under no circum-
stances be consideredsuccessful unless the whole range ofpossible extremesit
contains has been virtuallyexplored. [47]

The circle of extremes can be traversedonly potentiallynot only because the extremes
themselves areneverfully presentor realizedas such. Rather,they articulatethemselves
historicallyin termsof a split into a Vor-undNachgeschichte. This pre- andposthistory
of the singularidea constitutes "the abbreviatedand obscuredfigure of the remaining
world of ideas" [47].
This figure is to be deciphered(abzulesen). And it is here, precisely, thatBenjamin
finds himself faced with a problemthatseems to beara particularrelationto the German
baroqueand its interpretation:
diacritics / fall-winter 1992 7
 That characteristic feeling of dizziness which is induced by the spectacle of the
spiritual contradictions of this epoch is a recurrent feature in the improvised
attempts to capture its meaning.... Only by approaching the subjectfrom some
distance, and initially, forgoing any view of the whole, can the mind be led,
through a more or less ascetic apprenticeship, to the position of strength from
which it is possible to take in the whole panorama and yet remain in control of
oneself. [56]

In the baroque,the "circle"of potentialextremesto be traversedin the stagingof an idea

has become an encirclementof contradictionsand of antithesesfrom which thereseems
no escape, but only the "dizziness,"the vertigo that its spectacle elicits.
What sorts of contradictionsand antithesesencircle the Germanbaroque? Not the
least of these appearsto be a singulardiscrepancybetween its artisticintentionsand the
aestheticmeans at its disposal. And it is here that Benjaminencountersthe problemof
sovereigntyin a guise thatseems to be peculiarto the Germantheaterof the time: "The
Germandramaof theCounter-Reformation neverachievedthatsupplenessof formwhich
bends to every virtuosotouch, such as Calder6ngave the Spanishdrama. It took shape
... in an extremelyviolent effort, and this alone would suggest thatno sovereigngenius
imprintedhis personalityon this form"[49].
Whatis modem, topical,aktuell,aboutthebaroquein general,andaboutthe German
baroquein particular,is thus tied on the one hand to a certainlack of sovereignty,to a
certainincapacityof producingconsummateartisticforms, and on the otherto an effort
of the will thatstrivesto compensatefor this lack but insteadthreatensto overwhelmall
those who seek to interpretit:

Confronted with a literature which sought, in a sense, to reduce both its

technique, the unfailing richness of its creations, and the vehemence of its claims
to value, one should emphasize the necessity of that sovereign attitude which the
representation of the idea of a form demands. Even the danger of allowing
oneself to plunge from the heights of knowledge into the profoundest depths of
the baroque state of mind. [56]

The lack of sovereigntyof theGermanbaroquetheater,as well as thepowerof its will

seeking to compensatefor thatlack, rendera "sovereignattitude"all the moreimperative
andall the moredifficultfor those who seek to interpretit. This is at least one explanation
for why Benjaminis led to look for a "confirmation"of his style of researchin the Lehre
of Schmittconcerning,precisely, the questionof sovereignty.2

2. Herethequestionshouldat least be raisedinpassing whetherthe "dizziness" thatBenjamin

here identifieswiththeGermanbaroqueis notalso, inpartat least, a resultof his owndetermination
of the origin as a Strudel, a vortex or maelstrom that "reisst in seine Rhythmik das
Entstehungsmaterialhinein" [29]. The "rhythm"of the origin is split between a tendencyto
restore and to reproduce (Restauration,Wiederherstellung),on the one hand, and a certain
"incompletion"(Unvollendetes,Unabgeschlossenes)on the other. Thissplit in the origin is what
then articulates itself as the division intopre- and posthistory. The lack of a center,fully present
to itself, in theorigin isperhapsthe "origin"of thatSchwindelgefiihlthatBenjaminassociates with
thebaroquein general,and its Germanvariantinparticular. It remainsto be determined,however,
whetherthisconnectionindicatesthatthebaroqueis a particularlyoriginaryage, or ratherwhether
the origin itself is not particularlybaroque. Nor is there any guarantee that the answer to this
questionmustconformto the schema of an either/or,a simpledecision. Wewill returnverybriefly
at the end of this paper to the relation between "decision" and "rhythm"as articulated in
Benjamin'sbook.

8
 2

If the primaryobject of the GermanTrauerspielis historyas representedin the figure of

the sovereign, the destiny of the rulerin the baroquetheatermanifests a regularitythat
suggests the inevitabilityof a naturaloccurrence:"Theconstantlyrepeateddramaof the
rise andfall of princes... appearedto the writersless as a manifestationof moralitythan
as the naturalaspect of the course of history,essential in its permanence"[88]. History
as a repetitiveandineluctableprocessof rise andfall is identifiedwiththenatureof a fallen
creationwithoutany discernible,representablepossibilityof eithergraceor salvation. It
is the loss of the eschatologicalperspectivethatrendersthe baroqueconceptionof history
"inauthentic"and akin to a state of nature.
Sucha conceptionorconfusionof historywithnatureentailsatleasttwo fundamental
consequences for a theaterwhose primaryconcern is, as we have seen, precisely the
spectacleof this history. First,the loss of the eschatologicaldimensionresultsin a radical
transformationof the dramaticelement of the theater,insofar as it had been tied to a
narrative-teleologicalconceptionof history. The traditionalAristoteliananalysis of the
plot in terms of "unity of action" resulting from the exposition, development, and
resolutionof conflict, is no longer applicable. "History,"as Benjaminputs it, "wanders
onto the stage [Die Geschichte wandert in den Schauplatz hinein]" [92/89]. Second, the
baroquenaturalizationof historyprofoundlyaffects the figure of the sovereign,primary
exponent,we remember,of history. The naturalisticdestinyof the princedoes not merely
imply the rise and fall of an individualfigure, but more significantly,the dislocation of
sovereignty as such. Out of this dislocation Benjamin develops what he calls "the
typologyandpoliticalanthropology"of thebaroque.Thereasonthatthis "typology"must
be elucidatedat the outset is because it arises out of the articulation,or rather,disarticu-
lation of sovereignty, and hence of history, the primaryobject of the Germanbaroque
Trauerspiel.
Benjamin's reconstructionof the political anthropologyof the baroqueconsists of
threefigures, of varyingstatureand status,and yet each of which is unthinkablewithout
the others. This trio embracesthe tyrant,the martyr,and the plotter(der Intrigant). It is
the first and the last that will be of particularinterestto us here.
The point of departurefor this typology is, of course, the figure of the prince. It is
here thatBenjaminmakes explicit referenceto CarlSchmitt's theoryof sovereignty. To
graspthe significance of Benjamin'suse of Schmitt,it will be helpful if we first review
certainaspectsof the latter's discussion of sovereignty,startingwith the famouspassage
at the beginning of Political Theologyin which the notion is first announced:

Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception [Ausnahmezustand].

Only this definition can do justice to a borderline concept. Contrary to the
imprecise terminology that is found in popular literature, a borderline concept
is not a vague concept, but one pertaining to the outermost sphere. [5]

Despite the apparentand seductive clarity of this definition, it nevertheless leaves a

numberof problemsunresolved,aboveall regardingthenotionof the "stateof exception."
Firstof all, the stateof exception, Schmittinsists, is not simply equivalent,in German,to
a state of emergency or of siege: not every "danger"or "threat"constitutes an
Ausnahmezustandin Schmitt'ssense, since not every exceptionper se representsa threat
to the norm. The stateof exceptionthatconstitutesthe objectandproductof the sovereign
decision is one thatthreatensor calls into questionthe existence and survivalof the state
itself as hithertoconstituted. Sovereigntyis constitutedas the power to decide upon or

diacritics / fall-winter 1992 9

aboutthe stateof exception andthus in turnincludestwo moments: first, a decision that
a state of exception exists, and second, the effective suspension of the state of law
previouslyin force so thatthe statemaymeet andsurmountthechallengeof theexception.
In thusdecidinguponthe stateof exception,the sovereignalso effectively determinesthe
limits of the state. And it is this act of delimitationthatconstitutespolitical sovereignty
accordingto Schmitt.
This is why the translationof Ausnahmezustandas "state"of exception is not quite
accurate,or rather,why it obscuresthe delicatebalanceof similarityanddistinctionthat
determine the relationshipof the state as Staat and the exception as Zustand. The
Ausnahmezustandis a "state"in the sense of having a relativelydeterminatestatus;as a
"Zustand,"it is

always also somethingdifferent... from an anarchy and a chaos, [and thus]

order in thejuristicsense still prevails even if it is not of the ordinarykind. The
existenceof the state is undoubtedproofof its superiorityover thevalidityof the
legal norm. Thedecisionfrees itselffromall normativeties and becomes in the
truesense absolute. Thestate suspendsthe law in the exceptionon the basis of
its right of self-preservation,as one says. [12; my emphasis]

The paradoxor aporiaof Schmitt's position is suggested here by the conclusion of the
passage just quoted. For if the "decision"is as radically independentof the norm as
Schmittclaims, it is difficult to see how the decision of the state to suspendits laws can
be justified at all, since all justificationinvolves precisely the appealto a norm. This is
why, in appealingto a "rightto self-preservation,"Schmittacknowledgesthatthe term
is more "a way of speaking"thana rigorousconcept: "Thestate suspendsthe law in the
exception on the basis of its rightof self-preservation,as one says."
On the one hand,then,the sovereigndecision marksthe relationshipof the orderof
the general-the law, the norm,the concept-to thatwhich is radicallyheterogeneousto
all such generality. In this sense, the decision as such is sovereign, thatis, independent
of all possible derivationfrom or subsumptionto a more generalnorm. It is a pureact,
somewhatakin to the act of creationexcept thatwhat it does is not so much to createas
to interruptand to suspend. If such interruptionand suspensioncan never be predicted
ordeterminedin advance,theyarenonethelessnotarbitraryinsofaras theyareunderstood
as necessaryin orderto preservethe state as the indispensableconditionof all possible
law and order.
And yet, precisely insofar as it is situated in this temporalityof repetition and
reproduction,the decision cannotbe considered,Schmittnotwithstanding,to be entirely
absolute. Rather,it constitutes itself in and as a break with . . ., an interruptionor
suspensionof... a norm. In separatingwhat belongs to the normfrom what does not-
andin thissense everyauthenticdecision,as Schmittasserts,hasto do withanexception-
the decision distinguishes itself from the simple negation of order, from "chaos and
anarchy,"as Schmittwrites,andcanindeedlay claimto havingsome sortof "legalstatus."
Theproblem,however,is thatsucha claimcanbe evaluatedandjudgedonly afterthefact,
as it were, which is to say, froma pointof view thatis once againsituatedwithina system
of norms. For Schmitt,this paradoxis articulatedas the fact thatthe state, which is the
condition of all law and order, is itself constitutedby a decision that is prior to and
independentof all such considerations: "Authorityproves thatin orderto createrights,
it need not be right"[20]. On the otherhand,the nonlegalor alegal statusof the sovereign
and exceptionaldecision is justifiable and indeed identifiableonly insofaras it provides
the conditionsfor the reappropriation of the exceptionby the norm. The statethushas the
first and the last word in Schmitt's theoryof sovereignty.
This brings us to a second aspect of Schmitt's thought. Up to now, we have been
considering it in terms of a relatively abstract,general, and quasi-logical theory of
10
decision; but Schmitt's thinkingis also historical,as the very title of his book, Political
Theology, suggests and as the following passage makes manifest:

All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized
theological concepts not only because oftheir historical development-in which
they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for
example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver-but also
because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for
a sociological consideration of these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence
is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of this analogy can
we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas ofthe state developed
in the last centuries. [36]

To be sure,in the "analogy"thatSchmittis here constructing,"historicaldevelopment"

is subordinatedto "systematic"considerations.At the same time, it is only in a reflection
orrecallof thehistorical"transfer"-or rather,transformation-of theologicalcategories
into political ones thatthe "systematicstructure"of political discourseis fully revealed.
The salienttraitof thatstructureis, as we have alreadyseen, its dependenceupona certain
transcendence,uponthatwhich exceeds its self-identity,upon an irreduciblealterityand
exteriority: just as the miracle in Augustiniandoctrineboth exceeds and explains the
createdworld.
If historical reflection upon the development of political discourse reveals its
theological origins and hence its dependence upon a certaintranscendence,the actual
historical development of political theory and of theology has moved in an opposite
direction:

To the conception of God in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries belongs
the idea of his transcendence vis-a-vis the world, just as to that period's
philosophy of state belongs the notion of the transcendence of the sovereign vis-
a-vis the state. The nineteenth century was increasingly governed by represen-
tations of immanence. [49]

To these "representations
of immanence"belong the identificationof rulerandruledand,
above all, that of the state with the legal order (Identitit des Staates mitderRechtsordnung)
[49/63]. But if the developmentof modem thoughthas thustendedto efface the originary
and constitutiverelationshipof the political to transcendence,in the name of notions of
autonomyand self-identity,Schmitt's own approachdoes not seem to be entirelyfree of
suchtendencies. This canbe seen in the mannerin whichhe conceives the "consciousness
of the analogy"between political and theological categories,which for him is the key to
authenticallyhistoricaland systematicalunderstanding.
For what emerges in Schmitt's discussion of the relationof politics and theology is
thathe construesthe analogy between them above all in termsof identity,ratherthanin
terms of transformationor of alteration. For instance, he finds confirmationof his
theological-political thesis in the position of Atger, for whom "the monarch in the
seventeenth-centurydoctrineof the statewas identifiedwithGodandoccupiedin the state
the position precisely analogous to that occupied in the world by God in the Cartesian
system" [45]. The methodthat Schmitt advancesin Political Theology,which he calls
"the sociology of concepts," thus employs the notion of "analogy"in orderto reduce
difference to identity, as the following programmaticdeclarationclearly demonstrates:
"Themetaphysicalimagethata particularepochforgesof the worldhas the samestructure
as what the world immediatelyunderstandsto be appropriateas a form of its political
organization. The determinationof such an identity is the sociology of the concept of

diacritics / fall-winter 1992 11

sovereignty" [46; my emphasis]. One would be temptedto say that Schmitt's critique
seeks to replace the Immanenzvorstellungen of modern political theory with
Identititsvorstellungenthatseek to recalltheheterogeneityof politicalconceptsoutof the
oblivion into whichtheyhave fallen,butonly succeedin once againreducingtheiralterity
to the same: to "the same structure"and to "thedeterminationof... an identity."

With the ambivalenceof Schmitt's approachto the political in mind, let us now turnto
the mannerin which the question of sovereignty emerges in Benjamin's study of the
Germanbaroquetheater:

Thesovereign representshistory. He holds the course of historyin his handlike

a scepter. This view is by no meanspeculiar to the dramatists. It is based on
certain constitutionalnotions. A new concept of sovereignty emerged in the
seventeenthcenturyfrom a final discussion of the juridical doctrines of the
middle ages .... Whereasthe modern concept of sovereignty amounts to a
supremeexecutivepower on thepart of theprince, the baroqueconceptemerges
from a discussion of the state of emergency,and makes it the most important
function of the prince to exclude this [den auszuschliessen].. [54-55; my
emphasis]

A note at the end of this passage refers to Political Theology. And yet the very words
whichseem only to paraphraseSchmittconstitutein facta slightbutdecisive modification
of his theory. Schmitt,we remember,defines sovereigntyas constitutedby the power to
make a decision that consists of two moments: first, the determinationthat state of
exception exists, and second, the effective suspensionof the stateof law with the end of
preservingthe stateas such. ForSchmitt,then,the stateof exceptionmustbe "removed,"
beseitigt, "done away with," but only in each particular case, never as such: that is
precisely what Schmittcriticizedmoder political theoryfor tryingto do, by excluding
considerationof the stateof exceptionfromthe determinationof sovereignty. Benjamin,
by contrast,describesthe taskof the sovereignin the very termsthatSchmittrejects: the
sovereign is charged with the task of "excluding" the state of exception, "den
auszuschliessen."In short,thatwhich is already"exterior,"the Aus-nahmezustand,is to
be exteriorizedonce again, aus-geschlossen, and this applies not simply to the state of
exception as an individual,determinatethreatto the state-the position of Schmitt-but
to the state of exception as such, thatis, as that which transcendsthe state in general.3
In short, the function assigned to the sovereign by the baroque, according to
Benjamin,is thatof transcendingtranscendenceby makingit immanent,an internalpart
of the state and of the world, of the state of the world. And the reasonwhy the baroque
is so attachedto the state of the world Benjaminexplains as follows:

The religious man of the baroqueera clings so tightlyto the world because of
thefeeling thathe is being drivenwithit towarda cataract. Thebaroqueknows
no eschatology;andfor thatveryreason itpossesses no mechanismby whichall
earthlythingsare gatheredtogetherand exaltedbeforebeing consignedto their
end. Thehereafteris emptiedof everythingwhichcontains the slightestbreath

3. "Aberob der extremeAusnahmefallwirklichaus der Weltgeschafftwerdenkannodernicht,

das ist keine juristische Frage. Ob man das Vertrauenund die Hoffnung hat, er lasse sich
tatsdchlichbeseitigen, hdngtvonphilosophischen,insbesonderegeschichtsphilosophischenoder
metaphysischenUberzeugungenab" [13].

12
 --------

:?:-::? ?_:i-
i:Iji:?::::::::
.ifi)?: -T:
" ;:::;
::i:
:::-:
-:::-:: -_i::

rer:i'i:-:ii':i

'::: ::::
a

-16
Inmip?e88ssss%rakjsr as9sias BFA
i r %il
6eSSfS 8

jI i
i'
p
%:

i t4:

ii
R

---4; ? :

II

%Y

""
 of this world, and from it the baroque extracts a profusion of things which
customarilyescaped the grasp of artisticformulation and, at its high point,
brings them violently into the light of the day, in order to clear an ultimate
heaven,enablingit, as a vacuum,one day to destroythe worldwithcatastrophic
violence. [66]

Whatthe baroquerejectsis any admissionof the limitationof immanence,andit does so

by emptying transcendenceof all possible representablecontent. Farfrom doing away
with transcendence,however, such emptying only endows it with a force that is all the
more powerful: that of the vacuum, of the absoluteand unboundedother,which, since
it is no longerrepresentable,is also no longerlocalizable"outthere"oras a "beyond."The
othernessthatis no longer allowed to remaintranscendentthereforereappearsthis side
of the horizon,representedas a "cataract,"abyss, or fall. Or, even more radically,such
transcendencewill be representedby, and as, allegory.
In thisperspective,the"function"of the sovereignto "exclude"the stateof exception
conformsfully to the attemptof the Germanbaroqueto exclude transcendence.But the
very same desire to exclude transcendencealso condemnsthe functionof the sovereign
to malfunction: for unlike the political-theological"analogy"of Schmitt, the baroque
sovereign-and particularly,the Germanbaroquesovereign-is definedpreciselyby his
difference from God, just as baroqueimmanence sets itself up in contradistinctionto
theological transcendence. At the very point in time when the political sovereign
successfullygainshis independencevis-a-vis the Church,the differencebetweenworldly
powerandthatof the divinecan no longerbe ignored. The result,as Benjaminformulates
it, turnsout to be directlycontraryto the conclusion of Schmitt: "Thelevel of the state
of creation,the terrainon which the Trauerspielis enacted,also unmistakablyexercises
a determininginfluence on the sovereign. However highly he is enthronedover subject
and state,his statusis confinedto the worldof creation;he is the lordof creatures,buthe
remains a creature"[85]. Schmitt, we recall, had construedthe theological-political
analogy in termsof a relationshipof essential similarity: The sovereign transcendsthe
state as God transcendsthe creation. By contrast,Benjamin'snotion of secularization
stresses precisely the incommensurabilityof the change it entails. Such incommensura-
bility becomes even more evident in the specific case of Germanbaroquetheater: "The
rejectionof the eschatology of the religious dramasis characteristicof the new drama
throughoutEurope; nevertheless the rash flight into a nature deprived of grace is
specificallyGerman"[81]. TheGermanbaroquetheater"flees"wildly to nature-which,
we remember,is for it the otherface of history-only to discoverthatthereis no graceor
consolation to be had there, either. The undoing of the sovereign is the fact that in a
creation left entirely to its own devices, without any other place to go, the state of
exception has become the rule [see Garcfa-Diittmann211 ff.].
The resultis thatthe sovereign finds himself in a situationin which a decision is as
imperativeas it is impossible:

The antithesis betweenthe power of the ruler and his capacity to rule led to a
featurepeculiar to theTrauerspiel,whichis, however,onlyapparentlya generic
feature and whichcan be illuminatedonly against the backgroundof the theory
of sovereignty. The prince, who is responsiblefor making the decision to
proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity,that he is
almost incapable of makinga decision. [70-71 ]

The sovereign is incapableof makinga decision, because a decision, in the strictsense,

is not possible in a worldthatleaves no place for heterogeneity:the inauthentic,"natural"
history of the baroqueallows for no interruptionor radicalsuspension of its perennial

14
interruptions.The sovereign reacts by seeking to gatherall power and thus becomes a
tyrant;and yet the more power he has, the more he demonstrateshis incapacityto arrive
at an effective decision. Faced with this situation,the tyrantcan easily turninto a martyr.
Both figures,Benjaminobserves,arefor thebaroqueonly two sides of the samecoin, "the
Janus-headsof the crowned... the necessarilyextremeforms of the princelycharacter"
[69].
In emphasizingthe dictatorialtendencyof the sovereign,Benjaminfollows Schmitt
here practicallyto the letter ("Thetheoryof sovereignty,which takes as its example the
specialcase in which dictatorialpowersareunfolded,positively demandsthe completion
of the image of the sovereign, as tyrant"[69]). But in so doing, he arrivesat a resultthat
is almost diametricallyopposed to thatof Schmitt: the very notion of sovereigntyitself
is putradicallyinto question. One extremeillustrationof this is the figureof Herod,Kind
of the Jews, "who,as autocratgone mad,becameemblematicof a derangedcreation"and
as such also an exemplaryillustrationof the fate of the "sovereignfor the seventeenth
century":"thesummitof creation,eruptinginto madnesslike a volcano and destroying
himself andhis entirecourt.... He falls victim to the disproportionbetweenthe unlimited
hierarchicaldignity with which he is divinely invested and the humble estate of his
humanity"[70]. The key to the secularizationof which the Germanbaroqueis the result
is thus for Benjaminnot so much an analogybased on proportion,andhence on identity,
as a relation based on disproportion, on a Missverhaltniss.
The effects of this disproportiondo not stop at the dismantlingof the sovereign,who
is split into anultimatelyineffective if bloody tyrantanda no moreproductivemartyr;nor
does it come to rest at any of the compromisespossible betweenthese two poles, such as
that representedby the "stoic ostentation"that often characterizesbaroquerepresenta-
tions of the prince. Rather,the splittingof the sovereignis accompaniedby theemergence
of a thirdfigure, who standsin radicaldissymmetryto the othertwo. That figure, who
completes the baroque "political anthropology and typology," is the "plotter,"the
Intrigant:andit is he who turnsoutto hold thekey to thefate of sovereigntyin the German
baroquemourningplay.

To understandwhat distinguishesthe plotterfrom the other two figures in the baroque

political "typology,"it mustbe emphasizedthatthe incapacityof the sovereignto decide
involves the transformationnot merelyof an individualcharactertype, but of the manner
in which historyitself is representedin the Trauerspiel. And this in turndeterminesthe
way in which representationtakes place. With the split of the sovereign into tyrantand
martyr,what is dislocatedis not just the unity of a character,but the unity of character
as such. This disarticulationis of particularimportancefor baroque theater. If the
Aristoteliantheoryof tragedyassigns primaryimportanceto the unity and wholeness of
action,andrequiresto this end "consistency"of character[Poetics 1454a], it is precisely
this consistency and unity thatare underminedtogetherwith the statusof the sovereign.
Nothing, however, demonstratesthe distance of the Trauerspielfrom the Aristotelian
theoryof tragedymorethanthefact thatit is preciselythis disarticulationof unity-of the
sovereign and hence of the action-that contributesto the peculiar theatricality of
baroquedrama,as the following passage suggests:

Just as compositions with restful lighting are virtually unknown in mannerist

painting, so it is that the theatricalfigures of this epoch always appear in the
harsh light of their changing resolve. What is conspicuous about them is not so
much the sovereignty evident in the stoic turns ofphrase, as the sheer arbitrari-

diacritics / fall-winter 1992 15

 ness of a constantlyshiftingemotionalstormin which thefigures of Lohenstein
especially sway about like torn and flapping banners. And they also bear a
certain resemblanceto thefigures of El Greco in the smallness of their heads,
if we understandthis in a metaphorical sense. For their actions are not
determinedby thought,but by changingphysical impulses. [71; my emphasis]

From this accountit is clear thatthe dilemmaof the sovereign in baroquedramais also
and above all thatof the subjectas such: it is no longer determinedby its "head"-that
is, by its consciousness,its intentions-but by forces thatareindependentof it, thatbuffet
anddrive it fromone extremeto another. A powerfuldynamicis thusunleashed,which,
however, does not really go anywhere. Instead,like "tornflags" whippedaboutin the
wind, the baroquefiguresaredrivenby "tempestuousaffects"over which they have little
control. Whatresultsis a rhythmof abruptand unpredictablechanges and shifts, and it
is this rhythmthatdeterminesthe structureof the "plot"in the Trauerspiel. Moreover,
since neitherplot nor characteris sufficientlyunified or consistentto providea compre-
hensive framework for the play, this framework must be sought elsewhere. That
elsewhere turnsout to be the theateritself, as stage, as artifice,and as apparatus.This is
implicitin thepassagecited, which describeshow the "theatricalfiguresof the age appear
imgrellen Scheine"-in the "harshlight"-"of theirchangingresolve." The dismantling
of decision, of a definitive, ultimate,and absoluteact, gives way to a differentkind of
acting: thatwhich takesplace on a stage lit up by spotlights;the phrasegrellen Scheine,
which recursfrequentlyin Benjamin'stext, recalls the Scheinwerferof the theater.
In the theatricalspace thusopenedby the dislocationof the actionandof the subject,
and in the confusion thatresults,the sovereigntyof the tyrantis replacedby the mastery
of the plotter: "Incontrastto the spasmodicchronologicalprogressionof tragedy,the
Trauerspieltakes place in a spatial continuum,which one might describe as choreo-
graphic. The organizerof its plot, the precursorof the choreographer,is the intriguer"
[95]. The discontinuous temporality of decision, here associated with tragedy, is
replaced-that is, resituated-within a "spatialcontinuum"in which exceptionalinter-
ruptionsareno longerpossible because they have become the rule. The regularnatureof
the interruptionparadoxicallybecomes programmable,and the programmer,or "chore-
ographer,"is the"intriguer."The etymologyof thewordin-trigare,to con-foundandcon-
fuse, is all the more appropriatein a world in which the clear-cutseparationof the de-
cision is no longer effective. The intrigueor plot is thus designatedby Benjaminas a
Verwicklung: an imbroglio or entanglement,but one that is organized. The baroque
dramathus depends upon a plot that is based not upon a sovereign subjectbut upon a
masterfulorganizeror promoter(Veranstalter). It is precisely the calculating natureof
thismasterythatfascinatesthebaroqueaudience:"Hiscorruptcalculationsawakenin the
spectatorof the Haupt-undStaatsaktionenall the moreinterestbecausethe latterdoes not
recognizehere simply a masteryof the workingsof politics, butan anthropological,even
a physiologicalknowledgewhich fascinatedhim"[95]. The amoralcalculatednessof the
plottercontrastsradicallywith the attitudesof both the tyrantand the martyr. For only
the intriguerconfrontsa stateof the worldin whichtheexceptionhas becomethe rule,and
thereforein which universalprinciples-and be it the principle of the interruptionof
principlequa decision-can no longer be counted upon. The intriguerexploits mecha-
nisms of humanactionas the resultof forces over which therecan be no ultimatecontrol,
but which can thereforebe made the subjectof probabilisticcalculations.
The contingencyof such calculationsturnsthe "intrigue"into somethingcloser to a
game or to the exhibitionof a certainvirtuosity,ratherthanto the expressionof a cosmic
strategy for the good of all or of the state. Thus, not only the subject matterof the
Trauerspiel-historical action-changes, but its dramaturgicalstructureas well. The
plot is replacedby plotting: "Baroquedramaknows no otherhistoricalactivity thanthe

16
corruptenergy of schemers"[88]. At the same time, however, the structureof the plot
changes:

It differsfrom the so-called antitheticalplot of classical tragedyby virtueof the

isolation of motives,scenes, and types.... the baroquedramaalso likes to show
the antagonistsin crudelyilluminatedseparatescenes [in grelles Lichtgestellte
Sonderszenen],where motivationusuallyplays an insignificantpart. It could
be said that baroque intriguetakesplace like a change of scenery, so minimal
is the illusionistic intention. [75]

The utter indifference to psychological or moral "motivation,"combined with the

encapsulationof conflicting figures through"in grelles Licht gestellte Sonderszenen"
precludesany sort of resolutionin a totalizingdenouement. Whatintereststhe baroque
is not so much the dramatic resolution of conflict as its representationthrough a
mechanismthat acknowledges and even flaunts its own theatricality. The buffeting of
individualfiguresin thewindsof passionfinds its adequaterepresentationin a stagingthat
demonstratesits own artifices.
The privileged site and scene of such emphaticallytheatricalartifice is the court:
"Theimage of the setting,or, more precisely, of the court,becomes the key to historical
understanding.Forthe courtis the settingparexcellence.... In the Trauerspielthe court
representsthe timelessnaturaldecorof the historicalprocess"[92]. The "eternal,natural"
characterattributedto the court in the baroquetestifies to the situationof a historical
periodin which "Christendomor Europeis dividedinto a numberof Christianprovinces
whose historicalactions no longer claim to be integratedin the process of redemption"
[78]. Thus, with the eschatological perspectiveblocked, the irreduciblepartialityand
provincialityof the local courtrendersit the exemplarysite and stage of a movementof
history thathas been reducedto conspiratorialplotting,the aim of which is the destabi-
lizationratherthanthe takingof power. This is why the structuraldynamicsof the plotter
causes him to resemble comic figures or the fool ratherthan the prince who would be
sovereign. If the plotteris most at home in the court,it is only insofaras he knows that
therecan be "no properhome [keineeigene Heimstdtte]"for him [96].
In this sense the plottercan be said to be the Exponentdes Schauplatzesas thatplace
in which no one, includingthe sovereign,can be athome. Unlike the sovereign,however,
the plotter"knows"thatthe courtis a theaterof actionsthatcan neverbe totalizedbutonly
staged with more or less virtuosity. By thus heeding only the rules of the game without
seeking to reachultimateprinciples,the plotterbegins wherethe sovereignhopes to end:
with the ex-clusion of the stateof exception. The stateof exceptionis excludedas theater.
Whatcharacterizesthis theateris thatin it, nothingcan ever authenticallytakeplace, least
of all the stage itself.

In the EuropeanTrauerspielas a whole... the stage is also not strictlyfixable,

not an actual place, but it too is dialectically split. Bound to the court, it yet
remainsa travelling theatre;metaphoricallyits boards representthe earth as
the setting createdfor the enactmentof history; itfollows the courtfrom town
to town. [119]

If the stage of baroque theater is "dialectically split" and thus "inauthentic,"what

distinguishesthe Germanbaroqueis the impossibility of a dialecticalAufhebungthat
would constitutea totality: "Theintriguealone would have been able to bringaboutthat
allegorical totality of scenic organization,thanks to which one of the images of the
sequence stands out, in the image of the apotheosis, as different in kind, and gives
mourningat one andthe same time the cue for its entryandexit" [235]. But it is precisely

diacritics / fall-winter 1992 17

the inabilityto reachsuch an apotheosisthatcharacterizesthe Germanbaroquetheaterin
contrastto its Spanishcounterpartin Calder6n. And yet if this limits its aestheticvalue,
it is also what gives it its distinctivehistorical-philosophicalsignificance.
The theaterof the Germanbaroquedivergesbothfromclassicaltragedyandfromthe
Schmittiantheory of sovereignty in that it leaves no place for anythingresembling a
definitivedecision. Rather,it is preciselythe absenceof sucha verdictandthe possibility
of unendingappealand revision thatmarksthe Trauerspiel:

The legal analogy may reasonably be takenfurther and, in the sense of the
medievalliteratureoflitigation, one mayspeakof the trialof the creaturewhose
charge against death-or whoever else was indicatedin it-is only partially
dealt with and is adjournedat the end of the Trauerspiel. Its resumptionis
implicit in the Trauerspiel.... [137; my emphasis]

Nothing could demonstratemore clearly the distancebetween this eternalrevision and

Schmitt's notion of an absoluteand absolutelydefinitive andultimatedecision. Here,as
there, the question of decision, of its power and its status, is always tied to a certain
determinationof space. Whereasin Benjamin,however, this determinationis revealed
to be the errantstage of an inauthenticand unlocalizableplace, for Schmittdecision can
be situatedin terms of an unequivocalpoint:

The legal force of a decision is differentfrom the result of substantiation.

Ascription is not achieved with the aid of a norm; it happens the other way
around.Apoint of ascriptionfirstdetermineswhata normis andwhatnormative
rightnessis. A point of ascriptioncannotbe derivedfroma norm,only a quality
of content. [32; my emphasis]

If Schmitt asserts here that the norm presupposes a "point of ascription," a

Zurechnungspunktupon which one must count, but which the norm as such cannot
provide,the unmistakableimplicationis thatdecision alonedoes providesuch a point. In
his reinscriptionof Schmitt,Benjamintakes exception to this point, therebyrevealingit
to be a stage upon which anythingcan happen,even a miracle,but nothingdefinitively
decided.

WORKS CITED
Benjamin,Walter. Briefe [Correspondence]. Ed. GershomScholem and TheodorW.
Adomo. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1966.
. The Originof GermanTragicDrama. Trans.JohnOsborne. London:New Left
Books, 1977. Translationsoccasionally modified.
GesammelteSchriften. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1980. [GS]
. Ursprungdes deutschenTrauerspiels. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1963.
Garcia-Dtittmann, Alexander. Das Geddchtnisdes Denkens: VersuchiiberAdornound
Heidegger. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1991.
Schmitt,Carl. Political Theology:Four Chapterson the Conceptof Sovereignty.Trans.
George Schwab. Cambridge,MA: MIT P, 1985. Translationsoccasionally modi-
fied.
Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souverinitit. Berlin:
Duncker& Humblot, 1985.

18