Oliphint Dissertation

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O rder N um ber 9428899
The apologetical implications of Alvin P lantinga’s epistexnology
Oliphint, K. Scott, Ph.D.

Westminster Theological Seminary, 1994
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Aibor, MI 48106
THE APOLOGETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ALVIN PLANTINGA’S
EPISTEMOLOGY
by
K. Scott Oliphint
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
1994
Faculty Advisor : X C------- )

Dr. Robert D. Knudsen
Second Faculty Reader:

William Edgar f
Librarian: I
<Dr. Danyl G. Hi
K. Scott Oliphint: "The Apologetical Implications of Alvin Plantinga’s
Epistemology." Ph.D. dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1994.
Abstract
Our focus, like Plantinga’s, is on the rationality of belief in God. Thus,
Plantinga’s argument, in God and Other Minds and through to the present, is an
apology for belief in God. Apologetics, therefore, plays a significant role in this
process and in the dissertation.
In Chapter 2 we seek to lay out Plantinga’s argument for a Reformed
epistemology. As an apology, Planting argues that belief in God can be basic for a
cognizer, and properly so.
In Chapter 3 we work through Plantinga’s latest notion of warrant as set
forth primarily in Warrant and Proper Function, but not until other dominant views
of warrant are found wanting in Warrant: The Current Debate.
Criticisms of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology proposal, which will be
transcendental in their thrust, begin in Chapter 4. We begin first by showing that
Plantinga himself has, elsewhere in his writings, set forth an adequate approach to
his own epistemology, but has neglected to follow it. We seek to provide some
approximate parameters to the notion of a presupposition, and then to show (1) that
the Reformed rejection of natural theology was along presuppositional lines rather
than a rejection of a certain epistemological structure and then (2) how Plantinga’s
neglect of presuppositional argumentation gives way to a false view of religious
neutrality.
Chapter 5 attempts to show Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology as explained
in Chapter 2 to be in need o f serious revision. It provides, at best, for
metaphysical agnosticism and epistemological relativism, neither of which
Plantinga would want to affirm.
Chapter 6 is an attempt to put Plantinga’s notion of warrant within the
proper epistemological framework, that of creation, the fall and redemption in
Jesus Christ. It attempts to show the necessity of revelation in any and all
reasoning about knowledge, belief, etc.
Chapter 7 speculates on Plantinga’s forthcoming third volume and tries to
place the notions of the sensus divinitatis and the testimonium Spiritus Sancti, both
with which Plantinga promises to deal within their proper Christian framework.
TABLE O F CO N TEN TS
LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... viii
PREFACE ...............................................................................................................................x
Chapter
1. IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................... 1
1.1 The B ackground.......................................................................................1
1.11 The G o a l ....................................................................................2
1.12 The Task ................................................................................. 6
1.2 Theistic Belief as Rational ............................................................... 11
1.21 Warrant and the AnalogicalArgument ............................ 23
2. T H E NEW REFORMED E P IS T E M O L O G Y ................................................... 27
2.1 The Evidentialist Critique ............................................................... 27
2.11 Critique of the C ritiq u e ........................................................ 31
2.12 Critique of F oundationalism .............................................. 37
2.121 The Reformed Rejection ...................................... 44
2.13 Critique of Coherentism ......................................................46
Hi
2.131 Coherentism to Reidianism and R E P ............. 52
2.2 Belief in G o d .......................................................................................54
2.21 Knowledge as justified true b e li e f .................................... 54
2.22 Properly Basic B e lie f...........................................................63
2.221 Criteria and the Christian C om m unity .......... 67
2.3 R e fo rm e d .............................................................................................76
3. T H E REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY PROPOSAL A N D W ARRAN T . 85
3.1 In tro d u c tio n ........................................................................................ 85
3.2 W a r r a n t................................................................................................86
3.21 A First Approximation ................................................... 92
3.3 E pistem ology .......................................................................................94
3.31 C oherentism ............................................................................ 94
3.311 Bonjourian Coherentism .......................................99
3.32 R eliabilism .......................................................................... 109
3.321 Plantinga’s Reliabilism? .................................... 119
3.4 Intem alism /E xtem alism ............................................................... 124
3.41 D e o n to lo g ism .................................................................. 128
3.5 W arrant a g a in ................................................................................. 135
3.51 Proper Function ............................................................. 136
3.6 The Design P la n ............................................................................. 140
3.61 Theistic A rg u m e n t.......................................................... 154
4. REFORM ED EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRESUPPOSITIONS ............... 163
iv
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4.1 Introduction 163
4.11 Apologetics and E p iste m o lo g y .................................... 166
4.2 Plantinga on Plantinga .................................................................. 169
4.21 Presuppositions ............................................................. 176
4.3 Presuppositional Argumentation ................................................ 189
4.31 The "Reformed Objection" and Presuppositions . . . . 191
4.32 Plantinga’s Neutrality and Presuppositions ................ 197
4.4 The Failure of Plantinga’s E pistem ology....................................... 206
4.41 G O M and Rational Theistic B elief.................................. 207
4.42 The "Reformed Epistemology" is not Reformed . . . . 213
4.43 W arrant and Natural Theology ....................................219
5. T H E EPISTEM OLOGICAL STRUCTURE O F PLA N TIN G A ’S
T H O U G H T ...................................................................................................... 223
5.1 Presuppositions and REP ........................................................... 223
5.11 Proper B asicality................................................................ 225
5.111 Epistemic P o s s ib ility ......................................... 226
5.112 Epistemic Parity ................................................ 236
5.12 F oundationalism ................................................................ 243
5.13 Reidian F o u n d atio n alism ................................................ 252
5.131 Com m on Sense C o n cern s.................................. 253
5.14 Evidentialism ..................................................................... 260
5.2 Presuppositions and the Sensus D iv in ita tis................................... 276
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5.21 C a lv in .................................................................................. 278
5.22 Paul ..................................................................................... 287
6. A NEW ER NEW REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY .................................... 296
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 296
6.2 W arrant and a Presuppositional D ile m m a .....................................299
6.21 The D ile m m a ................................................................... 301
6.3 Creation and the Design Plan ......................................................... 311
6.31 A Reformed Design P l a n .................................................... 312
6.32 A Reformed Design Plan and Plantinga’s T P F 315
6.4 W arrant and the F a ll........................................................................ 319
6.41 Calvin, the Fall and Proper F u n c t io n ............................. 320
6.42 Sin as an Epistemological C a te g o ry .................................. 323
6.43 Suppression and S u b s titu tio n .............................................325
6.44 The Fall and Plantinga’s T P F .............................................329
6.5 W arrant and R e d e m p tio n .............................................................. 335
6.51 Reformed Extemalism and Intemalism .........................336
6.6 A New er Reformed Epistemology ..................................................339
6.61 W arrant Qualifications .......................................................340
6.62 Circularity and a N ew er Reformed Epistemology . . 341
7. C O N C LU SIO N : W ARRANT A N D C H R IS T IA N IT Y ................................345
7.1 W arranted Christian Belief ......................................................... 345
7.11 The Sertsus D iv in ita tis ....................................................... 345
vi
7.12 The Testimonium Spiritus S a n c ti.........................................349
7.2Advice to a Christian P h ilo s o p h e r ................................................ 355
SELECTED B IB L IO G R A PH Y .................................................................................... 359
IN D EX ............................................................................................................................. 381
vii
LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS
GOM God and Other Minds, by Alvin Plantinga
(PJB) Principle of Justified Belief
PR Definition of a presupposition
P IP Plantinga’s first project in his Reformed

Epistemology Proposal
P2P Plantinga’s second project in his Reformed

Epistemology Proposal
REP Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology Proposal
RN Plantinga’s notion of religious neutrality
SD Plantinga’s notion of the sensus divinitatis
T PF Plantinga’s theory of proper function
(TUT) Thesis of Universal Theism
W CD Warrant: The Current Debate, by Alvin Plantinga
W PF Warrant and Proper Function, by Alvin Plantinga
viii
But, allowing that every man is able to demonstrate to himself, that the world, and
all things contained therein, are effects, and had a beginning, which I take to be a
most absurd supposition, and look upon it to be almost impossible fo r unassisted
reason to go so far; yet, i f effects are to be ascribed to similar causes, and a good and
wise effect must suppose a good and wise cause, by the same way o f reasoning, all the
evil and irregularity in the world must be attributed to an evil and unwise cause.
So that either the first cause must be both good and evil, wise and foolish, or else
there must be two first causes, an evil and irrational, as well as a good and wise
principle. Thus man, left to himself, would be apt to reason, "If the cause and effects
are similar and conformable, matter must have a material cause; there being nothing
more impossible fo r us to conceive, than how matter should be produced by spirit or
any thing else but spirit."
Jonathan Edwards
PREFACE
But a man is not really convinced o f a philosophic theory when he finds that
something proves it. He is only really convinced when he finds that everything
proves it.
G. K. Chesterton
The project of natural theology has been to attempt to demonstrate the
rationality of belief in God based on propositional evidence. And concurrent with such
a project are at least tw o assumptions, sometimes more conscious than at other times,
but nevertheless always there. The first assumption is that rationality can be shown
only if it successfully responds to the evidential challenge. The evidential challenge
contends, generally, that one may not rationally believe in that which one cannot
demonstrate, by propositional evidence, to be the case. Thus, one’s belief in God is
impermissible until and unless one can show by propositional evidence that such belief
is rational, warranted, justified, o r whatever notion of acceptability one may prefer to
use.
N ow the ways that some have sought to meet this challenge have been varied in
their specific details. Thomas Aquinas sought to demonstrate G od’s existence in (at
least) five ways, beginning in each case from that which we know empirically and
w orking our way to that which we should deduce from such empirical knowledge.
Others, such as Bishop Joseph Butler, have attempted to begin, like Aquinas, w ith that
which we know, and then to conclude that, given what we know, it is not irrational to
believe other, analogous, propositions contained within the Christian faith. If, for
example, we see the flower die in w inter but come alive again in the spring, perhaps it
is not irrational to believe that, when we die, we too come alive again.
Whatever the form of argument, Christian apologetics has a long history of
attem pting to show that belief in God is rational based on the available evidence. And
in virtually all of the argumentation, the apologist has begun w ith that which everyone
claims to know and moved forward to that which many reject, i.e., belief in God.
The second assumption behind the project of natural theology has been the near
universal and wholly uncritical way in which those who argue for G od’s existence in
this way do so affirming, either explicitly or implicitly, the neutrality of the reasoning
process. If we were to th ink of a starting point as the place in which one might
uncritically begin one’s inquiry, then historically the starting point for the natural
theologian has been the neutrality of the process of reasoning. Thus, given this starting
point, it would seem that the existence of God and any necessity of believing in him
w ould be dependent on that which is given initially (be it neutral reasoning o r some
other starting point). In Aquinas, for example, a distinction is made between truths
which are self-evident and truths which need demonstration. The existence of G od
belongs in the latter category and, it would seem, itself needs the form er category in
order adequately to be shown. H ow then, we might ask, does the existence of G od
have any relevance to the form er category at all? And how might we explain the
xi
general agreement, if there be such, in self-evident beliefs in the first place? Who
decides what is self-evident and how? The answer to these questions has been to affirm
both the power and the process of reasoning.
In framing the natural theology debate in just this way, the relevance of Alvin
Plantinga’s epistemology for Christian apologetics becomes apparent. Plantinga has
attempted, throughout much of his career, to argue for the rationality of theistic belief.
In the past decade, he has attempted to do so under the banner of "Reformed
epistemology." Thus, my interest in Plantinga stems, not only from his general attem pt
to show that belief in God is rational, but now from his more specific denotation of his
epistemology as "Reformed." Fleshing out the substance of these two words,
"Reformed" and (Plantinga’s concern for and development of) "epistemology," will be
the general challenge of the pages following.
Plantinga, by way of upbringing and education, is aware of the historic
Reformed attitude toward the notion and project of natural theology. His education
both at home and more specifically at Calvin College, with influence primarily from
William H arry Jellema and H enry Stob, taught him something of the healthy suspicion
toward natural theology that has been present, not only in Calvin, but historically in
the D utch Reformed tradition following him. Thus, Plantinga, in line with that
tradition, has sought to w ork out the details of such a suspicion. And in so doing, he
has appealed to men such as Calvin, Kuyper and Bavinck in order to support his
rejection of the supposed need for natural theology in order for belief in God to be
rational. And he has argued, in his Reformed epistemology proposal, that belief in
xii
G od, rather than necessitating propositional evidence, as a m atter of fact, needs no such
evidence or argumentation in order properly or rationally to be held. And to insist
that it does is to w ork w ithin the confines of an inadequate epistemology.
A nother part of Plantinga’s project has been to develop an adequate
epistemology. Given such a project, at least two implications follow. First, Plantinga
has not set out specifically to develop an adequate apologetic. Therefore, though we
will see his project as itself an apology for the rationality of belief in God, we cannot
approach it as another apologetic method. Apologetics per se deals w ith criteria and
content w ith which Plantinga is not directly concerned. Having said that, however, it
is certainly the case that Plantinga’s development has direct implications for apologetics,
and we will seek to make that more explicit in the following chapters. Second, because
Plantinga’s project has been to develop an adequate epistemology, we will need to look,
w ith him, at some of the main currents in epistemology and thus our focus will be, at
times, more philosophical. This, of course, is not detrimental to apologetics as such,
given the fact that it interfaces, quite properly and naturally, with philosophy.
Beyond the more specific concerns of Reformed epistemology, Plantinga is, at
this stage in his career, seeking to develop an externalist epistemology that will not only
allow for warranted belief generally, but will also allow for warranted Christian belief.
And this latter concern will move Plantinga from his initial appeal that theistic belief is
innocent unless proven guilty and toward the warranted-ness of theistic belief if the
external factors leading to such are appropriately present. Thus, any analysis of
Plantinga, to this point, must deal both w ith his Reformed epistemology, as well as his
xtii
critique and development of warranted belief.
Furtherm ore, because of my interest in Reformed apologetics, I will need to look
beyond Plantinga’s arguments for justified or warranted theistic belief to the (Reformed)
apologetic implications of such arguments. In doing this, it is necessary to assume that
for which I cannot argue here, i.e., the need for theistic philosophy to consult theology
in its development. Because Plantinga does not do this, some problems in his
epistemology develop.
Prim arily and most obviously, Plantinga fails both to critique the
presuppositions behind other, opposing positions, as well as to give an adequate account
of his ow n presuppositions. And though he gives encouragement to his peers to start
their philosophical investigations w ith the existence of God, he does not seem to
understand this idea of "starting with" in the context of the necessity of
presuppositional argumentation. Therefore, while attempting to refute natural
theology’s answer to the evidentialist challenge, he at the same time does so w ithin the
context o f natural theology’s assumption of the neutrality of reason. As a m atter of
fact, Plantinga argues for religious neutrality in certain areas, thus borrow ing (not only
from the strengths but) from the weaknesses of his own D utch Calvinist tradition.
A nd, consequently, given the supposed neutrality of reason, or, perhaps better, the
assumed ability of reason to function w ithout recourse to biblical revelation, Plantinga’s
genius is limited both by the relativism or the stark emptiness of those positions he
seeks to m aintain and defend. Belief in God, therefore, is put forth as a belief among
other, optional, beliefs and acquired by supposedly neutral, unbiased functions. And
xiv
this cannot suffice within the context of the Christian position. The reasons for such
insufficiency are addressed w ithin the following pages.
In order adequately to critique Plantinga, it was necessary, first, to summarize
and encapsulate his position both w ith its Reformed epistemology emphasis and its
current emphasis on warrant. This summary, along w ith an initial look at Plantinga’s
first book-length argument for the rationality of theistic belief in God and Other Minds,
will be the substance of chapter one. Chapters two and three will set forth the main
tenets of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology and his critique and theory of justified or
warranted belief, respectively. In chapter four, we will build the bridge between
analysis and critique, seeking to show the importance of presuppositions for a Christian
epistemology and apologetic. Chapters five and six will focus on the shortfalls of
Reformed epistemology and Plantinga’s theory of proper function, respectively, while
chapter seven will attempt (speculatively) to provide some input to Plantinga’s
forthcom ing Warranted Christian Belief.
To the extent that any of the above is either clear or successful, credit must be
given where credit is due. To those acquainted with his work, the influence of the
thought of Cornelius Van Til should be obvious. Van Til’s radical critique of positions
that seek to oppose the tru th of Christianity provides the church w ith a lifetime of
fodder for those who desire a biblical defense of the Christian position. Beyond that
general influence, the influence of Van Til’s successor, Dr. Robert D. Knudsen, my
faculty advisor, should be obvious to any who know his passion for a transcendental
critique. D r. William Edgar, as my second faculty reader and, more im portantly, my
XV
good friend, has faithfully and graciously pushed me toward the fruition of this project.
D r. Sinclair Ferguson, who has been both a friend and a spiritual father to me, has
never tired of encouraging me to persevere. W ithout such encouragement, not only
would I likely be w ithout a dissertation, but w ithout a Ph.D . as well.
One of the great surprises that I encountered when I began seriously to consider
Plantinga’s work, was the graciousness and willingness that those w hom I had yet to
meet and who themselves had little time for such things have shown. William Alston,
William Hasker, Merold Westphal, Mark McLeod and Nicholas W olterstorff have all
provided me either with unpublished manuscripts or critical comments in the process of
writing.
Aside from the above, two experiences were most helpful and meaningful as I
worked through Plantinga’s material. First, Dr. James Sennett, whom I have yet
personally to meet, spent a tremendous amount of time in correspondence and on the
phone helping me both with an honest understanding of Plantinga and with clarity in
writing. His effort in this regard testifies to his ability as a theistic philosopher and his
gracious character. To the extent that this material fairly represents Plantinga and is
clear, to that extent has Sennett influenced it.
Secondly, I would like to thank Alvin Plantinga. W hen I first began my study,
he was kind enough to provide his, as yet unpublished, manuscripts on warrant. N ot
only so, but he has graciously answered both my questions and my criticisms as I have
worked through his material. Perhaps most gratifying as I met w ith him at N otre
Dame was his subsequent kind invitation and transportation to his church the following
xvi
Lord’s Day, followed by a delicious brunch in his home. N ot only did I have occasion
to see Plantinga the philosopher, but also to see Plantinga the elder and husband.
Surely Plantinga’s willingness to help those w hom he hardly knows is a testim ony to
the man behind the reputation. For having such an opportunity, I am grateful to him.
I am thankful to my dear wife, Peggy, who has been with me now for sixteen
years through trials of ministry and study, and w ithout whom I could not have done
either. She is the best example of a godly woman that I have ever seen and it is only
by grace that I have the privilege to know her as my wife. W ith encouragement and a
listening ear, she has endured lonely Saturdays and countless hours of her husband’s
preoccupations and meanderings. She has almost forgotten that her heart’s desire was
to m arry a rancher.
Finally, I thank the Lord for his goodness and mercy. If there is any tru th in
anything I have said in these pages, it is only to his credit; to him be the glory. It is
because of him that I have been pressed to affirm the necessity of presupposing his
existence in everything if anything is to be shown. I think it was C. S. Lewis who
once said, "I believe in the sun, not because I see it, but because by it I see everything
else." Well, it is only by virtue of G od’s existence that anything else can be seen,
know n, believed, etc. And a truly Christian epistemology should seek to show that
belief in G od is necessary in order to "see" anything else for what it is. Everything
proves that God exists. And a part of the cultural mandate is to w ork out the
implications of that truth. Only by the grace of God can such a task be explored and
developed. O nly by his grace has this task been initiated. And if there is even a
xvii
moment of success, that, too, is by his grace.
K. Scott O liphint
Spring 1994
xviii
C H A PTER 1
IN T R O D U C T IO N
1.1 The Background
Alvin Pi<wJnga has distinguished himself as the preeminent philosopher of
religion in America. In 1985, one of the "Profiles" series was devoted exclusively to his
thought, with subjects ranging from ontology' to foreknowledge to epistemology.1 At
the beginning of the volume the editors state, "Alvin Plantinga is widely recognized as
the most im portant philosopher of religion now writing. Indeed, his w ork is the
principal reason for the rebirth and flowering of philosophical theology during the past
tw enty years."2
To put the m atter within an (American) historical framework, the influence of
logical positivism called into suspicion any and all religious systems, including, of
course, Christianity. It seems that A ntony Flew and Alasdair M acIntyre’s New Essays
in Philosophical Theology in 1955 effectively rendered Christianity irrelevant and
1 James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, eds., Alvin Plantinga

(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985). There are certainly many
players in the Reformed epistemology game. Without doubt, Nicholas Wolterstorff has
published and defended such a view. William Alston is also within the general purview.
However, because of his extensive writing and thinking on the matter, we shall be highlighting
Plantinga as its primary representative.
2 Ibid., ix.
2
unconscious in American philosophical circles.3 One of the responses forthcoming to
logical positivism generally, and to Flew and MacIntyre more specifically, was the
fideistic assertion of Ludwig W ittgenstein’s later followers, in which religion (including
Christianity) was affirmed to be relevant, but only to itself, i.e., w ithin its ow n
"language game." The best that philosophy was able to do, in the face of the positivist
critique, was to confine religion to its own narrow circle of adherents. Yet even as
positivism finally self-destructed, religion still seemed marginalized, unable to assert its
relevance in, o r to speak to, matters philosophical. Alvin Plantinga changed that.
Before looking more specifically at the development of that change, direction and
definition are in order.
1.11 The Goal
It would be helpful at this point to summarize the substance of our critique in
order to see something of the forest before looking at the trees. The way in which we
will need to proceed will be, in one sense, very simple. We will seek to show that
Plantinga has not been sufficiently critical of his own, and others presuppositions in the
development both of his early "Reformed" epistemology and his later, fuller
development dealing with the knotty problem of warrant. Things are never as simple
as they seem, however.
O u r first task will be to set forth Plantinga’s position as clearly as possible,
including relevant arguments and criticisms. We shall deal, in chapter two, w ith
3 Note, for example, Merold Westphal’s article, "A Reader’s Guide to ’Reformed
Epistemology’," in Perspectives (November, 1992): 10.
Plantinga’s early arguments for the rationality of theistic belief, focusing primarily on
substantive issues related to his Reformed epistemology. In chapter three, we shall look
at Plantinga’s latest w ork on warrant. We will attempt to show both why and how he
changed his epistemological developments from wanting to argue for permissive
justification, and thus for theistic belief to be innocent until proven guilty, to a more
externalist view of knowledge in which how one acquires and maintains a true belief
becomes prom inent. Chapters two and three, then, will be an attempt accurately to
present Plantinga’s position and arguments for such.
C hapter four should be seen as the bridge between an exposition and a critique
of Plantinga’s position. Having analyzed Plantinga’s position, we will attempt, in
chapter four, to begin our critique. We will notice that Plantinga gives, at least to some
extent, the solution to his own predicament. Specifically, Plantinga urges those who are
Christians doing philosophy to "start with God" in their philosophizing. In noticing
his encouragement, we will also notice that Plantinga himself should seek to do the
same as he develops his epistemology. He, too, should "start with God."4 And because
of a somewhat confused understanding, generally speaking, of just what a
presupposition is, it will be necessary for us as we proceed to attem pt (though only to a
zeroeth approximation) to give it some defining characteristics.
Having done that, we will then show that Plantinga’s notion of the Reformed
* This is not quite accurate because Plantinga does, at least in some sense, start with God.
O f course, to "start with" God has various connotations and applications. We will attempt to
show that Plantinga’s own attempt to start with God actually excludes the necessary relevance
of his existence from the very position that Plantinga wants to maintain. If that is true, then
the notion of "starting with God" must be reconstructed.
4
objection to natural theology is itself in need of a radical critique. While Plantinga
wants to see such a rejection as an epistemological problem, we will seek to show rather
th at the problem was on the level of presuppositions. Among the, primarily
philosophical, reasons for a rejection of natural theology is its commitment to the
"principle of sufficient reason." Such a principle can only conclude for a contingent
god, at best. Furthermore, we will show that Plantinga’s presupposition of religious
neutrality (a presupposition which our definition of presupposition will automatically
reject) serves only to negate a fully Christian approach to epistemology.
In chapter five, we will critique (1) Plantinga’s idea of properly basic theistic
belief, (2) foundationalism, (3) its Reidian cousin and (4) evidentialism. While we will
w ant to affirm that one may believe in G od without propositional evidence, and thus
that one’s belief in G od may be properly basic, we will also want to affirm that such
evidence must be available and able to be shown. Given that every fact is created and
thus reveals God, we shall see that the fact of God’s existence is included within and
"supervenes" upon every fact and the knowledge thereof. If such is the case, one’s
showing of justification (and thus the rationality or warrant of a given belief) need only
go so far as the justification of any given know n or believed fact. O u r criticism of
foundationalism, therefore, in this regard will be that it fails to account for a
transcendental thrust in which one’s beliefs and knowledge must be grounded in
presuppositions. Plantinga’s notion of foundationalism only allows for a relativistic
paradigm for theistic belief such that one may properly basically believe that theism is a
crutch o r that it is legitimate, depending on one’s condition/belief set.
5
Reidian foundationalism will fail, again, because of its failure to account for
presuppositions. Setting up its own foundations in terms of comm on sense beliefs
allows for no consciousness of presuppositions, nor does it give to such beliefs the
ground needed for them to be posited as "common." Thus, presuppositions are either
unaccounted for o r are the common sense beliefs themselves. In either case, common
sense beliefs cannot provide for foundational considerations.
Evidentialism, like the above, will suffer at the hands of its presuppositions. The
decided necessity for propositional evidence will founder because of foundationalism’s
criticisms, but will nevertheless show itself to be useful if defined theistically. The
Christian position contends that since God created the universe every thing displays
evidence of G od’s existence and thus his existence can be shown in each and every fact
or belief (even belief in no God presupposes that he is).
Finally, we shall show that Plantinga’s notion of Calvin’s sensus divinitatis is
both insufficient and inaccurate. Rather, the sensus will be shown to be knowledge, not
mere belief, and as such will play a significant epistemological role.
C hapter six will amend Plantinga’s position on warrant, as explained in chapter
three. It will argue that the elements of creation, the fall and redemption in Jesus
Christ are necessary for any proper understanding of warranted belief. We shall note
that, given the first eight chapters of the Westminster Confession o f Faith, Plantinga’s
"first approximation" is in serious need of amendment.
In chapter seven, we shall simply speculate on Plantinga’s third, yet unwritten,
volume. We shall indicate the direction w ith which he should go w ith regard to two
6
Reformed notions with which he proposes to deal, i.e., the sensus divinitatis and the
testimonium Spiritus Sancti. Given that the first o f these will receive attention in
chapter five, we will concentrate our attention more on the second.
The general framework will be one of analysis and amendment. The bulk of
amendments, however, will begin in chapter four and conclude in chapter seven. First,
however, we must define our task more specifically.
1.12 The Task
The directions in which one can go and the tasks in which one can engage when
analyzing Plantinga are as rich and philosophically varied as his own writings.
However, because of our interests in Reformed apologetics, we shall attem pt to stay
w ithin the parameters of what we will call the "Reformed Epistemology Proposal" or
REP.
Though Plantinga would most likely not consider himself to be, first and
foremost, an apologist, he does state that one of his primary interests as a philosopher
has always been in apologetics.5 It is patently obvious, then, that REP is itself, at least
from one perspective, an apologetical argument. It is an attempt to demonstrate, to
show, one might even say, to prove, that one’s belief in the existence of God is
epistemicaily acceptable, o r rational, o r warranted. The arguments themselves tend to
be confined within more specifically philosophical terrain, yet because the philosophical
5 1 say that Plantinga would not consider himself first and foremost to be an apologist due to
his intense interest in philosophy and its relationship to theology and Christianity. See his
"Self-Profile" in Tomberlin and van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, 33.
7
debate centers itself around belief in God, the apologist may naturally be included in
the discussions. A nd because Plantinga’s arguments are classified by him as arguments
for a Reformed epistemology, the Reformed apologist has a vested interest in such
arguments. As we engage, then, in matters philosophical, our primary interests and
goals will be to see how the new Reformed epistemology relates itself to a Reformed
apologetic.6
Let us initially think of Plantinga’s position with the following approximation in
mind. Here is a summary of the Reformed Epistemology Proposal (REP):
REP: Theistic belief can have warrant within the context of a legitimate
epistemological structure.
There are a few points of clarification needed in REP that should be mentioned
here.7 First, note that REP is stated as an apologetic affirmation. It is stated in terms
of the "warrantedness" of theistic belief. It is stated as the conclusion to an argument
for the rationality of belief in the existence of God or, at the very least, as a significant
6 The issues here can become complex, particularly because much of what Plantinga has
done is still in process; all the more reason to attempt to have input into the process. However,
the issues surrounding the articles in the book Faith and Rationality are significandy different
from those surrounding his recendy published volumes on warrant. The former seeks to
develop an epistemology into which Chrisuan beliefs may most comfortably fit as warranted,
while the latter work more direcdy within an already established epistemological framework,
though somewhat altered. James Sennett sees the continuity in Plantinga’s work in terms of a
broader epistemological debate (see below). Because our interests are more specifically
apologedcal, we shall seek to narrow the focus to Plandnga’s REP. See Alvin Plantinga and
Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (hereafter FR)
(Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) and James F. Sennett,
Modality, Probability, and Rationality: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga
(hereafter MPR) (New York, Peter Lang, 1992).
7 It might be helpful to reiterate at this point that "theisuc belief" is belief that God exists.
8
element of such an argument.8 REP, then, is apologetic in nature.
N ote secondly that we use the term "warrant" in REP. We do so in order to see
REP w ithin the context of Plantinga’s most recent thinking on belief in God generally
and its relationship to epistemology. If one prefers the more traditional notion
"rationality" or "justification," one may substitute "rational" or "justified" for the term
"warrant" in REP, provided one is aware of the inherent problems associated with such
substitutes, some of which will be discussed below.
Thirdly, notice that there is mention of a "legitimate epistemological structure"
in REP. This, of course, is a debate in its own right, left purposely ambiguous here,
and much of our discussion will have to focus on the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of
certain episiemologies.
Fourth, when it is said that theistic belief "can" have warrant, the notion of
"can" is meant to express what Plantinga means when he says one can be w ithin one’s
epistemic rights in one’s theistic belief. "Can" here conveys epistemic permission, or
acceptance. As important, it conveys also that one need not include theistic belief
among one’s belief structure.
Finally, it will be helpful, given the above, to see REP as (at least) tw o projects
w ithin one; the project of affirming a legitimate epistemology (the first project) into
which warranted theistic belief (the second project) can fit. W ithout regard to logical
‘ There is an obvious difference between an argument for the existence of God and an
argument for beli-f in the existence of God as warranted. Though we shall not be thinking of
these two kinds of argument as interchangeable, we shall see both as apologetical in thrust and,
in that sense, similar so that our dealing with REP can be seen as a significant element in
apologetical argumentation.
(or any other) priority, let us call Plantinga’s first project, i.e., that of affirming a
legitimate epistemology, P IP and Plantinga’s second project, i.e., that of attempting to
argue for warranted theistic belief, P2P. This is what makes REP so complex and, at
times, difficult to analyze; we have tw o significant projects w ithin one creative and
controversial proposal. We can frame the matter, then, in this way:
REP: Theistic belief can have warrant within the context of a legitimate
PIP: A legitimate epistemological structure must be argued for and
affirmed.’
P2P: Theistic belief can have warrant within the parameters of P IP .10
Further initial points of clarification are needed here. We have noticed already
the intentional ambiguity of the phrase "legitimate epistemological structure." Given
that the details of such will become less muddled, what could it mean to argue for a
such and then to affirm the same? What does "affirmed" add to that which is "argued
for?" W hy must we state the m atter as an attempt both to argue for and affirm
9 We mention again the obvious ambiguity in the phrase "legitimate epistemological

structure". Such ambiguity does not need to hinder our discussion at this point since much of
what is legitimate and what is illegitimate will be included in our analysis below. However, the
problem of just what "legitimacy" entails will remain. Is legitimacy primarily normative? Is it
that which provides for the insights of Thomas Reid? Do common sense beliefs determine the
legitimacy of an epistemology? These questions cannot be dealt with at this time.
10 In personal correspondence with Plantinga, I asked him about the accuracy of my REP:
PIP, P2P summaries. In response, (April 29, 1993) he notes,
As to your account of my project: it seems perfectly sensible and accurate. The only
point I’d make is that what actually happened wasn’t as organized and clear as you
make it. I started with the stuff about how belief in God is like belief in other minds,
and how it doesn’t necessarily need propositional evidence. Reflecting on that led me to
broader epistemological concerns: it wasn’t as if I had those broader concerns in mind
all along.
10
something?
The answer, it seems, is that one could very well describe the argument, say, for
the incom patibility of the existence of God and the presence of evil. One could indeed
argue fo r such a position so that the arguments are laid out clearly and cogently. In the
context of this, one could also remain agnostic as to the same problem. That is to say,
though one may not have sound refutations for the argued incompatibility of G od’s
existence and evil, one still may not affirm such an argument. To argue for something,
then, is to set it out clearly; and maybe even to set out the argument as the best one
available. But to affirm such an argument adds commitment, that is, personal
com m itm ent to that which is argued for. Affirmation, then, adds commitment.
P2P is, in one sense, the climax of what Plantinga seems to be wanting. In
form ulating P2P in just that way, the attem pt is made to say, first, that theistic belief
can have warrant. It intentionally implies that theistic belief may not have warrant.
O ne can imagine a situation in which one claimed to believe in God because one was
convinced that one was God and one believed in one. O ne’s theistic belief would, in
this case, hardly have warrant. However, Plantinga wants to maintain that if one’s
cognitive faculties are functioning properly in an appropriate epistemic environm ent
(with other qualifiers), then one’s belief is warranted. "Can," then, means roughly what
it means in REP, though the context in P2P has shifted.
"W ithin the parameters of PIP" will be difficult to nail down precisely due to
the complexity of the discussions. However, it seems to carry with it at least the
following: To use one example, coherentism is illegitimate as an epistemological
11
structure because of its failure to take account of experience, at least according to
Plantinga (but see below). As illegitimate, then, theistic belief cannot have warrant even
i f one's cognitive faculties are functioning properly and one's epistemic environment is
appropriate, because the coherentist is, by definition, not concerned w ith one’s
environm ent. It seems, then, that one’s warranted theistic belief must be maintained
w ithin the context of an epistemology that is acceptable. W hether construing of
coherentism as it stands or seeking to "convert" it into some kind of foundationalism,
as Plantinga does, the conclusion is that coherentism fails and thus can stake no claim
on theistic belief. The expression, "within the parameters...,” then, is an attempt to say
that warrant must have a proper context, even beyond proper function and appropriate
environm ents.11
So we shall view Plantinga’s REP as an apologetic, more specifically, a self
professed Reformed apologetical argument, as he argues for warranted theistic belief,
and part of what we will say below must analyze the extent to which REP is
Reformed.12
1.2 Theistic Belief as Rational
In the early 1960s, Plantinga began to publish and edit books and articles
11 For this discussion and clarification of REP and its correlates PIP and P2P, I am grateful
to James Sennett for comments made in personal correspondence.
12James Sennett sees the golden thread in all of Plantinga’s work as an argument for theistic
belief and he is certainly correct. It is, however, Plantinga’s fairly recent notation of his
argument as "Reformed” that will focus our analysis more specifically than what Sennett desires
to do.
12
that dealt specifically with philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion.13 He
began to wrestle with such things as the classical ontological argument for the existence
of God, the problem of evil and its relationship to free will, the nature of necessity and
others. In 1967, he published God and Other Minds as an attempt to deal specifically
w ith the rationality of belief in God. O f this book Plantinga says,
In Part III I explore various analogies between belief in G od and belief in other
minds. I conclude that these two beliefs are on an epistemological par: if either
is rational, so is the other. But surely belief in other minds is rational. Thus,
we must say the same for belief in G od.14
Plantinga himself would probably admit that some of the suppositions of God and
Other Minds have been, in subsequent years, somewhat altered. However he would also
contend that what is argued in this early w ork would be substantially the same now in
his current works on epistemology and warrant (and thus are alluded to in his later
writings). It will be helpful, therefore, to look at his argument, and to see it as an
initial attem pt to develop what would come to be called a "Reformed epistemology".
Having looked at that, we will then try to show how the development of Reformed
epistemology has taken shape to the present.
In God and Other Minds, Plantinga recognizes that belief in G od (which for
Plantinga means belief that God exists) is assumed by most to be at best irrational. He
13 For example, Alvin Plantinga, "A Valid Ontological Argument?," Philosophical Review 70
(1961): 93-101; "The Perfect Goodness of God," Australasian Journal o f Philosophy 40 (1962): 70-
75; "Christianity and Analytic Philosophy," Christianity Today 8, no. 2 (1963): 17-20; ed., Faith
and Philosophy, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964); "The Free
Will Defense," in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black (New York: Cornell University Press,
1965), 204-220; "Kant’s Objection to the Ontological Argument," Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966):
104-108.
14 Tomberlin and Van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, 400.
13
therefore wants to show that belief in God is rational, just as belief in other minds is
rational. "In this study I set out to investigate the rational justification of belief in the
existence o f God as he is conceived in the Hebrew-Christian tradition."15 In his
investigation throughout the book, Plantinga seeks to analyze various attempts at
proving G od’s existence (e.g., the cosmological and ontological arguments) as well as
one of the prim ary objections to Christianity, the problem of evil. We shall not deal
with these, his first tw o, sections of God and Other Minds because of our more specific
concerns w ith REP. In Part ID, Plantinga turns to the analogical argument for the
rationality of belief that God exists. This section will be a helpful introduction to our
discussion o f REP.16
Plantinga’s contention in this (last) section of the book is that neither natural
theology nor natural atheology can provide a successful answer to the question of the
rationality of belief in G od.17 He wants to establish, therefore, that the analogical
argument for other minds provides justification for the rationality of belief, also, in
God.
The analogical argument has been supported by a num ber of important thinkers,
15 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1967), vii.
161 think it is fair to say that Plantinga’s concerns in God and Other Minds were couched
within the context of what he would later show to be an illegitimate epistemological structure.
O r at least he would recognize problems with his previous intemalism as contrasted with his
current externalist view of warrant. Because of this, there will be dissimilarities between the
arguments here and REP. As said above, though, these arguments are certainly the father of
REP and thus will bear the family resemblance, though with differences.
17 Ibid., 187.
14
among w hom are Descartes (Discourse on Method, Part V) and Locke (Essay Concerning
H um an Understanding, Book IV, Ch. iii, par. 27) in its seminal form. Later, more
explicit, arguments were given by David Hume, J.S. Mill, C.I. Lewis, A.J. Ayer, C.D.
Broad, H .H . Price and Bertrand Russell.18 There is a long-standing tradition for this
kind of argument.
After discussing objections (Wittgensteinian and Strawsonian) to the analogical
argument for the existence of other minds, Plantinga delineates, in chapter nine, certain
alternatives to the argument. While these discussions indirectly relate to our primary
epistemological and apologetical concerns, we shall have to move directly to the
relevant discussion of "God and Analogy" in chapter ten.19
The analogical argument for belief in other minds refers, for example, to the
analogy of my pain (as one "mind") with your pain in order to "prove" that you are
another "mind."20 Plantinga’s contention will be that if it is proven, o r at least to the
extent that it is proven, that you are an other mind, to that extent we must be rational
in believing in God also. O f central importance, then, in his argument in "God and
Analogy" are the following propositions:
(a) I am not the only being that feels pain.
18 For specific references to the works of each of these authors see Ibid., 191-192, n. 4.
19 It will be instructive to notice the progression of argument in this chapter so that the
very tentative conclusion at the end will come as no surprise.
20 In this aspect of "other minds" argumentation, it is supposed that pain is, rather than
purely physical, evidence of an inner conscious state and thus is (at least a piece of the) proof of
the existence of "mind." If it can be shown, then, that you experience pain, then by
implication it has been shown that you are another "mind."
15
(b) There are some pains that I do not feel.

(c) Sometimes certain areas of my body are free from pain.
(d) There are some pains that are n ot in my body.
(e) There are some cases of pain that are not accompanied by pain-behavior on
the part of my body.
(f) I am the only person who feels pain in my body.
(g) Sometimes someone feels pain when I do not.21
Following Plantinga (somewhat) we shall call this set of propositions (or its analogues)
K, which must be more probable than not on total evidence, both individually and in
any combination.
W hat, then, is our proof that K is rational? O n what basis are we given to
believe K? The answer, simply put, is that we are given to believe K by way of
inductive argument, if at all. We observe that in every situation in which a body
displayed pain-behavior, pain was present. Thus, probably, every case of pain-behavior
is accompanied by pain in the body displaying it.22
There are problems, however, w ith this kind of argument. While it may be true
that in every situation in which I observe pain-behavior in a body that body did in fact
have pain, it is also true that such an argument, in attempting to support (a) and (b)
above, allows for no conditions to the contrary. The inference from "in every situation
in which a body displayed pain-behavior pain was present" to "probably every case of
pain-behavior is accompanied by pain in the body displaying it" allows for no instance
in which an observed body does not contain a pain. The argument itself seems to
presuppose a necessary connection between the observation of pain-behavior and the
21 Ibid., 252-253.
22 Ibid., 254.
16
presence of pain in the body observed. "The fact that one cannot observe the absence
o f pain appeared earlier to deliver the analogical position from disaster; here it returns
to wreak destruction upon it."23 Therefore, there seems to be no strong argument for
the assertion of (a) and (b), due to the weakness of the inferences involved.
(c) above, however, seems to be the only proposition which Plantinga is willing
to concede as helpful. But in order to see any validity to (c) (Sometimes certain areas of
m y body are free from pain), we must look at A', the hub of Plantinga’s arguments for
and against K. A' states:
Where a, 0, is a simple inductive argument for S, 0 is of the form A ll A ’s have

B, and where C is any part of 0, a, 0 is acceptable for S only if the propositions
S has examined an A and determined by observation that it lacks C and S has
examined an A and determined by observation that it has C are both logically
possible.24
Proposition A ' is the statement to which any and all of K must conform if the latter,
K, is to be successful as an analogical argument. Obviously, we have already discovered
problems w ith both (a) and (b) above. H ow then does (c) hold up under A'? We
cannot observe the absence of pain in our own bodies. However,
(30) Every pain which is such that I have determined by observation

whether o r not it was accompanied by pain-behavior on the part of the
body in which it was located, has been so accompanied.
So probably
(31) Every pain is accompanied by pain-behavior on the part of the body

in which it is located.
But
u Ibid., 259.
14 Ibid., 258.
17
(32) A t least my body is not displaying pain-behavior.
Hence probably
(33) N o area of my body is presently pained.
From which (c) follows.25
N ote in this discussion two things. First, the reason that the above argument was
insufficient for (a) and (b) above, according to Plantinga, was due to the impossibility of
a counterinstance in the inductive inference. Such an impossibility is not applicable to
(c). Second, notice that both (a) and (b) depend on the existence of other persons
whereas (c) is specifically uni-personal. Thus, it would seem, though (c) is supported
w ith respect to A', it goes no distance in affirming, inductively, the existence of other
minds.
In propositions (d) and (e), Plantinga sees the same fallacy that accompanied (a)
and (b). The argument for (d) (There are some pains that are not in my body) includes
(1) Every case of pain-behavior such that I have determined by observation

w hether or not it was accompanied by pain in that body displaying it, was
accompanied by pain in that body. Hence, (2) probably every case of pain-
behavior is accompanied by pain in the body displaying it.26
We have already seen that such an inference excludes the possibility of observing
behavior in a body that does not display pain and thus, now, is ruled out by A',
specifically, the logical possibility of determining by observation that either A lacks C
or A has C. The same holds true for (e). Given A', we have now rejected (a), (b), (d)
and (e).
25 Ibid., 261. Obviously, I have kept Plantinga’s numbering here.
26 Ibid., 263.
18
"Does my total evidence provide me w ith a direct argument for (f)? Apparently
not."27 Based on A '’s stipulation of the logical possibility of observing both the lack of
and presence of C in A, (f) cannot be said either to stand or to fall. For if "every pain
in my body which is such that I have determined by observation whether o r not it is
felt by me, has been felt by me" is the premise, with (f), "I am the only person who
feels pain in my body” as the conclusion, A' is negated (or better, A' negates (f)) due to
the impossibility of observing a pain in my body which is not felt by me. So also
(given A7) can my total evidence provide me w ith an argument against (f). Thus, (f)
cannot stand either.
Finally, (g) (Sometimes someone feels pain when I do not), according to
Plantinga, ”[r]esembles (f) in that there seems to be no direct argument from my total
evidence either for o r against it."28
Thus, says Plantinga,
W hat the analogical arguer should conclude is that every pain occurs in his
ow n body and is accompanied by pain-behavior on the part of his body (and so,
perhaps, he could perform a splendid humanitarian service by destroying that
wretched body).29
Having summarized Plantinga’s argumentation we do not, at this point, want to
affirm o r reject the analogical argument for G od’s existence, but rather to show upon
what foundation rests Plantinga’s "rational basis" for belief in God at this stage of his
thinking.
27 Ibid., 265.
28 Ibid., 266.
29 Ibid., 267.
19
But let us suppose, as seems to me to be true, that there are no viable

alternatives to the analogical position. Then we must conclude, I believe, that a
man may rationally hold a contingent, corrigible belief even if there is no answer
to the relevant epistemological question.30
In other words, given K and its inability to stand the scrutiny of analysis (given A*), we
may, nevertheless, due to the lack of alternatives to K, rationally hold beliefs about
other minds, and thus about God. The rational justification of belief that God exists,
therefore, rests on the inability of the analogical position, the "analogical evidence,"31 to
make its case.
Hence, my tentative conclusion: if my belief in other minds is rational, so is

m y belief in God. But obviously the former is rational; so, therefore, is the
latter.32
We shall pursue this a bit more below but it should not escape us at this point
that the reason for belief in God is tied to the rationality of belief in other minds,
which rationality is such because there are no viable alternatives presently know n which
one may rationally believe.
O ne may wonder how secure such a belief (whether in God o r in other minds)
can be. Furtherm ore, a Reformed analysis should seek to place belief in God on firmer
ground, arguing, not for rationality based on the lack of presently known alternative
positions, o r rationality based on the fallacies or weaknesses inherent in the
argum entation of an acceptable position, but for the certainty of G od’s existence due to
the impossibility of any position which seeks to deny belief that G od exists. Crucial to
30 Ibid., 270.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 271.
20
this discussion is a Reformed analysis of knowledge and its near relatives (belief, truth,
warrant, justification, rationality) and these matters will have to be discussed in coming
chapters. Here in our early analysis, we will simply state that knowledge of G od is the
sine qua non of any other true, warranted, rational belief.
It will be instructive at this point to bring in the most recent criticism of
Plantinga’s theistic arguments in God and Other Minds (hereafter, GOM ), which
criticism will be relevant to our further discussion of the later w ork in Reformed
epistemology, what we are describing as REP.
In his book, Modality, Probability, and Rationality, James Sennett seeks to
analyze what he calls "The Plantinga Thesis," or PT,
PT: There is no plausible epistemological theory that rules out theistic belief as
a category of epistemically appropriate belief.33
He then begins to w ork through the elements of PT in light of Plantinga’s many and
varied attempts at its defense.
We have already seen that Plantinga’s burden in G O M is to contest what
A ntony Flew has called a "presumption of atheism," i.e., that the burden of proof is on
the theist and that one must produce sound, rational, compelling arguments for G od’s
existence if one desires rationally to hold the existence of G od as one’s belief.
Sennett frames Plantinga’s GOM argum ents) in this way,
(3) O ther minds belief is rational in virtue of the analogical argument if at all.
35 Sennett, MPR, 1. For the difference between Sennett’s Plantinga Thesis and my REP, see
note 12. Though I will agree in the main with Sennett’s criticisms of Plantinga’s position, I am
concerned, as Sennett was not, to relate Plantinga’s position as a Reformed epistemology to a
Reformed apologetic.
21
(4) The analogical argument has a certain flaw F.
Therefore,
(5) If other minds belief is rational, then an argument with F can establish the
rationality of its conclusion [from (3) and (4)].
(6) The ideological argument for theistic belief has F.
Therefore,
(7) Theistic belief is rational by virtue of the teleological argument if other

minds belief is rational by virtue of the analogical argument [from (3), (5), and
(6)]-
Therefore,
(8) Theistic belief is rational if other minds belief is [from (3) and (7)].34
In framing the argument in just this way, the conclusion hoped for by Plantinga
seems allusive at best.35 The contention above is that, just as the analogical argument is
considered by many to be rational in spite of its flaws, so we can affirm the rationality
of the teleological argument for God’s existence, which is itself flawed, and therefore
we can be assured of the rationality of theistic belief.36 However, Sennett seeks to show
that all Plantinga has given us in his argument is the possibility of theistic belief, which
is not enough to support PT. In other words, Plantinga wants to show that there is no
34 Sennett, MPR, 5. I am using Sennett’s own numbering.
351 am not sure at this point if Plantinga would frame the argument in the way that Sennett
has. To be sure, the implication of what Sennett stresses is there, but it may be that Plantinga
had more in mind than Sennett’s summary allows for.
36 It should be noted here and remembered that the teleological argument, in some form,
rears its head again in Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University Press,
1993) (hereafter WPF) and thus apparently maintains some importance to Plantinga as he
discusses his latest epistemological approach.
22
plausible epistemological theory that rules out the rationality of theistic belief. All he
has, in fact, shown is that theistic belief may be epistemically possible, given our
current arguments. Plantinga would not be comfortable with such a conclusion.
Rather than frame the discussion in just the way Sennett attempts to, it might be
m ore accurate to frame it with another emphasis. Sennett seeks to argue above that,
just as one flawed argument can conclude for the rationality of one belief, so another
flawed argument can conclude for the rationality of another, though similar, belief.
However, it seems that the emphasis in G O M is not on the comparison of the flaws of
accepted arguments, thus showing the conclusions of those arguments to be accepted
though flawed, but rather on the legitimacy of a belief though all that can be produced
is a flawed argument. It is not the flaw in the argument that provides for the
rationality of the belief, but rather it is the acceptability (could we say, the
justification?) of the belief in spite o f its flawed argument that gives another similar belief
justification. It is not quite accurate to say, therefore, that theistic belief is rational by
virtue of the teleological argument with its flaw just because "other minds" belief is
rational by virtue of its argument as flawed. Rather we could say that Plantinga’s point
is to show certain widely used and accepted arguments to be flawed though the beliefs
for which they argue are themselves entirely rational.37 This mild critique of Sennett’s
discussion is significant for the overall picture of the new Reformed epistemology and,
57 In framing Plantinga in just this way, we see hints of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense
Philosophy in which certain beliefs are simply accepted because they are common, whether or
not there are rational, compelling arguments for them. If our summary of Plantinga is right
here, therefore, there is a common "Reidian" thread throughout his epistemological
development, though it becomes more explicit in his latest work on warrant.
23
more im portantly for REP. Plantinga’s argument here is for P2P, the warrant or
justification o f theistic belief. H e is not saying that theistic belief is justified because
some flawed argument provides for its justification. He is saying that theistic belief is
justified just because belief in other minds is justified and we have no know n arguments
that can show it to be so. In other words, belief in God, like belief in other minds, is
innocent until proven guilty, and not, as in Flew, guilty until proven innocent.
1.21 Warrant and the Analogical Argument
In Plantinga’s latest work, Warrant and Proper Function, he develops and
supports the argument for other minds that he set forth first in G O M . In taking for
granted that certain beliefs about other per.jr.s have warrant for us, Plantinga asks, and
is prim arily interested in, the question as to how warrant is acquired in these
situations.38 Three answers are surveyed.
The first answer, interestingly, is the analogical position discussed above.
Summarily stated now, we know that other persons are persons because we observe in
them the same kinds of behavior that we ourselves exhibit and thus conclude that, like
us, the mental states we experience in relation to certain behavior is analogous to the
mental states that are most likely present when such behavior is exhibited by others.
Plantinga describes it this way; given a correlation of mental states and bodily behavior,
(1) W henever this body (i.e., my body) is in state S, there is a person whose
body it is who is (e.g.) angry.
I then observe that
31 Plantinga WPF, 65.
24
(2) B over there (a human body distinct from mine) is in state S
and conclude that
(3) B is a body of some person who is angry.39
The problem w ith this kind of argument is that arguments for the denial of
other persons can be, in the same way, devised. The analogical argument used to prove
that B is some person who is angry can be used also to show that, in fact, only / can be
angry. Because the analogical argument is unable to assume any connection between
mental states and behavior, and because (e.g.) all anger felt by me has only been felt by
me, it is just as easy to conclude that only / have felt angry.
The second argument for other persons is more a generalization of the first,
assuming our affirmation of the existence of other persons to be akin to scientific
hypothesis.40 This view, again like the first, is not to be construed as able to provide an
argument for other persons.
The third argument for other persons comes from W ittgensteinian criteria, i.e.,
"inward processes stand in need of outward criteria."41 Rather than base our belief in
other persons on analogical arguments or scientific hypotheses, there must be, say the
Wittgensteinians, certain criteria for us that allow us to conclude in favor of the
connection between behavior and mental states. The criteria seem to be some form of
39 Ibid., 68.
40 Ibid., 70.
41 See Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 212-244 and Ibid., 72.
25
behavior-with-circumstances.42 Plantinga sees this as a special form of what he calls
postclassical Chisholm ianism /3 In other words, warrant for the ascription of mental
states to another based on behavior-with-circumstances is relative to the intrinsic value
of the epistemic pairs which, in this case, are the mental-state-ascribing belief and the
behavior-with-circumstances.44 But, of course, there is no necessary connection (using
these criteria) between the mental state(s) ascribed and the behavior-with-circumstances.
The criteria given require such a connection and thus cannot provide warrant.
Thus, Plantinga is dissatisfied with the three primary arguments for other minds.
He is not, however, ready to say, with the skeptic, that belief in other minds is
irrational, quite the contrary. Belief in other minds (as we shall also see with regard to
belief in God) is warranted in any circumstances wherein mental states are ascribed to
another, provided one’s appropriate cognitive faculties are functioning properly.45 Says
Plantinga,
...I mean only to argue that we can (and do) have warrant for beliefs ascribing
mental states to others even if there aren’t any good inductive or abductive
arguments from premisses of the sort to which the analogical arguer must
confine himself to conclusions ascribing mental states to others.46
O ne of the primary tenets of Plantinga’s earlier REP will be that one’s belief in
« Ibid., 73.
41 See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford University Press, 1993)
(hereafter, WCD), Chapter 3.
44 Plantinga, WPF, 73-74.
45 Ibid., 75.
46 Ibid., 76. For more on this, see section 3.6.
26
God is "innocent until proven guilty, not guilty until proven innocent."'*7 One of the
supporting influences for this idea is the Com m on Sense philosopher, Thomas Reid. As
a m atter of fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, Plantinga labels the epistemological
structure for which he argues Reidian foundationalism, giving credit to Thomas Reid’s
comm on sense views. A nother supporting influence for the notion of a belief being
innocent until and unless proved guilty seems to stem from this initial discussion in
God and Other Minds. Plantinga himself refers us to this work on virtually every
occasion in which he is discussing the rationality of belief in God. We can see the seeds
for REP, therefore, in GOM and repeated again in his later works.
Therefore, as one follows the early arguments for the rationality of religious
belief, the distinct impression is left that the analogical argument is the best available for
the rationality of belief in other minds. The analogical argument also seems to fail at
significant points along the way as Plantinga offers counter evidence for its reliability.
Yet even in the face of such counter evidence, Plantinga is willing to admit that we do
have w arrant for ascribing mental states to others (and consequently for belief in God)
even though we can provide no good evidence for such belief. The "warrant" which
Plantinga is eager to give to such beliefs seems to culminate in the contention of the
new Reformed epistemology, i.e., that our beliefs (at least of this sort) are innocent
until proven guilty if formed by properly functioning epistemic faculties, with other
qualifiers. The first hint of REP is already present in God and Other Minds.
47 See, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorffs, "Can Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No
Foundations?," in FR, 163.
C H A PTER 2
T H E NEW REFORM ED EPISTEMOLOGY
2.1 The Evidentialist Critique48
O ne will immediately notice, in the description of the evidentialist critique
below, that the kind of evidentialism we are dealing with here is not an evidentialist
apologetic per se, but rather a philosophical criticism launched against those who would
want to determine how rationally to believe in the existence of God. In other words,
evidentialism here is not an argument fo r the existence of God based on evidence, but
rather it is either an argument against the existence of God based on the (supposed) lack
48 The evidentialist critique is, it seems to me, simply a springboard by which the
discussion of foundationalism’s demise and various problems of the justification of belief are
presented, in spite of the fact that Wolterstorff wants to insist that Reformed epistemology’s
project is simply to answer the evidentialist critique. It seems to me a bit strange to insist on
such a limitation when one of the most predominant epistemological traditions is being called
into question, not to mention the fact that he and Plantinga are attempting to give new insight
into the reality of belief in God. If we could frame the discussion within the context of REP,
we could say that the evidentialist critique has its place only within an illegitimate
epistemological structure (whether classical foundationalism or coherentism) and, as such, allows
no room for warranted tbeistic belief.
More is involved (in what I have called REP) than a simple critique of a certain
position. That is why I have attempted to see REP as two dependent yet distinct projects. Not
only is warranted theistic belief being argued for, but it is argued for only after (classical)
foundationalism, coherentism and reliabilism (see chapter three beiow) are found to be wanting.
It seems to me, then, that the evidentialist objection is not really the substance of Plantinga’s
response because as an objection, it must of necessity fit within an illegitimate epistemological
structure (but see Sennett, MPR). Sennett sees Plantinga’s rejection of evidentialism as the
primary problem, whether or not foundationalism is true.
27
28
of available, convincing evidence or an insistence (by either theist or nontheist) that
evidence must accompany any rational belief in G od’s existence.
The project of Reformed epistemology is to answer the evidentialist

critique of Christianity. The project is not to say how religious beliefs
are connected to each other. The project is not to say how religious
beliefs are connected to experience. The project is not to say how
religious beliefs are connected to life. The project is not to discuss how a
religious way of life is taught. The project is not to explain what a
religious way of life is. The project is not to consider what, if anything,
can be said to an unbeliever to "bring him around." The project is not to
discuss the role of reason in religion - to offer a theory of rationality in
religion. The project is not to develop a whole philosophy of religion of
a certain stripe. The project is to answer a certain criticism. Those who
are Reformed epistemologists have views on many of the issues cited
above; they have published some of those views. But, to say it one more
time, the project of Reformed epistemology as such is to answer a certain
criticism, a criticism not of Reformed epistemologists but rather of
Christians in general, and of Jews and Muslims and all other theists: the
evidentialist criticism. The project of Reformed epistemology is a
polemical project.49
From the above quote it seems obvious that at least one Reformed epistemologist
views much of the criticism that has been lodged against REP as irrelevant to the task
at hand.50 The task at hand is polemical; it is to answer the long-standing traditional
critique against theistic belief, i.e., that unless one has prepositional evidence for the
existence of God, one’s belief in him is somehow unsupported and therefore irrational.
O r, from the Christian perspective, it is to respond to the notion that, to be rationally
believed by S, Christianity must be evidentially supported by S.
49 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "What Reformed Epistemology is Not," Perspectives (November

1992): 15. WolterstorfPs last statement summarizes the apologetic thrust of REP.
50 I am not in full agreement with WolterstorfPs evaluation here; not that Wolterstorff fails
to understand what he has attempted to do, but rather there seems to be a lack of recognition of
the extent to which related truths (should) affect a truly Reformed epistemology.
The evidential objection to belief in God is summarized well in this way:
Evidentialism is the claim that religious belief is irrational, cognitively

disreputable, a violation of our epistemic duties, unless supported by sufficient
evidence or argument. Some theists have been willing to accept this assumption,
assuming that sufficient evidence or adequate argument can be provided to
render faith rational. But faith has not fared well in the empire of evidentialism,
especially after the assault on the theistic proofs by Hum e and Kant; and
Reformed epistemology rejects its rule as illicitly imperialistic, seeking to
establish the counterclaim that belief in God is properly basic.51
The primary text in which the response to the evidentialist objection is
expounded is Plantinga’s in the compendium of essays entitled Faith and Rationality:
Reason and Belief in God.
According to Plantinga, there is a long-standing tradition, perhaps more oral
than written, which suggests that one’s religious belief must conform to, or be based
upon, propositional evidence before it can rationally be accepted by one or acceptable
to one. Bertrand Russell, (to use just one prominent example) when asked to give a
reason why he does not believe in God, claimed he would respond (even to God), "N ot
enough evidence!"52 Plantinga’s most blatant example of the evidentialist objection to
belief in God comes from the nineteenth century philosopher-ethicist, W.K. Clifford,
"To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon
insufficient evidence".53 To the list of Clifford and Russell add Aquinas, Hume, A.
51 Westphal, "A Reader’s Guide to ’Reformed Epistemology’," 10.
52 See this quoted, for example, in George Mavrodes, "Jerusalem and Athens Revisited," FR,
199-200.
53 Plantinga quotes this in numerous places, among which are, "Rationality and Religious
Belief," in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 258; and FR, 25. The quote itself comes from W. K.
Clifford’s, "The Ethics of Belief," chap. in Lectures and Essays (London: Macmillan, 1879), 186.
30
Flew, Michael Scriven and others and the intellectual weight m ounts against the
nonevidential rationality of belief that God exists.
W hat Plantinga sets out to investigate, therefore, is (what he calls) the "moderate
evidentialist claim" that (1) it is irrational to accept theistic belief in the absence of
sufficient evidence or reasons and (2) there is no (or not sufficient) evidence for the
proposition that G od exists.54 The conclusion, of course, to (1) and (2) would simply
be the irrationality of belief in God based on the unavailability or inaccessibility o f
evidence.
It will be instructive to look at this discussion of the evidentialist objection, as
well as Plantinga’s more recent critique of evidentialist epistemology, which will then
lead us into the more central problem of foundationalism and its corollaries.55
One serious question that cannot be pursued here is whether or not Clifford, et al. were
as confined in their notion of evidence as Plantinga supposes. That is, were these objections
always referring to prepositional evidence or could other kinds of evidence been in view as well?
It seems Plantinga’s argument depends on a stria, prepositional notion of evidence, particularly
since he himself will admit that other kinds of evidence (perceptual, for example) are needed for
warrant.
MPlantinga, "Reason and Belief in God" in FR, 29. In the same book, Nicholas
Wolterstorff makes virtually the same point in his essay, "Can Belief in God Be Rational If It
Has No Foundations?" On page 136 of that essay Wolterstorff defines the evidentialist
challenge in terms of two claims:
...first if it is not rational to accept some proposition about God then one ought not
accept it; second, it is not rational to accept propositions about God unless one does so
on the basis of others of one’s beliefs which provide adequate evidence for them, and
with a firmness not exceeding that warranted by the strength of the evidence.
This is essentially Plantinga’s point and it is helpful to see that he and Wolterstorff agree on the
substance of this objection.
55 Plantinga (and Wolterstorff) take a different approach to the e v id en tia list objection than
would one in the tradition of Reformed apologetics. The details of this difference will be
discussed below. The substance of it, briefly, is that a truly Reformed approach to the
evidentialist objection would begin from a transcendental (covenantal) analysis of the objection
rather than an attempt at redefining the rules in which a (neutral) conception of rationality can
31
2.11 Critique of the Critique
O ne of the suppositions behind the evidentialist objection is the distinction
between "positive existential hypotheses" and "negative existential hypotheses".56 It is
contended that one is obliged to believe the denial of a positive existential hypothesis
(such as G od exists) in the absence of evidence whereas the same standard does not hold
for a negative existential hypothesis (such as the denial of the denial that God exists).
O n w hat basis, then, is it assumed that negative existentials have a stronger claim on us
than positive existentials?57
In conjunction w ith Plantinga’s discussion in God and Other Minds, must we say
that we are obliged to believe the denial of the existence of other minds (which is a
positive existential hypothesis) rather than its opposite in view of the lack of cogent
argument for such existence? O r must we not do what the history of philosophy has
done and assume the existence of other minds in spite of a supposed lack of
prepositional evidence? If the latter assumption is true, why must we assume the
opposing position when we discuss the existence of God? Such is the application of
be accepted and acceptable.
56 Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," FR, 28. In using these specific terms, Plantinga is
reacting specifically against Scriven’s objections to theistic belief.
57 Ibid. For those interested in the logic of the argument here, it is summarized for us.
According to Carnap and others, universal propositions have an a priori probability of zero.
Plantinga then reminds us that the negative existential, —(3x)Fx ("There is not at least one x
such that it is F") is quantificationally equivalent to the universal proposition, ((x) —Fx) ("There
is an x such that it is not F"), which, too, would have an a priori probability of zero. Its
positive existential denial would then have an a priori probability of 1 (on a probability scale of
0 to 1,0 being the least probable and 1 being the most probable). Given this evaluation, there
can be no reason to assume that negative existentials have a stronger claim on us than positive,
particularly since the above seems to show the exact opposite. Plantinga, however, shows his
disagreement with Carnap’s logic in WPF (see especially pp. 198-201).
32
Plantinga’s objection.
Though this discussion does not occupy a significant portion of Plantinga’s
response to the evidentialist objection, it does show the continuity of his thought from
his earlier discussion of the existence of other minds and the analogical argument to his
article in Faith and Rationality. Yet there is more that Plantinga wants to say about
evidentialism, at least in its more generic form.
The problem of an evidentialist epistemology rears its head again in Plantinga’s
latest w ork on warrant, on which we will concentrate in the next chapter. Here the
discussion centers itself around the Alston, Feldman, Conee discussion of evidentialism,
what Plantinga calls the AFC view.58 Though the tw o views (Alston and
Feldman/Conee) have their own distinctives, Plantinga’s generalization of them into
one seems not to obscure the discussion of evidentialism.
But what is the AFC view? Just this: the AFC view is that one can have a
justified belief attitude toward a particular proposition only if having such an attitude at
a specific time fits the evidence one has at that time. O r, to put the m atter another
way, "Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if
58 See Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, "Evidentialism,1' Philosophical Studies (1985) and
William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," The Monist, (January 1985), reprinted
in William P. Alston, Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory o f Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), 89-114. These are discussed in Plantinga, WPF, 185ff.
Plantinga distinguishes, in a footnote, between Alston’s requirement of the evidence
being a reliable indicator, as well as a basis, for justification, both of which Feldman and Conee
omit. Plantinga lumps the two positions together, however, and claims that his criticism applies
equally to both.
33
and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t".59 The question now
becomes, is this version epistemically correct?
Plantinga admits that A FC ’s view of evidentialism works well in situations
wherein we may have propositional evidence, testimony o r perceptual evidence.60 In
those situations we could show our doxastic attitudes to be justified just because we
would have the evidence to support them. AFC does not w ork well, however, for
situations in which my knowledge base is memory or a priori knowledge.
O n what evidential basis can I claim to know that I met a friend in California
last year? Plantinga wants to maintain that, though there is phenomenal imagery
involved in memory, there is no highly articulate mapping from m emory to belief as
there w ould be, for example, from sensuous imagery to perceptual belief. H ow , then,
can one be "AFC justified" in one’s memory belief? And if one cannot be so justified,
is the problem with the memory belief or with AFC evidential justification? Plantinga,
of course would contend that one cannot be AFC justified in one’s memory beliefs and
that therefore the problem is not with memory, but w ith the theory itself.
The same problems arise with respect to a priori knowledge. O n what evidential
basis are we justified in our knowledge of modus ponens?61 Surely we are not prepared
to say that modus ponens "fits the evidence at t" so that it becomes warranted for us on
59 Feldman and Conee, "Evidentialism," 15. Plantinga understands Feldman’s and Conee’s
term "justified" to be equivalent to his term "warrant," both meaning "that quantity, whatever
exactly it is, enough of which is sufficient to distinguish knowledge from mere true belief". See
Plantinga, WPF, 186.
60 Plantinga, WPF, 187.
61 Ibid., 188.
34
its evidential base.
Both memory beliefs and a priori knowledge cannot stand the scrutiny of AFC
justification. And Plantinga goes on to show how certain perceptual beliefs that we
hold (1) are not held on the basis of prepositional evidence and (2) include Kant’s
transcendental unity of apperception. And both of those also admit of no evidential
foundations.62 In Chapter 5 of Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga argues that
beliefs such as I am being appeared to in that tiger-lily way and I am not identical with
that tiger-lily are beliefs that would have high warrant (if one were appeared to in a
tiger-lily way) though they would, in fact, be non-propositional.63 W hen appeared to in
this way we do not form the proposition, "I am being appeared to in a tiger-lily way"
and then believe that proposition but rather we believe that which we experience and
thus are justified in that (experiential, evidential) belief.
Furtherm ore, when I believe such experiences it is I who believe them and not
someone else. The "I think" element of my believings is not subject to evidential
change, yet it is both believed by me (when I am appeared to, and at other times) and I
am justified in my belief that it is / who believe.
The summary of Plantinga’s latest discussion of evidentialism then is this:
...if we construe evidence in this broad fashion, including the inclination to

believe as well as prepositional evidence and sensuous phenomenology, then part
of the AFC suggestion is true: then it is indeed true that we always o r nearly
always form beliefs upon the basis of evidence (at least w hen there is no
cognitive pathology). But of course no amount of evidence of this sort is by
62 I am using Kant’s phraseology here rather than Plantinga’s "I think". Plantinga’s
discussion of the "I think," it seems, can best be summarized in Kant’s more complicated phrase.
63 See Plantinga, WPF, Chapter 5 and also 189ff.
35
itself sufficient for warrant.

So the evidentialist is right: where there is warrant, there is evidence. Having
this evidence, however, or having this evidence and forming a belief on the basis
of it, is not sufficient for warrant: proper function is also required.64
A t this juncture it is crucial and necessary to point out some significant
differences that, though still highly relevant to our discussion, have shifted the focus
somewhat. It will be remembered that we began this section with WolterstorfPs
insistence on what Reformed epistemology is not and what it is. In that citation,
W olterstorff insists that Reformed epistemology’s project is a polemical one, to answer
the evidentialist criticism, and we could add, criticism specifically concerning the
rationality of belief in God. As we have moved now to Plantinga’s latest work, we
have, w ith Plantinga, strayed from W olterstorfPs defined project of Reformed
epistemology, that is, the polemical project against the evidentialist objection, though
we are well w ithin the confines of REP. It is not the case then, that in both Warrant:
The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function Plantinga is focusing his specific
attention on W olterstorfPs concerns with the new Reformed epistemology. However,
because Plantinga is now, in his later writings, seeking to establish a "naturalized
epistemology" in which the criteria for warranted (theistic) beliefs (knowledge) would
fit, we can see this later w ork as a fuller exposition of P2P of REP.65 Having
established such criteria, he will then attempt to establish the relationship between
M Ibid., 192, 193.
65 Plantinga argues for a naturalized epistemology in WPF, Chapters 11 and 12. It would be
safe to say that proper function as a criteria for warrant fits well (exclusively?) within the
context of Reidian foundationalism. A naturalized epistemology should therefore be seen as a
part of P2P and not PIP of REP.
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
36
w arrant and Christian belief.66
In discussing evidentialism, therefore, in the context of warrant, Plantinga has
shifted his focus from an objection which itself relies on a faulty epistemology to a
specific element of quite another, yet related, epistemology. Because of the shift in
emphasis, the relevance of the latter material is not as directly obvious to the discussion,
for example, in Faith and Rationality and elsewhere. But because we have defined REP
as containing warranted theistic belief, there is a direct relation between Plantinga’s new
Reformed epistemology project, which has as its focus P IP of REP, and his latest w ork
on warrant, dealing more specifically with P2P.
Given the above discussion two concerns should be mentioned here about the
evidentialist objection. First, the evidentialist objector demands that beliefs be rational,
yet there is no consensus on a definition of rationality itself. A belief, to be rational,
must be one that is justified, o r so the philosophical tradition since Plato tells us. Yet
we have no clear idea as to what rationality itself entails.
N o r are we given clear direction as to the notion of justification. Is it a
normative view so that one has a duty or obligation to believe one thing and not
another? O r is it a m atter of forming one’s beliefs in the proper way? O r, further, is it
a m atter of having enough evidence to believe x so that x is rational based on the
am ount of evidence for x? The philosophical tradition has been as confused about its
answer(s) to this question as it has insistent about the necessity of justification and its
w The original title of Plantinga’s third volume on warrant was to be Warrant and Belief in
God. However, in WCD and WPF, Plantinga indicates that he has now changed the title to
Warranted Christian Belief, which, at the time of this writing, is all that has been written of
Volume Three.
37
partner in crime, rationality. But no unified answer is forthcoming. We shall notice
this problem again below as we look at the notion of normativity in foundationalism.
The second concern about the evidentialist objection is that no one has tim e to
m ount evidence enough for every belief one has so that presumably there are some
beliefs which can be rationally held by S and yet held w ithout S’s having propositional
evidence.
Plantinga’s first concern and its relationship to justified true belief will be
discussed in Section 2.21 further below. His second concern, however, leads us directly
to his discussion of foundationalism and its (apparent) demise, to which we now turn
our attention.
2.12 Critique of Foundationalism
According to Plantinga and others, foundationalism as an epistemic structure has
been dom inant since Plato and Aristotle.67 There are nuances and distinctions in
67 Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceedings o f the

American Catholic Philosophical Association vol. LIV (1980): 191. Plantinga’s, "The Reformed
Objection to Natural Theology," was originally an address to the American Catholic
Philosophical Association in April, 1980, and subsequently published in volume LIV of the
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1980, from which we will be
quoting. It was then published again in Christian Scholar’s Review volume XI, no. 3 (1982): 187-
197 and once more in Hendrik Hart, Johann van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds.,
Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 363-
384. A revised version can also be found in Part III of "Reason and Belief in God" in FR, 63-
73. The number of reprints and the responses evoked, particularly in the Christian Scholar’s
Review, indicate the significance of this article’s impact in establishing the "New Reformed
Epistemology" as a position with which to be reckoned. It seems to me that this was the article
which should be seen as central to PIP of REP, though it certainly does not say all that was or
should be said about the matter.
Unfortunately, we cannot trace the tradition of foundationalism itself but simply will
take Plantinga’s word for it at this point. There does seem, however, to be a general consensus
on foundationalism’s beginnings and reputed demise. For one analysis of Plato’s understanding
38
foundationalism that need some initial articulation here, particularly as we conclude
with Plantinga’s endorsement, rather than denial, of foundationalism (again, specifically
nuanced) as the proper epistemic structure for REP.
We begin w ith the "fundamental principle of classical foundationalism,"
A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-

evident to S or incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S.6*
Before looking more specifically at Plantinga’s analysis of the above principle, and
before we relate the substance of a foundationalist epistemology to the evidential
objection for theistic belief, it will help to delineate peripheral, yet crucial, truths
related to this foundationalist principle.
"The foundationalist, therefore - call him a generic foundationalist... - starts from
the distinction between beliefs we accept in the basic way and those we accept on the
evidential basis of other beliefs."69 That is, whether one is a classical, medieval, modem
of knowledge see Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An
Introduction to Reformed Epistemology (New York: State University of New York, 1991).
Plantinga, contra Hoitenga it seems, sees Aristotle as the "fountainhead of foundationalism"; see
Plantinga, WCD, 68.
“ Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 59. There are no noncontroversial definitions of
these three classes of belief and it is not within our parameters to engage the relevant debates.
In the interest of space, then, we can take a self-evident proposition as, approximately, one
whose truth can be known without appeal to anything outside the proposition itself. We shall
adopt Alston’s definition of incorrigibility as adequate for our purposes, in William P. Alston
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 263, i.e.,
P enjoys incorrigibility vis-a-vis a type of proposition, R - & For any proposition, S, of
type R, it is logically impossible that P should believe that S and that someone should
show that P is mistaken in this belief. (Condition A for P’s knowing that S logically
implies that no one else can show that condition C does not hold.)
And "evident to the senses," we hope, is "self-evident."
69 Plantinga WCD, 68.
39
o r "Reidian"70 foundationalist, one will accept this belief distinction as (epistemically)
necessary for one’s structure o f knowledge, which leads to the next commonality of any
brand of foundationalism, what Plantinga calls, one’s noetic structure.
There are at least three elements included in a noetic structure; (1) the
relationship of basic and nonbasic (inferential) beliefs, (2) the degree of belief and (3) the
depth of ingression, what we might call the centrality of one’s belief(s).71
Foundationalism is, at least to some extent, a thesis about such elements of the noetic
structure. First of all, it insists that knowledge must be conformed to a kind of basis
relationship which is both asymmetric and irreflexive.72 Irreflexive, according to the
foundationalist, because a belief cannot be its own support. If one believes in the
creation of the world based on one’s belief in God the Creator, there is an im portant
sense in which one’s belief in G od is prior to and supportive of one’s belief in creation.
However, one’s belief in G od cannot be prior to itself nor can it be supportive of itself.
Thus, in a foundationalist noetic structure the basic/nonbasic relationship is irreflexive.
Second, the belief relationship is asymmetric in a foundationalist structure. If
one’s belief in creation is based on one’s properly basic belief in God, it cannot be the
case that one’s properly basic belief in G od is based on one’s nonbasic belief in
creation. So in one’s foundationalist noetic structure the belief relationship is irreflexive
70 Plantinga will claim to follow Thomas Reid’s common sense views of knowledge and will
incorporate such into a foundationalist structure, thus Reidianism or Reidian foundationalism.
71 Cf., for example, Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 192.
72 This and the following discussion is based on and is a summary of Plantinga’s discussion
in "Reason and Belief in God," 52ff.
40
and asymmetric.73
The above relationship assumes also the notion of a basic belief as supporting its
nonbasic relatives. "It is not clear just what this relation - call it the ’supports’ relation
- is; and different foundationalists propose different candidates. Presumably, however, it
lies in the neighborhood of evidence; if A supports B, then A is evidence for B, or
makes B evident..."74 This supports relation as evidential will become directly relevant
to our discussion below so we will leave it for the moment.
Finally, with regard to one’s foundationalist noetic structure, we can say that
one’s "nonbasic belief is proportional in strength to support from the foundations."75
Plantinga attempts to w ork this out from the standpoint of the probability calculus, i.e.,
for any nonbasic belief A, P(A/F) > B,(A).76 This, however, poses more questions than
it answers and we are left to conclude that, whatever the "proportional in strength"
relation is, it must be there for a foundationalist structure. My belief, for example, that
m y wife loves me can be no stronger than my belief that she exists and that she is my
wife, the latter two o f which support the former. Whatever such a supports relation is,
therefore, it must both be there and play significantly into the degree of my beliefs.
O ne of the most significant aspects to a foundationalist structure is its normative
75 The example of God and creation is mine and not Plantinga’s. The example itself creates
questions that we cannot broach at this point.
74 Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 54.
75 Ibid., 55.
76 Ibid., 55.
41
emphasis.77 Contained within foundationalism’s insistence on norm ativity is its
concurrent insistence on rationality. It is assumed in foundationalism that people have
duties and obligations w ith respect to what they believe. To conform to those duties is
to be rational and to fail to conform to them is to be irrational. Thus, normativity is
intricately linked with rationality.
Rationality, says Plantinga, is
one of the slipperiest terms in the philosophical lexicon. The generic notion of
rationality...is what our Continental cousins, following Max Weber, sometimes
call Zweckrationalitat, the sort of rationality displayed by the actions of someone
who strives to attain his goals in a way calculated to achieve them .78
However, Plantinga goes on to say, there are different kinds of rationality. There is
"Aristotelian rationality" wherein rationality consists generically in m an’s ratio P
A nother kind of rationality would claim a belief to be rational if it is among the
deliverances of reason and irrational if it is contrary to those deliverances. There is
"deontological rationality" which claims that one has a duty to refrain from a belief or
from believing x unless one has prepositional evidence for x. In this case, says
Plantinga, rationality "is very close to the classical notion of justification. [I]n these
contexts ’justification’ and ’rationality’ are often used interchangeably."80
It is this notion of deontological rationality that, if not identical, is closely
77 Where Plantinga discusses foundationalism, almost invariably, he discusses its normative

aspect. See, for example, Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 19If.
78 Plantinga, WCD, 132.
n Ibid., 134.
80 Ibid., 176. For a confirmation of the various kinds of rationality, see also Wolterstorff,
"Can Belief in God Be Rational?," FR, 142.
42
related to the normative element of foundationalism. And the "guilty" parties who
m ore o r less introduced and propagated deontological rationality w ithin a
foundationalist structure are Descartes and Locke. "Descartes and Locke are the sources
of classical deontologism and classical intemalism; but...also...classical foundationalism."8l
R ather than launch into an extended analysis of either Descartes or Locke, one (rather
full) quote from Locke should suffice for our limited purposes in order to show the
deontological thrust,
There is another use of the word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith; which
though it be in it self a very improper way of speaking, yet common Use has so
authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it: O nly
I th in k it may not be amiss to take notice, that however Faith be opposed to
Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind: which if it be regulated,
as is ou r Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good Reason; and so
cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any Reason for
believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks T ruth as he
ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those
discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour.
H e that does not this to the best of his Power, however he sometimes lights on
T ruth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of
the Accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is
certain, that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into: whereas
he that makes use of the Light and Faculties G O D has given him, and seeks
sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this
satisfaction in doing his D uty as a rational Creature, that though he should miss
T ruth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and
places it as he should, who in any Case o r Matter whatsoever, believes o r
disbelieves, according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise,
transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties, which were given
him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater
Probability.82
81 Ibid., 178.
82John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an introduction by

Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), IV.17.24. This section is also quoted by
Wolterstorff, "Can Belief in God Be Rational?," 142. I have not altered the original spelling of
the text.
43
Locke is assuming here, as he does throughout his discussion of knowledge, that there
are duties and responsibilities that one has in one’s believings; to fulfill those duties is
to be rational, to neglect to fulfill them is to be irrational.
A t this point it is necessary to introduce yet another distinction within
foundationalism; that of strong and weak, foundationalism. According to Plantinga,
both Aquinas and Descartes were strong foundationalists.83 In strong foundationalism, a
belief is properly basic or is rational only i f it is either self-evident, evident to the senses,
or incorrigible. This is classical foundationalism, which combines both
ancient/medieval foundationalism (which, generally speaking, requires criteria of (1) self
evidence and (2) evident to the senses for basicality) with modern foundationalism
(which, generally speaking, adds incorrigibility to the list of criteria). Reformed
thinkers, says Plantinga, are best understood as rejecting classical foundationalism.
Weak foundationalism, on the other hand, admits that every rational noetic
structure has a foundation and that nonbasic belief in any rational noetic structure is
proportional in strength to support from the foundations.84 Thus, weak
85 Ibid., 85. It is still a matter of debate as to who is a foundationalist, who is not and
exactly how foundationalism should be construed. Plantinga seems to bring Aquinas, Descartes,
Locke and others all under the foundationalist umbrella. Wolterstorff, on the other hand,
wants to argue for significant differences between Aquinas and Locke and even between
Descartes and Locke, seeing Locke most explicidy as the forerunner to foundationalism, or at
least as the primary exponent of it. The historical detail, though fascinating, is outside the
scope of this discussion. Perhaps Wolterstorff will once and for all clarify the differences in his
When Tradition Fractures: The Epistemology ofJohn Locke and the Beginnings o f Modem Philosophy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming). Until then, see, for example, Nicholas
Wolterstorff, "The Migration of the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to
Evidentialist Apologetics," in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert
Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 38-81.
84 Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 194.
44
foundationalism allows for more criteria or content in one’s basic belief structure.
Thus, also, Reformed thinkers, including and according to Plantinga, have no quarrel
w ith weak foundationalism.
In one of Plantinga’s earlier statements on foundationalism, he discusses the
m atter in the context of "the Cliffordian," which would be one who would agree with
the above evidential objection as stated by W. K. Clifford.
N ow what the Cliffordian really holds is that for each person S there is a set F
of beliefs such that a proposition p is rational or rationally acceptable for S only
if p is evident w ith respect to F - only if, that is the propositions in F constitute,
on balance, evidence for p. Let us say that this set F of propositions is the
foundation o f S ’s noetic structure. O n this view every noetic structure has a
foundation; a proposition is rational for S, or known by S, o r certain for S, only
if it stands in the appropriate relation to the foundation of S’s noetic structure.85
This is perhaps the best summary of foundationalism which Plantinga offers. He then
gives us his analysis of it in terms, at least more specifically, of our REP.
2.121 The Reformed Rejection
Before looking more closely at the notion of foundationalism per se, we notice
Plantinga’s contention that Reformed theology has, implicitly at least, always rejected
foundationalism. In one of his first published papers on the matter, he seeks to show
that Herm an Bavinck and John Calvin, in their rejection of natural theology, were
rejecting in principle a foundationalist model of knowing.
In the Christian Scholar’s Review version of "The Reformed Objection to Natural
Theology," Plantinga describes the positions of both Herman Bavinck and John Calvin
85 Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?," in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C.
Delaney (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 12.
45
(the latter noted to be "as good a Calvinist as any"), while in Faith and Rationality he
adds Karl Barth to the list and, in another context, appeals also to Abraham Kuyper.
We will look at his discussion in a bit more detail below, but for now simply
summarize his main point.
In analyzing both Bavinck and Calvin, Plantinga concludes that each man is
arguing for the justification of belief in God, and for such justification obtaining
w ithout having its basis in argumentation. Bavinck wants to show that argument or
proof is not the source of a believer’s confidence in God. Calvin, arguing in the same
vein, wants to postulate a universal disposition to believe in God. For Barth, according
to Plantinga, it is improper for a Christian to place his faith in the deliverances of
reason in setting forth proofs for the existence of God rather than the revelation of
God. In other words, what Plantinga seems to put forth as comm on to these Reformed
thinkers is their unifled rejection of theistic proofs. Bavinck, Calvin and Barth all set
forth belief in God as that which either transcends argument or which must underlie
argument or both.86
Plantinga affirms Calvin’s distrust of reason and concludes that Calvin’s
argument for the authority of Scripture is true also for belief, i.e., that such comes, not
by argument, but by the testim ony of the H oly Spirit.
From Calvin’s point of view, believing in the existence of G od on the basis of

rational argument is like believing in the existence of your spouse on the basis of
the analogical argument for other minds - whimsical at best and not at all likely
161 am not now dealing with the debatable point as to what extent each of these three is
"Reformed". The relevance, however, of this discussion to REP should be obvious at this
point.
46
to delight the person concerned.17
All of this suspicion amongst the Reformed o f the arguments for G od’s existence
adds up to the fact that the "Reformers mean to say, fundamentally, that belief in God
can properly be taken as b a s i c In other words, Plantinga is seeking to show that the
Reformers are discussing and denying exactly what he himself is, yet as ones untim ely
born. So, Plantinga seeks to put them within the foundationalist debate and attribute
to them the assertion that belief in God is, in fact, for each of them and thus for at
least a part of the tradition of Reformed theology, properly basic. That is, a person is
entirely w ithin his epistemic rights, entirely rational, in believing in God, even if he has
no argument for this belief and does not believe it on the basis of any other beliefs he
holds. And in taking belief in God as properly basic, the reformers were implicitly
rejecting a whole epistemological structure, or an entire picture of knowledge and
rational belief; call it classical foundationalism.w
For REP, then, Plantinga sees himself as within the Reformed tradition in his
rejection of classical foundationalism and in his insistence that warranted theistic belief
need not depend on propositional evidence.
2.13 Critique of Coherentism
Classical foundationalism has met its demise. It is historically and (worse)
17 Ibid., 190.
MIbid., 191.
19 Ibid.
47
conceptually dead as an epistemological structure. What, then, is a poor epistemologist
to do? T he most obvious option available, given the demise of foundationalism, is
coherentism.90 Just what is coherentism and what are the differences between it and
classical foundationalism?
Coherentism is difficult to characterize primarily because of the confusion
surrounding its definition. Like music, notes Plantinga, coherentism had its three great
"B"s - Bradley, Bosanquet and later Blandshard.91 W ith the passing of absolute idealism,
however, coherentism slipped into obscurity for the next fifty years or so. A t present,
it seems to be enjoying a resurgence in thinkers such as Keith Lehrer and Laurence
Bonjour.92
T o simplify, let us characterize coherentism as the epistemological theory that
requires one’s beliefs to be coherent with one’s other beliefs in order to be warranted.93
Generally speaking, then, every belief would be accepted (or rejected) on the basis of
other, already accepted, beliefs. Warrant, in this structure, would not be transferred
from a basic belief to a non-basic belief, but rather would be warranted by virtue of one
90 See Ernest Sosa,"The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory
of Knowledge," chap. in Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165-191. As in Sosa’s metaphorical tide, we have chosen to
see Plantinga’s REP as, in part, an argument for an epistemological structure.
92 See Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), "The Coherence Theory of
Knowledge," Philosophical Topics 14, no. 1 (Spring 1986) and Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of
Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
93 The phrase, "to be coherent with’ is purposely ambiguous at this point due to the fact
that it would be defined differendy by different coherenusts. Generally speaking, it aims to be
more than mere logical consistency and less than mutual entailment.
48
belief’s place w ithin the belief structure. Coherence, and only coherence, is agreed to
be a source o f warrant. This being the case, the coherentist would see theistic belief as
irrational o r unjustified o r unwarranted if and only if such belief did not cohere with
the rest of one’s doxastic structure. In other words, the evidentialist objection to
theistic belief, rather than excluding theistic belief from one’s noetic structure due to
lack of evidence or the inappropriateness of theistic belief as properly basic would, in a
coherentist scheme, exclude theistic belief due to its inability to cohere with one’s belief
system or w ith the rest of one’s coherent beliefs.
Plantinga’s approach to an explanation of coherentism is to compare it to
foundationalism.94 Such a comparison provides at least two significant differences. • First
of all, coherentism, unlike foundationalism, affirms the necessity of circular reasoning.
Coherence requires that if one’s belief, B2, gets its warrant from, or more generally, is
coherent w ith B„ then B3 must itself be coherent with B2 (and BJ and B4 w ith Bn, etc.
Eventually, however, B„ must itself cohere with Bt and we are back to the beginning
again. Because there is no (at least implicit) properly basic belief in a coherentist
structure, there can be no relationship such that warrant or justification is obtained
from a foundational belief. Coherence alone is the source of warrant and thus circular
reasoning is inevitable.
Plantinga insists that "a noetic structure that displays a circle in its basis relation
displays a..warrant defect."95 Such is the case, he says, because no proposition can
94 Plantinga, WCD, 67f.
95 Plantinga, "Coherence and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," 122.
49
obtain all of its warrant from itself. And, according to Plantinga, there are no
completely self-warranted propositions.’6 Second, if it is the case that every belief and
each belief is warranted only to the extent that it coheres w ith the rest of one’s beliefs,
then coherence becomes, almost exclusively, a doxastic relation.
In coherentist theories, there is a (at least implicit) neglect of any kind of
belief/experience relationship. Plantinga’s "Epistemically Inflexible Clim ber” will serve
as the paradigm example of the problem,
Ric is climbing Guide’s Wall, on Storm Point in the G rand Tetons; having just
led the difficult next to last pitch, he is seated on a comfortable ledge, bringing
his partner up. H e believes that Cascade Canyon is down to his left, that the
cliffs of Mt. O w en are directly in front of him, that there is a hawk gliding in
lazy circles 200 feet below him, that he is wearing his new Fire rock shoes, and
so on. His beliefs, we may stipulate, are coherent. N ow add that Ric is struck
by a wayward burst of high energy cosmic radiation. This induces a cognitive
malfunction; his beliefs become fixed, no longer responsive to changes in
experience. N o m atter what his experience, his beliefs remain the same. At the
cost of considerable effort his partner gets him down and, in a desperate last
ditch attem pt at therapy, takes him to the opera in nearby Jackson, where the
N ew York M etropolitan O pera on tour is performing La Traviata. Ric is
appeared to in the same way as everyone else there; he is inundated by wave
after wave of golden sound. Sadly enough, the effort at therapy fails; Ric’s
beliefs remain fixed and wholly unresponsive to his experience; he still believes
that he is on the belay ledge at the top of the next to last pitch of Guide’s
Wall...’7
The point, of course, is to show how coherentism’s insistence on an exclusively
doxastic structure can easily lead one to deny knowledge, though one may affirm
coherence.’8 It also seems to show that coherence is not sufficient for warrant.”
96 We shall argue against this in chapter five.
57 Plantinga, WCD, 82. See also, WPF, 179.
98 Plantinga points out that Bradley allowed for a relationship of belief and experience.
Such a relationship causes problems in coherentism, not the least of which is having to deny the
50
Plantinga also seeks to show that coherence is not necessary for warrant. The
examples revolve around one’s believing, or attempting to believe, that which one
cannot support experientially. F or example, an eminent Oxford epistemologist
convinces one of his students that no one is ever appeared to redly (to use the
Chisholm ian locution). That student is then walking down the street and is startled by
the siren of a fire truck. He turns to look and is appeared to redly. Due to the
influence of the eminent Oxford epistemologist, being thus appeared to is incoherent
w ith his noetic structure. However, such an experience does have w arrant.100 Thus,
propositional relation of beliefs.
99 There is a subtle inconsistency in Plantinga’s "Epistemically Inflexible Climber" that may

serve to eliminate its critique of coherentism. According to the example, the initial set of
coherent beliefs (B) are directly related to Ric’s experience. Presumably, such a relationship
either disqualifies coherentism as a purely doxastic enterprise or it affirms the belief/experience
relation, both of which options significandy alter Plantinga’s characterization of coherentism.
O r to put it in the form of a question, what is the relationship of Ric’s experience to B,? If the
answer is that there is no relationship, then Ric could coherendy believe Bj at any ume and any
place, to which no coherentist would admit. If the relauonship is such that it provides for, or
causes, or supports (choose your own word) B-, then Ric’s B; at the opera would fail to be
coherent. The very least that can be said, given Plantinga’s example, is that criteria which
produce coherent beliefs on Guide’s Wall are drastically altered when Ric is at the opera.
In personal correspondence on this matter, James Sennett argues that the genius of
Planunga’s example is that it spells out to the coherentist just such an inconsistency as I point
out. He further remarks that, indeed, experience plays a role in the establishing of the doxastic
structure, but that, on the coherenust’s own terms, experience plays no epistemic role, and thus
Planunga’s example holds. Perhaps he is right. Without belaboring the matter, however, I
would be interested in finding the coherenust who holds to the (psychological?) necessity of
experience at one point and then the total neglect of the same at another, which is Plantinga’s
characterizauon in this example of coherenusm.
Even if my above analysis is correct, it does not put coherenusm in the clear
epistemically, it only serves to defeat Planunga’s initial defeater, so on that score it is relatively
insignificant overall.
100 This is an interesting twist from other counter-examples that Plantinga has given. Just
how does one proclaim, in this situauon, that there is warrant though the student denies what
someone else has determined he sees? Have we not resorted, in this example, to an objective
view of warrant such that it is affirmed to be the case whether or not the subject affirms it?
This may be a welcome addiuon to the warrant debate, but it requires much more than any
51
coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.101
It will not follow that coherence is not a source of warrant, only that it is not
the source of warrant. Coherentism, according to Plantinga, is false. Its primary
fallacy, it seems, is its tentative relationship with experience. As an exclusively doxastic
relation, coherentism will not suffice.
There is another way to construe coherentism, says Plantinga, which is much
more charitable. Perhaps the coherentist is really a foundationalist in disguise. Perhaps
he is construing coherence as the condition for properly basic beliefs. He is asserting a
situation in which warrant is acquired "without being accepted on the evidential basis
of other beliefs."102 The coherentist is not touting circular (or cylindrical) reasoning but
is instead proposing a new source for warrant. Rather than warrant transmission from
properly basic to nonbasic beliefs, the pure coherentist will see every belief that coheres
as basic just because of its coherence. Every coherent belief, then, is properly basic.103
O f course, as we saw above, a belief acquires no warrant because of its relation to
experience, hence Plantinga’s Epistemically Inflexible Climber.
In classical foundationalism, a belief is warranted (or justified) either by its
kind of physical or biological proper functioning.
101 Plantinga, WCD, 82-83.
102 This discussion is taken from Ibid., 78f., but see also Plantinga, "Coherentism and the
Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," 125ff.
103 Ibid., 79. Plantinga adds in a footnote that the coherentist may reject this view due to
the fact that the basis relation is epistemologically irrelevant in his epistemological structure.
However, because coherentism assumes an exclusively doxastic relation, no beliefs are accepted
on the evidential basis of others and thus all are properly basic. Coherentism, therefore, can fit
within a foundationalist structure (whether or not the coherentism wants it to) which is
Plantinga’s primary point.
52
inclusion as a properly basic belief o r by the transfer of warrant (or justification) from
the properly basic belief to a belief inferred. In other words, proper basicality is a
source of warrant (or justification). Though coherentism will have its different nuances,
we could say that, generally speaking, coherentism holds that coherence alone is a
source of warrant (or justification) and further that nothing else is a source of w arrant.104
So however we determine to conceive of coherentism, either as an alternative
epistemological structure in its own right or as an alternative foundationalist position,
coherentism fails. And because it fails, it can stake no claim on theistic belief.
2.131 Coherentism to Reidianism and REP
To put the m atter within the context of REP, we could say that, because
coherentism is shown to be an illegitimate epistemological structure, it forfeits the right
to determine whether or not theistic belief may have warrant. We should remember
here that w ithin REP there are two projects. Plantinga’s critique of coherentism fits
w ith P IP , i.e., to place theistic belief within a legitimate epistemology in order to argue
for its warrant, which, of course, is apologetic in its thrust.
We must conclude this section by taking note of Plantinga’s endorsement of and
adherence to foundationalism. It should be said here that, contrary to a first reading of
Plantinga, he is no anti-foundationalist. His concern with foundationalism seems to be
104 See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," 126.
Plantinga is responding here to William Alston’s legitimate critique of Plantinga’s "Reason and
Belief in God." Alston points out that the evidentialist objection does not necessarily have to
be rooted in classical foundationalism. It could be rooted, on the other hand, in coherentism.
See William Alston, "Plantinga’s Epistemology of Religious Belief," in Alvin Plantinga, ed.
Tomberlin and Van Inwagen, 289-312.
53
w ith its traditional limitations of the criteria for properly basic beliefs, i.e., the self-
evident, evident to the senses and incorrigibility. However, Plantinga affirms that
Reformed thinkers were inclined to accept weak foundationalism and, says Plantinga, "I
enthusiastically concur in these contentions of Reformed epistemology."105 The demise,
according to Plantinga, is not of generic foundationalism, but of classical
foundationalism. Some "conclude that the demise of classical foundationalism means we
must reject all of epistemology, or even the very notion of truth itself. This is a
whopping non sequitur.'"0*'
Therefore, Plantinga proposes "Reidian foundationalism" as the alternative
position.107
The difference between the two positions [classical and Reidian foundationalism]
comes into view when we ask how the experience in question must be related to
the belief in question, if the latter is to have warrant.108
Significantly, therefore, we could say at this point (though this is not all we
must say on the matter) that P IP of REP has made tremendous headway; warranted
theistic belief must be argued for w ithin the context of Reidian foundationalism. We
shall look more closely at this brand of foundationalism when we discuss various
105 Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 195.
106 Plantinga, WPF, 182. Plantinga’s remarks would include such modem epistemologists as
Richard Rorty.
107 Ibid., 183. Plantinga calls this type of "nuanced" foundationalism, "Reidian," after the
Common Sense philosopher Thomas Reid. Plantinga wants to revive Reid’s emphasis on the
necessity of holding some common beliefs in a basic way. The focus of our discussion here will
not allow for any serious analysis of Reid’s philosophy. We will, however, refer to it again in
chapters below.
10* Ibid.
54
epistemological options.
2.2 Belief in God
In the midst of the maze it is easy to forget that what Plantinga is arguing for is
the rationality or the justification o r the warrant for belief in God within the proper
epistemological structure. The long route to warrant is to discuss current accepted
views of warrant or justification or rationality, and their epistemological contexts, in
order properly to locate belief in God. We have looked at (the) tw o predominant
epistemological views and we have seen that both have some relation to evidentialism.
We have also seen that Plantinga means to reject all of the above views, classical
foundationalism, coherentism and evidentialism, and thus they cannot play a part in his
REP. Classical foundationalism and coherentism are rejected as illegitimate
epistemological structures, evidentialism is rejected as an element of either. Before
moving on, it will be helpful to see how the above views relate themselves to the more
specific question of knowledge.
2.21 Knowledge as justified true belief
For clarity’s sake, we will digress for a moment and notice w hy it is, in part,
that epistemological structures such as foundationalism and coherentism have developed.
O ne of the reasons for this is the "received tradition” account of knowledge.
A t least since Plato’s Theaetetus, philosophy has made a distinction, and at times
even an outright separation, between knowledge and belief. W hile one might firmly
55
believe the proposition, "I am appeared to treely" (again, to use the Chisholmian
locution), it is widely accepted that one does not yet have knowledge of that
proposition.
W ithout availing ourselves of the historical and polemical details, we will simply
state dogmatically, in the interest of space, that the "received tradition" with respect to
knowledge is that knowledge is justified true belief.109 W ithin this definition is what
some have called a tripartite account of knowledge.110 This tripartite account of
justified true belief (knowledge) can be stated this way:
S knows that p if and only if
(0 P
(ii) S believes that p and
(iii) S’s belief that p is justified.
Notice that, on this account, for one to know p, p must be, must be believed and the
belief must be justified. Thus, knowledge is justified true belief.
It is also w orth noticing that knowledge is not mere true belief. One might
believe p and p might be true, but in order for one to know p, the belief "that p" must
be justified. This third clause is designed to avoid situations in which one’s true belief
is more a m atter of presum ption than of actual knowledge.
Consider a situation in which you hear from your neighbor that they are
109 See, for example, Anthony Quinton, "Knowledge and Belief," in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967),
345-353.
110Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,

1985), 23ff.
56
contemplating the purchase of a dog for the family. You drive home one evening and
notice a Welsh Corgi in the front yard of your neighbor’s house, playing and chasing
your neighbor. You now believe that your neighbor is the proud owner of a new
Welsh Corgi puppy! Unbeknow nst to you, however, the puppy you saw in your next
door neighbor’s front yard actually belonged to your neighbor across the street.
Moreover, it is the case that, on the day you see the Welsh Corgi in the front yard,
your next door neighbor had purchased one as well, but that Corgi was quietly sleeping
in his new house. The question then is, did you know that your next door neighbor
had purchased a new Welsh Corgi puppy? It was certainly the case that they did own a
puppy; it was also the case that you believed they owned her and that your belief was
true. O n the justified true belief account of knowledge, however, you could not know
th at your neighbor owned a puppy. Your belief, though true and though itself a fact,
was not yet known because it was unjustified.
We can see here that there is some legitimacy to the claim that you do not yet
have knowledge. The last clause, then, in the tripartite definition is designed to avoid
unjustified true belief.111
But is it the case that, once the tripartite account is satisfied, one knows p? In
1963, Edmund L. G ettier wrote a three page article entitled, "Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge?"112 The amount of response engendered by G ettier’s short paper is beyond
111 This example is to be distinguished from Gettier counter-examples because, at least, your
belief is based on the presumption that the Welsh Corgi in your next door neighbor’s yard is
actually his.
112 Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified Belief Knowledge?," Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123;
reprinted in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed., Knowledge and Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
57
w hat anyone could have predicted at the time. Gettier sought to show that, even if the
tripartite account of knowledge is satisfied, one still may not have knowledge. So-called
"G ettier counter-examples" all seem to have at least one element in common, i.e.,
though one may be justified in one’s belief, that belief contains, as a part of its
justification, a falsehood.
G ettier’s original example can be summarized this way: p - Smith owns a Ford
o r Brown is in Barcelona. N ow Smith, a friend of yours, comes to you and shows you
the title of his brand new Ford. He gives you a ride in the Ford and tells you how he
has financed the purchase. You now believe that Smith owns a Ford. You also believe,
for some reason not apparent at the moment, that Brown (another friend of yours) is in
Barcelona. You now believe p. But as a matter of fact, it turns out that Smith was
trying to win your friendship and had asked his friend at the Ford dealership to give
him a dum m y title for the car. Smith does not own a Ford after all. But it just so
happens that Brown is in Barcelona. So, p turns out to be a justified true belief for
you. It is the case that Brown is in Barcelona. However, we certainly would not
consider it to be knowledge; we could not say that you know p.
O r consider a situation in which you are watching the W imbledon m en’s finals
on television on a hot day in June.113 Jimmy Connors is beating John McEnroe and, as
a m atter of fact, winds up defeating McEnroe handily in straight sets. As it turns out,
however, the netw ork televising the event lost its feed midway through the match and
1967).
113 This example, with certain insignificant modifications, is taken from Dancy, An
Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 25ff.
58
determined to air a rerun of last year’s Wimbledon. And it so happens that in last
year's W imbledon Connors beat McEnroe, again, handily in straight sets. So p -
Connors beat McEnroe in straight sets at W imbledon this year, and you believe p.
And as you are watching the rerun of last year’s Wimbledon, C onnors defeats McEnroe
at W imbledon this year. In this case, p is certainly true, you believe p to be true, and
you are justified in believing p. However, you cannot know p because your justified
true belief contains a falsehood. Your belief that p is based on the rerun of last year’s
W imbledon and not on the fact o f the matter, though your belief relates truthfully to
that fact.
Perhaps the most common "solutions" to Gettier counter-examples have to do
w ith proposals to eliminate falsehoods in the process. W ithout surveying all of the
relevant debate on the matter, suffice it to say, at least, that the proposal to eliminate
falsehood amounts either to one’s actually knowing very little or nothing at all.114
The point of this section in relation to REP is two-fold. First of all, the account
of knowledge as justified true belief provides problems to which classical
foundationalism has attempted to respond by bringing such an account of knowledge
w ithin its parameters. In other words, the justified true belief account of knowledge
relates directly to P2P of REP, in that it seeks for an account of warrant, and indirectly
to P IP , in that it assumes a certain epistemological structure. However, couched within
classical foundationalism’s attem pt to contain the justified true belief account of
knowledge is the notorious problem of the infinite regress.
1,4 For more on the Gettier debates see Robert Shope, The Analysis o f Knowing (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983).
59
If it is the case that my belief that p is justified and true, it must also be the case
that whatever justifies p must itself be justified and true if know n. My belief that
Smith owns a Ford is only as secure as my belief that Smith’s title is legitimate, that he
is telling the truth, and so on. If I am to know that Smith owns a Ford, therefore,
there must be justification for my belief that what Smith has is a legitimate title for the
Ford. The salesman at the Ford dealership affirms that Smith’s title is legitimate, but
now I must seek for justification of my belief that the salesman is telling the tru th (a
difficult task with regard to salesmen). But where will that justification come from?
And once justified, w on’t every belief thereafter scream for its ow n justification, and so
on ad infinitum }115
Classical foundationalism sought to resolve this regress by positing certain beliefs
as basic and on the basis of which other, inferential, beliefs may be known. Thus, the
infinite regress is avoided, but with all the inherent problems surveyed in our discussion
of foundationalism above.
Secondly, and even more directly relevant to our topic, Plantinga attempts to
analyze the justified true belief account of knowledge, complete with Gettier counter
examples, and to see how such accounts fair w ithin the context of his notion of "proper
function," which notion can be seen as an element within P2P of REP.
Though we have yet to look more closely at Plantinga’s latest works on warrant,
suffice it to say at this juncture that Plantinga is arguing for w arrant on the basis of
115 Richard Foley argues that the infinite regress argument will not stand scrutiny. See
Richard Foley, "Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress," American Philosophical
Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 311-316.
60
proper functioning cognitive faculties in an epistemically appropriate environment.
Given this approach, he critiques the Gettier counter-examples for their accidental
character. Rather than being true, our beliefs formed, or better, our justified true
beliefs, should be seen perhaps as justified false beliefs. True beliefs formed under
accidental circumstances are not true beliefs formed by virtue of the proper functioning
of o u r faculties.116
Essential to all G ettier situations, says Plantinga, is the production of a true
belief that has no warrant. Remembering that all three of the clauses in the tripartite
definition of knowledge are satisfied, we notice, due to Gettier, first that there is
something insufficient about the tripartite definition, and second, it should be necessary
either to reject the "received tradition" for a new one or to add significantly to what is
already there. Plantinga’s addition is this: Consider situations in which there is a
circumstance member M and a cognitive response R. Both are designed in a way that
they w ork well over as large a proportion as possible of the situations. In being
designed to work this way, Plantinga notes that there must be "trade-offs and
compromises."117 One of the reasons that Gettier situations need to be considered in
our notion of warrant is that R or M may compromise its design for true belief in
order to maintain its efficiency.
We might say that, in the misleading cases, R is joined with M not in order to
satisfy the main purpose..., but in order to satisfy...other constraints. O r
perhaps...the thing to say is that R is joined w ith M, not in order to directly
serve the main purpose of providing true beliefs (it doesn’t do that) but to do so
117 Ibid., 38ff and see section 3.6 below.
61
indirectly.n8
So Plantinga’s answer to G ettier counter-examples (and other perceptual and
otherwise misleading situations) is that the segment of the design plan governing the
production of the belief be directly rather than indirectly aimed at the production of
true beliefs. And, he says, an addition to that effect must be made to the official
account of warrant, which relates to our P2P of REP.119
We will conclude this section by indicating something of the relevance of the
justified true belief account of knowledge with REP. If knowledge is defined as
justified true belief, then if one claims to know p, one’s knowledge of p must be
justified. W hat, then, does the justification of knowledge entail? It entails, according to
the tradition, the notion that what one knows must be directly related to facts that are
there. G ettier counter-examples show either that one’s belief is both true and justified
but is not related to the facts that are there, at least not directly, or the facts contained
w ithin the particular belief-structure are epistemically inconsistent. I may know that
m y next door neighbor is getting a puppy because he tells me so,120 but the fact that I
>“ Ibid., 40.
119 There are perplexing elements here which cannot be discussed but which will relate to
our critique below. Who is it that must do the justifying in the doxastic situation? Is it the
believer himself? Someone within his proximity? And a further complication revolves around
who it is that proclaims that one’s belief is or is not justified? Must it be the believer? Can it be
someone in the believer’s "epistemic community?" Does the kind of belief determine, to some
extent, the answer to these questions? It seems in the Wimbledon example that the only error
was in one of the grounds for which one believed p. The question then becomes, must all
grounds be accessed by the believer in order for someone to claim knowledge for him? That
may be too much to ask both for knowledge and for "someone”.
120 Thomas Reid calls this kind of justification "The Principle of Credulity" wherein one is
believed unless there is good reason not to believe one. Of course, such a principle, as was seen
above, is not sufficient to ward off Gettier counter-examples.
62
later see a puppy in his front yard may be no justification that he has, in fact, gotten
one. T o add knowledge to m y belief it needs justification, which means that my belief
needs a (legitimate) reason in order to be more than mere belief. And the reason or
rationale, if it is to be knowledge, must relate itself, somehow, properly to the evidence,
to my experience, to the world that is there.
Foundationalism ’s addition to the justified true belief tradition was to posit
beliefs whose justification were not dependent on other beliefs, basic beliefs.
U nfortunately, belief in God was not given the privileged position of a basic belief but,
at least because of its controversial contents, was given the task of proving its
justification via evidence. Thus, the evidential objection has as a part of its central tenet
the justified true belief account of knowledge. Thus, theistic belief and believers
accepted the burden of proof and sought, subsequently, to prove G od’s existence in
order to show its warrant w ithin a foundationalist structure.
It is a short step, at least conceptually, to see that REP (while seeking to remain
within the foundationalist structure) seeks to couch theistic belief within the
epistemically safe confines of properly basic beliefs. Thus, Plantinga’s REP and his
attem pt to w ork w ith another epistemology that will more comfortably accommodate
such a notion.
2.22 Properly Basic Belief
Belief in G od is properly basic; at least Plantinga wants to argue for such. And
his argument carries w ith it all of the epistemological baggage that we have discussed,
63
and more.
Properly basic theistic belief would deal a death blow to the evidentialist
objection. It would show evidentialism’s objection to theistic belief to be misplaced
epistemologically and thus unwarranted or unjustified. It would deny any necessity of
S having to justify, or of being pressured to give reasons, for theistic belief before S
would be granted the privilege of holding such belief as warranted. Thus, Plantinga’s
REP is an argument for the rationality of one’s believing in G od’s existence w ithout
producing reasons, which is another way of saying that he argues for properly basic
theistic belief.
Theistic belief as properly basic would significantly alter the classical version of
foundationalism. It would show foundationalism’s acceptance of traditional basic beliefs
to be much too narrow and a bit arbitrary. It would challenge classical
foundationalism’s bias against theistic belief and would begin to assert the "epistemic
rights" of theistic belief to be included among the foundations of knowledge. Thus, the
proper basicality of theistic belief has radical implications for traditional epistemology.
In arguing for its properly basic position, Plantinga is attempting to vindicate a theistic
philosophy against traditional non-theistic philosophies and thus, again, we have entered
the terrain of apologetics.
W hat is the relationship of REP to theistic belief as properly basic? Among
other things, the proper basicality of theistic belief would contribute to its having
warrant w ithin a proper epistemological structure. Though most likely not sufficient
for warrant, proper basicality would at least be a necessary element of warranted belief.
64
W ithin the context of a foundationalist structure, Plantinga sees proper basicality
as its "fundamental principle". To repeat,
A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-

evident to S o r incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S.121
Plantinga sees at least two serious problems with the above principle. First of
all, he is willing to concede that a belief is properly basic if it is self-evident, incorrigible
o r evident to the senses. W hat he will not concede is that such is the case only if the
above conditions are met. Part of classical foundationalism’s problem consists in its
inability to account for much of what we take to be true.
We should note first that if this thesis, and the correlative foundationalist thesis
that a proposition is rationally acceptable only if it follows from or is probable
w ith respect to what is properly basic - if these claims are true, then enorm ous
quantities of what we all in fact believe are irrational. [R]elative to propositions
that are self-evident and incorrigible, most of the beliefs that form the stock in
trade of ordinary everyday life are not probable... Consider all those
propositions that entail, say, that there are enduring physical objects, or that
there are persons distinct from myself, o r that the world has existed for more
than five minutes: none of these propositions, I think, is more probable than not
w ith respect to what is self-evident or incorrigible for me...122
We see here, in Plantinga’s argument against classical foundationalism’s
conditions for proper basicality, an appeal to those things which are generally accepted
to be true, and true perhaps without evidence (remembering here our initial discussions
of GOM ), yet which generally accepted truths have no place in a foundationalist
structure. Thus, classical foundationalism is suspect as an epistemological structure
because it says too little. It has nothing to say to my belief that I was in Boston last
122 Ibid., 59-60.
65
year or that I did not just appear at my desk five minutes ago or that you, like me, are
a person. Classical foundationalism’s proper basicality is far too restrictive.
But it is also far too ambitious, and destructively so. N ot only does it say too
little but it also says too much. Consider Plantinga’s formulated "fundamental
principle" of classical foundationalism again,
(1) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is either self-
evident to S o r incorrigible for S or evident to the senses for S.
We have just noticed Plantinga’s problem with the "only if" aspect of (1), but now
notice that (1) itself cannot cohere within its own criterion. Consider that (1) must
either itself be a properly basic belief or it must be believed on the basis of some other,
more basic, belief(s). The classical foundationalist, believing (1), must be able to support
that belief by way of some beliefs that are either self-evident or incorrigible or evident
to the senses. But no argument has been forthcoming from the classical foundationalist.
Therefore, since (1) is not inferential, it must be itself properly basic in order to be
rationally believed. But (1) cannot meet conditions of being evident to the senses, self-
evident, or incorrigible. The fundamental principle of classical foundationalism, with
its insistence on and conditions of proper basicality, is itself, as Plantinga likes to say,
"self-referentially incoherent."123 Foundationalism’s own basic principle is insufficient to
support the very position for which it seeks to argue.
The above criticisms of classical foundationalism and, more specifically, of its
m Ibid., 61f. George Mavrodes seeks, among other things, to show Plantinga’s notion of
self-referential incoherence as erroneous in his "Self-Referential Incoherence," American
Philosophical Quarterly 22, no. 1, (January 1985): 65-72.
66
fundamental principle of proper basicality have led some to believe that Plantinga and
com pany are anti-foundationalist. Such is certainly not the case. Whereas one might
expect Plantinga at this point to opt for a more consistent epistemological structure
altogether, w hat he does instead is to opt for different beliefs to be included w ithin the
confines of proper basicality, including, of course, theistic belief.
It is Plantinga’s contention, as we have seen, that an epistemological structure
should make room for the proper basicality of theistic belief.124 Such is the case, it
seems, because an epistemological structure must make room for those things we all
take to be obvious, e.g., the existence of other persons. And, if belief in other persons
is obvious to everyone, w ithout itself satisfying classical foundationalism’s conditions
for proper basicality or for inferential belief, then the existence of God (himself another
Person) must be given at least the same status.
2.221 Criteria and the Christian Com m unity
Plantinga’s foundationalism, with all that it entails, is labeled by him "Reformed
epistemology." "Reformed" because there have been those (Calvin, Bavinck, Barth and
tangentially Kuyper) who have denied the supposition that belief in G od must be based
on evidence and w ho have argued, more or less precisely, for the proper basicality of
theistic belief; we need have no evidence for it, nor need we give reasons. We hold it
1241 have attempted to be as dear here in my wording as possible. It is not Plantinga’s

contention that an epistemological structure must include theistic belief or that theistic belief
should be contained somewhere within the structure. Rather, any epistemological structure
worth its salt must indude memory beliefs, beliefs about other persons, and theistic belief as
beliefs that are warranted without the constraints of prepositional evidence. It must, therefore,
have room for theistic belief, and theistic belief when included can rationally be properly basic.
as such because we believe it to be such, and that is the substance of the matter.
Obviously, objections are anticipated and Plantinga attempts initially to address them .125
Consider first the "Great Pum pkin Objection." If one may have theistic belief
as a part of one’s foundational structure, then someone else may be w ithin his epistemic
rights in holding as properly basic his belief that the Great Pum pkin rises from the
pum pkin patch every Halloween. There need be no evidence for such a belief, nor
must reasons be given. It just seems obvious and therefore must be the case, at least for
me.
Plantinga’s response to this anticipated objection is to ask what it is that would
make one think in this way. If classical foundationalism’s criteria for proper basicality
are rejected or are tentative, why would we automatically assume that anything goes?
W hy should such a rejection commit one to irrational beliefs?
Consider an analogy. In the palmy days of positivism, the positivists went about
confidently wielding their verifiability criterion and declaring meaningless much
that was obviously meaningful. N ow suppose someone rejected a form ulation of
that criterion - the one to be found in the second edition of A.J. Ayer’s
Language, Truth and Logic, for example. W ould that mean she was comm itted to
holding that (1) "Twas brillig; and the slithy toves did gyre and gymble in the
wabe" contrary to appearances, makes good sense? O f course not.126
Plantinga’s point here is that one’s rejection of certain criteria does not
automatically commit one to irrationality and meaninglessness. (The fact that
positivism rendered itself meaningless due to its own criteria for meaningfulness is
125 The most comprehensive response to anticipated objections is in "Reason and Belief in
God," 74ff, from which most of what we say below will be taken.
126 Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," in Philosophy of Religion: Selected
Readings, 2d ed., ed. William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright (San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanich Publishers, 1989), 423-424.
68
helpful support to Plantinga’s argument here). So the rejection of classical
foundationalism’s criteria for proper basicality is no reason to assume that there are in
fact no criteria.
But does such a rejection require one to argue for and support substitute criteria
that would provide for the justification or warrant of one’s belief? "Surely not.
Suppose I don’t know of a satisfactory substitute for the criteria proposed by classical
foundationalism; I am nevertheless entirely within my rights in holding that certain
propositions are not properly basic in certain conditions."127
So the answer to the Great Pum pkin Objection at this point is that one may
accept p as properly basic even if one is unaware of the criteria by which properly basic
beliefs are determined. Like (1) above, we may not know what criteria are used to
determine its meaninglessness, though we may judge it to be so nevertheless.
But Plantinga takes us a bit further than a mere agnosticism. He proposes that
the best way to arrive at a criterion for proper basicality is by induction. "We must
assemble examples of belief and conditions such that the form er are obviously properly
basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are
obviously not properly basic in the latter.'"28 Criteria for proper basicality must be
acquired through a series of test cases, cases in which a belief B is justified on condition
C, cases in which the < BC > relationship is not as clear, and cases in which < BC > is
not so obviously justified. One may propose that my belief that I had breakfast this
127 Ibid., 424.
69
m orning is based on my memory. However, it could be the case that my memory has
of late been showing itself to be less than reliable. What sufficient condition could one
add to that belief in order for it to be warranted? Perhaps there is none. We may
assemble other < BC > examples such that B is obviously not properly basic on C. In
testing the matter in just this way, says Plantinga, we can arrive at our criteria (criteria
which, it seems to me, are neither universally valid nor normative).
Plantinga anticipates another objection, in the context of the above discussion.
Some might object to the criteria which we have determined for proper basicality due
to the bias of our sample set(s). In attempting to show theistic belief to be relevant, we
may use as < B C > the sample set that (B) I believe God made this flower on (C) I see
this flower. Obviously, this is not a sample set that one such as Bertrand Russell or
Madelyn Murray O ’Hare would choose, "...but how is that relevant? Must my criteria,
o r those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The
Christian com m unity is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs."129
So, Plantinga’s conclusion is this: "the Reformed epistemologist can properly
hold that belief in the Great Pumpkin is not properly basic, even though he holds that
belief in G od is properly basic and even if he has no full-fledged criterion of proper
basicality."130
Thus, belief in God, unlike belief in the Great Pumpkin, can be properly basic.
Interestingly, Plantinga concludes with an appeal to Calvin, "...the Reformed
125 Ibid., 77.
130 Ibid., 78.
70
epistemologist may concur w ith Calvin in holding that God has implanted in us a
natural tendency to see his hand in the world around us; the same cannot be said for
the Great Pum pkin, there being no Great Pum pkin and no natural tendency to accept
beliefs about the Great Pum pkin."131
There are problems in this discussion of proper basicality, many of which have
been and are being pointed out by some of Plantinga’s critics. We shall point out one
problem that relates itself directly to REP. If we see REP as apologetic in its
orientation (and we do), and if proper basicality is crucial to the warrant of theistic
belief, then apologetical problems arise in the context of REP, one of which Plantinga
admits.
In discussing his own inductive procedure for fleshing out criteria of proper
basicality, Plantinga affirms that his method "may not be polemically useful."132 Such is
the case due to the (apparently) relative standard used for arriving at criteria. Because
one’s < BC > is community-relative, one com m unity may disagree with another’s use
of x for determining criteria. A community may, therefore, arrive at very different
criteria for proper basicality than another community. "Furthermore," says Plantinga,
"I cannot sensibly use my criterion to try to convince you that B is in fact properly
basic in C, for you will point out, quite properly, that my criterion is based upon a set
of examples that, as you see it, erroneously includes < BC > as an example of a belief
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 77.
71
and condition such that the former is properly basic in the latter."133 Plantinga’s criteria
for properly basic belief include, at least, Calvin’s notion o f the sensus divinitatis.
Properly basic beliefs, therefore, must be inductively produced by way of testing of
(apparently arbitrary) example sets.
Before attempting to relate Plantinga’s discussion here to REP, there are two
other elements of proper basicality that must be mentioned. Properly basic beliefs must
be ascertained by way of inductive sample testing. This is part of Plantinga’s answer to
the Great Pum pkin Objection. But there is more to Plantinga’s further response that
properly basic beliefs are not groundless. In certain cases (perhaps Plantinga would say
in all cases), there is a condition present which forms the ground of justification for
properly basic beliefs. Three examples are given, taken from three different kinds of
properly basic beliefs; perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs and belief in other minds.
Plantinga expresses them in this way, respectively, "I see a tree," "I had breakfast this
morning" and "That person is in pain."134 All three of these propositions we take to be
basic. We do not believe them on the basis of other beliefs, they are not inferred, but
rather we properly (rationally) believe them in a basic way. But they all have grounds.
My belief that I see a tree is not inferred from other beliefs I have, but it is grounded in
my seeing a tree.
The same would be true for my memory and other minds beliefs. I remember
having breakfast this morning. Assuming my memory to be functioning properly, my
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
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belief has a justifying condition surrounding it, one which is difficult to describe, partly
due to the complexity of m emory itself. However, the point for our purposes is that
there is an experience which grounds my memory belief.
And so also for my belief that "That person is in pain." One who would
exhibit a characteristic kind of behavior, grabbing her ankle, for example, along with
wincing and crying out in that characteristically "pain-ish" sort of way, could properly
basically be said to be in pain. Such a belief would not be inferred, but would in fact
be grounded in those conditions which surround pain behavior.
Interestingly, Plantinga now moves from the argument for grounds in
perceptual, memory and other minds beliefs to the same kind of argument for theistic
belief, but w ith a significantly different twist. Beginning w ith the following beliefs,
(8) God is speaking to me,

(9) God has created all this,
(10) G od disapproves of what I have done,
(11) God forgives me,
and
(12) God is to be thanked and praised,135
we can surmise that God exists. Plantinga admits at this point that it is not "God
exists" that is properly basic, but rather it isthose beliefswhich aresurrounded by
certain justifying conditions. One reads the Bible and determines that G od is indeed
speaking to him. One sees the beauty of the heavens and realizes God has created it all.
O ne has a sense of life’s true enjoyment and gives thanks and praise to God. All of
those properly basic beliefs have grounds; they are not beliefs that come from nowhere.
A nd from these grounded beliefs, Plantinga supposes that "God exists" is entailed. One
135 Ibid., 81. I have kept Plantinga’s numbering here.
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cannot very well properly basically believe "God created all this" w ithout believing also
that "God exists."
Therefore, according to Plantinga, it is not beliefs such as "There are trees" that
are properly basic, but rather beliefs such as "I see a tree," nor is it the belief that
"There are other persons" that is properly basic, but rather, "That person is pleased" is,
and so on. Once the commitment to justifying conditions, o r grounds, is present,
universal statements become, it seems, inferential beliefs.
N ow this is an interesting twist on the contention that belief in God is properly
basic. It is not interesting simply because of the fact that "God exists" is somehow
indirectly properly basic, but rather it is interesting because one’s justifying condition
for properly basic beliefs can be seen, w ithout too much argumentation, as evidence,
though not the kind of prepositional evidence to which the evidential objector objects
and to which Plantinga responds. This does not destroy Plantinga’s argument for
proper basicality specifically, nor for Reidian foundationalism more generally. It serves,
however, better to frame the discussion of just what it is that Plantinga is trying to
show; o r better, what he is not trying to show. He is not trying to show that belief in
G od is properly basic. Rather, he is trying to show that theistic belief is indirectly
properly basic based on the proper basicality of beliefs-cum-justifying conditions. N o r
is he trying to show that belief in God has no "evidential connection." Rather he is
trying to show that it is grounded in certain conditions, again relative to the < BC >
set. So as we will continue to discuss Plantinga’s argument that belief in G od is
properly basic, we should remember these significant nuances.
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Plantinga further addresses some of the confusion surrounding proper basicality
by arguing for arguments. Herein the apologetical thrust becomes more obvious. The
question now becomes the degree of one’s basic belief in God, o r perhaps its
relationship to incorrigibility. If one holds theistic belief as basic, must one also hold
such a belief to the degree that no argument could motivate one to give it up?
Plantinga says no. His reasoning includes at least two factors.
First of all, it may be the case that one’s belief in God as basic is held along with
other, irreconcilable beliefs that, if followed through consistently, would cause one to
give up the basic theistic belief. "So even if I accept [theistic belief] as basic, it may still
be the case that I will give up that belief if you offer me an argument from propositions
I accept, by argument forms I accept, to the denial of [theistic belief]."136 So, Plantinga
contends, one’s properly basic theistic belief may be accepted as such, but not
dogmatically. And he sees dogmatism as the ignoring of any contrary evidence or
argum ent.137
Secondly, Plantinga makes a distinction between prima facie and ultima facie
beliefs. The grounds of belief that are mentioned confer only prima facie justification
on ou r beliefs. The proposition "I see a tree" may be believed by me, and properly
basically believed by me, if I am appeared to treely. However, someone may then tell
me that the grove of trees I think I see is in fact a prop placed there by some involved
in the making of a movie. I now have a defeater for my properly basic belief that
06 Ibid., 87.
137 Ibid.
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overrides my prima facie justification. I am then told that the one who told me about
the film crew prop is unstable due to his long time obsession to be a movie actor, and I
am told that, as a m atter of fact, treely is exactly that to which I am appeared. I now
have a defeater-defeater, and so on and so on.
Prima fade, then, I can be justified in my properly basic belief. Ultima fade, or
all-things-considered, my belief may prove to be neither proper nor basic.
N ow suppose that I believe that I am appeared to treely. Is my belief, which
was at time t properly basic and at t, defeated, which at t2 defeated the defeater, now
based on m y belief at t 2? Plantinga says no. I do not accept the belief that I am
appeared to treely on the basis of the testim ony at tj, I have only considered more
relevant data and have been more convinced that my belief at t was proper and basic.
Could we say here that we have more grounds} Perhaps, though Plantinga does not put
it in that way. He does indicate, though, that "what confers prima fa d e justification
upon me in accepting a proposition p as basic is a condition that includes my believing
some other proposition q - where I do not believe p on the basis of q."us
H ow , then, does the notion of properly basic belief relate itself to our REP task?
First and foremost, proper basicality is a characteristic of warrant o r justification within
a belief structure. Primarily, then it is relevant to P2P of REP. P2P of REP relates
directly to the notion of the warrant of theistic belief. Plantinga has argued for its
warrant in terms of proper basicality, fundamentally attempting to show that theistic
131 Ibid., 86. Though the "on the basis of" relation is difficult to define in this structure,
Plantinga seems to indicate here that one may have ultima fade justification for p and still
properly basically believe p, again, due, it seems, to the addition of grounds for that belief.
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belief needs no argument nor evidence in order to be warranted or justified and in
order to be held. As Plantinga anticipates the charge of fideism, we begin to see his
rationale for the rationality of theistic belief.
2.3 Reformed
There is one final matter concerning properly basic belief that brings us to a
consideration of Plantinga’s ascription of his new epistemology as "Reformed." It is the
m atter of fideism. Obviously, the charge of fideism would come, given Plantinga’s
insistence that theistic belief can be proper quite apart from prepositional evidence or
argument. As expected, there are distinctions w ithin fideism that Plantinga makes
before answering. There is moderate fideism, relying on faith in religious matters, not
on reason, and extreme fideism, which "disparages and denigrates reason."139
First, then, is the Reformed epistemologist an extreme fideist? Plantinga
contends that Reformed epistemology need not commit itself to extreme fideism.
W hether one views it as faith above reason o r faith in conflict w ith reason, Reformed
epistemology need not hold to either. Extreme fideism is no threat to Reformed
epistemology. There are no specific arguments for this given by Plantinga; he seems to
assume that all will agree with him on this point.
But what about moderate fideism? Herein we begin to see hints of Plantinga’s
reasons for the ascription of "Reformed" to his epistemology. He appeals at this point
to Abraham Kuyper as one who may help in answering that question.
139 The fullest discussion of Plantinga’s answer to fideism comes from Ibid., 87ff.
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Kuyper held that anything taken as basic was taken as such on the basis of faith.
T ruths accepted w ithout demonstration were truths taken on faith. Plantinga quotes
from Kuyper’s Encyclopedia o f Sacred Theology,
There is thus no objection to the use of the term "faith" for that function of
the soul by which it attains certainty immediately or directly, without the aid of
discursive demonstration. This places faith over against demonstration, but not
over against knowing.1''0
Plantinga then goes on to argue that Kuyper’s understanding here is not the relevant
one for moderate fideism. If, for example, I accept supralapsarianism o r premillenialism
or the doctrine of the virgin birth, presumably I accept them on the grounds that God
reveals them and that what he reveals is true. I accept them, then, on the basis of
reason, not of faith.141
Plantinga goes on, secondly, to appeal to Calvin. "According to Calvin every
one, whether in the faith or not, has a tendency or nisus, in certain situations, to
apprehend G od’s existence and to grasp something of his nature and actions."142
Plantinga sees Calvin here, not as claiming that theistic belief m ust be held by faith, but
rather by the deliverances of reason, whatever those might be.
Elsewhere, Plantinga appeals to Calvin again for support.
There is w ithin the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness
of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from
taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men
a certain understanding of his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he
,w Ibid., 88.
141 Plantinga’s understanding of Kuyper, like that of Barth earlier, is open to criticism, but
that is not immediately relevant for our purposes here.
142 Ibid., 89-90.
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repeatedly sheds fresh drops...143
It is this "awareness o f divinity" that is linked to the proper basicality of theistic
belief. Perhaps we could say that, whereas proper basicality relates itself to the warrant
or justification of theistic belief, to P2P of REP, the ascription of "Reformed" relates
itself to the kind of proper basicality that theistic belief is. It is this aspect of
Plantinga’s approach that will prove to be most interesting as we look further at its
apologetic implications below.
We can begin to bring together the different elements of the new Reformed
epistemology in this section. Plantinga has argued against classical foundationalism with
its restrictive proper basicality. He has argued against evidentialism with its insistence
that (theistic) belief must be evidentially supported in order to be rationally held. N ow
we see that Plantinga attempts to plant these objections and criticisms within a
Reformed theological context. He sees the Reformed objection to natural theology as
an early expression of classical foundationalism’s demise, thus as another evidentialist
critique. He says,
In particular Reformed or Calvinist theologians have for the most part taken a
dim view of this enterprise [i.e., natural theology]. A few Reformed thinkers -
B. B. Warfield, for example - endorse the theistic proofs; but for the most part
the Reformed attitude has ranged from indifference, through suspicion and
hostility, to outright accusations of blasphemy. ...What exactly, or even
approximately, do these sons and daughters of the Reformation have against
proving the existence of God?144
143John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis
Battles, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), Book I, Ch.iii, Sect. 1 (hereafter
I.iii.l); quoted in Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," 189.
144 Ibid., 187.
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According to Plantinga, then, "the Reformed objection to natural theology, unformed
and inchoate as it is, may best be seen as a rejection of classical foundationalism."145
Plantinga appeals both to Herman Bavinck and to Calvin. We shall simply notice his
appeal to Bavinck and then summarize the five points which he wants to make.
Scripture urges us to behold heaven and earth, birds and flowers and
lilies, in order that we may see and recognize G od in them . "Lift up your eyes
on high, and see who hath created these." Is. 40:26. Scripture does not reason in
the abstract. It does not make G od the conclusion of a syllogism, leaving it to
us whether we think the argument holds or not. But it speaks with authority.
Both theologically and religiously it proceeds from God as the starting point.144
We receive the impression that belief in the existence of God is based entirely
upon these proofs. But indeed that would be "a wretched faith, which, before it
invokes God, must first prove his existence." The contrary, however, is the
truth... O f the existence of self, of the world round about us, of logical and
moral laws, etc., we are so deeply convinced because of the indelible impressions
which all these things make upon our consciousness that we need no arguments
o r demonstrations. Spontaneously, altogether involuntarily: w ithout any
constraint o r coercion, we accept that existence. N ow the same is true in regard
to the existence of God. The so-called proofs are by no means the final grounds
of our most certain conviction that God exists: This certainty is established only
by faith; i.e., by the spontaneous testim ony which forces itself upon us from
every side.147
Plantinga has five interpretive points with regard to Bavinck’s position. First,
arguments are not the source of a believer’s confidence in God. Second, argument is
not needed for rational justification. There is no need to have an argument for G od’s
existence in order to believe that God exists. And one’s belief that God exists is
rational o r epistemically proper or warranted (choose your own word) whether or not
>« Ibid., 198.
146 Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God, trans. William Hendricksen (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1951); quoted in Ibid., 188.
147 Ibid.
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there is an argument for it. Third, we cannot come to knowledge of God on the basis
o f argument. Fourth, Scripture proceeds from God as the starting point and so should
the believer. And fifth, Bavinck places belief in God on an epistemic par w ith belief in
the self and the world.
Natural theology, then, plays (at best) a secondary role in one’s belief that God
exists. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for such belief.
Plantinga then appeals to Calvin w ith the following four summary points.148 (1)
We have a strong inclination toward belief in God. (2) This inclination is suppressed
by sin. If sin did not hinder us, "human beings would believe in G od to the same
degree and w ith the same natural spontaneity that we believe in the existence of other
persons, an external world, or the past."149 (3) This disposition to believe is universally
present. (4) In certain conditions, a person knows that God exists apart from any
argument at all.150
Elsewhere Plantinga affirms that, according to Calvin, "certain beliefs about God
are also properly basic; the sensus divinitatis takes its place along w ith perception,
reason, memory, sympathy and induction as a source of warrant."151
As one might expect when one objects to natural theology before the American
H8 Ibid., 189.
149 Ibid. Note that Plantinga attributes a "parity thesis" both to Calvin and to Bavinck. In
chapters four and five we will discuss the weaknesses of such a thesis.
150 Ibid., 196.
151 Plantinga, WCD, 86. See also Alvin Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper
Function," Philosophical Perspectives "Epistemology" 2 (1981): 50, n. 31.
81
Catholic Philosophical Association, there were objections to the objections.152 Plantinga
responds to those objections, first to clarify and then to challenge. To clarify, Plantinga
maintains that he does not want to reject natural theology in toco. He only wants to
insist that it is not necessary for one rationally to believe in God. Though he has yet
to find a successful theistic argument, he is not opposed, in principle, to them as such,
but only as necessary elements to one’s belief in God. And therein lies his challenge.
Unlike those who object to his objections, Plantinga continues to claim that one who
accepts no theistic argument can nevertheless still rationally believe in the existence of
God.
O ne suspects at this point that there is more of theology than philosophy at
play in these disagreements. It is interesting, however, to read Calvin and Bavinck in
the context of Plantinga’s own arguments and interests. There can be no question that
Plantmga’s summaries of both Calvin and Bavinck will have deep implications for REP,
especially due to its apologetical thrust.
Two final points concerning this "Reformed" emphasis on proper basicality.
First, it is w orth taking note that Plantinga seems to allow for atheism, as well as
theism, as an element of one’s properly basic foundations. "Perhaps basic commitments
- to theism or atheism, for example, shape (and properly shape) what one takes to be
152 For example in Christian Scholars Review 11, 3 (1982) for a response to RONT and
Plantmga’s response "The Reformed Objection Revisited," Christian Scholars Review (1983): 57-
61. See also Linda Zagzebski, ed. Rational Faith: A Catholic Response to Reformed Epistemology
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1993).
82
rational belief or a good explanation."153 Those who object to Plantinga’s attack on
natural theology take this to mean that, while theism may be properly basic in one’s
noetic structure and thus rationally held, so might atheism. If this claim is true, it tends
to carry similar consequences as the Great Pum pkin Objection, i.e., one’s choice(s) of
properly basic belief is a bit arbitrary and therefore less than useful. Interestingly,
Plantinga remains somewhat uncommitted on this point, though one could read him
differently due both to what he asserts and to what he fails to assert.
...I didn’t assert and don’t believe that belief in the non-existence of God is
properly basic. A belief is properly basic in certain conditions. It may be that
there sometimes obtain conditions - say, being a fourteen-year-old who has been
taught from birth that there is no such person as God - in which belief in the
non-existence of God is properly basic. O n the other hand it may be that God
never leaves himself without sufficient witness in the life of anyone; whether
belief in the non-existence of God is ever properly basic, therefore, is a
complicated question on which I don’t propose to take a stand.154
This shows us a couple of things about Plantinga’s argument for properly basic theistic
belief. First, it shows us that, were Plantinga successful or convincing in what he wants
to show, at best he would be arguing for the relativity of properly basic beliefs (at worst
he may be arguing for the rationality of that which is in fact false). Therefore,
assuming Plantinga’s goal were achieved, properly basic theistic belief may o r may not
be held, depending upon one’s relative situation. This seems to imply that one would
have to be already predisposed to belief in God prior to one’s acceptance of it as a
properly basic belief. Second, it seems, in the previous citation, that Plantinga himself
153 "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Perspective," Christian

Scholars Review 11, 3 (1982): 202, quoted from Alvin Plantinga, "Existence, Necessity, and
God," The New Scholasticism 50 (1976): 72.
154 Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection Revisited," 59.
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does not w ant to commit to atheism as properly basic, though he also does not want to
take a stand as to whether or not it is. This, it seems, puts theistic belief in somewhat
of a precarious position with its properly basic neighbors). For surely Plantinga would
not want to say that belief in the past as well as no belief in the past can be properly
basic. A nd surely he would not want to say that memory beliefs as well as no memory
beliefs can be properly basic. And surely he would not want to affirm that belief in
other minds as well as no belief in other minds can be properly basic. Why, then, give
such latitude to theistic belief? Surely even within Reidian foundationalism something
must be contained in the foundations. Are there distinctions that should be made
between necessarily properly basic beliefs and contingently properly basic beliefs? O r
perhaps there is a need to look further. Whatever the case may be, there seems to be a
need for some refining at this point.
The second point concerning Plantinga’s "Reformed" emphasis is simply put this
way, has Plantinga accurately reflected Calvin’s teaching on belief in God? Is Calvin
really trying to reject classical foundationalism, yet as one untim ely born? It seems
there is more to Calvin than meets Plantinga’s eye and, interestingly and initially at
least, accuracy seems to come from Thomistic quarters. According to one author, when
Plantinga quotes Calvin in an attempt to show Calvin’s agreement that belief in God
requires no evidence, Calvin seems to be saying nothing of the sort.155 As a m atter of
fact, says Russman, Calvin seems more on the side of Plato’s innate ideas than on
A ristotle’s capacity fo r insight.156 W ithout question Plantinga sees Calvin as closer to
155 Thomas A. Russman, "Reformed Epistemology,” in Thomistic Papers IV, ed. Leonard
Kennedy, C.S.B. (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988), 194.
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A ristotle at this point. He continually refers to the sensus divinitatis as a tendency o r a
disposition o r a nisus to believe.157 The question at this point is not simply whether or
n o t Plantinga has interpreted Calvin accurately, but also, if not, what implications does
that have for his new epistemology’s "Reformed" status? And further, what
implications does it have for the apologetical thrust of REP?
After looking more closely at Plantinga’s recent view of warrant, we will then
"build the bridge" in chapter four between the analysis and the coming critique,
beginning in chapter five. We shall attem pt to show in chapters four and five the
weaknesses which the approach discussed here entails.
156 Ibid., 195. I would suggest that Calvin’s main (human) influence, in this matter at least,
was the apostle Paul, rather than either Plato or Aristotle.
157 Of which more in chapter five.
CHAPTER 3
T H E REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY PROPOSAL A N D W ARRAN T
3.1 Introduction
We have framed Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology as an apologetic argument.
As such, it is an attem pt to argue for the "philosophical acceptability" of belief in
G od.158 In order to argue for such, Plantinga has urged consideration of a proper
epistemological structure (i.e., Reidian foundationalism). But now he is also wanting to
argue for the way in which one can have knowledge w ithin such a structure; hence, his
volumes (two of which are published, one of which is still in process) on warrant.
O f his two published volumes, both are an attempt to deal w ith epistemology,
per se. More specifically, they are an attempt to argue for a proper view of that which
151 The more one reads the literature in this area, the more one gropes for terminology that
is appropriate. Suppose I said that such an argument is an attempt to argue for the "rationality"
of theistic belief. We would then be immersed in the confusion of just what rationality is and
how it is to be affirmed. Though "philosophical acceptability" carries its own set of problems,
it at least defines the parameters within which theistic belief is argued (i.e., specifically
philosophical parameters, as compared with, e.g., physical or biological, etc.) by Plantinga to be
acceptable (though it does not broach the question of, "acceptable by whom?").
Note also that, as an apologetical argument, the way in which we have framed the
discussion is not as an argument for the existence of God, but rather for theistic belief. But
more on that below.
85
86
"epistemizes true belief."159 And further, once Plantinga’s view of warrant is delineated,
he wants to contextualize it within (what he calls) Reidian foundationalism.160
We shall have, then, when all is said and done, a structure w ithin which beliefs
operate as a set of criteria o r conditions sufficient to "epistemize" such beliefs, if true.
W ithin these broader notions we shall locate, specifically, theistic belief and thus our
analysis of REP will be complete.
3.2 W arrant
It is imperative at this point that we look at Plantinga’s description of warrant.
There can be no question that, with the latest volumes, Plantinga has shifted his focus
from that which we saw in the last chapter. Sennett concludes that Plantinga has
moved from an internalist epistemology to an externalist one. Though we will have to
look more closely at those concerns below, suffice it to say at this point that such a
shift, if true, changes somewhat the focus of the debate, though not the substance. It is
also w orth noting that William Hasker sees Plantinga’s initial concern in the Reformed
epistemology literature as one of deontological justification "whereas deontological
159 According to Sennett, MPR, 139, Plantinga’s published thoughts on warrant began with
his article "Justification and Theism" (1987), further developed in "Positive Epistemic Status and
Proper Function" (1988) and is now at its most mature stage in the two initial warrant volumes.
There are indications from Plantinga concerning his future view on warrant, though he does
not use the term itself in Plantinga, "On Reformed Epistemology," Reformed Journal 32
(January): 17 and see Sennett, MPR, 140.
1601 am attempting to place Plantinga’s views on warrant within his affirmation of Reidian
foundationalism. As far as I know, no critique or discussion of Plantinga’s views to this point
have seen his work in epistemology in quite this way, due, largely, to the newness of his latest
works. However, it seems clear that Plantinga himself discerns a direct connection between
both Reidianism and warrant. See, for example, WPF, Chapter 10, 183ff.
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justification plays no part in [Plantinga’s] more recent epistemology."161 Plantinga’s
prim ary point throughout W CD is to show that traditional accounts o f warrant are
sadly lacking and thereby to pave the way for his own, externalist, account of proper
function.
In "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," Plantinga defines positive
epistemic status in this way,
Positive epistemic status, then, initially and to a first approximation, is a

normative property that comes in degrees, enough of which is what epistemizes
true belief.162
To elaborate, we have already seen that one’s true belief(s) does not, as such, constitute
knowledge. In Plantinga’s terminology, a true belief is not yet "epistemized." As
"unepistemized," then, we could say that true beliefs have a (not negative but) neutral
epistemic status. Surely if true beliefs are left unepistemized they are not, therefore,
useless or meaningless or substandard or illegitimate. I may believe that a high volume
of low density lipoprotein in my blood stream will contribute to heart disease and,
though I cannot claim to know such a thing, it may still be quite useful as a true belief,
not to m ention normative and meaningful. Nevertheless, for me, such a belief is not
epistemized. It does not yet have "positive epistemic status" for me; but neither is its
epistemic status negative in the sense that it can be evaluated as illegitimate or
substandard, etc. It remains in "epistemic limbo." According to Plantinga, once a true
161 From personal correspondence, January 19, 1993. I think that Hasker has overstated the
matter here, given that Plantinga allows for deontological considerations in his notion of
warrant. The point, however, is that Hasker, like Sennett, has detected a shift of focus.
162 Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," 3.
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belief has been “epistemized," it has acquired a property or an attribute, which property
(or attribute) is normative and which itself comes in degrees.
O ne wonders at this point if it is the normativity of the property that comes in
degrees, if it is the property itself o r a combination of the two. Could the property be
normative to the maximal degree but only partially that property suitable for
epistemization, or could it be fully that property and only minimally normative, or
must its norm ativity be identical in degree w ith its status as a property? O r is the
relevance of its normativity to its status as a property nil? Plantinga does not deal with
these questions, the answer to which seem (at least to me) relevant to his
form ulations.10 Sennett seems to indicate that it is the property itself which comes in
degrees, apparently, w ith its norm ativity always intact and consistent. Though
163 There is a perplexing difficulty in Anglo-American philosophy of this sort that should be
noted at this point. For all of its emphasis on clarity and precision, it is interesting to see to
what extent certain crucial and necessary concepts and formulations remain obscure, though
seldom challenged by those within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. The above
formulation is just one example. Another example can be found in Plantinga’s Warrant and
Proper Function. In that volume, the central concept of proper function, though circumscribed
in various ways, is admitted to be unclear. However, says Plantinga (WPF, 5), the notion of
proper function "is one we all have; we all grasp it in at least a preliminary rough and ready
way; we all constantly employ it."
My difficulty with the above is not with the ambiguities present in such literature, but
with the somewhat arbitrary way in which clarity is pressed and ambiguity is tolerated. One
man’s clarity seems to be another’s fog and vice versa.
In the Christian-theistic view of knowledge, there will always be ambiguities and
fuzziness because the lack of such would constitute (at least, near) omniscience. If I am right in
the above confusion, then greater headway, it seems, can be made toward a truly Christian
approach to these matters, including as well, apologetical argumentation by admitting ambiguity
at crucial junctures and even allowing for such and then arguing for one’s position in the context
of Christian theism.
In another vein, the citation from Plantinga, above, causes one to wonder as well as to
why one must argue for that which "we all have" and which "we all grasp" and which "we
constantly employ." If such universality is present, then might we not evaluate others positions
in light o f that which is universal rather than automatically assuming that if one does not
include such in one’s argumentation then it is obviously not taken into account?
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Plantinga would most likely agree w ith Sennett, one wonders if there is not a need to
press for clarity in the relationship between these tw o .164
W hatever the answers are to the questions of degree, it is clear that Plantinga
now wants to look in other places for an adequate view of knowledge. In his most
elaborate article on the matter, Plantinga (in true Plantingan fashion) seeks to analyze
"the dean of contem porary epistemologists," Roderick C hisholm .165 Chisholm ’s
epistemological theory has evolved through the years and we shall look more closely at
his current view below. However, it is helpful and interesting, in seeking to show
Plantinga’s shift, to notice his analysis of Chisholm.
"The fundamental idea" of Chisholm ’s epistemology, according to Plantinga, "is
that positive epistemic status is a m atter of aptness fo r the fulfillm ent o f epistemic duty or
obligation.”166 N ow Plantinga has no quarrel w ith the inclusion of this aptness, but he
is less than convinced that it is in any way a decisive factor for knowledge}a
Plantinga’s example is S’s belief that
(1) Feike can swim,
though S also knows that nine out of ten Frisians cannot swim and Feike is a Frisian.16*
So w hy does S believe (1)? It "seems overwhelmingly attractive to him; it seems wholly
164 Sennett, MPR, 141.
166 Ibid., 8, emphasis his.
167 The fact that Plantinga has no quarrel with Chisholm’s "aptness" factor tends to refute
Hasker’s contention noted above.
168 This entire discussion is taken from Ibid., 8f.
90
and obviously true; it has all the phenomenological panache of modus ponens itself." As
a m atter of fact, as it turns out, the reason S believes (1) is due to "psychological
malfunction" in which S has a tendency to assume that anyone he likes or admires is an
excellent swimmer. Now , if positive epistemic status were what Chisholm contends, S
would be entirely w ithin his epistemic rights (indeed, he would be derelict in his
epistemic duty otherwise) in accepting (1). (1) would have positive epistemic status for
S in that S accepted (1) in fulfillment of his duty.
Plantinga elaborates on this example (and provides tw o others), but the
im portant point to note is this: Plantinga will admit that S may be justified in accepting
(1), but will not admit that (1) is warranted or has the status of knowledge.
To have the status for him required by knowledge, something quite different is
demanded. We might say that he has permissive justification in accepting this
proposition - using the term ’permissive’ to indicate that the sort of justification
he has is such that in the proposition in question he is entirely within his
epistemic rights and is flouting no epistemic duty. Nonetheless, the proposition
has little by way of positive epistemic status for him .169
N ow it is not difficult to see that what Plantinga is now touting as insufficient,
i.e., permissive justification, he was arguing fo r in some of his earlier works. Consider
the notion (mentioned in chapter two) of one’s belief(s) being innocent until proven
guilty. Such a notion is one of permissive justification. O ne is epistemically entitled to
hold such a belief just so long as one does not encounter a convincing defeater for
such.170 A nd while Plantinga will n o t entirely eliminate notions of permissive
169 ibid., 9.
170Just whence this "permission" comes is not clear, neither is it clear from where one
receives one’s epistemic rights. It seems that what Plantinga assumes in arguing for such is
something akin to the notion of justification or rationality in the Anglo-American tradition.
91
justification, there is no question that a shift has now occurred in the literature on
warrant.
And there seems to be little question that the shift was intentional. Jay M. Van
H ook early on criticized Plantinga for what seemed to him to be a relativistic strain in
which tw o differing notions of rationality could never come together. Says Van Hook,
And this is made quite clear, I think, in Plantinga’s reply to one of his
questioners at the W heaton Conference:
I think it’s not appropriate to take as basic the proposition that God doesn’t
exist. But it doesn’t follow from that that I either do or ought to think that I
could prove to somebody who thinks it is appropriate to take that proposition
as basic that he’s wrong. Maybe I can’t. Maybe when he and I sit down
together to w ork out our criteria for proper basicality, maybe we don’t start
from enough of the same examples, maybe we just w on’t arrive at the same
criteria. So I can’t prove it to him. But nonetheless, I’ve got my views and he’s
got his. He thinks I’m starting in the wrong place. I think he’s starting in the
wrong place.
And Van H ook then asks the question, "Can either of the parties in the unresolvable
dispute above claim to know?"171 So the problem of relativism was pointed out very
early in the development of Reformed epistemology. O f interest w ith regard to our
present discussion on warrant is Plantinga’s response to Van H ook. After looking again
at Calvin, the "fans et origo of all things Reformed and thus of Reformed
However, a significant amount of effort has been expended by him designed to show that such
a tradition is faulty. Perhaps Plantinga would say that one’s epistemic rights are there from the
beginning, unless putatively taken away, e.g., by the evidentiahst critique.
171Jay M. Van Hook, "Knowledge, belief, and Reformed epistemology," Reformed Journal
(July 1981): 16. Plantinga’s response, though in a different context, sounds much too similar to
John W. Montgomery’s critique of presuppositional apologetics in "Once Upon an A Priori,"
Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics o f Cornelius Van Til
(Nudey, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1977), 380-392, but
especially 383-388. In Montgomery’s scenario, there are two worlds in collision and never the
twain shall meet.
92
epistemology,"172 Plantinga concludes with a notion of knowledge that is, no doubt, a
part of his present view of warrant.
The correct picture of knowledge, then, goes as follows: a belief constitutes

knowledge, if it is true, and if it arises as a result of the right use and proper
functioning of our epistemic capacities. O f course this is only a picture, not a
full-fledged account of knowledge. O f course there are many hard questions to
be asked and answered about it. But I do think it is the right picture.173
Here it is obvious that Plantinga is thinking toward his now more developed proper
function view of warranted true belief. This shift will be discussed more in 3.4 below.
3.21 A First Approximation
Given Plantinga’s fuller view of warrant, we can now see his ow n definition of
such and look briefly at the issues involved.
T o return to warrant then: to a first approximation, we may say that a belief

B has warrant for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved
in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment
sufficiently similar to that for which S’s faculties are designed; and the modules
of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2)
such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance
w ith those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true; and the more
firmly S believes B the more warrant B has for S. This is at best a first
approximation; it is still at most programmatic, a suggestion, an idea, a hint.
Furtherm ore, it might be suggested (in fact is has been suggested) that while it
may be difficult to find counterexamples to the view, that is only because it is
vague and imprecise.174
172 Alvin Plantinga, "On Reformed Epistemology," Reformed Journal (January) 1982: 16.
173 Ibid., 17. Sennett makes this same point in MPR, 140.
174 Plantinga, WPF, 19-20. Sennett’s own summary of Plantinga’s view on warrant, in
MPR, 146, is as follows:
(1) A belief B has warrant for a cognizer S if and only if B is produced in S
(a) by epistemic faculties that are functioning properly;
(b) in an environment appropriate to the proper functioning of the epistemic
93
We shall take Plantinga’s view of warrant here in the spirit in which he offers it, that
is, as "a suggestion, an idea, a hint" and we shall attempt at this point to clarify and
contextualize his concerns, and then further to give critical "suggestions, ideas o r hints"
in chapter six.
O ne of the recurring themes in Plantinga’s refutations of current views on
epistemology is that of cognitive malfunction. One may recall the Epistemically
(coherent, but) Inflexible Climber whose beliefs were "frozen," o r the Oxford
epistemologist’s student who is never appeared to redly, or C hisholm ’s Frisian non
swimmer, and there are others which we have not mentioned. All such examples are
calculated to illustrate cognitive malfunction. Interesting to note is the fact that, for
example, the Epistemically Inflexible Clim ber malfunctions due to outward physical
causes, whereas Chisholm ’s Frisian simply experiences "psychological m alfunction."175
W hatever the kin d of malfunction, crucial to Plantinga’s case is that malfunction takes
place in each case.
I therefore suggest initially that a necessary condition of a belief’s having

warrant for me is that my cognitive equipment, my belief-forming and
maintaining apparatus o r powers, be free of such malfunction. A belief has
faculties producing B;
(c) by epistemic faculties that are aimed at producing true beliefs; and
(d) by epistemic faculties that are reliable, in the sense that there is a high
statistical probability that a belief produced by them in an appropriate environment is
true.
With a further codicil added by Plantinga, noted by Sennett;
(2) A belief B has more warrant for S that does a belief B* if and only if B has warrant
for S and either Blf does not or S is more strongly inclined to believe B than B*. Sennett
intentionality leaves out the notion of the design plan for discussion later in his book.
Otherwise, he claims his view to be faithful to Plantinga and more explicit.
94
warrant for you only if your cognitive apparatus is functioning properly,

working the way it ought to work, in producing and sustaining it.176
Given Plantinga’s description of warrant above, we now move to a consideration of his
reasons for arguing for such a view.
3.3 Epistemology
In the Warrant series, Plantinga critiques intemalism, coherentism and finally
reliabilism. As was mentioned above, these first tw o volumes on w arrant have to do
almost exclusively with epistemology generally and not with Plantinga’s argument for a
theistic epistemology. Furthermore, because we have spent a fair am ount of time on
foundationalism and its correlates, it will not be necessary again to demonstrate the
specific brand of foundationalism that Plantinga endorses.
And because we shall be discussing his critiques of internalism below, we shall
look now at his critique of coherentism and then look a bit closer at his analysis and
subsequent critique of reliabilism.
3.31 Coherentism
Plantinga sets out to critique coherentism "uberhaupt," as he says, and then turns
us to the Bonjourian and Bayesian varieties in order to show more specifically their
respective deficiencies with regard to warrant.
Generally, then, Plantinga wants to consider coherentism in contrast to its
epistemological rival, foundationalism. First, as we saw in the last chapter, coherentism
95
accepts that which foundationalism rejects, circular reasoning. The foundationalist finds
fault w ith a system of beliefs "in which a belief Ag is accepted on the evidential basis of
a belief Aj, which is accepted on the basis of A2, which is accepted on the basis of A3...,
which is based on A„, which is based on Ag."177 The foundationalist will reject such a
chain of reasoning due to its circularity, whereas a coherentist will revel in it, provided,
of course, the circle is big enough.178
T he foundationalist, on the other hand, as we have seen, requires a basis and
support relation among beliefs in order for any beliefs to be justified. Plantinga here
lists seven foundationalist theses, which have already been discussed in chapter two
above, and which we, therefore, will simply list.
(I) A proper noetic structure will have a foundation: a set of beliefs not accepted
on the basis of other beliefs.
(II) The supports relation is irreflexive.
(ID) The basis relation is irreflexive in a proper noetic structure.
(TV) The supports relation is not asymmetrical.
(V) The basis relation is asymmetrical in a proper noetic structure.
(VT) The basis relation, in a proper noetic structure, is noncircular.
(VII) W arrant does not increase just by virtue of warrant transfer.179
178 Interestingly, in citing an example of one who endorses circular reasoning, Plantinga
quotes from William Temple, Studies in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity (London: Macmillan,
1914), 43, wherein Temple says, "So Edward Caird used to tell us - ’There is no harm in
arguing in a circle if the circle is large enough.’"
179 These are found and discussed on pages 72-74 in Plantinga, WCD.
96
Plantinga attempts to demonstrate to us why it is that the foundationalist will reject the
circular reasoning o f the coherentist.1*0
Let us say that "I see a tree" is believed solely on the basis of "I believe I see a
tree," and "I believe I see a tree" is believed solely on the basis of "I trust my perceptive
ability," and "I trust my perceptive ability" is believed solely on the basis of "My
perception is reliable," and "My perception is reliable" is believed solely on the basis of
"Perception is generally reliable," and "Perception is generally reliable" is believed solely
on the basis of "I see a tree". N ow say that "I believe I see a tree" is directly warranted
by "I trust my perceptive ability" if the former belief is believed on the basis of the
latter and gets all its wa-rant by virtue of being believed on the basis of the latter.
Then what we have here is a circular chain (a chain circular with respect to the directly
warrants relation). A circular chain is described in this way: a finite set of beliefs18' A,,
to An (ordered by the directly warrants relation) such that for any A;, A; is directly
w arranted by A; + 1, and An is directly warranted by A*,. N ow Plantinga thinks it is
self-evident that no belief is self-warranted; if a belief gets all its warrant from itself, it
gets no warrant at all. Also, according to Plantinga, the gets-all-its-warrant-from
relation is transitive. If then "I believe I see a tree" gets all its warrant from "I see a
tree" which gets all its warrant from "I trust my perceptive ability" and if "I believe I
1101 will attempt to construct Plantinga’s demonstration using my own terminology. For
Plantinga’s construction, see Plantinga, WCD, 76f. I am indebted to James F. Sennett, in
personal conversation, for clarifying Plantinga’s approach here.
1,1 Plantinga uses the word "proposition" where I am now using the word "belief". I am
convinced, again through conversation with James Sennett, that Plantinga would agree that
beliefs, and not propositions, are able to acquire and transmit warrant.
97
see a tree" is directly warranted by "I trust ray perceptive ability," then "I believe I see
a tree" gets all its warrant from "My perception is reliable." But then it follows for
w hatever finite num ber of beliefs one might have, the last will be the basis for the first
which, given the transitive relation, will mean that the last belief gets all its warrant
from itself, which is unacceptable.
To put the m atter in Plantingan fashion, A0 is directly warranted by and gets all
its w arrant from A „ A, is directly warranted by and gets all its warrant from A2.
Given the transitive relation, however, we would say that Aq is directly warranted by
and gets all its warrant from A2. N ow A 2 is directly warranted by and gets all its
w arrant from A3. But then we see that A 0 is directly warranted by and gets all its
warrant from A3. Suppose then that A 3 is the final belief in A;. H ow then is A<,
warranted? It appears that Ag gets all its warrant from itself since it itself is directly
warranted by and gets all its warrant from A 3 and A 3 is directly warranted by and gets
all its w arrant from Ag. Because of the transitivity of the first and last belief in A;,
warrant never really begins, o r must begin with a self-warranted belief which is not
possible, at least in this context. There is, therefore, according to the foundationalist, a
warrant defect in the coherentist’s circle. And coherentism fails.
W orth m entioning at this point also is the fact that coherentism’s criterion for
the acceptability of circular reasoning is that the circle be large enough. It is not
difficult to imagine, however, that any semi-creative coherentist would have the ability
to enlarge the circle, deeming it thereby sufficient for warrant. "Warrant cannot
98
magically arise just by virtue of a large evidential circle ."182
In the context o f our original characterization, then, we could view Plantinga’s
critique of coherentism "iiberhaupt" in this way: REP states that theistic belief can
have w arrant within a legitimate epistemological structure. PIP is Plantinga’s argument
for such a structure. P2P is his argument for warrant w ithin the conclusion of P IP .
Thus far, then, P 2 P itself cannot conclude with general coherentism as a legitimate
But Plantinga goes on to characterize coherentism as just another form of
foundationalism. Perhaps the coherentist is not touting circular reasoning, but is
instead pointing us to the conditions under which a belief acquires warrant. "[H]e
holds that a belief is properly basic for me if and only if it appropriately coheres with
the rest of my noetic structure ."183
Even characterized in this way, however, coherentism must be rejetted.
Plantinga’s primary criticism, as was seen in the last chapter, is coherentism’s purely
doxastic considerations. Once one negates the experiential dimensions in an analysis of
warrant, then all one need do is posit a circle of beliefs which are entirely coherent, yet
which are also completely unrelated to any surrounding experience. Coherence is not
sufficient for warrant.
N either is it necessary for warrant. Plantinga sets up possible scenarios in which
one’s doxastic system is coherent, yet in which also one suddenly believes something
1,2 Plantinga, WCD, 78.
183 Ibid., 79.
99
contrary to one’s system . 184 Is the latter belief warranted? Certainly it could be even
though it has no place w ithin one’s coherent system. Coherence then is neither
necessary nor sufficient for warrant.
3.311 Bonjourian Coherentism
Lest he be accused of defeating a straw man, Plantinga takes on tw o different
specific types of coherentism, one proposed by Laurence Bonjour, and the other dealing
with the notion of probability and coherence, called commonly "Bayesian" coherentism.
Plantinga looks at each of these in chapters five and six, respectively, of Warrant: The
Current Debate. Both accounts are extremely complex and would take us well beyond
the scope of REP were we to outline them in detail. It should be helpful, however, to
notice the nuances present in each of the two accounts, as well as points which will
become immediately relevant to our discussion in chapters below. N o t surprisingly,
Plantinga contends that neither Bonjourian nor Bayesian coherentism will suffice for
warrant.
It is Bonjour’s book, The Structure o f Empirical Knowledge, 185 that provides the
grist for Plantinga’s warrant mill in chapter five of W CD. Though Bonjour himself
seems to be concerned w ith the justification of knowledge, because he sees justification
as that which distinguishes true belief from knowledge, Plantinga discusses Bonjour as
1.4 Remember, for example, the Oxford epistemologist’s student in the last chapter who has
been convinced that he is never appeared to redly yet who sees the fire engine roaring by.
1.5 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985).
100
one who, too, is concerned with warrant . 186
"The justification of a particular empirical belief," says Bonjour, "finally depends,
not on other particular beliefs as the linear conception of justification would have it,
but instead on the overall system and its coherence ."187 Plantinga outlines a num ber of
different Bonjourian requirements for warrant. W ithout delineating them all, it is of
interest to note, given Plantinga’s Epistemically Inflexible Climber (and given Bonjour’s
book title, The Structure o f Em pirical Knowledge), that Bonjour lays out what he calls
an "Observation Requirement" for a system of beliefs that would be capable of
conferring warrant (or justification) on its members.
Thus, as a straightforward consequence of this idea that epistemic justification

must be truth-conducive, a coherence theory of empirical justification must
require that in order for the beliefs of a cognitive system to be even candidates
for empirical justification, that system must contain laws attributing a high
degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cognitively spontaneous beliefs
(including in particular those kinds of introspective beliefs which are required for
the recognition of other cognitively spontaneous beliefs) . 188
This would initially appear to provide a refutation of Plantinga’s Epistemically
Inflexible Climber and, thus, a defeater for Plantinga’s defeater of coherentism. But not
so, according to Plantinga.
Stipulate that his system of beliefs is coherent; and to adapt this example to
Bonjour’s specific account of justification, stipulate also that his system of beliefs
has both been coherent for some time and that it meets the Observation
Requirement. ...His system of beliefs thus meets Bonjour’s conditions for
justification; but then it meets those conditions equally well later on, when [Ric]
186 Distinctions between the traditional notion of justification in knowledge and Plantinga’s
notion of warrant will be detailed a bit more in section 3.4 below.
187 Ibid., 92, quoted in Plantinga, WCD, 90.
188 Ibid., 141, quoted in Plantinga, WCD, 92.
101
is at the opera and his experience is of a wholly different character .189
In o ther words, though Bonjour wants to postulate "laws attributing a high
degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of cognitively spontaneous beliefs," such
could be the case w ith the Epistemically Inflexible Climber while he is seated on the
belay ledge, but also while he is at the operal Thus, Bonjour’s Observation Requirement
is met, along w ith other requirements for justification, but the beliefs at the opera,
while certainly coherent, have no warrant. Bonjour’s coherence, then, is not sufficient
for warrant.
N either is it necessary for warrant. I could know my name and where I live
"even if m uch of my noetic structure is in disarray and displays little coherence ."190
N o t surprisingly, then, Plantinga is unconvinced by Bonjour’s elaborate analysis of
coherence.
O f particular interest in this chapter, however, is something that Plantinga
highlights in his initial examination of Bonjour’s account of coherence. In section II,
"Bonjourian Coherentism Examined," Plantinga begins with "A. Classical
Foundationalism and Trusting Reason ."191
A reading of the first chapter of Bonjour’s book might suggest that he endorses
the Q uixotic Enlightenment project of refusing to trust o r acquiesce in my
cognitive nature until I first determine that it is reliable, that it, for the most
part, provides me with truth. But of course this is wholly foolish and self-
forgetful, w orthy only of someone who, like Kierkegaard’s Hegel, forgets that
she is an existing individual and confuses herself with universal reason in the
Plantinga, WCD, 110.
190 Ibid., 112.
1,1 Ibid., 97.
102
abstract. For where do I stand when I conclude that since it is possible that my
nature should massively deceive me, I should not trust it until I determine that it
does not thus massively deceive me? Where shall I stand while making that
determination, while investigating whether or not my nature is or is not reliable?
Where is this Archimedian irou <j t u i ?
Obviously I have nothing but my epistemic nature...to enable me to see...that
if it is possible that my nature deceive me, then I must determine whether it is
reliable before I trust it .192
This is a fascinating turn in Plantinga’s analysis of Bonjour. Certainly Bonjour merits
such a critique. But is it really true that we have nothing but our epistemic nature to
enable us to see if our nature deceives us? It would greatly help us to define more
carefully just what this epistemic nature is.
N ow Plantinga admits that Bonjour is, as a m atter of fact, not involved in such a
self-defeating stance "...for he clearly begins his project w ith an initial trust in
reason.. ”m Bonjour holds that there are certain a priori beliefs that we just simply see
as true. "(Indeed, he sweeps a fair amount of dust under the a priori rug)."194 H e also
gives something like properly basic status to necessary beliefs, those that are self-evident.
But then, asks Plantinga, "If I can responsibly trust my nature with respect to what
seems self-evident, why can’t I trust it with respect to perception and m emory ...?"195
Then, as we might expea, he quotes from Thomas Reid.
The sceptic asks me, W hy do you believe the existence of the external o b jea
which you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my m anufaaure; it came from
192 Ibid., 98-99. We shall look at this again when we attempt an approximation of
"presupposition" in chapter four.
193 Ibid., 99.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
103
the m int of Nature; it bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right,
the fault is not mine; I ever took it upon trust, and w ithout suspicion. Reason,
says the skeptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to th row off every
opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. W hy, sir, should I
believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception? They came both out
of the same shop, and were made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of
false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another ?196
Bonjour, on the other hand, writes as though one would be irresponsible in accepting a
belief w ithout a reason, only later to affirm that beliefs of the sort "P is necessary" must
be accepted simply as "seen".
N ow just what is it that tempts us to trust reason over perception? According
to Plantinga, perception can mislead us and, as a m atter of fact, we discover perception’s
error through our use of reason. N ot only so, but consciousness seems privileged in its
ability to determine error. I can’t think about the reliability of my ow n faculties
w ithout in some sense trusting reason .197 W hether I conclude with Hum e that
perception is not to be trusted, o r w ith Reid that it is, I employ reason to make such
determinations. Yet I need not employ perception in order to consider its reliability or
the lack thereof.
O f interest is Plantinga’s brief m ention of reason’s reliability in the context of
divine revelation,
W hat would be required for me to conclude, sensibly, that reason is not to be

trusted? O ne suggestion: I may leam or think I learn from divine revelation,
say, that some proposition is true, which proposition conflicts w ith w hat reason
teaches. (Some people th in k thus - mistakenly, in my view - about th e Christian
m Thomas Reid, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind" in Inquiries and Essays, ed. Ronald
Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983); quoted in Ibid.,
100.
1,7 Ibid., 103.
104
doctrines of the T rinity and Incarnation.) But here there are deep waters. I rely
upon reason to conclude that there is a conflict between reason and revelation
here; so if I conclude that reason is unreliable, have I not lost my reason for
thinking there is a conflict (and hence my reason for thinking reason is
unreliable)? Further, if I rely upon reason in concluding that there is a conflict,
I can of course quite sensibly continue to rely upon it and conclude that the
alleged divine revelation is not really a divine revelation after all.158
The application of this discursus on reason has to do w ith Bonjour’s notion that
perceptual and memory beliefs require reasons in order responsibly to be held, whereas
self-evident beliefs do not. Thus, self-evident beliefs receive partiality. W ithout
discussing the details in Bonjour’s notion, however, the implications for Plantinga’s
discussion are many and interesting for a Christian, Reformed apologetic.
Aside from Plantinga’s intriguing discussion of reason, he concludes that Bonjour
has given us no satisfactory account of warrant w ithin a coherentist structure. As a
m atter of fact, Bonjour’s system seems to disqualify itself from the race. One example
of this disqualification would be Bonjour’s notion of Doxastic Presumption, which
notion affirms that my metabeliefs are approximately correct. If the Doxastic
Presum ption is not true, then my coherence beliefs will not be warranted. But how
can we simply accept the Doxastic Presumption as true w ithout being justified in
holding my metabeliefs? If I am not justified in holding my metabeliefs (beliefs about
what I believe), how can my other beliefs, dependent on the Doxastic Presumption, be
true? Thus, Bonjourian coherentism is stuck in the confusion both of reason’s role and
of beliefs about beliefs, and Bonjourian coherentism fails.
1,8 Ibid., 103-104.
105
3.312 Bayesian Coherentism
Plantinga now turns us to a consideration o f Bayesian coherentism, called by
some "Personalism," by others "Subjectivism," but by most "Bayesianism" given that its
adherents recommend change of belief in accordance w ith a generalization of "Bayes’
Theorem ."199
Plantinga begins by reminding us of the distinction between statistical or factual
probabilities, i.e., probabilities in which a member of one class should also be a member
of another, and normative o r epistemic probabilities, referring to propositions.
Bayesians are concerned, not with the first, but with the second kind of probabilities.
More precisely, Bayesianism is concerned with conditions for partial beliefs, i.e., beliefs
held to some degree or another.
Given that some of our beliefs are more o r less probable, Bayesianism aims at a
certain norm ativity for our partial beliefs, or, a probabilistic coherence.®0 A system of
partial beliefs is coherent, moreover, if and only if it conforms to the probability
calculus. W hy must my beliefs conform to this condition?
Well, suppose they don’t; suppose...I believe to degree Vs that the Lions will win
the Superbowl and also believe that the Giants have a 50-50 chance of winning.
N oting this fact and having fewer scruples than you ought to have, you propose
a couple of bets: for $66.67 you offer to sell me a bet that pays $100 if the Lions
win and nothing if they don’t; since I believe to degree % that the Lions will
m Ibid., 114. Plantinga notes that Bayes’ Theorem is "named after its discoverer, the
famous 17th century clergyman Thomas Bayes, who allegedly found it useful in gambling. (It is
not recorded whether he found it useful in fulfilling his pastoral duties.)"
Frankly, the better part of this chapter’s discussion and the next is well beyond the
focus of this work. We mention Bayesianism here, however, as another representative of
coherentism which, again, Plantinga finds wanting in its ability to produce warrant.
200 Ibid., 119.
106
win, I consider this a fair bet and accept. But you go on to offer me another bet
that pays $100 if the Giants win and nothing if they don’t; this bet costs $50.
Since I also regard this as a fair bet, I accept. And now I am in trouble .” 1
The point, of course, is that given the above scenario, there is no probability that I will
win the bet. You have collected $116.67 from me and the most that I can possibly win
is $100. You have made a Dutch Book against me; no matter what happens, I lose .” 2
So one reason to opt for Bayesian coherence is to avoid situations in which I always
lose (or, am irrational ?).” 3 Thus, Paul Horwich: "if a person is rational, he will
distribute his probabilities - his degrees of belief - in accord w ith these laws. For only if
he does this will he be able to avoid a so-called D utch book being made against him ."” 4
There are finer points of Bayesian coherence as rationality, but they need not
detain us here. O f the ones Plantinga discusses, strict coherence, conditionalization,
probability kinematics and reflection, they all have to do with the way in which one
ascribes certain degrees of belief to one’s credence functions .205
201 Ibid., 120.
202 Ibid., and see n. 11. There is an ongoing debate between Plantinga and Bas van Fraasen
as to which person is Dutch in the Dutch Book. According to van Fraasen, it is the Dutchman
who is clever enough to secure bets that will guarantee profit. Plantinga, on the other hand,
notes that the OED attributes to the one betting the honor of being Dutch, remaining
consistent with seventeenth century English usage which tended to acquire many derogatory
references to the Dutch, e.g., "Dutch bottom".
203 For those interested or adept in probability calculus, the further discussion of
Conditionalization, Probability Kinematics and van Fraasen’s Reflection (Old and New) may be
of interest.
204 Ibid., 121.
205 The question of what rule one might use in ascribing certain precise degrees to beliefs
seems crucial here. Who decides how a belief is given a probability of .8 rather than .9 or .3
and how does one ascertain such a thing?
107
In discussing the notion of rationality and Bayesianism, Plantinga outlines three
answers to the question, "Why must we be [Bayesian] coherent to be rational ?"206
The first answer he labels "the Argument from Means-ends Rationality." Simply
put, such an argument states that I am irrational if I employ epistemic means toward
less probable or impossible ends. We have already noticed this type of answer in the
D utch Book argument. A nother type of means-end rationality is one in which my goal
is a style of epistemic life in which vindication is not a priori excluded. "Incoherence
...is incompatible with achieving that style of life; so incoherence is means-end
irrational ."207
Plantinga’s second answer is the "Argument from Ideality." If an ideal intellect
would be coherent, it is argued, isn’t coherence an ideal for any intellect? Plantinga
notes (in Anselmian fashion) that a completely ideal intellect, an ideal cognizer, a
know er than which none greater can be conceived, would be essentially coherent - such
that it isn’t possible that it fail to be coherent. "Perhaps we should go still further
(following Anselm) and argue that a really ideal intellect would be necessarily coherent,
coherent in every possible world. W hat follows, however, for «s? N o t much, so far as
I can see."208 A n ideal intellect would be maximally opinionated; it would have
opinions on everything and would hold them to the maximum degree. Is this
something for which we should strive in order to be coherent? "I display nothing but
206 These are discussed in Chapter 7 of WCD.
207 Ibid., 142.
201 Ibid., 143.
108
hubris in taking for myself goals not suited to my powers... The argument from
ideality fails."2”
Plantinga’s third answer is the "Analogical Argument." This answer contends
that the probability calculus is no more than an extension to partial beliefs of formal
logic. But then coherence is analogous to consistency in full belief. I, therefore, strive
for coherence just as I do consistency. N ow given that we all ought, in some way, to
strive for consistency, isn’t it also true that rationality and the evidence require that I
admit my ow n inconsistency? If I wrote a book entitled I believe, listing in it the full
range of my beliefs, would I not have to note that, while I firmly believe all that is in
the book is true, I also believe that the conjunction of those beliefs is false?210 This
answer, too, fails.211
N ot surprisingly, none of the above is sufficient nor necessary for warrant. "To
satisfy coherence...I must believe each necessary truth...to the maximal degree. But
clearly I can know a great deal without doing that ."212 We can, contra Bayesianism,
know much even if we know that our full beliefs are inconsistent on the whole.
Bayesianism is not necessary for warrant.
N either is it sufficient. Here Plantinga reverts back again to his analysis of
coherentism, and in this case Bayesian coherentism, as a doxastic theory. Bayesianism
229Ibid., 144.
210 Ibid., 145.
211 Plantinga then moves again to van Fraasen’s Reflection, both Old and New, which
details shall be left to other readers.
212 Ibid., 126.
109
"says nothing...about how m y beliefs should change in response to experience. 1,213 We need
only remember here the Epistemically Inflexible Climber.
The purpose of the discussion thus far in this chapter is to attempt to show
Plantinga’s detailed analysis and rejection of coherentism as a legitimate epistemological
structure in which warranted belief may be found. Thus, the discussion is pertinent to
REP and its correlates. Because coherentism has brought the most persistent challenge
to a foundationalist epistemology, it was important for us to see Plantinga’s analysis of
its inconsistencies. Coherentism clearly is not a viable epistemology.
But there is another challenge to foundationalism and to coherentism which has
recently come on the scene. It will be necessary for us to look at that as well.
3.32 Reliabilism
Coherentisms - uberhaupt, Bonjourian or Bayesian - none are able to produce a
context suitable for warranted true belief. Though their respective structures attem pt to
provide a context for knowledge, knowledge is far too elusive to be held by the weak
links of coherentist epistemology.
But there is now a "new boy on the block ,"214 an epistemology that is making
some progress in the literature in seeking to set forth an alternative theory of how we
come to know, an alternative epistemological structure .215 It is a theory called,
213 Ibid., 129.
215 In the context of Sosa’s analysis, perhaps he would now need to write an article entitled,
"The Raft, the Pyramid and the Fuel-Injected Engine" or something of the sort.
110
generally, reliabilism. It may be helpful to look first at "generic reliabilism" before
moving to specific accounts. We shall consider Sosa’s account of the matter and then
look at Plantinga’s critique. The primary reason for looking first at Sosa is to frame
Plantinga’s critiques w ithin the context of the three problems that Sosa sees in
reliabilism.
Generic reliabilism can be understood as follows:
S’s belief that p at t is justified iff it is the outcome of a process of belief

acquisition or retention which is reliable, or leads to a sufficiently high
preponderance of true beliefs over false beliefs.216
There are three problems that are mentioned w ith regard to this description of
reliabilism. First, there is the problem of generality. The generality problem points to
either the (too) specific process or the (too) general process of belief acquisition as
reliable. If the process of belief acquisition as reliable is too specific, there are
problems. "A process-type might be selected so narrowly that only one instance of it
ever occurs, and hence the type is either completely reliable or completely
unreliable ."217 For example, we may determine that my "belief that p" is derived from
the specific process-type that "the Pope asserted p." However, p is yet unjustified
though derived from a reliable process.218 So, too, for a general process of reliability,
say, perception, in which, as a reliable process-type (generally), my evidential beliefs
216 Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspectivet Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 131.
217 Ibid.
218 See reliabilist Alvin Goldman’s discussion of this in his "What is Justified Belief?" in
Justification and Knowledge, ed. George S. Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1979), especially, for this scenario, 12.
Ill
may o r may not be justified. So the problem of generality must be faced in reliabilist
accounts o f knowledge.
The second problem mentioned is the "new evil-demon problem." "New,"
because it is a near-relative of, but not identical to, Descartes’ (old) evil demon problem.
This is the problem in which our thoughts and (mental) experiences are completely
reliable, yet also completely out of touch with our surrounding environment. Could
we then be justified in what we believe? We are deceived, in this scenario, by an evil
demon (or some other cognitive attacker) who causes us to distort and misunderstand
all that is "out there." Remember, however, that, in the midst of this deception, all our
thoughts and mental experiences are formed by reliable process-types.
The third problem Sosa labels as "the meta-incoherence problem," the reverse of
the evil demon problem. Here one’s belief about an external fact is true, yet there is no
(internal) reason for one to believe it. Perhaps one’s belief was acquired by
clairvoyance. These problems, then, will plague the reliabilist and must be corrected .219
Plantinga gives us a summary model from which we may be able to critique
reliabilist epistemologies :220
[C]ome up w ith an appropriate pathological process type of the right degree of
219 Sosa’s own correction contains what he calls "intellectual virtue". For more information
on that, see his "Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue," chap. in Knowledge in Perspective.
220 In order to understand Plantinga’s problems with reliabilism, it will not be necessary to
work through the entirety of his discussions on the matter. For those who are interested in the
details, I refer to "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function" wherein Plantinga deals
extensively with Nozick, Dretske and early Goldman, and then further to WCD wherein
Alston is substituted for Nozick and Goldman’s reliabilism is considered in its latest form from
the latter’s Epistemology and Cognition. We will look briefly at these in the context of Sosa’s
three problems above.
112
generality which is in fact reliable, but (due to the pathology involved) does not
confer much by way of [warrant] on the beliefs in its output .221
O ne will notice in this "summary model" elements coincident w ith Sosa’s analysis of
generic reliabilism. So, for example, when analyzing N ozick’s reliabilism ,222 Plantinga
proposes (among other scenarios) that I am a brain in a vat on Alpha-Centauri in which
m y captors are running a cognitive experiment. I have the same beliefs and thoughts I
would have were I on earth, so that they, in fact, are false (on Alpha-Centauri). These
captors also give me the belief that Mexico City is the largest city on earth (which
belief is true). O n Alpha-Centauri, though, all the evidence points to the fact that
Cleveland is the largest city on earth. Now, Nozick’s conditions are satisfied, but
surely I don’t know that Mexico City is the largest city on earth .223 This, as we can
see, is related to Sosa’s second problem, i.e., the new evil demon problem, in which I
know that which is true, yet w ithout warrant.
Alstonian justification, as at least semi-reliabilist, suffers from the same basic
critique. According to Alston, justification comes to this:
S is Jejt ["e" for "evaluative" and "g" for "grounds"] justified in believing that p iff
S’s believing that p, as S did, was a good thing from the epistemic point of view,
in that S’s belief that p was based on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient
222 Nozick’s reliabilism is framed this way: (1) p is true, (2) S believes p, (3) if p were not
true, S would not believe p, and (4) if p were true, S would believe p. In a footnote, Plantinga
notes that Nozick sees his own account as neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge and
then he goes on to explain Nozick’s attempt to make it such.
223 Plantinga, PES, 16-17.
113
overriding reasons to the contrary .224
A nd why is this a reliabilist (or semi-reliabilist) account? Primarily due to A lston’s
emphasis on evaluation and grounds. Justification has to do w ith the grounds of one’s
belief p as an indicator of the tru th of p, a reliable indicator. "S’s belief that p is
Alston-justified if it is based on a ground that is both accessible to S and is a reliable
indicator of the tru th of p ."225
Among Plantinga’s refutations here, we see one example as illustrative of Sosa’s
meta-incoherence problem. In order to see the matter (complete w ith humor) dearly,
we shall quote it rather than attempt a paraphrase.
Where the ground of a belief is in fact a reliable indicator, this will be,
naturally enough, because of the nature of the indicator, and relation between it
and the proposition in question. More generally, it will be because of the
character of the cognitive environment in which the subject finds himself.
Imagine, therefore, that I suffer from a rare sort of malady. A certain tune is
such that whenever I hear it, I form the belief that there is a large purple animal
nearby. N ow in my cognitive environment, this is not in fact an indicator of
the truth of this belief; so the belief has no Alstonian justification. But imagine
that I am suddenly transported without my knowledge to...Australia...; and
imagine further that there, when that tune is heard, there is almost always a
large purple animal nearby. (The tune in question, as it turns out, is the love
call of the double Wattled Purple Cassowary.) In my new cognitive
environm ent, the tune is indeed a reliable indicator of the tru th of the belief; but
of course the belief in question would...have no warrant - it would have no more
warrant for me in Australia than it did in my original cognitive environm ent .226
So Alstonian reliabilism (or semi-reliabilism) suffers from Sosa’s meta-incoherence
problem; a problem, remember, in which one’s belief is true given the external fact,
nt William Alston, "Cognitive Epistemic Justification," chap. in Epistemic Justification

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); quoted in Plantinga, WCD, 186.
225 Ibid., 190.
226 Ibid., 191-192.
114
but, though produced itself by a reliable process type (iii this case, the love call tune), is
unwarranted.
Because Plantinga’s objections to Dretske are similar to those above, we can
make quick w ork of his analysis at this point. Plantinga concludes his analysis of
D retske’s reliabilist account w ith this formulation:
(D5) K knows that s is F if and only if K believes that s is F and there is a state
of affairs r ’s being G such that (1) r ’s being G causes K to believe that s is F and
(2) P{(s is F )/(r’s being G & k)} - 1 and P{(s is F)/k} -< 1.
T hough a fair and thorough analysis of this formulation would take us too far afield, it
will help to see just what exactly Plantinga is saying in (D5). Dretske wants to account
for the way in which someone knows that something is a fact.227 In order to account
for such, Dretske proposes that such knowledge must include the fact that one’s belief
that something is a fact is caused by the information that something is a fact. As
Plantinga seeks to analyze w hat Dretske could mean by the "information that s is F,"
he runs into areas of probability and of background knowledge. O n the notion of
probability, the probability of something like "Susan is jogging" will be difficult to
discern and Plantinga confesses to no reasonably satisfactory answer to the problem,
no r does Dretske address it. W hat he does address, however, is the notion of just how
inform ation is received and is relative to particular persons. It is received, says Dretske,
when a signal having a certain property (F’) causes one to believe that s is F. N o t only
so, but the signal carrying such information is determined on the basis of the
227 K knows that s is F - K’s belief that s is F is caused (or causally sustained) by the
information that s is F. See Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (hereafter
KFI) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1981, 1982), 86 .
115
probability of s’s being F, given the signal, and one’s background knowledge (k), is less
than l.22® If I already know that s is F, the probability of s’s being F relative to my
background knowledge is 1 and no signal (r) carries the information that s is F relative
to me. But if I do not know that s is F, then the information carried to me by any
state of affairs whose signal (r) combined with what I do know (k) - 1 and results in
m y knowledge. Thus, (D5) is now understood to say that I know that something is a
fact iff I believe it is a fact and there is a state of affairs such that it’s signal causes me to
believe that that thing is a fact and the probability of its being a fact on the state of
affairs combined w ith my background knowledge is 1 and the probability of its being a
fact on my background knowledge (alone) is less than 1 . This is the probability notion
of reliabilism in which one is said to know a true proposition if one believes it and if
the right probability relations hold between the proposition and "its significant
other ."229
But, not surprisingly, (D5) will not account for warrant. Consider, again, a
situation of meta-incoherence, which situation will be called on again below; the Case
of the Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion: K suffers from a brain lesion that seriously
disturbs his noetic structure causing him to believe wildly false propositions. It also
causes him to believe that he is suffering from a brain lesion. Now , K knows that s is
F. Furtherm ore, K’s belief that s is F is caused by his brain lesion and the probability
of his suffering from such on his background knowledge and his knowledge that he is
221 Plantinga, WCD, 194 and Dretske, KFI, 65.
116
suffering from such is 1 (because he knows he is). Yet the probability of his suffering
from such on his background knowledge alone is less than 1 (because the brain lesion
caused the knowledge). All of the conditions of (D 5) are met, but surely K does not
know he is suffering from a brain lesion, or at least we can say that his knowledge is
unwarranted. He has no evidence that he is; as a m atter of fact, (let us say) he has the
strongest possible evidence to the contrary. So, again, the objective fact of the m atter is
known, but the way in which the knowledge was obtained is highly suspect (as in Sosa’s
clairvoyant) and meta-incoherence rises to the surface again.
We turn now, lastly, to Plantinga’s analysis of Alvin G oldm an’s reliabilism, both
old and new. His latest position can be seen in his Epistemology and Cognition.2*0 This
is, in many ways, the most difficult one to analyze given the complexities of G oldm an’s
system.
In early Goldman, the problem of generality (what Plantinga calls, the problem
of the degree of justification) is determined by the degree of reliability of the process
type. Let us say the process type is narrow and let us adapt the Case of the
Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion. The lesion itself causes the victim to believe he has
a brain lesion. It is a narrow process type. Because one has no evidence of the lesion,
no symptoms, no testimony, etc., though the process type is reliable, the resulting true
belief has little or no warrant. Thus, early Goldman’s "paradigm reliabilism" is
dismissed as also inadequate to provide for warrant, for basically the same reasons that
we saw in Dretske.
230 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986).
117
The new Goldman, however, is significantly different from the paradigm
reliabilism expressed above .231 N o t surprisingly, such difference will in no way alter
Plantinga’s refutatory example.
There are several stages to Goldm an’s later version which we will not attem pt to
outline here in any detail. The following considerations should suffice.
(P,) S’s believing P at time t is justified if and only if (a) S’s believing P at time t
is perm itted by a right system of justificational rules (J-rules) and (b) this
permission is not undermined by S’s cognitive state at t .232
Skipping over other problems of detail, we may ask how it is that we know a set of J-
rules to be right, to which Goldman responds with
(ARI) A J-rule system R is right if and only if R permits certain (basic)

psychological processes, and the instantiation of these processes would result in a
tru th ratio of belief that meets some specified high threshold (greater than .S).233
N ow Goldman wants to hold that only process types can be reliable, not process tokens-,
to which Plantinga responds in disagreement. A reliable process type may contain an
unwarranted token of belief w ith it and a J-rule set that permitted such a type would
not be a right J-rule set. Furthermore, there is the serious problem relating to just what
a type of psychological process would be, given the fact that it must be narrower than
231 There are deep complexities attached to new Goldmanian reliabilism, not the least of
which is unclarity. As we will shortly see, Plantinga’s analysis of the later Goldman is designed
to show that Goldman’s view of warrant is nowhere necessary nor sufficient for such. He does
this by way of a relatively quick summary and critique of Goldman’s counterfactual in (ARI)
and (ARI*), some of which Goldman himself realized. He then brings in the attempt to
appease the Gettier problem. None of this is satisfactory, given the deletion of proper function
from the varied conditions.
232 Plantinga, WCD, 200 and Goldman, EC, 63. One example of (b) would be a case in
which you mistakenly believe that p is not permitted by such a system of J-rules.
233 Ibid., 201 and Goldman, 106.
118
perception, etc., due to the problem of generality.
Plantinga’s main problem centers around the counterfactual introduced in (ARI).
W hat could it mean that the instantiation of J-rules would result in a high ratio of true
belief? According to Goldman, it means something like "result in such in possible
worlds close to W." At this, Plantinga launches off into an analysis of how one might
determine truth ratios in possible worlds and thus an actual tru th ratio.
Suppose we have types of cognitive processes. Certain types of these processes
will be permitted, according to Goldman. If there are many types of permitted patterns
of cognitive processes, we could combine them into megatypes, some of which will be
instantiated. To determine truth ratio, we would compute the ratio of true beliefs to
total beliefs in the instantiated megatypes, and thus determine the truth ratio of a set of
J-rules. So, the truth ratio of a set of J-rules in a possible world would be the ratio of
true beliefs to beliefs simpliciter, taken over all the instantiations, in W, of all the
megatypes perm itted by the system .234
Yet even if such calculations could be done, and Plantinga is doubtful, given,
among other things, that the tru th ratio in one world might be high, yet low in
another235, other problems, Gettier-like, loom on the horizon. Goldman must try to
exclude relevant alternative situations in which a true belief is not knowledge even
though the process would cause S to believe p. Thus, there must be what he calls,
234 Ibid., 203.
235 Ibid., 205, n. 33.
119
"local reliability ."236
But this, too, will fail. Consider again the Case of the Epistemically
Serendipitous Lesion. As a result of this lesion, most of my beliefs are false. Yet,
again, I believe that I am suffering from a brain lesion. There is, then, a cognitive
process, in Goldm an’s sense, displaying local reliability, occurring only in conjunction
w ith such a lesion, and whose output is the belief that I have a brain lesion. This belief
is justified (because the process type which occurs only in conjunction with this lesion
is added to a right system of J-rules) and I know that I am suffering from a brain lesion;
but this belief has little or no warrant for me.
Plantinga goes on to argue that, on Goldman’s account, that which one believes
one knows (which of course if true of Goldman would render his notion problematic at
best), but again we need not discuss these matters here.
And what is Plantinga’s detailed discussion of Nozickian, Alstonian, Dretskian,
Goldm anian (old and new) reliabilism designed to do? Just this; it is designed to show
that reliabilism, like coherentism (though more recent) must give a non-pathological
account of true belief in order to account for knowledge. None of the accounts thus
far have been able to do that.
Is Plantinga able to do that?
3.321 Plantinga’s Reliabilism?
Is Plantinga’s own account of proper function (and its near relatives) a reliabilist
236 Ibid. "Local reliability" I take to be the externalist version of direct access.
120
epistemology? Clearly, there seem to be affinities between the general tenets of
reliabilism and the proper function theory (hereafter TPF ) .237 Plantinga himself notes
one of the similarities between his T PF and reliabilism,
Even more exactly, the module of the design plan governing its production must
be such that it is objectively highly probable that a belief produced by cognitive
faculties functioning properly according to that module (in a congenial
environment) will be true or verisimilitudinous. This is the reliabilist constraint
on warrant, and the important truth contained in reliabilist accounts of
w arrant .238
So there are indeed similarities, acknowledged by Plantinga himself. Plantinga,
however, claims to have avoided the generality problem that we saw above. Goldman
claims that Plantinga has not, after all, been able to avoid the same problem. Goldman
suggests that "a little reflection would make it clear that cognitive faculty individuation
is no trivial m atter ."239 In other words, Plantinga’s view suffers from the generality
problem in a way that is different from either extreme such a problem has to face. O n
Plantinga’s view, there is no delineation o r individuation of just what faculty it is that
produces (when properly functioning) these warranted beliefs.240 Plantinga admits to
the lack of individuation, and to incompleteness in his own TPF, but he also indicates,
I don’t, of course, say that the degree of warrant of a belief is determined by the
237 Plantinga, in the preface to WCD, says he prefers the designation, "The Theory of
Proper Function" (hereafter TPF) taken, first of all, from William Hasker.
239 Ibid., 29. The quote from Goldman came from the symposium on warrant at the
Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, St. Louis, 1986.
240 One will remember chat the two extremes faced in the generality problem are that the
process types touted as reliable are either too broadly conceived as to include false beliefs or too
narrowly construed as to allow for far too little. Plantinga’s view simply touts no faculty or
faculties at all.
121
degree of reliability of the faculty or faculties that produce it; the analogue of
that claim for processes is what creates the problem for Goldman; so at any rate
I am not afflicted w ith the very same problem .241
In order to respond to Goldman further (and to other objections as well),
Plantinga employs an objection presented by William Hasker which we will quote in
full in order to provide the entire context in which the debate between Hasker and
Plantinga took place.
Geoffrey, who as the result of a random genetic m utation, not directed or

planned by anyone, finds himself in an unusual cognitive situation. O n the one
hand, Geoffrey is totally blind, and there is no hope of his ever regaining any
degree of vision. But the mutation which rendered Geoffrey blind also had
another result. The portion of his brain which would normally be devoted to
processing visual information has now acquired another ability: it registers, in an
extremely sensitive way, the magnetic fields, generated by the earth and by
objects in the environment. Because of this, Geoffrey has the ability, hitherto
verified only in certain marine organisms, to locate himself and to make his way
about with considerable facility; automobiles are still a problem for him, to be
sure, but so long as he stays on the sidewalk he is all right.
U nder the described circumstances I think we are obliged to say that
Geoffrey’s beliefs about his whereabouts are warranted, and indeed that he
knows where he is. It seems, however, that Geoffrey’s cognitive situation is by
no means in accordance with his design plan; that plan calls for that portion of
his brain to be devoted to visual perception. So there can be warranted belief
even where there is not function according to the design plan, and [TPF] is
false.242
Plantinga then responds to Hasker’s objections and Hasker, in a paper soon to be
published, responds to Plantinga’s response .243 Initially, Plantinga argues that if
« » Ibid.
242 Ibid., 29-30.
243 Hasker’s soon to be published paper is entitled, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and
Religious Knowledge," to be published in a festschrift for Arthur Holmes edited by Steven Evans
and Merold Westphal. Citations from the above will be from the unpublished paper.
122
Geoffrey’s max plan is acquired by chance, so could a new design plan be acquired .244
Moreover, those who don’t give credence to such things may believe that a new design
plan has been given by God.
But, even given the above, can we say that Geoffrey knows? Plantinga claims
that Geoffrey’s beliefs may be warranted, but warranted by induction. However, it is
not clear that Geoffrey’s beliefs are warranted; nor is it clear that they lack warrant. So
Plantinga speaks of "different senses" of warrant and of proper function. Because
Geoffrey has true beliefs about his location, we can think that the relevant cognitive
module is indeed functioning properly, but not in accord with the design plan and thus,
it is not functioning properly in the strict sense. Geoffrey’s cognitive module, then, is
functioning properly in an "analogically extended sense" and thus his beliefs do have
warrant, but not in the full o r strict sense. "Here we must follow Aristotle (who did
not have Hasker in mind): ‘we should perhaps say that in a manner he knows, in a
manner n o t .’"245
Hasker is not satisfied w ith Plantinga’s analysis of his objections and he replies
to Plantinga’s reply. The notion that Geoffrey’s beliefs are warranted by induction is
just not an option which is available to Plantinga given Hasker’s example. It has
2MThe maximum plan, unlike the design plan, is not a description of how something works
under specific circumstances the designer plans for or takes into account, but rather it takes into
account much broader circumstances. Further, the max plan stipulates what a thing will do
when it is broken, damaged, destroyed, etc. as well as when it is functioning properly. Lastly,
the max plan includes a complete specification of relevant circumstances in a way that the design
plan could never do. Compare, Ibid., 22f.
245 Ibid., 31. The quote from Aristotle is taken from Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 71a 25 in The
Oxford Translations o f Aristotle, trans. G. R. G. Mure, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1928).
123
already been determined just how Geoffrey obtained his beliefs and induction is
irrelevant to the process. Geoffrey knows where he is w ithout working through the
inductive process of belief-formation. Also important, to Hasker’s mind, is the fact that
Plantinga admits to the tension of wanting to affirm warrant, but at the same time
having to affirm that whatever warrant Geoffrey has was had in spite of proper
function. So, says Hasker on whether or not Geoffrey’s beliefs are warranted, "For
those w ho do not come to the example with a strong prior commitment to the [proper
function] theory, the decision may be simpler .1'244
Furtherm ore, Plantinga’s talk of an "analogical extension," according to Hasker,
is vulnerable to other ideas of analogy, i.e., that there must be a commonality in the
context of the analogical relations in order for the analogy to hold. Therefore, says
Hasker, "I want to insist on a Yes or N o answer to the following question: Does
Geoffrey, in virtue of his use of his faculty of magnetolocation, have warrant for his
beliefs about his location - warrant such that were it sufficiently strong, and extraneous
defeating circumstances lacking, he could know where he is on this basis?"247 A "Yes"
answer concedes the counterexample. A "No" answer requires significant explanation
o r revision of Plantinga’s TPF.
Clearly, however, given this interchange between Hasker and Plantinga, and
given the externalist emphasis (see 3.4 below) in these accounts, it is clear that
reliabilism’s epistemology is closer to Plantinga’s TPF and his most recent w ork on
246 Hasker, "Proper Function, Reliabilism, and Religious Knowledge," 15.
247 Ibid., 15-16.
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warrant than either (classical) foundationalism o r coherentism .248 It is also clear that,
given Plantinga’s criticisms of reliabilism above, he finds it, in all of its various forms,
insufficient for warranted belief. Thus, though there are similarities, Plantinga would
not see himself as reliabilist.
3.4 Intem alism /Extem alism
Discussions of intemalism and extemalism in epistemology could easily detain us
throughout the remainder of this work. Due to other, more urgent, matters, however,
we shall have to be briefer than the topic itself deserves. There are fascinating and
promising elements in these discussions, to which a thorough-going Christian
epistemology could well respond. But that for another time.
In both prefaces to his tw o volumes on warrant, Plantinga highlights the
importance o f the intem alism /extem alism debate.
Classical foundationalism has been dominant in Western epistemology ever since

the Enlightenment; more broadly and more exactly, it is really classical
deontologism - the view that epistemic responsibility and fulfillment of epistemic
obligation and duty are of crucial epistemic importance - together w ith its
consequent intemalism that has been thus dom inant. Although classical
foundationalism has fallen into ruins in the last half of the present century, the
same most emphatically cannot be said for classical deontologism and
2,8 How does this closeness of TPF to reliabilism relate to my REP wherein I try to show
that Plantinga’s view of warrant "fits" within a Reidian foundationalist structure? I have two
responses. The first is to say something like "time and space will not allow for an extended
discussion of this matter," which is what one says when one does not know the answer to the
question. The second, however, is to notice that, unlike foundationalism and coherentism,
reliabilism seems to be, not so much an epistemological structure, in which knowledge "stands,"
but rather an epistemological "cement mixer" through which elements must be mixed in order
to account for certain elements of the entire structure. There is something more "dynamic" or
"process-oriented" in reliabilism that is not found in either foundationalism or coherentism.
But, "time and space will not allow for an extended discussion of this matter."
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intemalism.
Nevertheless one of the most exciting developments in twentieth-century
theory of knowledge is the rejection of deontology and the sudden appearance of
various forms of extemalism. More precisely, this development is less the
appearance than the reappearance of extemalism in epistemology .249
Plantinga then attributes extemalism, not surprisingly, to Thomas Reid, and then back
of him to Aquinas, and back of him to Aristotle.
In his second volume, Plantinga devotes a good bit of his prefatory remarks to a
review of the internalist/externalist problem discussed in his first volume. "Intemalism
in epistemology ...goes hand in hand with the idea that warrant is really justification . 1,250
”Further...deontology generates intemalism; so it is also easy to see the roots of
contem porary intemalism ."251 Thus, Plantinga attempts to assess the debate in
epistemology with regard to what is, is not, should, or should not be accessible to the
knower. We shall first need to frame the discussion before moving to the internalist
link to deontology.
According to Plantinga, "the basic internalist idea...is that w hat determines
whether a belief is warranted for a person are factors or states in some sense internal to
that person; warrant conferring properties are in some way internal to the subject or
cognizer ."252 The example of Chisholm would serve as intemalistic in which, according
to him, one can determine by reflection alone whether or not a proposition is warranted.
2<9 Plantinga, WCD, v.
250 Plantinga, WPF, v.
251 Ibid., vi.
126
Thus, intemalism refers to epistemic qualities rather than, for example, biological or
physiological.
"The externalist, by contrast, holds that warrant need not depend upon factors
relevantly internal to the cognizer; warrant depends o r supervenes upon properties to
some o f which the cognizer may have no special access, or even no epistemic access at
all."253 Obviously, the early Goldman (see 3.32 above) would qualify as externalist in
his view that warranted belief is produced by a reliable belief-producing mechanism.
O ne need have no epistemic access, nor access at all, to the mechanism that produces
such warranted belief.
Before moving to a consideration of deontologism, and because a consideration
of extemalism will occupy us in sections 3.5 and following below, it might be helpful
here to delineate Plantinga’s three internalist motifs .254
M l. Epistemic justification (that is, subjective epistemic justification, being such
that I am not blameworthy) is entirely up to me and within my power.
Here is the deontological notion again, stated explicitly, of which more below. Suffice
it to say, at this point, that in order for one to actually be blameworthy, at least
according to this account, beliefs must be within one’s control. That is what M l is
attem pting to state.
M2. For a large, important, and basic class of objective epistemic duties,
objective and subjective duty coincide; what you objectively ought to do
253 Ibid., 6 .
254 We shall be quoting from and summarizing the discussion in Ibid., 19-25 in our entire
discussion of the three motifs.
127
matches that which is such that if you don’t do it, you are guilty and
blameworthy.
There are three corollaries to M2 that will help explain it. First, you must be able to
see that it is your duty to regulate your belief in this way. So
C l In a large and im portant set of cases, a properly functioning human being
can simply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake about) what objective
epistemic duty requires.
Plantinga is following both Locke and Descartes in the delineation of these corollaries
and, in the case of C l, he draws from Locke’s insistence that what one must do is
regulate belief in accordance with the available evidence and that not to do so is a
transgression against one’s own light.
C2 In a large and im portant class of cases a properly functioning human being
can simply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake about) whether a
proposition has the property by means of which she tells whether a proposition
is justified for her.
In this corollary, and, again, according to Locke and Descartes, we can see if the
property which tells us whether a proposition is justified is present. Plantinga sees C l
as, in some sense, a corollary concerning the ratio cognoscendi for justification, and C2
as, in some sense, a corollary concerning the ratio essendi of justification. And further,
according to Locke according to Plantinga, the ratio essendi of justification is the
property of being supported by the cognizer’s total evidence for a belief, but then the
ground of justification (ratio cognoscendi) is identical to that property so that the two
128
ratios coincide, at least in traditional internalist accounts. So,
C3 In a large, im portant and basic class of epistemic cases a properly
functioning hum an being can simply see (cannot make a nonculpable mistake
about) whether a proposition has the property that confers justification upon it
for her.
N ow the th ird internalist m otif is less defined than either M l o r M2. It has to
do w ith the fact th at "I have a sort of guaranteed access to w hether a belief is justified
for me and also to what makes it justified for me..." This is a bit more difficult to state
given the fact that whatever it is that gives me access attaches to my believings,
appearings, etc. It is a m otif that almost requires some kind of internal quality of one
as a person. Thus, says Plantinga, "personal internalism" might be a good name for the
third internalist motif.
O ne can readily see that these motifs, together with their corollaries, require
some kind of deontological view of knowledge. Whenever internalism has been
assumed o r set forth, there has also been an inevitable emphasis on one’s epistemic duty
or obligation in the knowledge situation. And just why has that been the case?
3.41 Deontologism
"The main story of 20th century epistemology is the story of three connected
notions: justification, internalism, and deontology ."255 O ur concern in this section is
w ith the last of the three. N ow it is hardly disputed that the flowering of internalist
255 Ibid., 5.
129
concerns in epistemology depends on the root of deontology. Where there is
internalism, deontologism hides under it. To use one (of many) example, Sennett
frames his entire discussion of internalism this way:
Hence, I will label the internalist conception of epistemic appropriateness

"epistemic responsibility" and characterize it thus:
ER: A belief B is epistemically appropriate for a cognizer S to the extent
that S has "done" what she needs to "do” to confirm for herself that B is
true .256
Internalism is characterized in this way due to the fact that what is appropriate
epistemically for internalist epistemologies is "responsible cognizing of some kind ."257
N ow why is internalism so closely linked to epistemic responsibility and thus to
deontology?
According to Plantinga, what we need to answer that question is "archeology";
history and hermeneutics. We must go back to the fountainheads of western theory of
knowledge, those tw in towers of Western epistemology, Descartes and Locke .258 F or
Descartes, one who does not use his free will in accord w ith the light of nature is
blam eworthy if he affirms that which is true. "It is in the misuse of free will that the
privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met ."259 For Locke, on
the other hand (as we noticed in chapter two), m an’s reason is duty-bound to act only
256 James F. Sennett, "Toward a Compatibility Theory for Internalist and Externalist
Epistemologies," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 52, no. 3 (September 1992): 642.
257 Ibid.
259 Ibid., 13, from Meditations 4 in Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. Haldane and Ross
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911; reprint, New York: Dover, 1955), vol. 1, 176.
130
in accord w ith what is permissible.
One o f the reasons that Plantinga shifts the epistemological context from that of
justification (in his earlier works) to warrant is due to the fact that the form er is replete
with deontological considerations and connections whereas the latter (ostensibly) is not.
The traditional epistemological trinity is comprised of justification, internalism and
deontology; three in one and one in three. Thus, "[djeontological justification is
justification most properly so-called"2" and, as might be expected, the way in which one
performs one’s epistemic duty is by (again, according to the tradition) believing only
that which is in accord w ith the evidence. There is a symbiotic (or at least parasitic)
relation, then, between the epistemological trinity and evidentialism; which connection
harkens back to our discussion in the last chapter.
Plantinga spends a good bit of time and space on the problems inherent in the
epistemological tradition. We shall highlight some of the high points and refer the
reader to the text itself for more details.
We have already seen (in the first internalist motif) that significant importance is
attached to the notion of subjective epistemic duty. As long as I do what is required of
me epistemically, what I am obligated to do, then I am not blam eworthy (thus, am
justified) w ith respect to my belief(s).
"Classical Chisholmian internalism," as Plantinga calls it, "shares im portant
elements of structure w ith moral obligation: there is supervenience, defeasibility, the
application of the prima /zrie\all-chings-considered distinction, the characteristic
260 Ibid., 25.
131
relations among permission, obligation, and prohibition, and so on ."261 Thus, for
classical Chisholm, rationality or reasonability is a normative concept, deontological,
pertaining to duty and obligation .262 In "post-classical Chisholmian internalism ,"263
however, there is a shift away from pure deontological considerations and toward
axiolcgical ones .264 N ow we see that there is a need for "a purely psychological
property."265 While warrant (or better, for Chisholm, justification) is conferred by doing
one’s epistemic duty in classical Chisholmianism, post-classical Chisholmianism sees
justification conferred when one is (epistemically) in a right relationship between
evidence-base and belief(s). W hen such a relationship is "right," then there is a kind of
intrinsic value present, which value is difficult to specify.266
How , then, does Plantinga react to classical and post-classical Chisholm? First of
261 Ibid., 32. Chapter Two of WCD is entided, "Classical Chisholmian Internalism."
262 Ibid.
263 The tide of chapter three of WCD.
264 For those interested in the (Chisholmian) history of the matter, classical Chisholm refers
primarily to his earlier works including the first and second editions of Theory of Knowledge
(New York: Prentice-Hall Publ. Co., 1966, 1973) and The Foundations o f Knowing (Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982). Post-classical Chisholm is represented in, for example,
Roderick M. Chisholm, "Self-Profile," in Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. Radu Bogdan (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1986). Given the classical/post-classical distinctions, Plantinga also intimates that the
latest Chisholm may be a return back to the more classical position (Theory o f Knowledge, 3rd
ed., 1989).
265 Ibid., 49.
266 Having made these internalist distinctions, Plantinga also moves to considerations of
"Pollockian Quasi-Intemalism" in Chapter Eight, which need not detain us here. Suffice it to
say, at this point, that Plantinga wants to commend Pollock for attempting to build a kind of
bridge between internalist and externalist concerns; though he goes on to criticize him for
building a bridge which has no support.
132
all, he shows that one may be entirely dutiful and fulfilling one’s epistemic obligations
and still not be warranted in one’s belief^ ).267 Consider classical Chisholm’s P5 (as
stated in The Foundations o f Knowing, p. 21 and restated, with slight alterations, by
Plantinga),
P5a F o r every x, if (i) x perceptually takes there to be something that is F, and

if (ii) his perceiving an F is epistemically in the clear for x, then it is beyond
reasonable doubt for x that he perceives something that is F.
P5b If conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled and furthermore x’s perceiving
something that is F is a member of a set of propositions which mutually support
each other and each of which is beyond reasonable doubt for x, then it is
evident for x that he perceives something that is F .268
Plantinga sets his counterexamples against P5a.269
Consider Paul, an avowed Kantian who has determined to edit his cognitive
nature, demonstrating his autonomy from natural tendencies. O n occasions when Paul
is aurally appeared to in that church-bell kind of way, he is able to form the belief that
he is appeared to orange-ly. As Paul is walking and is thus aurally appeared to, he
believes he is appeared to orange-ly.
N ow what can Chisholm ’s P5a offer to help refute Paul’s Kantian belief?
N othing, according to Plantinga. Paul is epistemically in the clear, in the way that
Chisholm defines such .270 Paul forms his beliefs in accordance with his epistemic
267 Actually, Plantinga first sets out to argue against Chisholm by refuting his notion of
"self-presenting" properties or propositions. We shall by-pass that discussion here and move to
the more obviously deontological notion.
268 Ibid., 40.
269 What follows is a paraphrase of Plantinga’s counterexamples found in Ibid., 41f.
270 "Epistemically in the clear for x" is a proposition such that it is not disconfirmed by the
conjunction of all those propositions such that it is more reasonable for S to accept them than
133
policy. And they were formed in accord with his determination to live dutifully. But
his beliefs(s) cannot have positive epistemic status (justification) for Paul. Paul has
satisfied P5, but is w ithout justification in his belief(s). Classical Chisholmianism’s
deontology is insufficient for justification.
But maybe post-classical Chisholm provides more hope. Consider Chisholm ’s
reduction of epistemic concepts to the concept of intrinsic value:
(ED 8) Believing p is epistemically preferable for S to believing q = def. Those

of S’s purely psychological properties which do not include believing p and
believing q are necessarily such that having those properties and believing p is
intrinsically preferable to having those properties and believing q .271
Given this construction, there is no quarrel with the fact that some belief/evidence-base
pairs display more intrinsic value than others. The problem is that Chisholm proposes
that the only thing that can confer warrant upon a belief is my exemplifying an
appropriate evidence-base.272 As one might expect, enter the Cartesian demon (or, the
Alpha-Centaurian, take your pick). Suppose a deceptive demon so scrambles my
m em ory beliefs so that there is mass distribution of those facts which do support those
beliefs, and so that only a small part of those things I remember are true. N ow suppose
I do in fact remember something that is true. I will be (deontologically) justified in
that belief (because what I believe will be connected with the proper evidence-base, and
because I will have done my epistemic best in my belief), yet the belief will have little
o r no w arrant for me due to the fact that, though what I believe is true, the belief is
their negations. See The Foundations o f Knowing, 18ff. and WCD, 40.
271 Ibid., 55. This is Plantinga’s construction of Chisholm.
272 Ibid., 60.
134
true only by accident. It could just as well have been a belief that is associated w ith the
w rong phenomenon. So, more must be said for a belief to have warrant and the
"more" cannot simply stop at intrinsic value.
N ote also that the key ingredient in post-classical Chisholmianism is evidence. In
order to show that such a view is incorrect, all one need do is construe a situation in
which one’s belief is true because such a belief matches the evidence and another
situation wherein the same belief w ith the same evidence is false, because, due to some
deceptive demon o r Alpha-Centaurian, the evidence one has in the latter situation does
not match the actual experience. The Epistemically Inflexible Climber comes to mind
again in post-classical Chisholmianism, though in this situation, the Clim ber’s beliefs
need not be coherent, but need only have the proper evidence-base. The belief(s) on
the m ountain is warranted and we can say that he knows the things that are listed in
Plantinga’s example, i.e., that he is climbing Guide’s Wall in the Grand Tetons, that
there is a hawk gliding below him, that he is wearing his new Fire Rock shoes, etc., yet
the same belief(s), w ith the same evidence-base, at the opera is unwarranted. Post-
classical Chisholmianism, therefore, has also failed as an adequate account of warranted
o r justified true belief.
Deontologism, then, also fails. One can be performing one’s epistemic duty in
excelsis and still believe that which has little o r no warrant. Part of the reason for this
is that one’s epistemic duty is inextricably linked to that which is internal to one, that
which one has, "knows" one has, and has access to. And the reason internalism has
been the majority vote is due to the (overemphasis on the justification of knowledge,
135
or the justified true belief account of knowledge. Justification, internalism and
deontologism simply will not work as an adequate account o f how we come to know
that which we believe.
3.5 W arrant again
N ow we can see a bit more clearly w hy it is that Plantinga has shifted his
epistemological concerns from certain aspects of justified belief in some of his earlier
work, to the present w ork on warrant. Warrant, at least in the way that Plantinga has
construed it, is externalist in its approach.
The above examples and counterexamples have been set forth and expounded in
order to show (primarily) one main point, i.e., not only that the (recent) traditional
account of knowledge is seriously wanting, but that what is needed is a return to the
pre-Cartesian emphasis on knowledge, an emphasis that provides for externalist
constraints on knowledge, an emphasis that now paves the way for Plantinga’s
arguments for the necessity of proper function for any adequate account of knowledge.
T o recount, then, notice Plantinga’s counterexamples in light of his recent
emphasis. Remember the Epistemically Inflexible Climber. His problem was not that
his beliefs were not coherent, they were, but the problem was that, due to a wayward
burst of high energy cosmic radiation, Ric’s faculties failed to function in a way that
would adjust to his operatic experiences later on. O r remember the Alpha-Centaurians
who transport me to their planet, yet w ith my ow n beliefs (based on my earthly
experience) so that they are all false (except the belief that Mexico City is the largest
136
city on earth, which, remember, has no warrant for me). In this situation, it is not that
m y cognitive faculties are malfunctioning, but that they are functioning properly in an
epistemically inappropriate environment. O r remember the love tune of the Double
W attled Purple Cassowary. It is just because that tune causes me to believe I am in the
presence of such an animal that goes to show that there is cognitive malfunction and
thus that the belief is unwarranted. And, of course, we have come nowhere near the
m ultiplication of Plantinga’s own examples.
All of the counterexamples, however, are designed to show that unless one sets
forth the externalist criteria of proper functioning cognitive faculties in an epistemically
appropriate environm ent (with a few more qualifiers), one cannot claim to have
warrant.
As we look now at Plantinga’s own view of warrant, it will be helpful to
remember tw o things: First, his view of warrant is what we have set forth as P2P of
REP and as such is crucial to what we have framed as a discussion of theistic belief.
Second, and related, there is the promised third volume on warrant, Warranted
Christian Belief, which will be Plantinga’s attempt to set forth theistic belief w ithin the
context of P2P. Thus, while his view of warrant is, at this stage, more concerned with
epistemology per se, it has as its inbred goal the development of warranted theistic belief
and thus is a significant part of the REP. We shall attempt to speculate on Plantinga’s
th ird volume in chapter seven.
3.51 Proper Function
137
As we have noted, Plantinga all along has been attempting to show that, in
virtually all accounts of knowledge, justification, o r warrant, what is sadly lacking is a
notion o f proper function. The Alpha-Centaurian’s victim, the one with the
Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion, the Epistemically Inflexible Climber, the Oxford
Epistemologist’s student, the avowed Kantian and on and on, all have at least one thing
in comm on, their cognitive faculties are not functioning according to the stipulations of
Plantinga’s notion of warrant, which includes essentially his notion of proper function.
Thus, all have come to epistemic ruin.
According to the central and paradigmatic core of our notion of w arrant (so I
say) a belief B has warrant for you if and only if (1) the cognitive faculties
involved in the production of B are functioning properly...; (2) your cognitive
environm ent is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties
are designed; (3) the triple of the design plan governing the production of the
belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the production of true beliefs
(and the same goes for elements of the design plan governing the production of
input beliefs to the system in question); and (4) the design plan is a good one:
that is, there is a high statistical o r objective probability that a belief produced in
accordance w ith the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of
environm ent is true. U nder these conditions, furthermore, the degree of warrant
is given by some monotonically increasing function of the strength of S’s belief
that B. This account of warrant, therefore, depends essentially upon the notion
of proper function .273
Proper function, then, first of all, simply means that for one to have knowledge or
"warranted true belief," one’s cognitive faculties must be working properly in an
epistemically appropriate environment. N ot only so, but even if these two conditions
(cognitive faculties working properly and an epistemically appropriate environment)
obtain, there is more that must be maintained, including the fact that warranted true
belief will come in degrees; "...to (at most) a zeroeth approximation...in the paradigm
138
cases of warrant...if both B and B* have warrant for S, B has more warrant than B* for
S iff S believes B more firmly than B *."274 I know that it rained yesterday and I also
know that the first bicycle I ever owned was red. However, I believe the form er more
firmly than the latter, though both beliefs have warrant for me and thus I can speak of
them as knowledge.
There are elements of this notion of proper function that must be mentioned.
The prim ary element is the design plan (as opposed to the max plan) and we shall
discuss that in more detail below. But there are notions that shape the essential
com ponent of proper function. I design and build a radio which plays only on the
frequency that picks up the jazz radio station in tow n. Once it is built, it cannot be
sabotaged by tuning it to any other kind of music, be it "elevator," "heavy metal," or
other. However, occasionally when the radio is off, it picks up transmissions from low-
flying aircraft pilots. Is this part of its design? According to Plantinga, this is an
unintended by-product, not to be considered as part of the design plan. Though the by
product happens, not by chance, but due to something in the radio, it is, nevertheless,
not what the radio was designed to do .275
Furtherm ore, it may be (as in the case of the Epistemically Serendipitous Lesion)
that something is causing me to believe a true proposition, yet that thing’s purpose is to
destroy (or subvert) the original design or function. Such belief will be true, but not
warranted. In order for a belief to be warranted there must be proper function of
274 Ibid., 9.
275 Plantinga’s discussion of this kind of thing is in Ibid., 24-25.
139
cognitive faculties aimed at truth, and not at something other than truth. In the case of
the jazz radio above, it may be that when my wife turns it on one day she decides to
reroute a crucial wire, causing the radio only to pick up the local talk show. N ow it is
functioning according to its design, but it is not properly functioning in accord with its
intended purpose. In this case, we have what Plantinga calls "functional m ultiplicity ."276
But suppose after building my radio I tune in and am enjoying the latest
recording from M onty Alexander. And suppose further that, due to my virtually
uncontrollable rhythm ic behavior, I accidentally knock the radio off the desk and,
instead of breaking it, it emits sounds clearer and sharper than when I first built it.
What shall we say about the radio now? We can certainly say that it should have been
(could have been) built better than my original construction (which will come as no
surprise to those who know my radio-building abilities). And we can say that what it
was designed to do, it did, but now it accomplishes its purpose beyond its original
design. Was it functioning properly before, after or before and after it was knocked off
the desk by me? "In cases like this the answer is not always clear; here we reach that
penumbral area of vagueness surrounding the central paradigm ."277
Plantinga notes also that there must be "trade-offs and compromises" in any
notion of proper function .278 W hy does a stick immersed in water look bent when just
prior to immersion it was straight? Because of trade-offs and compromises. Accuracy
276 Ibid., 25-26.
277 Ibid., 28.
278 Ibid., 31-40.
140
gives way to efficiency in some cases because of the fact that the system functioning
properly is not designed to flesh out the implications of every belief (not designed, we
might say, to evaluate whether or not the stick is really bent and what laws, perceptual
and otherwise, cause us initially to see it as bent) but rather it is designed to produce
true beliefs most of the time, with a smattering of false beliefs here and there. There is
a trade-off, accuracy for efficiency, and compromise, some beliefs will be false (though
formed in accordance with the proper function stipulations). O r, according to
Plantinga, we would say in these cases that a belief has warrant only if the proper
function stipulations are directly rather than indirectly aimed at the production of true
beliefs .279
More could be said about the notion of proper function, and not surprisingly
Plantinga has more to say. O f highest importance for our apologetical interests is
Plantinga’s notion of the design plan and how it works to provide for us, in the end, an
argument for theistic belief. Because the majority of W PF (chapters three through nine
of twelve) discusses the "design plan” aspect of proper function, we will not be able to
deal w ith it in any kind of exhaustive way. What we will do, therefore, is highlight the
relevant points and then conclude with the apologetical thrust, thus closing the circle of
o u r analysis of REP.
3.6 The Design Plan
O nce the other epistemological structures have foundered with regard to
279 Ibid., 40.
141
warrant, the most specified and articulated aspect of Plantinga’s thesis is his notion of
the design plan. As a m atter of fact,
Design plan and proper function are interdefinable notions: a thing...is functioning
properly when it functions in accord with its design plan, and the design plan of
a thing is a specification of the way in which a thing functions when it is
functioning properly. So we might say, as I did, that the central notion w ith
respect to w arrant is proper function; but we might as well say that the central
notion is that of design plan .280
Plantinga’s W PF seems to bear this out in that better than half of the book is devoted
to a specification o f the design plan in its various contexts. So, initially and according
to him, the design plan must itself be a good design (rather than, like the jazz radio
above, one that will w ork better when accidentally disrupted) and it must be aimed at
truth (rather than aimed at falsehood or not aimed at all and discovering sometimes
tru th sometimes falsehood).
O ur project for the next six chapters or so is a whirlw ind tour of some o f the
main modules of our epistemic establishment: Self-knowledge, memory,
perception, knowledge of other persons, testimony, a priori knowledge,
induction, and probability .281
Though we will not be able to survey all of the "main modules" mentioned, certain
ones will be relevant to our analysis of REP.
First of all, Plantinga (uncharacteristically) wants to affirm the epistemic
tradition concerning self-knowledge. In terms of knowledge of myself and of my
(present) pain, how I am appeared to and the like, we could say (a) we do have
privileged epistemic access to these matters and (b) what we have is knowledge, and not
2!0 Plantinga, WCD, 213.
2,1 Ibid., 48.
142
mere belief. Some of this knowledge, according to the tradition, is incorrigible and in
this the tradition is right, at least nearly so.m
"But do we know what sort of thing we are? Well, what sort of thing do we
think we are ?"213 Plantinga then answers by affirming that most of us (rightly) th in k we
have existed for more than five minutes and that we are conscious. Moreover, each of
us is aware of himself, which is rooted in intentionality. He then refers us to Thomas
Reid’s comm on sense view of the matter, affirming that we have no need of philosophy
in the m atter of self-knowledge, for philosophy cannot strengthen our knowledge of
our selves and to attem pt to weaken that knowledge would commit that philosophy to
insanity.
N ow , for those in the Reformed tradition, particularly in the Calvinistic
tradition, self-knowledge is an im portant aspect of our knowledge of God. One
wonders at this point w hy Plantinga, who stands in such a tradition, makes no appeal
either to Calvin o r his tradition (as he does in other matters), but rather to Reid (who
was himself no Calvinist). But more on that below. At this point, Plantinga wants to
show that our design plan (and its relatives) 284 will warrant self-knowledge. Some of the
standard objections to this approach to self-knowledge revolve around the skeptical
thesis of the logical possibility that we are in fact simply brains in vats controlled by
281 Ibid., 49.
2,5 Ibid.
2,4 From here on, for the sake of space and simplicity, I will forego listing the qualifications
and stipulations of the proper function thesis. When I speak of the design plan, then, I shall be
implying its proper function, together with its circumstance/response/purpose triple, its being
aimed at truth in an epistemically appropriate environment.
143
Alpha-Centaurians or mad scientists (who, presumably, know that they are not brains in
vats) who simply stimulate the brains to have the experiences they (we) have, i.e., that
we have existed for more than five minutes, that we are appeared to redly, etc.
Plantinga’s reply here is telling. He wants to say both that we can know ourselves and
our appearances (pain, redly, etc.), and at the same time affirm the possibility of the
brain-in-a-vat thesis. Both can have warrant due to the fact that our experiences do not
have to guarantee the truth of what we believe, but rather, the tru th of what we believe
should be held with sufficient confidence and be produced according to the design plan.
"Therefore the question whether we know that we are persisting subjects of experience
(distinct from those experiences) reduces to the question w hether these beliefs are
true."2*5 And at this, Plantinga "resists the tem ptation to make an excursion from the
firm dry ground of epistemology into the misty miasmic morasses of metaphysics . 1,286
So knowledge of myself and my experiences (and memory beliefs, which discussion we
shall bypass in the interest of space and direct relevancy) is indeed knowledge,
warranted by the design plan and, we could say, properly basic in the context of a
Reidian foundationalism .287
We began our discussion of Plantinga’s argument for theistic belief w ith his
analogical argument for other minds. He returns to the matter, as we saw in chapter
245 Ibid., 55.
2.6 Ibid. Why Plantinga resists the temptation here seems to be a bit arbitrary, especially
given the fact that he will revel in metaphysical morasses later on.
2.7 The notion of proper basicality, near invisible in Plantinga’s WCD, now comes to the
fore again in WPF, and especially in his discussion of memory beliefs. Thus, the
epistemological circle (with REP) begins to close.
144
one, in W PF. Here, there seems to be a stronger reliance on Reid than there was in
G O M , which changes the shape of the discussion somewhat. It will be remembered
from chapter one that, after detailed discussion of the possibility of rational belief in
other minds, it was concluded by Plantinga that, though belief in other minds had no
strong argumentative support, it was nevertheless a belief we all have and with which
we all operate. Thus, if that is true, then belief in God can be placed in the same
category and is, therefore, as rational as is belief in other minds. True Plantinga
rehearses again the analogical argument for other minds, but he does not conclude
thereby that belief in other minds is rational. As expected, having surveyed the
analogical position, the scientific hypothesis position (in which each of us observes in
others what we see in ourselves and thus assume others to be like us) and the
W ittgensteinian criterial position (inward processes stand in need of outward criteria,
e.g., if I observe pain behavior in someone, that observation serves as a criterion,
tending to make evident to me that such a person is in pain), Plantinga opts for
"simplicity itself,"
The answer, first, is just that a human being whose appropriate cognitive
faculties are functioning properly and who is aware of B will find herself making
the S ascription (in the absence of defeaters). There is nothing in the least
unjustified about such ascriptions; nor is there anything strange, odd,
nonstandard about making them quite independently of any analogical or
inductive or abductive arguments. Indeed, the pathology is on the other foot: it
is the person who believes in others only on the basis of analogical
arguments...who is weird and nonstandard .288
Thus, the rationality of belief in other minds has shifted somewhat to an externalist
view of warrant. O r, in Reid’s words,
m Ibid., 75.
145
"N o man thinks of asking himself what reason he has to believe that his
neighbour is a living creature. ...This belief stands upon another foundation
than that of reasoning and therefore, whether a man can give good reasons for it
o r not, it is not in his power to shake it off."289
Plantinga’s discussion of testim ony as a source of belief is helpful in many ways
and will, in fact, be useful in our further analysis. Testimony has been virtually
ignored as a source of belief. This is all the more striking when we consider that we
are "dependent upon testim ony for most of what we know ."290 And what we believe
by way of testim ony, we believe "in the basic way, not by way of inductive or
abductive evidence from other things I believe"291. In other words, testimonial beliefs
are typically properly basic and thus noninferential. It is ordinary, therefore, and
em inently necessary that much of what we believe has come to us by way of testimony.
Does this entail that most of what comes to us by testimony is true? According to
Reid (and thus, here, to Plantinga as well), there is in us "a propensity to speak truth...
T ru th is always uppermost, and is the natural issue of the mind. ...Lying, on the
contrary, is doing violence to our nature ..."292 Due to our (supposed) tendency to
truthfulness, then, testim ony is more credible than not. O r so it must be, given
Plantinga’s (via Reid’s) view of man and truth.
But G ettier problems arise when we consider our propensity to believe based on
289 Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," in Beanblossom and Lehrer,
278-279; quoted in Ibid., 66 .
290 Ibid., 78.
2.1 Ibid., 79.
2.2 Thomas Reid, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense,"
in Beanblossom and Lehrer, 95; quoted in Ibid., 1.
146
testim ony. Suppose I believe B because you told me B, but B has no warrant for you.
Can B then have w arrant for me? Surely not. Suppose, by cognitive malfunction, you
form the belief that a cure for the common cold has been discovered. I know you well
and have always found you totally trustw orthy. You tell me that a cure for the
com m on cold has been discovered. (And let us say, to make it interesting, that a cure
for the comm on cold has been discovered). Does my belief have warrant? It would be
hard to argue an affirmative answer.
But we need not posit a situation of cognitive malfunction. Suppose you simply
decide that it’s high time for me to be deceived by you. You tell me that there is now
a cure for the common cold. (And again, though there is a cure for the common cold,
you have yet to find it out). I believe that there is now a cure for the common cold.
Does my belief have warrant? Again, it seems unlikely. A nd notice here that your
cognitive faculties are functioning according to the design plan. All requirements for
warrant are in place. So why is there no warrant for me? "When this happens, when
the testifier employs the relevant segments of the cognitive system for...deceit or
subterfuge, then on that occasion the testifier’s intentions override the natural purpose
of the cognitive modules in question. O n that occasion their use is not (as it ordinarily
is) aimed at the production of true beliefs but at...the production of false beliefs."293
N ow Plantinga recognizes some of the (though not some of the crucial) problems
w ith testimonial beliefs. Testim ony is a "second-class citizen of the epistemic
2,3 Ibid., 85.
147
republic ."294 Firstly, because testim ony is only as strong as the strongest link in the
testimonial chain (thus, if no "links" are warranted true beliefs then mine is not either)
and secondly, because direct access to a fact is preferable than someone’s (indirect)
testim ony about such a fact. Perceptual evidence, for example, carries w ith it more
epistemic weight than bare testimony - and Plantinga turns to just such evidence as a
part of our design plan.
Among others who have sought to refute this idea of design plan, Philip Q uinn
also engages the debate w ith Plantinga .295 Q uinn’s point seems to be that perceptual
beliefs warranted at one time as basic can be warranted at another time as inferred
beliefs, perhaps with a higher degree of warrant. The proposition
(1) I see a tree,
can be accepted on the evidential basis of
(2) It seems to me that I see a tree in front of me,
according to Q uinn. The problem w ith this rejoinder from Q uinn, according to
Plantinga, is that (2) would itself have to have warrant if (1) were warranted
inferentially. And how can (2) acquire warrant? "...it is at best extremely unlikely that
there are any decent (noncircular) arguments...whose premises are self-evident
propositions together w ith the appropriate experiential propositions, and whose
2,4 Ibid., 87.
295 The debate began with Quinn’s general response to Plantinga in the former’s "In Search
of the Foundations of Theism," Faith and Philosophy 2 (October 1985): 469-486, to which
Plantinga then responded in "The Foundations of Theism: A Reply," Faith and Philosophy 3
(July 1985): 298-313. Plantinga brings the discussion up again here, and Quinn has just
published another response, below.
148
conclusions are propositions entailing the existence of such things as tables, chairs, trees,
and houses ."296 How, then, can Q uinn make sense of the "based on" relation of
perceptual beliefs? (2 ) may offer little to no warrant thus rendering ( 1) unwarranted as
well. Yet ( 1) has warrant due to its being formed according to the design plan.
A bout the time that WPF was published, Q uinn’s latest (thus far) rejoinder in
the series of responses was also published .297 Q uinn attempts to refute Plantinga in this
way (I will keep my ow n numbering here, rather than Q uinn’s, but with Q u in n ’s basic
content in mind): Suppose that (1) is properly basic for me. Suppose, too, that I reflect
on m y sense perceptual experience and form (2). Suppose further that I then change
my belief structure 298 so that (1) comes to be based on (2). Now , according to Q uinn,
(2) is properly basic for me. Like ( 1), it has an (nonpropositional) evidence-base and is
grounded in my experience of the tree. W hat, then, becomes of (I)? It is no longer
properly basic but is, according to Q uinn, properly based on (2) and therefore is as
justified as it was prior to the change in belief structure. N ow Q uinn agrees w ith
Plantinga that it is hard to see how a cogent argument can be constructed from
experiential beliefs like (2 ) to propositions which entail the existence of, e.g., a tree, like
(1). But that is irrelevant to the issue of whether (2) is good evidence for (1). So Q uinn
297 In Philip Quinn, "The Foundations of Theism Again," (hereafter FTA) in Zagzebski,
Rational Faith, 14-47.
291 At this point Quinn speaks of changing his "noetic structure," not his belief structure. I
am not sure what Quinn means by a noetic structure and because Plantinga’s understanding of
such is much broader, I have changed the wording to belief structure. This will not change
anything of substance in Quinn’s rejoinder.
149
remains convinced that if (1) is properly basic (in the right circumstances), then it can
be properly based on (2) w ithout loss of justification .299
And where does that leave us? "The disagreement carries over from perceptual
beliefs grounded in sensory experience to experientially grounded theistic beliefs. 1,300
N othing that Plantinga has said thus far, according to Q uinn, has made the following
indefensible: Suppose I believe
(3) G od is speaking to me
in a properly basic way. Suppose, too, that I reflect on (3) and form
(4) It seems to me that God is speaking to me.
Suppose further that I then change my belief structure here so that (3) becomes based
on (4). N ow , (4) is properly basic for me, (3) is inferred and, as inferred, has lost
nothing in its status as justified (when properly basic). N ow (3) becomes an inferred
belief and theistic belief is evidentially based, which Plantinga is seeking to deny. N ow
it will be helpful to quote Q uinn in full in order to place his rejoinder within the
context of Plantinga’s w ork on warrant .
There are conditions, let us suppose, in which theistic beliefs that self-
evidently entail the existence of God have, when properly basic, enough warrant
to make them knowledge. But there are also conditions in which such beliefs,
when properly basic, do not have enough warrant to make them knowledge. If
I were initially in conditions of the second sort and discovered a deductive
argument for the existence of God whose premises were known to me and
whose validity was self-evident to me, I could improve the epistemic status of
my belief in God by basing it on the premises of that argument. If I did so base
it, it would become knowledge, which it had not previously been, and would
have more warrant than it had when it was properly basic. So there is a way in
m This is my paraphrase of Quinn’s argument in FTA, 29-33.
300 Ibid., 33.
150
which a successful piece of natural theology could improve the epistemic status
of belief in G od even for some theists who do not, if Plantinga is right, need it
in order to be w ithin their rights in believing in G od .301
The argument, then, in terms of Q uinn’s latest rejoinder, takes issue, not w ith the basic
reliability o f sense experience, but with the consequent structure of beliefs so
experienced as to their justificatory (or warranted) status. Q uinn wants to show the
"help" that theistic belief, once properly basic, now properly based, can receive from a
deductive argument for G od’s existence .302
The second thing to note about perception in relation to the design plan,
m entioned briefly by Plantinga ,303 is the necessity of epistemic circularity when
attempting to establish the reliability of sense perception. First, epistemic circularity,
according to Alston, is not logical circularity. Logical circulatory of the form "p,
therefore p" negates the relevance both of premise and conclusion as such, and is thus
meaningless as an argum ent .304 Epistemic circularity can be set out like this:
(TV) 1. At t„ S! formed the perceptual belief that p„ and p t.

2. At t 2, S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2.
5=1 Ibid., 34.
302 This seems to me to be a minor point in the overall construct of Plantinga’s (and my)
emphasis. It betrays, perhaps, the Roman Catholic bias of Quinn more than a flaw in
Plantinga’s argument; still it gives us a hint as to the flavor of the very recent and ongoing
debate in this area.
303 In WPF, 97.
304 We will see below that there is a legitimate circularity to a Reformed apologetic as well.
However, it is decidedly not of the logical form given here by Alston. It is all too easy to see
circular reasoning in that form and such is not of the substance of a Reformed apologetic.
Furthermore, I am not convinced that Alston has successfully escaped every form of logical
circularity, nor am I convinced that one must do so for one’s argument to be compelling.
151
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.305
N otice that the conclusion is nowhere stated in either 1. o r 2. H ow , then, is circularity
involved? Primarily in the fact that, in asserting 1 . and 2., I must already be trusting in
the tru th of the conclusion. Had Alston stopped short and said
3. A t t„ S, formed the perceptual belief that p t,
then all that would have been asserted as true would have been that S, formed the
perceptual belief that p, at t„ and the conclusion simply would not (could not) follow
from 3. In other words, (TV) requires the manifestation of the tru th (or at least the
application) of the conclusion prior to its being reached. Furtherm ore, suppose
someone challenged premise 1 . or 2 . To what w ould I appeal in order to show that one
o r both of them are correct? Obviously, the appeal itself would have to be to sense
experience and its reliability .306 Alternatively, if one came to premise 1. or 2. absolutely
convinced that sense experience was not reliable, then nothing save his "conversion" of
that belief could cause him to accept the premises. Thus, Alston:
In this way we might say that the argument "presupposes" the tru th of the
conclusion, although the conclusion does not itself appear among the premises.
N ote that the necessity of this presupposition does not stem from the logical
form of the argument, or from the meaning of the premises. It is not a
syntactical or a semantic presupposition. It stems rather from our epistemic
situation as human beings (emphasis mine). ...we might call it an "epistemic"
presupposition, since it depends on our epistemic situation... In parallel fashion
we might term the kind of circularity involved "epistemic circularity ".307
Could this notion of perceptual beliefs as properly basic and Alston’s notion (with
305 William P. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," chap. in Epistemic Justification, 327.
306 Ibid., 328.
307 Ibid., 328-329.
152
which Plantinga agrees) of epistemic circularity have anything to do w ith a helpful
analysis of REP? Before answering that question, we must finish out the discussion o f
the elements in our design plan.
There are three things w orth highlighting in Plantinga’s discussion of a priori
knowledge as an aspect of our design plan. First, his description of a priori knowledge
provides some help. Traditionally, that which is known a priori is purported to be
know n independently of or prior to experience. Obviously, this could not mean that a
priori knowledge is such without or apart from any experience, for such knowledge
would require that one first not exist. As a matter of fact, according to Plantinga, a
priori knowledge o r belief is typically accompanied by experience.30® In order to know
that "If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is m ortal," I must have
some experience of m ortality, humanity, as well as some notion of implication (unless
the latter notion simply arises out of the argument itself). Perhaps I simply "see"
(nonperceptually) the tru th of the argument, but such "seeing" entails my existence in
the world. The tradition has sought to call this "seeing" intuition, which is just a
semantical shift. W hat we know a priori we intuit without the need for further sensual
or experiential support. O r perhaps we deduce from general principles that are true to
the tru th of more specific principles. Both cases, whether intuition o r deduction, have
to do w ith the compelling character of the principles themselves .309
Second is the notion of self-evidence. According to Plantinga, self-evidence is a
30* Here I am summarizing his argument from Ibid., 103-106.
309 Plantinga goes on to show that, while a priori knowledge is knowledge, the tradition has
erred in its view that intuition is infallible knowledge.
153
species-relative notion .310 And while there certainly are self-evident truths, it may be
better to think of self-evidence as a proposition such that a properly functioning (mature)
hum an being can’t grasp it w ithout believing it .311 Moreover, says Plantinga, Aquinas
asserted that the existence of truth is self-evident and, "I think he is right ."312 Thus, it is
incumbent upon mature human beings, having grasped the truth, to believe it. Even
stronger and more accurately, it is necessarily true that once a mature human being
grasps the tru th of a self-evident proposition, he believes it as well.313 Plantinga’s
notion of self-evidence requires such a statement.
Thirdly and finally, Plantinga has an interesting discussion on the relationship of
a priori knowledge to a notion of causality or a causal relation. In order to have a
priori knowledge of x, x must in some way cause that knowledge. O r, conversely, if
there is no contact w ith x, x cannot cause itself to be known and thus cannot be
know n. After looking at the relationship of propositions to a priori knowledge,
attem pting to show that propositions cannot be concrete objects and thus cannot be
causally related to a priori knowledge, Plantinga goes on to affirm that the causal
requirement principle "seems to have at least some initial intuitive support; some version
of it, it seems, is likely to be true. But what kind of causal connection between object
5,0 Ibid., 109.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid., 110.
313 Just what does it mean to grasp truth? It is metaphorical in its content and thus a bit
unclear. Presumably, Plantinga would equate "grasping" with "judging to be true" or something
of the sort. And, of course, one could judge something to be true without believing. But not
so with judged-to-be-true self-evident propositions.
154
of knowledge and know er is required ?"314 The epistemological tradition, beginning
w ith Aristotle and developed further by Aquinas has attempted to argue for the notion
of abstraction in knowledge such that the object known is the form abstracted from the
material object itself, now known as immaterial and universal. O n this view, perhaps
the causal relation comes primarily from the object (as presented) and secondarily from
the know er (as abstracting). In any case, some view of causality seems needed.
Induction and probability theory, as further elements in the design plan, though
fascinating in their ow n right, provide nothing essentially new to our understanding of
the design plan overall. N ot surprisingly, Plantinga asserts with regard to induction
that what "makes it right to form belief in that inductive manner is just the fact that
that is how a properly functioning human being forms beliefs..."315 Probabilistic
warrant, on the other hand, is simply a sublevel of prepositional warrant, which is itself
a second-level source of warrant. So, though complex and w orth someone’s time and
patience, it is not w orth ours at this point .316
3.61 Theistic Argument
In his latest volumes on warrant, Plantinga is arguing for a naturalized
epistemology; "...striking the naturalistic pose is all the rage these days, and it’s a great
31* Ibid., 120.
315 Ibid., 136.
316 Plantinga characterizes epistemic conditional probability as the relationship between a pair
of propositions A and B when A is prepositional evidence for B and further when we must ask
as to the probability of A on B. What determines if A on B is high or low? Such is epistemic
conditional probability which is, as we said a sublevel (nondeductive) of second-level warrant.
155
pleasure to be able to join the fun ."317
Naturalized epistemology can be seen, according to Plantinga, in at least two
different ways. From one perspective, a naturalized epistemology is one in which the
notion of normativity is denied, o r at least relegated to less than first class status which,
as he says in W CD, is against the epistemological tradition. A naturalized epistemology
would eliminate deontological notions from the forefront of its theory. This, of course,
is quite radical from an historical perspective but it is also quite consistent w ith what
Plantinga has been trying to do. The most extreme version of naturalized epistemology
would attem pt to replace epistemology w ith psychology .318
Plantinga argues for a naturalistic epistemology in the m ilder sense. There is a
norm ativity, but it is not deontological. "This is the use in which we say, of a damaged
knee, o r a diseased pancreas, or a w orn brake shoe, that it no longer functions as it
ought to ."319 So Plantinga joins the naturalistic band. However, he also thinks that
naturalistic epistemology is ill-named and it is just here that we begin to see something
of a theistic argument.
In the first place, [naturalistic epistemology] is quite compatible with, for

example, supernatural theism; indeed the most plausible way to think of
warrant, from a theistic perspective, is in terms of naturalistic epistemology.
And second..., naturalism in epistemology flourishes in the context of a theistic
view of human beings: naturalism in epistemology requires supernaturalism in
317 Ibid., 46.
318 Ibid., 45. Two examples given by Plantinga are Hilary Komblith Naturalizing
Epistemology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985) and the more extreme approach in W. v. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
319 Ibid.
156
anthropology.320
Plantinga argues his point at the end of WPF; and his argument tends to go, first, with
naturalism in epistemology, and then with supernaturalism in metaphysics.
Can’t anyone, theist or not, see that a horse, say, is suffering from a disease...?
Can’t anyone see that an injured bird has a wing that isn’t w orking properly?
That an arthritic hand does not function properly, or that a damaged rotator
cuff doesn’t w ork as it ought? W right seems right: "it seems to me that the
notion of an organ having a function - both in everyday conversation and in
biology - has no strong theological commitments. Specifically, it seems to me
consistent, appropriate, and even common for an atheist to say that the function
of the kidney is elimination of metabolic wastes."321
The notion of proper function, then, as an epistemic notion, is something that all and
any could understand and put to (epistemic) good use. In this sense, it is a naturalized
epistemology. But it is a naturalized epistemology that, as we saw in the last section,
has at its root the design plan and all that such entails.
However, Plantinga attempts to show that one who is a metaphysical naturalist
will have trouble making sense of epistemological naturalism. And all of the examples
of naturalistic explanations of proper function that Plantinga mentions fall prey to his
basic counterexample: A madman gains control and orders his scientists to induce
significant mutations into selected victims. The mutations spread out of control so that,
after a few generations, virtually all people function in this mutated state. Is this
m utation now an example of proper function? Can we say that the perpetual m utation
is now the example of what it means to function properly in an appropriate
environment? Obviously not. And Plantinga concludes, in the course of his analysis of
320 Ibid., 46.
321 Ibid., 198.
157
naturalistic accounts of proper function, that none of them is able to give an account
adequate to describe such a function.322
So what becomes of metaphysical naturalism? Plantinga allows two options for
a naturalist who tries to make sense of TPF. The first option is to adopt "Die
Philosophic des Als O b”m in which one takes the intentional stance, assuming, strictly
for the purpose of explanation, that certain fictions (like theism) were true. This, of
course, goes back (at least) to Kant, in which one is encouraged to make sense of the
world and its "functions" by thinking as i f certain theories were true. "There can be,
then, purposiveness w ithout purpose, so far as we do not place the causes of this form
in a will, but yet can only make the explanation o f its possibility intelligible to ourselves by
deriving it from a w ill” (emphasis mine).324
There is no purpose, therefore, but we must assume o r act as i f purposiveness
comes by way of a will, though we know it cannot. "So perhaps the naturalist can join
Kant and Vaihinger here, and explain or understand proper functioning in terms of this
fiction (as he sees it); perhaps he could say that our faculties are working properly when
they are working the way they would work if the theistic story were true."325 This is
the naturalist’s first option. It seems less than honest and epistemically «n-natural, but
it is an option, at least as Plantinga sees the matter.
322 I have attempted to summarize here the argument from Ibid., 203-204.
323 Ibid., 211, taken from a book by that name by Hans Vaihinger.
324 Ibid., 212, quoted from Kant’s Critique of Judgement.
325 Ibid.
158
The second option for the naturalist is more honest but, if one holds tightly to
Plantinga’s T P F (and we can assume that Plantinga does) is fraught w ith its ow n set of
difficulties. The second option is simply to reject Plantinga’s notion of warrant, of
proper function and of the design plan. "A high price, no doubt - but no more than
w hat a serious naturalism exacts."326
But there really is a third option for the naturalist. Perhaps the naturalist sees
that knowledge must have warrant. Perhaps he sees that there is such a thing as our
cognitive faculties working properly, according to the design plan and all that it entails.
A nd perhaps he sees that there is no naturalist account of these things. Then what?
Then what you have "is a powerful theistic argument; indeed what you have is a
version of Thomas Aquinas’s Fifth Way..."327 Aquinas’s Fifth Way, of course, is the so-
called teleological argument, or the argument from design. So, Plantinga sees his notion
of proper function, design plan, etc. as offering an argument for metaphysical theism as
over against metaphysical naturalism. The TPF is an apologetic after all, used in the
end to display the bankruptcy of naturalistic theories of knowledge.
The last chapter of W PF is entitled, "Is Naturalism Irrational?" In this chapter,
Plantinga seeks to show, not just that naturalism is false, but that it is irrational to
accept it.328 And this line of argument shows some promise apologetically.
Plantinga argues, finally, against naturalism generally, and against evolutionary
326 Ibid., 214.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 216.
159
theory m ore specifically, by way of probability argument. W ithout detailing all of his
options and prospects for successful explanation, it is helpful to see how he constructs
his probability argument against naturalism. H e begins w ith the following form ulation
P((N&E&C)/R)
where N is (at least something close to) a naturalistic view, E represents a form of
evolutionary theory, C includes cognitive faculties and their abilities to produce beliefs
and R represents the reliability of such. The question then becomes, what is the
probability of R on N&E&C? O r, how probable is it that reliability will be sustained
given naturalism and evolutionary theory and our cognitive belief-producing
mechanisms? N ow , according to Bayes’ Theorem
P((N&E&C/R) - nN & E & Q xP W (N & E & C ))iN
H ow w ould one go about figuring out this probability? According to Plantinga,
...P(N&E&C) is your estimate of the probability for N& E& C independent of

the consideration of R. You believe R, so you assign it a probability near 1 and
you take P(R/(N&E&C)) to be more than V4. Then P((N&E&C)/R) will be no
greater than Vi times P(N&E&C), and will thus be fairly low. You believe C
(the proposition specifying the sorts of cognitive faculties we have); so you assign
it a very high probability; accordingly P((N&E)/R) will also be low. N o doubt
you will also assign a very high probability to the conditional i f naturalism is
true, then our /am ities have arisen by way o f evolution; then you will judge that
P (N /R ) is also low. But you do think R is true; you therefore have evidence
against N . So your belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable gives you a
reason for rejecting naturalism and accepting its denial.330
It seems Plantinga’s probability argument, at this point, is simply a long way to a short
point; the short point being that, given the reliability of our belief-producing
Ibid., 228.
530 Ibid.
160
mechanisms, it is highly unlikely that naturalism w ith its commitment to evolutionary
theory is true.331
Plantinga goes on to show that even one who holds an agnostic position toward
P(R/(N&E&C)) is irrational. And what does agnosticism maintain in this case? Put
simply, it maintains that we simply don’t know about P(R/(N&E&C)). Since we don’t
know about such probabilities, we surely can’t know if R. And once we don’t know if
R, then how can we claim to know N&E? To give an argument for N & E would
presuppose R, or at least pragmatically presuppose R, so that for one to accept N& E, R
would have to be assumed and used in the argument itself. This results in the
dialectical process which highlights the utter irrationality of the position. Plantinga
says it well at this point.
W hen the devotee of N & E notes that he has a defeater for R, then at th at stage
he also notes (if apprised of the present argument) that he has a defeater for
N&E; indeed, he notes that he has a defeater for anything he believes. Since,
however, his having a defeater for N & E depends upon some of his beliefs, what
he now notes is that he has a defeater for his defeater of R and N&E; so now he
no longer has that defeater for R and N&E. So then his original condition of
believing R and assuming N& E reasserts itself: at which point he again has a
defeater for R and N&E. But then he notes that that defeater is also a defeater
331 Ibid., 220-221. One of the reasons for seeing it in this way comes from Stephen Stich.
Stich points out that the evolutionary belief that "evolution produces organisms with good
approximations to optimally well-designed characteristics or systems" cannot be sustained, given
the fact that "natural selection is not the only process at work in evolution; there is
also...random genetic drift, which "can lead to the elimination of a more fit gene and the
fixation of a less fit one." In other words, chance production is no basis for reliability.
Notice in Plantinga’s argument from probability that certain truths are taken for
granted, e.g., the reliability of our cognitive faculties, R, and the proposition specifying those
faculties, C. There is nothing inherently wrong with this as long as one recognizes that one of
the main reasons that a low probability is concluded is due to what is taken for granted at the
outset.
161
of the defeater of R and N&E; hence... So goes the paralyzing dialectic.332
The theist, on the other hand, made in the image of God, has no problem
affirming R. The theist feels no compulsion toward skepticism;
There are no propositions he already accepts just by way of being a theist, which
together with forms of reasoning...lead to the rejection of that belief that our
cognitive faculties have the apprehension of truth as their purpose and for the
most part fulfill that purpose.
Once again, therefore, we see that naturalistic epistemology flourishes
best in the garden of supematuralistic metaphysics.333
Obviously, much more needs to be said w ith regard to Plantinga’s theistic
argument here. But because we shall leave this and other matters for following
chapters, a brief concluding summary and analysis is in order.
REP states that belief in God can have warrant within the context of a
legitimate epistemological structure. In chapter two, we set out to show just what
Plantinga’s conception of the structure would be. It would not be classical
foundationalism for it disallows too many beliefs that we take to be properly basic.
Classical foundationalism makes no room for memory or perceptual beliefs, and it
requires that belief in God be supported with prepositional evidence, as we have seen.
The foundation, therefore, in classical foundationalism, is too weak, built w ith a paucity
of materials and having significant cracks even in that which is there. But neither will
coherentism serve as the context for warranted belief, given its exclusive doxastic
considerations and its penchant for illegitimate circularity. The option developed by
Plantinga is Reidian foundationalism; a view that uses common sense in the building of
352 Ibid., 235.
333 Ibid., 237.
162
its foundations, allowing, perhaps, for a broad foundation and a scanty superstructure.
P IP then concludes w ith Reidianism.
This chapter illustrates to us both the bankruptcy of current epistemological
options, not just as structures, as in chapter two, but as incapable of providing a context
for warrant. Foundationalism foundered on its deontological intemalism.
Coherentism, too, foundered on the same thing, but it also crashed into its inability to
transfer warrant circularly. Reliabilism was rejected as inadequate to account for false
reliability. So, P2P requires TPF for warrant. And TPF, itself, provides an apologetic
argument for theism.
The question that now faces us is this: Is REP what it claims to be? We will
discuss the answer to that question in chapters four and five. The further question, to
be discussed in chapter six is, how can one make REP what it claims to be? We will
take a stab at answering that question as well.
CHAPTER 4
REFORM ED EPISTEMOLOGY A N D PRESUPPOSITIONS
4.1 Introduction
REP claims to be an argument for the rationality of theistic belief.354 As we
have seen in the last three chapters, it is deep and complex in its scope and its various
implications. Put simply, however, it seeks to show that one can believe "in God"
(read, "that God exists") and such belief can be warranted (or "positively epistemized")
and rational w ithout recourse to prepositional evidence for support. Belief that God
exists may be, if one so desires, included in one’s noetic structure w ithout need of
pointing to other beliefs to support it.
It will be helpful now to analyze this a bit further and in so doing we will
concentrate the bulk of our attention, in this chapter and the next, on PIP of REP.
That is, we will attem pt to show (at least some of) the problems inherent in the
354 By this point, we are all aware of the complications of using the term "rationality" or
any other term of similar scope. We use this term realizing that we could easily and perhaps
more accurately substitute the phrase "warrant" or "positive epistemization” instead. However,
such matters will occupy us later. We use the term "rationality," not to return again to the
confusion engendered by that term, but simply as a summary word for the discussions of
theistic belief in previous chapters. One should then read "rationality" with the connotations
previously discussed and not as one might have read it apart from such discussions.
163
164
epistemological structure for which Plantinga opts.335 REP is set forth as a negative
apologetic, as contrasted w ith a positive apologetic. It is set forth as an answer to an
objection against the rationality of theistic belief. In its various forms, the objection to
theistic belief contends that one must have prepositional evidence in order rationally to
believe in God. REP attempts to reply by insisting that such constraints are both
arbitrary and prejudicial. Arbitrary, because philosophy as a discipline and
epistemology more specifically have taken certain, fundamental, beliefs for granted
w ithout the same demands; and prejudicial because it seems to be only the "religious"
belief th at is called to the dock for questioning while other beliefs (of the same
epistemological ilk) are allowed to maintain their status w ithout giving account of
themselves. Thus, Plantinga argues for the (epistemic) possibility of theistic belief
residing among others already assumed to be innocent, provided such beliefs are
warranted.
It will be helpful to remember that Plantinga’s REP is not, in the main, an
argument fo r the existence of God, at least not explicitly. It is an argument for the
rationality of theistic belief However, such an argument, if sound, entails the existence
of God, unless of course one could argue for the rationality of a belief in that which
does not exist.336 We do not want to construe Plantinga in that way at this point. His
315 There is no solid and clear line between PIP and P2P. In working with Plantinga’s
epistemological structure, we will also be dealing with proper basicality, which is more a part of
P2P than of PIP. However, given the recent material on warrant, we can see P2P as referring
more to warrant than to proper basicality, or any of the other notions involved in Plantinga’s
initial affirmations of permissive justification.
336 O r perhaps all Plantinga argues for, as Sennett contends, is that i f God exists, then some
basic theistic beliefs are warranted. This, of course, does not say very much, which is Sennett’s
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
165
argument, therefore, for the rationality of theistic belief is also, because of what it
entails, an argument for the existence of God.337 It is not, then, epistemically possible
for one rationally to believe in God and for God not to exist.338 So Plantinga is
attempting to bring credibility back to (or to provide more credibility for) theistic
belief. And in so doing he is arguing also for God’s existence.
The steps toward the rationality of theistic belief, then, would go something like
this: Staying with the evidentialist objection, we could posit a situation in which one
challenges the rationality of theistic belief due to its lack of support from prepositional
evidence. The theistic believer then (historically) responds w ith an argument from
natural theology. He seeks to prove the rationality of theistic belief by supporting it
w ith prepositional evidence such as "everything that comes to be has a cause."
Plantinga, as we have seen, objects to this approach and seeks instead to ask as to the
contention. For our purposes at this point, we will see Plantinga in the best possible light and
then discuss Sennett’s notion of Plantinga in chapter six.
1,7 At this point, we can rely simply on the notion of entailment, yet with significant
qualifiers, stating that p entails q if and only if it is not possible for p to obtain and not q.
Sennett, in MPR, 2f., wants to use his own technical definition of "obvious entailment," which
definition has to do with the obvious entailment of two beliefs. However, I want to maintain
that Plantinga’s argument for the rationality of theistic belief must entail, not merely the belief
that God exists, but the existence of God, which is quite another matter. The question then
becomes, must a rational theistic belief entail the objective existence of God? I believe that it
must. On Sennett’s scheme of obvious entailment, we would construe Plantinga as arguing that
the proposition, "God made this flower" obviously entails the proposition, "God exists" and
Plantinga certainly argues that way. However, I want to go further in construing Plantinga’s
REP as an apology and set forth the supposition that Plantinga’s argument for the rationality of
theistic belief must entail the fact of God’s existence, so that the proposition, "My belief in God
is rational" entails the fact that God actually exists. This stretches entailment beyond the
parameters of mere propositions.
318 There are complicating factors here that make this formulation less than satisfactory, but
we shall not discuss them here. For example, as was stated above, one may claim to believe
that theistic belief is rational or proper i f God exists.
166
possibility of the theistic challenger’s belief in other minds, o r in objects of perception,
o r in m em ory beliefs, or in beliefs about other mental states (e.g., pain). Such beliefs
must simply be taken as justified because given as basic, that is, as unsupported by other
beliefs that we might hold. Surely, then, we can affirm our belief in God as a justified
belief because it, too, is given as basic, at least for some. And if taken as justified
because given as basic, then God exists just as do persons, perceptions and past events.
There are a few complications in the above apologetic that must be commented
on before we go further. First, we must not forget the complexities surrounding the
issue of rationality and its near relatives. We must remember the deontological,
internalist and relativist history behind the term and read it here, as it were, w ith those
problems in abeyance. We must also remember that any substitute term we might
choose to use in order to avoid some of the problems associated with the term
"rationality" would itself be problematic; whatever term we finally choose to use is
fraught w ith certain difficulties.
Second, as was noted above, Plantinga does not extend his apologetical
argum entation to the objective conclusion of God’s existence. Plantinga does not
directly argue from rational theistic belief to the actual existence of God, though, again,
the first entails the second.339 Having said that, there is one more distinction that must
be made.
4.11 Apologetics and Epistemology
539 We wiH see below that Sennett argues that the most Plantinga has shown is that i f God
exists, theistic belief is rational.
167
Apologetics is, generically, a defense. W ithin the context of Christianity, it is a
defense o f the Christian position, relating more directly to Christian theism’s
contention of the existence of the Christian God. N ow there is some confusion over
w hether this defense of the Christian position is an art or a science. In order to answer
that question fully, it would be necessary to see both the mutual relationships that
obtain between an art and a science, as well as their respective distinctions. Generally
speaking, an art would concentrate its focus on practice and a science on principles.
In a less than satisfactory but more immediately useful way, we shall think of
apologetics as the science of setting out principles for defending Christian theism and
reserve the term "apology" for the art of applying apologetics to more specific
situations.
So what do we mean when we define apologetics as a science? Generally, we
mean that the focus of apologetics as a science is to clarify, expound, analyze, collate,
interpret, dissect, and justify the principles that must be present when one presents an
apology for the Christian faith. N ot only the principles, however, but the procedures as
well must be a part of the apologetical package. But won’t involving ourselves in
procedures carry us from apologetics to apology? N ot necessarily. O ne can lay out the
way in which apologetics must be done without, at the same time, presenting an
apology for the Christian faith.340 In apologetics, then, we shall be looking at the
principles that must be present in a defense of Christian theism for it truly to be a
M0 These distinctions are not and cannot be hard and fast. Even as we work through
apologetical principles we will be arguing for and thus giving an apology for those principles.
The distinction, however, is designed to focus us more toward the principles involved, rather
than how they should then be applied to individuals.
168
defense of such. And we must also recognize that any apology can and should be
subjected to a critical analysis, given the fact that it can be, at times, employed
uncritically.
A nd now we must see Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology proposal as an apology.
A nd as an apology, it makes use of principles of apologetics. In this case, furtherm ore,
we have an apology, employing apologetical principles and couched w ithin a specific
philosophical discipline, i.e., epistemology. There is an obvious connection, then,
between REP and apologetics, at least as we have framed the former. We could say that
what we want to offer in the rest of this chapter are the principles which must guide
and direct any apology which works from the nature of epistemology and which also
seeks to defend theism, or more specifically, Christian theism.
REP, therefore, is more specifically an apology rather than an apologetic, at least
in the main, as long as we keep in mind the symbiotic relationship between the two.
And if an apology, it will be our task in the pages below to provide some corrective
(apologetical) principles for REP as apology.
But there is more to the relationship of apologetics to epistemology than just the
specific relationship of REP and apologetics. Any apologetic must deal with the
question of knowledge. Central to the defense of Christian theism is the knowledge of
G od and central to such a knowledge claim is the problem of knowledge itself. In
chapter six, therefore, we will seek to apply some of the principles of our apologetic to
some o f the knotty problems in epistemology, more particularly Plantinga’s T P F as
inclusive of P2P of REP.
169
O ne more qualifier must be mentioned, and one that is most im portant for our
discussions below. Plantinga sets forth, not just a theistic epistemology, but a Reformed
epistemology proposal.341 We shall be looking at such w ithin the context, not of a
generic apologetic (if there could even be such), but w ithin the context of a specifically
Reformed apologetic.342 As such, some principles will be taken for granted or assumed
that cannot, at this point, be debated. We shall not be able to deal w ith differences
between Reformed and non-Reformed, or even with differences w ithin the Reformed
com m unity itself, except as those differences are specifically reflected in our Reformed
analysis of Plantinga’s REP.
4.2 Plantinga on Plantinga
There are some principial problems with Plantinga’s REP as an apology that
must be noted. Interestingly, some of the parameters w ithin which Plantinga’s
problems must be addressed are provided by Plantinga himself. It seems then, at least at
this point, that our best approach in analyzing Plantinga is to follow Plantinga himself.
O n November 4, 1983, Plantinga was inaugurated as the John A. O ’Brien
341 In personal discussion with Plantinga, he indicated that he would most likely not use the
term "Reformed" again for his position, given the fact, among others, that certain responses
tended unduly to highlight such a term. The current choice of title for his forthcoming
Warranted Christian Belief is indicative of his move away from "Reformed" as, in part,
descriptive of his epistemology. Not using the term, however, does not erase the content of
Plantinga’s approach and thus the above third volume promises to contain an elaboration both
of Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis as well as the testimonium Spiritus Sancti, both of
which find their home within the Reformed tradition.
342 The primary exponent of a specifically Reformed apologetic would be Dr. Cornelius Van
Til and the content of such can be found in any of his writings, e.g., The Defense o f the Faith
(Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1955).
170
Professor of Philosophy at the University of N otre Dame. O n the occasion of his
inauguration, he presented an inaugural address entitled, "Advice to Christian
Philosophers."343 We will take his advice and then seek to use it as a helpful (and
necessary) corrective to his REP.
Plantinga contends that the intellectual culture of our day is profoundly anti-
Christian.344 As such, one can expect that one’s intellectual training will be profoundly
anti-Christian as well. N ot only so, but one can expect that one’s intellectual training
may be hostile to the Christian position at crucial points and in crucial areas.
However, Christianity is "on the move," be it only at a snail’s pace.345 And just
because it is (ever so slowly) on the move, Plantinga encourages those who are studying
and who are Christians to take their Christianity as seriously as those who teach take
their opposition to Christianity. Here then is a possible scenario: A Christian college
student studies philosophy and, as a m atter of fact, studies long enough and hard
enough as eventually to earn her Ph.D . in philosophy. And now what does she do?
It is natural then for her, after she gets her Ph.D., to continue to think about
and w ork on these topics. And it is natural, furthermore, for her to w ork on
them in the way she was taught to, thinking about them in the light of the
assumptions made by her mentors and in terms of currently accepted ideas as to
what a philosopher should start from o r take for granted, what requires
argument and defense and what a satisfying philosophical explanation o r a
343 Printed in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 3, (July 1984): 253-271. It is worth noting
here that others took his advice and published Michael D. Beaty, ed. Christian Theism and the
Problems o f Philosophy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), as an attempt to
apply the principles stated in Plantinga’s address.
344 Ibid., 253.
345 Ibid.
171
proper resolution to a philosophical question is like.346
But Plantinga rightly points out that such should not be the case for a Christian
philosopher. A Christian philosopher must learn to display more autonom y from the
current philosophical trends, more integrality (or wholeness) in her philosophical
approach, and more Christian boldness (or self-confidence) in approaching her topics in
a C hristian way. W ith this advice we can certainly agree. And we shall elaborate on
the extent of our agreement below. Before elaborating, however, we need to quote
Plantinga more fully.
Perhaps the theist has a right to start from belief in God, taking that
proposition to be one of the ones probability with respect to which determines
the rational propriety of other beliefs he holds. But if so, then the Christian
philosopher is entirely within his rights in starting from belief in God to his
philosophizing. He has a right to take the existence o f God for granted and go
on from there in his philosophical work - just as other philosophers take for
granted the existence of the past, say, or of other persons, or the basic claims of
contem porary physics.
M any Christian philosophers appear to think of themselves qua philosophers
as engaged with the atheist and agnostic philosopher in a common search for the
correct philosophical position vis a vis the question w hether there is such a
person as God. ...But he will think, or be inclined to think, or half inclined to
th in k that as a philosopher he has no right to this position unless he is able to
show that it follows from, or is probable, or justified with respect to premises
accepted by all parties to the discussion - theist, agnostic and atheist alike.
Furthermore, he w ill be half inclined to think he has no right, as a philosopher, to
positions that presuppose the existence o f God, i f he can’t show that belief to be
justified in this way (emphasis mine).347
This is Plantinga’s apologetic for Christian philosophy. We must not simply borrow
from non-Christian philosophy the problems, principles and procedures in order then
to attem pt to inject Christianity into such a foreign element later on. Christian
346 Ibid., 255.
347 Ibid., 260.
172
philosophers have a right to start with God in doing philosophy. But what exactly does
it mean to "start with" something (or someone)? H ow does one know when one has
"started with" one thing and not w ith another? Is "starting with" a conscious decision
that one makes or is it something that simply happens by virtue of the knowledge
situation, or both? W e can perhaps get a hint at Plantinga’s meaning here as we look at
one of his most recent attempts to "do" Christian philosophy.
In his (as yet) unpublished paper, "Methodological Naturalism?," Plantinga
attempts to go from the general principles we saw above to a more specific application
of such.M8 "First, I shall point to three examples of the religious non-neutrality of
scientific claims or hypotheses. I shall then argue that a Christian academic and
scientific com m unity ought to pursue science in its own way, starting from and taking
for granted what we know as Christians. "M9 Plantinga gives examples of how and why
a Christian should begin his scientific inquiry taking the existence of God for granted,
as well as examples of theories in which God has been excluded as (at best) irrelevant.
M y main point, therefore, can be summarized as follows. According to

Augustine, Kuyper and many others human history is dominated by a battle, a
contest between the Civitas Dei and the City of Man. It is part of the task of
the Christian academic com m unity is [sic] to discern the limits and lineaments of
this contest, to see how it plays out in intellectual life generally, and to pursue
the various areas of intellectual life as citizens of the Civitas Dei. This naturally
suggests pursuing science using all that we know: w hat we know about God as
well as what we know about his creation, and what we know by faith as well as
w hat we know in other ways. That natural suggestion is proscribed by the
principle of Methodological Naturalism. M N, however, though widely accepted
"Methodological Naturalism?" was delivered at the symposium "Knowing God, Knowing

Christ, Knowing Nature in a Post-Positivistic Era" at Notre Dame University in April, 1993.
Because it is as yet unpublished we should, in fairness, see its claims as still tentative.
M9 Ibid., 2.
173
and indeed exalted, has little to be said for it; when examined cooly in the light
of day, the arguments for it seem weak indeed. We should therefore reject it.350
A nd w hy should we reject MN? Just one of Plantinga’s examples will suffice at this
point.351
Pierre Duhem was a Catholic and a scientist who was accused of allowing his
religious views to interfere with his science. Duhem, in response to the accusation,
claimed that his Christianity had nothing whatsoever to do w ith his study of physics.352
As a m atter of fact, Duhem was disconcerted about the intrusion of metaphysics into
physical theory. In attempting to give explanations of observable phenomena, there
were deep differences between, for example, Aristotelians, New tonians and Cartesians.
Each would give his own account of magnetism, pointing to deep differences that were
related more to their metaphysical rather than their physical theories. In this kind of
situation, according to Duhem , any physical theory is only as strong as its metaphysical
father. Add to this confusion the further problem that physicists will never be able to
w ork together because their respective metaphysical theories will ingress into their
physical theories and each physicist is then relegated to his ow n personal view.
He therefore proposes a conception of science (of physics in particular) according

to which the latter is independent of metaphysics:
...I have denied metaphysical doctrines the right to testify for o r against
any physical theory. ... Whatever I have said o f the m ethod by which
physics proceeds, o r the nature and scope that we must attribute to the
350 Ibid., 46.
351 The following material will be taken from Ibid., 36ff.
352 The relevant text here would be Duhem’s The Aim and Structure o f Physical Theory, trans.
Philip P. Wiener (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954) and particularly the appendix
entitled, "Physics of a Believer".
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theories it constructs, does not in any way prejudice either the

metaphysical doctrines o r religious beliefs of anyone who accepts my
words. The believer and the nonbeliever may both w ork in common
accord for the progress of physical science such as I have tried to define
it.
So here we have another argument for methodological naturalism...353
N ow we must disagree with some of Plantinga’s further discussion of "Duhemian"
science. F or example, Plantinga wants to make the point that, as far as observation,
logic, mathematics, and perhaps other examples are concerned, "theism, anti-realism and
naturalism have nothing to do with it."354 We will have to discuss this below and so
will simply state it here as a point with which we cannot agree.
But Plantinga’s further point is well w orth considering. Duhem ’s exclusion of
metaphysics is far broader than even he could accept. N ot only does it exclude the
existence of God from its purview, but it must also exclude metaphysical naturalism, as
well as concepts that underlie cognitive science, or the idea that human beings are
material objects, or that human beings have minds, or that something is or is not
rational, and a whole host of other ideas, concepts and theories about which there is no
small metaphysical controversy. In commenting on what Duhem attempts, Plantinga
says, "Instead of speaking of ’methodological naturalism’ therefore, we should speak of
’methodological neutralism’ or maybe ’metaphysical neutralism.’"355 As Plantinga then
goes on to argue for some notion of neutrality (with which we cannot agree), he also
argues for what he terms "Augustinian science” in which the facts of observable science
353 Plantinga, "Methodological Naturalism?," 38.
354 Ibid., 41.
355 Ibid., 42.
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are brought into a fuller context. So with the basic conclusion o f this example, we
must agree, "There is nothing here to suggest that if it ain’t Duhemian, it ain’t
science."356
According to Plantinga, then, the way in which one "starts with" God is by
bringing him into the discussion at relevant points thus denying the initial prejudice
that seeks automatically to exclude him. "Starting from" God (to summarize much of
Plantinga’s discussion) in this paper, means that we challenge the majority opinion for
methodological naturalism as simply unproved arbitrary prejudice rather than scientific
fact. It means that we challenge those who disallow the Christian understanding of
G od in scientific theory to show us why such exclusion is necessary. To put it
positively, to "start from" God means to "evaluate various scientific theories by way of
a background body of belief that includes what we know about God and what we
know specifically as Christians."357 It means that, rather than affirm with the majority
that biological evolution is a fact, the Christian is free to follow the evidence wherever
it may lead. For the evolutionist, naturalism is the only game in tow n.358
W hat Plantinga has shown us in his "Advice to Christian Philosophers" and his
later "Methodological Naturalism?" is that the Christian philosopher or scientist has a
356 Ibid., 43.
357 Ibid., 35.
358 Ibid., 9ff. In this section on evolution, Plantinga labels the evolutionary position "GEM"
- the Grand Evolutionary Myth - and seeks to show that, due to its radical adherence to a
naturalistic understanding of the universe, it is trapped in its own dogmatism. When he notes
that the Christian is free to follow the evidence, he also notes, "And of course part of the
evidence, for a Christian, will be the Biblical evidence. I myself think that the Biblical evidence
for a special creation of human beings is fairly strong," Ibid., 11, n. 15.
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right to begin his inquiry taking for granted the existence of God.359 What Plantinga
has show n is that the existence of G od can play a deciding role in one’s thinking and
theorizing and knowing. The question to be asked at this point, however, is as to the
nature of Plantinga’s encouragement. Is Plantinga arguing here that one must take the
existence of G od as a presupposition, or rather is he arguing for something much
weaker? And if the latter, will such an argument really make a difference in the end?
These are difficult questions that must be faced. Before facing them, however, we
should look more closely at the extent and nature of a presupposition.
4.21 Presuppositions
Just what is a "presupposition"? The etymology is not particularly helpful; it
only indicates that it is something that is supposed or perhaps assumed beforehand. But
how are we to understand "beforehand"? Before what? Is it meant to be temporal
priority o r logical priority? Both? Neither?
A ttem pting adequately to define a presupposition can be notoriously difficult, if
not near impossible. There are elements and factors involved that could easily require
extensive discussion and elaboration. While it is not possible, at this juncture, to
accommodate such a requirement, it may be helpful nevertheless before going further to
attempt, in true Plantingan fashion, a "first approximation, an idea, a hint" at a
359 Plantinga makes some of the same points again in The Twin Pillars o f Christian
Scholarship (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Calvin College and Seminary, The Stob Lectures
Endowment, 1990) which were the Stob Lectures of Calvin College and Seminary, 1989-90,
published in pamphlet form.
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definition for presupposition.360 But first we must note some of the deep complexities
involved in such an attempt.
Central to any discussion of presupposition is the distinction between the
Christian position and every other, non-Christian, position. Even to make such a
distinction presupposes a num ber of arguable points. However, for the sake of time
and space, we must simply assert here, w ithout arguing the point, that the Christian
position is true and that all opposing positions are false.361 This is the antithetic
situation which Christianity demands. Thus, any presupposition that is contrary to the
Christian position is false.362
Given the above, we must also note that there are presuppositions of a more or
less subjective nature and presuppositions of a more o r less objective nature. Perhaps all
we can do by way of explication at this point w ithout muddying the waters too much
is to focus on the reference points of the presupposition itself. If the presupposition has
as its prim ary reference point something in the thinking subject, it is subjective. If it
360 It will be helpful to remember during this entire discussion what we have mentioned
previously, i.e., all attempts at defining and clarifying are limited, given a Christian theistic
context. It will never be the case, therefore, that we will be able to define a presupposition, or
anything else for that matter, in a way sufficient to comprehend all the complexities of the
knowledge situation. For that reason, I prefer the terminology of "first approximation," which
may eventually lead to a "final approximation," but which will never fully define or
comprehend all of the various aspects. Only God could do that.
361 The short, principial "proof” of this statement is transcendental in that unless the
existence of the Christian God is true, nothing else is and that all truth depends for its
truthfulness on the existence of such a God.
362 Let us also note here that "the Christian position" would comprise all things revealed
and taught in Scripture as well as those derived from Scripture by good and necessary
consequence; if Scripture teaches, as it does, that God controls all things then it is true and a
part of the Christian position that God controls the car outside as well, though the car itself is
never mentioned.
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refers to something w ithout the subject, it is objective. But even this distinction cannot
be rigidly applied. W hen, to use one example, the apostle Paul was in Athens he was
distressed by the rampant idolatry there. It seems, however, that the presupposition
behind the general idolatry was the more specific notion of an unknow n god. Could
we not say that the presupposition of an unknow n (and perhaps unknowable) god is an
objective presupposition, referring to something w ithout the subject? But then we must
ask as to the existence of an unknow n god and, given the tru th of the Christian
position, conclude that, as a m atter of fact, the unknow n god is an idea in the mind
having no real objective existence. Thus it may purport to be objective but, when
scrutinized, can be shown to be subjective. Or, to use just one more example, perhaps
we want to see the "Grand Evolutionary Myth" (GEM) of which Plantinga speaks as
presupposing a universe governed by chance. Could we not say that the presupposition
of ultimate chance is an objective presupposition, which, of course, as in o u r first
example, has its impetus in the subject? As a m atter of fact (and this needs much more
elaboration), could we not say that all false presuppositions are in fact merely subjective?
W hat, then, of objective presuppositions? Perhaps all we can say o f objective
presuppositions is (1) that they are "supposed" to be such and (2) may exist whether or
not one knows o r believes them.
And with that we see two further points. First, presuppositions can maintain
their status as presuppositions even if they are false. The reason for this is that
presuppositions are "supposed" or presumed or assumed to be such but may in fact turn
out not to be. Second, when we speak of a presupposition that can be neither known
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n or believed we are speaking of that which necessarily is the case, let us say, in the
epistemic situation, even if the believer or cognizer does not believe it or know it to be
so. Perhaps, then, this is a true objective presupposition in which even the believer
both does not know it as such and that it must be present in order for his position to
be intelligible.363 Perhaps here we have an externalist presupposition distinct from the
internalist variety.
Closely related to our distinction between subjective and objective
presuppositions is that between epistemic and ontic presuppositions. Perhaps we could
th in k of it in this way. An epistemic presupposition relates primarily to the knowledge
situation per se, whereas an ontic presupposition, while it may o r may not be know n or
believed, refers to that which is essentially non-epistemic. So, for example, Descartes’
"cogito, ergo sum" jumps from an epistemic to an ontic presupposition. The "I th in k ”
is obviously epistemic whereas the "I exist" is essentially non-epistemic, referring to an
ontological reality. O ntic presuppositions, therefore, refer to that which can be quite
distinct from the knowledge situation.
And, finally, joined to the above distinctions is the distinction between ultimate
and non-ultimate presuppositions.364 An ultimate presupposition might be one which is
supposed to provide the final explanation of a given fact while a non-ultimate
343 This would be the case, for example, when a non-Christian denies the existence of God.
Even that denial presupposed that the person exists by God’s creative act, that he lives and
moves and has his being in the God whom he seeks to deny.
364 There is another distinction sometimes made between relative and absolute
presuppositions. Such a distinction is related to our discussion here but it need not be resolved
at this point. We will contend below that the Christian presupposition is alone absolute and all
others are relative, and that all other assumed ultimate presuppositions are erroneous.
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presupposition, while necessary for further elaboration of a given fact, may simply be
one link in an as yet incomplete chain.
But complications surely arise, particularly when the above distinctions are
blended or woven together in a given situation. To return to a former example,
suppose one holds (GEM) to be a fact. And suppose that one is asked as to the
presuppositions behind (GEM) and the preconditions for its truth. And suppose further
that one becomes convinced, while maintaining crucial aspects of (GEM) such as
random genetic drift, a certain uniformitarianism, etc., that God in fact must have
created and designed the elements necessary for the process (at least) to begin. W hat
now do we say about this presuppositional chain of beliefs? We must say more than
simply some are right and some are wrong. The ultimate presupposition in such a case
is the existence of G od and his creative/designing work. O ther presuppositions in the
process are random genetic drift and uniformitarianism. Is it possible now to evaluate
which of these presuppositions are subjective and which are objective? Can we say that
the presupposition of G od’s existence is an ontic presupposition because essentially non-
epistemic? O r do we contend that uniformitarianism is purely epistemic in nature
because, say, incoherent w ith the Christian position? Is the Christian/non-Christian
distinction clear in this case?
O r consider any example in which one holds a given fact and one holds that the
ultim ate presupposition behind such a fact is that G od does not exist. W ould not the
Christian position hold that the presupposition behind the supposed fact of the non
existence o f God is, in fact, the fact that G od exists? W hat kind of presupposition is it
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that must obtain even when it is expressly denied? And on what basis can one say that
it must obtain?
Perhaps the best way to approach these questions is to go back to our initial
distinction between the Christian and non-Christian positions. H ow does one go about
supporting such a distinction? Again, the answer here is many-sided and complex, but
must finally resolve into the one fact of G od’s self-revelation in his Word. It is because
God has revealed himself in his W ord that we have any foundation, any certainty, any
knowledge and any clue as to the perplexing problem of presuppositions. The truth
revealed in G od’s W ord provides the ultimate epistemic presupposition as well as
knowledge of the ontic presuppositions and thus the criteria by which we can discern
the entire situation.
A t this point we can return to one of Plantinga’s points in his analysis of
Bonjour’s epistemology. Plantinga states the following:
...where do I stand when I conclude that since it is possible my nature should

massively deceive me, I should not trust it until I determine that it does not thus
massively deceive me? Where shall I stand while making that determination,
while investigating w hether or not my nature is or is not reliable?
Obviously I have nothing but my epistemic nature...to enable me to see...that
if it is possible that my nature deceive me, then I must determine whether it is
reliable before I trust it.365
W hen Plantinga asks the question, "where do I stand...?," he is asking the
presuppositional question. He is asking, given our distinctions above, the question both
of criteria and of ultimate presuppositions. Unfortunately, his answer to such a
question provides neither criteria nor ultimacy; nor is it quite so obvious as Plantinga
365 Plantinga, WCD, 98-99.
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wants to maintain.
Is it really obvious that we have nothing but our epistemic natures to enable us
to see whether or not those natures deceive us? Obviously not. Certainly it is obvious
that in any and every knowledge/belief situation, including situations in which
presuppositions are or become more prominent, our epistemic natures always play a
crucial and necessary role. Taking the term "epistemic nature" in its broadest sense
(which is how Plantinga seems to use it), we can say that we know or believe nothing
w ithout them. In that sense my epistemic nature is the presupposition behind any
specific claim to knowledge or belief; it is the presupposition, for example, behind
Descartes’ cogito. But we cannot assign the kind of ultimacy to the presupposition of
our epistemic natures that Plantinga assigns to it. We cannot say with him that
"obviously I have nothing but my epistemic nature to enable me to see..." As a m atter
of fact, in other places, it is clear either that Plantinga himself believes no such thing,
or, perhaps, that he is significantly inconsistent w ith his above affirmation. T hink, for
example, of his early REP. When elaborating on how basic theistic belief is proper
while Pum pkinite belief is not, Plantinga appeals, among other things, to
condition/belief sets. Surely the conditions in the given condition/belief set cannot be
seen as essentially epistemic in nature, unless Plantinga wants to contend that the
conditions exist only in our minds, or, perhaps, in Kantian fashion, that all we know of
the world is constrained completely by our minds and their categories.366 Could we not
366 Or does Plantinga want to contend such a thing? One wonders when he resorts to
polemically useless and completely relative sets of examples if he has not himself succumbed to
a philosophically untenable position.
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say that at least in part Plantinga "stands" on the conditions that must obtain in order
for a belief properly to obtain as well?
O r consider Plantinga’s latest position on warrant. W hy would he postulate
more than simple proper function if our epistemic natures were all we had to enable us
to see if we are deceived? Instead he includes both appropriate epistemic environment
and tru th conducivity in his notion of warrant, which notion, I take it, is calculated to
avoid epistemic deception. In the warrant situation, then, Plantinga "stands" on the
proper functioning of epistemic faculties, an appropriate epistemic environment, tru th
conducivity, and others.367 So, clearly, there is more than our epistemic natures
involved in the determination of whether or not we are massively deceived, o r deceived
at all. Surely more than our epistemic natures must be involved in the knowledge
situation.
N one of what we have said thus far is related directly to just exactly what a
presupposition is. Most of what we have said simply relates to the distinctions involved
once we determine that we are dealing with presuppositions. So how shall we define
presupposition? Simply put, we can begin to define it this way:
PR , - any proposition, principle or state of affairs that is assumed to be
necessary for the rationale of another given proposition, principle or state of
affairs.
Some clarification is in order. First, what does it mean for something to be
"necessary"? W hat is the force of this "necessity"? It is not broadly logical necessity
347 But, righdy, Plantinga would say that the entire warrant project is developed and based
on the reliability of his reason, so we come back to the problem.
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but rather a necessity perhaps best explained in terms of the common notion of
"necessary condition".36* Any proposition, principle, o r state of affairs, then, is thought
to be such that its rationale comes, at least in part, from its presupposition.
N otice also that we want to see a presupposition as something that is "assumed
to be" necessary in our definition. We phrase it this way for tw o reasons. First, one
need not be aware of that which is assumed. An assumption is oftentimes present
w ithout one either being conscious of it or being immediately aware of it. Second,
because a presupposition is only assumed to be necessary, it can, and may in fact, turn
out to be false. In this case one may be presupposing something that will, in the end,
be of no use and as a m atter of fact contrary to, the explanation of a given fact. We do
not want to think of an assumption merely as another name for a presupposition. So
the word "assumed" in our definition is meant to play a rather generic, though crucial,
role. A given fact, then, according to our definition, is thought to owe its rationale to
those propositions o r principles or states of affairs which serve to provide reasons for
their meaning, existence, etc.
A nd further we want to see a presupposition as necessary when one asks for the
reason(s) o r ground(s) for believing a given proposition to be true or false, o r a given
principle to be valid o r invalid o r a given state of affairs to exist or not exist. The
necessity, therefore, relates to the exigency of a rationale and not directly to the status
368 A necessary condition is one in which x is necessary for y when nothing is a case of y
without also being a case of x, e.g., nothing is a wife without being also a woman. So while
being a woman is a necessary condition for being a wife, it is not a sufficient condition wherein
anything that is a case of x is also a case of y.
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of a proposition, etc. as such.369
So take a given fact. And suppose that the presupposition behind such a fact is
sought and agreed upon. W hat happens if the presupposition disconfirms the fact?
O ne answer would be to conclude that the fact is not a fact after all. But what if the
fact is overwhelmingly obvious, say, the fact of my existence?370 W hat happens to the
presupposition behind that fact when the fact itself seems insurmountable as a fact?
The obvious response would be to give up the presupposition.
But if we give up the presupposition, what does that say about the heretofore
discovered relation between the presupposition and the fact? It says, at least, that
som ething is amiss, either in the presupposition, the fact, the method used to determine
the former, or something of the sort. Let us suppose the method used was impeccable.
A nd we have already noted that the fact is all but absolutely certain. W hat, now, is the
status of the presupposition in question? Can a presupposition be both a necessary
condition for a fact and disconfirm that same fact at the same time? That cannot be an
option. H ow can x be both a necessary condition for y and disconfirm y at the same
time? It simply cannot. Therefore, it seems the natural conclusion would be to
determine that the supposed presupposition behind the fact was, in fact, erroneous. If,
on the other hand, it can be determined that the fact was not a fact after all, then one
has the option either of staying w ith one’s presupposition(s) or giving up both
369 The categories of proposition, principle and state of affairs is meant to be neither
exhaustive nor all-inclusive. It is meant, rather, to highlight the fact of a presupposition’s
application to more than mere propositions.
370 As a matter of fact, our definition assumes the "factness" of the fact.
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presupposition and fact. Presuppositions, then, m ust be accountable to (and even
"provable" by) given facts if they are to be rationally held.371
There are still at least tw o crucial considerations needed when attem pting to
delineate a presupposition. First is the fact that, whereas another proposition, etc. may
serve as a presupposition to a given proposition, the w ord "presupposition" carries with
it a kind of "cosmic" connotation, a connotation connected oftentimes with one’s more
generic and basic view of the world. Perhaps this is where ultimate presuppositions
have their place.372 However, when presuppositions are discussed, they are often seen,
say, as grids through which many (if not every) other interpretations and theories and
beliefs are filtered, and oftentimes without one being conscious of their pervasive
influence. O r, put more simply, they are often seen as foundational starting points,
influencing that which is believed or thought, but in a hidden and perhaps less-than-
conscious way.
So let us think of a presupposition now, using Plantinga’s metaphor, as a place
on which to stand.373 But what does it really mean, in this context, to "stand" on a
571 This is a point often overlooked or even denied when discussing presuppositions. It is
sometimes thought that presuppositions have nothing but a supports relation to their respective
facts. However, though presuppositions are foundational in some ways, they must be entailed
by, as well as entail, the fact in question. This is just one of the ways that the charge of fideism
is irrelevant to our notion of presupposition.
372 Though one could postulate an ultimate presupposition which would be a bit removed
from what we have in mind here. Plantinga’s notion of our epistemic natures being all that we
have to determine deception seems to be an ultimate presupposition in terms o f the epistemic
situation, but it lacks an, at least explicit, appeal to a view of the world, though such a
statement certainly includes such a view.
373 This is a metaphorical way of describing what we mean by "foundation." One could,
however, have a foundation which itself needs a further foundation and so on until one reaches
an assumed ultimate presupposition.
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place? A t least the following. It means that one’s activity, w hether thinking, believing,
theorizing, etc., is directed beyond and away from the place whereon one stands. It
also means that one’s activity could not be done unless one had such a place. Does it
always mean that the place whereon one thinks one stands, in fact, is such a place? N ot
necessarily, especially when we keep in mind the fact that presuppositions are
assumptions and may in fact be false. In that case, presuppositional argumentation
should show that the place whereon one thinks one stands is actually no support at all.
So let us call this aspect of a presupposition "foundational," realizing the possible
confusion such a term might engender and therefore keeping in mind the qualifier that
something can be foundational without at the same time necessitating foundationalrim.
And now we must further refine our definition of presupposition.
PR 2 - any foundational proposition, principle o r state of affairs that is assumed,
to be necessary for the rationale of other given propositions, principles o r states
of affairs.
But there is still something significant missing from our definition. We have not
yet given due consideration in our definition of the pervasive and sweeping influence
that a presupposition can exert on a given fact. And at this point it is necessary for us
to return to our first distinction mentioned above, that between the Christian position
and all other, non-Christian, positions. If the Christian position alone is true, and it is,
then it follows that, to the extent that one is true to one’s commitments in this regard,
one’s propositions, principles and states of affairs will be significantly influenced by
one’s relationship to the Christian position.
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The Christian position teaches, among other things, that the existence of the
Christian theistic God has sweeping and foundational ramifications for everything else
in the created world. And it also teaches that its tru th provides the dividing line
between it and absolutely every other position. What this means in terms of our
definition above is that there are foundational presuppositions that are Christian and
then there are all others.374 Thus, foundational presuppositions will either include the
Christian position (and thus, we would say, be true) or exclude it. Whatever the case,
however, whether the Christian position is included or excluded in foundational
presuppositions, we can affirm that these presuppositions take on the character of
religious propositions, principles o r states of affairs. Religious, because they must relate
themselves to the exclusivity of the Christian position. Even, therefore, if they seek to
exclude the notion of God altogether, they are still foundational and thus must take on
(at least some of) the attributes which are characteristic of religion as broadly conceived,
e.g., they may be such that their own authority is assumed to reside within them, they
may motivate and influence the entire epistemic and pragmatic situation, they may be
exhaustively applicable to any other proposition, etc.375 Included within, but going far
beyond, the notion of its foundational character, therefore, is the religious character of
presuppositions. Finally, then, we can formulate our concluding (yet still approximate)
374 Though we cannot argue the point here, we can say that the point can be argued in a
way that demonstrates that unless the Christian position is true, nothing is. This transcendental
argument gives due weight to presuppositional influence in the positions involved.
375 Of course, from a Christian perspective, life itself is religious because, among other
things, of the exhaustive presence of God. Within the context of life, however, some aspects
are more obviously religious while others may remain on the periphery of knowledge or belief.
We are thinking of religion here in its more central and obvious aspect.
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definition.
P R - any religious, foundational proposition, principle or state of affairs that is
assumed to be necessary for the rationale of other given propositions, principles
or states of affairs.
In formulating our definition in just this way, we have not yet dealt adequately with
any of the above complexities that surround the notion of presupposition. W hat we
have done is provide a (at least approximate) context in which a presupposition can be
seen. But more on this below.
4.3 Presuppositional Argumentation
Any Christian-theist (philosopher or otherwise) engaged in an apology,
(epistemological, ethical, etc.) must argue presuppositionally. That is a sweeping
statement w orthy of an entire book. For the present, however, we shall outline some
of the main tenets.
One of the reasons that we must reason presuppositionally is stated aptly by
Plantinga himself, "We must test the spirits, not automatically invite them in just
because they are decked out in the latest academic regalia."376 And one of the reasons
the spirits must be tested by Christian-theistic philosophers is that it is all too easy to
compromise the Christian faith at significant points just for the sake of philosophical
acceptability. But there is much more at stake than style. Let us think of the Christian
philosopher, for the m oment, as also a Christian apologist as we make our case for
376 Alvin Plantinga, "Method in Christian Philosophy: A Reply," Faith and Philosophy, vol.
5, no. 2, (April 1988): 164.
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presuppositional argumentation.
Let us say that God is a necessary being.377 This tru th has ramifications for
absolutely everything that exists. As a necessary being only he has existence as an
essential perfection. Therefore, it is impossible that G od not exist.378 But his necessary
existence is no mere logical fact. It is the presupposition behind any fact whatsoever.
A ny fact that any person chooses to deal w ith in any way includes G od as its
presupposition. As such, his existence is the necessary condition both for the knowing
and the being of any fact. N ot only so, but his existence is essential for the foundation
of a present fact’s existence. N ow it is the task of any Christian apologetic to employ
such a tru th in its apology. And w hy must this be the task of the Christian apologist?
Because any other approach compromises the very Christianity one claims to believe.
We shall give two examples of this kind of compromise. O ne will be a (at least partial)
response to Plantinga’s notion of the Reformed objection to natural theology. We will
have to disagree w ith Plantinga’s analysis of why those in the Reformed tradition have
rejected natural theology. We shall intimate that more is there than a mere "inchoate
rejection” of classical foundationalism. As a m atter of fact, had Plantinga seen the
necessity of arguing presuppositionally, he might have seen that the Reformed objection
to natural theology was due more to its compromise of the Christian position than to a
377 We say this in this way not in order, first of all, to satisfy the demands of logic, modal
or otherwise. We say this in the context of God’s revelation in his Word. His aseity, for
example, demands his absolute necessity. Furthermore, his necessity is such that it is impossible
that he should not exist. Such impossibility, however, is defined by his character first of all and
not by any abstract logical notion.
371 A Christian apologist, therefore, can never really assume the non-existence of God, but
only for the sake of argument to prove the necessity of his existing.
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mere epistemological glitch.379 O ur second example will focus more specifically, not on
Plantinga’s analysis, but on his (erroneous) affirmation of religious neutrality.
4.31 T he "Reformed Objection" and Presuppositions
First, most arguments for the existence of God employing prepositional evidence
as their beginning point have, at their root, the principle of sufficient reason.380 The
principle of sufficient reason states, simply, that for every state of affairs that obtains, x,
y must also obtain. The sufficient reason for y obtaining is x. If there is no y, there is
no x. And x entails y. This principle has been used by virtually every form of natural
theology since Aquinas.381 N ow we must ask the question whether o r not the principle
of sufficient reason (PSR) is a presupposition. Clearly, those who argue in this manner
could not deny its necessary and foundational status. In arguments for G od’s existence,
PSR is an assumed principle, it is necessary for the rationale of the relevant fact, and it
379 Of course, there is also a strong epistemological element in the Reformed objection to
natural theology. As we will see in our discussion of Calvin’s rejection of natural theology, the
reality of the noetic effects of sin plays a significant role. And, as we will also see in chapter
six, Plantinga gives far too little attention to such a reality.
3,01 say "most" arguments because, for example, the ontological argument begins from
somewhat different premises, e.g., that of the conception of the greatest possible being. There
are problems here as well but they are not related to the discussion of PSR. When I say "most"
here, I am referring primarily to the Thomistic "five ways" and their near relatives in apologetic
argumentation.
381 The principle is more obvious in some arguments than in others. Any cause/effect
argument puts such a principle in a prominent position, whereas a teleological argument might
be able better to "hide" the principle. For example, it is not explicit in the argument for design
that the "Designer" himself (or itself) needs a designer. However, if the argument entails that
the supposed final "Designer" cannot give what he does not have, then the question must come
as to whence his design came.
Without going further into the matter, we will contend that such arguments presuppose
the principle of sufficient reason.
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is assumed to be essential for the being of that fact; both its ultimacy and its religious
dimension are demonstrated by the fact that, in such arguments, the conclusion is
always something like (in Aquinas, for example), "And this we call God.1,382 Certainly
the existence of God is perceived to be, in these conclusions, necessary, essential,
ultimate and religious.383
But the problem with PSR as a presupposition lies just in this last notion. Is it
the case that PSR allows for such a theistic conclusion as those who employ it in
natural theology seem to indicate? It seems not, and for at least two reasons.
First, PSR is insufficient as a presupposition to define anything other than a
wholly contingent god, if a god at all. For example, PSR applies itself, by definition, to
contingent principles, e.g., every thing that comes to be has a cause or, we could say,
the sufficient reason for the existence of the effect is the cause. A "thing that comes to
be" is, of course, contingent. But what about the sufficient reason of the "thing that
comes to be"? It, too, must have a sufficient reason, given PSR.
Let us take the conjunction of the maximum num ber of contingencies, call it C,
each contingency of which necessitates PSR.38'1 What now is the sufficient reason for
,,J See, for one example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One: God trans.
Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955), 94.
5,3 The reader may refer at this point not only to any of Aquinas’ arguments for God’s
existence, but also to later works such as, for example, Samuel Clarke’s A Demonstration o f the
Attributes and Being o f God, Norman Geisler’s Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Baker Book House, 1976) or to R.C. Sproul, John Gerstner and Arthur Lindsley, Classical
Apologetics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing Company, 1984).
384 My discussion of PSR here is dependent on the discussion by Peter Van Inwagen in An
Essay on Free Will (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1983), 202-204. For a discussion of PSR and
the cosmological argument, see William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), esp. chapter two, and for a recent discussion of the failure of
193
C? We cannot attribute another contingency, C *, to C because C is the maximum
num ber. Suppose now, parallel with Aquinas, we postulate a god as the sufficient
reason for C. What is the status of this god vis-a-vis C? He, too, must be a part of C.
A nd no m atter how many contingencies you add to contingencies, you never end up
w ith necessity. But this is unacceptable. So, (and this is the second reason that PSR is
in fact insufficient) as the argument goes, we now postulate a necessary existence G , for
C. W hat now is the relationship of C and G? O n PSR, it is a relationship of
entailm ent and that which is necessary cannot entail that which is contingent. So PSR
fails. It cannot support the weight attributed to it in order to arrive at the conclusion
of G o d ’s existence.
But notice also the problem of entailment for any truly Christian position. If x
is a sufficient reason for y such that it is impossible for x to obtain w ithout y also
obtaining (because it is the principle of sufficient reason)385, then, in these standard
approaches to natural theology, we would be forced to say that the existence of G od
entails the existence of the world, which is surely not the case for G od as a necessary
being. If it were the case, G od’s existence would be incomplete without the existence
of the world, which cannot be true of God. Serious logical and biblical errors remain if
PSR is employed in this way in Christian apologetics. And it is these errors that
should, at least in part, motivate a rejection of (at least) these forms of natural theology,
not simply an error in epistemological structure, as Plantinga contends.
PSR see John O ’Leary-Hawthome and Andrew Cortens, "The Principle of Necessary Reason,"
Faith and Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 1, (January 1993): 60-67, esp. 60-62.
3,5 See Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 203.
194
The same is not true, of course, if PSR is used simply as a principle, perhaps
even a necessary principle, in an apologetical argumentation which presupposes the
existence of God. In that case, one might contend as a Christian that every thing that
comes to be has a cause. If the point is reached in which the parties agree that the
universe itself necessitates a cause, then one may conclude w ith the existence of God,
which conclusion was, of course, the presupposition behind the cause/effect process
(and thus behind PSR) all along.
The complaint of the Reformed com m unity to which Plantinga refers was,
rather than a more o r less inchoate rejection of classical foundationalism, a rejection of
the guiding principles of natural theology. It was a rejection of the necessary
correlativity of God to his creation, at least in part. For example, in attempting to
answer the question of the relation of the natural principium to the special principium,
Kuyper says,
Hence the dispute can advance no farther than the acknowledgment of

antinomies in our consciousness and the insufficiency of ou r reason to satisfy
entirely our thirst after knowledge. But where the recognition of this leads you
to the conclusion of the necessity o f Sacred Scripture, the rationalist either stops
w ith the recognition of this disharmony, or glides over into other theories,
which allow him to limit himself to the natural principium. And rather than
call in the aid of another principium w ith you, he will cast himself into the arms
of materialism, which releases him at once from the search after an infinite
world...386
386 Abraham Kuyper, Principles o f Sacred Theology, trans. J. Hendrik De Vries (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1980), 385. Without attempting to alter De Vries’
translation, we will, however, provide the original, "Het geding is uit dien hoofde nooit verder
te brengen dan tot de erkentenis van de antinomieen in ons bewustzijn en het ongenoegzame
van onze rede, om onzen dorst naar weten geheel to bevredigen. Maar, waar de erkentenis
hiervan u leidt tot de conclusie van de necessitas Sacrae Scripturae, blijft de rationalist of bij de
erkentenis van dit min harmonieuze staan, of glijdt over in allerhande andere theorieen, die hem
veroorloven zich in het principium naturale op te sluiten. En liever nog dan met u om de
195
N ote that Kuyper delineates two responses to the realized limitations of reason in the
knowledge enterprise. O ne response is to see the necessity of Sacred Scripture for the
knowledge situation. The other, the "rationalist," response is committed to the natural
principle, which releases the rationalist from the search after the infinite world. The
rational principle, in and of itself, leads to antinomies, which in relation to PSR, we
have outlined above. N o sufficient reason for the existence of that which is natural will
lead, by itself, to that which is supernatural. Thus, it seems, classical foundationalism is
not the primary culprit in Kuyper’s objection to natural theology, but rather false and
destructive epistemic and ontic presuppositions.
So also in the case of Bavinck:
But the cosmological proof proceeds on certain assumptions which are not self-
evident and accepted by all. It assumes not only that the individual objects
existing in the universe are contingent, finite, relative, imperfect; but it also
assumes the same in regard to the entire universe; it assumes that an "infinite
chain of causes" is inconceivable; and that the law of causality should also be
applied to the universe as a whole. O nly in case all these assumptions should be
justified would the cosmological proof have any force. ...If anyone wishes to
conclude that the universe must have had a cause, which itself also had a cause,
he has done full justice to the force of this argument.387
hulpe van een ander principium te roepen, zal hij zich in de armen van het materialisme
werpen..." Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopaedic der Heilige Godgeleerdheid (Kampen: J.H. Kok,
1909), 11:339.
5,7 Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine o f God, trans. William Hendricksen (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Baker Book House, 1951), 69. "Maar het kosmologisch bewijs gaat van verschillende
onderstellingen uit, die met op zichzelve en voor alien vaststaan. Het onderstelt, niet slechts dat
de bijzondere dingen in de wereld maar dat ook het gansch heelal contingent, eindig, relatief,
onvolmaakt is; dat eene series causarum in infinitum ondenkbaar is; dat de causaliteitswet ook
geldt van de wereld in haar geheel. Eerst wanneer al deze onderstellingen juist waren, zou het
kosmologisch bewijs kracht hebben. ...Wie uit de wereld tot eene oorzaak besluit, welke zelve
ook eene oorzaak behoeft, heeft aan de logische kracht van dit bewijs genoeg gedaan." Herman
Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1967), 11:53.
It is interesting that it is precisely this section of the book from which Plantinga
196
Obviously, what Bavinck was objecting to in the cosmological argument was exactly
what we noticed in our discussion of PSR above. The fundamental problem here is not
that those who employ such proofs demand propositional evidence and reasons for
G od’s existence, but a much more serious problem lurks in the neighborhood. The
problem is that those who employ such arguments employ also presuppositions that,
from the beginning, disallow a conclusion for the existence of (the Christian) God.
N atural theology can only conclude with a contingent god.
Thus, PSR is insufficient as a presupposition and it must be discarded for one
that is able to carry the epistemic and ontic (not to mention the biblical) weight.
Plantinga should have seen this. In his "Reformed objection to natural theology"
analysis he should have probed deeper and searched for the root rather than a possible,
though confused, and untimely epistemological dissatisfaction. His lack of
presuppositional thinking, however, crippled his entire approach in this area. And this
"crippling" in Plantinga’s approach will prove not to heal, but rather to be fatal to his
entire REP. We will discuss the reason for its demise below. But before doing so, it is
necessary to analyze Plantinga’s notion of neutrality.
4.32 Plantinga’s N eutrality and Presuppositions
We want to look a bit closer at Plantinga’s notion of neutrality in order to see
the necessity (for a Christian apologist) of argument by presupposition. Plantinga
follows Kuyper in setting forth a notion of the acceptability (in some areas) of religious
quotes to substantiate his analysis of Bavinck’s rejection of classical foundationalism.
197
neutrality. We return again to his paper, "Methodological Naturalism?," wherein he
attem pts straightforwardly to ask and answer the question of religious neutrality.
It would be excessively naive to think that contemporary science is religiously

and theologically neutral, standing serenely above that Augustinian struggle and
wholly irrelevant to it. Perhaps parts of science are like that: the size and shape
of the earth and its distance from the sun, the periodic table of elements, the
proof of the Pythagorean Theorem - these are all in a sensible sense religiously
neutral. But many other areas of science are very different; they are obviously
and deeply involved in this clash between opposed world views. There is no
neat recipe for telling which parts of science are neutral w ith respect to this
contest and which not, and of course what we have here is a continuum rather
than a simple distinction. But here is a rough rule of thum b: the relevance of a
bit of science to this contest depends upon how closely that bit is involved in
the attempt to come to understand ourselves as human beings.388
Plantinga then goes on to show, as we saw above, some of the areas in which religious
neutrality is more difficult to come by.
So how shall we define this religious neutrality? It seems neutrality must
presuppose (at least) tw o opposing or competing sides. This is the context w ithin
which Plantinga argues here as he sets out Augustine’s view of hum an history as a
struggle between the Civitas Dei and the City of Man. So perhaps we should define
Plantinga’s notion of religious neutrality as an arena, a territory or a set of facts in
which this struggle between cities is not significantly enjoined. And why, according to
Plantinga, is the struggle not enjoined in religiously neutral areas? Because of the
proxim ity of this area to the attempt to come to understand ourselves as human beings.
But we may not be doing justice to Plantinga here, given his statement that, "of
course what we have here is a continuum rather than a simple distinction." Rather
than an area o r territory, then, perhaps we should define religious neutrality as an
3,1 Plantinga, "Methodological Naturalism?," 1-2.
198
aspect o r a part of a particular fact o r set of facts. To speak of a continuum is to speak
o f a degree of participation in the two poles of the continuum , without, perhaps we
could say, the poles themselves ever being realized by any one fact o r set of facts.389
Can we say, then, using Plantinga’s notion, that religious neutrality can be defined in
this way?
R N , - jf for any fact o r set of facts there is a degree of participation in the
Civitas Dei and the C ity of Man.
This definition will not do, given Plantinga’s discussion. A continuum w ith the Two
Cities at the poles would only allow for a degree of participation in the cities, which,
w hether possible o r not, is not what Plantinga is after in his notion of RN. RN , on
Plantinga’s scheme, has to do, not w ith the extent to which a fact or set of facts
participates in the Tw o Cities, but rather w ith the extent of non-participation of a fact
or set o f facts in either City. So the poles of the continuum in RN , are wrong, and as a
definition of Plantinga’s R N they must be replaced.
Replaced w ith what? Perhaps what Plantinga intends is for one pole to be "the
closest possible attem pt to come to understand ourselves as hum an beings," call it
(AHB), and the other pole to be "absolutely no attempt to come to understand
ourselves as human beings," call it (NAHB). A nd now religious neutrality can be
defined as:
R N - df the value a fact (or set of facts) has relative to the continuum of (AHB)
589 One might think, for example, of the continuum of human knowledge in which neither
total ignorance nor exhaustive knowledge could ever be realized and in which all instances of
human knowledge would participate in both poles to some degree.
199
and (NAHB).
Given this definition, we could assign the value of 1 to (AHB) and 0 to (NAHB). So,
for example, a fact that is completely religiously neutral would have a value of 0,
meaning that such a fact carries w ith it absolutely no attem pt to understand ourselves as
human beings (keeping in mind also that for a continuum to be valid does not require
the realization of either pole).
But there is one more m atter to this entire discussion that must be included.
The reason that Plantinga even entertains the idea of religious neutrality is due to his
agreement w ith the Augustinian view that history comprises a battle of the Tw o Cities.
So it seems this battle, or more specifically, the Two Cities must be inextricably linked
to any understanding of religious neutrality and our definition thus far excludes them
from consideration. But perhaps all we need here is a more explicit connection
between the poles of the continuum and the Tw o Cities. Perhaps all we need is a
codicil indicating that the heat of the battle of the Two Cities is absolute at (AHB) and
non-existent at (NAHB), so that a fact that stands, for example, at .8 on the continuum
is hotly engaged in the battle, seriously committed to one of the Tw o Cities and
obviously so, and a fact that is .1 on the continuum has virtually withdrawn from the
battle altogether. It is both sufficiently religious neutral and battle-free as well.
Let us say that, given R N , Plantinga wants to contend that (to refer to one of
his examples) the Pythagorean Theorem is (roughly) at .1 on the R N continuum and
that discussions of the origin of man are (roughly) at .9. W ould this mean that the
(relative) religious neutrality of the Pythagorean Theorem causes its distance from the
200
heat of the battle, is identical with its distance from the battle, o r what? It is difficult to
tell, given RN . Let us say the value given to a fact is identical to the value of the heat
of the battle, so that a fact that is .1 on R N is also heated to only .1 degree, and so on.
Notice that this analysis does not contend that there is a fact (or set of facts) that is
outside of the battle, in C ity Three, say. It only contends that, as the battle between
Tw o Cities rages, there are facts that play a more or less significant role (religiously) in
that battle.
But there are problems here; problems which Plantinga himself has seen, at least
implicitly, but has yet to reconcile; problems that deal directly w ith the necessity of
presuppositional apologetic reasoning. For example, in "Methodological Naturalism?,"
Plantinga delineates a few religiously neutral elements in science. For instance,
Plantinga notes, "Perhaps observation is, as many have told us, in some sense ’theory
laden’; but it doesn’t follow that it is theory-laden in such a way as to destroy
commonality."390 N ow this sentence needs some analysis, but suffice it to say at this
point that its conclusion is at least a near relative if not identical w ith Plantinga’s
contention in RN . Further down, though, Plantinga states that science also employs
"the deliverances of reason, logic, mathematics - where, once more, there is little
disagreement."391 Now, again, "little disagreement" can be understood, at least in part,
as in line w ith the thrust of our R N above, particularly given R N ’s link w ith the Two
Cities battle. "Little disagreement" could mean some point on the R N continuum
390 Plantinga, "Methodological Naturalism?,” 40.
391 Ibid.
201
wherein the heat of the battle is minimal. In other words, "little disagreement" and
religious neutrality are at least compatible if not mutually entailed notions.
But there is a problem with maintaining the notion of "little disagreement." The
bulk of P IP of REP has to do with Plantinga’s contention that classical foundationalism
has failed, especially at the level o f the deliverances o f reason. And so he summarizes his
discussion of "Reason and Belief in God" in this way,
It is not that the theist and nontheist agree as to what reason delivers, the theist
then going on to accept the existence of G od by faith; there is, instead,
disagreement in the first place as to what are the deliverances o f reason (emphasis
mine).392
A nd now we must ask the hard question; how can there be "little disagreement" as to
the deliverances of reason on the one hand and disagreement in the first place as to
w hat are the deliverances of reason? A prima facie judgment would construe the two
statements as affirming, in the first place, that when reason delivers, there is "little
disagreement," but what reason delivers provides disagreement "in the first place." But
can there really be "little disagreement" when reason delivers and disagreement "in the
first place" on what is delivered? Suppose, as Plantinga contends, the theist contends
that among his deliverances of reason is his belief in the existence of God. The
392 In Plantinga and Wolterstorff, FR, 90. In personal correspondence (August 16, 1993)
Plantinga notes,
As you point out, I said that the deliverances of reason aren’t for the most part involved
in the struggle between the cities. I should have said ’the deliverances of reason in the
narrow sense’ - i.e., (for the most part) logic and mathematics. ...[H]ere the point would
be just that most of logic and mathematics does not divide the cities; most of us accept
first order logic and arithmetic, no matter which of the cities we belong to.
It seems, however, that Plantinga’s qualification of "narrower" and "broader" deliverances of
reason still does not face the ever-present reality of the createdness of logic, mathematics, as well
as reason. As created, these facts do, in fact, contribute to the division of the two cities.
202
nontheist will take issue w ith this notion, primarily because of the battle of the Two
Cities.3’3 Surely there cannot be "little disagreement" at this point. W ould Plantinga
want to say that there is "little disagreement" at every other point? It appears so, and
precisely because of R N . But then the theist must contend that the only real point of
contention between him and the nontheist on the deliverances of reason is the question
of the existence of God. But this is not what Plantinga wants to contend, nor should
he.
O f course the nontheist may disagree; he may deny that the existence of God is
part of the deliverances of reason. A former professor of mine for whom I had
and have enorm ous respect once said that theists and nontheists have different
conceptions of reason. A t the time I did not know what he meant, but now I
think I do.3W
Plantinga goes on to discuss different conceptions of the deliverances of reason, which
can be quite a different thing from different conceptions of reason. And here we notice
the necessity of presuppositional reasoning.
O ne of the reasons that the theist and nontheist have different conceptions of
reason is due to the fact that the Christian theist understands, and the nontheist does
not, that reason is created by God and to be used in his service. It is not simply that
the Christian theist adds belief in the existence of G od to an already adequate stockpile
of true, warranted beliefs. Rather, it is that the Christian theist knows reason itself, not
sim ply its deliverances, to be marred by sin, redeemed by grace and called by God to
service in his kingdom. This makes the Christian theist’s logic, mathematics, etc.
3.3 Staying with Augustine, the Christian theist would be a citizen of the Civitas Dei and the
nontheist of the City of Man.
3.4 Ibid.
203
fundamentally and epistemically different from what the nontheist portends.
And here we see that what divides the Civitas Dei from the C ity of Man is not
simply one embattled addition to the otherwise affable army of deliverances; but it is
the entire army which belongs to one city, obeys its superiors, fights by its own rules,
and moves toward its own ultimate goal. If that is true, then logic and mathematics,
for example, have more to do w ith the reason which employs them than with the
deliverance itself. And the reason which employs them belongs to one who is a citizen
of only one of two cities. Therefore, while we might want to call Plantinga’s notion a
"working neutrality" or something of the sort given the less than obvious relation
between, for example, mathematics and belief in the existence of God, religious
neutrality is decidedly what it is not. For it is precisely one’s religious commitment
that determines membership in one of the two cities.
We mentioned above that there is a difference in the reason employed, rather
than just reason’s deliverances. Plantinga has pointed us in this direction as well.
...how should we think about human persons? W hat sorts of things,

fundamentally, are they? W hat is it to be a person, what is it to be a human
person, and how shall we think about personhood? H ow , in particular, should
Christians, Christian philosophers, think about these things? The first point to
note is that on the Christian scheme of things, God is the premier person, the
first and chief exemplar of personhood. God, furtherm ore, has created man in
his ow n image; we men and women are image bearers of God, and the properties
most im portant for an understanding of our personhood are properties we share
w ith him. H ow we think about God, then, will have an immediate and direct
bearing on how we think about hum ankind.395
A nd just how should we Christians th ink about persons? One of the things most
relevant to our discussion is that it is persons who think, reason, observe, etc. and it is
3,5 Plantinga, "Advice to Christian Philosophers," 264-265.
204
persons who then take that which they have thought, reasoned, observed, etc. into
themselves and do something with it. And it is those same persons who are part and
parcel of the constitution of the Tw o Cities. How, then, we might ask, can one, who
is a citizen of the City of Man, use his logic to determine the structure of propositions
(let us say) and such use and structure be religiously irrelevant to the battle itself? O nly
if belief in the existence of God is thought of as an appendix, a donum (or factum ))
superadditum of an otherwise competent reason.
But suppose the existence of God is an ultimate presupposition, such that it is
essential both for the knowing and being of any fact. Then the battle rages even at
those more initially "impersonal" (or NAHB) points. While logic and mathematics may
be, on a relative scale, pragmatically less controversial, given the amount of
comm onality that can be obtained without initial appeal to G od’s existence and control
as a presupposition, it can never be religiously neutral.396 And if not religiously neutral,
then any kind of pragmatic qualification is only superficial and tem porary.397
1,6 The notion necessary for a further defining and refining of such qualifiers as "relative
scale" and "pragmatic" is, of course, the notion of common grace. Common grace presupposes
the necessity of God’s existence as well as his compassionate character. Thus, further defining
and refining would have to include the fact of God’s existence as necessary even for the least
controversial facts.
397 In personal correspondence, Plantinga comments on this section by attempting to qualify

his approach.
1 don’t know whether 1 used the phrase ’religious neutrality’ or not. But 1 did say that
some propositions don’t seem to be involved in the contest between the cities; all I
really meant is that everybody in both cities accepts these propositions - or, if there is
disagreement about them...the disagreement doesn’t seem to involve what distinguishes
the cities.
Without commenting too much on his comments, it seems that this is still inadequate both for
a Christian approach to philosophy, as well as to apologetics. It seeks still to avoid the crucial
presuppositional analysis needed for an adequate apology.
205
There is a (perhaps legendary) Civil War story about a watering hole in
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania called Spangler’s Spring. And the story goes that, during the
night, both Confederate and U nion soldiers would come together and together drink
the water, which was necessary for the survival of each. And while they drank, they
ceased fighting. Perhaps Plantinga touts religious neutrality as an epistemological
Spangler’s Spring, in which both sides come together for the sake of (epistemological)
survival. But the tru th of the m atter at Spangler’s Spring was that, while each soldier
drank, they remained enemies. And the one’s drink was for the purpose, in the end, of
defeating the other. And the Spring itself, while perhaps "pragmatically" neutral
because of its service to both sides of the battle, was owned, in fact, by only one side.
And what might be construed as neutral, was, as a m atter of fact, a gift o f survival from
the one who owned the Spring, that the battle might continue until the victory was
won.
Presuppositional argument is necessary if one’s desire is to explicate the fact of
the matter, and not merely the (superficial) appearance. And it is necessary for the
Christian philosopher and apologist if the One who owns it all is to be given his due
honor.
M uch more could be said with regard to presuppositional argumentation. At
this point we have attempted to argue for the necessity o f presuppositional
argumentation by showing, first, that Plantinga’s "Reformed objection to natural
theology" was less than satisfactory both as Reformed and as an objection, and, second,
we have sought to show that Plantinga’s acceptance of religious neutrality (while in
206
K uyper’s line) is unacceptable because o f the necessity of presuppositions in any and
every fact. In arguing fo r presuppositional argumentation, then, we can do no more
than to argue presuppositionally. And now it is necessary for us to explicate the
reasons for the demise of REP.
4.4 The Failure of Plantinga’s Epistemology
In the next two chapters, we shall attempt to show Plantinga’s position with
regard to REP wanting in significant and crucial areas. We shall see that Plantinga’s
failure adequately to account for his own presuppositions will result in relativism and
compromise of REP on the one hand, as well as superficiality and inconclusiveness on
the other. As if these charges were not serious enough, we must now show that an
even more serious charge plagues Plantinga’s REP; as an attempt at a Reformed
epistemology, it is anti-Christian at its root.398 Furthermore, we shall see that
Plantinga’s REP falls prey to some of the most serious problems of certain forms of
natural theology, and thus puts Plantinga himself within the confines of his own critical
project.
4.41 G O M and Rational Theistic Belief
It will be helpful at this point to recall our early discussion of Plantinga’s
approach in GOM , to which approach he has referred in his latest works on warrant.
3,1 We need to be as clear as possible when making such a charge. Given the radical
antithesis that the Christian position demands, Plantinga’s epistemology can only be either
Christian or anti-Christian. We would contend that the latter is the case. Furthermore, this
has to do, not with Plantinga himself, but with the presuppositions behind his epistemology.
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We will remember in that approach that Plantinga seeks to argue for the rationality of
theistic belief. His argument for rational theistic belief finds its support in the (near)
com m on acceptance of belief in other minds. And because belief in other minds is
com m only accepted, Plantinga declares it to be rational. Yet belief in other minds itself
lacks persuasive and cogent argumentation. W hy then, asks Plantinga, require such for
belief in God? Since G od himself is an "O ther Mind," it is rational to believe in him as
well.
This form of apology for the rationality of theistic belief will in fact prove
principially to undermine and defeat the entire proposal for rational theistic belief.
Consider again the set of propositions again, call it M', which Plantinga uses to
elucidate the argument for other minds: M' equals
(1) I believe in the existence of other minds.
(2) I cannot point to a cogent principle that proves my belief to be rational.
(3) I cannot develop an argument that is compelling for such a belief.
(4) Yet I do believe.
Such is the status of our belief in other minds.
But consider also that Plantinga then pronounces M' to be rational;3” and
having pronounced it to be both unprovable and rational, he then inserts belief in God
into the same context, but with a significant difference. Though he contends that
because M' is rational so is belief in God, what he in fact shows rather is that to the
extent and in such cases that M' is rational, so also may belief in G od be rational. It is
359 Plantinga, GOM, 271.
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one thing to say that because M ' is rational so is G, but Plantinga is not saying that in
this case. It is quite another m atter to say that the rationality o f G is dependent upon
and only as strong as M ', which is closer to his position on the matter. We will
contend that, because of this construction of dependent rationality, this form of rational
theistic belief, in fact, self-destructs.
N ow in order to see the nature of such self-destruction, it will be necessary, first,
to recall the discussion of rational belief within the context of Plantinga’s G O M , and
then further to notice the progression of the same basic principles up to and including
Plantinga’s latest w ork on warrant. We will need, therefore, to develop our criticism
from GOM , through his Reformed epistemology proposal, up to and including his two
volumes on warrant.
First of all, consider the point made above that the rationality of belief in God
carries no intrinsic rational weight of its own. It is only as secure and as rational as its
"host" belief, i.e., belief in other minds. And the latter rationality is only contingently
rational. That is, M' is rational only to the extent and in such cases that compelling
arguments are not introduced against it. N ow Plantinga would not contend that
compelling arguments could not be introduced against the rationality of M'. He only
contends that, thus far, no arguments have been introduced against it. And he spends a
good deal of time showing that the arguments and evidence that we now have for M' is
thoroughly unconvincing and flawed. Plantinga then goes on to assert, to summarize
our discussion in chapter one, at least three reasons w hy M' should be seen as rational:
(1) There are no viable alternatives to the inconclusive analogical argument.
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(2) We may hold a contingent, corrigible belief if there are no viable arguments
against it.
(3) The fact that there is no answer to the epistemological question on this
m atter should not hinder one’s holding such a belief.
N ow having placed M' in such a tentative context, he then simply adds belief in G od as
an appendix to that main, tentative, contingent and corrigible argument. Thus, the
rationality of belief in God is not only itself contingent, but is dependently contingent
on a prior contingently rational belief; it is, we could say, doubly contingent. That is,
theistic belief could lose its status as rational with little to no effect on the rationality of
M'. The converse is not the case, however. Whatever status M' holds, belief in God
holds as well. N ow this way of arguing places belief in God in the most tentative
position imaginable. One would suspect that the evidentialist objectors would
themselves have no objection to this way of arguing.
Belief in God, in this case, is no more or less rational than, for example, belief in
U FO s. Granted that I have never seen a UFO, and granted that the existence of a
U F O presupposes an intelligence, an "other mind," (at least) as its designer, my belief in
U FO s is itself rational, or is dependently rational to the extent that my belief in other
minds is rational.
Furthermore, and this is all-important, in his formulation in GOM , Plantinga
simply posits belief in God w ithout sound argumentative support of any hind. From
the perspective of the analogical argument for other minds, the rationality of belief in
God does not even have the luxury, as does other minds belief, of an unpersuasive or
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inconclusive argument at its disposal. It has virtually no argument at all, except in its
dependence on the nonconclusive argument for other minds.
Thus, it is not the case, in this instance (but see section 5.112), that Plantinga is
placing the rationality of belief in God on a par w ith the rationality of belief in other
minds. Rather, the rationality of belief in other minds carries with it an
"independence" which belief in God does not have. The rationality of belief in God is
dependent upon the rationality of belief in other minds in an asymmetrical and
irreflexive way. The parity, therefore, of rational theistic belief is not M', but rather
something in the category of "rational" U F O belief, both of which need the rationality
of belief in other minds in order to be deemed by some as (secondarily) rational.
If this is the case in GOM , then the rationality of belief in God is reduced to
each and every individual’s doxastic preference, w ithout need of recourse to any other
direct argument o r evidence. And if that is true, then this kind of rationality itself is
reduced to the preferences one might have given other, more primary, rationalities.
A nd if that is the case, then the real problem with Flew’s "presumption of atheism" is
not his atheism per se, but rather the fact that he will not allow for the rationality of a
contradictory notion, such as belief in God, for which Plantinga is quite willing to
allow.400 Flew’s preference may be not to believe in the existence of God or to believe
in the non-existence of God; so far so good, given Plantinga’s formulation. But if we
take Plantinga seriously here, then all that Flew must acknowledge is a rational belief
that is in direct opposition to his. Flew’s problem is n ot his atheism, but simply the
400 We shall use Flew here simply as a paradigm "evidentialist objector." We could just as
easily insert the name of Clifford, Russell or any number of nontheists.
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unfair demands he places on theism or theistic belief.
We could contend that within this debate Flew is closer to the truth of the
m atter in his atheism than is Plantinga in his theism. For if rationality is reduced to a
preference-based-on-other-beliefs model, then surely Plantinga has placed the rationality
of belief in God on (irrational) shifting sand. Plantinga thinks his belief in God to be
rational precisely because no one has yet shown M' to be irrational. The very
rationality that was supposed to provide the criterion for justified belief has itself, in
this scheme, been reduced to (irrational) opinion.
W hat meaning can rationality have if it must be contended that both one belief
and its polar opposite are rational? Plantinga’s argument reduces rationality to a
person-relative status, thereby eliminating any intelligent means of predication on the
matter. Flew believes in other minds without conclusive argument. His belief is
rational, but he does not believe in God, and Plantinga will allow for the rationality of
such unbelief. Plantinga believes in other minds without conclusive argument, his
belief is rational, and he posits the rationality of belief in G od as a codicil to his other
minds belief. Plantinga’s formulation in this case must conclude that both are right.
Furthermore, the best that Plantinga can hope to conclude is that his belief in
G od is given the status of Flew’s disbelief. This is clearly unacceptable for a Christian-
theistic position. Because Plantinga has failed to challenge the roots of disbelief in God,
because he has not dealt w ith the presuppositions behind such unbelief, he has argued
for belief in God to be placed on the same ground as unbelief. Such is the case because,
in the final analysis, Plantinga’s notion of theistic belief, and by implication of theism,
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is strictly hypothetical and we will m ention that again below.
It is also the case because Plantinga’s notion of rationality itself is one of brute
fact. H e has not challenged the evidentialist objector’s notion of rationality but rather
has adopted it as a standard by which theistic belief must also be measured. In so
doing, he has implicitly denied both the created nature of human rationality as well as
the standard of rationality in the character of God himself. W ithout such an objective
and absolute standard of rationality, the only option available is a notion of rationality
that is contrary to the Christian position. And if such a notion is thought to be the
measure of theistic belief, then belief in God is itself subjected to the scrutiny of non-
Christian presuppositions. Thus, the non-Christian principle holds sway over the
Christian principle and the rational is subjected to irrationality. The only conclusion
possible in such circumstances is the irrationality of theistic belief.
4.42 The "Reformed Epistemology" is not Reformed
We saw in chapter tw o that, following his appeal for rational theistic belief in
G O M , Plantinga further argues for the proper basicality of belief in God. His
complaint w ith classical foundationalism is not with what it does say, but w ith w hat it
does not say. It does say that certain beliefs are properly basic. It does not say that
belief in G od can be among those beliefs. Plantinga, therefore, wants to contend for
such.
There are at least tw o complications w ith this entire discussion that have yet to
be addressed by Plantinga. First, there is the obvious interplay between a theological
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form ulation and a philosophical problem. Plantinga wants to argue for the non
necessity o f natural theology for theistic belief and then further for the possibility of
theistic belief to be included in his own modified epistemological structure. In support
for the non-necessity of natural theology he appeals to Calvin, Bavinck and others, and
in support of theistic belief as foundational he appeals (among other things) to Reid.
One of the problems w ith this, however, is that there is no clear delineation of just
how it is that that which is Reformed influences or is influenced by that which is
Reidian. O ne suspects, because of this unclarity, that the N ew Reformed Epistemology
might be better classified as the New (or Old) Reidian Epistemology.
If what Plantinga wanted to develop was a Reformed epistemology, then some
radical changes would have to be incorporated into his line of argument. Plantinga
would have to see the ontological fact of G od’s necessity as an epistemological fact as
well. He would have to see, in other words, that just as G od is himself the one and
only necessary being, so also, given creation, is his existence necessary for the
knowledge situation. Had God not created, there would be no epistemological
question. Given his creative and sustaining work, however, it is both unbiblical and
illogical, not to m ention non-Reformed, that G od would be removed or otherwise
tangential to the problem of knowledge generally. All Plantinga had to read in this
regard was the first sentence of Calvin’s Institutes.W1 Had he read that far, he could
401 A matter worthy of another volume would be the extent to which Plantinga himself fits
within traditional Reformed theology. His free will defense, as well as his arguments for the
counterfactuals of freedom give fairly strong indications that on the level of theology proper,
Plantinga is no Reformed thinker. If that analysis is correct, his argument for a Reformed
epistemology might simply be a natural, though erroneous, extension of his less-than-Reformed
metaphysical position. Those matters, however, must be left for another time. For our present
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have surmised that there can be no knowledge, no belief, except upon the sure
foundation of our knowledge of God (see section 5.2 and following). N ot placing
knowledge and belief on such a foundation, however, places Plantinga’s epistemology
on shaky ground.
Plantinga’s argument is that belief in God should be raised to the status of a
possible common sense belief, rather than reduced to the status in which unbelief can
impose its ow n demands, as in the evidential objection discussed in chapter two. Those
w ho object to theistic belief do so on the grounds that such has not been "proven," that
it cannot be supported by propositional evidence. They neglect, however, to be as
critical toward other beliefs they hold. Plantinga argues for the possible inclusion of
theistic belief among those others.
Again, serious problems creep into this line of reasoning, problems on a
presuppositional level that, if carried through, will undermine Plantinga’s entire project.
The question as to the possibility of common sense beliefs themselves is never raised by
Plantinga. The criteria for determining common sense beliefs seems absent from the
entire discussion. Thus, the reason given for the possible inclusion of theistic belief
among common sense beliefs is that the latter are held and believed w ithout demanding
much by way of proof or argument.
Given Plantinga’s line of argument, common sense beliefs are made to function
on the presuppositional level. That is, referring back to our definition, they are
propositions, principles, states of affairs, etc. that are assumed to be necessary for the
purposes, we will take Plantinga’s taxonomy of "Reformed" at face value.
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rationale o f other beliefs, and which are seen to function on a foundational and
religious level.'102
W hat is the case, therefore, when common sense beliefs are posited in this way?
First of all, comm on sense beliefs must either derive their status from something or
someone else, or must have it intrinsically. That is, any given common sense belief
must abide by some criteria in order to maintain its status as properly basic o r its
proper basicality must be inherent within the belief itself. Plantinga contends that an
inductive approach will suffice for the establishing of common sense beliefs. However,
such an approach depends on the disposition of the one investigating in that certain
conditions will be acceptable to one and not to another. Com m on sense beliefs, in this
case, are only as "common" as the given bias of the investigator. And if the comm on
ness of the belief depends on the one holding such a belief, then any notion of
"common" sense is subverted. O r, to put it another way, when one can only account
for comm onality by way of individual preference, then the criteria needed for such an
account is absent. Com m on sense, in this case, makes no sense.
Had Plantinga grounded his notion of commonality in the universal tru th of
m an’s knowledge of God, then the ground for commonality would reside both in
universal conditions and in conditions that are self-attesting and self-authenticating. But
such conditions can only be posited if one’s presupposition is the self-attesting God of
402 Plantinga would not argue with the bulk of this description. He would, however,
argue with the religious character of common sense beliefs. It is at this point that section 4.32
above becomes most relevant. We have shown in that section that Plantinga wants to see
common sense beliefs as among the deliverances of reason and therefore as religiously neutral.
And it is precisely at this point that his Reformed epistemology proposal fails; it is neither
Reformed, nor can it bear the presuppositional weight that Plantinga wants to give it.
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Scripture who reveals himself both in the world he has made and in the W ord he has
given. Since Plantinga failed to take account of such truths, his comm on sense beliefs
fall into the abyss of irrationality, and thus belief in G od falls w ith them .403
The further problem of "rationality" rears its head again here as it did in GOM .
Plantinga accepts and works w ith a notion of rationality that has been delimited by a
system in which G od is excluded at the outset. There are certain beliefs thought to be
rational, w hether o r not G od exists. The challenge to theistic belief comes in the
context of beliefs already thought to be rational. Plantinga’s answer to that challenge is
to argue for theistic belief to be included in the same rationality as those other,
accepted, beliefs. In arguing this way, Plantinga has simply given a new tw ist to an old
problem. In arguing this way, Plantinga has placed himself w ithin the camp of the very
natural theology that he has attempted to discourage.
Though natural theology can take many different forms, its method remains
fairly uniform . Natural theology argues within the context of notions and propositions
that are assumed to be accepted and acceptable to both Christian and non-Christian.
For example, in some forms of the cosmological argument, the notion of cause and
effect is thought to be explained and explicable to both sides, regardless of the existence
of God. Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology argues in much the same way. He takes
for granted that the non-Christian system of thought has much for which it is to be
commended, w hether o r not G od exists. He assumes that much of what is held by
405 Without going into the knotty problem of defining rationality and irrationality, suffice
to say at this point that what Plantinga has argued for is a "commonality" based on individual
preference. If such is the case, then there is no link between the "universal" of commonality
and the "particular" of preference. Herein lies the epistemological dilemma.
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unbelieving thought is necessary, good and rational as it stands. In other words, for all
o f its talk against prepositional evidence for theistic belief, and this is all-important,
Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology proposal depends, fo r its cogency, on the propositional
fact that some beliefs are accepted in a properly basic way. Lying behind Plantinga’s
attem pt for properly basic theistic belief is the necessary proposition that some beliefs
are basic, and properly so. And lying behind that proposition is an acceptance of (at
least significant aspects of) the non-Christian position.
Furthermore, while (to use the cosmological argument again) natural theology
pleads for the inclusion of the existence of G od within an already coherent process of
cause and effect, Plantinga is arguing for the possible inclusion of belief in God w ithin
an already coherent system of beliefs. In other words, as in all natural theology, the
assumed coherence of the non-Christian system (of beliefs or facts) is the necessary
prerequisite for the plea for theism. Plantinga’s apology, then, begins from what we all
know and accept as true, and attempts to reason to the possible acceptability of theism.
This is natural theology in disguise.
In this Plantinga has misread his Reformed forebears. In reading them as
rejecting classical foundationalism, he has read them as rejecting the inclusion of (all too
few) certain beliefs within the rational purview to the exclusion of God. But, to use
Calvin again as just one example, Plantinga should have read them as insisting that
one’s true knowledge of God is the only foundation upon which any other true
knowledge o r belief must rest. Instead, Plantinga gave ground in order to take it back,
but instead wound up on the very ground which he sought to reject. Such is always
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the case when theism or theistic belief is thought to be merely an addendum to an
already rational or semi-rational system rather than the presupposition behind any and
every notion of rationality, coherence, knowledge, belief, etc.
W ithin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology, finally, is the notion of theism or
theistic belief as a hypothesis. We see this when it is argued that one may include
theistic belief among the foundations of one’s noetic structure. The substance of
Reidian epistemology, then, can be summarized as always including properly basic (or,
rational) beliefs and, depending on one’s preferences, perhaps including theistic belief as
well. Thus, not only is theistic belief denied the status of other properly basic beliefs,
it is, in one sense, a tertium quid, in that it "fits" neither with truly foundational beliefs,
nor w ith those which are based on the latter. It is, so to speak, a foreign immigrant
into an already self-sufficient country, and Plantinga is arguing for toleration and
hospitality in what has tended to be a hostile environment. If one decides to include
this foreign element within one’s noetic structure, it should, like other "natural"
elements, be tolerated.
This, of course, reduces belief in G od to a mere hypothesis, mere conjecture, and
it affirms, since so much can be properly believed without theistic belief, that there can
be no certainty w ith such belief, nor is it necessary for such belief to be present in
one’s noetic structure at all. There is nothing of Reformed influence in such a notion.
4.43 W arrant and Natural Theology
Plantinga’s new approach to epistemology in his most recent books on warrant
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is burdened w ith the same problems above and then some. First of all, Plantinga still
wants to insist that there can be warranted belief whether o r not God exists. O r, to be
fair, his form ulation of the warrant situation is agnostic as to the existence of God.
W hen Plantinga postulates that one can have warranted belief if one’s epistemic faculties
are functioning properly, are aimed at truth, and are functioning in an epistemically
appropriate environment, he has not explicitly argued for the necessity of presupposing
G od for the warrant situation.
Furthermore, Plantinga will want to insist that theistic belief, if it conforms to
the above stipulations, can be accepted and acceptable as a rational and proper belief.
Perhaps the greatest challenge that Plantinga will face in this new development
will be, again, the place of natural theology. Having argued fairly strongly against the
necessity of natural theology in his earlier REP, he now argues that one who accepts his
view of warrant in epistemology should accept as well his theistic metaphysic. As a
m atter of fact, he argues that the only explanation for his naturalized epistemology is a
supernatural metaphysic. It would appear, then, that natural theology has returned
w ithin the context of Plantinga’s new epistemology. And if such is the case, then he
will either have to affirm natural theology, against all he has said earlier, or he will have
to show how his natural theology is different from that which necessitates agreement
w ith the evidentialist objection to theistic belief. It is true that Plantinga has not
rejected natural theology per se, but he has been sufficiently critical of it and of what it
presupposes that he should set forth a good argument as to the viability of (something
like) Aquinas’ fifth way toward which his naturalized epistemology is supposed to
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point. Plantinga should make clear how his natural theology differs from that against
which he has argued.
Finally, if we can see Plantinga’s approach to the rationality of theistic belief as
spanning, roughly, from G O M to WPF, one of the primary problems w ith this entire
argument is the necessity of positing the rationality of belief in G od as a hypothesis.
As in all such cases in which problems discussed above arise, there is something much
deeper and more pervasive working here, something which destroys Plantinga’s
argum ent at the outset, something which our explication of presupposition is designed
to expose and correct. W ith all of his encouragement for Christian philosophers and
scientists to "start with" G od in their philosophizing and scientific inquiry, Plantinga’s
rational theistic belief along w ith his understanding of what it means "to start with
God" is nothing more than (a parasite of?) a mere hypothesis. W ith that, he has
eliminated any attempt truly to start w ith the God of Christian theism.
If we use a standard definition of hypothesis as "a provisional assumption about
the ground of certain phenomena, used as a guiding norm in making observations and
experiments until verified or disproved by subsequent evidence,”404 then we can begin to
see serious problems w ith Plantinga’s view of theistic belief in this context.
N ow clearly Plantinga sees belief in other minds as a hypothesis. He has
shown that such a belief cannot be proven rational. Yet he has declared it so. And the
strength of the rationality of belief in G od is only as strong as the contingent,
declaratory rationality of belief in other minds. U ntil something else comes along to
404 Thomas Greenwood, "Hypothesis," in Dictionary o f Philosophy, ed. Dagobert D. Runes

(Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1980), 134.
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take its place, belief in other minds stays, and it stays as rational. Consequently, if one
so prefers, one may add belief in God to such a belief and it, too, will share the
attributes of its host belief.
This amounts, however, to affirming the irrelevance, though perhaps
pragmatically useful notion, of theistic belief. N ot only will it fail to make theistic
belief necessary, it defines it simply as subject to the whims o r preferences of a
particular individual or individuals. And if theistic belief carries no more
epistemological weight than that, then the evidential objection is back w ith a vengeance.
The question still remains as to the rationality of theistic belief. N ot only so, but the
further question presents itself as to the relationship of the existence of G od to theistic
belief, of which more in chapter five.
Thus, Plantinga’s project must be radically revised if what is hoped for is a
Christian o r Reformed epistemology. A Reformed epistemology will not be able to
posit belief in G od as a working hypothesis, inserted by preference among other, more
acceptable beliefs. A Reformed epistemology will need to make clear at the outset that
the presupposition of the existence of God and belief in him are the only avenues
through which true knowledge can be had. We will look a bit more at the details of
the above-mentioned problems in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 5
T H E EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PLA N TIN G A ’S T H O U G H T
5.1 Presuppositions and REP
We have sought to show that argument by presupposition is necessary for
Christian apologetics, including a Christian apology which takes its cue from
epistemology, as Plantinga’s does. We have sought to define presupposition as both
religiously and foundationally qualified, assumed to be necessary for a given
proposition, etc.405 And we have seen, first, that natural theology is insufficient as an
apology, not because of a supposed "inchoate rejection of classical foundationalism," but
rather because of its commitment to the principle of sufficient reason as a
presupposition. In that way, we have tried to show that reasoning on the basis of false
presuppositions leads to logical and biblical ruin. And we have seen, second, that there
is really no such thing as religious neutrality, particularly in the context of the battle
between Tw o Cities.
Both of these relate to REP. O n the first scenario, we have sought to show in
the previous chapter that Plantinga’s apology takes its cue from natural theology. It
405 The "foundational" aspect of a presupposition may or may not be ultimate, and here our
distinctions become relevant again. The question would be whether a presupposition is
ultimate, assumed to be so, etc., or whether it is foundational to a given proposition, etc. but not
ultimate as well. These need further analysis, but cannot be discussed here.
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seeks to give to the unbeliever a good bit of epistemological ground and then simply to
"add" theistic belief as a possible belief. O n such a scheme, belief in God and theism
generally is even more tentative than other beliefs that have no argumentative force.
Furtherm ore, one wonders if Plantinga’s notion of the design plan, which is an integral
part of P2P of REP, is really just another version of PSR. He himself mentions its
affinity w ith Thomas Aquinas’ Fifth Way. As such, it would operate with the premise
that "everything that is designed must have a designer" and seek to show, in some kind
of neutral fashion, the truth of such a claim. In arguing in this way, the natural
question would then be, "Who (or what) designed God?" If such is the case, then his
notion of the design plan as a theistic argument needs significant revision. W hether or
not that is the case, it is certainly the case that Plantinga’s analysis of the Reformed
objection to natural theology falls short of accuracy; such a rejection goes much deeper
than a mere revision of epistemological foundationalism (more on foundationalism in
5.12 below). Rather, the Reformed objection to natural theology operates on the level
of presuppositions.
O n the second scenario, the problem of religious neutrality is shown to be
inconsistent with a Christian apology, epistemological o r otherwise, and thus should be
discarded for something that properly frames the nature of a fact and, more
im portantly, attributes to God, as a necessary being, the due honor and glory he
deserves. Religious neutrality seems to assume that God is neither the Creator nor
Sustainer o f logic, mathematics, etc., complete with their (created) laws. But certainly
he is, as well as the Definer and Teacher of just how those elements of his creation are
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to be used.
But there is more to a presuppositional analysis of REP than the above,
specifically, its relationship to Plantinga’s notions of proper basicality, Reidian
foundationalism and evidentialism. Some of our analysis above touched on each of
these but it is time now to take them individually.
5.11 Proper Basicality
Theistic belief is properly basic according to Plantinga. And, as we have seen,
the meaning of such a notion is that one may rationally believe in the existence of God
w ithout need of a defense for such belief via propositional evidence. Even more
specifically, one may believe in a basic way (for example) that G od made the flower (to
which one is appeared) and be rational, which belief entails the belief that God exists,
the latter of which belief is then believed indirectly properly basically.
The notion of properly basic theistic belief is, no doubt, the most controversial
notion presented in Plantinga’s early discussions of Reformed epistemology. This
notion obviously relates itself to Plantinga’s discussions of the demise of classical
foundationalism and the relative demise of evidentialism as a challenge to theism. But it
seems that the proper basicality of theistic belief is the eye o f the storm. It is not
surprising, then, that responses have been forthcoming.406
406 A (chronological) sample of some such responses is Stewart C. Goetz, "Belief in God is
N ot Properly Basic," Religious Studies, 19, (1983): 475-484; J. Wesley Robbins, "Is Belief in God
Properly Basic?," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 14, (1983): 241-248; Richard
Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga," International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion, 14, (1983): 123-127, and "The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly
Basic Belief and Belief in God," Religious Studies, 26, (1990): 389-401; Jonathan L. Kvanvig, "The
225
It is not our intent here to survey all the responses and their respective merits
and demerits. Furthermore, we have attempted, in the last chapter, to show that there
are serious problems w ith the epistemological context in which Plantinga frames his
discussion of theistic belief. Given that critique, there are two further responses that
deserve recognition.
5.111 Epistemic Possibility
James Sennett’s critique of Plantinga is by far the best in print. It is both
penetrating and constructive. And because of its intricacies and detail, it will be
impossible for us significantly to reconstruct it. We will, therefore, highlight the points
relevant to our discussions below and refer the reader to the text for detail. Sennett
sees Plantinga’s notion of the proper basicality of theistic belief as claiming one o f two
things. It is either claiming that "Most theists in contem porary Western culture are
justified in accepting some theistic beliefs basically" (which he calls SRE for Strong
Reformed Epistemology) or, "It is epistemically possible, in the informed sense, that
basic theistic belief be justified" (which he calls WRE for Weak Reformed
Evidentialist Objection," American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, (1983): 47-55; Jamie M. Ferreira,
"A Common Defense of Theistic Belief: Some Critical Considerations," International Journal o f
Philosophy o f Religion, 14, no. 3, (1983): 129-141; Mark S. McLeod, "The Analogy Argument for
the Proper Basicality of Belief in God," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 21,
(1987): 3-20; Peter C. Appleby, "Reformed Epistemology, Rationality, and Belief in God,"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 24, (1988): 129-141; James G. Hanink, "Some
Questions About Proper Basicality," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 1, (January 1987): 13-25;
Robert McKim, "Theism and Proper Basicality," Philosophy of Religion, vol. 22, (1989): 29-56;
Michael R. DePaul, "The Rationality of Belief in God," Religious Studies, 17: 343-356; Most of
the responses, it seems to me, have been wide of the mark of substantive critique, though the
second noted article by Grigg is a bit of an exception. We have already mentioned above the
exchanges between Quinn and Plantinga on this and related issues.
226
Epistemology).407 Plantinga, by the time he wrote "Reason and Belief in God," was
arguing for SRE. Sennett concludes his analysis by claiming that, if Plantinga has
accomplished his goal (which Sennett claims is questionable), all he has demonstrated is
WRE, which is insufficient to support the notion of properly basic theistic belief. We
have looked at Plantinga’s arguments for (what Sennett calls) SRE in chapter two. We
need now to notice Sennett’s conclusion.
In order to see why Sennett concludes that Plantinga’s arguments lead, at best, to
WRE, we must first delve into the clarification of "epistemic possibility" in WRE.40®
Sennett wants to distinguish between pure and epistemic modality. Pure modality has
to do w ith concepts concerning the absolute necessity, possibility and contingency of
propositions. Epistemic modality, on the other hand, concerns the modal status of
propositions relative to a noetic structure.409 N ow consider a proposition
(12) P is epistemically possible relative to S’s noetic structure.410
(12) can be read as
(12*) P is metaphysically possible411 and there is no proposition Q such that Q

entails —P and S justifiably believes Q.
N ow in order to believe (12*), one must (at least) believe each conjunct separately. If
401 This entire discussion of epistemic possibility will be taken from Ibid., 7ff.
409 See our discussion of noetic structure in chapter two above.
4101 shall retain Sennett’s numbering in this discussion.
411 According to Ibid., 8, "A proposition is metaphysically possible just in case it is not
metaphysically impossible" and "a proposition is metaphysically impossible just in case its
negation is metaphysically true." For a proposition to be metaphysically possible, then, it
would not be the case that its negation is metaphysically true.
227
one conjunct is not believed, whether the other is or not, (12*) cannot be believed.
These tw o propositions illustrate "informed epistemic possibility," articulated in WRE.
But now consider
(13) S is not aware of any evidence that P is metaphysically impossible or that

there is any proposition Q which he justifiably believes such that Q entails —P.
(13) now makes room for the fact that S may simply be unaware of any evidence that
would make (12*) o r either of its conjuncts false. Sennett colloquially phrases it in this
way;
(13*) For all S knows, P is possible412 relative to S’s noetic structure.
In order to believe (12), I must believe both conjuncts of (12*). But now (13*)
stipulates that all that is required to believe it is that I do not justifiably believe either
of the conjuncts of (12*) to be false. In other words, if I do not believe (we shall
assume, rather than state, the "justifiably" qualifier) either "P is metaphysically possible"
o r "there is no proposition Q such that Q entails ~ P and S justifiably believes Q" to
be false, then I can believe (13*). And (and this is an important "and"), I need not
believe the conjuncts of (12*) to be true in order to believe (13*). All that is needed for
(13*) to be believed is that I not believe either of the conjuncts of (12*) to be false.
Therefore, I can believe (13*) and not believe (12). I can believe that "For all I know, P
is possible relative to S’s noetic structure" and not believe that "P is epistemically
possible relative to S’s noetic structure." The propositions (13) and (13*) demonstrate
w hat Sennett calls "ignorant epistemic possibility."
4121 take Sennett’s meaning here to be epistemic possibility, though it is not stated as such as
it is in (12).
228
N ow in the course of Plantinga’s development of what we have called REP,
Sennett sees in Plantinga formulations of both ignorant and informed epistemic
possibility. Consider first what Sennett calls "The Plantinga Thesis" o r PT
PT There is no plausible epistemological theory that rules out theistic belief as a

category of epistemically appropriate belief.413
And now, according to Sennett, we can consider an argument with the premise Q . "PT
is epistemically possible in the informed sense." If S is justified in believing Q , then S
must, given informed epistemic possibility, know that PT is metaphysically possible.
But there is not much else that Q is able to do beyond that. Q has relatively
little argumentative force behind it. For example, Q cannot by itself justify PT. Just
because PT is metaphysically possible it is not thereby justified. PT needs justification
even as an informed epistemic possibility. So although there is a necessary relation
between epistemic possibility in the informed sense and metaphysical possibility, there
is no relationship between a proposition’s being epistemically possible in the informed
sense and its being justified.
Epistemic possibility in the ignorant sense fares even worse, however. Sennett
frames one aspect of PT as RE.
RE Theistic belief need not be based on propositional evidence in order to be

justified.414
According to Sennett, Plantinga’s argument in "Reason and Belief in God" amounts to
an argument for ignorant epistemic possibility. Thus, Plantinga’s defense of RE is
413 Ibid., 1.
414 Ibid., 102. Notice the affinities of Sennett’s RE with P2P of our REP.
229
framed in this way,
(10) N o one is aware o f any evidence that RE is metaphysically impossible or

that there is any justifiably believed proposition that entails o r inductively
supports the falsity of RE.415
If Sennett is right in his form ulation of Plantinga’s notion of proper basicality here,
then the best that Plantinga can say fo r RE is that it is epistemically "innocent," or not
liable, as far as we know, to refutation. But we must realize at this point that if that is
Plantinga’s case for properly basic theistic belief, then the same case can be made fo r
evidentialism. We can frame (10) as a defense of evidentialism; call it (10*).
(10*) N o one is aware of any evidence that evidentialism is metaphysically

impossible or that there is any justifiably believed proposition that entails or
inductively supports the falsity of evidentialism.416
Given ignorant epistemic possibility, (10) is as valid a defense as (10*). Moreover, even
w ith the validity of (10), there still remains no necessary relationship between it, as a
form ulation of ignorant epistemic possibility, and any metaphysical modality.417 Thus,
not only does (10) remain epistemically "innocent," as it stands, but as innocent it can
415 Ibid., 113. We have retained Sennett’s numbering here.
4,6 Ibid.
417 Though the details of the matter need not detain us here, it is perhaps worth mentioning
something more of the relationship of ignorant and informed epistemic possibility to the
metaphysical. Informed epistemic possibility can be thought of in the context of an "extended
logic" such that all theorems of Erst order logic are or can be employed, but with some
additions. So, as Sennett notes (Ibid., 15, n. 17), informed epistemic possibility can be seen as
an extension of metaphysical modality. Such is why there is, in this variety of epistemic
possibility, a necessary relation between the epistemic and the metaphysical. For ignorant
epistemic possibility, there is no such relationship, which is why one might phrase epistemic
possibility in the ignorant sense as, "For all S knows..." Such phrasing purposely makes no
metaphysical commitment, at least on the surface, and seeks to stay metaphysically agnostic. As
such, ignorant epistemic possibility seems to be saying nothing of significance, which is one of
Sennett’s points against Plantinga.
230
easily accommodate what it seeks to refute in the first place. Therefore, (10) says
nothing about the validity o f RE; and (10) says nothing about the validity o f properly
basic theistic belief. N either informed nor ignorant epistemic possibility are able to
establish anything positive concerning the proper basicality of theistic belief.418
Remember that Sennett’s analysis of Plantinga’s theistic proper basicality
required either SRE or WRE. Plantinga argues for SRE. But will his argument for the
proper basicality of theistic belief support SRE? Sennett says no and gives his
reasons.419 First, classical foundationalism has failed because of its inability to account
for a num ber of beliefs for which there appear to be no evidence, yet which are also
justifiably believed, e.g., memory beliefs, perceptual beliefs, belief in other minds, and
others. Sennett calls these the "problem cases." But "problem cases," unlike theistic
belief, have universal sanction.420 Theistic belief, according to Sennett, is not one of
those and thus should not be considered w ith the problem cases.
N ow the significance of the problem cases argument ties in directly w ith the
refutation of Plantinga’s notion of RE (as SRE) as well as our discussion of epistemic
modality above. Sennett argues that if universal sanction is prima fa d e good reason for
4,11 say "anything positive' because Plantinga’s "Reason and Belief in God” since being
written some ten years ago has neutralized somewhat the evidentialist objection. Like his
discussions on the problem of evil, therefore, Plantinga’s discussions of theistic belief have built
nothing up, but have perhaps warded off the intensity of some of the attacks against theism.
419 What follows will be taken from Ibid., chapter five, "Reformed Epistemology: The Early
Defense."
420 A universally sanctioned belief, roughly, is any belief kind the reliability of which is
required in order for a human being to behave as a human being.
231
accepting the "problem cases" as properly basic beliefs,421 and if theistic belief has no
universal sanction, then a modified foundationalism (which includes the "problem
cases") can be accepted w ithout theistic belief being included in the foundations. And if
theistic belief is not included in the foundations of modified foundationalism, then it
must be included as an evidential belief, contra Plantinga. N ot only so, but Sennett’s
argument for universal sanction of the problem cases, devoid of theistic belief,
challenges Plantinga to move beyond the mere rejection of classical foundationalism as
"self-referentially incoherent" and to develop an argument at least as strong as the
universal sanction argument in order to maintain the proper basicality of theistic belief.
Plantinga’s argument in "Reason and Belief in God," according to Sennett, amounts to
this: "Evidentialism is the only reason to deny proper basicality of theistic belief;
evidentialism rests on an unsubstantiated premise; furthermore, some noted theologians
have denied evidentialism; therefore, there is reason to believe that evidentialism is false
and RE true."422 If Sennett is right here, SRE is certainly denied. Sennett’s summary
above only surmises that, given evidentialism’s failure, we know of no reason to deny
theistic belief properly basic status within a modified foundationalist structure (what
we, following Plantinga, have chosen to call "Reidian" foundationalism). But now if
universal sanction obtains, then theistic belief is automatically excluded from the
foundation of properly basic beliefs.
421 One will remember here that properly basic beliefs may have grounds or that their
criteria may be inductively sought, both without recourse to prepositional evidence.
422 Ibid., 112.
232
O ne more consideration offered by Sennett on properly basic theistic belief/23
Consider a situation in which I am driving down 1-76 and I see a construction worker
on the highway. N ow (eliminating necessary temporal references such as "...at time
t...")
(1) I saw a construction worker on 1-76.
entails
(2) There was a construction worker on 1-76.
Here we could say, using Plantinga’s distinctions, (1) is properly basic for me and (2) is
indirectly properly basic for me. But suppose I am driving down 1-76 and I see a
giraffe. N ow (again eliminating temporal references)
(3) I saw a giraffe on 1-76.
entails
(4) There was a giraffe on 1-76.
Sennett wants to argue that, while (1) and (2) can be properly basic for me, (3) and (4)
cannot be due to the uniqueness of the latter event. In order to ground the latter claim,
according to Sennett, we would need something more than the "quick and easy"
perceptual experience, a headline in the paper, for example, or an extended perceptual
experience, or something of the sort.
His point, of course, is that theistic belief is more like (3) and (4) than (1) and
(2). The likelihood of someone indirectly properly basically believing that God exists
based on that one’s being appeared to flowerly and properly basically believing that
423 This discussion, with insignificant revisions, will be taken from Ibid., 159ff.
233
G od made the flower is as untypical and controversial as one indirectly properly
basically believing (4) based on properly basic belief of (3). Again, the uniqueness of
the event, o r occasion, or experience in question disqualifies it from properly basic
status, thus giving more weight to the universal sanction thesis.
We shall return to Sennett below in another context but there are concerns here
that need a response. First, it seems that Sennett’s critique of Plantinga’s "informed
epistemic possibility" and "ignorant epistemic possibility" is good as far as it goes, but
that it does not go as far as one should in evaluating Plantinga. We must remember
that the burden of REP was not only to refute evidentialism, but also to provide
reasons o r grounds as to why S who is (relatively) "ignorant" can properly basically
believe in G od w ithout S having reasons or grounds for such belief.424 One of
Plantinga’s reasons o r grounds for the proper basicality of theistic belief is the sensus
divinitatis. If articulated properly, then, the sensus would necessitate, at least, informed
epistemic possibility, and perhaps more. The very fact that informed epistemic
possibility necessarily includes metaphysical knowledge (at least of metaphysical
possibilities) gives us some hint of the solution to Plantinga’s problem. At the very
least, the sensus, as playing a prom inent role in Plantinga’s analysis of proper basicality,
m ust be included in any analysis of REP and we shall analyze Plantinga’s notion of it
424 In Kelly James Clark’s Return to Reason: A Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism and a
Defense o f Reason and Belief in God (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1990), he seeks to support Plantinga’s notion of proper basicality. Of interest in the
present context is his final remarks entitled, "Conclusion: The Rationality of My Grandmother"
wherein he states, based on his discussion in the book, that his grandmother’s theistic belief is
in fact rational though "ignorant.” Clark catches here the practical force behind Plantinga’s
argumentation in REP in that S can be justified without 5 having to show justification (of which
more below). Sennett, it seems, neglects this aspect of Plantinga’s REP.
234
and provide correctives below in 5.2 and following. The point here, however, (and we
shall note its internal inconsistencies in the next chapter) is that the very postulation of
the sensus negates ignorant epistemic possibility because to postulate such is also to
make a metaphysical determination beyond mere agnosticism. This, too, will become
troublesom e for Plantinga, but it is also troublesome for Sennett’s argument for
Plantinga’s WRE.
Secondly, Sennett’s argument that modified foundationalism does not, in fact,
include theistic belief in its foundations points to a serious flaw in Plantinga’s
Reidianism that we will have to address in 5.13.
Finally, with all of the above in mind, we must agree w ith Sennett’s conclusion
that Plantinga’s argument for the proper basicality of theistic belief fails. We should
note Sennett’s emphasis, in his "giraffe on the highway" scenario, that theistic belief is
of quite a different order than other "problem cases" beliefs. A nd w ith that, Sennett
has seen the crux of Plantinga’s problem in attempting to bring theistic belief into the
arena w ith properly basic beliefs. He has not, however, seen the presuppositional
necessity of knowledge of God, which we will address below.
It is w orth mentioning here that Q uinn, in his earlier w ork on Plantinga’s
notion of proper basicality, sought to refute its epistemic possibility (to use Sennett’s
term). If we th in k of epistemic possibility as (12*) wherein P is metaphysically possible
and there is no proposition Q such that Q entails —P and S justifiably believes Q,
Q uinn asserts that th e consequent condition is simply not obtained. There is a
proposition such that it entails the non-existence of G od and S justifiably believes it,
235
and that is the prevalence of that which militates against and is indeed contrary to the
very essence of God, i.e., evil. And if Plantinga wants to maintain theistic belief as
properly basic because innocent until proved guilty, the existence of evil is something
that prima facie125 proves belief in the existence of God guilty in the first degree, given
proper basicality.
5.112 Epistemic Parity
There is another critique of Plantinga’s position that will shed some light on the
problems associated with proper basicality and theistic belief. Mark
McLeod426approaches Plantinga’s REP in terms of what he calls the "parity thesis" and
its correlate, the "universality challenge." The parity thesis, as it relates to Plantinga’s
formulations,427 is this:
The Parity Thesisp^jnp^Tpi) - Under appropriate conditions, S’s belief that p,

where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical, normative justification
as S’s belief that p*, where p* is a paradigm belief.422
This is simply another way of saying what Plantinga has argued for, i.e., that theistic
425 Plantinga would no doubt insist that his own Free Will Defense and his probable
argument against evil defeat whatever import the "problem of evil" objection carries. Even if it
does, however, the prima facie objection is still justified.
426 In his forthcoming The Parity Thesis and Reformed Epistemology: An Essay on the
Rationality of Theistic Belief, due to be published by Cornell University Press sometime in 1994.
Quotations will be from the manuscript version of this book, graciously supplied by Dr.
McLeod.
427 McLeod spends the bulk of his critique on William Alston’s position and stipulates a
parity thesis for him as well. Our interests, however, take us to his critique of Plantinga.
422 Ibid., 134. Page references are from the manuscript version. McLeod specifies PTP1 by
stipulating perceptual belief as just one of other paradigm beliefs and denotes his specified
version as PTP1..
236
belief should occupy the same privileged position as perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs,
other minds beliefs and others. Theistic belief, in other words, is on a par w ith other
properly basic beliefs.429
N ow McLeod wants to challenge this parity thesis. And his critique focuses on
what he calls the universality challenge.
The universality challenge is this: Given an experience shared by both theist

and nontheist alike, nearly everyone will be led to form a shared
nontheistic...belief, while only the theist will be led to form a theistic belief. So,
while both the theist and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of the universe,
only the theist (and perhaps not even she in every instance) will form a belief
about G od’s creativity. O r perhaps more telling (because avoiding potential
problems with the aesthetic overtones of "awe"), when both theist and nontheist
experience a tree, both will form the belief "I see a tree" while only the theist
will (sometimes) form the belief that God made the tree. The challenger suggests
that this universality of belief formation indicates the firmly grounded nature of
the...paradigm beliefs, and since the experience that generates the theistic belief
does not provide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper
basicality.430
W hy is it, given a multitude of experiences, that both theist and nontheist can generate
paradigm beliefs and only the theist can generate theistic beliefs? That is a question
that Plantinga must answer. It is a question that our presuppositional emphasis can
answer, but only after looking briefly at one of McLeod’s possible answers.
Though McLeod is not satisfied with the following approach, it is, for our
previous discussion, the most interesting and useful response which he offers to the
*29 It should be remembered at this point that, in chapter four, we disagreed with McLeod’s
notion of Plantinga’s epistemic parity. McLeod has not penetrated to the root of Plantinga’s
argument and thus sees theistic belief as on a par with other foundational beliefs. However, as
we saw above, Plantinga’s argument, if successful, places theistic belief in a dependent
relationship with other foundational beliefs and thus the supposed parity is only illusionary.
430 Ibid., 137.
237
universality challenge. He begins this response with the notion of supervenience,
First, it is widely held that moral facts are supervenient on physical facts.
...Further, it is consistent with this position that there be tw o people, both of
whom have exactly the same experience of the physical facts but one of whom
does not form the same moral belief as the other.431
And in order better to explain supervenience, McLeod invokes an analogy from
baseball.432 While it is true that one can throw a ball, run from one sandbag to
another, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood, one can only throw a man out,
steal a base, o r strike out in a baseball game. Thus, n[t]here are new facts brought into
existence by the practice of baseball."433 The fact of the baseball game and its
corresponding rules supervene on the mere physical facts of throw ing a ball, etc.
Moreover, one who knows nothing about the game of baseball and who is sitting beside
one who knows the game well can experience the same physical facts as the one to his
side and yet form entirely different beliefs about those same facts.
The parallel to theistic belief and baseball belief is this: O ne can experience the
awesome beauty of the universe and form the belief that God created it and another
one can experience the same thing and form no such belief. The first would be a case
of supervenience and the latter would have no supervenience come into play. The
431 Ibid., 150. McLeod acknowledges his dependence here on W.D. Hudson’s Modem Moral
Philosophy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1970) which discusses the notion of
supervenience.
432 Ibid., 151. McLeod’s analogy here is taken from John Rawls’, "Two Concepts of Rules,"
Judith J. Thompson and Gerald Dworkin, eds., Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
McLeod chooses this analogy particularly because of its less controversial reliance on "rules"
rather than "morals" for supervenient facts.
433 Ibid.
238
theistic facts are supervenient on the physical facts. Thus, the universality challenge is
met since one can form theistic belief due to supervenience and one need not, given the
same experience^). In other words, supervenience would explain w hy theistic belief is
not universal as are the other paradigm beliefs.
As was mentioned, McLeod rejects this notion of supervenience, and for the
following reasons. First, one must explain the nonuniversality of belief formation
about supervenient facts. "One might suggest that the nontheist is epistemically
deficient in just the way the nonbaseball believer is: she lacks theistic concepts. The
problem here is that many nontheists apparently have the requisite theistic concepts.
H ow one is to explain the lack of theistic belief generation in their case is difficult.1'434
So the universality challenge is simply pushed one step further. It is now up to those
holding to properly basic theistic belief to explain why some who can do not form
theistic belief in a properly basic way as they do the other paradigm beliefs.
Secondly, McLeod rejects supervenience because of what he perceives to be its
entailment w ith theology proper.
If the experience shared by the theist and nontheist were of the same natural
facts, and the theistic facts supervened on those natural facts, then the theistic
facts would be inextricably bound up w ith the natural facts. But in the
commonly accepted picture of theism, God is ontologically independent of the
physical world. That facts about God are supervenient on physical facts presents
us w ith an ontologically inferior God, an unhappy state of affairs for the
Christian theist and hence for Plantinga. At best this account allows a type of
pantheistic G od whose ontological status is not independent of the physical
universe.435
434 Ibid., 153.
435 Ibid., 153-154.
239
While appreciating McLeod’s challenge to Plantinga’s notion of proper basicality,
on which we will remark below, we will respond first to McLeod’s criticisms of the
notion of supervenience and thereby hope to give back a measure of its appeal.
First of all, we should not see the notion of baseball as bringing in, to use
McLeod’s words, "new facts." W ithout requiring more precision than the illustration
warrants, is it not the case that supervenience requires that those forming disparate
properly basic beliefs be experiencing the same facts? One of the conditions of the
baseball illustration is the notion that both believers are experiencing the same thing,
but that the game of baseball necessitates a different belief for the one who knows it
than for the one who is ignorant of it. Thus, "new facts" are not what supervenience
creates, but a diffeient context in which the facts must be interpreted.436 The analogy
to theistic belief would be a situation in which both believers have the same context
and knowledge of the same "rules," but one did not acknowledge such and one did.
The tw o watching baseball, for example, would both know the game and see the same
facts, but one would refuse to interpret those facts within their proper context of
baseball. W hy someone would refuse to do such a thing is problematic, though less so
if we switch back from "rules" oriented examples to morally oriented examples, given
the fact that morality is more readily agreed to be doxastically diverse.
McLeod’s second objection is a bit puzzling as well. Granted that in the theory
of supervenience "theistic facts would be inextricably bound up with natural facts," on
436 McLeod’s last response to the universality challenge, which we will not explore and
which again he does not accept, has to do with a gestalt shift which might answer our critique
of his critique. The important point here, however, is that supervenience does have merit and
that McLeod’s criticisms of it are less than compelling.
240
what basis, then, must we conclude for an ontologically inferior G od o r a God who is
as dependent on the natural facts as the facts are on him? Three possibilities come to
mind. Perhaps McLeod has simply agreed w ith "the supervenience account of moral
facts" whereby "the moral state of affairs, while not reducible to the physical state of
affairs, would have no ontological status w ithout the physical state of affairs.1'437 This is
the most plausible explanation given McLeod’s m ention of it here. However, there is
certainly no compelling reason to think that a moral fact’s inextricable, ontological link
w ith a natural fact necessarily makes the person of God dependent, unless one
presupposes at the outset that all reality, including God, is at bottom one. In any case,
McLeod need not simply affirm the standard notion of supervenience in order thereby
to dismiss it.
But perhaps what we have lurking behind this assumption is the principle of
sufficient reason rearing its ugly head again. Perhaps McLeod is understanding a
supervenient fact’s being "inextricably bound up with" a natural fact to mean something
like "a sufficient reason for the natural fact(s) is the supervenient fact(s), including
God." If so, then the problems discussed above insure that the god whose existence is
entailed by the theistic belief(s) is a dependent god. But here we need only reject the
principle of sufficient reason and opt for a notion of presupposition, as approximated
in the previous chapter, yet now not just merely assumed but shown to be necessary. If
the supervenient fact is a necessary epistemic principle for the rationale of a natural fact
and is also essential to it, then the supervenient fact may o r may not retain
437 Ibid., 153.
241
independence from the natural fact and remain necessary for the existence of such a
fact.
The third possibility, which is neither inclusive no r exclusive of the others, is
simply that McLeod’s notion of the Christian-theistic God is insufficient. Lacking the
space to discuss the m atter fully, we can simply state that classical orthodox
Christianity has always taught the immanence of God, while maintaining his
independence, transcendence, immutability, etc. The "inextricable" link between God
and his creation while ontologically necessary is also accidentally necessary, given the
contingency of creation. Therefore, one can assert the existence of a supervenient fact
on a natural fact while at the same time realizing that the former need not be
ontologically dependent on the latter (if the former is a necessary fact), the latter being
itself contingent (and we should note here again that such contingency depends on the
rejection of PSR as a presupposition).
Theistic belief, therefore, cannot be properly basic and both Sennett and McLeod
have seen some of the reasons why. Sennett has noticed the lack of universal sanction
in theistic belief, a lack which is not (nor could it be) characteristic of the other
"problem cases."438 But Sennett has also seen a problem in Plantinga’s admitted
constraint of knowledge for theistic belief. McLeod, somewhat in the same vein,
recognizes in his universality challenge that Plantinga fails to explain why the
431 We leave aside here the knotty cultural problem in which, for example, Vedantic
philosophy posits sensual phenomena as illusion, or maya. This would tend to exclude
perceptual knowledge as properly basic. Given the sheer number in the Hindu religion, Sennett
might be forced to reduce "universal sanction" to "Western sanction." However, if such were
conceded, Sennett’s universal sanction would reduce to a relativism that would necessarily
include Plantinga’s notion of theistic belief.
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"paradigm cases" are universal while theistic belief is particular only to theists.
We will look at this in a bit more detail below, so for now we can simply state
that what Plantinga has done is reduce belief in God to secondary status and thus in so
doing has, in fact, destroyed the foundation upon which the "problem cases" or
"paradigm cases" must rest. Theistic belief cannot take its place among other,
"universal" beliefs w ithout significant compromise and insurmountable problems.
Theistic belief must be the presupposition upon which all other beliefs must rest. It
must be the ultimate "supervenient fact" which contextualizes and "exegetes" all other
facts. In that sense, both Sennett and McLeod are right; theistic belief is of quite a
different order than any other belief. C ontra both Sennett and McLeod, however, we
do not want to regard theistic belief as "lacking" what other basic beliefs have, e.g.,
universality, but rather theistic belief must be seen as providing the reason for any
universality in the first place. We noticed that in the last chapter and it remains for us,
in the rest of this chapter and the next, to elaborate further on why such is the case.
5.12 Foundationalism
Rather than attem pt a thorough critique of foundationalism, or even of
Plantinga’s critique of foundationalism, we shall simply summarize the points relevant
to our further discussion and then seek to show its inherent weaknesses.
It will be remembered that Plantinga criticizes foundationalism for its imposed
epistemic limitations on properly basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism allows for
only three kinds of beliefs in its properly basic category, incorrigible beliefs, self-evident
243
beliefs and beliefs evident to the senses. Plantinga argues for self-referential incoherence
in this construction and then suggests that the properly basic doors be opened wide so
that m ore and more kinds of beliefs may enter. Further, and consonant w ith his initial
discussion in GOM , he argues for the same considerations to be given to theistic belief
that are given to other minds beliefs, as well as to perceptual and memory beliefs. So
foundationalism is much too exclusive in its proper basicality criteria.
N o t only is foundationalism much too exclusive, but coherentism, as another
epistemological option, is incapable of justifying its own beliefs, not to mention its
structure. Given the ambiguity of what it means to cohere, coherentism cannot explain
how justification (or warrant) is transferred from one belief to another. And if warrant
cannot be transferred, in a coherentist structure, it can never begin. Thus, no belief can
be warranted in such a structure. Plantinga opts, then, for construing coherentism as
another version of foundationalism, with the bulk of beliefs being properly basic and
thus justified as such.
There are some problems with Plantinga’s notion of (Reidian) foundationalism
that will undermine any effect it may have had as an apology, the first of which is,
what we might call, the problem of grounds. Let us put the problem in A lston’s
words,
F o r whatever mode of immediate justification we think attaches to beliefs about

one’s current states of consciousness, the question can still be raised as to what
defense can be given of the epistemological principle that beliefs of this sort are
justified under these conditions. ...It is incumbent on any such epistemology to
specify the grounds for principles that lay down conditions for beliefs of a
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certain sort to count as justified.439
In other words, the question at this point is directed toward the justification of
believing that p is properly basic, or, how can one be justified in believing that one’s
basic belief is justified?
It might be helpful here to mention A lston’s distinction between being justified
and showing justification.440 Let us say for the moment that it is possible for one to be
justified w ithout showing that one is justified in one’s belief(s). I may believe that I
have a headache and be perfectly justified in that belief, but I may not be able to show
that I am justified to your, o r anyone else’s, satisfaction. N ow the epistemological
problem of grounds, as noted above by Alston, has to do w ith the showing, o r what he
calls the establishing, of justification rather than being justified in one’s belief. What
principles o r procedures must be employed in order to show justification in accepting p
as a properly basic belief? This is foundationalism’s dilemma (and the dilemma of any
epistemological structure) and it is one to which Plantinga attempts an answer.
And hence the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking,
inductive. We m ust assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the
form er are obviously properly basic on the latter, and examples of beliefs and
conditions such that the former are obviously not properly basic in the latter.
We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient conditions of
439 Alston, Epistemic Justification, 49. Alston’s "immediate justification" is roughly

equivalent to proper basicality.
440 Alston makes this distinction in a number of different places, among which are "Two
Types of Foundationalism," "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?," "What’s Wrong With
Immediate Knowledge?," "Intemalism and Extemalism in Epistemology," and "An Internalist
Extemalism," which are all found in Epistemic Justification, and also in William Alston,
Perceiving God (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 71-72.
245
proper basicality and test these hypotheses by reference to those examples.441
Plantinga then goes on to state that one "is under no obligation to reason"442 to the
belief (just to use one example) in other minds from other beliefs one holds. Thus, one
may believe in the existence of other human beings in a properly basic way.
But how does this scenario com port with the contention that theistic belief is
properly basic? We must remember, first of all, that, strictly speaking, it is not
(1) G od exists
that is properly basic, but rather propositions such as
(2) God is speaking to me,
(3) God has created all this,
(4) God disapproves of what I have done,
(5) G od forgives me,
etc.,443 are, and (2) - (5) self-evidently entail (1). But, even granting that one can be
justified in properly basically believing (2) - (5), what principles can one employ to show
that (2) - (5) are justified in a properly basic way? To refer again to Plantinga’s example
of belief in other minds, one might simply assert that he is "under no obligation" to
reason to (2) - (5) from other beliefs that he holds. But how is that determined? Do we
w ant to say that the believer is the one who determines his own obligations? This
seems to be unworkable given its relativism. Is it, then, the objector who determines
441 Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief," 276.
442 Ibid.
443 See for example, Ibid., 273 for these examples, though they occur elsewhere.
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w her and where obligations apply? Surely Plantinga would not agree with this given
the fact that his entire REP was motivated by the evidentialist objector’s illegitimate
mandate for evidence. Is it a given community that decides w hen and where
obligations apply? This seems to be Plantinga’s answer. To repeat a previous quote,
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from below rather
than above; they should not be presented ex cathedra but argued to and tested by
a relevant set of examples. But there is no reason to assume, in advance, that
everyone will agree on the examples. The Christian will of course suppose that
belief in G od is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this belief on
the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite
properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn M urray O ’Hare may
disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian
community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian com m unity
is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs.444
Plantinga goes on to state the obvious, i.e., that such a construction as the above "may
not be polemically useful.1'445 But to say such a thing is to understate the matter.
Suppose I believe (2) - (5) and you do not. And suppose I believe them in a properly
basic way and you challenge the proper basicality of them, not to mention their truth.
You have now asked me to give reasons for my properly basic beliefs. I must now,
according to Plantinga, come up with conditions C in which my belief is shown to be
properly basic. So let (4) above - B and let condition C include the fact that I lied to
my spouse and that the initial lie proved to evolve into more deceit and dishonesty
until she finally left me for one more honest. As I reflect on C , I conclude w ith B,
stated as (4). A nd my conclusion, B, includes its properly basic status as well as its
entailment that G od exists. The follower of Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, given
444 Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God,” 77.
445 Ibid.
247
C, concludes, no: w ith (4), but with
(4*) Many people who cause adverse circumstances for themselves, rather than
admit their ow n stupidity, will invent a god who holds them accountable in
order to feel guilty rather than correct the problem.
And the Russellites hold (4*) in a properly basic way, they hold it on C, and, let us
say, (4*) entails that there is no god. But now what is the relation of those holding (4)
to those holding (4*)? According to Plantinga, they now each have properly basic
beliefs and "we may not be able to resolve our disagreement."**4
The natural reaction to such a conclusion is that relativism reigns supreme.
Plantinga sees such a problem and continues,
O f course it does not follow that there is no truth of the matter; if our criteria
conflict, then at least one of them is mistaken, even if we cannot by further
discussion agree as to which it is. ...[I]f I am mistaken in this matter, then if I
take B as basic in C...then I am irrational in so doing.**7
But now where are we? It seems we have argued for the proper basicality of theistic
belief. And we have argued for such because other beliefs are properly basic and there
seems to be no reason not to include theistic belief among them. Such is theistic belief
as justified. But in order for one to hold theistic belief in a properly basic way, one
may be challenged to show justification. N ow one will need grounds, examples, tests,
and hypotheses that support theistic belief. And such tests, examples, and hypotheses
need n o t be agreed upon by the one challenging the belief. But if the tests, examples
and hypotheses result in contradictory properly basic beliefs, and if the conclusion of
446 Ibid., 78.
**7 Ibid.
248
properly basic theistic belief is tied to its grounds, then what has one accomplished in
amassing evidence as grounds? Perhaps Plantinga would say that universal agreement is
never attainable in such cases, for any properly basic belief, theistic or otherwise, and he
is most likely right in that. And perhaps he would say that the argument itself does, in
fact, give grounds for believing in the proper basicality of theistic belief, even if the
challenger does not agree, and he may be right in that as well. But Plantinga himself
concludes that, where tru th is concerned, if he holds to the proper basicality of theistic
belief and is mistaken, then he is irrational, which is the very contention o f the (evidential
and otherwise) challenger in the first place. The debate concerning the proper basicality
of theistic belief was initially motivated by the contention of the irrationality of theistic
belief.*8 And to posit a series of circumstances, tests, examples and hypotheses from
which contradictory properly basic beliefs can be derived is, first, to admit the relativity
of one’s properly basic belief and, second, to stand still w ith regard to showing
justification; the argument itself provides no advance tow ard solving the initial problem
at hand.
N ow admittedly, Plantinga’s main point may simply be to state that one is
justified in holding theistic belief in a properly basic way. If that is the case, he has
certainly done that. But if his argument for grounds fails to support one’s choice of
properly basic beliefs, then the "Great Pum pkin Objection" holds, as does the
Russellites properly basic disbelief in the existence of God, (4*). Thus, because
448 Of course, for "Russellites" or "O’Harites," the main point of contention is the existence
of God. I am putting the matter, at this point, within Plantinga’s context of the refutation of
the Russellites’ demand for evidence and the further contention that belief in God can be
properly basic.
249
Plantinga contends that a belief is properly basic in certain conditions, he is forced to
say (as we saw in chapter two) that he cannot take a stand on the possibility of the non
existence of God as properly basic. Surely this is unacceptable for any philosophy or
apology purporting to be Christian.
So, while Alston rightly contends that any epistemology must specify the
grounds for principles that lay down conditions for beliefs of a certain sort to count as
justified, he also rightly contends that "a sober assessment of the situation would reveal
that no epistemology has been conspicuously successful at this job."449
O f course, Plantinga has the arsenal to be "successful at this job," but he has not
yet used it to his fullest benefit. W ithout going into the m atter as fully as we could,
Plantinga’s REP, and particularly PIP of REP, should have more fully and consistently
taken its cue from Reformed theology. Instead of reading into the Reformed objection
to natural theology Plantinga’s own problems with foundationalism, thus simply
jumping from one wrong view (classical foundationalism) to another wrong view
(Reidian foundationalism, of which more below), Plantinga should have read the
Reformers with more attention to what they actually said. Abraham Kuyper, to use
just one of Plantinga’s examples, never rejected natural theology as such, nor were his
complaints directed against evidentialist challenges. Rather, Kuyper’s contention was
that natural theology must always go hand in hand w ith its revelation counterpart.
Thus,
Knowledge is the pinnacle which is not placed on the ground alongside of the
steeple, but is supported by the body of the steeple and is lifted up on high.
M9 Alston, Epistemic Justification, 49.
250
You may not say, therefore: This is my natural revelation, in addition to which
comes the special. For as a result, you obtain but one "knowledge of God," the
content of which has flowed to you from both sources, whose waters have
mingled themselves.
A nd if for this reason an exhibition of the special knowledge w ithout the
natural is inconceivable, the representation is equally absurd that the natural
knowledge of God, w ithout enrichment by the special, could ever effect a
satisfying result.450
Kuyper’s objection to natural theology was not that the demand for evidence placed
such knowledge in a precarious position, but rather that, if ever separated from special
revelation or special knowledge of God, it could never "effect a satisfying result." This
is far from a mere "inchoate rejection of classical foundationalism." To press the point
one more time, says Kuyper,
Natural Theology, therefore, is not added to the Scripture as a second

something, but is taken up in the Scripture itself, and by the light of the
Scripture alone appears in connection with the reality of our life. Hence natural
theology cannot be explained in dogmatics, except under the category of man in
his original righteousness and man in his fall.451
O f course Plantinga not only fails to consider, in this context, what he mentions
450 Kuyper, Principles o f Sacred Theology, 377; "De cognitio specialis is de gevelspits, die niet
naast den toren op den bodem wordt neergezet, maar door het lichaam van den toren gedragen
en in de hoogte wordt geheven. Nooit moogt ge dus zeggen: dit is mijn revelatio naturalis, en
daar komt nu de revelatio specialis nog bij. Immers, het resultaat is, dat ge slechts eene cognitio
Dei erlangt, waarvan de inhoud uit beide principien u toegevloeid is, en wier wateren zich
hebben vermengd.
En is uit dien hoofde een uitstallen van de cognitio specialis zonder de naturalis
ondenkbaar, evenzoo ongerijmd is de voorstelling, alsof de naturalis cognitio Dei, buiten de
verrijking door de specialis om, metterdaad tot een bevredigend resultaat zou kunnen leiden."
Kuyper, Encyclopaedic, 11:331.
451 Ibid., 610; "De theologia naturalis komt dus niet als een tweede iets bij de Schrift bij,
maar is in de Schrift zelve opgenomen, en treedt eerst bij het licht der Schrift in rapport met de
werkelijkheid van ons leven. De theologia naturalis kan en mag derhalve niet anders
uiteengezet dan onder de categorie van den homo institutus en destitutus in de dogmatiek."
Kuyper, Encyclopaedic, 0:564. Limited space will not allow a discussion of Kuyper’s views here.
We use them strictly as exemplary.
251
elsewhere, i.e., anthropology, but he fails to take adequate account of man’s state since
the fall, something anyone pleading for a Christian approach to philosophy and
knowledge must do.452
So P IP of REP fails. Plantinga has tried to argue for the inclusion of theistic
belief as properly basic, which inclusion presupposes a foundationalist structure. But
such a structure cannot accommodate theistic belief due to foundationalism’s inability
to account for anything more than a relativistic (at best) or irrational (at worst) belief in
God. And that kind of belief in G od is no part of Christian theism, nor should it be a
part of one’s epistemic structure.
5.13 Reidian Foundationalism
But what can we say of (Plantinga’s revised) Reidian foundationalism? Surely
there are things that we know, call them objective facts, states of affairs, beliefs, etc.,
quite apart from demonstrative evidential proof. Surely humans hold a good many
beliefs w ithout endlessly providing proofs for such beliefs. Was not Reid, in fact,
correct in contending for common sense beliefs as supportive of other beliefs? Perhaps
"yes" and "no" would be the best way to answer such a question.
"Yes," because there are basic beliefs that are a result of our situation as humans
on which we rely if we are to function as such. One wonders, for example, how one
could get up in the m orning and go to work, all the while believing that perception
452 We shall also have to deal with Plantinga’s notion of the sensus divinitatis, which notion
we will contend is not in line with the Reformed and biblical teaching on the matter. More on
that in section 5.2f.
252
was always deceptive and there was no such thing as other persons. But we must also
say that Reid sorely missed the mark in his common sense contentions and, further,
that Plantinga adds insult to injury. We have sought to work this out in sections 4.4f
above. It remains now to bring in one further critique.
5.131 C om m on Sense Concerns
In his excellent article, "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia,"453
George Marsden attempts to show, among other things, the (partial) historical
progression in which scholarship has divorced itself from Christianity, beginning in the
eighteenth454 and into the nineteenth centuries. And one of the key elements in this
progression was the adoption, in evangelical apologetics, and the consequent failure of,
Reid’s Com m on Sense philosophy. And the primary contribution to the failure of
Reid’s Com m on Sense philosophy was its failure to acknowledge, critique and revise its
ow n presuppositions. Marsden’s critique, then, is fully in line w ith our insistence above
that w hat Plantinga lacks and desperately needs is an argument by presupposition.
As Marsden follows the historical progression up to the middle of the nineteenth
century, he notes the inability of evangelical apologetics, during that time, to deal with
the destructive elements of Darwinism. And Marsden’s central question, given such an
inability, is this: "W hat...about this midnineteenth-century American evangelical
453 Ironically, this article which provides a substantial refutation to Plantinga’s Reidianism is
found in FR, 219-264.
454 It is interesting to note that Marsden sees Jonathan Edwards as the only one among the
specified group who saw the necessity of grounding common sense beliefs in biblical revelation.
See Ibid., 247.
253
apologetic made it particularly vulnerable to onslaughts of the scientific revolution
associated w ith Darwinism?"455 N ow the "midnineteenth-century American evangelical
apologetic" of which Marsden speaks is that prom oted by, among others, Mark
Hopkins, Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge and B.B. Warfield. And, says Marsden,
"Common-Sense philosophy was the starting point..."454 Beginning one’s apologetic
w ith the Common-Sense philosophy meant beginning (and notice the affinity w ith
Plantinga’s views on the matter) w ith the "immediate, noninferential beliefs...as Reid
proposed, such as the existence of the self, the existence of other personal and rational
beings, the existence of the material world, the relationship of cause and effect, the
continuity of past and present... By Reid they were called principles of common-sense,
and by Dugald Stewart fundamental laws of belief.1'457 In defending Christianity,
therefore, Hopkins, et al. began by showing how Christianity could fit w ithin the
already established truths of common sense. In other words, belief in God can fit with
other, comm on sense, beliefs (which, of course, is just another way to phrase
Plantinga’s argument for theistic proper basicality).
W ithout reproducing Marsden’s penetrating article, which would be well w orth
the space if we had it, we will move to his analysis of the failure of the Reidian (via
Hopkins, et al.) approach.
As Hodge (following Reid) remarked in stating his assumptions, common-sense

truths were "given in the constitution of our nature." Having been so purposely
455 Ibid., 241.
454 Ibid., 235.
457 Ibid.
254
designed, they could be relied on with perfect security. Moreover, the design of
nature was assumed to involve the creation of a single universal hum an nature.
Hence the presumption was that common-sense principles were universal and
unalterable. So, as we have see, Reid thought it possible to establish once for all
a universal code of agreed-upon common-sense principles.458
N ow , to be sure, Plantinga has not gone so far as Reid in assuming that there is a
universal code of principles. His critics, however, especially Sennett and McLeod, as
mentioned above, have seen that such is exactly what Plantinga must affirm w ith regard
to theistic belief if he wants to include them in the so-called "paradigm cases."
But there are serious problems with Reid’s assumption; and the problems show
themselves, not so much in the "paradigm cases" themselves, but in the presuppositions
behind the cases. For example, when Darwinism came on the scene, one of its most
serious challenges was that it could retain its principle without recourse to theism. It
was not so much that Darwinism needed atheism, but rather it needed only
agnosticism, to seriously undermine the theistic consensus of the day. It was not that
Darwinism had to contend, "There is no God, but there is design," but only, "We see
design in everything, though we are not sure w hether or not God exists," which is far
less radical (and thus more challenging) than blatant atheism. For the apologetical
consensus of the day could not allow both for the existence of God and agnosticism
about the existence of God to live side by side among the masses. So Darwinism
challenged Christian theism ’s contention of the certainty of G od’s existence by
postulating agnosticism along with a thesis fo r design, and, tragically, those married to
Reid’s philosophy could only respond by positing that Darw in’s position excluded an
458 Ibid., 243.
255
intelligent Designer, which was all too obvious even to need asserting.459
As Marsden points out, all that Hodge (for example) could do was assert that
large parts of the population still believed in an intelligent Designer (is this Plantinga’s
notion of being justified?), but the next generation would show such a belief to be far
from universal. So, the fatal blow to Reidianism was demonstrated in the apologetical
responses to the introduction of Darwinism; and the fatal blow can be summarized in
this way: "Com mon sense could not settle a dispute over what was a m atter of common
sense."460
This is exactly what we have seen thus far in our discussions of proper basicality
and of foundationalism generally. Sennett argues for universal sanction as a criterion
for proper basicality, but such a criterion depends on a consensus of the so-called
"paradigm cases,” which consensus can (and will, given the theory) change with the
winds of the (vast?) majority. Plantinga, on the other hand, does not argue for
universal sanction, but goes the other direction, arguing (if Sennett’s characterization is
correct) that "most theists in contemporary Western culture" are justified in their
theistic belief. Are not these formulations indicative of the criticism lodged against
Reid and his followers? If one relies on a group of people, be it "Western" o r even
459 Ibid., 243-244.
460 Ibid., 244. At least one of the reasons for this seems obvious. If common sense beliefs
function, as they do here, as presuppositions, then they have the religious characteristic of
authority, ultimacy, etc. But it is also "common” knowledge that common sense beliefs were
only generally common and not absolutely so. Therefore, there was no criterion by which to
determine which views are and which are not common sense. Or, to say it another way, there
was no way to give a rationale for such common sense beliefs without, at the same time,
appealing to that rationale, rather than those beliefs, as a presupposition.
256
universal, for one’s "first principles," then the seeds of destruction are sown w ithin the
first principles themselves, as subject to the whims of the majority. This is, at best,
unsatisfactory.
McLeod, as well, presses the "universality challenge" but such a challenge is
fraught w ith the same difficulties of universal sanction. But even if universality is set
aside as irrelevant, we are still faced with the relativistic and even contradictory notion
supported by Plantinga above that theistic belief is circumstance-dependent and thus
Russellites and Christians will be forced to disagree, leading, once again, to an
unanswered contention that theistic belief is irrational. So the problems of American
evangelical academia in the midnineteenth century face us again at the end of the
tw entieth. But the solution, again, is not far to be found.
The solution lies, not in the simple affirmation of common sense facts o r beliefs,
but in ascertaining the presuppositions behind those facts, something that Hopkins, et
al. failed to do. To put it another way, once one affirms, for example, the connection
between the subject and object of knowledge, what Plantinga calls perceptual
knowledge, then one must ask as to the presuppositions behind such an affirmation.
To put it in terms of our discussion of presupposition, one must ascertain what are the
necessary epistemic and ontic conditions behind the meeting of subject and object, and
what is foundational to and for the being of the same. And, again, in line w ith
Plantinga, we can refer to Kuyper.
Kuyper and the Common-Sense thinkers agreed that the nature of our
consciousness forces us to believe in an organic harmony between subject and
object. That is, we must believe that our subjective perceptions of reality can
correspond to an actual reality external to ourselves. The Common-Sense
257
thinkers took this correspondence as given, a dictate of comm on sense, needing

no further justification. Kuyper did not quarrel on the immediate and common-
sense status of this belief but observed that it was fraught with difficulties unless
connected with another primal belief • belief in God as Creator
We could say here that what Kuyper thought, as over against Plantinga and the
Reidians before him, was that the only proper and rational ground for the reliability o f
properly basic beliefs was the fact of G od’s existence and his creating and sustaining
power in the knowledge situation. The "universality" required can only be affirmed
upon the proper foundation of the "unity" of creation, creatures and the Creator. O f
course, there is no universality with regard to belief in God as Creator, which is
Sennett’s and McLeod’s point. But, says Kuyper, "The want of general consent is no
proof of want of foundation..."462 So, as our discussion of presupposition shows, a
presupposition need not have as one of its attributes universal agreement, but it may
certainly be ascertained from those facts that tend to be universally or commonly held.
Therefore, as is (hopefully) evident by now, unless one presupposes the existence
of God, there is no way to ascertain the tru th of one hypothesis against another, no
way to ascertain universally basic beliefs, no way to settle the disagreement over what is
properly basic; in short, there is no apologetic. Thus, Van Til, standing in Kuyper’s
tradition, affirms that "except for the tru th of Christianity it would be impossible to
exclude one hypothesis rather than another. It would be impossible to exclude such
461 Ibid., 249, emphasis mine. Would Kuyper assert a parity thesis with respect to belief in
God and other beliefs? If so, the difficulty with Plantinga would plague his position as well.
462 Kuyper, Principles, 357. "Het gemis aan algemeene instemming is alzoo geen bewijs van
ongegrondheid..." Kuyper, Encyclopaedic, 11:311.
258
ideas as would enter ’into the minds of the insane.’"463 A nd it has not been difficult to
see that one o f the sustained critiques against most any epistemological structure is the
ability to postulate (at least a modified) insanity as refutation (e.g., Alpha Centaurian
scientists, denying the redness of the fire truck, Ric’s epistemic inflexibility, etc.).
There must be fruitful contact between the subject and the object of knowledge and
such cannot be affirmed w ithout the prior condition of the existence of God. O r, in
Kuyper’s ow n words,
And since the object does not produce the subject, nor the subject the object, the
power that binds the two organically together must of necessity be sought
outside o f each [emphasis mine]. And however much we may speculate and
ponder, no explanation can ever suggest itself to our sense, of the all-sufficient
ground for this admirable correspondence and affinity between object and
subject, on which the possibility and development of science wholly rests, until
at the hand of H oly Scripture we confess that the A uthor of the cosmos created
man in the cosmos as microcosmos "after his image and likeness."464
Thus, the ground for Plantinga’s properly basic belief must be the presupposition of the
Christian God, w ithout which we are left, not just w ith relativism and irrationality, but
w ith the sure demise of his own epistemology. Reidian foundationalism cannot be
sustained and thus REP cannot be sustained w ithin its structure.
443 Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 283.
444 Kuyper, Principles, 83. "En daar nu noch het object het subject, noch het subject het
object produceert, moet de marht, die beide organisch saamverbindt, uiteraard buiten beide
gezocht worden. Hoe men dan ook zinne of peinze, nooit zal de genoegzame grond voor deze
bewonderenswaardige correspondentie of verwantschap tusschen het object en het subject,
waarop toch geheel de mogelijkheid en de ontwikkeling der wetenschap rust, voor ons besef
verklaard worden, tenzij we met de H. Schrift belijden, dat de Auteur van den kosmos, in dien
kosmos, den mensch als mikrokosmos schiep ’naar zijn beeld en naar zijne gelijkenis.’" Kuyper,
Encyclopaedic, 11:29.
259
5.14 Evidentialism
In chapter two, we mentioned that evidentialism was the springboard from
which Plantinga sought to develop a legitimate epistemological structure, Reidian
foundationalism, w ithin which theistic belief could justifiably fit. If we are correct, the
evidentialist challenge was the catalyst behind Plantinga’s REP. We have just seen,
however, that REP cannot be sustained within a Reidian foundationalist structure. And
if we are correct in that also, then evidentialism as an objection is now "hanging in
limbo," as it were, with no epistemological place to lay its head. In evaluating and
criticizing Plantinga’s Reidianism, we have not, at the same time, given due
consideration to evidentialism. We shall now have to evaluate evidentialism in its own
right in order to locate it properly. There are issues that deserve much fuller and more
detailed attention. We can only touch on them here.
In this section, we will argue for the following principle of justified theistic
belief:
(PJB) Theistic belief can be properly basic for S iff its justification can be
shown.
It will not be difficult to notice that (PJB), as it stands, goes against what Plantinga has
urged, at least on the surface. Notice that we can affirm properly basic theistic belief
w ithin (PJB). In so doing, we are agreeing with Plantinga that S can believe in God
w ithout necessarily inferring that belief from others that S holds. But we are also
affirming in (PJB), contra Plantinga, that in order to be justified in one’s basic theistic
belief, justification of such must be able to be shown. N ow notice a couple of
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im portant points in (PJB), points that are purposely not stated. First, it is not stated
that S must show o r even be able to show justification. It is certainly plausible for S to
believe in God in a properly basic way without showing w hy S has so believed.
Second, (PJB) does not say when justification must be shown. (PJB) allows for S to
properly basically believe in God at time t2, while showing justification could be either
at t, o r at t 3, o r at tn. We will now seek to build the case for (PJB).
We will remember that evidentialism states, generally, that any and every belief,
to be rationally held, must be supported by and comport w ith the evidence. In relation
to theism, it states that S’s belief in God must be supported by S’s evidence if it is to be
rationally held by S. The nontheistic conclusion, as in Clifford and Flew, has been to
note that the evidence does not comport with theism thus the latter cannot be
rationally held by S. The theistic answer has been to build an apologetic based on the
evidence and thus to prove that theism is rational. Plantinga’s answer has been to
advocate a "pox on both houses" and to argue for and affirm the rationality or
justification of theism quite apart from evidential support.
Perhaps the best response to Plantinga on the m atter of evidentialism per se
comes from Stephen W ykstra.445 W ykstra begins by asking three questions of "the
Calvinians" ("Reformed epistemologists"):
(Q l) W hat sort of thing is this "evidence" which evidentialists aver (and

Calvinians deny) theism needs?
(Q2) W hat relation to this evidence is it that evidentialists aver (and Calvinians
445 Stephen J. Wykstra, "Toward a Sensible Evidentialism: On the Notion of ’Needing

Evidence’," in William L. Rowe and William J. Wainwright, eds. Philosophy o f Religion: Selected
Readings (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1989, 2d ed.), 426-437. James
Sennett, in MPR, also appeals to (and agrees with) Wykstra’s analysis.
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deny) theistic belief needs to have?

(Q3) For the sake o f what do evidentialists aver (and Calvinians deny) that theism
needs this relation to evidence?446
In answering (Q l), W ykstra points out, quite rightly, that the kind of evidence which
Plantinga denies as needful for theism is inferential evidence.467 This is an im portant
point, particularly in apologetical debates. We will remember that Plantinga affirms the
necessity of evidence for warranted belief.46* This sounds, on the face of it,
contradictory to Plantinga’s entire REP. However, it is im portant to remember that
what Plantinga objects to and what he wants to argue against, is not the presence of
evidence in ou r beliefs, even our theistic beliefs, but rather the stated necessity of
propositional evidence for theistic belief.
Plantinga does, however, affirm the need for grounds for theistic belief. My
believing that God created this flower is grounded in my experience of the flower, we
could even say, my evidential experience of the flower. But such an experience is not
of the nature of inferential evidence. And it is inferential evidence that attempts to
place an undue burden on theistic belief. As W ykstra comments, "But the dividing
issue is whether such grounds, when they are efficacious, can be enough. Calvinians
th in k they can be. Evidentialists deny this, insisting that something inferential is
Ibid., 427.
467 Once we begin to distinguish between inferential and noninferential, we seem to be

back within the foundationalist realm. For convenience, if for no other reason, we will
continue to refer to such distinctions, though we need not impose on them all the
epistemological baggage (see section 2.12) that goes with foundationalism.
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required."449
The answer that W ykstra gives to (Q2) is predictable by now. Plantinga denies
that one’s theistic belief, to be justified, must have an "individualistic" inferential
relation to the evidence. W ykstra wants to see Plantinga’s notion of the basic/non-
basic distinction as centering on whether o r not an individual infers a belief from other
beliefs that the individual holds.470 And Plantinga is arguing that inferred evidence is
simply nonessential to rational or justified theistic belief.
(Q3)’s answer is, put simply, for the sake of rationality. Plantinga denies that
one m ust have inferred evidence for the sake of a rationally held theistic belief.
Theistic belief can be rational within the context of other rationally held beliefs which
themselves have no need of inferential evidence.
Thus far, W ykstra’s analysis has been similar to our own explication of
Plantinga. A nd W ykstra wants to insist, w ith Plantinga, that evidentialism’s contention
for the rationality of theistic belief for S based on S’s evidence is itself unwarranted.
Surely we are not irrational in our beliefs in electrons, even if we believe in such on the
basis of what we have been taught. So it goes, according to W ykstra and Plantinga, for
theism. This strong form of evidentialism, then, is rejected.
As one might expect from the title, however, W ykstra has more to say on the
449 Wykstra, "Toward a Sensible Evidentialism," 428.
470 Sennett, in MPR, 177, n. 48, rightly argues that evidentialism’s contention need not, and
often is not, as strong as Wykstra wants to make it here. It may very well be that the believer
need not have evidentially inferred the belief, but rather must only have access to the evidential
inference. This is closer to the evidentialist challenge without changing the substance of
disagreement between REP and evidentialism.
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matter, moving toward a more "sensible" evidentialism. Sensible evidentialism affirms
the necessity for evidence relative to some beliefs, while at the same time allowing for
the proper basicality of those beliefs.
One thing we do not want to say in taking, say, electron belief to need
evidence, we do not mean that it cannot be properly basic. F or as noted above,
we allow that one can properly believe in electrons through spontaneous trust in
the say-so of school teachers. But although person A might so believe by
trusting the say-so of person B, and B by similarly trusting C, we take it that
this chain of testim ony is, somewhere in the community, anchored in something
other than testim ony. And for electrons, we take this "something other" to be
an evidential case for electrons/71
Thus, evidence is essential for the belief in electrons, but it need not be inferred by the
individual. Rather, it must be available in the community to the believer. This
establishes evidence essentiality as community, rather than individualistically based. In
this (PJB) takes its cue from Wykstra.
N ow what can it mean for evidence to be "essential"? Initially, we could say
that essentiality relates to availability. If no evidence is available for belief b, then it is,
given W ykstra’s view, incumbent on us to give up b. O r, if it is discovered that b,
though long believed, is in fact a hoax, then to continue to hold b would place one in
"epistemic hot water, in (let us say) big doxastic trouble."472
Tw o further distinctions must be made. First, subjective evidence essentiality
relates to a person’s taking evidence to be available for a belief, w hether or not it in fact
is available. To use W ykstra’s example, one who believes in electrons and who takes
evidence to be available, would not therewith be deemed irrational if it were discovered
471 Wykstra, "Toward a Sensible Evidentialism," 430.
472 Ibid.
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that there was, in fact, no evidence for electrons after all. Such is the case because one
may rationally believe what one is taught, under normal circumstances. This kind of
evidence essentiality, however, is not the kind for which W ykstra wants to argue.
Objective evidence essentiality is the one that will concern us and, put simply,
objective evidence essentiality is a situation in which evidence for b is in fact available
to one who holds belief b. A belief, in this scenario, "needs an available case in order
to be epistemically adequate, o r free from epistemic defect."473 A "sensible
evidentialism," then, will concern itself with objective evidence essentiality.474
N ow Plantinga wants to maintain that belief in God is evidence nonessential,
"even if no evidential case is available for it, theistic belief suffers no epistemic
defectiveness and should not be seen as being in big (or little) doxastic trouble."475 But
can he really maintain such a thing? (PJB) would say "no." We will now apply
W ykstra’s notions to Plantinga’s contention against evidentialism.
W ykstra maintains that theistic belief can be properly basic. The 14-year-old
theist may properly basically believe in God. So the question at issue is not whether
belief in God can be properly basic; both Wykstra and Plantinga believe that it can.
475 Ibid., 433.
474 It will be helpful here if we remember another distinction along with the
subjective/objective distinction, i.e., that between being justified and showing justification.
Subjective evidence essentiality is related to being justified and objective evidence essentiality to
showing justification. Obviously, if objective evidence essentiality obtains, then so does
subjective; so also if one can show justification then one is justified. Sennett distinguishes
subjective and objective evidence essentiality as dealing with rationality and warrant,
respectively.
475 Ibid., 434.
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
265
T he point o f contention is whether or not theistic belief, even as properly basic, is also
evidence essential in the objective sense. W ykstra says yes; Plantinga says no. In other
words, W ykstra says that theistic belief is like electron belief. Plantinga contends that
theistic belief is like other properly basic beliefs in which one is justified in holding
them even if there is no inferential evidence available.
Consider first electron belief. Suppose an electron is defined (as it is in my
dictionary) as "an elementary particle that is a fundamental constituent of matter,
having a negative charge o f 1.602 x 10'19 coulomb, a mass of 9.108 x 10 JI kilogram, and
spin of V4, and existing independently or as the component outside the nucleus of an
atom." N ow obviously one can believe in electrons without believing the above
definition of it. W ykstra has conceded as much to Plantinga with regard to theistic
belief. His point, however, is that theistic belief is parallel to electron belief in that
something like the above must be available and arguable in order fo r our basic theistic
belief to be justified on that level. In other words, the justification of basic beliefs that
are objectively evidence essential entails the availability of a case before that basic belief
can be deemed proper. But in order to affirm the parallel between electron belief and
theistic belief, must we also affirm that theism, like electrons, must be exclusively
inferred, there being no non-inferential experience of either? Surely this is not the case
w ith theism, and W ykstra recognizes that fact, resulting in another im portant
distinction w ith regard to inference.476
Derivational inference is a category of inference relating, for example, to belief in
476 Ibid., 434f.
266
electrons. It assumes that there is no non-inferential experience of electrons and thus
the case available for one believing in electrons on the basis of testim ony must be
derivationally inferred, i.e., based on those truths which are given to us by our basic
faculties, resulting in truths to which our basic faculties give us no access.
Discriminational inference, on the other hand, has to do with situations in which the
inform ation given to us by our basic faculties is conflicting (i.e., there is an "ostensible
epistemic parity" problem between basic beliefs) and needs resolution. Herein we learn
to find reasons to believe one proposition over another and thus refine or discriminate
between the parity problem in the basic beliefs. Theistic belief, according to Wykstra,
can be evidence essential in the discriminational rather than the derivational sense. This
would allow for a situation, for example, in which one’s theistic belief is given via
Calvin’s sensus divinitatis,*77 but one also perceives evil in a way that causes one to
doubt one’s basic theistic belief. Herein is a problem of epistemic parity. And this
problem of ostensible epistemic parity can be resolved by our basic faculties working in
harm ony w ith the evidential reasons which produces refinement, rather than in an
independent fashion as in derivational inference. Those evidential reasons move us
tow ard a resolution in what was given in a basic, but conflicting, way.
And where does that leave us w ith regard to W ykstra (and Sennett) vs.
Plantinga? First, it seems, we can gain some clarity w ith our distinction between being
justified and showing justification. Both Plantinga and W ykstra agree that one can be
justified in one’s basic theistic belief. But where do they stand with regard to showing
477 We are using Plantinga’s notion of the sensus here. We will contend below that the
sensus does not, as a matter of fact, produce belief.
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justification? Obviously, W ykstra wants to maintain that showing justification must be
available in order for one to be justified in one’s basic theistic belief. O ne’s basic
theistic belief, therefore, depends on the availability of showing justification.
Significantly, however, W ykstra seems to indicate that discriminational inference
is necessary for virtually every basic belief, "So, also, when parity problems block the
flow of memory, perception, or other basic faculties in resolving such problems by
appeal to ’good reasons,’ ou r evidence discriminates, as it were, a direction for one’s
believing, while one’s basic faculty continues to provide the force.”m W hat shall we
say, then, of proper basicality? Shall we say that all properly basic beliefs are evidence
essential by virtue of ostensible epistemic parity problems? It seems W ykstra wants to
say so. And if so, then it is not primarily W ykstra’s notion of theistic belief that is the
issue between him and Plantinga, but his notion of properly basic beliefs. "Sensible
evidentialism," therefore, applies not simply to theistic belief and not, say, to physical
object belief, but it relates itself to every kind of basic belief, memory, perceptual, and
other basic beliefs included. We could say then that all pronouncem ents that one is
justified in one’s belief depend on the fact that showing justification be available. O r to
use W ykstra’s terminology, all properly basic beliefs must be objectively evidence
essential either in terms of discriminational or derivational inference in order to be
rationally held.
N ow where does this put us w ith regard to Plantinga’s contention of theistic
belief as properly basic? Suppose now that one believes, w ith Plantinga,
m Ibid., 436.
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(1) God exists
and that one claims to believe it in a (indirect, but) properly basic way. At this point,
there is no disagreement between W ykstra and Plantinga. But how does Plantinga
contend for the proper basicality of theistic belief at this point? In a number of ways.
He contends that our properly basic belief must be tested within the context of
conditions in which the belief is obviously properly basic, not obviously so, and not so.
He says that arguments denying the tru th of our belief should be considered; he says
that we should produce arguments that show our belief to be justified; he says we
cannot hold the belief dogmatically, but must deal with other counterarguments or
counterevidence against our arguments.479
N ow , it seems one must ask at this point how it is that Plantinga’s contention of
properly basic belief as needing arguments, grounds, conditions, evidence, etc. is
different from W ykstra’s notion of sensible evidentialism. If the only answer is (which
I suspect it is) that W ykstra affirms and Plantinga denies the need for inferential
evidence, such an answer seems to ignore the near identity between W ykstra’s
discriminational inference and Plantinga’s plea for grounds, conditions, arguments,
reasons for the proper basicality of theistic belief.480
479 For examples of these contentions by Plantinga see "Reason and Belief in God," 73ff.
410 If space would allow, I would give a number of examples of this "near identity." One
example, however, will suffice here. Says Plantinga in "Reason and Belief in God," 84,
Suppose I am within my epistemic rights in accepting belief in God as basic; and
suppose I am presented with a plausible argument..dor the conclusion that the existence
of God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. ,..[P]erhaps I have it on
reliable authority that Augustine, say, has discovered a flaw in the argument; then I am
once more justified in my original belief.
It would not change the substance of Plantinga’s contention here if, rather than a plausible
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But we should remember that (1) is really only indirectly properly basic, due to
the fact that it is entailed by, for example,
(2) G od made this flower
which itself is directly properly basic. And it is at this point that we begin to see the
problem w ith Plantinga’s contention of theistic belief as properly basic.
Given the fact that (1) is evidence essential, what, we must ask, is the status of
(2)? Plantinga wants to maintain that (2) is a specific incident which entails the proper
basicality of theistic belief generally. But now we seem to have a problem. Plantinga
holds (2) to be directly properly basic such that its entailment, (1), is indirectly properly
basic. But W ykstra (and we) wants to maintain that (1) is evidence essential. Can (2)
now be evidence nonessential? N o t if the implication above of what W ykstra says is
true, i.e., that ostensible epistemic parity problems necessitate discriminational inference
and thus evidence essentiality. And certainly not if (PJB) is true.
Perhaps I am touring the Philadelphia Zoo and am struck by the beauty, majesty
and intricate orderly detail of a tiger. I look at the tiger and believe, "God made this,"
something like (2). A nd perhaps the tour guide, a noted feline expert, begins
convincingly and passionately to recount the evolutionary history of this tiger,
concluding w ith the fact of m an’s direct link with it. I now experience an ostensible
epistemic parity problem such that basic beliefs (one testimonial, the other perceptual)
argument for the conclusion that the existence of God is logically incompatible with the
existence of evil, we said, as we did above, that I simply see something that is prima facie
incompatible with the existence of God. Now I have an ostensible epistemic parity problem.
But I also believe that Augustine’s privatio boni argument is compelling. What is this but
evidence essentiality of the discriminational inference variety? Is this not a requirement that a
case be available for one to be justified in one’s basic theistic belief?
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conflict. A t this point I appeal to discriminational inference, remembering a recent
lecture by a Christian biologist detailing the intricate design of this tiger, and ruling out
its production by mere chance. I now continue to believe (something like) (2) in a
properly basic way. So, (2) is not evidence nonessential either. But that does not mean
that (2) cannot be believed in a properly basic way. It only serves to show that a case
must be available for (2) if my properly basic belief in (2) is to be rationally held.
Could it serve to show also that there is no evidence nonessential properly basic belief?
It seems likely that it could.
But now we must turn around and ask: How do we determine what we
can properly basically believe? This is the essence of the Great Pum pkin objection.
Suppose one believes
(3) The Great Pum pkin rises every year on Halloween night and distributes good
will to all w ho see it.
And suppose one further claims to believe (3) in a properly basic way. Is one’s belief in
(3) justified? Here we would have to say no, agreeing with Plantinga. But Plantinga’s
negative answer is based on "there being no Great Pum pkin and no natural tendency to
accept beliefs about the Great Pum pkin."481 But how does Plantinga know that}
Inductively, he says. But we will remember from above that this kind of inductive
process only serves to ground properly basic belief within a community, (which is quite
different from a case being available in a community) which com m unity need not
(apparently) have evidence for its beliefs, nor need its beliefs com port w ith any other
481 Ibid., 78.
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com m unity. So, though Plantinga is right that the Great Pum pkin belief cannot be
properly basically held, he is wrong about how we can know that. We can know that
only if the knowledge of such is either inferred or directly given. A nd there must be a
case available, its justification must be shown, thus (PJB). If Great Pum pkin belief is to
be justifiably held (or warranted), there must be a situation in which someone,
somewhere can show reasons for such a belief. If such belief is directly know n, then
reasons must be given as to why some believe and some do not, how such belief is
given directly, in what way the Great Pum pkin relates to the rest of the know n world,
etc. In other words, and this is the all-important point, in order to be justified in a
belief, showing justification must be available. Showing justification is one of the
grounds for being justified. It need not be the case that the one who is justified in
belief b be able to show the justification, only that showing justification be available.
Thus, properly basic beliefs depend on w hether or not such beliefs can be shown to be
justified.'182
Evidence essentiality, then, and (PJB), can be seen as an aspect of Christian
apologetics. To put the matter in terms of theism, one may certainly believe in the
God of Christianity w ithout at the same time being able to point to the relevant
available evidence for his existence. And one would be rational and justified in such a
4,2 It will by this point be recognized that our (PJB) is, in other words, stating the necessity
of a transcendental argument. It is affirming the fact that one can believe a fact or experience,
but it is also saying that such a belief or experience must rest on something besides itself.
Showing justification is another way to assert the necessity of transcendental argumentation.
Just how (PJB) would operate with beliefs the object of which are themselves completely
subjective, e.g., my belief that I have a headache complicates the issue. Perhaps we rest content
here with the reaffirmation of degrees of justification.
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belief. But if justification for such a belief could not in any way be shown, then the
belief itself would be legitimately called into question.
In other words, referring again to our propositions above, could not (1) be
supported by (2) as evidence o f ( I f W hy could not
(2) God made this flower
be the case available or the evidence that is essential for
(1) G od exists?
There seems to be enough biblical warrant for such a claim, given the fact that G od’s
creation testifies of his existence. But if so, we still have the problem of the evidence
essentiality of (2). Let us say that (1) is evidence essential (objectively), as W ykstra
maintains. We will remember that objective evidence essentiality requires that a case in
fact be available for one’s belief. Can we not say that the case available for (1) is (2)?
But now what can we say about the status of (2)? Is there, in fact, a case available for
(2)? Even if (2) is properly basically believed, it can also be evidence essential,
objectively. Surely there is ample argument available to demonstrate that creation
testifies of its createdness as well as that God is both the Creator and Sustainer of his
creation. And surely a case can be made for the fact that G od’s creation, as God's
creation, testifies of its Maker (more on that in Chapter six). So, we can say that one
may believe (2) and that (2) entails (1) and that both (2) and (1) are evidence essential, in
the objective sense. And if we maintain our distinction between being justified and
showing justification, we can say that someone is justified in believing both (2) and (1)
in a properly basic way, that is, without having to show justification for either, while at
273
the same time maintaining that (1) and (2) are evidence essential in that arguments
(cases) are available for them/®3
O r, to use W ykstra’s example, we could ask how it is that we claim justification
for electron belief, which belief has as its ground the testimony of our teachers. The
answer is that we trust that someone has shown the justification of such a belief. If we
thought that our teachers were just positing their own ideas as fact, we would be
somewhat reluctant simply to believe them . We are justified in our belief in electrons
because we (rightly) intimate that an individual or community has shown justification.
There seems to be, therefore, a necessary reciprocity between being justified and
showing justification/84
4.3 The crucial problem in this entire argument is how one might know when a case is
available and when one does not. Such knowledge, if relativism is to be avoided, can only
come from a biblical framework, thus the necessity of revelation undergirds our (PJB). And
furthermore, the necessity of argument by presupposition undergirds any use made of proper
basicality.
4.4 Having noted the relationship between being justified and showing justification, one
objection must be mentioned. In personal correspondence, July 20, 1993, James Sennett notes,
However, there is a real, non-empty category of evidence nonessential beliefs for which
the conditional does not hold. My belief that I am not the only person in this room is
certainly such a belief. I do not have, nor is there to be had in my epistemic
community, a justification (in terms of an argument following from propositions
accepted by the community and not begging the question against the solipsist) for non
solipsism. Nonetheless, I am quite justified in my belief without evidence and even
though there is no evidence forthcoming from the community.
It seems to me that Sennett is right about being justified. But what happens if there is an
ostensible epistemic parity problem that emerges? It seems to me there is a good argument
available in such a case, which argument is transcendental in nature, arguing from the
impossibility of the opposite. What, for example, is an argument if no one else is there? And
that question leads us to our notion of presuppositions, complete with epistemic and ontic
distinctions mentioned. Of course, even that argument would not go far enough and would,
from an apologetic point of view, only rest on the fact of the impossibility of any fact apart
from the existence of the Christian God. This may not satisfy Sennett’s strict criteria of
argumentation, but that only shows the fallacy of the criteria.
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O ne more crucial m atter must be enlisted at this point that will serve to frame
the entire discussion of evidentialism thus far. Theistic belief, as a belief whose content
is both ultimate and all-embracing, is, among other things, the presupposition upon
which any and every discussion of justification and beliefs must depend for its
rationality. One of the problems with Plantinga’s construction of theistic belief is that
he claims that he leaves the question open as to whether or not God really exists/85
Says Plantinga,
Here we see the ontological and ultimately religious roots of the epistemological
question as to the warrant or lack thereof for belief in God. What you properly
take to be [warranted], depends upon what sort of metaphysical or religious
stance you adopt; it depends upon what kind of being you think human beings
are, and what sorts of beliefs their noetic faculties will produce when they are
functioning properly. ... And so the dispute as to w hether theistic belief is
rational can’t be settled just by attending to epistemological considerations; it is
at bottom not merely an epistemological dispute, but an ontological or
theological dispute/86
Thus Plantinga is saying, to quote Sennett again,
(3) If God exists, then some basic theistic beliefs are w arranted/87
A nd now the problem becomes acute. It is not only that theistic belief must be
evidence essential in order to be held properly basically, nor is it that what we must
deal w ith is a mere ostensible epistemic parity problem, but it is that warrant and
justification and rationality and every other epistemological notion depend, for their
ow n rationality, on whether o r not God exists. And the question of the existence of
4.5 Sennett makes this point in MPR, chapter six, and refers to Plantinga’s "retreat to
metaphysics" as a crucial flaw. We will discuss such a "retreat" in chapter six below.
4.6 From Plantinga, "Warrant and Basic Belief in God," quoted from Ibid., 152.
487 Ibid., 153.
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
275
G od is something that must be reckoned w ith before any rational or viable
epistemology can be developed. And thus, the question of the existence of G od serves
on a presuppositional level, rather than merely on a doxastic level, and its status must
be resolved before one can make any headway in these other matters. Plantinga has
tried to make some headway in the other matters and the implication of what he has
given us is that his arguments are only as strong as is the argument for G od’s existence.
We will begin to deal w ith that argument in the rest of this chapter and develop it
further in the next. By now one can see the quagmire from which Plantinga must
extricate himself.
Belief in God can be properly basic, if the latter notion is redefined. It cannot
be unrelated to the available evidence, and the evidence is everywhere. N either can it
stand on its own w ithout addressing the more fundamental question of the existence of
God. Thus proper basicality and its relatives must be radically revised. This is not
problem atic since foundationalism (both classical and Reidian) is no longer an
epistemological contender. But it does serve to increase the pressure for an adequate
epistemology, of which more in the next chapter.
5.2 Presuppositions and the Sensus Divinitatis
O u r last tw o sections can be brief. Though brief, they should not be seen as less
im portant than our previous discussions. In fact, these last tw o sections could be the
most im portant corrective to Plantinga’s entire REP.
We will remember that one of Plantinga’s arguments for the proper basicality of
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theistic belief is rooted in Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis, defined by Plantinga
as ou r tendency to believe in God, which tendency God has implanted in us.
Moreover, one of the reasons that Plantinga gives for the irrationality of the Great
Pum pkin belief is the lack of such a tendency/88 It would seem, then, that the sensus
divinitatis is a necessary element in Plantinga’s entire REP discussion. And Plantinga is
certainly to be commended for ascribing epistemological significance to the sensus
divinitatis. There are some crucial elements, however, in Plantinga’s understanding of
the sensus that have been omitted and must be included.
In our critical discussion of proper basicality, it will be remembered that we
noticed two objections, each having something in common w ith the other. Sennett
criticizes Plantinga’s inclusion of theistic belief among properly basic beliefs because of
its lack of universal sanction, which sanction is enjoyed by other beliefs such as
perceptual and memory beliefs. McLeod, in somewhat the same vein, complains o f a
lack of parity, contra Plantinga, between theistic belief and others, given the latter’s
universality. N ow conceivably, Plantinga might answer both Sennett’s and McLeod’s
criticisms of a lack of universality for theistic belief by appealing to the sensus
divinitatis. We have already seen that Plantinga considers the sensus to be universal in
its scope. There are, however, certain qualifiers to this universality that are crucial for
Plantinga’s discussion.
5.21 Calvin
488 See, for example, "Reason and Belief in God," 78.
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First of all, we should note that the sensus is presented by Plantinga as a
tendency. A nd as a tendency, it provides for a mere potentiality for theistic belief. If
one "actualizes" theistic belief, then the tendency has been completed. If one does not,
then the sensus remains a tendency. We shall refer to this again below. Secondly, this
tendency is actualized if and only if certain conditions obtain, conditions which may be
impossible adequately o r exhaustively to delineate, but which nevertheless are necessary
for the tendency to be actualized/89 So, clearly, the sensus divinitatis, on Plantinga’s
interpretation of Calvin, is a tendency needing further conditions and circumstances in
order to be considered as belief, o r further, as knowledge.
O ne of Plantinga’s justifying conditions for properly basic belief in God,
therefore, is Calvin’s sensus divinitatis. And this sensus is a tendency toward belief in
G od that is implanted in us. We can formulate the relationship between properly basic
theistic belief and the sensus divinitatis as (SD) and in this way:
(SD) At least one of the reasons that S can properly basically believe in God is
that Calvin’s notion of what God has implanted in us is true.
There are implications here that will show Plantinga to be wrong, if SD is right, in at
least two areas. In order to see these implications, we can divide (SD) further in this
4MSo, in Ibid., 67, Plantinga says,

And Calvin’s claim is that one who accedes to this tendency and in these
circumstances accepts the belief that God has created the world - perhaps upon
beholding the starry heavens, or the splendid majesty of the mountains, or the
intricate, articulate beauty of a tiny flower - is entirely within his epistemic
rights in so doing. ...His belief need not be based on any other propositions at
all; under these conditions he is perfectly rational in accepting belief in God in
the utter absence of any argument, deductive or inductive. Indeed, a person in
these conditions, says Calvin, knows that God exists.
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way
(SD,) S can properly basically believe in God.
(SDJ has already been considered above so need not be further discussed here. (SD),
however, entails a further, related proposition.
(SD^ In order for theistic belief to be properly basic, Calvin’s notion of what
God has implanted in us must be true.
(SD2) is, in effect, one of the main reasons that Plantinga initially referred to his thesis
as a "Reformed" epistemology.490 There is a difficulty here, however, that seems
obvious, given our formulation. The difficulty is not on the level of proper basicality,
i.e., that S must believe one thing related to something else S believes. That can be true
of other properly basic beliefs as well. Plantinga himself argues both for grounds and
for argument in order further to establish properly basic belief as such. Moreover, we
do not want to maintain, at this point, that Plantinga is arguing that S must hold
Calvin’s notion to be true, and in that (SDJ is concerned with warrant (with its
concom itant externalism) rather than permissive justification. However, Plantinga is
saying (if (SDJ is right) that the way in which properly basic theistic belief can be
shown to be warranted is Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis, something God has
implanted in us all.
In other words, if we might retrace our steps for a moment, Plantinga begins the
REP debate by attempting to show that one need not infer the existence of G od from
other beliefs one has in order for theistic belief to be rational. A nd his argument is
The other main reason being Reformed theology’s aversion to natural theology.
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eventually couched w ithin a (Reidian) foundationalist structure such that his conclusion
is that theistic belief is purported to be rational as a basic belief. And Plantinga argues,
concerning basic beliefs, that there is something inherent in our condition that grounds
our, e.g., perceptual, m em ory and other minds beliefs.4’1 But the grounds for the
rationality of theistic belief, it seems, must include the fact of Calvin’s notion that God
has implanted something (call it a capacity) in us such that we are inclined to believe in
him. But, as it turns out, (SDJ depends on the very fact that is now in question, i.e.,
the rationality of theistic belief (now couched w ithin foundationalist categories). One
must already posit the existence of God and (the rational) belief in him and Calvin’s
notion of w hat God has done in us in order to show that one’s belief in God is rational
(properly basic) and not dependent on propositional evidence. This amounts to a
colossal begging of the question, if what is expected of a ground for properly basic
belief is some kind of epistemological support.
Suppose, for example, Charles Brown argued in his famous Institutes o f the
Pumpkinite Religion that the Great Pumpkin, one of whose attributes includes
omnipotence, implanted in every person a capacity to believe in him. And suppose
now that one of Brown’s followers is arguing for the rationality of pum pkinite belief.
A nd suppose further that he argues in this way: "Pumpkinite belief is properly basic in
the same way, for example, that perceptual beliefs and m em ory beliefs are. I can argue
for this by pointing to the numerous evidences I see of his existence, the orange o f the
sunset, for example. So, actually, ‘The sunset reveals the Great Pum pkin’ is properly
4,11 say "inherent in our condition" referring to Plantinga’s persistent references to Thomas
Reid, culminating in his taxonomy of "Reidian foundationalism."
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basic for me and entails ‘The Great Pum pkin exists’, which is indirectly properly basic
for me. Primarily, however, the reason that I believe in the Great Pum pkin in a
properly basic way is because he has implanted in me (and in all of us) a capacity to
believe in him. Thus, my belief is grounded in what he has done." This argument is
parallel to (SDj) above and carries w ith it the same rational appeal (or lack thereof),
given Plantinga’s view of rationality. It is an argument that states the proper basicality
of theistic belief due to its grounding in what God has done in us. But, obviously, if
what God has done in us is already know n, then the rationality of theistic belief is
either not in question at the level of proper basicality, o r is pushed back to the
justification of (SDj). It is not difficult to see therefore that (SDj) fails as a ground for
theistic belief. And if it fails as a ground, then the universality of theistic belief is in
question again. It appears to have its ground in relativistic notions and vicious circles.
There is one more proposition in (SD) that must be considered. W ith
modification, it will prove to be the remedy to some of Plantinga’s predicaments, as
well as a big step forward in establishing a Christian epistemology with promise, (SD3):
(SD3) Calvin’s notion is that G od has implanted a tendency in us to believe in
him.
But this understanding of the sensus is inadequate, both for a Reformed epistemology
(and thus for a Reformed apologetic) and for an adequate understanding of the biblical
data.492
4,2 Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. in Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga (New York: State
University of New York Press, 1991), attempts to argue for the sensus divinitatis of Calvin as
knowledge acquired because of who man is, that is, by nature, rather than by what God does,
that is, by revelation. His arguments here, as in the rest of the book, are less than convincing.
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In order to see clearly our disagreement with Plantinga, we shall set out our
main thesis in prepositional form. This thesis will be discussed in both this section and
the next and will be crucial to our analysis in the next chapter. Let us call it the Thesis
of Universal Theism, (TUT):
(TUT) Every person infallibly and incorrigibly knows the Christian-theistic
God.
There are innumerable ways of showing (TUT) to be true, as well as innumerable
implications for its truth. In this section, however, we must restrict ourselves to
Calvin’s view and then, in the next section, to the apostle Paul.
But first, two clarifications are needed in (TUT). How shall we think of
infallibility here? Typical subjective definitions will not do. Perhaps, borrowing from
Alston, we can define infallibility in this way: "With regard to a specified class or type
of proposition, satisfaction of the belief condition and failure of the tru th condition is
n ot a possibility."493 And because infallibility in (TUT) relates to the source of the
knowledge rather than the knower, such a quality has little to do with whether o r not
one chooses to believe that which is known.
But, secondly, there is more to (TUT) than infallibility. We want also to
include incorrigibility such that this kind of infallible knowledge is knowledge the
content about which it is impossible for one to err and, conversely, it is impossible for
it to be shown to be in error. So (SDj) above relates both to infallibility as well as to
I refer to it here for those who would like an interpretation differing from the one we will give
below.
4,3 Alston, Epistemic Justification, 291 and Note B, 314.
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the related notion of incorrigibility.''94
Perhaps the most striking sentence in all of Calvin’s Institutes is the one with
which he began every version, "Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true
sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves."495
Calvin goes on to articulate what he means by this, e.g., "...our very being is nothing
but subsistence in the one God"496 and "...it is certain that man never achieves a clear
knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon G od’s face, and then descends
from contemplating him to scrutinize himself."497 There is, in Calvin, a symbiotic
relationship between knowledge of ourselves, our world and God. W ithout knowledge
of God, we cannot know either ourselves or the world.
The crux of the discussion, then, is the knowledge of God the Creator. And
Calvin leaves no doubt as to his understanding of such. Calvin makes plain that God
"daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As a consequence,
men cannot open their eyes w ithout being compelled to see him." And further Calvin
declares that "there is no spot in the universe wherein you cannot discern at least some
sparks of his glory."498 But not only does the entirety of the universe clearly display
494 "Indubitability" is another notion often related both to infallibility and incorrigibility.
However, for various reasons, including the noetic effects of sin, the knowledge of God as
infallible and incorrigible, need not be, nor can it be considered to be, indubitable.
4.5 John Calvin Institutes o f the Christian Religion John T. McNeill, ed., Ford Lewis Battles,
trans. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), two volumes, I.i.l.
4.6 Ibid.
497 Ibid., I.i.2.
4,8 Ibid., I.v.1.
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the true God, but man himself, both within and without, displays and reveals God.
"H ow detestable, I ask you, is this madness: that man, finding G od in his body and soul
a hundred times, on this very pretense of excellence denies that there is a God?"4” In
effect, then, by virtue of creation, man knows God. "Since, therefore, men one and all
perceive that there is a God and that he is their Maker, they are condemned by their
ow n testim ony because they have failed to honor him..."500
W ithout surveying all that has been written by and about Calvin on this matter,
it will be helpful simply to point to one such work.501 Dowey discusses Calvin’s notion
of the duplex cognitio Dom ini. And though he indicates that Calvin’s sensus is not
comprehensively defined by him, there are aspects to it that are certain.502 Speaking of
the fact that Calvin varies his terminology somewhat, Dowey nevertheless affirms that
...in spite of the varied terminology, we must insist again that the noetic element
does exist. This is knowledge o f God (emphasis mine). It is not a mere notion, or
presentiment, and it does not originate from within us. Were the knowledge
element not clearly present, this primitive feeling might be interpreted in terms
of mere subjectivity and by its vagueness might be said to have some other
source than God. ...[I]t is quite clear that "God himself has endued all men with
some knowledge of his deity." This knowledge issues in a proposition: "God
exists..."503
The most telling and insurmountable problem which Plantinga faces, as we saw above,
Ibid., I.v.4.
500 Ibid., I.iii.l.
501 Edward A. Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge o f God in Calvin's Theology (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1952).
502 Ibid., 50.
503 Ibid., 52.
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is that he assumes Calvin to be speaking of a tendency or a capacity rather than of
knowledge.504 If Calvin’s notion is simply one of tendency, and if it is a tendency that
grounds the rationality of basic belief, then Plantinga must show w hy it could not just
as well be argued that any tendency, once realized, gives grounds to proper basicality.
Could a tendency to believe that everyone is out to get me make my belief both proper
and basic? Does a tendency to think that the universe is a product of chance plus
m atter make such a belief rational and basic, w ithout need of prepositional evidence?
Once Plantinga views the proper basicality of theistic belief as relying, at least in part,
on a tendency, he gives the notion of tendency more weight than it is able to bear,
both for rationality and further for truth.
The sensus divinitatis, therefore, should not be seen as a simple tendency to belief,
as Plantinga has framed it, but rather it should be seen as clear and unequivocal
knowledge o f God, which knowledge serves to render man w ithout excuse before God.
And not only is the sensus knowledge, but it is universal knowledge, so that all have it
and all are responsible for what they do w ith it.
But does this not simply serve to strengthen rather than weaken Plantinga’s push
for theistic belief as properly basic? Does this notion not simply guarantee theistic
belief a place alongside other basic beliefs such as perceptual and other minds beliefs?
N o, and for at least two reasons.
504 This is all the more striking given the fact that Plantinga, in "Reason and Belief in God,"
65-66, for example, quotes Calvin as affirming that God implants in us an "awareness," an
"understanding," a "perceiving," a "conviction," an "inscription on the heart," and a being
"compelled to see." These terms and phrases speak more toward knowledge than toward some
sort of propensity.
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First, the sensus divinitatis is knowledge. It is not mere belief, nor is it primarily
circumstance-dependent.505 If we follow Calvin, the correlative to the sensus divinitatis
is self-consciousness. Once one is self-consciousness, one is, at the same time, G od
conscious.506 Thus we can say that all who are self-conscious know God.
Furthermore, this knowledge that all people have of G od is made effectual (or
could we even say "justified"?) by God himself. This puts such knowledge in a unique
category among kinds of knowledge. As such, this knowledge need not be inferred
from other beliefs. It is "inborn," "implanted." Thus, following Dowey, the
proposition, "God exists" is in the mind w ithout recourse to anything other than
consciousness. And as given by God, this knowledge is guaranteed to be infallible. It
is not a knowledge that could be errant. It is not a knowledge that lacks clarity or
precision, at least for the purposes for which it is given. It is a clear and present
knowledge, giving us tru th concerning who G od is. Thus, we leave the realm and
discussion of belief and speak here of that which is known.
As knowledge, and infallible knowledge at that, the sensus provides a sure and
505 Plantinga does say that die sensus divinitatis may produce knowledge, but only in certain
circumstances and under certain conditions. Thus, the sensus may lead to knowledge but does
not, as such, include knowledge.
Furthermore, in saying that it is not circumstance-dependent I am assuming that the one
who has this knowledge exists and is self-conscious. In that sense it is dependent on creation.
Given one’s existence, however, one has, regardless of circumstances, knowledge of God.
506 There are admitted perplexities here, which Calvin himself saw. For example, which
comes first, self-knowledge or God-knowledge? Calvin was net sure, it seems. But further
questions come to mind. What does it mean to be self-conscious? Is Plantinga’s fourteen year
old theist self-conscious? Presumably he is, and thus he is also God-conscious. Does self-
consciousness come in degrees? If so, does God-consciousness come in degrees as well? These
are important questions, beyond the scope of what we need here. Suffice it to say at this point
that when discussing this matter we have in mind an adult whose cognitive functions are
normal.
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certain foundation, universal in its scope and inerrant in its content, for our believing
and knowing of other facts, properly basic and otherwise. Resting on the certainty of
knowledge of God’s existence, the rest of what we claim to believe and know relates
itself both to the character and to the content of this sensus?*7 Knowledge of God comes
to us through creation and is itself dynamic. As such, it guarantees a certain continuity
with our knowledge of the world, other people and ourselves. As the presupposition
behind other beliefs and knowledge, the sensus must be seen as revelation and not as, in
the first place, ratiocination. This is at least a part of what the apostle Paul wants to
tell us.
5.22 Paul
The best that Plantinga’s REP can offer thus far is a somewhat arbitrary and
relativistic notion of the proper basicality of theistic belief. He has attempted to place
theistic belief within the context of other beliefs that (at least most) people hold,
thereby (he hopes) liberating theistic belief from the scrutiny which other, inferred,
beliefs seem to demand. But we have seen above that such an approach will not suffice,
either due to the question-begging nature of such a view or to its insufficiency to
accommodate what theism entails. Therefore, we have posited (TUT) as solid
epistemological ground. And we have seen above that Calvin himself understood our
507 And here we reach the subject of what could be another entire project, i.e., how does the
warrant of that which we believe relate to that which we know in this sensus? Or, more
specifically, how does every person’s knowledge of, say, the absolute rationality of God relate
to one’s warrant of a given fact? There seems to be a connection here but, at this point, it shall
remain imprecise.
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knowledge of God as inextricably linked w ith our knowledge o f ourselves. This
knowledge is not just another form of parity thesis, but rather is designed to show that
no further knowledge or belief is possible apart from the knowledge of God.
And now we need to move one step further in our argument for (TUT). We
will note below that CTUT) finds its ground, not exclusively but primarily, in Paul’s
epistle to the Romans, chapter one, beginning in verse eighteen.50® Though there are
many crucial and vital truths contained in this passage, we will, in this section, have to
restrict ourselves to those truths that relate themselves more or less directly to the
epistemological problem at hand.
W hile Paul’s discussion in this section is not to provide an adequate
epistemology, he does, nevertheless, provide some of the principles sufficient to ground
our epistemological endeavor. In verse eighteen and following, the fact is set out that it
is of the very essence of being a self-conscious person to know the G od who created all
things. The sensus divinitatis finds its infallible description in the pages of Scripture.
The dynamic of Paul’s description of universal culpability can be described in
various ways, with differing emphases. There are, however, certain elements that are
abundantly clear in the text.
Generally speaking we could say that one of the main points in this passage is to
assert th at there is no one on the face of the earth who will be able, for example, (pace
Russell) to say to God on that day, "Not enough evidence!" N o t only so, and this is
50! I realize that one who appeals to divine revelation when doing (theistic) philosophy is
suspect. However, it seems to me that, aside from the irrationality inherent in such a position,
the aversion to divine revelation is historically naive at best and intellectually arrogant at worst.
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the second point, neither will anyone be able to say to God, "I never knew you.” Paul
tells his readers clearly that knowledge of G od is a universal condition of hum anity
(yvovrec; top deop, v. 21). And w ithout looking now at how mankind responds to that
knowledge, it will be helpful to explain some of the aspects of that knowledge that
serve, in some sense, to ground a Christian epistemology.
First of all, Paul sets forth the fact that the knowledge of G od is clear in all
men. This knowledge (yvuarop, v. 19) that all have is "evident," (<f>avep6u in the Greek,
manifestum in the Latin). This is not some shrouded, obscure notion or sense that
something, somewhere might be out there. It is clear and unequivocal knowledge.
And it is knowledge that is in (ei>) man, for G od has made it plain (k<t>avepuioep, v. 19)
to man, which leads to our next point.
This knowledge that all have of G od is knowledge that God has given to all
people and not knowledge that people have generated quite apart from anything or
anyone else and exclusively by their own powers. The implication of what Paul is
telling us here is that this knowledge is given by God and has little or nothing to do
w ith ou r disposition or conducivity toward it. As a m atter of fact, as we will see in the
next chapter, when this knowledge is taken by us, we immediately and by nature
pervert and distort it to our own peril. But the point Paul is making is that it is true
knowledge of God, a knowledge the tru th (aXrideiccv, v. 18) of which we suppress
(KocrexoPTOjv, v. 18). And obviously one cannot suppress what one does not first have.
So the knowledge of God which we have is a clear knowledge given to us by God
himself.
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But Paul says more about this knowledge of God. He tells us something of its
specific contents. Again, it goes far beyond a mere notion that some supreme being
exists somewhere. Paul says that all people everywhere know G od’s "invisible
attributes, eternal power and divine nature" (v. 20). W ithout bringing in all the
relevant exegetical data concerning the details of Paul’s tripartite category, suffice it to
say, with Charles Hodge, that Paul intends to include here "all the divine
perfections."509 In other words, had Paul desired to delineate only specific attributes
know n about God, he would have done so. However, his list is intended to be all-
inclusive so that, we could say, while it may not be the case that all people everywhere
know everything about God, it is certainly the case that all people everywhere know all
the divine perfections of God, including his aseity, his immutability, his sovereignty, his
providence, his holiness, goodness, truth, etc. Furthermore, if we move a bit further
through this chapter and into the next, we notice that all people everywhere know
something of the ordinances of God (v. 32) and, as chapter two makes clear, something
of the law of God (w . 14-15).510 And it is helpful to remember here that this
knowledge comes by way of revelation. It is knowledge that people could not have
unless God so chooses to reveal it. And it is knowledge that comes by way of
something else, creation.
509 Charles Hodge, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm.
B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1950), 37.
510 One wonders at this point if the content of (TUT) is much broader and specific than has
been assumed in the past. Perhaps rather than assuming a broad category of properly basic
beliefs, one should contend for a broad category of infallible and incorrigible knowledge based
on Paul’s discussion of what we have called (TUT).
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G od could surely choose to communicate himself to us in an almost infinite
num ber of ways. O ne of the ways that he has chosen to communicate to us is through
language, using people to write down that which the H oly Spirit inspires. Thus, in the
writing of Scripture we have as essential elements human language, human people and
the third person of the Trinity, God the Holy Spirit. In this universal theistic
knowledge, however, we have a broader vehicle for a broader knowledge. One of the
ways in which God has insured that this knowledge of him is both given and constant
is that it comes to us through creation, which includes all but God himself. This kind
of revelation from God has been given since the creation of the world, and further,
th ro u g h the things that have been made (onto icrioeag koo/io v ro lq iro irm a o iv, v. 20).
We can further clarify (TUT), then, in this way. We have already noted that it
is infallible knowledge. We can now see that it is such because of its source, God
himself, and its purpose, i.e., G od’s gracious revelation of himself to all people. We
have also seen (TUT) as consisting of incorrigible knowledge. Because this knowledge
is knowledge of God and because it is God who both gives it and insures its status as
knowledge, it is impossible for one who knows God in this way to be in error about
such knowledge and, moreover, it is impossible for someone to show that this
knowledge is in error. In this way, (TUT) can be seen as an epistemic presupposition
behind any and every other form of belief or knowledge.
For example, w hy is it that Plantinga, Sennett, McLeod and others continue to
postulate perceptual beliefs, other minds beliefs, memory beliefs as universally properly
basic? As we saw above, those who hold such things can never move beyond a mere
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arbitrary reason for such a position. If the reason is, just to use one example, that
"most people believe these things without needing to support them," then the thesis is
subject to the whims of the majority. O r if, as Plantinga wants to do, one tries to
support one’s view of a properly basic belief by way of induction, then one’s belief is
only as strong as the agreement between those who are collecting the facts, the
interpretation of the facts and the inferences reached by way of the facts. But, of
course, Plantinga has already recognized that a Christian’s sample set may be far
different from Bertrand Russell’s or Madelyn Murray O ’Hare’s, but that is irrelevant (at
least to Plantinga). Thus, while wanting to postulate the (at least possible) universal
proper basicality of theism, Plantinga can only resort to a universal tendency, implanted
by God, of which some may and some may not take advantage.
But w ith (TUT), the reason for wide agreement among properly basic beliefs
becomes m ore obvious. Indeed, only with (TUT) can any kind of wide agreement be
justified o r substantiated. Because the knowledge of God which all men have is given
by G od through the things that are made, it is implied that the things that are made will
be known alongside o f the knowledge o f God. This is, at least in part, what Calvin meant
when he made the knowledge o f God and of ourselves somewhat correlative. His was
no parity thesis. He was recognizing the epistemological necessity (as revealed by God)
of knowledge of creation with knowledge of God. The reason, therefore, that we can
know ourselves is because as creatures of God we must know him and the most
immediate and immediately relevant vehicle through which we know him is ourselves.
Furtherm ore, the reason that perceptual beliefs and other minds beliefs are so
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readily and (almost) immediately taken as knowledge by most people is that they are
the most pervasive and comprehensive way in which the ever-imposing and ever-
renewing revelation of the knowledge of God makes its way to us.511 N ot only can
(and must?) properly basic beliefs be accounted for on the basis of (TUT), but the
rejection of such can be accounted for as well.
And finally, notions of deception can be ascertained and the skeptic answered
only on the basis of (TUT).5'2 Suppose, to use one favorite example, we are victims of
what is called the "new evil demon problem" that we saw in chapter three.513 H ow
then can we know anything under this scenario? Given (TUT), ou r universal
knowledge of God comes to us from God through creation. And no m atter how
distorted we make that which we experience, the knowledge of G od contained in that
experience comes to us as knowledge. It is a given that we will certainly distort that
knowledge. But it is also a given that it is knowledge that we are distorting. Further,
we need to remember that what God reveals to us is not simply some abstract
something, but he reveals all of his perfections. And because all men know all the
511 If we were able to probe the murky waters of doxastic voluntarism here we could begin
to see, just to use one example, that certain forms of schizophrenia wherein one "loses touch"
with otherwise properly basic beliefs may be more a result of one seeking to avoid the true
knowledge of God that bombards one daily by way of these beliefs. For a voluntarist
understanding of (at least some) mental illness, see, for example, Abraham Hoffer and
Humphrey Osmond, How to Live With Schizophrenia (New York: University Books, 1966) or
Thomas Szasz, The Myth o f Mental Illness (New York: Dell Press, 1960). I am indebted to an
unpublished paper by Joel Garver for this observation.
512 That is, "only on the basis of (TUT)” as delineated in this context. The bigger picture is
that all knowledge must presuppose revelation, of which (TUT) is the significant subjective
element for a nontheist.
513 This is the problem wherein our beliefs are formed reliably, but all that we think and
experience is distorted and misunderstood by an evil demon.
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perfections of God, even deception displays his character, given the fact that the demon
is a part o f G od’s creation doing his bidding, and the facts which have been distorted
by us have given to us knowledge of G od’s aseity, sovereignty, immutability, etc. O u r
ground for all knowledge, and further for all beliefs, both true and false, justified and
unjustified, is that we begin the enterprise, always and again, w ith the true and certain
knowledge of the G od and his perfections.
So how shall we contextualize (TUT) w ithin the parameters of our previous
discussions? Perhaps we can see this universal knowledge of G od as self-warranted. As
such, to use A lston’s formulation,
Every B is warranted just by virtue of being a B.514
In this form ulation, the knowledge of G od is warranted just by virtue of w hat it is,
revelation, from G od, about God, through creation, given as knowledge. But if it is
given as knowledge, then we are obviously outside the pale of the "justified true belief"
account of knowledge. Surely, however, that cannot count against us, given the
disarray such an account is in at present. Moreover, we are still w ithin the pale of
significant discussion on the matter, as Bertrand Russell himself provides some help.
Tw o quotes from Russell should suffice. In his essay, "Knowledge By Acquaintance
and Knowledge By Description," Russell explains the former in this way,
I say that I am acquainted w ith an object when I have a direct cognitive relation
to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. W hen I speak
514 Alston, Epistemic Justification, 296. Such a view of self-warrant would be true for every
revelation. Once it is believed, it is warranted just by virtue of what it is. I suspect at this
point that it is the fact of belief which Alston has in mind. What we have in mind, however, is
the nature of what it is rather than the fact of its being believed (or not). We can frame self-
warrant in this way, however, because it insures that what is warranted is also believed.
of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes
judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation.515
And elsewhere Russell notes concerning knowledge by acquaintance that,
The main consideration is undoubtedly to be derived from remembering what

’presence’ actually is. W hen an object is in my present experience, then I am
acquainted with it; it is not necessary for me to reflect upon my experience, or
to observe that the object has the property of belonging to my experience, in
order to be acquainted with it, but, on the contrary, the object itself is know n
to me w ithout the need of any reflection on my part as to its properties or
relations.516
Thus, while the "justified true belief" account of knowledge is insufficient to account
for (TUT), other plausible accounts of knowledge have been purported that can
accommodate (TUT). Even if there are no plausible accounts of the knowledge
situation that can accommodate (TUT), however, such would not count against it since
virtually no account of knowledge has met with much success in the epistemological
debates anyway.
And now it is time to turn to our next chapter and evaluate Plantinga’s TPF in
light of the present considerations.
515 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918), 209-210;
quoted in Ibid., 303.
516 Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge (New York: MacMillan Co., 1956), 167.
CH APTER 6
A NEW ER N EW REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY
6.1 Introduction
It remains for us to deal with the newest aspect of Plantinga’s REP, i.e., the
notion of warrant contained in P2P. In this chapter we will seek to analyze and amend
Plantinga’s latest developments in epistemology.
At the conclusion of his book, Sennett comments on Plantinga’s TPF.
Concerning the search for a plausible theory of epistemology that supports

[TPF], I think Plantinga’s...program is as good a start as any. However, further
research must be done into how exactly to tell a story about properly
functioning epistemic faculties that produce theistic belief.517
We can agree w ith Sennett at this point and we shall also offer some suggestions as to
h ' w to "tell a story" about some of the basic concerns of epistemology generally, and
specifically w ith regard to a Reformed epistemology.
W hat we shall offer in the remainder of this work will be parallel to the
development of the respective positions set forth by Plantinga. So, to be more specific,
in this chapter, we shall only give "suggestions," "ideas," "hints" to a fuller and more
295
296
proper development of Plantinga’s most recent published work on warrant.518 The
development o f a full-fledged critique of that w ork could easily occupy an entire book.
We will only attem pt to steer the discussion in a more appropriate direction.
In the next, concluding chapter, we shall comment on Plantinga’s third volume
on warrant (as yet unpublished and unwritten). Because his thoughts in this area are
yet to be set forth in print, our suggestions will be based somewhat on our speculative
analysis of what is to come and should therefore be read as mere conjectural
emendations. Nevertheless, there do seem to be definite patterns to which Plantinga
has com m itted himself and which, if carried through consistently, will serve to defeat a
significant element of his own project.
In chapter four, we sought to show that Plantinga’s own analysis of Christian
philosophy could provide some of the correctives for his epistemology. More
specifically, we sought to show that one who argues for theistic belief cannot afford to
ignore the definitive and pervasive nature of presuppositions in his argum ents).
Plantinga himself urges those who are Christians doing philosophy to start w ith the
existence of God in their philosophizing and thus to avoid some of the current and
accepted debates in philosophy. But even in his urging Plantinga does not go far
enough in seeing both the inevitability of presuppositional influence on any and every
epistemological system, as well as the necessity of the existence of G od as the only
presupposition which can save epistemology from a mere preference at best o r self-
511 Remember Plantinga’s contention, in WPF, 19-20, that what he proposes to offer is a
"suggestion, an idea, a hint" with regard to warranted belief. His forthright tentativeness should
be taken seriously and therefore our correctives should be seen in such a context.
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destructive relativism at worst.
M ost arguments for the existence o f God, historically at least, have employed the
principle of sufficient reason as a presupposition, which principle, as we have seen, can
never prove anything beyond a contingent god. The Reformed objection to natural
theology, therefore, runs much deeper than an epistemological objection.519
Furtherm ore, Plantinga’s notion of religious neutrality attempts to give facts and truths
to any and every epistemological theory, w hether o r not God exists. And surely such
an idea is opposed to the substance of what Plantinga wants to do. Moreover, the
implications of Plantinga’s lack of presuppositional argument led him to a mere
relativistic notion of theistic belief in which belief in God, belief in the Great Pum pkin,
o r even belief in no G od at all have (potentially, at least) the same epistemological
status; all can be, in certain circumstances, properly basic and thus warranted. Most
damaging to Plantinga’s attempt, as we saw in chapter four, are the non-Christian roots
of the position which he develops. Plantinga gives ground to unbelieving thought and
thereby attempts to incorporate theism and theistic belief w ithin the context of
unbelief. As a Christian apology, then, Plantinga’s REP fails.
But perhaps there is hope in Plantinga’s latest w ork on warrant. Perhaps he has
seen that his initial notion of permissive justification is not able to carry theistic belief
to the high ground on which he argues it should stand.520 And perhaps that is why
519 Plantinga contends, as we saw above, that the Reformers’ problem with natural theology
centered in classical foundationalism’s weaknesses.
520 We noted earlier that Plantinga’s move from intemalism to externalism in his later
warrant series is indicative of this shift. Also, Plantinga speaks of permissive justification as not
being sufficient for "positive epistemic status" in, for example, "Positive Epistemic Status and
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Plantinga turns his concerns from one’s epistemic rights and epistemic duty to proper
function and design plan, clearly a move designed to bring a more objective analysis to
bear on the problem of theistic belief. However, Plantinga’s notion of proper function
needs itself to be rooted in a presuppositional analysis if what is hoped for is anything
more than, at most, a generic description with little o r no specifics. In our analysis,
therefore, of Plantinga’s latest notion of warrant, we will seek to add those elements
that will be necessary for such a notion to have any hope of success.
6.2 W arrant and a Presuppositional Dilemma
A Christian transcendental analysis will seek to reason from the impossibility of
the opposite. That is, it will seek to show that unless the Christian position is
presupposed, no position, theory, idea, concept o r state of affairs can be consistently or
rationally maintained.521 This obviously needs some clarification.
First of all, what is meant by "the Christian position?" W hen we speak of "the
Christian position" it will suffice to think of such in its central and essential elements.522
Among those elements would be the fact and attributes of Scripture and creation as
Proper Function," 9.
521 And, of course, we have seen enough by now to know that "rationally maintained" must
itself be understood within a Christian-theistic context.
522 It is difficult to ascertain the criteria by which one could distinguish between that which
is "central and essential" and that which is peripheral. This becomes all the more difficult when
it is recognized that all the elements of Christianity cohere and interrelate. There is, to use one
example, a sense in which the Christian doctrine of baptism is central to the position itself.
However, without engaging the debate over central/peripheral doctrines, let us say for our
purposes here that the first eight chapters of the Westminster Confession of Faith set forth a
certain pedagogical, presuppositional and even epistemological priority of those doctrines that
are central and essential to the Christian position.
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G od’s revelation, the existence, character and attributes of God, the universe as created
and sustained by God, the fall of man into sin, G od’s solution to the fall through
redemption in Jesus Christ and those elements entailed by the above. In speaking of
"the Christian position," then, these should all be kept in mind, one requiring and
entailing the other, and all of central importance, no m atter which is explicitly stated.
Secondly, on what basis can one argue from the impossibility of the opposite?
First and foremost, such an argument presupposes the, at least, possibility (if not
essential accuracy) of the position held. If one seeks to show that another position is
impossible, one is assuming that one’s position is, in fact, possible.523
W ithin the context of the Christian position, however, a much stronger claim is
being made. The claim from the Christian perspective is not that the Christian position
is merely possible, but rather that any other position is impossible and thus no other
position can provide the necessary conditions for knowledge o r for experience.524 We
do not want to say, then, that the Christian position is merely possible, in the
philosophical sense commonly understood in that its negation is not necessary, but
rather we want to say that it is necessary such that its negation is not possible.52S And
furtherm ore, within the Christian position alone resides the necessary conditions for
523 Bee?use the transcendental method has its first systematic expression in Kant, the notions
of possibility and impossibility refer there, as here, not to that which is currently discussed in
modal logic and possible worlds semantics, but rather to that which is the necessary condition
of kn'vn'!edge or experience. This should be kept in mind throughout our discussion.
524 And this will have radical ramifications for the warrant situation.
525 Of course, this does not mean that people cannot verbally deny the Christian position.
What it does mean is that any fact, any experience, be it a denial of Christianity or otherwise,
presupposes the Christian position itself.
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know ledge, belief and experience and thus it justifies the same. T his w ill be seen as we
discuss th e specifics o f P lantinga’s view o f w arrant below.
6.21 T h e D ilem m a
Before moving to the specifics, however, it is necessary now to frame Plantinga’s
entire discussion on warrant by placing that discussion within the context of its
presupposition. Plantinga himself seems not to do this, to his detriment. As was
m entioned before, he seems to see epistemology as sufficient unto itself to provide its
own grounds both for warrant and for knowledge. Because of that erroneous view,
Plantinga’s view on warrant seriously and (we would say) fatally compromises the
Christian position.
Plantinga’s presupposition with regard to his TPF can be seen throughout his
discussion, though the material on the design plan brings it out most clearly.
The question is whether the claim that our faculties can function properly or
improperly (the claim that our faculties have a design plan) - the question is
w hether this claim entails that we really have been designed by some personal
rational being such as God. The question is whether, on my account of warrant,
the proposition that some belief has warrant for you or someone entails theism
o r something like it. O f course, the question isn’t exactly that: for such a
proposition might trivially entail theism, by virtue of the fact that (as the theist
thinks) theism is a necessary truth. (If so, then any proposition will entail
theism, just as any proposition entails that there are prime numbers greater than
1000.) Alternatively, perhaps theism itself is not a necessary truth, but (as the
theist may also think) it is a necessary truth that all contingent beings (God
apart) have been created directly o r indirectly by God. (Then any proposition
predicating knowledge o r any other property of someone distinct from God
would entail theism.)526
Plantinga goes on, then, to state the "real question," i.e., whether there is a satisfactory
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naturalistic explanation o r analysis of the notion of proper function.527
Though Plantinga will conclude that there can be no satisfactory analysis of the
notion of proper function w ithout a concomitant notion of supematuralism in
metaphysics, his discussion of this entire m atter provides no real impetus tow ard the
Christian position. Plantinga sees the knowledge situation as able to provide its own
rationale, or better, as we have said, as self-sufficient. Notice in the quote above that
one of Plantinga’s options w ith respect to the existence of God is that it is a fact among
other facts and as such is only trivially entailed by any other proposition in the same
way that any proposition entails that there are prime numbers greater than 1000. How,
then, is it possible for Plantinga to give presuppositional significance to the fact of
G od’s existence? It simply is not, and we suspect that Plantinga is not concerned at this
point w ith such a thing. Presumably, therefore, as we have seen in earlier chapters,
Plantinga is assuming that the knowledge situation can be wholly explained by
reference to itself, i.e., if our cognitive faculties are functioning properly in an
epistemically appropriate environm ent (along with his other qualifiers), then our
knowledge is warranted.
There are at least tw o fatal problems with this supposition of the self-sufficiency
of knowledge, one of which is recognized by Sennett and on which we will elaborate,
the other of which we have spoken above and will comment on again.
First, as we have seen, Sennett sees Plantinga’s latest position on w arrant as
affirming the following,
527 Ibid.
302
(3) If God exists, then some theistic beliefs are warranted
and
(4) If God exists, then some basic theistic beliefs are warranted,52*
and then Sennett goes on to point out that "Plantinga has argued that defense of (3) or
(4) is the best that can be done by the epistemologist. Argument over the comm on
antecedent of these is the task of the metaphysician or theologian."529
If Sennett’s analysis is correct at this point, then Plantinga’s TPF allows for an
entire philosophical enterprise, i.e., epistemology, to be explained and maintained
w ithout resolving the question of God’s existence and perhaps even if God does not
exist. There is, then, according to Sennett’s view of Plantinga, a philosophical
discipline that has no need for the existence of G od in order to be known.
Those familiar w ith the history of apologetics, particularly in the Thom istic
tradition, will notice similarities with such a tradition in the above sum m ation.530 If we
can frame the discussion within that context, we could say that Plantinga’s argument
for basic theistic belief suffers from an irreconcilable presupposition of both nature and
iU Sennett, MPR, 156.
529 Ibid.
510 Or could we say that Plantinga’s formulations are more akin to Butler’s analogy whereby
the rationality to believe in nature makes it all the more rational to believe in supemature. We
will see a bit more of the similarity between Butler and Plantinga in chapter seven. This
similarity with Butler was brought to my attention by Robert D. Knudsen.
It would seem that there may be a presuppositional affinity between Aquinas and Butler
in this regard. Both positions must allow for an autonomous realm of interpretation as well as
a posited theism to more or less augment such a realm. Further refinements and analyses,
however, cannot detain us here.
303
grace.531 This contrast can perhaps best be understood from Plantinga himself.
So the view I propose is a radical naturalism... The view I urge is indeed best
thought of as an example of naturalistic epistemology... naturalistic
epistemology, however, is ill-named. In the first place, it is quite compatible
with, for example, supernaturalistic theism; indeed the most plausible way to
think of warrant, from a theistic perspective, is in terms of naturalistic
epistemology. And second..., naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the
context of a theistic view of human beings: naturalism in epistemology requires
supematuralism in anthropology.532
So w hat does it mean to propose a naturalistic epistemology? It means that such an
epistemology "invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences;
the only kind of normativity it invokes figures in such sciences as biology and
psychology."533 We will remember Plantinga’s point in this regard that to know that a
bird’s wing is broken or that a kidney is malfunctioning o r that a horse has a disease
"requires no strong theological commitments."53* And the primary point of Plantinga’s
T PF is to argue that warrant depends on the same kind of naturalistic normativity; as
long as one’s epistemic faculties are functioning properly (i.e., in a naturalistically
normative kind of way), and are functioning properly in an epistemically appropriate
environm ent, w ith other qualifiers, then one’s belief is warranted, and the warrant as
531 It is helpful to remember here our notion of presupposition discussed in chapter four,
i.e., that it is a religious, foundational principle assumed to be necessary for the rationale of
other nonfoundational principles. Such is the case with nature and supernature (or "grace") as
Plantinga uses them here.
532 Plantinga, WPF, 46. One will note that it is Plantinga’s language here (and elsewhere) of
theism being the "most plausible" way to think of warrant and of naturalism in epistemology
"flourishing best" within theism that shows Plantinga’s lack of transcendental thinking. Do we
really want to say that the Christian position is "simply" the best option for a rational position,
or is it the only option, any other being impossible?
533 Ibid., 194.
53* Ibid., 198.
well as th e know ledge itself require no strong theological com m itm ents.535
W ith o u t attem pting to divulge all o f the problem s inherent in such a notio n , at
least th e follow ing question is in order. O n w hat basis does Plantinga contend th a t
because, to use his example, an atheist can recognize a bird ’s broken wing, o r a horse’s
disease, o r a k id n ey ’s m alfunction, th at he can also recognize the p ro p er functioning o f
epistem ic faculties, and th at such recognition entails epistemological naturalism ?536 If he
replies th a t such is th e case sim ply because one w ho denies belief in G od can still have
w arranted know ledge as well as knowledge of w arrant, th en he has granted that the
know ledge situation does n o t require th a t one know G od and thus th at know ledge of
G o d is irrelevant to know ledge generally.537 If he replies th at, as a m atter o f fact, th e
535 We might want to agree with Plantinga on one level in that a non-Christian, S, can
certainly know a great deal without S committing to theism. However, if our (TUT) is true,
we must say that, as a matter of fact, there is a sense in which S is indeed (both ontically and
noetically) committed to the existence of God as known, though suppressed. But perhaps all
Plantinga wants to say is that S can have warranted belief without a conscious commitment to
theism. In line with our previous discussion and with (PJB) we must insist that i f S’s belief is
warranted, then it must be the case that warrant (or justification) can be shown. And further,
warrant cannot be shown without an appeal to the existence of the Christian God. Thus,
Plantinga’s statement is prima facie true only if ultima facie established or establish^/?.
536 A further question to be asked in this regard is whether Plantinga really wants to see
such physical maladies as analogous to the epistemic situation. If so, then the only accurate
comparison would be, for example, the proper functioning of a bird’s wing on the one hand
and the brain on the other hand. But surely there is much more involved in the epistemic
situation than biology and the natural sciences. There is also a person’s worldview and prior
(philosophical and otherwise) commitments. Plantinga recognizes this in one of his own
examples. His highly impressionable Oxford epistemologist’s student claims not to be appeared
to redly. Surely his brain seems to be working in good order. However, unlike the
epistemically serendipitous lesion, there are other, nonphysical factors at work resulting in the
student’s warped perspective. And these nonphysical factors do, contra Plantinga, require a
theological c o m m itm e n t. Thus, there seems to be equivocation between how an atheist knows
a physical malady on the one hand and an epistemic malady on the other.
537 Our (TUT) opposes this option.
305
knowledge situation does require that God exist metaphysically, then he has only
affirmed that the rationale for epistemology fits best in the realm of metaphysical
theism. O n either count, epistemology stands alone as such, and confidently so. It is,
in this construction, autonomous, a law unto itself.
A nd the generic description of this irreconcilable contention is that the
independent, "natural" realm is ruled and governed by its own laws and judged within
its ow n sphere, which sphere is atheological, and that the supernatural realm, while
perhaps influencing the natural, is beside the natural and functioning on its ow n as well.
In the case of Plantinga’s view on warrant, anyone can have warranted beliefs and can
determine if and when beliefs are warranted, regardless of whether God exists or one
believes in him. If someone wants a fuller explanation of the warrant situation, then
Plantinga offers what Sennett calls a "retreat to metaphysics" wherein he attempts to
show naturalistic metaphysics as irrational and supematuralistic metaphysics as rational.
As long as one stays w ithin the realm of epistemology, however, one is in the epistemic
clear w ith regard to warrant.538
T o put it in the presuppositional context of our nature/grace dilemma, Plantinga
is saying that a good bit (if not, at least in principle, all) of "nature" can be known
quite apart from theism, but should really be accounted for by the "grace" of an appeal
to metaphysics or theology.539 O r, even more precisely, we could say that according to
531 And how is it that one could stay within the realm of epistemology? Suppose one
affirms a theistic metaphysic. Can one maintain that such a metaphysic is outside of
epistemology and yet known?
539 Even to put it this way shows, again, that "nature" of itself must be thought to be non-
revelational, which is contrary to the actual situation.
306
Plantinga knowledge can be accounted for naturalistically, but nature can only be
accounted for supernaturalistically.5*0
This account simply will not do for a Christian, Reformed epistemology. For
example, we encounter a similar problem here that Plantinga encountered w ith the
coherentist (iiberhaupt). We will remember that one of Plantinga’s complaints against
the coherentist was that he affirms for warrant only a purely doxastic relationship and
thus does not take proper account of his environment. The example of Ric, the
Epistemically Inflexible Climber, was designed to illustrate that. But the problem that
Plantinga had w ith Ric is the same problem, though with an im portant and specific
difference, that rears its head here in Plantinga’s naturalistic epistemology. Remember
that Plantinga’s problem w ith Ric at the opera was that his beliefs were coherent but
not warranted due to the (absolute) lack of consideration of the epistemic environm ent.
In other words, coherentism failed adequately to take into account the environm ent of
the cognizer because of its purely doxastic emphasis. But the fact of the m atter remains
that, though Plantinga includes in his warrant criteria an epistemically appropriate
environm ent, he too has failed adequately to describe and account for such.
Christianity holds that it is the Creator G od who reveals himself and presents
himself to his creatures through and in his creation. A nd it further holds that such a
revelation and presentation perpetually evoke a response from his creatures whereby
540 With regard to our distinction between being justified and showing justification, is
Plantinga simply saying that one can be justified in what one knows but that showing that
justification requires metaphysics? Perhaps. But we must contend that warrant or justification
of a belief p must be shown within the context of epistemology per se. And in saying such a
thing, we must reject Plantinga’s hard distinction, as it stands, between epistemology and
metaphysics.
307
there is either acceptance of and submission to him through Jesus Christ or rejection of
and rebellion against who he is. Therefore, natural epistemology is revealed
epistemology wherein the created known, the knowledge and the know er are all,
persistently and perpetually, intricately intertwined with the revelation and knowledge
of God. To put it more accurately, any and every created "thing," be it the thing
known, the knowledge itself, o r the knower, contains and reveals as such (staying with
Plantinga’s terminology) the metaphysical, so that the knowledge situation always and
everywhere carries with it the requirement of submission to the God who reveals
himself in it all. And in this we can affirm that which McLeod considers and rejects,
i.e., the notion of supervenience. The fact of the creation of the world by God entails
that every created thing that is known, is known both as it is and as created by and
revealing the true God. To "epistemize" a true belief of p, therefore, means to
acknowledge both aspects of that to which p refers.541 So, the revelation of God clearly
and understandably supervenes on every fact, including the fact of knowledge itself.
A n d with this the deontological character o f knowledge must he asserted, contra
Plantinga. There is an epistemic duty, a requirement, if one’s knowledge is to be
justified or warranted. And the duty and requirement is that God be acknowledged,
thanked and praised in one’s knowledge and belief, as in any other situation. And the
further duty and requirement is that God be acknowledged as essentially related to and
sustainer of any and every epistemological endeavor. Thus, the only epistemically
appropriate environment is one in which God is constantly and clearly revealed and
541 This, of course, has only been complicated by the fall, as we will see below. There was
no real separation of the two aspects of knowledge in the Garden.
308
revealing. And the only naturalized epistemology is the one which sees nature as
revelation and thus, at one and the same time, both "natural" and "supernatural." Any
other view resolves itself in compromise (of the Christian position) and dialectic (of
presuppositions).
Perhaps we should see Plantinga’s view as relating more to historic deism rather
than to historic Christianity. His notion is such that the world is so constructed and
designed by God as to admit of knowledge thereof belonging naturally to man as man,
while, if one so desires, a metaphysical appeal to God may be in order.542 Thus, God,
in effect "wound up" the epistemic situation and left it to run on its own, but, if need
be for some, to be accounted for by an appeal to his design (and thus PSR enters the
picture again).
The further problem that surfaces w ith Plantinga’s naturalistic epistemology is
one that we have seen already, the problem of a supposed religious neutrality. If it is
the case that the atheist can properly discern both the criteria for warrant as well as
warranted belief, then it must be the case that such knowledge is religiously neutral. As
a m atter of fact, it must be the case that virtually all knowledge, save the knowledge of
G od (and as we saw in the discussion on religious neutrality those situations in which
we are closest to attempting to understand ourselves as human beings) is religiously
neutral. A nd if knowledge is religiously neutral then it seems we have not done the
very thing that Plantinga has warned elsewhere we must do, we have not "tested the
542 Even this is not an adequate way to express it. It is, in fact, the case that knowledge
belongs to man as man. Part of what it means to be the image of God, as we will see below, is
that m an be a knower. But the problem comes when "man as man" is thought of or defined
quite apart from the image of God.
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spirits." We have rather "invited them in just because they were decked out in the
latest academic regalia." And in so doing, the Christian faith has been compromised at
significant points for the sake of philosophical acceptability.543
And further, it is w orth noting, and perhaps most telling to Plantinga, in this
regard that if he really wants to maintain that basic theistic belief is warranted i f God
exists, then he must provide an argument o r a rationale for the existence of God in
order to show basic belief as warranted. And the minute he attempts to provide a
rationale for the existence of God, the very evidentialism that he has argued against
since the beginning of his Reformed epistemology proposal is back with a vengeance,
and necessarily so, given Plantinga’s own system. The way that one accounts for
naturalized epistemology is through supernaturalistic metaphysics; a design points to a
designer. And w ith that, Plantinga has placed himself into the camp of the enemy
w hich he has fought so intensely to avoid since the beginning of his REP.
So it seems that Plantinga’s latest TPF is immersed in a confusing and
compromising quagmire. And it seems that only a consistent application of the
Christian position will extricate Plantinga from such a difficulty. The remainder of
what we will say below will be an attempt to amend Plantinga’s TPF within the
context of Christianity in order, perhaps, to begin moving toward a newer new
Reformed epistemology.
543 Plantinga himself sees the war between the Two Cities as most intense at those points
wherein we attempt to understand ourselves as human beings. Would not the epistemic
situation demand such an intensity given that it is always directly tied both to man and to an
understanding of who we are? I must admit that I cannot reconcile Plantinga’s (Kuyperian)
notion of neutrality with its application in his epistemology.
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6.3 Creation and the Design Plan
In this section we look briefly again at Plantinga’s notion of the design plan and
seek to offer correctives and critiques that will further refine and develop such a notion.
First, according to Plantinga,
A thing’s design plan is the way the thing in question is ’supposed’ to work, the
way in which it works when it is functioning as it ought to, when there is
nothing wrong w ith it, when it is not damaged or broken or nonfunctional.
Both human artifacts and natural organisms and their parts have design plans.544
And w ithin the context of this design plan are five qualifications, which we will here
summarize and refer to again below.545 There is, first of all, the distinction between the
design plan and the max plan. Whereas the design plan specifies how a thing should
work, the max plan is m uch broader in scope and it says how a thing might behave
when it is broken o r otherwise malfunctioning. Secondly, there are unintended by
products, such as our example in chapter three of the jazz radio picking up
transmissions from low-flying aircraft. It was not intended, not designed, to do so, but
it does. Such a by-product, however, should not be seen as a part of the design plan.
Thirdly, there is functional multiplicity. Here there may be differences in the way
different parts of the design plan are aimed. Plantinga uses the example of one’s
tem perature designed to be at a certain level, yet rising when the body attempts to
attack and destroy a disease within. It is certainly designed to rise in such
circumstances, but such, a rise is due more to functional m ultiplicity than design per se.
There are also differences between a purpose and a design. A thing’s purpose might be
545 This summary will be taken from Plantinga’s discussion in Ibid., 21ff.
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thought of in terms of what a thing is designed to do and its design might be how it is
designed to accomplish its purpose. This relates to the jazz radio just after it has been
knocked to the floor and, consequently, works better because of it. Is it now broken
because it no longer functions according to my design? It would be hard to say so.
But is it functioning according to its design? It would be hard to answer affirmatively
to that as well. It is this distinction which causes Plantinga to add as a condition for
w arrant that a design plan be a good one. Fourthly, there are trade-offs and
compromises such that some of our warranted beliefs are false and sometimes the
conditions for warrant are not met but our beliefs are warranted nevertheless. Fifthly,
there can be defeaters and overriders to our otherwise warranted beliefs.
6.31 A Reformed Design Plan
N ow what should a Christian, Reformed epistemology say to such suggestions?
The first thing it should say is that no account of a design plan and its relation to
warranted belief should be given w ithout taking into consideration the fact of creation
and its correlative truths.
O ne of the problems that we have noticed w ith Plantinga’s position is that he
postulates neutrality and autonom y in epistemology. W hat that means is that,
according to him, we can know something, or at least have a warranted true belief
about something, whether o r not G od exists. However, if the biblical teaching on
revelation is true (and it is), then this account compromises Christianity in a most basic
way.
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Christianity holds that before there was anything created, there was God. And
it holds that God is from everlasting to everlasting; he had no beginning and will have
no end. In Aquinas’ terms, God’s attribute of existence is correlative to his essence.
Thus, Christianity does not contradict ex rtihilo, nihil fit, nor does it teach, strictly
speaking, creation ex nihilo. Rather, it teaches creation ex dews, creation from God.
N ow it is conceivable and possible that God could have created both the world and
man and that man could have no knowledge of God whatsoever.546 In order for such a
thing to obtain, creation would either have to reveal nothing of its Creator, or
whatever it revealed would have to be withheld from man.
The actual situation, however, is that God created the world and man, and that
he revealed himself to man by way of covenant. This covenant that G od made with
man has its foundations and primary articulation both in creation and in G od’s spoken
W ord.
It is necessary, therefore, in any discussion of epistemology, to see creation as
covenantal revelation. As a covenant, creation places on every human being an
obligation. It places on man the obligation to submit to the knowledge of G od that is
given through it547 (thus our (TUT) above) and, in submission, to acknowledge that all
things come from his sustaining and controlling hand. Thus, in the beginning, in the
Garden, Adam and Eve were created and designed both to know G od and to serve him.
546 The Westminster Confession o f Faith, chapter seven, section one, speaks of our fruition of
God as necessitating a divine condescension. Thus, grace and not justice motivated God’s
revealing himself to man by way of covenant.
547 Of course, one has such knowledge whether or not one submits to it. The submission
relates to the acknowledgment rather than the possession of such knowledge.
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A part of the command that God gave to them just after their creation was to subdue
and rule over the earth (Genesis 1:28). This command was given, not because the
creation would tend toward disarray otherwise or because it had the principle of self
corruption w ithin it, but rather it was given so that Adam and Eve might take their
place as vicegerents under God, knowing him more by serving him more, and in
serving him, giving him glory.
We could say, therefore, that the design plan of our cognitive faculties has its
origin and its interpretation in the creation of man and woman in the Garden. It
would be impossible for either Adam or Eve to subdue or rule over the earth unless
they knew that over which they should rule. O r, to put it another way, part of ruling
over the earth was, in fact, knowing it, knowing its various aspects and purposes, and
in know ing those things to enhance them to G od’s glory. Here, in the Garden, Adam
and Eve’s cognitive faculties were functioning the way that they were "supposed" to
work, functioning as they ought to, when there was nothing wrong with them, when
they were not damaged or broken or nonfunctional. This, then, is the design plan.
And how does it fare w ith respect to Plantinga’s TPF? N ot well at all.
6.32 A Reformed Design Plan and Plantinga’s TPF
First of all, Plantinga is quite right that the knowledge situation requires a
supernatural anthropology.548 But then we must ask just what it is that a supernatural
548 This notion of anthropology is one which Plantinga refers to at important junctures in
his publications and addresses (e.g., "Advice to Christian Philosophers" and "Warrant and Basic
Belief in God" both refer to the importance of anthropology for epistemology) but never quite
seems to develop. We would hope that Warranted Christian Belief will flesh out the
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anthropology requires? The answer to that question can be touched on here. Any
biblical (read "supernatural") account of man must be quick to assert the covenantal
relationship of all men to God. W hen Adam and Eve were created, they were created
in the image of God. A t least a part of that image entails that they were related to God
in such a way as to be accountable to him for the way in which they related
(epistemically and otherwise) to the world he had made.*9 Their responsibilities in the
world as G od’s revelation were set by G od’s further, spoken, revelation to them . They
were to be fruitful and multiply, they were to subdue and rule over the earth, and they
were not to eat from a particular tree which God declared forbidden.
From the beginning, therefore, there has always been natural revelation
correlative w ith supernatural revelation from God, and both have always placed
obligations on man, obligations that simply could not be carried out if either aspect of
revelation were missing. If Adam and Eve had been given G od’s command to subdue
the earth but had been given no earth, they could not have been obedient to that
command. As absurd as that sounds, even so is it absurd to think that all Adam and
Eve needed in the Garden for obedience was the Garden itself. O n the contrary, what
they needed along w ith the Garden was G od’s word to them both about the Garden
and their behavior in it. To be made in G od’s image, therefore, meant, at least, to be
accountable to him in a way that the rest of creation was not. This accountability is a
implications of anthropology for epistemology.
549 As we will see below, it is the fact of the distorted image of God because of the fall that
allows for the post-fall complication wherein one might know something, but without
justification. Thus, we would say in this context that knowledge cannot be justified true belief.
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significant aspect of G od’s covenant with Adam and Eve.
N ow let us suppose that Adam and Eve are going about in the Garden seeking
to be epistemically obedient to God. They walk by the forbidden tree, and w hat do
they think? Do they simply think that the tree before them is a tree like any other
tree so that to have warranted knowledge of the tree is simply to see the tree as a tree?
Do they say to each other, furthermore, that as long as their posterity see that tree as a
tree, it will suffice? Surely to see the tree as anything other than forbidden is to see the
tree in opposition to what God has declared it to be. And do we say that if Adam and
Eve see the tree as simply a tree, just so long as their epistemic faculties are working
properly (which they are because sin is not a factor), etc. that they know the tree, or
that their knowledge of the tree is warranted? H ow could they be affirmed in their
knowledge of the tree if their knowledge eliminates what God has said of the tree?
O r conversely, how could they know any tree as a tree and not as a rock or a
snake unless God created them to know such a thing? D o they know these things
simply because their cognitive faculties are functioning properly in an epistemically
appropriate environm ent, with other qualifiers? Perhaps. But what could proper
function mean apart from the creative and sustaining work and w ord of God? Is
proper function merely, for Plantinga, the knowledge of the world without the word?
W hat w ould such knowledge entail? At the very least it would seem to entail, were it
possible, crass rebellion in that what was know n of the forbidden tree would run
contrary to G od’s identification of it. Thus the knowledge of the prohibited tree is
meaningless w ithout all other trees and the knowledge of how to act and w ork and
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think toward all other trees is itself dependent on the word of God. Thus also,
God did not give his prohibition so that man might be obedient merely with
respect to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that merely at one
particular moment of time. He gave the prohibition so that man might learn to
be self-consciously obedient in all that he did with respect to all things and
throughout all time. Man was meant to glorify God in the "lower" as much as
in the "higher" dimensions of life. Man’s act with respect to the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil was to be but an example to himself of what he
should or should not do with respect to all other trees.550
Returning to Plantinga’s notion, then, to say that one’s belief is warranted or
that one knows p whether or not God exists would be tantam ount to Adam and Eve
saying that their knowledge of the trees of the Garden is warranted whether o r not
God exists and whether or not he created and sustains them. It would be for them to
set forth the idea that as long as their cognitive faculties were working properly, in the
epistemically appropriate Garden, and were aimed at truth551, their beliefs in the Garden
were warranted. And perhaps they would even say to God as they walked w ith him in
the Garden in the cool of the day that their understanding of warrant worked best if, in
fact, he exists but, whether o r not he exists, there is a way for their belief in the trees
to be warranted belief, if true.
The awkwardness of the above scenario is calculated to highlight the relationship
of m an’s creation in the image of God and its relationship to the knowledge situation.
Man is a covenant being, always and everywhere confronted w ith the face of G od in
every fact. And if confronted with the face of God in every fact, then truly to know
550 Cornelius Van Til, "Nature and Scripture" in The Infallible Word (Phillipsburg, New
Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1946), 270.
551 And the question of truth here is of central importance.
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the fact is to know it for what it is and as it is. This much seems obvious. It is not
the case that the trees of the Garden are first know n as trees and only later, perhaps, as
trees created by and revealing their Creator, and even more so if what one seeks is an
apology for theistic belief. Rather it is the case that, without the Creator, there is no
tree nor is there knowledge of the tree in the first place.552 Adam and Eve, as image
bearers and vicegerents of God, would not, could not, separate their knowledge of the
trees from their knowledge of God. For them, the proper functioning of their
cognitive faculties, as well as an epistemically appropriate environment, necessitated a
theistic (rather than a naturalized) epistemology in that God was as necessary for the
knowledge situation per se, as for any "metaphysical" addendum as well. O r better,
there simply was no epistemology that was not, at one and the same time,
metaphysical. There was no tree, but only a created and God-revealing tree. And there
was no knowledge, but only created and God-revealing knowledge. And every fact in
the Garden imposed its obligation to be known in such a way. The gift of being
created in G od’s image and of being placed in the Garden, under God, brought the
obligation to Adam and Eve to rule only to his glory and for his sake. Therefore, a
supernatural anthropology disallows and negates a naturalistic epistemology, at least in
the original situation.
But surely Plantinga knows this. And perhaps his five qualifiers in the warrant
552 Perhaps this is what Plantinga means above when he states that "any proposition
predicating knowledge or any other property of someone distinct from God would entail
theism." However, if so, why does he refuse, in two volumes, to assert the fact that any and
every aspect of knowledge or belief entails theism, in that the knowledge of God is essential to
it, rather than simply asserting that (naturalized) epistemology should lead one to supernatural
metaphysics? What kind of requirement is this?
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situation are meant to address the fact that, whatever the case in the Garden, our
epistemic situation is a far cry from the one which Adam and Eve experienced. So it is
incum bent upon us to th ink next of the effects of the fall for epistemology, generally,
and w arrant more specifically.
6.4 W arrant and the Fall
Recall that the first indication that we have of a developing view of warrant in
Plantinga’s epistemology comes from his article, "Justification and Theism."
Significantly, it is in that article that Plantinga recognizes at least the possibility of
counting the noetic effects of sin as epistemically important. At the end of the article,
Plantinga mentions further relevant topics related to his (at this point, new) view of
positive epistemic status. He says,
O u r spiritual forebears at Princeton used to speak of the noetic effects o f sin.

Clearly (from a Christian perspective) sin has had an im portant effect upon the
function of ou r cognitive faculties; but just how does this w ork and how does it
bear on specific questions about the degree of positive epistemic status enjoyed
by various beliefs?553
We have seen that the original situation in the Garden necessitated the existence
and character of G od in order for Adam and Eve to have any knowledge of anything.
But then Adam and Eve fell from their original state and the world, including man,
changed. And the change that took place brought a multitude of complications to the
knowledge situation.
It must first be recognized that the fall of m an into sin affected not only his will
553 Alvin Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 4 (October
1987): 425.
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but his intellect as well. This is what Plantinga is referring to above when he speaks of
the noetic effects of sin. Sin affected the mind so that what was affirmed and practiced
before the fall, with respect to knowledge, was now suppressed and replaced. A nd sin’s
affect on the mind means that the original knowledge situation is far different from the
way in which it was originally designed to be. Or, we could say, whereas there was
proper functioning of epistemic faculties before the fall, at least a part of what the fall
means is that proper functioning has been thwarted. N ot only so, but the environm ent
which was epistemically appropriate prior to the entrance of sin in the world is now, at
least in some sense, epistemically inappropriate (because creation itself fell when man
sinned). If such is indeed the case, then Plantinga’s "Justification and Theism" should
have started, rather than ended, w ith the reality of the noetic effects of sin.
Correctives, therefore, are in order and we will look at them from three different
angles.
6.41 Calvin, the Fall and Proper Function
First, because Plantinga has seen the development of his epistemology as
including the Reformed tradition, it would be helpful briefly to refer again to Calvin.554
N ote first of all one of Calvin’s more explicit statements on the m atter of the fall’s
effects on knowledge generally and knowledge of God.
H ow detestable, I ask you, is this madness: that man, finding G od in his body
554 Though Plantinga has moved from the denotation of his epistemology as "Reformed,"
recall that volume three of his series on warrant promises to deal with the relationship of
warrant to the sensus divinitatis and the testimonium Spiritus Sancti, both of which reside within
the Reformed tradition.
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and soul a hundred times, on this very pretense of excellence denies that there is
a God?555
And further,
...for nothing is more preposterous than to enjoy the very remarkable gifts that
attest the divine nature within us, yet to overlook the A uthor who gives them
to us at our asking.556
And to summarize Calvin on this matter, he affirms that those who respond sinfully to
the revelation of G od through nature "use nature as a cloak" and "substitute nature for
God."557
This small sampling from Calvin is significant for at least tw o reasons. First and
of lesser importance, the sections from which we have quoted are contained
immediately after the sections from which Plantinga quotes to support his attem pt to
see his earlier epistemology as Reformed.558 It appears either that Plantinga should have
read further in Calvin or that his references to Calvin should be taken as incomplete, at
best.
Secondly, however, these quotes from Calvin serve to frame the situation in
which man finds himself after the fall. And, contra Plantinga, Calvin and all his
interpreters are agreed as to the reason for Calvin’s rejection of natural theology, and it
does not include an "inchoate rejection of classical foundationalism," as Plantinga wants
to maintain. So, in section twelve of Book one, chapter five, the title is, "The
555 Calvin, Institutes, I.v.4.
556 Ibid., I.v.6.
557 Ibid., I.v.4.
558 Plantinga’s citations from Calvin come from I.v.l and I.v.2.
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manifestation of God is choked by human superstition and the error of the
philosophers," and concerning, primarily, those philosophers, Calvin says,
Yet hence it appears that if men were taught only by nature, they would hold to
nothing certain or solid o r clear-cut, but would be so tied to confused principles
as to worship an unknow n god.559
And in the footnote referring to this text, the editor remarks that while there is
disagreement as to the application of natural theology ro Christians, such is not the case
w ith regard to natural theology as such.
Natural theology (human reasoning about God, under the conditions of sin,
unaided by special revelation) has been the subject of this chapter through
section 12. All scholars agree that the above words present Calvin’s verdict
upon it, held consistently in all his writings.560
So it is not as though Plantinga would have to search long and hard for the
reason for Calvin’s rejection of natural theology; nor is it the case that Calvin has been
inconsistent in his view or that he speaks in shadows. His position is clear; to be
taught by nature alone produces sinful worship, in a word, idolatry and thus to appeal
to such reasoning is religiously apostate. Calvin’s rejection of natural theology was due
to his analysis of the effects of the fall together with his understanding of the pervasive
nature of religious motivations (presuppositions) in fallen man.
Thus Calvin’s position seems clear and clearly different from Plantinga’s
interpretation both of it and of its application to epistemology. Calvin views it as
reprehensible that one could use the very gifts given by G od to deny him . He sees any
such attem pt as substituting nature for God. It would seem, then, that the only
559 Ibid., I.v.12
540 Ibid., 66, n. 41.
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recourse available to man would be to acknowledge the One who gives to him
knowledge while acknowledging as well the gift of knowledge as given by God. M an’s
responsibility after the fall is to affirm, as Van Til says, that "the knowledge that we
have of the simplest objects of the physical universe is still based upon the revelational
activity of God"561 and thus to see all knowledge as such by virtue of God and his plan.
This Plantinga does not do. And in his failure to account for the religious nature of
knowledge, he fails as well to account for an adequate view of proper function.
6.42 Sin as an Epistemological Category
The second angle from which to view Plantinga’s epistemology, and building on
the first above, comes to us in a fine analysis by Merold Westphal entitled, "Taking St.
Paul Seriously: Sin as an Epistemological Category."562 One of W estphal’s contentions
in this article is to assert that Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology, while showing the
failure of foundationalism, does not take advantage of the unique opportunity such an
epistemology would have to make sin an essential epistemological category.563 And
561 Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 283.
562 In Thomas P. Flint, Christian Philosophy, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1990).
563 Ibid., 211. Westphal is content, it seems, with Plantinga’s refutation of foundationalism
via modus tollens, i.e., if foundationalism is true, then p must be abandoned as irrational; but p
is more obviously rational than any known refutation of it; therefore, foundationalism is not
true. Put in just this way, there seems to be a close affinity with Plantinga’s refutation of
foundationalism coupled with his consequent affirmation of the rationality of theistic belief and
the apologetical approach of Bishop Butler mentioned above. If so, then Plantinga, like Butler,
has no way to account for that which is known or is rational and thus we are back to the
beginning problem, but see below. Again, I am indebted to Robert D. Knudsen for bringing
this affinity to my attention.
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Westphal has specific problems, too, w ith Plantinga’s understanding of Calvin’s sensus.
Whereas Plantinga wants to see Calvin as asserting that the disposition to believe in
God is universally present, though partially suppressed,5*4 Westphal understands Calvin
to be saying that none of us comes naturally to the knowledge of G od because the
tendency to believe is universally, and not just partially, suppressed.565 And we would
go on to add, in this regard, that the universal suppression of the tru th of knowing God
manifests itself in the substitution of another idol in the place of God, be it an
assumption that knowledge is independent, or that m an’s ability to reason is not
affected by the fall, etc. So, says Westphal,
This does not seem to me to be a good example of taking Paul seriously. In

[Plantinga’s] epistemology creation does a full day’s work, while the fall is only
asked to put in a cameo appearance. It is rather different w ith Paul. For him
creation does not serve to assure us that we naturally have innocent beliefs. And
he appeals to our sinful suppression of the truth about G od to insist that we do
not, and he invokes creation to illuminate, not the innocence of our tru th but
the culpability of our untruth.566
And finally he says,
Isn’t this in fact Calvin’s own conclusion, his critique of natural theology being
but a subordinate moment on a larger argument denying that we can have any
trustw orthy knowledge of God, direct or inferential, apart from the divine gift
of the W ord and the Spirit?567
544 In Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 66.
565 Westphal, "Taking St. Paul Seriously," 213.
564 Ibid., 215-216.
547 Ibid., 217. It is worth mentioning at this point one of the reactions to Westphal’s
project. In a review of Christian Philosophy, in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 10, No. 1, (January,
1993), 111, William Hasker surmises,
Once we employ the noetic effects of sin to launch a general assault on human
cognition, three outcomes are possible: We will ourselves be buried in the general
epistemological wreckage, we will (sinfully) exempt our own projects from the
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It would seem, therefore, that Plantinga’s lack of consideration of Christian truths
serves to undermine his project in epistemology. Had he followed Calvin, o r even
W estphal following Calvin, he would have had to see "proper" function w ithin the
context, not of creation, but of creation and the fall, which leads us to our third angle.
6.43 Suppression and Substitution
Thirdly, what can we discern about knowledge and belief generally after the fall?
H ow does P2P of REP fare w ithin the context of the fall? We certainly cannot suggest
that the essential nature of created reality has changed. We know that when man fell
he did not cease to be man, or become less than man. N or did the world and the
things therein lose their created status o r their individuality. Man is still, though now
in a distorted way, the image of G od.568 And as the image of God, men and women
cannot escape the ever-present, imposing revelation of God through creation, including
themselves. The epistemic difference between the situation after the fall and th at before
the fall lies, primarily, in what man does with the knowledge of God that he receives.
A nd here the situation becomes quite complex.
"principle of suspicion," or we will appeal to divine inspiration, in which case we are no

longer engaged in doing philosophy.
This criticism simply points to yet another case of the seemingly complete dismissal of the
necessity of presuppositional reasoning and argumentation. Is it really the case that one is not
"doing philosophy" when one appeals to divine inspiration? Historically, perhaps, it is true, but
such a thing could very likely be the reason that philosophy has, since Thales, produced little
more than mere (oftentimes even absurd) opinion and preference.
5481 recognize that there is debate over whether or not man is still the image of God after
the fall. To cease to be such, however, it seems to me, would be to cease to be man, which is
not the postlapsarian situation at all.
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We can begin with a description from J.H . Bavinck.
De gedachte zal wel wezen, dat dit verdringen zo onmiddellijk, zo spontaan, zo

tegeiijk met het "verstaan" en "doorzien" plaats vindt, dat op het eigen moment
waarop de mens ziet, hij al niet meerziet, op het moment zelf waarop hij kent, hij al
niet meer kent (emphasis mine).549
The complexity of the knowledge situation is evident here in that one, at times, seems
to resort to blatant contradiction in order adequately to describe the character of such.
However, if one desires adequately to describe the situation after the fall, there must
certainly be elements of intellectual and practical tension that perhaps cannot be
thoroughly delineated. What Bavinck wants to stress above is the fact of the
immediacy of sin’s influence on knowledge. At the same time as one sees and
understands the fact of God’s revelation in creation, one takes out one’s eyes and
immediately distorts that which one has been given. Bavinck speaks of the dynamic of
"verdringen en verdrangen" of that which God gives.
Let us say, then, that, at the fall, the fact of the created, revelatory nature of
G od’s universe did not change. It was, and is still, God’s universe and it is still the case
that the revelation of God gets through to sinful man. It is a clear revelation, and it is
understood. Thus, our (TUT) above. However, the disposition of man is such that, to
the extent that he is consistent with his own, now sinful, nature, he perpetually and
continually seeks to suppress and substitute the very knowledge that he has been given,
and to his ow n supposed gain.
There is a significant difference, therefore, between the way our epistemic
faculties function before the fall and the way they function after the fall. W hich one
569 J.H. Bavinck, Religieus Besef en Christelijk Geloof, (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1949), 172.
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would Plantinga want to call "proper function?" It would seem he wants to ascribe
proper function to the post-fall situation. If such is the case, however, much more
needs to be said.
In qualifying his notion of proper function, Plantinga wants to distinguish
between faculties functioning normally and faculties functioning properly.
It may be (and in fact is) the case that it is not at all abnormal for a person to
form a belief out of pride, jealousy, lust, contrariness, desire for fame, wishful
thinking, o r self-aggrandizement; nevertheless when I form a belief in this way
my cognitive equipment is not functioning properly. It is not functioning the
way it ought to .570
Given this explanation, it would seem that the only time in which our epistemic
faculties are functioning properly is in the pre-fall situation.571 But this needs further
explanation.
If (TUT) is correct, then it is the case that the knowledge of G od which all
possess, in spite of their depraved natures, comes by virtue of creation as revelation.
Thus, there is an obligation for one who knows a fact to acknowledge as well the fact
that such a fact reveals the God who created and sustains it. But it is also true that,
since the fall, man continues to suppress and substitute the knowledge of God presented
in a fact so that when and if a fact is known, the knowledge of God is, at one and the
same time, know n and suppressed, so that the fact is articulated in a way that is
contrary to the knowledge of God it contains, e.g., as independent from God. Thus,
570 Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," 408.
571 Most likely this is at least a part of what Westphal means when in his criticism he
maintains that Plantinga’s position gives creation a full day’s work while the fall is only asked
to put in a cameo appearance.
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every belief is formed out of pride, jealously, lust, or, to summarize, out of rebellion
against the G od who made it.
D o we want to say now that a belief arising out of, say, perception as a belief-
producing mechanism is warranted and thus know n though it will always be articulated
(in the context only of the fall) w ithout and in rebellion against God? If we use
Plantinga’s notion of proper (as opposed to normal) function, defined as it is by him as
that which is operative without bad or wrong motives, we simply cannot, given the fact
that he has excluded the effects of the fall from the warrant situation.572 If one of the
preconditions for proper function is that our epistemic faculties be free from pride, etc.,
then proper function ceased at the fall. But Plantinga is indeed correct when he
contends that our faculties are designed for us to have warranted true belief. H ow shall
we reconcile these two?
Perhaps we should return to the notion of "normal" rather than proper when we
speak of the functioning of our cognitive faculties. A nd perhaps our notion of normal
should be used in its normative rather than its statistical sense.573 If so, we could say
572 Of course, Plantinga would not say that he has excluded the effects of the fall. He has
said, as we saw above, that such effects should be given due consideration. I suspect, however,
that the reason he can define proper function as including, in part, an absence of wrong
motives, is because of his presupposition of the self-sufficiency of epistemology. In other words,
Plantinga does not consider, when he speaks of pride, lust, etc. in the functioning of cognitive
faculties that such motives might apply first to the knowledge of God, but rather, it seems, such
motives are simply thought to be from creature to creature.
573 Two qualifiers are needed here. First, to say that epistemic faculties are functioning
normally must be seen as a postfall situation. Given the pre-fall situation, we would agree, for
example, with Kuyper that the situation now, including the epistemic situation, is abnormal.
Second, when we speak of normal in the normative sense, we are seeing normal as a standard,
rather than, as in the statistical sense, a proportionally (in terms of numeric or percentage)
larger state of affairs.
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that the post-fall situation shows the "normalcy" of an epistemic situation in which
m an’s knowledge includes the created "thing"574 w ithout acknowledging its Creator.
N ow , do we want to contend that, in knowing a "thing," the normal situation is
that one does not know God? It seems our discussion of (TUT) denies such a thing.
Do we want to say that, in knowing a "thing," one knows it independently o f that
thing’s revelation of God? This kind of knowledge would be impossible, given the fact
that knowledge of G od comes to man through (and we could imply here) knowledge of
the things that are made. So that at the tim e that one knows a "thing," one also knows
God, and the normal situation is for one to suppress the latter while affirming the
former.
6.44 The Fall and Plantinga’s TPF
But most of this does not directly respond to Plantinga’s concern for warranted
true belief. Plantinga’s notion of warrant simply wants to set forth the conditions
under which one’s true belief goes beyond mere opinion or conjecture. Plantinga wants
to answer the question, "How is one’s true belief warranted?" or, "What epistemizes
true belief?" In order to answer such a question, something must be said both about
the know er and the known. And now we can formulate the relationship between
Plantinga’s concerns w ith warrant and our insistence that such concerns be located
w ithin the context of the Christian position. For example, with respect to perceptual
knowledge, Plantinga asserts that
574 Using the word "thing" in its broadest possible sense, including abstract entities, events,
etc.
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a perceptual judgment - that there is a squirrel running across my backyard, for

example - constitutes knowledge if and only if (roughly speaking) that belief is
true, sufficiently strong, and produced by cognitive faculties that are successfully
aimed at truth and functioning properly in an epistemic environm ent that is
right for a creature of my perceptual powers.575
In asserting such a thing, particularly within the context of our analysis above,
Plantinga has really said very little.576 N o t only so, what he has said assumes a great
deal and requires that a (particularly Christian) philosopher make plain the place on
which he stands.
First of all, how shall one determine that a belief is true? Does not such an
assertion require the definition of just exactly what truth is before one can determine if
a belief is of such a nature?577 And is not the notion of tru th one of the prim ary points
of contention between the Christian position and all others, not to m ention between
competing philosophers and philosophies? Furthermore, even if the relevant parties
agreed on what tru th is, how could one determine if one’s cognitive faculties were
successfully aimed at such w ithout at the same time presupposing that someone,
somewhere already knew the (in this case) perceptual fact in question?
F or example, suppose I see a squirrel running across my backyard and I then
claim to know that I saw a lion run across my backyard. H ow can it be determined
576 This may not concern Plantinga at this point since, remember, what he claims to offer
simply is "an idea, a suggestion, a hint" with regard to warrant.
577 Plantinga has said elsewhere, in agreement with Aquinas, that truth is self-evident, but
this notion would have to be explained in light of the fact that the truth of God’s existence is
denied. Of course, the fall explains such a thing but then we are back to the original problem
of Plantinga’s virtual ignoring of sin as an epistemological category.
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that, in fact, what I saw was a squirrel and not a lion, and that, therefore, my cognitive
faculties were not, at that moment, successfully aimed at truth? Perhaps someone else
saw a squirrel and thus contends that my faculties are unsuccessful. But how can one
know w hether or not it was a squirrel o r a lion? Is not the determination that it was a
squirrel dependent on the objective fact, which fact, as know n or believed, is the very
thing in question? Thus, to posit that warrant requires a successful aiming at truth, is
only to say that one’s warranted true beliefs cannot be false, which is a given.
Furtherm ore, Plantinga notes that the perceptual environm ent must be "right for
a creature of my perceptual powers." But now we have one more notion, packed with
moral and ethical implications, simply left empty as a category. H ow can one
determine if an environment is "right" w ithout at the same tim e affirming the
"rightness" of the environment? Plantinga admits the difficulty here, "Now I don’t
know how to prove to someone intent on denying perceptual knowledge that we really
do have it."578 But let us pursue this a bit further.
As we saw in chapter three, William Alston asserts the reality of epistemic
circularity w ith regard to perceptual experience in this way:
1. A t t„ St formed the perceptual belief that p„ and p,.

2. At t 2, S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2.
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.579
While this argument is circular, it is not viciously circular in that one says one
perceptually believes what one perceptually believes. However, there is no avoiding the
571 Ibid.
579 William P. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," Epistemic Justification, 327.
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circularity involved. The problem, however, is in the same category w ith the problem
m entioned above in Plantinga’s formulation. If S forms the belief that p„ on what
basis can we simply say, "and p,?" W hat is it that gives us the "epistemic permission"
o r the "warrant" to assert "and p!?"
To answer that question requires that something of the nature of created reality
already be known and that such knowledge be required (in a presuppositional,
transcendental fashion) in order to postulate the circularity in the first place. In other
words, Alston and Plantinga, at this point, are simply keeping us w ithin the confines of
the perpetual epistemological dilemma that has plagued philosophy in the first place.
A nd while the circumlocutions may be different, they are really saying the same thing.
Does it really help to affirm perceptual belief strictly by an appeal to what I suppose I
saw and then to ascertain that, statistically, such beliefs tend to match what I think I
saw? As Alston points out, in setting forth this argument, one is already presupposing
its truth. But suppose its tru th is the very point in question. Can one appeal only and
finally to the tru th of it in order to show it to be true? T o do so might be to engage in
a good bit of analysis, but it would not be adequate to satisfy the impulse of the
question.
Let us rather think of it in this way. Is not the question above really the
question of why perceptual beliefs are basically reliable? If so, then an in-depth analysis
showing that they are reliable because they must be reliable in order to assert their
reliability does n ot say much, particularly when it is affirmed in such an argument that
if one wants to deny such reliability there is really no good answer for him. The
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question really is, why must our perceptual beliefs be reliable? A lston’s answer is akin
to Plantinga’s analysis of reason in 4.21 above, "we have nothing but our epistemic
natures" to appeal to in order to give some credence to the reliability of our perceptual
experience. But here only the Christian-theistic position has an answer. Perceptual
experience must be reliable because the means through which God reveals himself is his
creation. And one of the most significant ways in which one knows God through
creation is through the world as seen.5*0 The culpability, therefore, for one’s rejection
of G od lies in one’s knowledge of what G od has made. The reason, therefore, that "at
t t I form ed the perceptual belief that p„ and p„" was because the created fact contained
in p, imposed itself, as revelation both of itself and of God, on me as G od’s creature
and as a creature I responded to that revelation.581 This formulation takes us beyond a
supposed self-sufficiency of perceptual belief to the presupposition behind perception
itself.582 A nd behind perception itself lies the infallible, incorrigible knowledge of God
5.0 Obviously, one who cannot see still knows God in that his revelation comes to man
through all of creation. The fact of one’s existence, then, reveals God knowingly to one.
5.1 The response to God’s revelation in nature was something with which Jean-Paul Sartre
struggled in his early existentialism, though he framed the probelm itself in terms of his own
attempt at atheistic philosophy. For all of its erroneous views, Sartre did see, by God’s
common grace, that reality imposed itself on man and demanded a response. The very fact of
existence, therefore, places man within what Sartre called a "structure of exigency" (Jean-Paul
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956),
74ff.) in which man is always and everywhere accountable and, for Sartre, such accountability,
combined with man’s freedom, produces absolute despair. The truth of this account is that
despair is, in fact, the end result for any non-Christian attempt to respond to creation.
582 For Sartre’s early existentialism, there was nothing beyond our consciousness as
intentional and factidty as imposing itself. Thus, man is a nothingness, always tending toward
that which he could never be. This only points up the difficulties involved when if, like
Alston, one seeks simply to stop at perception itself. And this is just one more dangerous
implication of attempting to see epistemology and its contents as self-sufficient. And, further,
this is a part of the problem when one attempts to assert the foundational status of "common
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in man, the exigencies of creation, including man, the fact over which man is to rule
and, supremely, the existence of God.
But what of the fall? It seems the fall must be seen as complicating, while not
invalidating, the epistemological enterprise. Suppose my perceptual beliefs are wrong,
say, three percent of the time. Must I now conclude with the skeptic that one error
necessitates the possibility of mass deception? O nly if the fall is seen without creation
as its foundation.583 Because creation includes the original design plan, with its (still
intact) mandate to subdue the earth, and because, even after the fall, the knowledge of
God is infallibly and incorrigibly revealed to all men, there is no possibility of mass
deception in this world.584 Creation and its order reveal the character of the G od who
is known. And because the knowledge of God given through creation includes his
character, the content of such knowledge negates the possibility of universal skepticism.
But we must affirm here that (TUT) has as its corollary the fact that such
knowledge of G od is suppressed and substituted. And we must conclude that the
effects of such substitution reside, for example, both in Plantinga’s and Alston’s attem pt
to define the epistemic situation, whether o r not God exists, and to posit normative
notions that result in nothing but bringing us back to the original question. Thus,
sense" beliefs.
5.3 Which is usually the case, unfortunately, with formal logic and its ill-conceived notion of
possibility.
5.4 Of course, this too must be qualified. There is certainly a possibility of subjective mass
deception wherein I believe or choose to believe, on a mass scale, that which is contrary to
creation. Skepticism, however, speaks of deception, typically, as including both the objective
and the subjective situation, e.g., the "bent" stick in the water.
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neither Alston nor Plantinga have taken us beyond the very questions they sought to
answer. All they have done is merely to assert the questions in various ways.
6.5 W arrant and Redemption
Perhaps it is in the context of redemption in Jesus Christ that Plantinga’s
formulations on warrant best fit. Consider that Plantinga’s notion of warrant
necessitates properly functioning cognitive faculties. There is certainly something of
this that redemption from the effects of the fall brings. Whereas at the fall man fell
from his original state of knowledge, righteousness and holiness before God,
redem ption’s effects restore us to that original state.585 Thus, in principle, those who
are redeemed are, at the same time, renewed unto knowledge.
W hat this means for Plantinga’s notion of warrant is that it is the redeemed
whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly. Because it is the responsibility of
those in C hrist to see the world as revealing its Creator, and to accomplish their tasks
w ithin the context of their submission to his Kingship, proper function can only obtain
w ithin the context of Christian redemption. Perhaps we could say that with regard to
the epistemic situation, justification is, indeed, by faith alone. O ne can only be justified
in one’s true belief if it is shown that only the Christian position, including the
knowledge of God, allows for such. But how can this be worked out within the
context of Plantinga’s externalist view of warrant?
585 This is only a rough and ready way to state the matter. Redemption places us in Christ
which is a far better state than that in which Adam and Eve stood. However, as in Christ, we
are certainly renewed unto knowledge, righteousness and holiness (Ephesians 4:24; Colossians
3:10).
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6.51 Reformed Extemalism and Internalism
First o f all, to say that proper function can only obtain within the context of
redem ption is to negate any hope for a pure extemalism in the epistemic situation.
O nly one who is redeemed can be justified in his knowledge. But does it follow that
one who is not redeemed cannot know anything? Certainly not, and precisely because
the Christian position is true. Perhaps we can employ a traditional distinction
concerning the image of God in order best to explain this.
The notions of creation, fall and redemption apply themselves to a proper
understanding of the image of God in man. Prior to the fall, there was no need for a
redemptive aspect in any of creation, so that what is now redemptive belonged, to some
extent, to prelapsarian creation as such. Since the fall, however, there is no question
that the image of God has been seriously and negatively affected. Creationally
(ontically), though, we must say that man still remains man. As such, he is a covenant
being, accountable to G od in his knowing and doing. And as accountable to God in
these areas, man still retains the capacity to know the creation and, to some extent, to
subdue it.586 As the image of God (ontically), man retains the capacity to know and act
in the world that G od has made, and culpably so. Therefore, for man to be, ontically,
a covenant being, he must know and act. We cannot say, therefore, that man as man
cannot know anything unless redeemed.587 The very faculty of reason that people
586 And here we see an interplay between the post-fall image of God in man and God’s
common grace.
587 This is the way that some try to characterize Van Til’s epistemology, though it is not
accurate.
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possess, even after the fall, accommodates itself to the world around and in that way is
designed for such an accommodation. But we cannot simply affirm such a design as an
aspect of warrant, and for three reasons.
First, while the design of our cognitive faculties may still be, after the fall,
accommodating to the know n so that knowledge can be explained by way of design,
the design itself is affected by the fall so that, under "normal" circumstances, the
knowledge that one possesses of a thing will be retained w ithout the further affirmation
that it is G od who is to be acknowledged as the Giver and Sustainer of it. O r, to put
the m atter w ithin the context of Plantinga’s concerns, to say that warrant is had
because o f the design plan is to shortstop the epistemic situation with regard to
knowledge of God. If the "thing" is known, G od demands to be known as well
through the "thing". And not to acknowledge God is to negate that which the "thing,"
in part, is, i.e., a revelation of God.
Second, we dare not say that just because one’s cognitive faculty holds (to use
Plantinga’s example) that a squirrel ran across the yard, that, therefore, such knowledge
was warranted because aimed at truth. Though the belief is true, its warrant cannot be
ascertained w ithout including the truth of its revelatory character. O r suppose, with
Plantinga, that we do assert its warrant. O n what basis, then, can the Christian
position be relevant to such a warranted fact? N one, so far as we can see, and we are
left w ith Plantinga’s notion that the existence of G od is only trivially entailed by such a
w arranted fact in the same way that the necessary tru th that "there are prime numbers
greater than 1000" is trivially entailed by such a fact. This is the principle of the parity
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thesis taken to its most extreme. Either the knowledge of G od is the relevant fact with
regard to knowledge of things or it is reduced, at best, to triviality, which brings us to
ou r third reason.
A Christian philosophy must never allow for one’s knowledge, or true belief, to
be warranted until and unless G od is acknowledged. In this we see a true REP as
opposed to Plantinga’s REP. It will be remembered that REP states the relative
acceptability of theistic belief as warranted so long as other warrant conditions are met.
This makes theistic belief both optional and relative. Rather, we w ould say that theistic
knowledge is the foundation upon which all other beliefs rest, and further that unless
one acknowledges the necessity of God in the knowledge situation, warrant cannot be
granted.588 O r, could we perhaps say to someone that the belief that one saw a squirrel
running across the yard is true (provided one did see such a thing), but can only find its
warrant w ithin the context of the Christian position? We have tried to show that any
other answer is fraught both with conflict and compromise.
But perhaps Plantinga will develop these areas w ith an appeal to "degrees of
w arrant.” Perhaps he will be able to show that one can have w arrant simply by
acknowledging the created fact, at least to one degree, and w arrant to the fullest degree
581 To say that "warrant cannot be granted" puts the matter in a way that highlights one of
the main, though hidden, problems with this entire discussion. On what authority does
Plantinga suppose to lay down the conditions for warrant? How is it that Plantinga can
determine what is and what is not warranted true belief? Is it because he is a brilliant
philosopher? Other brilliant philosophers have tried and failed, and still others have developed
opposing scenarios to his. The granting of warrant, it seems, must have its imprimatur, not
merely from one whose entire theory must itself be shown to be developed from a properly
functioning faculty, in an appropriate epistemic environment, with a cognitive faculty aimed at
truth, but rather from One who transcends the knowledge dilemma altogether. Thus, the need
for "an appeal to divine inspiration," contra Hasker above.
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whenever one acknowledges the fact of God’s self-revelation in that fact. This,
however, has tendencies toward the nature/grace dilemma that we saw above and
therefore must be approached w ith extreme caution.
6.6 A New er Reformed Epistemology
All we can do at this point is, to use Sennett’s phrase, "tell the story" in a bit
more detail, yet only, still, as a hint. Properly functioning theistic faculties that
produce theistic belief are redeemed faculties.589 And that's the story that Christian
philosophers need to tell. But there are (at least) two elements of our discussion in this
chapter that may serve to move us further toward a newer new Reformed epistemology.
6.61 W arrant Qualifications
We will remember that Plantinga has five qualifying elements to his notion of
proper function. Some of those can now be seen as useful w ithin a (Christian) revision
of Plantinga’s epistemology. Recall that the "max plan" is such that it must account for
a broader notion of how a thing works, including how a thing might work if broken or
malfunctioning. It seems that, given our new direction, we should say that something
of the max plan must be included within the context of warranted knowledge.
Specifically, if one of the functions of the max plan is to delineate how a thing works
when it is broken, then the necessary elements both of creation and the fall in the
5,9 The theological reason for this is that one can only have faith in Christ and thus believe
in the Christian God if one is first regenerated by the Holy Spirit, which regeneration includes
one’s acknowledgment of that which one has known from the beginning, i.e., God. More on
this in 7.12 below.
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epistemic situation would fall under the general rubric of the max plan. In this way,
the max plan forms a basis for any correct notion of "normal" function or proper
function. T hat is, it would be necessary to show that in creation God designed our
epistemic faculties to w ork a certain way, properly, but that after the fall those faculties
w ork "normally" but not properly. Thus, specifications of the max plan would be
necessary for further specifications of proper function.
Furtherm ore, Plantinga notes that, in the design plan, there are unintended by
products which are not a part of the design. We can certainly say that the fall and its
effects are not a part of the original design,590 but it would seem that our understanding
of suppression and substitution must indeed be included in any adequate account of
warrant. And if included, we may have to use some other notion than "design" to
specify our epistemic capacities and functions.
Finally, Plantinga admits to a "penumbral area of vagueness" with regard to
differences between purpose and design. Perhaps we can see the purpose of our
epistemic situation as bringing honor and glory to God, and the specifics of bow that is
done as significantly altered from the pre- to post-fall situation.
These qualifications, therefore, do, it seems, shed a bit more light on our
epistemic predicament, but must be seen w ithin the context of the matters discussed
above.
But perhaps our qualifications fit into Plantinga’s formulations quite easily after
590 Not a part of the design, that is, in the way that chapters three and six speak of such
things relative to the fall, or better, in the way spoken of in the Westminster Confession o f Faith,
V.iv.
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all. Perhaps we can say that the normal functioning is o f those unredeemed and that
such functioning is to know the world and suppress the knowledge given through it of
its Creator, but that the proper functioning of our cognitive faculties can take place only
when such are redeemed. And only when our faculties are redeemed does one submit
to, rather than fight against, the epistemic environment as covenantally qualified. And
only in the fact of redemption can one’s knowledge be aimed at such truths. We will
discuss this a bit m ore in chapter seven. But for now, one more subject must be
broached.
6.62 Circularity and a New er Reformed Epistemology
W ith regard to circular reasoning, we can conclude w ith the following
observation. We will recall that Plantinga refutes coherentism’s circularity because of
its failure to transfer warrant from one belief to another. And we will also recall that
Plantinga affirms A lston’s notion of epistemic circularity. The reason that one is
affirmed and one denied is that the former circularity allows for the proper basicality of
perceptual belief and thus to its warrant. The latter makes no room for proper
basicality as such.
But let us th in k again about Plantinga’s refutation of coherentism. Ag is
directly warranted by and gets all its warrant from A„ A , is directly warranted by and
gets all its w arrant from A2. Given the transitive relation, however, we would say that
Ag is directly warranted by and gets all its warrant from A2. N ow A2 is directly
warranted by and gets all its warrant from A3. But then we see that Ag is directly
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warranted by and gets all its warrant from A3. Suppose then that A3 is the final belief
in A;. H ow then is A<j warranted? It appears that A q gets all its warrant from itself
since it itself is directly warranted by and gets all its warrant from A3 and A3 is directly
warranted by and gets all its warrant from A q. Because of the transitivity of the first
and last belief in A;, warrant never really begins, o r must begin w ith a self-warranted
belief. N ow Plantinga contends that there are no self-warranted beliefs. We, however,
have contended the contrary and (TUT) is designed to set forth such a thing.
N ow suppose that Ao is the knowledge of God that all men have by virtue of
being created in G od’s image. And suppose that one claims to know p and that p
equals, say, a perceptual belief. And let us say that p is o r refers to a fact. Can we say
that one does, in fact, know p? It seems that we can and for at least two reasons.
First, the knowledge of G od as given is no abstract knowledge but reveals,
through creation, G od’s faithfulness, sovereignty, etc. As such, it is natural (in the
ontic sense) that one’s knowledge of p, when coherent with the knowledge of G od, is
warranted. Second, if what Plantinga seeks is warrant transfer, then the knowledge of
God is certainly able to transfer warrant to any and every belief o r proposition that is
coherent w ith it and all that it entails. This coherence may, at times, need to be
determined by "the community" (which is why G od chose "a people" and not "a
person"), but, given the ontic situation, knowledge of facts are comm only obtained.
And w ith this we see the appeal of (Reid’s) Com m on Sense philosophy, but as
undergirded, as Marsden has stated, w ith the first principles of Christian-theism.
But the question will certainly come as to w hy one w ould believe (TUT). The
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question will be how one can non-circularly prove (TUT) to true. The question is not
a new one, historically, nor has an answer been difficult to find.
And if I tell a man that the "heavens declare the glory of God, and the
firmament showeth his handiwork," or that the "invisible things of God from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made," and he shall demand how I prove it, it is a sufficient answer to say
that these things, in and by themselves, do manifest unto the reason o f every
man, in its due and proper exercise, that there is an eternal, infinitely wise and
powerful Being, by whom they were caused, produced, and made; so as that
whosoever know eth how to use and exercise his reasonable faculty in the
consideration of them, their original, order, nature, and use, must necessarily
conclude that so it is. If he shall say that it doth not so appear unto him that
the being of God is so revealed by them, it is a sufficient reply, in case he be so
indeed, to say he is phrenetic, and hath not the use of his reason-, and if he be not
so, that he argues in express contradiction unto his ow n reason...591
And it is at this point, rather than at Alston’s point of perceptual belief or Plantinga’s
point of reason’s abilities, that we must affirm that such a tru th is mandated by and
stems from our "epistemic situation as human beings."592 Thus, warrant can be
"transferred" by virtue of G od’s known revelation in all of creation, both of himself,
and of creation.
But warrant cannot be shown by virtue merely of its transfer. In order for one
to show that certain beliefs are warranted, one must affirm the reality of (TUT) and all
5.1 John Owen, The Reason o f Faith; or, An Answer Unto That Inquiry, 'Wherefore we believe
the Scripture to be the Word o f God' (1677), reprinted in The Works of John Owen, ed. William H.
Gould, (London: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1850-53), vol. 4, 89. Note here that Owen speaks
of the proper exercise of reason, which proper exercise, he will go on to say, will acknowledge
God in all things created. Note also that Owen "stands" not on some undefined epistemic
nature or reason, as in Plantinga, but rather he defines that which is in accord with reason as
that which agrees with God’s revelation in nature. Thus, again, our (TUT).
5.2 See Alston, Epistemic Justification, 328. Recall also Plantinga’s assertion the we "have
nothing but our epistemic natures" to determine the reliability of our epistemic natures. On
the contrary, we have infallible, incorrigible revelation to determine such a thing.
343
that it entails.5” And for one actually to affirm such a thing entails that one is
redeemed. Thus, again, referring to (PJB), one may be justified in holding p, but in
showing p to be justified, such warrant can only be given because Christian-theism is
true, and only shown within the epistemic context of redemption.
595 We have not even broached the question as to what (TUT) entails, but it is surely highly
relevant and sweeping for the epistemic situation.
CHAPTER 7
CO N C LU SIO N : W ARRANT A N D CHRISTIANITY
7.1 W arranted Christian Belief
Plantinga’s promise is that his third volume will attem pt to provide for the
w arrant of theistic belief w ithin the confines of his Theory of Proper Function. We
look forw ard to the genius which Plantinga will apply to this difficult problem. There
are indications as to his direction, however, that, if correct, will need further
supplem entation. In concluding our analysis, then, it may help to look briefly at those
indications, which can be summarized under two main points, the sensus divinitatis and
the testimonium Spiritus Sancti.
7.11 The Sensus Divinitatis
W ith regard to Plantinga’s notion of the sensus divinitatis, we have already seen
its less than adequate appropriation into his earlier REP. W hat remains, therefore,
w ould be to locate such a notion more specifically within the context of Plantinga’s
new perspective on warrant.
345
Plantinga still wants to maintain (his) Reidian foundationalism w ithin his TPF.594
A nd w ithin that context, the (Reidian) question becomes, "When a person’s faculties are
functioning properly, what sorts of propositions will she take as basic?"595 O f course,
the classical foundationalist will argue for the proper basicality of perceptual beliefs,
belief in other minds, and the rest. The Reidian foundationalist, however, will argue
for those and other beliefs to be included in the foundations of our noetic structure,
beliefs such as moral beliefs o r belief in God.
And how is it that one might include belief in G od as properly basic in one’s
noetic structure? By way of the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga argues, as we have seen,
that the sensus, (as a tendency) if realized, provides adequate grounds for the proper
basicality of theistic belief. In other words, it is the sensus that justifies the positing of
theistic belief as basic.596
It seems, however, contra Plantinga at this point, that Calvin’s understanding of
the sensus is diametrically opposed to Plantinga’s (who claims to follow Calvin in the
matter). For example, in speaking of the sensus (also called by Calvin, as here, the "seed
of religion" or semen religiones), Calvin asserts, "Yet that seed remains which can in no
wise be uprooted: that there is some sort of divinity; but this seed is so corrupted that
594 See Plantinga, WPF, 183f.
595 Ibid., 183.
596 In Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," 66, he notes, "Calvin’s claim, then, is that God
has created us in such a way that we have a strong tendency or inclination toward belief in
him." The proper basicality of theistic belief is grounded in the realization of that tendency.
346
by itself vc produces only the worst fruits" (emphasis mine).597 And, says Calvin, there is
none in whom this seed of religion ripens - "much less shows fruit in season."598
It would seem, then, that the sensus, rather than serving as a tendency and
ground of theistic belief or as a (theistic) belief-producing mechanism, is rather
evidenced in the fact of m an’s (religious) rebellion against God and is thus shown by the
lack o f Christian-theistic belief among men. It is not, then, like perception or memory,
a belief-producing mechanism which serves to justify the proper basicality of (theistic)
belief, but it is, as knowledge of God, that which shows unbelief for what it is, i.e., a
perversion of (rather than lack of or tendency toward) the true knowledge of God. We
should not maintain, therefore, as Plantinga does, that theistic belief can be properly
basic because of the sensus divinitatis.599
If Warranted Christian Belief is to continue its appeal to Calvin for support of
properly basic theistic belief, then it would seem that Plantinga needs to change his
direction w ith regard to his understanding of the sensus. Rather than suppose that there
is a direct line from the proper functioning of the sensus to basic theistic belief, he
would be more faithful both to Calvin and to the Christian position if he supposed that
the rejection of theistic belief is, in itself, irrational fo r everyone based on the sensus as
defined in (TUT). It is the dynamic of suppression\substitution that serves as the
"normal" functioning of our cognitive faculties in and of themselves. It is the fact of
5.7 Calvin, Institutes, I.v.4.
5.8 Ibid., I.iv.l.
5” Plantinga implies this, among other places, in WPF, 42, wherein he gives a (partial) list of
things on the basis of which we believe.
347
inexcusability, noetically and otherwise, that is the "proper function" of the sensus. We
would say, then, that it was not the case that Bertrand Russell could rationally declare,
"N ot enough evidence!" if asked by God why he would not believe, but rather such a
declaration serves to affirm the very function of the sensus in those who reject
Christian-theism. So, whereas the sensus gives to all men knowledge of God, it also
takes away any excuse for theistic disbelief, which disbelief presupposes the knowledge
of G od which is the sensus, according to Paul in Romans 1.
So, again referring to our analysis in the previous chapter, it would seem that if
the sensus is going to be included in any notion of warrant (which it certainly should
be), then it will have to serve both as affirming universal knowledge of God, but also as
the basis upon which people invariably reject that knowledge and substitute another
idolatrous belief in its place. It cannot be, as Plantinga supposes, the vehicle through
which theistic belief can be properly basic.600
The other m atter that will prove to have grave consequences should Plantinga
pursue it is stated by Marsden. In speaking of the serious errors in the thinking of
nineteenth-century evangelical apologists, Marsden points out that one of those errors
600 We must note here again, since the point is both important and radically different from
the one Plantinga likes to make, how the sensus has been described (in this case, by Owen, not
Calvin).
All the sobriety that is in the world consents in this, that the light of the knowledge of
God, in and by the inbred principles of our minds and consciences, doth sufficiently,
uncontrollably, and infallibly manifest itself to be from him; and that the mind neither
is nor can be possibly imposed on in its apprehensions of that nature. And if the
dictates of reason concerning God do not evidence themselves to be from God, they are
neither of any use nor force; for they are not capable of being confirmed by external
arguments, and what is written about them is to show their force and evidence, not to
give them any (Owen, Works, vol. 4, 87).
This, again, is clearly in line with Calvin and contrary to Plantinga’s application of the sensus.
348
was a failure to recognize "that sinfully determined basic first beliefs and commitments
can pervade the rest of one’s intellectual activity."601 Rather than appealing to
universally shared beliefs, Christians philosophers and epistemologists should realize
that "sin creates a widespread abnormality."602 And, we could say, if such an
abnorm ality is widespread enough, then one cannot simply start with doxastic
universality when analyzing warrant. It just may be that such universality is also
abnormal, given the Christian position’s understanding of creation and fall. A t this
point, Plantinga would need radically to rethink and revise his notion of religious
neutrality, affirming, as we have seen, that because of G od’s creation covenant, no such
thing actually obtains.
Thus, it seems, neither the sensus nor proper function, in the way that Plantinga
has initially formulated them, can account for warranted theistic belief, at least without
substantial qualifications. And such qualifications should occupy a significant portion
of Plantinga’s third volume if what he is intent on arguing for is the rationality of
theistic belief.
7.12 The Testimonium Spiritus Sancti
Perhaps the most encouraging sign in the development of TPF and its
relationship to Christian belief is the fact that Plantinga promises to take account, not
only of the sensus, but of the internal testim ony of the H oly Spirit as well. Plantinga
601 Marsden, "American Evangelical Academia," 256-257.
602 Ibid., 257.
349
notes that in his W PF he will "stick to modules about whose existence there is fairly
wide agreement."603 However, there are more controversial modules; “...there is the
sensus divinitatis of which John Calvin speaks, as well as what some theologians refer to
as the Internal Testim ony of the Holy Spirit."604 And Plantinga states in a footnote, "I
hope to give an account of these...two in the sequel, Warranted Christian Belief.M605
W ithout giving such a topic its due, we can at least provide something of a hint
as to how the Spirit’s testim ony should fit into theistic belief, at least according to
Calvin. And perhaps the best summary on the matter, given all of Plantinga’s concerns
in epistemology, is this:
Let this point therefore stand: that those whom the H oly Spirit has inwardly
taught truly rest upon Scripture, and that the Scripture indeed is self
authenticated; hence, it is not right to subject it to proof and reasoning. And
the certainty it deserves with us, it attains by the testim ony of the Spirit. For
even if it wins reverence for itself by its own majesty, it seriously affects us only
w hen it is sealed upon our hearts through the Spirit. Therefore, illumined by
his power, we believe neither by our ow n nor by anyone else’s judgment that
Scripture is from God; but above hum an judgment we affirm with utter
certainty (just as if we were gazing upon the majesty of God himself) that it has
flowed to us from the very m outh of G od by the ministry of men. We seek no
proofs, no marks of genuineness upon which our judgment may lean; but we
subject our judgment and wit to it as to a thing far beyond any guesswork! This
we do, not as persons accustomed to seize upon some unknow n thing, which,
under closer scrutiny, displeases them , but fully conscious that we hold the
unassailable truth!606
There are hints, in this citation, not only of some of Plantinga’s concerns, but
604 Ibid.
605 Ibid., n. 2.
606 Calvin, Institutes, I.vii.5.
350
also of a decided direction in which one who wants to consider the Spirit’s testim ony
should go.
First of all, it seems that the testim ony of the Holy Spirit refers to the
recognition of that which Scripture is rather than the understanding and assimilation of
particular Scriptures.607 Thus, such a testim ony refers to our disposition toward
Scripture rather than our understanding of its contents. And in this, there is promise
for Plantinga’s further development.
Paul Helm ’s The Varieties o f Belief* is perhaps the best summary of the
relationship between theistic belief, self-authentication and the internal testim ony of the
H oly Spirit. First of all, if it is true that the design of the internal testim ony of the
H oly Spirit is to change our disposition toward Scripture, entailed in that fact is the
fact that our disposition toward Scripture is of a negative nature. We are naturally
predisposed against accepting Scripture for what it is. And furtherm ore, Scripture itself
is self-authenticating, as Calvin notes above. But as self-authenticating, it can,
nevertheless, be rejected and dismissed. Thus, self-authentication relates, not to the
subjective situation per se, but rather to the nature of Scripture as Scripture.609 As
Calvin points out, the nature of Scripture is analogous to the nature of that which is
607 B.B. Warfield makes this point in his article, "Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of
God," appearing, among other places, in William Park Armstrong, ed., Calvin and the
Reformation, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1980), 131-214, but see 167f. This is
not to say that the Holy Spirit’s ministry is restricted to such an understanding, but only that
the internal testimony of the Spirit, according to Calvin, is so restricted. See also the
Westminster Confession o f Faith, I.v.
608 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1973).
609 Ibid., 104-105. Helm also refers us to Calvin, Institutes, I.v.2 and to Owen, vol. 4, 64ff.
351
w hite or black, sweet o r bitter.610 One needs no proof of such a thing but understands
and knows it by the experiencing. And, conversely, if one is shown that which is
white, but cannot see, then the whiteness of the thing is still self-authenticating, but
w ith no result in the subject. And it is just here that the internal testim ony of the
H oly Spirit is relevant.
H ow, or on what grounds, for what reasons, do we believe the Scripture to be a

divine revelation, proceeding immediately from God, or to be that word of God
which is tru th divine and infallible? W hereunto we answer, It is solely on the
evidence that the Spirit of God, in and by the Scripture itself, gives unto us that
it was given by immediate inspiration from God; or the ground and reason
whereon we believe the Scripture to be the word of God are the authority and
tru th of God evidencing themselves in and by it unto the minds and consciences
of men.611
It appears, then, that one will not fully accept the testimony of Scripture accept
on the internal testimony of the H oly Spirit.
This understanding of the inward testim ony has ramifications, only three of
which can be mentioned here. First, entailed with the acceptance of Scripture as
Scripture is the acceptance of revelation in all of its aspects. Thus, one will not accept
one’s knowledge of G od given through the things that are made unless the Spirit first
testifies to such within. And further in this regard, it would seem that the internal
testim ony of the H oly Spirit should cause one to begin one’s understanding,
philosophizing, doing, etc. within the context of the foundational, presuppositional
tru th of G od’s revelation to man. In that case, proper functioning of epistemic faculties
depends on the internal testim ony both for its definition and its application. That is,
610 Calvin, Institutes, I.vii.2.
611 Owen, Works, vol. 4, 20.
352
one’s epistemic faculties must first w ork properly with respect to Christian-theistic
belief before they can so w ork with respect to others, and that is a monumental reversal
o f Plantinga’s present direction in epistemology.
Secondly, there is an interesting contrast between Butler and Calvin/O w en with
regard to the nature of belief that may shed some light on Plantinga’s own
understanding of such.
This view of religious beliefs as certain, together with an epistemology that rests
on intuition o r ’illumination’, enables a contrast to be made between faith and
sight that cannot be made in anything like the same terms by the view of
religious belief as belief in certain probabilities. For Locke and Butler the
contrast between faith and sight must be between believing and knowing,
whereas for Calvin or Owen the contrast is between believing the testim ony of
God, and taking account of the appearances of things. For Butler to believe is to
go on appearances of things, on what is probable judged by certain analogies,
whereas..., the model of belief of Owen and Calvin allows for this possibility,
the possibility of trusting in the promises of G od despite the present apparent
non-fulfillment of them .612
As indicated above, it would seem that this contrast shows Plantinga’s notion of
belief to be more akin to that which both Locke and Butler have proposed, rather than
Calvin.613 If such is the case, then Plantinga will have to choose up sides in this debate,
w hether to conclude with the probable truth of Christian-theism o r to view the
certainty of such as foundational to other beliefs; whether, therefore to depend on
612 Helm, Varieties, 115.
613 O ur initial discussion of Plantinga’s argument in God and Other Minds, the substance of
which has not changed significandy during the course of his career, is indicative of a "Buderian"
nouon of belief. So, he argues, if we must believe in the rauonality of the existence of other
minds, then surely it is not irrational (or at least is as radonal as the former belief and more
rauonal than arguments against it) to believe also in God. At least one of the presuppositions
of this way of arguing, as we have seen, is religious neutrality which neither Calvin nor Owen
would have sanctioned.
353
Calvin in this m atter o r refer, rather, to Locke and Butler. This will radically affect
Plantinga’s epistemology. One choice would insure that the new Reformed
epistemology would now be the new Arminian epistemology, complete w ith its
dangerous theological implications.614 O n the other hand, Plantinga promises to deal
w ith the inward testim ony of the H oly Spirit. If such is dealt with in faithfulness to
Calvin and O w en, then there is great promise for Plantinga’s notion of warrant.
Thirdly and finally, it may be helpful to repeat Helm’s summary notion of
religious belief as articulated by Calvin and Owen, but with one revision. Helm states
it this way:
A religiously believes p i f A assents firm ly to p (where p is taken to be a revealed

proposition) because A intuits , in grasping the meaning ofip, that it is revealed by
God.615
It should be noted that p refers to that which God has revealed. And the question
must be asked here as to the relationship of p to general revelation, which is not a part
o f H elm ’s concern. Can we say that any p, because given by (general o r special)
revelation of God depends, for assent, upon such an intuition? And here we propose
one qualification to H elm ’s formulation, a qualification that remains clear w ithin the
context of Helm ’s ow n discussion, but that needs articulation in the formulation here.
614 One wonders if this kind of criticism would really bother Plantinga. His "Free Will
Defense" seems to be blatantly within the parameters of Arminianism’s erroneous notions of
God’s character, as does his (and others who agree with him) notion of the counterfactuals of
freedom. In all of these arguments, what is taken for granted is the necessary relation between
man’s free choices and God’s lack of direct control such that God’s sovereignty, in the classic
Reformed sense, is compromised. Perhaps Plantinga’s (near Arminian, at least at this point)
epistemology is simply evolving to line up with his (Arminian) metaphysics. See Plantinga,
"Self-Profile," 36-95.
615 Helm, Varieties, 114.
354
We would specify H elm ’s formulation a bit more in this way.
A religiously believes p if A assents firmly to p (where p is taken to be a

revealed proposition) because, through the testimony o f the Holy Spirit, A
intuits, in grasping the meaning of p, that it is revealed by God.
W ith this qualification it is stated that one can only intuit the revelation of God
by way of the internal testim ony of the Spirit.616 Thus, rather than theistic belief being
dependent on the "actualization" of the sensus tendency, it is rather dependent on the
regeneration and transform ation of the Spirit working with the self-authenticating W ord
in bringing certainty, not probability, and true faith, not fallible belief.
7.2 Advice to a Christian Philosopher
We must now conclude our discussion on warrant. There are many topics and
strands of information that need to be pulled together into a coherent framework, but
not here. We can now offer something of a summary of a Reformed epistemology that
takes Plantinga’s considerations seriously, and at the same time attempts to incorporate
elements that seem essential to any successful (read, "Christian") epistemology.
First, is it the case that a Christian epistemology can remain w ithin the confines
of a Reidian epistemological structure? It would seem not. There needs to be an
account given of just why certain beliefs are common sense and why some are not. And
616 Much more work remains to be done in this area. Owen, Jonathan Edwards and others
recognized the necessity of positing the indwelling and work of the Holy Spirit in all people,
even in those who do not believe. And such an indwelling would have ramifications for
epistemology. Though Owen rightly sees the internal testimony of the Spirit as coincident with
religious faith, the Spirit nevertheless inhabits and works in the entirety of creation, including
all people. Such "working" is perhaps part of the explanation of the constant exigency of God’s
general revelation to man wherein the Spirit perpetually "calls" men to submit to the God who
is revealed and revealing through that creation.
355
such an account cannot simply be conceived of as grounds o r conditions of proper
basicality. Rather, such an account must dig deeper into the religious presuppositions
that motivate such common sense beliefs in order to show either that some common
sense beliefs are in serious need of revision o r that those which are common are such
because of the commonality that all men share as creatures, created, sustained, revealed
to and called to account by God. Would this epistemological structure be
foundationalist? Coherentist? Reliabilist? Most likely it would be a "fourth way,"
combining truthful elements of the others but providing a necessary theistic context for
them all, bringing them back where they belong.
And where would theistic belief fit within such a context? It would seem that it
would need to be the necessary subjective requirement for the more objective,
externalist position to be set forth in the first place. If theistic belief is the effect of
which the internal testim ony of the Holy Spirit working with the self-authenticating
W ord of God is the cause, there would seem to be no adequate, Christian-theistic,
account of warrant w ithout such necessary elements included.
So, it seems Plantinga’s notion of proper function can be extended. We could,
in a newer Reformed epistemology, affirm that one’s belief is warranted if one’s
cognitive faculties are functioning properly. But we must also affirm that such faculties
are not functioning properly until and unless the sufficient condition of the Spirit
working with the W ord (in a person) is met. And we could say that an epistemically
appropriate environm ent must be present, but such an environm ent is only secondary
to proper functioning cognitive faculties, given creation. In other words, if one’s
356
environm ent was not epistemically appropriate and one was claiming to have warranted
belief, then someone w ith proper functioning cognitive faculties must be able to point
out such a thing. If one’s epistemic environm ent was not appropriate and one knew it,
then one w ould not be claiming one’s belief was warranted, unless it was the belief that
one’s epistemic environment was not appropriate.
O r, to turn it around, we may want to say that, given creation, God has created
an epistemically appropriate environment and both because of G od’s character and
creation revealing his character, we can trust that which we experience, but not always.
And, again, the fact of possible error only leads to the skeptical conclusion if, in fact,
the world is not created and does not reveal, continually, rationally and clearly, God.
Because it is and it does, error only points us to the fall, not to epistemological (and
metaphysical) skepticism.
And finally, Plantinga contends that our faculties must be aimed at truth. In
this he is correct and such a fact makes it all the more clear that properly functioning
faculties aim at the tru th created and revealed by God. W arrant does not accrue to a
belief simply by affirming a fact. Such affirmation is not the truth of the matter. The
tru th of the m atter is that such a fact is G od’s fact, his interpretation and that to know
it in truth is to know it as such. And cognitive faculties aimed at tru th would be aimed
at the epistemic subduing of the earth to the glory of God.
We look forward to Plantinga’s third volume. We do hope, however, that the
inconsistencies mentioned will only help him to apply his genius more consistently and
more Christian-theistically.
357
The above, then, is simply more advice to a Christian philosopher.
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IND EX
Alston (1, 32, 38, 52, 111-113, 150, 151, 244, 244, 249, 281, 293, 330-332, 334, 342,
358)
Apologetics (6, 30, 43, 63, 91, 166-168, 192, 193, 204, 222, 252, 271, 302, 364, 378)
apologetic (7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26-28, 32, 45, 52, 70, 78, 85,
104, 108, 143, 144, 150, 158, 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 171, 190, 191,
200, 208, 209, 253, 257, 260, 273, 280)
apologetical (6-8, 11, 14, 70, 74, 81, 84, 85, 88, 140, 166-168, 194, 254, 255,
261, 322)
apologist (6, 7, 189, 190, 196, 205)
apologists fl65, 167-169, 189, 190, 204, 207, 217, 222, 223, 243, 249, 297, 317,
364)
apology (165, 167-169, 189, 190, 204, 207, 217, 222, 223, 243, 249, 297, 317,
364)
B anh (45, 66, 77)
Bavinck (44, 45, 66, 79-81, 195, 196, 213, 325, 360)
Belief (3-14, 18-83, 85-93, 95-100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108-121, 123-138, 140, 142-146,
148-152, 154, 159-161, 163-166, 169, 171, 175, 182, 183, 188, 201-204,
206-221, 223-226, 228-249, 251, 253-281, 284-287, 290, 291, 293-298,
300, 302-304, 306-309, 311, 313, 314, 316, 317, 322-324, 326-332, 334,
336-338, 340-342, 344-350, 352-356, 358-379)
Belief in God (4, 7-9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 23, 25-27, 29-31, 35-42, 44-46, 48, 51, 52, 54, 62,
64, 66-69, 73, 74, 80-83, 85, 144, 149, 150, 161, 165, 166, 171, 201,
207-212, 214, 216-218, 220, 221, 223-226, 228, 230, 231, 233, 242, 246,
248, 251, 253, 257, 260, 264, 268, 274-277, 279, 284, 297, 304, 313, 323,
345, 358, 359, 361-364, 366, 368-374, 378, 379)
Calvin (44, 45, 66, 69, 70, 77-81, 83, 84, 91, 142, 176, 213, 217, 276, 277, 280,
282-286, 291, 319-321, 323, 324, 345-347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 361, 372,
377)
Christian (4, 5, 7, 13, 28 36, 37, 44, 45, 66, 69, 78, 82, 88, 103, 104, 124, 136,
167-172, 175-181, 187-190, 192-194, 196, 202-206, 211, 212, 216, 217,
380
381
220-223, 238, 241, 246, 249, 251, 254, 258, 270, 271, 273, 280-282,288,
296-301, 303, 304, 306, 308, 309, 311, 313, 318, 322-324, 328, 329,332,
334-338, 341, 343, 344, 346-349, 352, 354-358, 360-363, 365-367, 371,
372, 374, 377)
Christian position (5, 167, 170, 177, 178, 180, 187, 188, 190, 193, 206, 212,
217, 298-301, 303, 308, 309, 328, 329, 334-337, 346)
Circular reasoning (48, 95-98, 150, 340)

circularity (95, 150-152, 161, 330, 331, 340)
Coherentism (10, 11, 27, 46-52, 54, 94, 97-101, 104, 105, 108, 109, 119, 124, 161, 162,
243, 306, 340, 371)
coherent (47-51, 93, 98-101, 105, 107, 134, 135, 217, 306, 341, 354)
coherentist (11, 48-51, 95-98, 104, 109, 243, 306, 355)
Com m on sense (5, 9, 22, 26, 39, 53, 142, 145, 161, 214-216, 251-253, 255-257, 341,
354, 355)
Creation (5, 39, 40, 172, 175, 194, 213, 223, 241, 254, 257, 272, 283, 285, 286,
289-293, 298, 306, 307, 310-314, 316, 319, 323-326, 332, 333, 335, 338,
339, 341, 342, 348, 354-356)
created (4, 5, 72, 73, 79, 180, 188, 201-203, 212, 213, 223, 237, 245, 258, 261,
277, 287, 299, 300, 307, 312, 314-317, 324-326, 328, 331, 332, 337, 341,
342, 345, 355, 356)
Deontological (41, 42, 86, 87, 126, 128, 130-132, 155, 162, 166, 307)
Epistemic parity (235, 236, 266, 267, 269, 273, 274, 363, 373)
parity (323, 324, 339, 346)
Epistemology (1-4, 6-9, 11, 12, 20, 22, 26-30, 32, 35-38, 43, 47, 52, 53, 55, 57, 62, 63,
66, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85-87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 109-111, 116, 120, 123-125,
128, 129,136, 143, 154-156, 161, 163, 164, 166, 168, 169, 181, 206, 208,
212-219, 221, 222, 224, 225, 230, 235, 243, 244, 249, 258, 275, 278, 280,
287, 288, 295, 296, 300, 302, 303, 305-309, 311-314, 317-324, 327, 332,
335, 338, 340, 349, 352-355, 358-360, 362, 364-368, 371-379)
epistemic (8, 10, 11, 25, 26, 29, 32, 37, 38, 46, 50, 61, 63, 67, 80, 86, 87, 89,
90, 92, 93, 100, 102, 105, 107, 111, 112, 124, 126-134, 137, 141, 147,
149-152, 154, 156, 164, 179-183, 186, 188, 195, 196, 219, 225-230,
233-236, 240, 242-244, 249, 251, 256, 258, 263, 264, 266-269, 273, 274,
277, 281,290, 293, 295, 297, 298, 303-309, 315, 318, 319, 324-337, 339,
340, 342, 343, 351, 352, 356, 359, 362-364, 368, 371-374)
epistemic permission (8. 331)
epistemic possibility (61, 92, 93, 120-122, 137, 138, 140-143, 146-148, 150, 152,
382
154, 156, 158, 223, 298, 300, 310, 311, 313, 333, 336, 339)
epistemological (3-5, 7-10, 12-14, 19-22, 26, 27, 46, 47, 51, 52, 54, 58, 62-64,
66, 85, 89, 94, 98, 109, 124, 130, 135, 140, 143, 154-156, 161-164, 189,
191, 193, 196, 205, 209, 213, 216, 221-223, 225, 228, 243, 244, 258, 259,
261, 274-276, 279, 286, 287, 291, 294, 296-298, 304, 307, 322,323, 329,
331, 333, 354-356, 359, 363, 364, 367,370)
epistemological structure (7-9, 13, 26, 27, 46, 47, 51, 52, 54, 58, 63, 64, 66, 85,
98, 109, 124, 161, 164, 164, 193, 213, 244, 258, 259, 354, 355)
Evidence (4, 5, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 26-37, 40-44, 46, 48, 62, 64, 66, 67, 73, 74, 76, 83,
108, 112, 116, 127, 130, 131, 133, 134, 145, 147, 148, 152-154, 159, 161,
163-165, 175, 191, 196, 208, 210, 214,217, 220, 224, 227-231, 246, 248,
250, 260-275, 279, 284, 287, 347, 351,358, 363, 369, 375, 376, 378, 379)
evidential (29, 33, 34, 38, 40, 44, 51, 62, 73, 95, 98, 110, 147, 214, 221, 231,
248, 251, 260-264, 266, 359, 362, 378)
evidentialism (4, 5, 27, 29, 32-34, 36, 54, 78, 130, 224, 229, 231, 233, 259-264,
267, 268, 274, 309, 361, 363, 366, 367, 378, 379)
evidentialist (27-32, 35-37, 43, 48, 51, 52, 63, 78, 91, 165, 209, 210, 212, 219,
225, 230, 246, 249, 259, 262, 367, 371)
Externalism (124-126, 244, 278, 297, 335)
Fall (5, 18, 156, 216, 250, 251, 299, 307, 314, 318-329, 333-336, 338, 339, 348, 356,
365, 372)
sin (80, 191, 202, 282, 299, 315, 318, 319, 321-323, 329, 348)
Fideism (76, 77, 186, 359)
Foundationalism (4, 5, 11, 26, 27, 30, 35, 37-44, 46-48, 51-54, 58, 59, 63-66, 68, 73,
78, 79, 83, 85, 86, 94, 95, 98, 101, 109, 124, 143, 161, 162, 187, 190,
194-196, 201, 212, 217, 222-224, 230, 231, 234, 242-244, 249-251, 255,
258, 259, 261, 275, 279, 320, 322, 345, 365, 366, 368, 370, 379)
God (3-10, 12-14, 18-20, 23-31, 35-42, 44-46, 48, 51, 52, 54, 62, 64, 66-70, 72-74, 77-83,
85, 91, 122, 142, 144, 149, 150, 161, 163-168, 171, 172, 174-181, 188,
190-196, 201-204, 207-221, 223-226, 228, 230-238, 240-242, 244-251, 253,
254, 257-261, 264, 268, 269, 271-293, 296, 297, 299-302, 304-309,
311-328, 332-339, 341, 342, 345-347, 349-356, 358-374, 376, 378, 379)
G round (5, 19, 71, 113, 127, 143, 184, 211, 214, 215, 217, 220, 223, 232, 249, 257,
258, 270, 273, 279, 280, 286-288, 293, 297, 346, 351, 358, 360, 363)
Hasker (86, 87, 120-123, 323, 337, 365)
383
H elm (350, 352, 353, 365, 370)
Intem alism (13, 42, 94, 124-126, 128-131, 134, 135, 162, 244, 297, 335)
Justification (3, 4, 8, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 32-34, 36, 38, 41, 45, 48, 52, 54, 57, 59,
61, 62, 68, 71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 86, 87, 90, 91, 99-101, 110, 112, 113, 116,
125-128, 130, 131, 133-135, 137, 149, 151, 164, 228, 233, 235, 243, 244,
247-249, 257, 259; 260, 264-267, 271-274, 278, 280, 281, 293, 297, 304,
306, 314, 318, 319, 326, 330, 334, 342, 359, 362-364, 369-375)
being justified (104, 228, 244, 255, 264, 266, 271-273, 306)
justified (8, 23, 32-34, 36, 37, 51, 54-62, 68, 75, 76, 90, 95, 104, 110-113, 117,
119, 127, 128, 130, 133-135, 148, 149, 166, 171, 195, 211, 225, 228, 233,
235, 243-245, 247-249, 255, 259, 262, 264-273, 285, 291, 293, 294, 306,
307, 314, 334, 335, 343, 360, 364, 366)
justified true belief (37, 54-59, 61, 62, 134, 135, 293, 294, 314)
showing justification (244, 248, 260, 264, 266, 267, 271-273, 306)
K now (3-5, 20, 32-35, 38, 39, 43, 46, 47, 49, 54-63, 80, 85, 87-92, 99, 100, 109-116,
118, 119, 121, 123-125, 128, 129, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 141-143, 149,
152-154, 158, 168, 172, 177, 179, 181-183, 188, 194, 195, 198, 213-215,
217, 218, 221, 233, 234, 239, 241, 244, 249-251, 255-258, 271, 273, 277,
280-294, 299-301, 304-308, 312-319, 322-338, 340, 341, 346, 347, 350,
351, 358-370, 373-377)
Knudsen (302, 322)
K uyper (45, 66, 76, 77, 172, 194-196, 249, 250, 256-258, 327, 367)
Marsden (252, 253, 255, 341, 347, 348)
McLeod (225, 235-238, 240-242, 254, 256, 276, 290, 307, 362, 367, 368)
N atural theology (4, 13, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 53, 78-82, 150, 165, 190-196, 205, 206,
213, 216-220, 222, 223, 249, 250, 278, 297, 320, 321, 323. 361, 363, 368,
371, 372, 374, 376, 378)
N eutrality (4, 172, 174, 191, 196-199, 201, 203, 205, 222, 223, 297, 308, 309, 311, 348,
352)
neutral (30, 87, 197, 199, 200, 204, 205, 215, 223, 308)
religious neutrality (4, 191, 197-199, 201, 203, 205, 222, 223, 297, 308, 348,
352)
R N (198-200, 202)
O th e r minds (9, 12-14, 17, 19-26, 31, 32, 45, 71, 72, 83, 143, 144, 166, 207-211, 220,
384
221, 230, 236, 243, 245, 279, 284, 290, 291, 345, 352, 371)
O w en (49, 342, 347, 350-354)
P IP (9-11, 35-37, 52, 53, 58, 98, 162-164, 201, 249, 251)
P2P (9-11, 23, 35, 36, 58, 59, 61, 75, 78, 98, 136, 162-164, 168, 223, 228, 295, 324)
(PJB) (259, 260, 263, 264, 269, 271, 273, 304, 343)
Plantinga (14, 6-18, 20-27, 2941, 43-54, 59, 60, 62-103, 105-109, 111-125, 127-132,
135, 137-150, 152-161, 164-166, 169-172, 174-176, 178, 181-183, 189-191,
193-220, 224-226, 228-231, 233-236, 238, 241-252, 254-257, 259-262,
264-271, 274-281, 283-285, 290, 291, 295-298, 300-311, 313, 315,
317-323, 326-331, 334, 336-342, 344-349, 352, 353, 356, 358-366,
369-371, 373, 375, 376, 378, 379)
Presupposition (3, 4, 102, 151, 176-187, 189-192, 194, 196, 204, 215, 218, 220-222,
240-242, 252, 255-258, 273, 274, 286, 290, 296, 297, 300, 302, 327, 332)
presuppositions (2, 4, 5, 163, 176-183, 186-188, 191, 195, 196, 206, 211, 212,
222, 223, 252, 254-256, 273, 275, 296, 308, 321, 352, 355)
Proper function, theory of (27-32, 35-37, 43, 48, 51, 52, 63, 78, 91, 165, 209, 210,
212, 219, 225, 230, 246, 249, 259, 262, 367, 371)
Properly basic (4, 29, 38, 39, 43, 46, 48, 51-53, 62-76, 80-83, 98, 102, 143, 145,
148-151, 161, 212, 215, 217, 218, 224, 226, 229-236, 238, 239, 241-249,
251, 257-260, 263-265, 267-272, 275-280, 284, 286, 289-292, 297,
345-347, 361, 363, 364, 371)
basic (4, 29, 38-40, 43, 44, 46-48, 51-53, 59, 62-77, 80-83, 91, 98, 102, 112, 117,
125, 126, 128, 143, 145, 147-151, 156, 161, 164, 166, 171, 175, 182, 186,
208, 212, 215, 217, 218, 224-226, 229-236, 238, 239, 241-249, 251,
257-260, 262-272, 274-280, 284, 286, 289-292, 295, 297, 302, 309, 311,
313, 345-347, 361, 363, 364, 366, 371, 372, 376)
proper basicality (52, 63-71, 73-75, 78, 81, 91, 143, 164, 212, 215, 224, 225,
229-231, 233-236, 239, 243, 245, 246-248, 253, 255, 263, 267-269, 273,
275, 276, 278, 280, 284, 286, 291, 340, 345, 346, 355, 364, 365, 368,
370)
Prepositional (4, 5, 9, 28-31, 33, 34, 37, 41, 46, 50, 66, 73, 76, 154, 161, 163-165, 191,
196, 214, 217, 224, 228, 231, 261, 279, 281, 284)
Rational (6, 8, 11-15, 18-22, 26, 28-30, 36, 41-46, 79, 82, 106, 107, 144, 148, 163, 165,
166, 171, 174, 195, 206-212, 216-221, 224, 233, 246, 253, 257, 260, 262,
385
271, 274, 275, 277-280, 284, 300, 302, 303, 305, 322, 352, 358, 362, 365,
367, 370, 371, 373, 376, 378, 379)
rationality (3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 13, 19-22, 26, 28-30, 32, 35-37, 41-45, 54, 63, 76, 82,
85, 90, 91, 106-108, 131, 144, 163-166, 207-212, 216, 218, 220, 221, 225,
233, 235, 245, 260, 262, 264, 274, 279, 280, 284, 286, 302, 322, 348,
352, 358-360, 362, 363, 365-369, 371, 373, 375-379)
Redemption (5, 299, 334, 335, 340, 343)
Reformed (1-3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 19, 20, 22, 26-30, 35-39, 41, 43-46, 53, 66, 69, 76, 78, 79,
81-86, 91, 104, 142, 150, 163, 168, 169, 190, 191, 194, 196, 205, 206,
208, 212-218, 221, 223-225, 230, 235, 249, 251, 260, 278, 280, 295, 297,
306, 309, 311, 313, 316, 319, 320, 322, 335, 338, 340, 353-355, 359-362,
364-366, 368, 370, 371, 374-379)
Reid (9, 26, 53, 61, 102, 103, 125, 142, 144, 145, 213, 251-255, 279, 374, 378)
Reidian (4, 5, 22, 26, 35, 39, 53, 73, 83, 85, 86, 124, 143, 161, 213, 218, 224,
231, 243, 249, 251, 253, 258, 259, 275, 279, 345, 345, 354)
Reidianism (39, 52, 86, 162, 234, 252, 255, 259)
Reliabilism (27, 94, 109-113, 115-117, 119-121, 123, 124, 162)
REP (6-11, 13, 20, 23, 25-28, 35-38, 44-47, 52-54, 58, 59, 61-63, 70, 71, 75, 78, 81, 84,
86, 98, 99, 109, 124, 136, 140, 141, 143, 152, 161-165, 168-170, 182,
196, 201, 206, 219, 222-224, 228, 233, 235, 246, 249, 251, 258, 259, 261,
262, 275, 276, 278, 286, 295, 297, 309, 324, 337, 344)
Science (167, 172-175, 197, 200, 258, 375)

scientific (24, 144, 172, 175, 220, 253)
Sennett (7, 11, 20-22, 27, 50, 86-89, 92, 93, 96, 129, 164-166, 225-234, 241, 242, 254,
255, 260, 262, 264, 266, 273, 274, 276, 290, 295, 301, 302, 305, 375)
Sensus divinitatis (5, 6, 71, 80, 84, 169, 233, 251, 266, 275-278, 280, 284, 285, 287,
319, 344-346, 349)
Supervenience (130, 237-240, 307, 369)
Testimonium Spiritus Sancti (6, 169, 319, 344, 348)
Theism (4, 81, 82, 86, 88, 147, 148, 155, 157, 158, 162, 167, 168, 170, 174, 211, 217,
218, 220, 223-225, 230, 238, 251, 254, 260-262, 265, 271, 281, 286, 291,
297, 300, 302-305, 317-319, 326, 341, 343, 347, 352, 360, 362, 364,
367-370, 372-374)
386
theistic (3, 4, 7-11, 20-23, 27-31, 35, 36, 38, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 53, 62, 63, 66,
67, 69, 70, 72-78, 81-83, 85, 86, 88, 94, 98, 136, 140, 143, 149, 150, 154,
155, 157, 158, 161, 163-166, 169, 177, 182, 188, 189, 192, 206-214,
216-221, 223-226, 228-243, 245, 247, 248, 251, 253-256, 259-262,
264-269, 274, 276-281, 284, 286, 287, 290, 295-298, 302, 303, 305, 309,
317, 322, 332, 337, 338, 344-350, 352, 354, 355, 359, 363, 365, 366, 368,
378)
T PF (120, 123, 124, 157, 158, 162, 168, 294, 295, 300, 302, 303, 309, 313, 328, 345,
348)
Transcendental (4, 30, 34, 177, 188, 271, 273, 298, 299, 303, 331)
(TUT) (281, 286, 287, 289-294, 304, 312, 325, 326, 328, 333, 341-343, 346)
Van Til (91, 169, 257, 316, 322, 364, 377)
W arrant (2-5, 7-13, 20-23, 25, 26, 30, 32-36, 47-54, 58-63, 68, 70, 75, 78, 80, 84-88,
91-101, 104, 105, 108, 112, 113, 115-117, 119, 120, 122-126, 130, 131,
133-138, 140-144, 146-149, 154, 155, 158, 161-164, 183, 206, 208, 218,
219, 243, 264, 272, 274, 278, 286, 293, 295-301, 303-306, 308, 311, 313,
316-319, 327-331, 334, 336-344, 347, 348, 353-356, 368, 370, 372, 373)
warranted (5-11, 20, 25, 27, 30, 33, 35, 36, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 63, 66, 69, 76,
79, 90, 92, 96, 97, 99, 104, 109, 120-126, 132, 134, 136-138, 143, 147,
150, 161, 163, 164, 169, 202, 219, 243, 261, 271, 274, 278, 293, 296,
297, 301-309, 311, 313, 315, 316, 327, 328, 330, 336-338, 340-342, 344,
346, 348, 349, 355, 356)
W PF (21, 23, 25, 31-36, 49, 53, 60, 86, 88, 92, 94, 120, 125, 137, 140, 141, 143,
144, 148, 150, 156, 158, 220, 261, 296, 300, 303, 310, 329, 345, 346,
348, 349)
W estminster Confession of Faith (5, 298, 312, 339, 350)
Westphal (29, 121, 322-324, 326, 377)
W olterstorff (1, 7, 27, 28, 30, 35, 37, 41-43, 201, 358, 365, 366, 369, 371, 373,
377-379)

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Oliphint Dissertation

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The apologetical implications of Alvin P lantinga’s epistexnology

Oliphint, K. Scott, Ph.D.

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of

WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Faculty Advisor : X C------- )

Second Faculty Reader:

Epistemology." Ph.D. dissertation, Westminster Theological Seminary, 1994.

Our focus, like Plantinga’s, is on the rationality of belief in God. Thus,

process and in the dissertation.

In Chapter 2 we seek to lay out Plantinga’s argument for a Reformed

cognizer, and properly so.

In Chapter 3 we work through Plantinga’s latest notion of warrant as set

of warrant are found wanting in Warrant: The Current Debate.

Criticisms of Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology proposal, which will be

transcendental in their thrust, begin in Chapter 4. We begin first by showing that

neglect of presuppositional argumentation gives way to a false view of religious

Chapter 5 attempts to show Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology as explained

in Chapter 2 to be in need o f serious revision. It provides, at best, for

metaphysical agnosticism and epistemological relativism, neither of which

Plantinga would want to affirm.

Chapter 6 is an attempt to put Plantinga’s notion of warrant within the

proper epistemological framework, that of creation, the fall and redemption in

reasoning about knowledge, belief, etc.

Chapter 7 speculates on Plantinga’s forthcoming third volume and tries to

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... viii

1.1 The B ackground.......................................................................................1

1.11 The G o a l ....................................................................................2

1.12 The Task ................................................................................. 6

1.2 Theistic Belief as Rational ............................................................... 11

1.21 Warrant and the AnalogicalArgument ............................ 23

2. T H E NEW REFORMED E P IS T E M O L O G Y ................................................... 27

2.1 The Evidentialist Critique ............................................................... 27

2.11 Critique of the C ritiq u e ........................................................ 31

2.12 Critique of F oundationalism .............................................. 37

2.121 The Reformed Rejection ...................................... 44

2.13 Critique of Coherentism ......................................................46

2.2 Belief in G o d .......................................................................................54

2.21 Knowledge as justified true b e li e f .................................... 54

2.22 Properly Basic B e lie f...........................................................63

2.221 Criteria and the Christian C om m unity .......... 67

3. T H E REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY PROPOSAL A N D W ARRAN T . 85

3.1 In tro d u c tio n ........................................................................................ 85

3.21 A First Approximation ................................................... 92

3.3 E pistem ology .......................................................................................94

3.31 C oherentism ............................................................................ 94

3.311 Bonjourian Coherentism .......................................99

3.32 R eliabilism .......................................................................... 109

3.321 Plantinga’s Reliabilism? .................................... 119

3.4 Intem alism /E xtem alism ............................................................... 124

3.41 D e o n to lo g ism .................................................................. 128

3.5 W arrant a g a in ................................................................................. 135

3.51 Proper Function ............................................................. 136

3.6 The Design P la n ............................................................................. 140

3.61 Theistic A rg u m e n t.......................................................... 154

4. REFORM ED EPISTEMOLOGY AND PRESUPPOSITIONS ............... 163

4.11 Apologetics and E p iste m o lo g y .................................... 166

4.2 Plantinga on Plantinga .................................................................. 169

4.21 Presuppositions ............................................................. 176