1963 HAAS Et Al Eds Limits and Problems of European Integration

STICHTING GROTIUS SEMINARIUM
LIMITS AND PROBLEMS

OF 'EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
TIIE CONFERENCE OF MAY 30 - )UNE 2, 1961
Papers by
ERNST B. HAAS, DAVID MITRANY,
JHR. MR. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS, G. M. NEDERHORST,
JHR.J. ALTING VON GEUSAU, HUGH BEESLEY,
CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE, FRANQOIS BORELLA, F. HARTOG,
AND MRS. M. ROHLING VAN SPANJE
With an InJrodu&tion
by
B.LANDHEER
SPRINGER-SCIENCE +BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.Y .
The Grotius Seminarium has as its purpose the study of international

problems under the aspects of"living and cooperating in one world".
Its Conference ofMay 30-June 2, 1961 attempted to view European
integration within the framework of this general goal. "The limits
of European integration" lie in the necessity of fitting it in the wider
framework ofinternational cooperation, while its problems lie in the
various interpretations and concretizations of its own goals, about
which there are a number of different viewpoints.
It could be stated that the European is faced with three sets of
problems: the creation ofa more unified world as a global problem;
the regional integration of Europe; and thirdly, the continuation of
more strictly national interests.
It is hoped that the essays combined in this volume raise a number of
relevant questions and contribute to the elaboration of some more
concrete problems.
Table of contents
B. Landheer, Introduction
Ernst B. Haas, International Integration. The European and the
Universal Process
David Mitrany, Delusion of Regional Unity
M. van der Goes van Naters, La portee de l'integration europeenne.
Point de vue juridico-politique
G. M. Nederhorst, Possible Forms of European Integration
}. Alting von Geusau, Law and Politics in the European Communities
Hugh Beesley, Direct Elections to the European Parliament
C. Durand-Prinborgne et F. Borella, Les risques de chevauchements
et d'imbrications de structures. L'application du droit europeen
F. H. Hartog, In how far is the Expectation of increasing Consumer-
demand justified?
M. Rohling van Spanje, Consumers and European Integration
1963. IV and 144 pages. Guilders 13.15
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Obtainable through any bookseller or direct f rom the publisher
STICHTING GROTIUS SEMINARIUM
LIMITS AND PROBLEMS

OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
THE CONFERENCE OF MAY 30 - JUNE 2, 1961
Papers by
ERNST B. HAAS, DAVID MITRANY,

]HR. MR. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS, G. M. NEDERHORST,
]HR. ]. ALTING VON GEUSAU, HUGH BEESLEY,
CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE, FRANC;:OIS BORELLA, F. HARTOG
AND MRS. M. ROHLING VAN SPAN]E
W ith an I ntroduction
by
B. LANDHEER
•
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
ISBN 978-94-011-8529-5 ISBN 978-94-011-9276-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-9276-7
Copyright I963 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands in 1963
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereot in an" form
T able 0/ contents
B. LANDHEER
I ntroduction I
ERNST B. HAAS
International Integration: The European and the Universal Process 6
DAVID MITRANY
Delusion 0/ Regional Unity 37
M. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS
La portee de l'integration europeenne. Point de vue juridico-politique 47
G. M. NEDERHORST
Possible Forms 0/ European Integration 56
J. ALTING VON GEUSAU
Law and Politics in the European Communities 68
HUGH BEESLEY
Direct Elections to the European Parliament 80
c. DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET F. BORELLA
Les risques de chevauchements et d'imbrications de structures

L' application du droit europeen 99
IV TABLE OF CONTENTS
F. H. HARTOG
In how tar is the Expectation ot increasing

Consumer-demand iustitied? I22
M. ROHLING VAN SPANJE
Consumers and European Integration I36

INTRODUCTION
by
B. LANDHEER
The Grotius Seminarium has as its purpose the study of international

problems under the aspect of "living and cooperating in one world."
Its Conference of May 30-June 2, I96I on "Limits and Problems of
European integration" attempted to view European integration within
the framework of this general goal as is somewhat implied in its title.
"The limits of European integration" lie in the necessity of fitting it
in the wider framework of international cooperation, while its problems
lie in the various interpretations and concretizations of its own goals,
ab out which there are a number of different viewpoints.
It could be stated that the European is faced with three sets of
problems: the creation of a more unified world as a global problem; the
regional integration of Europe; and, thirdly, the continuation of more
strictly national interests.
It is not justified to assume that these three circles of interest are
automatically complementary: they are often antagonistic, and a
"philosophy of integration" would have to arrive at a structural
presentation of those various values and of tbeir interrelatedness.
While it is obviously not possible for a small Conference to give those
problems their full weight, it is nevertheless hoped that the essays
combined in this volume raise a number of relevant questions and
contribute to the elaboration of some more concrete problems.
The matter of global versus European values is elaborated in the
study of Professor E. B. Haas, as weH as in the contribution of Pro-
fessor Mitrany.
There seems to be no doubt that the global perspective deserves
priority, as we can not put only one part of the world on its feet. We
have to visualize the functioning of the world as a whole, and then ask
the question of the function of Europe and the West.
There is no simple or direct answer to tbis question, and perhaps tbis
is not necessary, as long as the global perspective is present and as long
2 B.LANDHEER
as it reduces the propensity to power-thinking which also occurs in

regard to European integration and its function in the Western world.
In fact, it could be asserted that the limited response to European
integration on the part of the European is partiaHy due to the un-
certainty of its general perspective and the lack of a convincing and
articulate philosophy.
Modern Man seeks security, permanence and prosperity, but
certainly in regard to the highly developed countries, the first two
attributes are more basic than the last one. The combination of
prosperity, and the continuous threat of nuclear war do not engender
any real feeling of weH-being, and often create the impression that
increased economic activity also functions as a smokescreen for the
more essential problems of world-security as well as permanence.
This dualistic aspect of modern society also makes it very difficult
to obtain a clear picture of the role of the economy in the life of the
individual, as a decrease in tensions might give us reason to correct our
image of Man and to be less certain that "homo faber" is the ultimate
answer.
In some of the economic contributions this dilemma can be sensed,
and one can only wish that more thought would be devoted to as-
sumptions which may seem self-evident under present conditions, but
which may acquire different dimensions from a long-term viewpoint.
At present, there seems to be a sense of urgency about many matters
which are of secondary importance. The conclusion can therefore be
that we have to do with a "transposed" urgency which has its real
roots in our basic uncertainty in regard to the future of Mankind as a
whole.
The limited participation of the European in European integration
may have deeper causes, and it may not be simply a matter of more
and better information.
This accounts perhaps also for the hesitancy of governments to
arrive at a European parliament in the proper meaning of the term,
though it could also be advanced that the complexity of modern
society is becoming so great that the relations between parliaments
and executive organs can no longer be viewed in the tradition al
manner. They are, however, in any case a means of communication
between governments and the governed, and even aH arguments about
terms like "supernational" or "intergovernmental" cannot obscure the
fact that this communication is largely lacking.
If social institutions have the function of "upgrading common
INTRODUCTION 3
interests," to use the tenn of Professor Haas, there must be such
interests in reality rather than as a matter of belief, imputation or
anticipation. In this respect, increased contact is very necessary,
particularly because our economic thinking takes high-consumption as
its key-note, while Europe with its more organic traditions and its
universal values may ultimately attribute another function to the
economy than, for instance, the United States.
If in astabier world, the hypnotic effect of power were to diminish,
it is logical to expect greater differentiation. In this respect, the role of
Europe lies more in the recognition of its historical roots than in their
denial.
The tradition of Europe means differentiation, individualism, and
spiritual and intellectual diversity. While its diversity was too great in
the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century, it should nevertheless guard itself against monolithic and
technocratic tendencies. Those qualities are not the attributes of the
future, but already of the past, as they are unable to point the way
towards a world-society.
It is also not in the tradition of Europe to regard Man purely as a
producer and a consumer. One should perhaps remember Faust:
"When thus I hall the Moment flying
'Ah still delay- thou art so fair'
Then bind me in thy bonds undying" 1
Short-tenn and materialistic thinking are but one of the many
facets of European thought, and it would be more than unfortunate of
the universal values of Europe were to be lost in the chaos of the
"paradise-on-short-term. "
European integration should be a means to re-assert the identity of
Europe rather than weakening it, while in tenns of world-thinking, the
cultural entity should be stressed rather than only one of its
aspects.
European democracy, European capitalism, the "European way of
life" are essentially different from comparable institutions in America,
while Yugoslav or Polish communism is not the same as the commu-
nism of the Sovjet-Union or of the People's Republic of China.
The European mind has a structure of its own, which is the result of
history, environment and social structure. This cannot be altered at
1 Goethe, FtJlISt. transl. by Bayard Taylor. Leipzig (Brockhaus) :1:872., p. 60.

4 B.LANDHEER
will, and overconscious striving tends to increase tensions rather than

to reduce them.
Within a global perspective Europe has a very marked role of its
own; within the context of Atlantic unity much less, but it can be
stressed only again that global thinking should have priority over
regional thinking, also as a yardstick of the more strict1y national
policies.
Integration finds its lower limits in the natural propensity towards
larger socio-economic units; its upper limit lies in total integration
as a power-mechanism. It takes no prophet to see that reality will
somewhere lie between the two, delicately balanced by the general
world-situation, but influencing it in turn.
n is this second factor on which we can concentrate our efforts, while
the first is outside the realm of our own conscious volition.
Europe has always had an open sodal system: open towards the
world in its entirety and this should remain the key-note of European
policy: whether it is integrated or not.
Integration is a much overplayed term, because, on the one hand, it
means the adjustment to achanging world-structure - which might
develop more regional propensities - while, on the other hand, it is
often presented as a spontaneous or willed action.
This it is only to a very limited extent, as the increase in sodal
density in the world leaves much less room for alternatives than the
nineteenth century. It is this very fact which we should c1early
recognize, as also European integration cannot alter the fact that the
role of Europe has become more limited, as also that of the United
States which has seen a reduction in its sphere of influence.
This is no more than natural in a world in which sodal space is being
filled up by many nations, large and small, but it still seems difficult
for many to understand that sodal evolution points in the direction of
a world in which there will not be one dominant nation or one dominant
sodal system.
Evolution means differentiation, for Man as an individual as well as
for Man as a group.
If we could only recognize this fact, we could solve many problems as
it would break the compulsion of striving for the deadening uniformity
and mechanisation which are Man's worst enemies.
It is Europe, but not only Europe, which could contribute to a new
vision on Man, just as this would be possible for all nations, peoples and
INTRODUCTION 5
individuals who have not fallen victim to deterministic and compulsive
thinking.
Man is not there to develop, but to live.
If he lives, his development is a process of natural growth, but not
one imposed from without by the compulsions of modem society which
do not create life, but only a distorted image of it.
So much for the more universalist view on European society, but
also the rigid regionalists have their say in those essays which present a
few of the possible views. The more views, the better, and it is high
time that we retumed to having opinions: opinions about a more
universal or a more limited role for Europe; opinions about the priority
or non-priority of world over regional problems.
All is positive that contributes to our thinking and feeling and
diminishes the danger of our becoming mechanisms of largely verbal
behavior.
This means that we should not add too much to the stream of words,
but hope that those used may have some content.
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 1
THE EUROPEAN AND THE UNIVERSAL PROCESS
by
ERNST B. HAAS 2
European and Universal Integration

The established nation-state is in fuU retreat in Europe while it
advances with the strides of several voracious giants in Africa and Asia.
Integration among discrete political units is a historical fact before our
very eyes in Europe, but disintegration seems to be the dominant motil
elsewhere. Cannot the example of successful integration in Europe be
imitated? Could not the techniques of international and supranational
cooperation developed in Luxembourg, Paris and Brussels be put to
use in Accra, Bangkok, Cairo, as weU as on the East River in N ew York?
Or, in a different perspective, will not the progress of unity in Europe
inevitably have its integrating repercussions in other regions and at the
level of the United Nations even without efforts at conscious imitation?
Such a development would be most satisfying to our souls. Pre-
sumably it would contribute to world peace by creating ever-expanding
islands of practical cooperation, eventually spilling over into other
controversy-Iaden fields which threaten us directly with thermonu-
clear destruction. The functionalist theory of international peace
might be put to work by a generalization of the European mode of
post-I945 international cooperation. Further, those who hope to
contribute to the peaceful solution of conflict could take much solace
from such a development, for the European mode of resolving conflicts
among states has demonstrated that "there often comes a moment
when there is a simultaneous revolution of interests on both sides and
unity precipitates itself," to quote Mary FoUett, one of the foremost
students of the ethics of administration.
But it would also satisfy the scientist and theoretician who dwells in
1 Published in "International Organization". Vol. XV, no. 3 (Summer 1961) pp. 366-392.
B The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and of
the Institute of International Studies of the University of California in the preparation of
this essay. He is also indebted to Hans Daalder and Leon Lindberg for criticism though he
alone is responsible for the conclusions.
most of uso If the progress of integration in Europe owes something to
the deliberate social engineering of a Jean Monnet, the general appli-
cation of this technique would seem to validate our pretensions to
policy scientism. If we do not develop into philosopher-statesmen, at
least we will be the philosophers to whom statesmen will listen when
they look for avenues toward unity.
Before we abandon ourselves to such pIeasant speculation, however,
it would be well if we state systematically what we have leamed about
the causes of European integration and then investigate where else
these causes might be operative. This effort cal1s for some definitions.
We are interested in tracing progress toward a terminal condition
called political community. Successful nation-states constitute such
communities and subsequent amalgamations of several such states
may also. A variety of constitutional and structural factors are
compatible with this notion ; its central feature is the certainty of
internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with
mutually antagonistic claims.' The process of attaining this condition
among nation-states we call integration, the process whereby politica1
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new and !arger
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states. It should be noted that the objective economic,
social, and communication "factors" oftenidentified with "integration",
in my scheme, are conditions typical of an ongoing political community.
At best they may serve as indicators to help us assess the progress of
integration.
This focus precludes attention to what may be ca11ed the "imminent
myth" of European unity which owes its inspiration to cultural-
historical antecedents considered equally relevant to the contemporary
process of integration. It appears to me that the fact of European unity
under the Roman, Frankish and medieval Roman-German imperial
realms has no more analytica1 importance than the unity of a11 Islam
in the 8th century, the domains of the Ming Empire in the 15th or the
Guptas in the 5th. The mere fact that specific regions were unified
politica11y and culturally at one time seems not to prevent them from
subsequently dividing into warring nations denying in their conduct
the cultural unity the historian wishes to impute to them: they do not
then constitute any kind of politica1 community. If this is so we cannot
use some previous historical experience which involved the notion of
community as an argument for assuming the natural and inevitable
8 ERNST B. HAAS
re-emergence of this happy state of affairs. Itmay indeedemerge, but in

response to the factors we shall discuss. Naturally, in the political
advocacy of integration by some specific movement, the "memory" of
a historical community may play its part in the construction of a myth;
but this does not make the past an active causative agent.
Conflict resolution is a particularly interesting indicator for judging
progress along the path of integration. A elose study of negotiating
processes in international relations suggests the prevalence of three
types of compromise, each indicative of a certain measure of integration.
(r) The least demanding we may call accommodation on the basis
of the minimum common denominator. Equal bargaining partners
gradually reduce their antagonistic demands by exchanging concessions
of roughly equal value. Gains and losses are easily identified, but the
impact of the transaction never goes beyond what the least cooperative
bargaining partner wishes to concede. This mode of compromise is
typical of elassic diplomatic negotiations.
(2) Accommodation by "splitting the difference" carries us a little
farther along the path of integration. As before, demands are reduced
and concessions of roughly equal value exchanged among autonomous
bargaining units. But in this mode of compromise the mediatory
services of a secretary-general or ad hoc international expert study
group may be admitted by the parties. Conflict is resolved, not on
the basis of the will of the least cooperative, but somewhere between
the final bargaining positions. This type of negotiation is prevalent in
international economic organizations and in other dealings permitting
financial identification of gains or losses, such as the formulation of a
scale of assessments for members of the United Nations.
(3) Finally, accommodation on the basis of deliberately or inad-
vertently upgrading the common interests of the parties takes us
elosest to the peaceful change procedures typical of a political com-
munity with its full legislative and judicial jurisdictions, lacking in
international relations. To confuse matters further, this mode of
conflict resolution is often identified as "integration," as said by Mary
Follett, who wrote that it, unlike mere compromise, signified "that
a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place,
that neither side has had to sacrifice anything." If this is so it must
mean that the parties succeeded in redefining their conflict so as to
work out a solution at a higher level, which almost invariably implies
the expansion of the mandate or task of an international or national
governmental agency. In terms of results, this mode of accommodation
maximizes what I have elsewhere caIled the "spill-over" effect of
international decisions: policies made pursuant to an initial task and
grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as
reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the
task. In terms of method, the upgrading of the parties' common
interests relies heavily on the services of an institutionalized
mediator, whether a single person or a board of experts with an
autonomous range of powers. It thus combines intergovernmental
negotiation with the participation of independent experts and spokesmen
for interest groups, parliaments and political parties. It is this combi-
nation of interests and institutions which we shall identify as "supra-
national." The initial creation of such an agency, of course, demands a
creative compromise among the states parties to the effort, based on
the realization that certain common interests cannot be attained in
any other way. This in turn presupposes that identical and converging
policy aims predominate rather than antagonistic ones.
Each of these modes of accommodation, in addition to specifying a
type of outcome relating to intensities of integration, also is typified by
appropriate institutional mechanisms. There exists, moreover, a fourth
prominent procedural device - parliamentary diplomacy - which is
capable of producing any of the three outcomes. Parliamentary
diplomacy, as Dean Rusk defined it, implies the existence of a con-
tinuing organization with a broad frame of reference, public debate,
rules of procedure governing the debate, and the statement of con-
clusions in a formal resolution arrived at by some kind of majority vote.
When bodies like the UN or the Council of Europe define a conflict
situation by filtering discussion through this machinery they may also
be setting the limits within which eventual settlement comes about,
though parliamentary diplomacy rarely defines the actual terms of the
settlement. Instead it mobilizes political mediatory forces - the uncom-
mitted states, parties, groups or persons - whose voice in the settlement
process is given volume by the reluctance of the parties to the dispute
to annoy the mediating forces. Since the institutional context in which
parliamentary diplomacy can be practiced maximizes the represen-
tation of a variety of interests emanating from the same nation it opens
up areas of maneuver which are foreclosed in negotiations exclusively
conducted by carefully instructed, single agents of foreign ministries.
To that extent it facilitates a greater amount of integration even
though it does not necessarily produce out comes which upgrade common
interests.
10 ERNST B. HAAS
Where ean these modes of aeeommodation be identified in the history

and institutions of European integration?
(z) The Lesson 01 European Integration

Clearly all these modes of aeeommodation are part of the European
pattern of international adjustment. While they do not provide the
only indieators of degrees of integration, they appear to be partieularly
strategie ones in that they foeus on decision-making, thereby aeting as
a summary of, and an abstraction upon, other factors which eould also
be used in the role of indieators. Broadly speaking, international
institutions maximizing decision-making by means of the seeond and
third modes yield the greatest amount of progress toward the goal of
politieal eommunity.
Parliamentary diplomaey is the chief eontribution to European
unity whieh ean be eredited to the various parliamentary assemblies.
They have not meaningfully eontrolled their various exeeutives nor
have they legislated in any real sense, though they have attempted and
partially exercised powers in both these fields. But they have acted as a
spur to the formation of new voluntary elite groups across national
boundaries - the European political groups - and the interplay among
these has produced a type of diplomatie problem-solving which takes
its inspiration from parliamentary resolutions and is able to upgrade
eommon interests. As examples we may cite the work of the Council of
Europe in relation to the Saar, in refugee relief and resettlement, and
in the relaxation of frontier formalities. We may add the work of the
Nordie Council in the negotiation of the now superseded Nordie
Common Market Agreement. But let it be admitted at the same time
that the total eontribution of parliamentary diplomacy is not very
great. It found no institutional outlet at all in OEEC; yet that organi-
zation's contribution to integration was substantial even though it
operated primarily on the level of aecommodation by "splitting the
difference. "
The most successful institutions in Europe are the "communities" of
the Six, constitutional hybrids which onee eaused nightmares to the
publie lawyer. They facilitate the resolution of eonflict by virtue of all
three modes, but the upgrading of common interests is their true
eontribution to the art of politieal integration. All fundamental
decisions are made by the Councils of Ministers. But they are decisions
based on eontinuous compromise, eonstantly informed by generally
respected expert bodies with constitutional powers of their own and
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION II
in constant contact with supranational voluntary associations and

interest groups. The character of decisionmaking stimulates interest
groups to make themselves heard; it spurs political parties in Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg to work out common positions; it creates an
enormous pressure on high national civil servants to get to know and
establish rapport with their opposite numbers; and it sharpens the
sensitivities of the legal profession to European norms and political
processes in preparation for the inevitable flood of litigation before the
Court of Justice. In short, many of the decisions are integrative in their
immediate economic consequences as welt as in the new expectations
and political processes which they imply. It is this indirect result which
is maximized by the mixture of institutions which usually achieves
accommodation at a higher level of agreement as compared to the
initial bargaining positions of the parties. Earlier decisions, including
the ones constituting the communities, spill over into new functional
contexts, involve more and more people, call for more and more inter-
bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own
logic in favor öf later decisions meeting, in a pro..;community direction,
the new problems which grow out of the earlier compromises.
Intergovernmental institutions of the classic variety, even when
assisted by respected international civil servants and advisory boards,
have not been able to match this performance. NATO and OEEC, for
reasons to be explored, have continued to make their contribution to
integration by means of compromises based on techniques found also
in the United Nations. They have transcended these only in relation to
certain tasks hinging around the direct implications of the welfare
state.
This brings us face to face with the key question of which organi-
zational/unctions, or tasks, have contributed most to the process of
integration in Europe. The superficial answer clearly points to the
field of economics; but by no means all organizations with an economic
competence have performed equally weIl and few of them solve their
problems on the basis of upgrading common interests. Parliamentary
diplomacy has apparently been of importance in advancing economic
integration only in the Nordie Council; OEEC functioned on the basis
of splitting the difference or compromising on the level of the minimum
common denominator in all areas except those relating to currency
convertibility and the removal of quotas (ih which common interests
were indeed upgraded). EFTA has not taken strides comparable to
those of the EEC and ECSC.
12 ERNST B. HAAS
Not merely economic tasks, therefore, but the degree of functional

specificity of the economic task is causally related to the intensity of
integration. The more specific the task, the more likely important
progress toward political community. It is not enough to be concemed
with the reduction of trade barriers or the forecasting of industrial
productivity. Specificity of task is essential, with respect to such
assignments as creating a common market for narrowly defined pro-
ducts, unifying railway rates, removing restrictive practices in certain
branches of industry, removing import quotas by fixed percentage
points during fixed periods, and the like. Functional specificity, how-
ever, may be so trivial as to remain outside the stream of human
expectations and actions vital for integration. This would seem to be
the case with the standardization of railway rolling stock, for example,
or the installation of uniform road signs. The task, in short, must be
both specific and economically important in the sense of containing the
potential for spilling over from one vital area of welfare policy into
others.
Other types of tasks have shown themselves much more barren. The
cultural activities of the Council of Europe lack a focus on intensely
experienced human wants. Its emergency aid measures have been
short-range and its contributions to the solution of political tensions
non-repetitive. The "Europeanreview" function is much too vague to
yield observable resuIts. The standardization efforts of the Nordic
Council lack the stimulus of controversy and debate: they are so
deeply rooted in the Scandinavian setting that one suspects integration
of proceeding even without the Council. Continuous contact among
civil servants and ministers is capable of contributing to integration
in narrowly defined areas even without the participation of parlia-
mentarians. The only functionally specific assignment of WEU is the
supervision of the arms aspects of the Paris and London Agreements
(1954). This function is being carried out in a supranational manner,
but the reason is in the non-controversial and non-recurrent aspect of
German rearmament, at least at the inter-governmental level. The
other activities of WEU are unlikely to be remembered by history.
What about the field of European eonventions? Surely these are
specific in content and many of them relate to eeonomics and welfare
poliey. The fact remains, however, that their very eontent reflects
merely the minimum common denominator among the existing
practices and policies of the member states, and that the Council had
to resort to the device of "partial agreements" to get beyond this level.
Conventions which depart from this denominator tend not to be ratified
by the country whose standards are below the norms fixed in Stras-
bourg. Integration, therefore, is advanced by the European conventions
only to the extent that their content calls for a new, a supranational,
political process which can generate new expectations and policies.
This, probably, is the case only with reference to the field of human
rights, a very significant field indeed.
Military and defense questions have not displayed a elose affinity to
integration unless the issue involves the related question of saving and
allocating resources for welfare measures. NATO's experience in the
financing of infrastructure programs, weapons research, integration of
air warning systems and the switch to centrally-controlled nuelear
deterrents indicates that the upgrading of common interests does take
place - not without obstaeles and delays - when the economic burdens
of defense for small countries are considered incompatible with their
welfare commitments. But the other activities of the Atlantic Alliance
make plain that more primitive modes of accommodation continue to
flourish and that integration is more pronounced on paper than in the
command post, the procurement center and the council chamber.
This survey of the functionallessons of European integration leads
to the inevitable conelusion that functional contexts are autonomous.
Integrative forces which flow from one kind of activity do not neces-
sarily infect other activities, even if carried out by the same organi-
zation. OEEC could not repeat in the field of tariff bargaining the
results it obtained on questions of convertibility. NATO cannot
transfer its success in planning strategy for new weapons systems to the
standardization of the enlistment period; and ECSC has shown itself
more adept in negotiating cumulative compromises on the creation of a
common market than on shortrun solutions for the coal crisis. De-
cisions made by identical officials, in organizations with a stable
membership, in a non-revolutionary socio-ideological setting, with
similar institutional characteristics nevertheless vary sharply, in terms
of their integrative impact, depending on the functional context. If this
is true even in the European setting, how much more true is it likely to
be in the United Nations. But the converse proposition is equally
important: the autonomy of functional contexts means that disinte-
gration in one range of relations among certain states does not ne ces-
sarily imply parallel disintegration in other relations among the same
states. Thus the breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations did not
entailaretreat frommonetary convertibility; NATO's work on unifying
14 ERNST B. HAAS
air raid warning systems was not interrupted by the split between the
Six and the Seven.
The attempt to compare the European experience with efforts
elsewhere compels attention to the environment in which the process of
integration is taking place, what some scholars call the "bac;kground"
factors. This investigation will show that while "Europe," in the
largest sense of the nineteen countries west of the Iron Curtain,
possesses no completely common factors at all, significant islands of
almost identical environment al factors exist among certain of them.
Social structure provides one set of factors. With the' exception of
Greece, Turkey, Portugal, parts of Spain and southern Italy, the
Western European social scene is dominated by pluralism. Articulate
voluntary groups, led by bureaucratized but accessible elites, compete
with each other more or less rationally for political power and social
status. The population is mobilized and participates in this process
through affiliation with mass organizations. In the countries mentioned,
however, affective and functionally diffuse social relations prevail.
Economic and industrial development furnishes a second set. With
the exception of the same countries plus Ireland, we are dealing with a
very high level of economic development, including the countries in
which the dominant products are agricultural, from the point of view
of productivity, investment, and consumption. Significantly correlated
with industrialization we find the usual high degree of urbanization
and ever-growing demands for government services and durable
consumer goods. We also find increasing demands on limited natural
resources and greater dependence on foreign (or regional) trade. But
note some partial exceptions: N orway' s industrial weakness compared
to Sweden, Belgium's inefficient agriculture compared to Holland's.
Ideological patterns provide the final set of factors. Since policies of
integration are, in the first instance, advanced or blocked by the
activities of political parties and their ministers, parties may be used as
an index of ideological homogeneity. A given cluster of count ries is
"homogeneous" ideologically if the divisions among the parties are,
very roughly, the same among all the countries in the cluster, when the
principles professed and the concrete socio-economic interests repre-
sen ted by the parties are roughly analogous on both sides of a fron tier.
Given this definition, the Scandinavian countries emerge as ideologi-
cally homogeneous among themselves (with the partial exception of
Iceland) but quite dissimilar from the rest of Europe. The Benelux
countries, West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria seem homogeneous
and with considerable affinity for Italy and France. But a disturbing
element is introduced here by the large anti-parliamentary minorities
in France and Italy. Portugal, Greece, Spain and Turkey 1ack the
typical European socio-economic and therefore the approprlate party
systems and do not fit into any neat ideologica1 package. The British
and lrish parties show some affinity for their continental colleagues,
especially the socialists, but the patterns of interest aggregation and
politica1 style differ sufficiently to prevent the positing of a homo-
geneous pattern. We therefore have two large ideologica1 clusters (the
Six plus Switzerland and Austria and Scandinavia) and a number of
single national systems whose characteristics seem sui generis.
Let us relate these environmental patterns to the integration
process. Integration proceeds most rapidly and drastica1ly when it
responds to socio-economic demands emanating from an industrial-
urban environment, when it is an adaption to crles for increasing
welfare benefits and security born by the growth of a new type of
society. In the words of two European scholars :
For decades industrialism has been revising the workways and consuming habits
of people everywhere. It has enabled cities to grow and the urban way of life to
spread. Urbanism is the great outreaching dynamic, breaking down isolation and
encroaching upon tradition. Modem industrial urbanism is innately inimical to
any isolation. It demands access and stimulates mobility. As earlier it resisted
being confined to city walls, now it resists being confined to limited political
areas. This resistance to confinement is greater than the resistance against the
encroachments. In the measure that industrial urbanism has gained in this
contest against the rooted barriers - in that measure integration is needed. The
effort toward European integration reflects this need of industrial urbanism for
wider organization. 1
I reject the teleological aspects of this statement. In terms of a social

process based on rational human perceptions and motives, no mere
concept "calls for" or "needs" anything: a discrete set of group motives
converging with motives of cognate groups from across the bord er,
results in a certain pattern of policy; the aims and the policy reflect
demands born from the environment, and the later policies may we11
change the environment in a wholly unintended fashion. Qnly in this
sense, then, does industrial urbanism favor integration. Because the
modern "industrial-politica1" actor fears that his way of life cannot be
safeguarded without structural adaptation he turns to integration; but
by the same token, political actors who are neither industrial, nor
1 Jan J. Schokking and Nels Anderson, "Observations on the European Integration

Process," Jou,nal/ar Conllia Resolulion, Vol. IV, no. 4 (December 1960), p. 409.
16 ERNST B. HAAS
urban nor modem in their outlook usually do not favor this kind of
adaptation for they seek refuge instead in national exclusiveness.
It follows, further, that countries dominated by a non-pluralistic
social structure are poor candidates for participation in the integration
process. Even if their governments do partake, at the officiallevel, the
consequences of their participation are unlikely to, be feIt elsewhere in
the social structure. Hence the impact of European integration, in all
its aspects, has been minimal in Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Finally,
sufficient ideological homogeneity for valuesharing among important
national elite groups is essential for rapid integration. The implications
for Europe are obvious, as reflected in the differential rates of progress
toward political community which have been made within Scandinavia,
within the Six, within Benelux, as compared to the all-European level
represented by OEEC, NATO, and the Council of Europe.
In addition to these environmental considerations, which relate to
the internal characteristics of the region undergoing integration, there
are often external environmental factors of importance. Fear of a
common enemy is an absolutely necessary precondition for integration
in military organizations: without the USSR there would have been
no NATO. But the common enemy may be a more subtle manifestation,
such as fear of external groupings of cuIturally and economically
suspect forces: such considerations were not irrelevant to the "third
force" argument which entered the integration process among the Six
and it is apparent in the convergence of interests which resuIted in
OECD. While external environments produce motives favoring
integration they are never sufficient in themselves to explain the rate
and intensity of the process.
Institutions, functions and environments provide useful categories
for arranging the human data among which our various modes of
accommodation made themselves feIt; but they do not exhaust the list
of crucial given factors of which we are all aware and without which
the process of integration simply cannot be discussed. Variations in
nationalpolicy, forinstance, are fundamental to the life of international
organizations, especially in agencies which do not possess the insti-
tutional power to influence significantly the policy aims of their
member states. However, this truism should not be rendered in the all
too common form which asserts that differences in power among
members determine organizational behavior and the speed and
direction of organizational response. Variations in national policy pro-
vide apower determinant, not in absolute terms, but only in relation
to the functional strength of particular states in relation to the specific
task of the organization. The military and economic power of the
.United States in NATO, for instance, is a meaningful ingredient in
the life of that organization only when it is brought to bear on in-
frastructure or procurement negotiations. The fact remains, nonethe-
less, that changes in the policy needs experienced by member states,
reflecting as they do the pressures of the home and of the international
environment, create definite phases in the life of international organi-
zations.
Therefore, lessons about integrative processes associated with one
phase do not generally carry over into the next because the specific
policy context - often short-range - determines what is desired by
governments and tolerated by them in terms of integrative accommo-
dations. This, in turn, forces us to the conclusion that types of accommo-
dation, and the associated procedural norms of an organization, de-
veloped in one phase of its life, do not necessarily carry over into the
next. In short, there is no dependable, cumulative process of precedent
formation leading to ever more community-oriented organizational
behavior, unless the task assigned to the institutions is inherently
expansive, thus capable of overcoming the built-in autonomy of
functional contexts and of surviving changes in the policy aims of
member states.
The importance of this lesson must be illustrated from the experience
of one of the more successful European organizations, OEEC, with
multilateral accommodation in liberalizing trade and payments - the
aspect of OEEC which contributed most to integration in Europe. The
typical OEEC procedure inc1uded confrontation, col1ection of detailed
information, mediation in closed sessions, and working out of specific
solutions to crises by autonomous bodies of national experts. The
procedures were perfected during the period (1948-51) when the chief
task of OEEC was the distribution of American aid, assistance which
was conditional on trade and payments liberalization. During the next
phase (1952'-56) the procedure continued and was remarkably suc-
cessful in further removing obstacles to intra-regional commerce,
despite the cessation of American aid. Why? Largely because the
major national policies continued to be oriented toward liberalization
and the recurrent French and British payments crises could therefore
not successfully challenge the multilateral decision-making process;
continuing French and British demands for a relaxation of the OEEC
Code resulted in successive compromises along the principle of "splitting
I8 ERNST B. HAAS
the difference," but involving the upgrading of common interests in

the system of review and accountability which accompanied the
relaxation. Since I956, all this has changed. Further economic inte-
gration has become enmeshed in the political issue of the Six against
the Seven, with the result that the procedures which had apparently
been institutionalized successfully in an earlier phase of OEEC's life
have stagnated with disuse. Fundamental changes in national policies
provide the crucial explanatory variable.
This process went on in a setting of intergovernmentalism. More
than in the supranational setting, this permits great freedom to states
strongly endowed in a specific functional context. Let us use monetary
cooperation as an example. The history of OEEC suggests - as that of
ECSC and EEC does not - that certain types of states can use their
special bargaining power more readily to get their way. Thus, economi-
cally weak countries whose trade is not crucial to the system are
readily exempted from the governing norms and play little part in
decisionmaking; but economically strong countries, in terms of total
foreign trade and credit capacity possess ade facta veto power. Structur-
al creditors whose role in regional trade is secondary occasionally assert
a veto power and delay decisions, but their influence is never dominant.
Structural or occasional debtors (France and Britain) with a very
important stake in regional trade are able to exercise a constant
blackmail power and succeed in obtaining exemptions from regional
rules, being immune to the threat of retaliation and responsive only to
the techniques of discrete mediation and confrontation.
In short, changes in national policy and variations in national
strength have an important bearing on the ease of integration even
when ideological, social, and industrial conditions favorable to the
process predominate.
We can now summarize the lesson of European integration for the
world at large.
(I) Institutianally, supranational bodies most readily lend them-
selves to accommodation on the basis of upgrading common interests.
This is equally true of intergovernmental bodies which permit certain
of their expert commissions the role usually associated with the com-
munities of the Six, such as the OEEC Steering Board for Trade, the
Council of Europe's Commissioner for Refugees, and WEU's Arma-
ments Control Agency. These institutions are least susceptible to the
alternation of phases and most likely to develop cumulative decision-
making precedents.
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
( z) F unctionally, specific economic tasks resolving policy differences

emerging from previous imperfeet compromises on welfare questions,
but involving large mass interests, are most intimately related to rapid
integration. Conflicts may be resolved by all the usual methods, but
upgrading common interests predominates. The tendency toward
autonomy of tasks can be overcome only by building into the insti-
tutions specific assignments which maximize the spill-over process.
(3) Environmentally, integration fares best in settings controlled by
social groupings representing the rational interests of urban-industrial
scenes, and seeking to maximize their economic benefits, and dividing
along regionally homogeneous ideological-political lines. Changing
national policy inhibits integration unless compensated by strong
central institutions maximizing the spill-over process.
Obviously, integration may take place and has taken place among
nations which have few of these characteristics and through inter-
national organizations which depart little from the classic intergo-
vernmental pattern. But the pace and intensity of such integration is
pallid in such a context as compared to the situation in which all opti-
mal conditions are met. Hence it should come as no surprise that the
communities of the Six represent the most, and the Council of Europe
the least, successful organizations in a European spectrum in which all
organizations make some contribution to some aspect of the integration
process.
(3) The Lessons Applied to Other Regions

Before proceeding to a projection of these conclusions at the global
level of the UnitedNations, it might be instructive to see to what extent
they can be used to explain progress toward political community in
other areas of the world. I have selected three such areas, the European
members of the Soviet bloc, the Arab world, and the Western hemi-
sphere. Each of these possesses more unifying environmental charac-
teristics in certain aspects than does Western Europe. The Arab and
Latin American worlds are, respectively, relatively homogeneous with
reference to language and religion. They share, less uniformly, it is true,
economic underdevelopment and dependence on monocuIture. They
also share certain ideological commitments, at least if we do not probe
too deeply below the surface of ringing affirmations and generous
platitudes. The Soviet bloc owes its unity less to any of these con-
siderations than to the organizational and ideological ties among the
ruling elites - and these may be undergoing disintegration now!
20 ERNST B. HAAS
Soviet Bloc. There are no supranational organizations in the bloc

now, nor were the relations which dominated during the Stalin era of
that type. On the contrary, the organizations which prevail are
intergovemmental and the party meetings which take place seem
almost like diplomatie conferences. The law of alternating phases
seems to apply as exemplified by the lack of cumulative decision-
making and precedent formation. Further, the specificity of functional
contexts is an operative reality; the most continuous type of inte-
grative activity is in the area of joint economic planning with highly
detailed objectives. Environmentally speaking, this goes on in a setting
dominated by aresolution to industrialize, with growing urbanization
and a deepening socio-economic division of labor in each communist
country, even though totalitarianism precludes the flowering of a
pluralist society.
The truly revealing lesson of the Soviet bloc, however, emerges from
the organizational context. Actually, integration was least successful
when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union possessed an organi-
zational monopoly over the process. The Stalin period witnessed a
minimum of military cooperation, no joint economic planning, no
exchange of information apart from the slavish imitation in Eastern
Europe of Soviet examples and no successful value-sharing among
fellow communists. Integration was a one-way process in which the
aims of the European satellites were simply subordinated to Russia's.
The brittleness of the structure stood exposed in the fall of 1956. Now,
with the occasional flowering of "revisionism," there is little central
direction, accompanied paradoxically by a good deal of practieal
integration. The dismantlement of the central apparatus of coercion
and manipulation yields to a process of voluntary integration based on
a calculation of economic advantage, accompanied by the proper
dosages of ideological compromise negotiated among equals. The
modes of accommodation are as varied as elsewhere with the upgrading
of common interests by no means always victorious. However, the
more varied the centers of power in the bloc become, with the implied
instability of alignments and unpredictability of compromise patterns,
the more likely the emergence of some habits of continuous intra-bloc
adjustment by techniques not unlike those of Western Europe.
Hence, the essentiallessons of the Western European integration
process seem to hold in the communist setting, with the pragmatie
value-sharing of allied communist parties taking the place of inter-
action among kindred democratic parties. However, the continuation
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 2I
of this process c1early depends on the observation by the sate1lite rulers

of the limits to voluntarism imposed by the Soviets. Imre Nagy
demonstrates the non-obsewance of these limits, while Wladislaw
Gomulka exemplifies the principle of limited dissent within a frame-
work of fundamentalloyalty to bloc objectives. Unlike other regional
systems, voluntary integration in the Soviet bloc depends on the
patience of one national elite.
Arab States. Institutions in the Arab world contain no trace of supra-
nationality. The Arab League as weIl as the African organs in which
certain Arab states participate are intergovernmental conferences, with
no or weak secretariats. While their deliberations are eloquently
c10thed in the phraseology of Arab Brotherhood and often refer to the
lofty aims of the Arab Nation, they result in accommodations based on
the minimum common denominator, if they achieve accommodation at
all. But this is a symptom of the lack of integration rather than a cause.
Much the same is true of the conclusions which can be drawn from a
functional analysis. In principle, Arab institutions have tasks which
cover collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes among the
members, security against external aggression, economic integration,
regional investment, legal harmonization, cultural cooperation,
coordination of transport and communication - the list of activities is
identical with the European prototype. The only functions success-
fully carried out, however, are of a purely negative character. While
the autonomy of functional contexts is fully intact in the Arab world,
none of the tasks show a tendency toward spilling over into new areas
of common concern and many show evidence of periodic atrophy.
Specifically, nothing of consequence has occurred toward economic
and legal integration, though some common transport policy measures
have been elaborated. The most striking successes were the defense of
the Middle East against Western and Israeli policy. Arab unity has
been sustained in keeping up the economic-diplomatic boycott of
Israel and in making common policy against western countries sus-
pected of neo-imperialist designs. Security and peaceful settlement
among members of the Arab League has been less consistently achieved,
but several instances of successful mediation and compromise settle-
ment have occurred. When the total international environment made
it seem that the consequences of inter-Arab strife (as in the Lebanese-
Jordan crisis of I958) would be destructive for all concerned, the
phrases of Arab Brotherhood enshrined in League proceedings were
translated into reality. Success in highly specific security undertakings,
22 ERNST B. HAAS
lack of success in other pursuits, the prevalence of the Illilllmum

common denominator,: these are merely more symptoms, not causes, of
lack of integration and progress toward an Arab political community.
The causes, then, must be found in the environment with its de-
ceptive facade of unity. With the exception of the Pan-Arab socialist
party (Ba'ath) there are few ideological links of unity among Arab
political groups. Each modernizing elite in power, whether an intel-
lectuals' independence movement or the Army, acts and thinks only
in the context of its state; each traditional-feudal oligarchical elite
is intent on preserving its position and rejects cooperation with hostile
Arab groups across the border. They "integrate" in meeting jointly
experienced threats from outside the region; they cannot meaningfuIly
work together on normaIly integrative tasks because they experience
no common needs. Even in the area of economic development, it is the
maximization of national resources which motivates elites, not a
pooling of resources. In fact, Iraqi nationalist suspicion that Egypt had
its eye on Iraq oil may have been a factor in the split among such
similarly motivated leaders as Kassim and Nasser.
If Europe is to serve as our model, too few of the preconditions for
integration exist in the Arab world to make an imitation of the inte-
gration process a likelihood in the near future. If neither the economic
nor the social environment be ars any resemblance to that of the West,
the ideologies which prevail are unlikely to conform to that pattern.
Forcible integration - conquest - remains the major possibility, but
this would hardly be an application of the European modes of accom-
modation.
The Americas. Though there are no supranational institutions in the
western hemisphere, the fact remains that the prevailing intergovern-
mental organizations contain bodies which, on occasion, perform as if
they were supranational. This is true of the Inter-American Peace
Committee and of occasional subcommittees of the OAS Council. It is
also possible that certain bodies of the Central American and Latin
American Common Market organizations will develop such modes of
behavior. However, ways of accommodation thus far have never gone
beyond the minimum common denominator. They have had distinct
integrative consequences because the techniques of consultation have
created precedents, subsequently applied in similar situations. Still, it
may weIl be that the OEEC proposition concerning the determining
role of historical phases applies he re too, preventing the precedents
from becoming cumulative.
Precision can here be gained from functional analysis. Within the
OAS a growing complexity of economic, social, and cultural organs has
resulted only in cumulative inaction: the c1ashing expectations and
demands of the United States and of the underdeveloped Latin Ameri-
can countries have thus far check-mated one another. There has been
no expansion of the organizational task, leave alone a spill-over. But
the same is not true of the maintenance of security and the peaceful
solution of disputes among members of the OAS.
A mixture of quiet mediation, admonition and the threat of economic
and military sanctions has sufficed to stop almost a dozen western
hemisphere wars since I945. Why? Essentially because no major
ideological issues were at stake. The wars in question involved the
mercenary ragamuffins of one oligarchy arrayed against those of
another in very minor military skirmishes. Is it in these situations that
the mediatory prowess of the OAS proved itself and in which it
achieved the institutionalization of precedent. But when this context
changes a new picture emerges. Wars involving the issue of outside
intervention - whether collective or unilateral - in a civil conflict in
which democratic-revolutionary forces are arrayed against a traditional
oligarchy (Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Cuba) cannot
be disposed of in a similar manner. Costa Rica was saved and the
Trujillo regime faced with collective denunciation and sanctions
because there was a huge majority in favor of the democratic forces in
question. But the Guatemalan and Cuban cases show that intervention
is considered hostile, by the same majority, to modernization and thus
cannot receive organizational approval. Is it not likely that the very
success of OAS in collective security is possible only as long as the
issue of interlering with modernization is not involved? If so, we are
now living in a new phase in which past precedents will not shape future
policy, which may imply a decay in the hitherto successful security
functions of OAS.
The current preparation by OAS of a convention on human rights
and of a document concerning the limits of multilateral intervention on
behalf of democracy may prove that common interests, for the first
time, can be upgraded in this field. It would imply institutional
growth, new tasks, a spill-over, and adefinite advance toward political
community. While this has not yet happened, it could suggest that
economics need not be the chief carrier of the integration process. In
fact, this begs one of the most puzzling of questions : can only industri-
alized nations integrate or can the very fact of underdevelopment be a
ERNST B. HAAS
spur to regional unity? When one super-developed power confronts

twenty disunited nations eager for aid, the answer is no. But would
this be true if the OAS possessed the power to distribute aid on the
scale of OEEC under the Marshal Plan? There are two Latin American
common market organizations now functioning, each using as its
raison d' etre the need for development and the creation of large markets
as a spur to industrialization. The tasks imposed by their respective
treaties are less precise and more permissive than the Treaty of Rome
and they lack the power to hold out and withdraw economic rewards
to their members. The picture for integration seems unpromising, but
again it may be too soon to judge, especially since defense against the
export prowess and possible protectionism of a united Europe is
another factor making for unity in Latin America. Regional unity in
Europe may yet father regional unity in Latin America even though
the process obeys different impulses.
If this reasoning is correct, the fact of underdevelopment and the
prevalence of monoculture may turn out to be environmental factors
favorable to integration, though they were hostile to it in Europe. At
the same time, social and economic underdevelopment creates major
regional ideological affinities, especially among radical socialist-
nationalist reformist parties of the A prista type. But regimes and
parties have ahabit of changing rapidly in this area. Even if they
remain in power for longer periods, the preoccupation with purely
national development has thus far carried the day. The intensification
of the national-revolutionary process may still have the same disinte-
grative consequences here as in the Middle East.
Returning to our initial propositions, then, let us reiterate that
intensity of integration is positively .correlated with industrialization
and economic diversification. These conditions, in turn, imply an
interest in social legislation at the national level; when a regional
integration process is launched, the need for an intra-regional harmo-
nization of social legislation is frequently expressed. That being the
case, the degree of existing uniformity of such legislation, prepared
often under the auspices of the International Labor Organization and
subject to its continuing review, provides a useful indicator for
judging the existence of commonly experienced needs and interests.
Table I makes clear that the indicator of international sociallegislation
confirms our earlier reasoning concerning the impact of industrialism
on integration. The ILO conventions involved, of course, were drafted
on the basis of global considerations; even so the interest shown by
regional organizations grouping underdeveloped countries is minimal.

Table II offers similar computations for the conventions conc1uded
under the auspices of the Council of Europe, showing their coverage
for the important regional organizations within Europe and for certain
countries relatively aloof from the work of integration. Again, the
figures support the proposition that environmentally similar countries,
with a common basis in pluralism and industrialism, tend to express
the joint interests which flow from this environment in harmonizing
nationallegislation. While the overall coverage of ILO conventions is
about 33 percent, that of the European conventions is 59 percent.
(4) The Lesson Applied to the United Nations

The attempt to impute environmental regularities into the charac-
teristics of the United Nations member states would be futile. Any
superficial examination on the basis of the indicators we used in the
case of Europe will demonstrate the absence of pervasive traits common
to all members. More than half of the member states are non-industrial
and underdeveloped; two-thirds, perhaps, lack a rationalpluralistic
social structure and continue to exhibit various degrees of traditiona-
lism; totalitarian, democratic and oligarchical regimes are represented
in about equal numbers. Most important, perhaps, the ideals of member
states run the gamut from the advocacy of revolutionary change to the
staunch defense of some status quo. The UN environment, in short, is
volatile and dynamic: it changes with every admission of a new member,
with every revolution, almost with everyelection. The Western
European environment, in contrast, is the epitome of stability.
This, obviously, implies a marked systemic dependence on historical
phases. The UN, during the period of deceptive inter-allied unity was
one kind of system; it functioned very differently during the subsequent
period of American-NATO supremacy, to give way to still another
mode of action when neutralism came into its own with the mass
admission of new members in I955. The advent of the African states
and the eventual obsolescence of the whole colonial issue is certain to
create a new environment again. Environmental instability is much
greater than in any regional example here investigated and the
performance of the UN system is proportionately uneven.
In fact, the environment was singled out for initial attention here
because it imposes on the UN an entirely different species of organi-
zationallife as contrasted with regional systems. Regional integration
responds to certain common environmental features, no matter how
ERNST B. HAAS
elusive or temporary; it is based on certain common needs experienced

by all participants, often in defense against some outside force. Nothing
of the kind is true in the UN. The United Nations system represents
the cohabitation of enemies, the institutionalized attack-and-retreat
of hostile forces seeking to get the better of each other by peaceful
means, but without any intention of deliberately emphasizing what
they may share in common. Integrative consequences flowing from
this game are wholly unintended, though none the less real when they
do occur. Consequently, it is idle to expect stable agreement on the
primacy of certain tasks in the UN; the volatile environment is
responsible for a shifting perception of necessary and common tasks,
thus interfering with the functional specificity desirable for integration.
I t would be amistake to conclude from this picture that the insti-
tutions of the UN may be dismissed as irretrievably impotent. The UN
institutional structure is so complex and the variety of tasks so great
that they run the gamut from pure intergovernmental diplomacy to
certain cautious approaches to supranationality. Further, the variety
of organs is so great and the conditions under which they function so
diffuse that a1l modes of accommodation can and do flourish under the
proper circumstances. Institutionally, then, the system is exceedingly
flexible and has shown the most startling constitutional adaptations,
often to the chagrin of internationallawyers.
But it remains true just the same that the dominant mode of
accommodation has been compromise on the basis of the minimum
common denominator, though splitting the difference is not unknown
in the activities of certain specialized agencies. Not that the upgrading
of common interests has not been attempted, as indicated in a variety
of colonial, economic development and military proposals, beginning
with the Baruch Plan. The record, rather, points to the lesson that
successful UN action or solution of crises has always been based on the
minimum common denominator, success being judged by the degree of
implementation given to UN resolutions. Resolutions, by contrast,
which emerged through the process of parliamentary diplomacy and
represented the view of a majority sharply contested by the defeated
minority never achieve full implementation. Bona fide compromise
may resolve individual crises (as in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, and
aspects of the Palestine war) but unless the process yields to more
community-oriented modes of accommodation, these remain ad hoc
settlements of no integrative significance.
N ow it is true that the efforts of the Secretary-General, acting in the
name of the UN, to deal with certain crises contain a dose of supra-
nationalism and seek to upgrade common interests. By committing
the UN to a given course of action (as in the Congo) and subsequently
requesting ever larger authority from the Security Council or the
General Assembly to enable him to carry out tasks assumed earlier,
the Secretary-General causes the accretion of new powers and responsi-
bilities to the UN as a whole. In the European context such efforts often
resulted in a permanent growth of community-oriented procedures; in
the UN this has not occurred. Member states, in deference to changing
policy at home and shifting alignments abroad, will acquiesce in such
courses of action in New York and then proceed to sabotage them in
the field: UN authority has not increased in the Congo context, not
because of Mr. Hammarskjl2lld's mistakes, but because certain crucial
member states blocked the execution of his mandate. Much the same is
true of the UN operation in Suez. The claim for supranational powers
and the desire to upgrade common interests in peaceful change and
relative stability - both of which do grow out of crises dealt with by the
UN - run afoul the persistence of member states to use the techniques
only for the advancement of their own local policy aims, as exemplified
by the conduct of Ghana, Guinea, Egypt and Belgium in the Congo
crisis.
The prevalence of environmental phases in an institutionally weak
system results in a paucity of cumulative decisions creating integrative
precedents. While this was also true in certain European organizations
and in the Western hemisphere, it is much more striking at the global
level. The first Charter provisions with respect to collective security
and enforcement were changed by the Uniting for Peace Resolution, a
change which had fallen into quiet disuse by 1955. Powers given to the
Secretary-General change - but do not necessarily grow - from crisis to
crisis. Issues which appeared settled reappear a few years later, inclu-
ding major constitutional questions.
But despite all this, one major procedural advance in the direction of
political community has shown a tenacious persistence: the role of a
stable majority in the General Assembly, through the medium of
parliamentary diplomacy, to set the limits and define the direction of
certain crucial tasks. In the realm of security and enforcement, this has
resulted in the enshrinement of the conciliation process, as executed
through the agency of uncommitted nations. But a much more stable
majority has imposed its stamp on other organizational tasks, which
confirms at the global level that functional specificity bears the major
28 ERNST B. HAAS
responsibility for integration, and that functional contexts tend toward

autonomy in New York as in Strasbourg.
Environmental heterogeneity and institutional weakness need not
prevent global integration around certain tasks which command
general interest: but it is the environment which defines the nature of
convergence of national aims. Integration in the UN system has
occurred, not in the context of purely non-controversial and technical
activities which are of equal interest to all member states, even though
of no transcendent importance to any of them, but in areas of conver-
gence due to the major political conflicts of our era. Tbe Cold War, the
anticolonial struggle and the revolution of rising expectations are
responsible for the national policy aims which, by converging at the
UN, have resulted in new and larger tasks. Further, the dependence of
the major powers and their allies in their ideological conflict on the
support of nations more interested in anticolonialism and economic
development, neatly merges these separate strains into one melange,
infusing the Cold War with the colonial issue and economic develop-
ment with the East-West ideological struggle. Thus, the universal
military-ideological environment based on conflict begets certain areas
of common interest in which organizational tasks have expanded.
In the realm of collective security this has resulted in the erosion of a
task and in the decadence of institutions of a quasi-supranational
character. But in the functional realm of economics the picture is
otherwise. UN experience indicates again that functional specificity acts
as a spur to integration even in a situation with mixed environment al
characteristics. Originally, the UN task was the elaboration of universal
economic policy, tending toward a common world trade and payments
system, coordinated counter-cyc1ical policies, continuous consultation
on all issues relating to economic stability, inc1uding commodity
trade. This task was not successfully carried out in the UN, in the IMF,
FAO, or in the still-born ITO. Universal economic policy foundered on
the ideologically mixed environment which produced irreconcilable
demands.
But more specific economic aims resulted in a spectacular expansion
of another task: international investment and related activities of
technical assistance. The history of expanded IBRD responsibilities
and operations, the creation of three new UN investment agencies
since I955 and the integration of investment with highly focussed and
centrally controlled technical aid, through the Special Fund, speaks for
itself. Further, each decision to expand the UN task was taken on the
basis of majority pressure mobilized by parliamentary diplomacy,

followed by detailed compromises among the major contributing
powers, involving both an upgrading of common interests and a
splitting of the difference. Routinized administrative control by inter-
national civil servants followed eventually, thus submitting national
development programs to an integrating process. The upgrading of
common interests then continues in the flow of decisions made by such
agencies as the Special Fund.
Anti-colonialism suggests a parallel lesson. The irreconcilable
demands implicit in the environment prevented the kind of firm but
general colonial policy from developing which is suggested by the UN
Charter. General discussions on colonialism inc1uded ample invective
but no concrete solutions. Peaceful change, as a regular integrative
process in UN organs, was not in evidence with reference to colonial
disputes. But the very Cold War pressures which resulted in progressive
compromises among the major powers in the economic development
field also brought pressure on the West to yield to the anti-colonial
demands mobilized through parliamentary diplomacy. The result was a
recurrent pattern of enhanced UN responsibility with respect to
assuring a peaceful transition to independence in the case of specific
territories facing specific problems, through the processes of the
trusteeship system. Somewhat more generally, this constellation of
forces brought about an institutionalized increase in the procedural
powers of the UN to hear and deal with complaints. If peaceful
change means the gradual yielding of one type of policy in the face of
the onslaught of another, minimizing violence and relying on parlia-
mentary diplomatie pressure allied with Cold War overtones, the
demise of colonialism provides a striking example of task expansion. In
contrast to the collecti've security function, the existence of a stable
UN majority on the colonial issue has brought about cumulative
precedents on procedure that may survive the historical phases which
buffet the universal system.
Let us complete this functional survey with a word about universal
human rights. I suspect strongly that here the dominance of phases
reasserts itself and that the integrative role of this function, which
exists at the regional level, will have no counterpart. The prominence
of universal human rights in UN discussion is due almost solely to the
desire of member states to score propaganda points off one another:
initially the West used the issue to embarrass the Soviet Union; now
the Afro-Asian, Latin American and Soviet blocs are tactically united
30 ERNST B. HAAS
in using the issue to embarrass the West on the colonial and overseas
investment issues. The imminent end of colonial rule will destroy this
tactical alliance and create a new UN phase. Then, it is highly doubtful
that either the Soviet Union or the underdeveloped countries with
totalitarian tendencies will be eager to create a system of universal
private rights or a scheme of international accountability. In the
European context the protection of individual rights could have inte-
grative results just because the pre-existing environment was already
homogeneous, a point much less strikingly applicable in the western
hemisphere. But no integrative consequences can emerge at the UN
level if many of the member states are motivated purely by short-run
interests which will not survive the current phase.
This analysis suggests further functional areas in which integrative
UN activities could weIl be undertaken. True, neither colonialism nor
humanrightsarelikelyto provide opportunities for converging interests
in a few years. But economic development will continue to offer a field
of action to such aims as long as the current world tripolarity prevails;
in fact, that very condition suggests additional common interests. The
peaceful uses of outer space, pooled space research, UN control over
stellar bodies, are obvious candidates. Less obvious but elearly within
our framework of analysis is the field of regulated arms reduction and
the increasingly international peaceful use of nuelear energy. These
activities involve converging interests among conflicting states; they
have a very high spill-over potential and require supranational
administrative bodies for adequate control. In short, they evoke the
upgrading of common interests in the execution of highly specific
programs.
But let us guard against the fallacy that any non-political program
yields greater integrative results than a concerted political effort to call
into life a world political community. Our European survey makes
elear that politically-infused economic tasks flowing from an industrial
environment with a pluralistic society yield the greatest amount of
integration. Other regional experiences do not elearly support this
proposition, but the UN lesson is elose, at least, to its functional
component. Yet the economic work of the UN is obviously less inte-
grative than Europe's, for the institution al and environment al reasons
stated. The art of manipulated integration consists of isolating function-
al areas which produce converging interests among moderately ho stile
states, and capitalizing upon those which, while not being immediately
political, nevertheless very soon spill over into the realm of politics
when specific programs are envisaged by strong international insti-
tutions. The urban-industrial-pluralistic environment is optimal for
this purpose, but not unique.
(5) Integration as a Discontinuous Pro~ss

Five major conclusions can be drawn from tbis discussion. Processes
which yield optimal progress toward the end of political community at
the European level simply cannot be reproduced in other contexts
because the necessary preconditions exist to a much lesser degree.
Therefore, European integration will proceed at a much more rapid
pace than universal integration. Further, other regions with strongly
varying environment al factors are unlikely to imitate successfully the
European example.
However, it is by no means clear that slightly different functional
pursuits, responding to a different set of converging interests, may not
also yield integration. The Soviet and Latin American examples
suggest that this ma'y be the case. But it is also true that if regional
integration continues to go forward in these areas it will obey impulses
peculiar to them and thus fai! to demonstrate any universal "law of
integration" deduced from the European example.
Integration at the universal level obeys still different impulses. It
flows from much more intense conflict than the regional process, in
deference to the heterogeneity of the environment in which it unrolls.
Consequently, the areas of common interest are more difficult to
isolate and the proper specific functions harder to define. In view of
the prevalence of phases it then becomes very hazardous to forecast any
even and consistent pattern of integration.
The UN effort suffers from the buiIt-in defect that the very economic
development and technical aid acti'vities which at the moment consti-
tute its integrative task may create the kind of national environment
in which less integration will take place a generation from now. To the
extent that the UN effort stren'gthens national economies and adminis-
trative structures it actually reduces the final integrative component.
Functionally specific economic tasks found to provide progress toward
a political community in Europe may thus have the opposite final
effect at the world level. Whether, in some future UN phase, space and
nuclear tasks would produce more integration remains an open question.
The element of discontinuity among the various processes is in-
creased by the continued autonomy of the universal and regional
decision-making contexts. As Tables 3 and 4 make clear, there is no
32 ERNST B. HAAS
overwhelming evidence that the members of a cohesive regional

system remain uni ted in the UN, nor is there evidence that normally
weak and heterogeneous regional systems may not perform cohesively
in N ew Y ork. In short, the contexts remain separate and distinct in the
minds of policy-makers, a feature hardly conducive to the elaboration
of a unified and'global integration process.
A final element of discontinuity must be frankly exposed. Regional
integration, because it proceeds more rapidly and responds to a greater
number of optimal factors, may eventually slow down universal
integration altogether. The regional process may create a relatively
small number of integrated political communities, facing each other in
the UN system. In fact, the expanded UN task looking toward pooled
economic development and regional agencies in Africa, Southeast Asia
and elsewhere, may actually contribute to this trend. In that case,
the growth of fewer and larger political communities will contribute to
regional, but not to universal, peace. The universal system will remain
what it now is: the arena for minimizing conflict and maximizing
common interests in deference to the minimum common denominator.
TABLE I
Regional Coverage 0/ ILO Conventions. August I960 *

Arab AllILO
Category of Convention OAS EEC EFTA NATO
League Members
Occupational Hazards (13. 62) 24 67 29 33 19 28

Freedom of Association (Il. 87. 98) 48 89 76 75 37 55
Anti-Discrimination (100. Il I) 29 33 43 33 25 27
Social Security (2.3. 12. 17. 18. 19.
24.25.35.36.37.38.39.40.42.44.
48. 102. 103) 21 51 37 33 13 22
Hours and Vacations (I. 4. 14. 20.
3~4I.4~6~ 8~ 52. 101. IO~ 24 31 24 22 14 24
Administration of Labor Legis-
lation (26. 34. 63. 81. 94. 95. 99) 29 57 49 41 14 30
Minimum Age and Protection of
the Young (5. 6. 10.33.59.60.77.
78.79.90) 25 55 23 29 5 25
• "Coverage" is the ratio of actual ratifications to possible ratifications for all the members
of a given regional organization, expressed in percent.
Source: International Labour Organizations, International Labour Conventions, Ckart 01
Ratilications. The computations are the author's responsibility.
TABLE 2
Covet'age 01 Council 01 EUt'ope Conventions *

(as 01 Mat'ch ZO, I959)
Coverage in %
Type of Convention Total EEC EFTA ~ordi~ United Greece Turkey Ireland
une Kingdom
Politieal Integration
(nos. I, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9,23) 66 61 81 85 67 50 25 50
Eeonomie Integration
(nos. 4, 10, I I, 12, 13,
14, 15, 21, 25) 56 75 60 53 75 11 0 75
Cultural Integration
and International
U nderstanding (nos.
18, 19, 20, 27) 62 63 70 56 100 25 50 75
General Convenienee
(nos. 16, 17, 24, 26, 22) 50 53 64 60 60 20 40 60
Total 59 63 69 64 76 27 29 65
* "Coverage" is the ratio of aetual to possible ratifications of each eonvention in eaeh

eategory. Possible ratifications were so eomputed as to exelude eountries to which specific
conventions are not applicable beeause of their subject matter.
Source: European Yearbook, vol. VI, for the information on ratifications. The computations
are the author's responsibility.
34 ERNST B. HAAS
TABLE 3
Cohesion 0/ Regional Caucus Groups in the United

National General Assembly, I94S-I9S8
Cohesion of Member States
Before Creation of After Creation of During the Whole
Caucus Caucus % Caucus % Period % **
Identi- Solida- Di- Identi- Solida- Di- Identi- Solida- Di-
cal rity vided cal rity vided cal rity vided
African * 4 6 .7 33·3 20.0
Western European 65.0 23.8 11.2 82·4 II.O 6.6
Asian-African 11.4 36.4 53·9 34·5 42.2 23·4
Benelux 77-5 17.0 5·5
Scandinavian 68·3 23·9 7.8
Commonwealth 13.0 27·7 59·3
Arab 63·4 27. 2 9·4
Latin America 28.8 33.2 38.0
Soviet 96.0 3·9 0.1
* The African Caucus had functioned for only two sessions at the time these computations
were made, thus prec1uding firm conc1usions. Prior to the formation of the Caucus there were
not enough African member states to create a meaningful statistical pattern.
** The caucusing groups listed for "the whole period" were formed before or at the time
of the first meeting of the General Assembly.
Source: Thomas Hovet, Jr., Eloe Polities in the United Nations, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, pp. 64-65, 86, 98, IIl, 121-122, 131,
ISS, 172, 187·
Hovet's study is based on the counting of an "adjusted gross" number of roll-call votes.
For the meaning of this device, see Hovet, pp. 239 ff. On an "identical" vote the frequency of
members voting the same way, not considering abstentions, is counted; on a "solidarity"
vote, the frequency of members of a caucusing group abstaining rat her than voting against
their colleagues is determined; a "divided" vote covers the situations of direct opposition
among members of a group.
TABLE4
Cohesion 01 MembMs 01 Regional Pacts in the United Nations

G_al Assembly, I945-I958
Before Conclusion After Conclusion
of Pact ofPact
Identical Divided Identical Divided
PACT Votes Votes Votes Votes
% % % %
ANZUS 75. 8 13.8 78.2 5·4
Central Treaty Organization . 39·2 26.2 55.0 15.0
Council of Europe 51.0 21.0 43. 0 30.0
NATO 47·4 21.1 55·4 21·3
Organization of Central American
States 48 .3 24.2 67·5 29.8
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 37.0 34. 8 75.0 10.0
Western European Union. -* -* 75.0 3.6
• Since Italy did not participate in UN debates prior to 1955, no meaningful figure for the
pre-pact period can be given.
Somce: Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the Unitell Nations, Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958, pp. 196-203.
This computation is based on certain roll-call votes considered as relating to "significant
resolutions" on a variety of issues before the United Nations. A panel of outstanding partici-
pants in the debates determined which of the votes dming each session merited the label
"significant." It is Hovet's conclusion that in all instances votes dealing with matters of
collective measmes and the peaceful settlement of disputes commanded the greatest cohesion
among the members of each regional pact.
Summa,,, 0/ Integ,ation Experience 0/ Eu,opean O,ganizations

Ideological-
Organi- Institutions Mode of Accommodation Social
zation and Functions Environment
OEEC-EPU inter-govern- upgrading common remove trade mixed ideologi-

Age: mental; weak in teres ts : barriers ; cally, economi-
12 years secretariat; splitting difference: divide US aid; cally, socia!
strong autono- emergency distri- structure
mous expert bution of goods;
minimum common planning for long-
denominator: range economic
growth
Council of inter-govern- minimum common European inte- mixed ideologi-
Europe mental; inter- denominator: gration in general; cally, economi-
Age: parliamentary; minimum common European legisla- call y, socia!
12 years weak secreta- denominator plus tion; structure,
riat; rudimen- parliamentary though uni ted
tary j udicial in- diplomacy: on democracy
stitution splitting difference solution of specific
and parliamentary short-range
diplomacy: problems
NATO inter-govern- minimum common integrated defense mixed ideologi-
Age: mental; inter- denomintor: policy; cally, economi-
13 years parliamentary; splitting difference: coordina ted foreign cally, social
strong secretari- policy; joint de- structure, and
at; strong au- fense economics; in military
tonomous ex- upgradiug common planning for new power
pert bodies interests: weapons and strate-
gy
Nordic inter-govern- parliamentary di- Economic inte- homogeneous
Council mental; inter- plomacy plus mini- gration; legal stan- ideologically,
Age: parliamentary mum common deno- dardization; social but mixed in
8 years minator: security harmoni- social structure
zation and economic
development
Benelux inter-govern- minimum common Economic integra- homogeneous
Age: mental; inter- denominator: tion on all counts,
17 years parliamentary except role of
agriculture
EEC supranational upgrading common Economic integra- homogeneous
ECSC interests: tion in longrun on all counts
Euratom splitting diffference: Solution of shortrun (except in
Age: 9 and economic problems southern Ita!y)
4 years minimum common labor mobility: nu-
denominator clear planning
Western inter-govern- parliamentary di- foreign policy homogeneous
European mental; inter- plomacy plus mini- coordina tion; on all counts
Union parliamentary; mum common de- except separate
Age: weak secre- nominator: UK ideological
6 years tariat; strong upgrading common arms control position and
autonomous interests: special German
expert bodies mili tary po-
sition
EFTA inter-govern- splitting difference: remove trade bar- Mixed on all
Age: mental; weak riers counts
3 years secretariat
DELUSION OF REGIONAL UNITY
by
DAVID MITRANY
The round table organised by the Grotius Seminarium had as its

subject "The limits of European integration." It could be assumed that
"limits" was meant in a restrictive internal sense - in the sense of how
far the member states could be integrated into something like a
unitary political and economic supra-national structure. That was
indeed how the discussion developed: much was said about the econo-
mic advantages of such integration, about the relative increase in
strength it would bring to Western Europe as against the Eastern and
Atlantic Powers, and so on. But nothing was said of the relation
of the regional idea to the universal and historical problem of building
up a system of international peace.
Up to a point that absorption with the domestic side of the idea was
natural enough. West European integration faces in itself a great many
political, legal and social problems; the surprising thing is indeed how
little these problems have been examined by those who since the end
of the War have favoured and pressed the general idea of EUl'opean
union. But to the student of international affairs it is still more
surprising how little concern they have shown for the likely reper-
cussions of a Western Union on the global problem of peace and
progress, though these wider effects cannot be ignored even from the
narrower regional standpoint. For if these effects should be harmful
they are bound to recoil also upon the internal progress of the European
group, no matter what its economic and political strength might be.
Therefore the central question must remain the effect which the setting
up of such a group might have at this historie turning point on the,
crucial effort to establish an effective international system. There is
therefore a different and no less urgent sense in which the "limits" of
European integration must be looked at, namely to see how far such a
regional experiment might go, or should go, if it is not to damage the
prospects of the wider and more vital universal integration.
DAVID MITRANY
No doubt one could find more than one reason why the trend for
regional grouping should have spread at the same time and side by side
with the most ambitious and promising experiment in international
organisation ever attempted. Different views are also possible on the
relation of the two conceptions to one another; and especially on the
evolution of internationallaw and organisation in this moment of tense
historical transition. But whatever view one takes, the likely effects of
the one on the other cannot be passed over lightly, nor taken for
granted. 1s it true, above all, that as is often asserted the two ideas
belong to the same category of political development, that the lesser is
but a necessary and desirable intermediate stage in the progress of the
greater?
If we look at the present world situation in historical perspective we
can see that, politically speaking, it is marked by two special charac-
teristics: first, by the wholesale creation of new states and, secondly,
by the attempt to bind all states together into a system of inter-
national government. At first sight the two trends might seem contra-
dictory, even antagonistic; in actual practice they reveal themselves as
complementary parts and within the natural line of democratic
evolution. The powerful liberal democratic current which made the
political greatness of the nineteenth century fed two parallel strands
of evolution: the individual was enfranchised into a citizen within the
nation and by analogy national groups were enfranchised within the
world at large. Both sprang from the same political philosophy, both
were an expression of the same political evolution: the liberal West in
its assault on the old autocratic regimes proclaimed nationality to be
the state-making principle, until it reached its most clear-cut expression
as the principle of "self-determination" at the Peace conference of
I9 I 9·
But there was one fundamental difference between the two acts.
Within the state the democratic process led to the establishment of
representative popular government - that is, the new citizens were
given a voice in the making of the law and policy by which they were
to be governed in common. Between the states, however, the process of
political emancipation led rather to a disruptive conclusion, to the
enthronement of the principle of national sovereignty, with its denial
of any common authority, of any organised world community.
What should have been the ultimate stage in the democratic process
was thus vitiated by an impossible contradiction. Freedom cannot live
in isolation, and government and law and order cannot be built upon
DELUSION OF REGIONAL UNITY 39
the liberum veto. If that ambiguous situation was at all tolerable during
the nineteenth century it was because of another apparent paradox:
sovereign national independence went hand in hand with the free and
wide expansion of international intercourse and activity. The principle
of national sovereignty was not then so construed an~ used as to
stifle the growth of an international community. Outside the privileged
range of police and defence, the Western system was generally one of
laisser faire, with almost limitless freedom for private initiative and
enterprise in economic as in culturallife, in the movement of men as of
money. But now all that is changed: nationalism in the twentieth
century in allying itself with the new current of social revolution has
suffered a change both in its character and in its purpose. Mazzini and
Victor Hugo would hardly recognise it and would certainly not claim
again that it was the gateway to international unity.
Whatever their constitutional structure and their political philoso-
phy, all countries now work with a restrictive planned loeal policy in
the seareh for eeonomic stability and social seeurity. It is in the nature
of planning that it must be initiated and eontrolled by government;
it is also inevitably in the nature of sueh plans and controls that they
must be eoneeived and exeeuted within a closed jurisdiction, within a
closed political territory. Therefore the new twentieth eentury praetice
has cheeked and ehoked the formerly free eeonomie and social inter-
course between individuals and groups in different eountries, the
innumerable links that together were building up inereasingly the
substanee of a living international society. Whatever benefits national
planning may be thought to bring to any particular country, it is clear
that as a general praetice it has eome to mean a grave regression in the
earlier practice of free international intercourse and development.
What was said before of individual and national emancipation in the

nineteenth century should make it clear that the combination of the
two politieal charaeteristics of our time, the creation of many new
states and the endeavour to create a system of international govern-
ment, is merely trying to catch up with and to eomplete the modern
demoeratic proeess. President Wilson either knew this or sensed it, so
that there was a harmonious relevanee and not a confliet - as all too
many critics have assumed - between his support of the principle of
"self-determination" and his simultaneous devotion to the idea of a
league of nations. Perhaps this aspiration was premature; eertainly
Wilson did not get much more genuine support from the politicians who
DAVID MITRANY
then ruled in Western Europe than he got from his own Senators. But
that aspiration is premature no longer : now it is indeed both urgent
and practical.
To begin with, there is no doubt that a tremendous change has taken
place in the political climate of opinion, and that in addition other
positive signs tend to show that for the first time in history we now
have the elements of a living world society. One might cite three central
points as evidence for this view. First, the change in outlook: the now
almost universal conviction among all the peoples of the world that
peace and not war is and must be the natural condition of mankind.
Secondly, and in conjunction with that, the almost universal accep-
tance of the idea of a common citizenship - in the sense of the politica1
equality of all states - and consequently of the need for some common
authority. Thirdly, and perhaps more unexpectedly, there is the
remarkable change in social outlook: the spontaneous acceptance by
the richer countries of a sense of responsibility for helping the less
developed or less endowed countries to secure a better life for their
peoples. The idea of the "welfare state," fairly new even in the pro-
gressive countries of the West, has quickly expanded into the idea of a
welfare world.
No student of international affairs could deny that these are vital
changes, exciting in their promise at a time when nuclear power and
the opening up of space have made a system of international govern-
ment an absolute and elementary necessity. Our discussion cannot
therefore run away from what must be the central aspect of any
international debate - from the question whether the regional idea
would help or hinder the early achievement of that essential inter-
national unity. The critics of the regional idea maintain that it would
merely reproduce in a different form the old kind of partial alliances.
Its supporters insist that it is in fact both the offspring and a necessary
component of any collective system. All one can say is - it all depends.
It all depends on the manner in which the regional idea is applied, and
the verdict must therefore depend on the answer to two primary
questions. First, is any particular regional union to be a closed and
exclusive union? And, secondly, are such regional unions to be linked,
at a subordinate level, to a wider common authority?
The possible use of the regional idea as part of a system of adminis-
trative devolution has hardly been explored so far. Given the complexi-
ties of modern life, and the restlessness of the mass of new states, it is
evident that the demands that are likely to be made upon any central
universal authority are bound to be extreme1y heavy, and perhaps
excessive. It would be all to the good if that burden could be relieved
by entrusting regional groups with the right and the duty to deal in the
first instance with any local issues through regional councils and
regional courts'; with the right of appeal to the central Council and
Court if the local effort should fail. Such a scheme of devolution would
also have politically great educational value, in that it would encourage
the local groups - in the Middle East as in the Balkans, in Latin
America as in South-East Asia and in West Africa and elsewhere - to
learn through the exercise of direct responsibility the need for and the
habit of give and take in their mutual relations. For it is unfortunately
true that although most of those states live in what are natural regional
groups, and share as such substantial elements of common history and
traditions and ways of life, that similarity of experience and their
geographical proximity have not always produced an atmosphere of
political goodwill and tolerance between them. (And perhaps, as a
secondary advantage, such regional arrangements might also help to
ease the difficult problem of representation at the centre: a regional
group consisting of a number of less developed states could possibly be
given continuous representation on the central organs through one
joint delegate, chosen in rotation from among the members of the local
group.)
There are thus valuable possibilities in the regional idea, if it were to
be placed upon a basis of direct but subordinate relation to an uni-
versal authority. But the idea would produce a very different offspring
and painfully different effects if it were used instead to set up closed
political units. The new units would then not support but would cut
across the jurisdiction and authority of any international system. The
argument about their being a necessary intermediate step is obviously
only valid if the regional unions are to be open unions; whereas if they
are to be closed and exclusive unions, the more fully and effectively
integrated they are, the deeper must in fact be the division they would
cause in the emergent unity of the world.
That unhappy effect wou1d be worse in the case of a Western union
than of any other possible regional union; and for the same important
reasons it is likely to recoil upon it to the same degree. Being so highly
deve10ped industrially Western Europe cannot exist, let alone advance,
without a free and easy economic intercourse with the rest of the world.
Her political security and standing demand the same thing. With the
end of the colonial era Europe cannot retain something of her old
DAVID MITRANY
standing and influence except through her leadership in political and

sodal ideas. It must not be forgotten that such still is her deserved
reputation that even those who have broken away from colonial and
imperial dependence still pay Europe the compliment of wishing and
seeking to imitate our political ideas and arrangements. We are now
apt to deplore and even fee! hurt by the somewhat raw nationalism
that has gripped the overseas world. Yet the national idea was born and
bred in Europe and was ecstatically glorified, and propagated, by our
liberal fathers and forefathers. It will be even so with the regional idea.
If the West takes it up and glorifies it as something new and progressive,
it will certainly be imitated and practised elsewhere; espedally as there
are, as we have said, in the other continents groups of countries which
form much truer natural regions than do the countries of Western
Europe.
Moreover, regionalism under present conditions is bound to be, like
the new nationalism, more intransigent and assertive. In the economic
sphere the now universal practice of national planning will have to be
applied even more forcefully in a closed regional union than in a single
country. Regional integration must mean a considerable re-arrange-
ment in the location of industries and the currents of trade, and there-
fore in the movement of capital and labour, if that integration is to
produce the best results according to local resources and possibilities.
I t follows that any comprehensive regional integration, shaped by a
strict usage of regional planning, must stimulate for competitive
reasons the use of similar controlled regional planning elsewhere; and
the general consequence cannot be anything else but the introduction
of a correspondingly hard economic division into a would-be harmo-
nised international system.
The same consideration applies with equal force to the political
factor. As we know, the nationalist current has often had to disinter
or invent all sorts of historical, sodal and emotional affinities in order
to build up a cohesive loyalty among the parts, whether provinces or
groups, of any new national state. Regionalism will obviously have to
go even further in that. It will start from a situation in which there will
be more differences - historical, sodal and linguistic - between the
members of the group than affinities. There is a lesson to be learnt in
this respect from the experience of India. India had started upon her
new politicallife with a great surge for unity, generated by a long anp
spirited struggle for independence. And yet since achieving inde-
pendence India has had to allow the creation of a number of new
"states" within the federation because of old and hard-set linguistic or
tribal differences; the alternative would have been to impose unity by
force or to breed a common "patriotism" through aggressive foreign
adventures. What is to be the binding element between the much
more differentiated and old-established national states of Western
Europe? It is not surprising that in the search for such a binding
element, inevitably synthetic, the protagonists of European union
have had to indulge in such aberrations as the discovery of a "Western
nationality," even of a "European soul" said to be emphatically
different from the "American soul"; and indeed, even of a European
"race" ! "The cultural goal of Pan-Europa is to make the European
race conscious of its western nationality" - whatever that may mean. 1
Since the War, and admittedly, on a more sober level, Western
union has nevertheless been pressed forward by its protagonists as an
essential step for putting Europe in a position of economic and political
self-defence as against the United States on the one side and Soviet
Russia on the other. 2 All of which goes to show that the element of
nationalistic competition, both economic and political, cannat be kept
out of such a scheme of things. It is true that the supporters of the idea
have often claimed that regional union was a necessary stage towards
international peace. So did the leading prophets of the national idea in
the nineteenth century, Mazzini and others, claim and no doubt sincerely
believe that the division of the Continent into national states would put
an end to imperial ambitions and adventures, and so would generate
goodwill all round and bring peace to all - thaugh Mill and Acton
and Grillparzer had a truer foresight of the likely consequences that
would follow from substituting nationalism for humanism.
So it will be now. In fact and at best, the division of the world into
c10sed regional unions can only lead us back to the policy of the balance
of power. As such it would fit into the outloqk which dominated Europe
and the world until the First World War, but not into the new outlook
which has struggled to find institutional expression and substance in
the two great experiments of the League of Nations and the United
1 Die Selbsterkenntniss der europäischen Rasse als abenländische Nation. This and similar
statements can be found repeatedly in the writings of Count CoudenhoveKalergi.
• One can find this "nationalistic" argument used continuously as a means for frightening
a tepid public opinion into accepting the scheme for European union. Recently a Liberal
candidate for Parliament has put it quite bluntly in a letter to The Guardian (Manchester),
26 August, X961: "On a politicallevel, would not a elose association of the two groups of
nations [the Six and the Commonwealth] have great advantages to both? Both sure1y have
one overriding aim [our italics] in mind - how to avoid coming under Russian domination
without at the same time accepting permanent American overlordship."
44 DAVID MITRANY
Nations. In that sense closed regional unions would mean no more than
the extension to regional dimensions of the ideas and ways of the old
nationalism and not a contribution to the new hope of a uni ted uni-
versal society. In an article last May on the implications for Britain of
joining the Common Market, Mr. Denis Healey, M.P., now the Labour
Party's chief spokesman on foreign affairs, had this to say:
I cannot help feeling there is a fallacy in the fashionable assumption that
economic and political developments require the crystallisation of the world into
a few super-states. I suspect on the contrary that both peace and prosperity may
depend on the proliferation of overlapping international groupings, whose
membership will differ according to the functions they perform. Many of the
arguments for Britain becoming part of a larger unit comparable with the
United States or the U.S.S.R. seems to assume the continuation of power
politics on ascale so gargantuan that it must lead inevitably to global war. 1
That seems a cool-eyed appraisal of the material side. On the

cultural side the loss might prove even more painful. The very concept
of a closed regional union is indeed a contradiction of the true European
idea. The unique characteristic of European civilisation in contrast
with eastem and other civilisations is that it has always been an open
civilisation: open to receive and absorb enriching influences from else-
where and, especially and for that reason, able to permeate the whole
world with her political, social and cultural outlook and experience.
That true European spirit must wither if it is to be shut in within a
timorous regional nationalism, and it will not then find as in the past
ready acceptance everywhere on ce it becomes suspect of being now
the tool or weapon of a new centre of power. It would not be difficult
to demonstrate that the influence of Marxism as a philosophy and a
political idea also began to decline when Soviet Russia entered upon
"Socialism in one country" and Communism became a nationalist
weapon.
When one thinks of the past humanistic glories of the old universities
of Paris and Oxford and Prague, how strange it is to be faced now - just
when science is opening up the furthest ways to outer space and the
planets - with a proposal for a European university where things are
to be taught from a specifically "European" angle, so as "to reinforce
Europe's cultural and scientific potential"! Perhaps it is not odd but in
character that this retrograde proposal should have been put into the
Euratom treaty, although the new university will include in its
teaching the economic and political sciences, as well as sociology and
psychology.
1 The Observer (London), 28 May I96r.
Far from revealing a renewal of confidence in the strength of the
European spirit, all this suggests rather a sudden dec1ine into "esca-
pism," politics joining the decadent trend that has marked literature
and the arts in recent times. Europe after the Wars suffered a great
diminution in her standing not simply through the materialloss of
colonies and empires - they were as much a handicap as a help to
Europe's spiritual influence - but even more by being caught in a
universal current of sodal revolution. As she was stable and mature
Europe found herseH, not necessarily on the conservative side - the
supposedly new radical ideas had all been born and practised here -
but in a conservative position. Soviet Russia benefited from that
widespread sodal upsurge not because she had anything real to
contribute but because she happened to find herseH in a revolutionary
position; and we helped her to exploit that advantage by describing
and denouncing all those inevitable sodal revolts as being Communistic
or at least inspired and organised by Communism.
That contingent advantage has been fading of late. The West has
learnt better, while the newly emandpated peoples are no longer so
starry-eyed about Soviet Russia. But if the old and experienced and
still greatly admired Europe were to retreat now into a narrow regional
nationalistic outlook and practice, Europe will suffer a second and
more withering diminution, one that may hurt more and certainly be
more irretrievable than the first. The economic loss of empire can be
made good through the development of free economic intercourse, for
which we are weIl placed. But if, by our own deliberate choice, we
become merely one of a number of regional groups in material and
ideological competition, we shall ine'vitably forfeit by default a unique
and traditional position of influence, the prospect of political and moral
leadership in one of the most emphatic periods.of historical transition.
It is difficult to come to any other conc1usion than this - that the

whole conception of a Western union is both unreal and illfound. In the
first place, to bring in Great Britain, Denmark and N orway in the
north, Greece and perhaps Turkey in the south, and even some outer-
European countries, makes nonsense of the whole idea of Western
regional unity. It surely proves the point that a grouping which is
fairly open cannot be regional, and that to achieve regional unity a
grouping will have to be c10sed and narrow.
In the second place, what good could such a c10sed group achieve
locally or regionally? On the economic side there are as many doubts as
DELUSION OF REGIONAL UNITY
expectations arnong the experts; especially in the long ron, if the

setting up of one regional union were to stimulate the setting up of
competing regional unions elsewhere. As regards defence, no one has
ever ventured to suggest that a Western union could dispense with
NATO and with continuous Atlantic support in general. And on the
social and cultural side, it would be strange indeed if any scientist or
historian or artist were to maintain that a narrowing of the horizon
will bring an enrichment of the spirit.
Finally, what good would the regional idea do in terms of world
issues? The great issue now, as at the time of the Reformation, arises
from the clash of two opposed ideologies. If wellbeing depends upon
peace, in its turn peace depends upon finding a modus vivendi between
these warring currents. Can the creation of regional unions do that -
except in terms of power, of a balance of power? Obviously not. They
are more likely to multiply and harden present divisions, because the
gestation of regional unity will have to be fed and encouraged by
emphasising distinctions of character and opposition of intesests
between regional groups. In the process the instroments and insti-
tutions for universal co-operation in the UN will be drained in the
same degree of some of their incipient common authority. There is no
aspect and no fact which justifies any other conclusion than this:
that the regional concept is not the triumph of the new internationalism
but only an extension of the old nationalism.
LA PORTEE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE
POINT DE VUE JURIDICO-POLITIQUE 1
par
Esse aliquod inter populos ius commune.

HUGO GROTIUS, Prolegomena
(I) Les donnees en presence

Lorsqu' on parle de l'integration de l'Europe on se reiere generalement
a l'existence d'une institution primordiale: la Communaute europeenne.
On parlait au debut de trois Communautes, mais puisqu'elles ont
dejcl plusieurs organes en commun - l'Assemblee parlementaire, la
Cour de Justice, et dans une large mesure, le Conseil de Ministres - et
puisqu'elles sont en train de fusionner completement, on peut mieux
parler de la Communaute europeenne dans ses trois manifestations.
Cette fa~on de voir a d'ailleurs ete sanctionnee par la Cour de
Luxembourg qui a declare en 1959 "qu'il convient d'interpreter ces
dispositions (le statut des fonctionnaires) selon le sens de I'unite
lonctionnelle des Communautes europeennes et des institutions annexes,
jugement ainsi motive:
"Si, actuellement, il n'est certes pas possible de parler d'une unite
iuridique des trois Communautes europeennes, on ne peut eependant
eearter la eonstatation que les liens iuridiques des trois Communautes
qui existent deia et leur unite spirituelle constituent une realite qui
appelle une unification juridique plus poussee" 2
Or, la Communaute europeenne n'est pas une federation proprement
dite; m~me si on est tente de I'appeler une "preiederation," on n'a pas
l'assuranee, qu' elle evoluera necessairement dans le sens de la federation.
La question se pose m~me de savoir si les chanees d'une telle evolution
ne sont pas affaiblies par les reeentes dec1arations du Gouvernement
britannique, indiquant que celui-ci n'a pas l'intention d'adherer cl une
federation europeenne? Jene le erois pas; l'essentiel de la Communaute
n'est pas dans sa position juridique ou de fait actuelle; l'essentiel est sa
1 Elaboration du texte d'une conference tenue devant le S6minaire Grotius, en juin 1961.
2 Affaire Campolongo contre la Haute Autorit6, no. 27-59, (Recueil 1960, volume VI,
deuxieme partie, Fascicule Il Les italiques sont celles du jugemen t.
faculte de developpement, son dynamisme, san avenir. Sa force interne,

l'inter8t economique de ses ressortissants, la volonte de ses syndicats,
etc. la conduisant vers la realisation de sa destinee. Or, la population,
l'industrie, les trade-unions anglaises, n'echapperont pas acette
solidarite -la "solidarite de fait" de la Declaration-Schuman. Je pense
donc, que l'appellation de "prefederation" reste bien fondee ....
Tous les auteurs sont d'ailleurs d'accord sur le caractere complexe de
la Communaute europeenne; c' est precisement l'inspirateur du pre-
mier traite europeen (sur le charbon et l'acier, la C.E.C.A.), Robert
Schuman, qui a constate que le "Supra-national" de ce traite se situe
a mi-chemin entre le National et le Federal, mais ce m8me homme
d'etat a salue, dans sa Declaration de 1950, la naissance de ce traite
comme "les premieres assises coneretes d'une federation europeenne."
Un observateur impartial, l' Americain Henry L. Mason, parvient a
la m8me definition: "beyond international organization, below
federal organization." 1
Enfin un Groupe d'Etude de I'Institut des Relations internationales
de Bruxelles eompare la Communaute tres explicitement a un Etat
Federal:
.... mais il ne les assimile pas. Non, ce qui est surprenant: le
Groupe eonstate que la Communaute depasse m8me l'Etat federal sur
un point important:
"Dans sa source, la souverainete de la Communaute est inter-etati-
que: elle n'atteint pas le stade federal, en raison de l'absence d'une
nation unifiee exprimant directement sa volonte eommune. Dans son
exercice, au eontraire, la souverainete de la Communaute s'exprime
essentiellement par un organe unitaire: la Haute Autorite et par un
organe etatique: le Conseil de Ministres; elle depasse done le stade
fMeral et oseillera entre un type unitaire et un type federal, selon la
predominanee qui sera exereee, en fait, par la Haute Autorite et par le
Conseil." 2
Mais il faut eneore aller plus loin sur le plan de l'analyse juridique.
(2) L'Ordre iuridique

Tout d'abord on avance contre nous la differenee de earactere entre
le Pool Charbon - Acier et les deux traites de Rome: Marche Commun
et Euratom. On dit generalement que la C.E.C.A. a un earaetere plus
1 The European Goal and Steel Gommunity, La Haye 1955.

2 La G.E.G.A., par un Graupe d'Etude de l'Institut de Relations internationales de Bruxel-
les; 1953.
PORTEE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE 49
supra-national que les deux autres institutions. C'est exact - selon la
lettre; mais 1a C.E.C.A. est aussi moins flexible. Le Traite-C.E.C.A.
etablit lui-m~me la plupart des regles et des normes qu'il faut respecter
dans le domaine de la libre concurrence des entreprises et de la circu-
lation des deux matieres premieres. Les Traites de Rome se limitent
a fixer un cadre pour le jeu des activites economiques; ils ne definissent
pas son contenu. Ils proc1ament que le transport, que l'agriculture,
doivent devenir chose commune; ils ne contiennent ni un code de
transport, ni une legislation agraire, mais ils comprennent la possibilite
de Iegisferer en ce domaine.
On definit donc, a juste titre, la C.E.C.A. comme un retraite norma-
tif" et le Marche Commun comme un retraite de procedure" ou un
"traite-cadre." On a donc la liberte de remplir ce cadre. Cette tAche
incombe aux organes executifs et a la Cour.
Cette procedure n'est nullement exorbitante. 11 faut reconnaitre
aussi que la vie d'un Etat, son activite politique, economique et
culturelle, ne s'expriment guere dans sa constitution. La constitution
donne quelques grandes lignes; elle donne des garanties; elle cite des
exceptions (etat de siege, etc.). La vie politique et administrative se
deroule a cote, m~me a l'encontre des textes. 11 y ales coutumes
sanctionnees par les cours de justice et les conseils d'Etat; mais il y a
eu toujours et partout une premiere coutume qui n'est pas encore rede
coutume" : une ordonnance du droit non-ecrit, repondant aux necessites
de l'instant.
C'est ce qui se produit chaque jour dans la Communaute europeenne
et notamment dans la Communaute Economique Europeenne (C.E.E.).
Le tripie traite qui regit la Communaute ne limite pour ainsi dire pas
ses possibilites d'action et le developpement de ses organes. Seule il
limite la volonte politique de ses Etats-membres et de ses ressortissants.
Est-ce-que cette volonte politique sera contrecarree, paralysee, par
l'adhesion de la Grande Bretagne? 11 y a deux reponses acette question.
D'abord: les Anglais refuseront - ils a la Communaute a laquelle ils
vont adherer la reconnaissance et l'application de cette partie du
Droit, le Droit non-ecrit, qui chez eux, a ete d'une fecondite egalee
seulement dans l'histoire par le droit pretorien? Et ensuite: la voie
choisie il y a dix annees avec tant de fermete par la Cour de Luxem-
bourg, sera-t-elle abandonnee lorsque'un ou deux juges britanniques
siegeront a cote des sept juges continantaux?
Ces juges ont comme fonction d"'assurer le respect du droit"; il ne
s'agit pas d'un droit special, du droit conventionnel par exemple; il
50 M. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS
s'agit de toutes les sourees du Droit possibles. Comme dans le eas du

droit eonstitutionnel etatique, ees sourees sont plus abondantes que
l' on ne pense en general.
11 y a d'abord le droit des dispositions des TraiMs, droit dejä. assez
soupie ; il Y a aussi le droit eonventionnel cree ou ä. ereer sur la base des
TraiMs, eelui des reglements, des direetives et des decisions des Exeeu-
tifs europeens.
Ensuite, il y ales "principes generaux du droit" et parmi eux, la
doetrine infiniment importante des "implied powers," des pouvoirs
impliques. La Cour de Luxembourg a tres expressement attribue ees
pouvoirs aux Exeeutifs de la Communaute. 1
11 y a, enfin, la coutume et (nous venons de le eonstater), lä. Oll il n'y
a pas eneore de eoutume, il y a en tout eas le droit non-eerit.
Ce droit non-eerit est - eontrairement ä. ce que eertains pensent -
plus eoneret que "les principes generaux du Droit," auxquels se refere
I'article 36 du Statut de la Cour internationale de ]ustice de la Haye.
Dn des premiers exemples de l'applieation de ee droit non-eerit en
Europe organisee figure dans le fameux " Avis sur la participation des
Observateurs du Conseil de I'Europe a l'Assemblee Commune," de
deeembre 1952, emis par les Professeurs Reuter, Ophüls et de Rossi. 2
Quoique l'incident dont il s'agissait est en dehors de notre sujet, la
solution juridique a la quelle il a donne lieu est pour nous d'un inter~t
essentiel: il s'agissait de determiner le droit qu'il eonvient d'appliquer
vis-a-vis de l'Assemblee parlementaire europeenne, au eas Oll les
dispositions sur l' Assemblee, que eomporte le Traite, ne donnent pas de
reponse a une question eonerete.
Voici la reponse des trois juristes: "Si done un doute peut legitime-
ment subsister sur un point interessant le statut de eette Assemblee,
c'est dans le droit parlementaire traditionnel qu'il taut rechercher une
solution."
Ce qui est proclame ici pour la premiere fois, d'une fa<;on presque
revolutionnaire, a ete reeonnu ensuite eomme valable dans les eas les
plus divers: le droit interne des Etats et notamment des Etats-membres
s'applique a la plupart des questions auxquelles les Traites ne donnent
pas une reponse eonerete. 3
1 Affaire Federation Charbonniere de Belgique contre la Haute Autorite. No. 8-55

(Recueil X955-X956, Volume II).
2 Conseil de l'Europe, Document S.G. (5z) ZO.
3 "Quant aux SOU1ses de ce droit, rien ne s'oppose evidemment a ce qu'on les recherche, le
cas echeant, dans le droit international, mais normalement et le plus souvent, on les retrou-
vera plutöt dans le droit interne des divers Etats membres." (Conc1usions de M. Ma urice
PORTEE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE SI
On voit ici l'analogie des solutions apportees avec le systeme federal.
Dans son etude "Confederation d'Etats et Etat Federal" le professeur
Chades Duraud de la Faculte de Droit d'Aix, constate que pour les
differents types de federation "le cadre juridique forme par un texte
(pacte ou constitution) est loin d'etre toute la vie d'une federation; le
lonctionnement pratique presente une importance encore superieure."
Plus loin l'auteur revient sur cette constatation et il dec1are que "le
contenu d'un regime constitutionnel dont le domaine d'application est
tres vaste, ne peut se trouver uniquement dans la lettre d'un texte
souvent assez court et dont les auteurs n'ont pu prevoir tous les cas ou
il y a lieu de l'appliquer." "Ce texte" - dit-il - "devra donc frequem-
ment etre complique par des interpretations visant de tels cas d'espece,
mais qui, si elles prennent une certaine etendue et acquierent quelque
stabilite, creeront en fait une constitution comptementaire, secondaire,
superposee ala constitution ecrite et pouvant pratiquement en modifier le
contenu." 1
Il Y a deja maints exemples de cette interpretation dynamique,
grä.ce a laquelle il n'y a, dans la Communaute europeenne, presque pas
de tension entre "le juridique" et "la volonte politique" ....
Il existe donc "un ordre juridique autonome propre a la Commu-
naute," l'avocat general de la Cour des Communautes Europeennes a
Luxembourg, M. Maurice Legrange, nous le confirme. Il se presente, en
effet, une difference essentielle entre cet ordre juridique et tout autre
ensemble juridique fonde sur les traites internationaux ou inter-
gouvernementaux normaux. Le prefosseur Fritz Münch (Bonn) a
explique cette difference dans sa communication au Congres juridique
sur la S.E.C.A., a Stresa en 1957. Cet ordre juridique propre est, pour
ainsi dire, congenital: "Les engagements des Etats en vertu des traites
sont interpretes generalement de fa90n restrictive; on suppose que les
parties contractantes n'ont voulu abandonner que le strict necessaire de
leur liberte d'action. Mais en ce qui concerne les Communautes supra-
nationales, il faut interpreter les engagements des membres et les
droits correspondants de la Communaute d'une fa90n beaucoup plus
Legrange, avocat general, dans l'affaire no. 8-55: FM. Charb. de Belgique contre la Haute
Autorite, Receuil 1955-1956, Volume II). En 1957, la Cour a six lois statue, que l'egalite des
administres devant la reglementation economique est "un principe generalement admis dans
le droit des Etats membres." Les autres decisions - plus concretes - ont rapport aux actes
suivants: acte administratif conferant des droits subjectifs, contrat de travail; detournement
de pouvoir; egalite devant la loi; exception d'ilIegalite; faute de service; inter~t a
agir, recevalilite; recours en interpretation.
1 Contedlration d' Etats et Etat Federat; realisations acquises et perspectives nouvelles (Paris
1955).
large a cause du meme principe qui a determine la regle de !'interpre-

a
tation limitative. Lorsqu'ils entrent faire partie d'une Communaute et
qu'ils font naUre du droit supranational, les Etats membres veulent mener
une politique determinee et poursuivre des buts determines .... " 1
Au meme Congres de Stresa, le professeur Leontin Constantinesco,
de Sarrebrück, a confirme, dans une autre communication, "que l' ordre
juridique de la Communaute dans le domaine Oll il Y a limitation et
transfert de competences, dispose d'une preponderance, d'une priorite
face aux ordres juridiques nationaux" .... "Plus que signer un Traite,
les Etats membres en le faisant ont adhere au principe dont ce Traite
est l'expression. Cest au principe de la limitation correlative de sou-
verainete qu'ils se sont engages. Si donc au moment de l'interpretation
ils invoquent le principe contraire, ils procedent au reniement de l'ob-
jectif auquel ils se sont engages. Celui qui veut le but doit vouloir les
moyens." 2
On peut conclure que, si l'on nous invite a nous prononcer sur les
limites juridiques du developpement de l'integration europeenne, il
faut donner la reponse suivante: il n'y a pas de limites juridiques. Le
progres peut se poursuivre, dans les Traites, avec les Traites, sans les
Traites, meme contre les Traites. 11 est sage d'adapter de temps en
temps les textes, mais cette adaptation n'est pas essentielle pour le
processus meme qui est en cours.
(3) Limites et Possibilites politiques
Nous voici donc amenes au probleme des possibilites et limites
politiques.
Ces limites existent. Elles ressortent des faits et des hommes; elles
sont imposees de l'exterieur et de l'interieur. Tout d'abord elles se
presentent la, Oll les conditions economiques requises pour un progres
vers l'integration europeenne, font defaut. Mais ces conditions econo-
miques constituent - elles toujours un facteur absolu - ou s'agit-il
quelquefois d'un "tabou" economique, avance pour des raisons
politiques? Toujours est-il, que, lors de la creation du marche commun,
les hommes politiques, comme M. Spaak, ont brise quelques reticences
economiques presentees comme obstacles "absolus" a l'integration et
que jusqu'a present l'histoire a donne raison a la politique ....
Ces limites existent aussi Ia Oll la politique communautaire se heurte
aux politiques d'etats-tiers ou d'organisations internationales.
1 Actes Officiels du Congres; Torne II, p. 283; la reproduction de la derniere phrase ne
sernble pas tout a fait correcte.
2 Actes Officiels du Congres; Torne II, p. 2I8.
PORTEE DE L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE 53
Les relations avee les etats-tiers ont ete, des le debut, ce que l'on
pouvait en attendre. Le Traite de Rome lui-m~me part de la presence
d'inter~ts opposes et indique une procedure pour les eoncilier (voir
l'art. I8; l'association - art. 238 - est une autre formule). La necessite
de tenir compte des inter~ts d'autres Etats ne eonstitue donc pas une
limitation de la sphere normale de la Communaute.
En ce qui concerne les organisations internationales le danger a He
plus grand; il a existe notamment au G.A.T.T. auquel tous les Etats-
membres de la Communaute ont adhere. Mais deja en I9521e G.A.T.T.
a exprime tres sagement le principe que les Gouvernements des Six
"doivent avoir la possibilite d'agir pour les fins de l'Accord General
comme si les territoires europeens de ces Etats constituaient des territoires
d'une seule partie contractante.', Paroies prophHiques!
Enfin il y a l'Association europeenne de Libre Echange (A.E.L.E.)
creee - pourquoi le dissimuler - comme bastion de defense, ou, si l'on
veut, comme machine de guerre contre la Communaute europeenne.
Or, les orateurs a la Chambre des Communes, dans le grand debat
d'aout I96I, ont He unanimes pour declarer que, de ce point de vue-
egalement l' A.E.L.E. avait echoue ....
Non, des entraves serieuses ne peuvent venir que de l'interieur: des
Etats-membres et du Conseil.
Quel transfert de souverainete un Etat moderne peut-il eoneeder;
que peuvent supporter ses ressortissants, son Parlement, son Gouverne-
ment? Cela depend beaucoup de la situation internationale en general;
e'est la crise de Coree qui a rendu possible le "saut vers l'inconnu" de
la C.E.C.A. La deuxieme "relance europeenne" fut influencee par la
crise de Berlin : il fallait enfin donner une reponse eonstructive, positive
et efficace au defi du systeme soviHique, systeme qui avait donne,
quarante ans plus tot, un essor miraculeux, tant economique que
politique, au peuple le plus arriere de l'Europe. La crise de Berlin vient
d'eclater de nouveau. Il serait inconeevable, que cette fois-ci nous
restions sans reponse ....
Une analyse historique, qui nous menerait trop loin, pourrait prouver
que chacun des Six Etats a son tour a connu des vagues egoistes et
nationalistes ainsi que des sursauts vraiment "europeens." Il y a eu
toujours des surprises La France, par example, d'abord le partenaire le
plus reticent parmi les Six, la France qui avait fait rediger tout un
systeme de clauses de sauvegarde pour ses inter~ts nationaux .... n'en
a invoque aucune ; par contre elle a pris m~me l'initiative pour accele-
rer la mise, en vigueur des dispositions du Traite qu'elle avait le plus
redoutees: la diminution des tarifs et la suppression des contingents.

Mais la regle generale est que tous les pays, chacun dans son domaine
(L'Allemagne: l'agriculture; les Pays-Bas: le transport) hesitent a
transferer les pouvoirs ou le contröle dont ils disposent, ou dont
deposent, plus exactement, leurs ministres et leurs fonctionnaires. Mais
i1 est peu probable que les interHs nationaux puissent entraver
longtemps le processus en cours. Le Marche Commun est un trop
grand succes. Dans un de ses discours le President de la Haute Autorite,
M. Malvestiti, a constate que "contre l'individualisme des Etats,
l'Europe a deja confirme le principe de la supranationalite en tant que
methode feconde de gestion et d' arbitrage dans la vie economique." La
Cornmunaute devient de plus en plus un seul espace economique, ou
s'imposent une division de travail et une repartition de la production
et des fonctions - et la l'exigence de l'efficacite maximum l'emporte
sur la raison d'Etat! En effet: il n'y a plus de voie de retour. Nous
Europeens nous aimons nous servir du terme: par la force des choses.
Les gest es de quelques chefs d'Etat eminents prouvent qu'il est plus
sage, plus realiste, de tenir compte de cette "force des choses" que
d'aller a son encontre.
(4) Les Donnees de l'Avenir

La "force des choses" vient de seduire les Anglais. Les Anglais sont
restes sceptiques a l'egard de nos intentions et de nos projets ; ils ne le
sont plus a l'egard de nos realisations et de nos succes. Ils ont attendu
ce moment pour vouloir se joindre a nous et l'immense majorite de la
population de la Communaute europeenne de 170 millions d'habitants
les serrera sur son coeur.
Mais a une seule condition: que les A nglais eux aussi reconnaissent le
caractere "dynamique" de la Communaute et qu'ils sachent qu'il n'y a pas
de voie de retour.
Il faut dire que, sous ce rapport, le grand debat a la Chambre des
Communes ne fut pas tout a fait rassurant. Il ne faut pas que le fonde-
ment politique de la Cornmunaute soit ignore; il ne faut pas que la
regle de l'unanimite - donc le droit de veto - soit maintenue lorsqu'il
n'y a pas necessite absolue; il ne faut pas qu'on assiste, des debut a une
coalition eventuelle des "nouveaux" (le Royaume Uni et les pays
scandinaves) contre les "anciens"; il ne faut pas que le renforcement
necessaire des institutions - par exemple l' election directe de l' Assem-
blee et l'elargissement de ses competences soit mis en cause. Il faut que
sur tous ces points une reponse definitive soit prealablement acquise.
PORTEE DE L'INTEGRATlON EUROPEENNE ss
11 faut enfin - mais ici il ne s'agit pas de la Grande Bretagne - mettre
nettement en lumiere, que l'integration politico-economique en cours
presuppose une certaine conformite dans l'appreciation des evene-
ments mondiaux et la maniere de reagir sur le plan politique et diplo-
matique; conformite sur laquelle on ne pourra pas transiger.
On voit dans tout cela que les possibilites juridiques et les conditions
politiques de !'integration europeenne sont etroitement liees: la des-
union politique conduisant a une desintegration sur tous les terrains,
l'insertion d'un droit formel de veto, la degradation du developpement
"interne" du droit de la Communaute, la reduction de celle-ci a une
simple et superflue "O.E.C.D. pour Sept ou Neuf" .... tout cela ne
sera pas possible. 11 faut que les Anglais et les Scandinaves non seule-
ment aiment les succes de la Communaute europeenne, mais acceptent
egalement le caractere juridique et qu'ils soient disposes a ne pas y
toucher.
Le caractere juridique de la "Prefederation europeenne" est partie
integrante de sa volonte politique et cette volonte politique tient a
proteger, maintenir et pousser ce caractere juridique: ces deux ele-
ments sont lies dans la plus brulante actualite.
POSSIBLE FORMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
by
G. M. NEDERHoRsT
In summer 1961 the process of Western European integration has

considerably accelerated its pace and may weIl soon reach a point where
the European states will have to take far-reaching decisions as to the
form and scope of the emerging European community. European
integration actually seems to be at the crossroads as far as the question
of its future political and legal structure is concerned, be it ca1led
"federation," "confederation" or some kind of "supranational union."
What matters in this context is not so much the name the forthcoming
community of European states will be given (there are quite a few
unitarian states being called "federation") but the form and structure
which correspond best to the present diversity of interests and needs
and the future tasks and aims such a integrated Europe will have. It
cannot be doubted that there is for the time being a real gap between
the ultimate aim - some kind of federative state or confederation - and
the practical feasability of attaining it. There are quite a number of
obstacles limiting or narrowing down the possibilities of a further in-
tegration in the strict sense of the word. They have to be taken into
account realistically as long as they cannot be overcome. Whilst it
remains highly desirable to keep in mind what ultimate (and ideal)
form the European community should be given, it is nevertheless
necessary to adapt its "intermediate" forms to the given possibilities
and requirements. Thus, a precise forecast on what kind exactly the
future European union will be, is a risky undertaking and does hardly
serve the purpose. All what can be said for the moment is that there is a
definite agreement to promote integration as much as possible and
that there are some forms which seem to be better suitable and ade-
quate for its realization than others. It is the purpose of this short
contribution to present a few ideas on this issue which may be of some
interest for the further discussion.
The present situation of European integration was till now charac-
POSSIBLE FORMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 57
terized by two main factors: the threatening formation of two economic
groupings - the "Six" and the "Seven" - which had already taken place
if not de facto then at least de iure and which was on the way to create
quite novel complications and tensions in Western Europe. And the
second was the uncertain, almost nationalistie European policy of the
French President de Gaulle. In spring 1960 he made some fairly
clearcut statements on this question, reviving once more the con-
ception of a Europe with a strong national trend. In the course of his
broadcast and television speech of May 31st, 1960, de Gaulle outlined
the ultimate aim of his European policy in the following untranslatable
sentence: " .... en attendant d'en venir, peut-~tre, a une confeder-
ation." This was an indieation of the future structure, the emerging
European community should be - according to the President's opinion
- given. It took later on, during the meeting between de Gaulle and
Adenauer in Rambouillet on J uly 29thand 30th, a more concrete shape.
De Gaulle then outlined to the German Chancellor a new plan for
Europe as well as the idea of a structural reform and reorganisation of
the Atlantie Alliance (NATO). In both instances de Gaulle's program-
me tended to check the process of European and Atlantic integration,
and to return to the traditional idea of national sovereignty and
conventional treaty policy. France was to be assured of a leading role
within this framework. In the case of the EuropeanEconomicCommu-
nities (EEC), de Gaulle wanted to curtail the authority of the Brussels
administration and to withdraw the power of politieal decision-making
from the Commission and re-invest it in the governements. Similar
reforms along the lines of areturn to an outdated national programme
envisaged that the continental member countries - that is again the
"Six" as a sort of a "nucleus" - should set themselves up as the
European group of NATO under the leadership of France, to form a
kind of "Third Force" within the Atlantie community. The high
sounding phrase of a "Europe des patries" revealed itself as a retro-
grade step in the method of integration specifieally promoted by the
EEC. It explained furthermore the reluctance of the French government
to accept Great Britain as a member of EEC (whatever form this
"association" would be given): this would, indeed, put an end to the
French desire to be "more equal" than the other European countries on
the continent.
It was partially due to this policy of the French government that the
countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) seemed to
be even less disposed to depart from their once adopted partie ular
58 G. M. NEDERHORST
form of association, at least as long as the future way of the EEC

remained uncertain. In their view General de GaulIe's conceptions have
produced even in France, including government circles, confusion and
differences of opinion about her own policies of integration within the
"Six." It therefore was in some way understandable that the "Seven,"
by demonstrating the soundness of the machinery and institutions of
EFTA, wanted to prove conclusively that a free trade area is at least as
suitable an instrument of integration as the EEC. So both sides
could not move towards areal rapprochement but limited their
activities to endless negotiations and mutual declarations of sympathy.
In this situation it appeared to be not very useful to think of and set
up a framework of principles and institutions both groupings already
have in common or were willing to accept and which, in case of an
eventual rapprochement, could serve as a basis of bargaining.
In the meantime things moved slowly but steadily and some barriers
on the way to such a bridge-building which hitherto seemed to be
unsurmountable, could be removed. In spring r96r it leaked through
that the British Government, encouraged by the new American
Administration, was seriously considering to apply for admission to the
EEC. As a consequence of this development the Ministers of the EFTA-
countries met at the end of J une, r96r, and issued a kind of a M anifesto
in which they reaffirmed their willingness to negotiate and to contribu-
te to the creation of an "economic integration of Europe as a whole, in
the form of a single European market." They furthermore stated with
regard to the possible form of this integration "that the aim of any
solution must be to promote unity and solidarity in Europe; to
strengthen the European economy and to build an integrated market
upon solid and permanent foundations. To this end, Ministers agreed
that there must be effective institut ions to supervise the impleman-
tation of undertakings necessary to achieve a solution acceptable to
all parties." 1
This fairly vague statement does not include any reference to a
political integration and leaves open all possible interpretations of
what nature these "effective institutions" are intended to be.
On July r8th, r96r, the Heads of Governments of the six EEC-
countries issued on their side a "Manifesto" on the future development
of European integration. In this communique they not only declared
their willingness "to organize and harmonize" their political co-oper-
ation eventually leading to common (political) institutions but charged
1 See text of the Communique in EFTA-Bulletin (Geneva), vol. II, no. 7, ]uly I96I, p.8.
POSSIBLE FORMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 59
the experts with the elaboration of a so-called European Statute. 1 It is
hard to say what the juridically quite unprecise expression "Statute"
actually means; it is the result of a compromise between those who
would have preferred a "European constitution" and those for whom
some kind of loose association seemed to correspond better to the
present day political realities. Thus, the agreement on the word
"Statute" implies that the political unification of Europe, following
the economic integration, will be given sooner or later a legal framework
flexible enough to embrace more than the EEC-countries, but at the
time time sufficiently strong to hold together a heterogeneous group
of states such as the European countries. Here, too, we find no concrete
proposals concerning the form and structure by which the European
union should be materialized and so again one essential issue is left
for all kind of conjectures.
In the meantime, however, the EEC in Brussels proceeded to a
careful examination of the possible economic and political consequences
an admission of Great Britain (and other EFTA-countries) to the
Common Market would have. In this context it has to be borne in
mind that in case of an association or fuU membership of a given
country the Commission is either charged with the negotiations with
this country (Sections 228 and 238 of the EEC-Treaty) or has to be
heard by the Council of Ministers before such negotiations are under-
taken (Section 237). Furthermore, the "open-door-c1ause" of the Treaty
("any European country can adhere to the EEC if it is willing to do
so") is applicable only under the condition that the candidate-country
is prepared to take over a1l responsibilities and liabilities such a step
may involve, manifesting by this its belief in the cause of European
integration. An admission of a new country - as was made quite c1ear
by the EEC - does not imply mere co-operation but integration with
all its possible assets and consequences. 2 Brussels is therefore obviously
not willing to give up the considerable accomplishments it already has
achieved in the last four years just for the sake of having inc1uded a
new country. Looking at possible forms for the further European
integration it thus seems to be indispensable to take into account this
EEC - point of view according to which the existing economic insti-
tutions and political principles cannot be basically changed but must
be preserved and developped.
1 See text in Inf01'mationsdienst des Deutschen Rates der Europilischen Bewegung (Bonn), 12.
Jg., no. 15, August Ist, 1961, S. I (in German)
8 Cf. "Die EWG-Kommission und die gesamteuropäische Integration," in Neue Zürcher
Zeitung (Zurich), 27.7.1961, p. 5.
60 G. M. NEDERHORST
Quite apart from the political aspect of this attitude it is constantly

stressed by the Commission that economically speaking a freely
organized market without any distortions and artificial restrictions is
only feasible if and when all sectors of the economy are inc1uded and
gradually integrated into one single unit. A restriction on the removal
of taxes, for example would, according to this "philosophy of compe-
tition ("Wettbewerb-philosophie), discard only an arbitrary part of the
hitherto distorted system of competition, whilst real and full inte-
gration necessitates the removal of all distorting elements. This,
however, can be done, only if all member-countries agree and co-
ordinate their policies and instruments accordingly. "Die im (EEC-)
Vertrag vorgesehenen wettbewerbsfördernden und -regelnden Mass-
nahmen sind .... sachlich und zeitlich so aufeinander abzustimmen,
dass sie sich nicht gegenseitig behindern oder aufheben, sondern
ergänzen, dass nicht neue Lücken entstehen, sondern eine europäische
Wettbewerbsordnung geschaffen wird." 1 This attitude implies much
more than just a economic programme: it determines to a large and
decisive extent the scope and comprehensiveness of economic inte-
gration which inevitably will influence the forms of the political
institutions as wen.
For Great Britain on the other hand (and, mutatis mutandis, an
EFTA-countries) the problem of this integration and, first of all, her
admission to the Common Market presents itself in quite a different
way. After having fortunately overcome the first - and certainly
difficult - obstac1e of French opposition to any kind of British rap-
prochement a second and major obstac1e remains: what will be the
conditions under which Britain can gain admission? What will be the
appropriate forms by which the Commonwealth countries and all their
relations with Britain do imply can be in one way or another connected
with this European market? One realises very wen in London that the
Rome treaty is a "highly political, delicately balanced compromise
bargain between the interests of the original participants." 2 No
question that Britain's admission would or will upset to a large extent
this balance, left alone the problem of the Commonwealth countries.
1 H. von der Groeben, (member of the EEC·Commission), in Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb,

July I96I, quoted after: "Die EWG-Kommission und die gesamteuropäische Integration"
(see footnote 3).
2 For the following see: U. Kitzinger, Britain and the Common Market, in The World
Today, (London) vol. 17 June I96I, pp. 236-254, and "Für und wider den Beitritt Grossbri-
tanniens zur EWG. Der gegenwärtige Stand der Diskussion," in Europa-Archiv (Bonn), 16.
Jg., no. 14,25.7.1961, pp. 379-390.
POSSIBLE FORMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 6I
But the treaty is after all only a loi cadre and in many of its vital fields
of application the real decisions have not yet been taken even between
the Six - a chance Britain certainly will (or should) not fall to make use
of. At this moment, however, comes again the "key-problem" i!lto the
picture, namely the political aspect of the Common Market with its
solemnly proclaimed aim to be the nucleus of an ever eloser European
union. To join the EEC in the way Brussels asks for, would mean for
Britain a long-term and irreversible commitment the consequences of
which cannot be foreseen for the time being. On the other hand, the
EFTA-countries have now a chance to influence the further progress of
integration - which will go on anyhow, also without them - and
participate in an active way in the shaping and setting up of the
common institutions. Drawing the balance sheet of the present situ-
ation in summer I96I it can be safely said that the succes or the failure
of further integration depends mostly on the form it will be given and
on the ways and means by which the governments concerned will try to
attain it.
While it is too early to make any definite prediction about what
exactly will happen in this field, some basic principles or elements
concerning the European integration of tomorrow can be outlined
already today. In this connection it should be stressed that anyfurther
integration - and its first major step to it, the admission of Great
Britain to the Common Market - cannot be implemented by some
pragmatic step by step decisions only. They remain, as necessary as
they are, somewhat "in the air" unless they are taken on the basis
of a generally accepted conception of what the European community
shall be in the next ten or twenty years, what place it is going to take
within the wider framework of the Atlantic Alliance and, in the last
resort, which tasks and tests it will have to face in the world of to-
morrow. It may therefore be useful to outline briefly some ideas on
how the further process of integration could be possibly conceived.
As it has been already pointed out the EEC can be considered today
as the starting point for the establishment of a future European
community (the EEC as "the basis of an ever eloser union,") as
expressed in the preamble of the Treaty). Looking at the treaty and its
rather flexible wording it can also be said that many possibilities for a
further stage by stage progress and construction of a union covering at
least Western Europe are latent in the EEC. The selected terms "eloser
1 Cf. "Vor der nächsten Etappe der europäischen Integrationspolitik," in Europa·Arckiv,
IS. ]g., no. 13-14, pp. D 157-158.
G. M. NEDERHORST
union" has been left vague deliberately, because as far as everything

else is concerned, it is necessary to recognise that the contrast between
the "functional" and "federalist" method of integration is only a
partial aspect of a far reaching and more comprehensive political
problem. The course toward a larger community - such as envisaged
by the "Six" - is fortunately not proceeding along a predetermined
course. The alternatives of whether this course is to lead to a European
federation, or confederation, or towards a still more flexible form of
integration has cautiously been left open. The present organization in
Brussels represently only a minimum of all that is required for the
proper functioning of a "European Customs Union": the model of a
European lederal state - even if considered the ideal solution - has not
been made into a sine qua non in Brusse1s. The door continues to
remain open and nothing seems to be more vital for the forthcoming
negotiations than that. There is, however, no doubt, that these negoti-
ations can only be successful as long and if both sides are politically
prepared to proceed with integration.
To be sure, there is neither an absolute necessity to preserve the
already existing European institutions "tel-quel" nor would it make
any sense to remove them completely. On the contrary: there must be
a minimum of "institutionalised" integration, which can carry on
(with the consent of the governments) the further integration. What
then is this minimum standard a integrated organization (or com-
munity) requires if its development should have some prospect of
success?
Both sides, the EEC as weIl as the EFTA - as mentioned above -
share the opinion that there must be "effective institutions." Two
possibilities can be envisaged - and still do not anticipate the decision
on the final form of integration: community, confederation or feder-
ation -; first, the present status quo can be gradually "rationalised,"
i.e., the already existing institutions of the respective organisations
(EEC. EURATOM, European Parliament, Coal and Steel Community)
can be adapted to the new requirements, unified, where and if necessary
enlarged according to the balance between new and old members;
national legislation can be made uniform in the field of common
interests and collaboration, especially in the economic, social and
cultural field, and the Foreign Ministers can meet more frequently and
regularly for consultations. De Gaulle's project of a "standing group"
or permanent secretariat of the Foreign Ministers may weIl turn
out to be a useful contribution to this harmonization of the different
viewpoints and consequently bring the "Six" and the "Seven" (or at
least those EFTA countries which are able to participate) c10ser together.
There is no doubt that such a "rationalisation" will facilitate any
further integration considerably.
It is, however, highly questionable whether this would be sufficient
and, above all, whether this rationalisation would not too easily
serve as apretext of not going on with the integration itself. It does at
any rate lack the kind of dynamism every such process needs. This
dynamic impetus has to come from the states themselves and their
govemments. Whatever form one may think best for European
community it does pre-suppose a political decision. There is a great
temptation to underestimate this fact: looking at the fruitless negoti-
ations in the last two years one could have the impression that in view
of the variety of economic, technica1, legal and institutional problems
with which all countries concemed were struggling, nobody really
dared to take political decisions. For some time already a certain
trend in favour of considering the immediate stages of integration as
a primarily technical and economic process seemed to have been
prevalent. This, in spite of, or just because, the indefatigable industry
of the countless commission-meetings of experts, the dozens of "Round
Table Talks" and working groups, lead to a vacuum in the political
field. There seemed to be an inc1ination to believe - as Herbert Lüthy
has brilliantly pointed out 1 - that such a dynamic economic integration
would almost automatically turn into a political one without new and
fundamental decisions. Surely, economic unity favours the process
of political integration and can largely prepare the field for the re-
spective decisions. But that is by no means sufficient for its materi-
alization. The economy follows politics - and not vice versa. They go,
to say the least, hand in hand but both sides must be equally taken
into account. This applies no less to the envisaged European elections.
They are likely to contribute Jittle or nothing to the formation of a
European consciousness so long as the election campaign is fought over
the decision making power of the EEC-Commission (or, now, a broader
community) or, say, the standardisation of the certificates of origin,
instead of the future political structure of Europe. The European
Common Market, the existing European administration, or some kind
of liaison agencies with the outside countries hardly require a European
parliament as their logical complement. Rather, we believe, a European
1 Herbert Lüthy, "Als Zeus Europa liebgewann," in Der Monat (Berlin), no. 145, October
1960, pp. 33 ss.
G. M. NEDERHORST
parliament would require a European executive as an essentiallogical

complement.
We may say therefore that, apart from the rationalisation a second
element is needed if European integration really shall advance: a
change in the thinking about the hitherto valid or prevalent conceptions
concerning the structure of the future European community. The
question whether this change could be made without Great Britain -
on a purely continental basis - has been answered in the negative
since London is willing to participate in the formation of the common
European institutions. Continental Europe thus will be compeIled to
consider again a number of plans on the possible form of integration.
There are, however, three principles at least, which can be considered
as still or even more valid then before:
(1) The principle of supranationality, as desirable as it may be and
as it is proclaimed by some EEC-countries, should not be overstrained
nor hinder the flexibility of any common European institution as long
as a stable and comprehensive European community is not established.
This particularly applies to the present situation where Britain is on
the way to join the EEC and may be, for a number of reasons, "frighten-
ed" by the idea of a supranational "super-state."
(2) It is more important to have weIl functioning institutions
although established on a lower level and with limited powers than to
set up highly technical, and complicated organizations with a wide
range of objectives which in practice fail or hinder a further develop-
ment.
(3) Every newly created institution should fit in and be adapted
to the nature and functioning of the already existing institutions
unless it does replace them partially or totally and improves in this
way their "co-ordination" and harmonization. Where - and whenever
possible, it should be avoided to overload the process of integration
with too many and too complicated institutions. The form and,
eventually, the success of the integration largely depends on the
flexibility and "rationality" of its institutions which, as experience
shows, acquire in the course of their existence increasingly a specific
"weight" of their own, difficult to reduce or remove later on.
Based on these assumptions we can perhaps formulate some more
concrete desirata and a general outlook with regard to the possible
form of the European community:
- There is no doubt that this Community has to be apart of the
Atlantic Alliance. It is in the perspective of this wider framework
that the forthcoming stmcture of Europe has to be seen and its

institutions, whilst remaining of "European" character, have to be
consequently conceived. This means first of all a strengthening of and
eloser co-operation within the Atlanticinstitutions, mainly the NATO
and, mutatis mutandis, the OECD.
- The European community must be loose and flexible enough to
embrace as many free and democratic European countries as possible.
Accordingly, different forms of integration, association and mere co-
operation have to be found under the present circumstances, taking
into account the different political and economic situation of the
European states. The progress of integration depends more on the
gradual convergence of national policies towards commonly accepted
aims and objectives than on the institutional and legal forms the
European community will be given. "A rigid federation, atme union, a
consistent united front might - as a scholar pointed out with regard to
a another attempt of elose international co-operation 1 - weIl have
broken down under the continuing stresses and strains of inter-Arab
dissension and dispute. The very looseness of the Arab league, the very
noncommittal character of most of its instmments has become an asset
instead of a liability."
- I t has to be stressed, on the other hand, that this Community must
be strong enough to meet all threats and chaIlenges coming from the
outside as weIl as to cope with possible tensions which may develop inside.
It should become the fountain-head which bears in itself the dynamics
of promoting an ever eloser union. This necessarily implies a linking
up of the hitherto prevalent economic aspect with the political one.
The formula which can be found already in some governmental and
private cireles, namely to adopt the "supranational principle" for the
integration in the economic field and the "federative principle" in the
field of politics has much in its favour and may weIl serve as a guide
for the further evolution of the Community.2 The trend of centrali-
lisation, inherent in almost every solidly integrated federation based on
common political, economic and social principles, may gradually unite
its member states into an even eloser union.
This being said, it seems self-evident that Britain's move towards
the continent makes sense only if it sooner or later culminates in a wider
1 Cf. J. S. Raleigh, "Ten years of the Arab League," in: Mitldle Eastern Affairs, vol. VI,
no. 3, March 1955, p. 77, quoted after Ernst B. Haas, "Regional Integration and National
Policy," in International Conciliation, no. 513, May 1957, p. 401.
B Cf. "Das Europamanifest der Sechs," in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19.7.1961, p. 7.
66 G. M. NEDERHORST
political and economic European community. This, however, depends

to a very large extent on the strength of the Bonn-Paris axis, which
may strongly influence London's further (not only economic but also
political) orientation towards Europe. The EEC-countries' grouping
around this central axis of Western Europe have for a long time now
invested the conception of the "European balance of power" with
different dimensions and alternatives, which directly or indirectly
affect the EFTA-countries around this nuc1eus as weil, drawing them
into the larger whole which is to be set up. This, again, should help to
establish an inner-European equilibrium as the very precondition of a
federalist pluralism. Such a pluralistic form of integration alone will be
capable of neutralising and overcoming internal tensions, dissensions
or orders of preferences, and balance out the different centers of
political gravity. We have seen that even the EEC-Treaty offers a wide
choice of forms of integration, and is therefore suitable to make al-
lowances for the many different national requirements, reservations
and considerations. Thus, some kind of political andjor economic
association of Britain with the EEC means not only the end of the
"Three-Circ1es-Theory" which for many years has helped Britain to
maintain her political and economic freedom of movement vis-a-vis
continental Europe, the Commonwealth and the United States, it
would furthermore bring a new and most important dimension in the
long term development of the whole of Europe. It is mainly up to EEC
to select the right degree and scope of integration in such way as to
not render the affiliation of the other European countries, and above
all Great Britain, impossible as a result of an "overdose."
In addition to this, the necessity for the future Western European
cornmunity - whichever shape it may finally take - should not be
overlooked to have adequate scope with a view to its attitude towards
Central and Eastern Europe: therefore, provision should primarily
be made for the inc1usion of some alternatives for a more chailenging
policy towards these countries and for the solution of the German
problem.
This all requires that we should draw the framework of the future
European integration wide enough so that it corresponds to the reality
of the whole of Europe. This does not only concern Great Britain and
the other EFTA-countries but equally Greece, Turkey, Ireland and
Iceland. Even more so we must not accustom ourselves to the idea (it
would be wonderfully convenient to do so) of Europe and its unification
beginning at the river EIbe; we must aiways remain conscious of the
presence if its Eastern part now under cornmunist rule: this at least
applies to mental processes and future planning, so long as reality does
not permit its translation into practical political action.
Thus, the search for a European equilibrium and an adequate form
of its realisation requires more than solution of "Little Europe" within
the framework of the "Six," the "Seven" or the "Fifteen," if for the
reason alone that the future of our continent on the other side of the
EIbe is officially planned to take quite a different and for us by no
means reassuring course, whilst the hopes of the people who live there
perhaps coincide with our own ideas. The task, which the European
federalists set themselves in the Resistance movement and during the
first post war years - to create in Europe the political and social
conditions for an all-European peace-order (gesamteuropäische Frie-
densordnung) - still remains unsolved. This is a programme which does
not accept as inevitable the status quo thrust upon us by Soviet policy,
but seeks, instead, to determine and overcome it by virtue of its own
dynamic content. Such a task, however, can only be accomplished if
this programme is carried out by a European community, if, therefore,
especially France and Britain become its chief pillars, and if it is done
within the framework of a larger alliance in the Western hemisphere,
particularly in elose co-operation and connection with the United
States. The form of this European community will and can only be
determined by these very objectives and purposes.
The future of Europe will be less influenced by the present-day
realities, than by the developments in the future. In the perspective
of the next ten or twenty years the idea of Europe as a "Third Force"
will look even more unrealistic than it does today. The decision tor a
European community within the Atlantic Alliance has already been
imposed on us by the challenge of the global political situation. This
actually means that the choice of ways and forms to achieve it will -
we hope - be our own, it means also that otherwise there is no freely
acceptable alternative left.
* Attention is drawn to the fact that this article was written prior to the recent
development in regard to Great Britain's entry into the Common Market (Ed#or's Note)
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1
by
Abbreviations used: 1 EAEC (Euratom): European Atomic Energy

Community; ECSC: Euröpean Coal and Steel Community; EEC:
European Economic Community.
The establishment of the European Communities has meant that
economic relations between member States have been subjected to
specific legal rules embodied in the constituent treaties. It has not
meant, however, that legal rules have replaced the interplay of
political forces as the standards for conducting these relations. With
the British application for membership of the European Communities,
the French proposals for organizing closer political cooperation between
member States, and the end of the first stage 1 of the transitional
period in EEC, it seems useful to pay attention to the relation between
legal and political factors in the three Communities. On the following
pages we intend to discuss some aspects of this relation, focussing atten-
tion on the existence of conflicting or convergent trends in the evolution
of law and politics in the Communities. After abrief survey of some
characteristics of the law of the treaties and politics in the Com-
munities, we shall inquire into the extent to which the law can serve as an
instrument of integration in the evolution of relations between member
States.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LAW OF THE TREATIES
Superposition
The paramount characteristic of the European Communities lies
in the fact that certain organs have been established, the members of
which are to act independently from national instructions. The
"executives" - the High Authority of ECSC, and the Commissions of
1 Transition to the second stage depends on adecision of the CounciJ. This decision has not
yet been taken at the time of completing this artic1e.
LAW AND POLITICS 69
EEC and Euratom - shall ensure the functioning and the development
of the Communities. Their members shall perlorm their duties in the
general interest of the Communities. 1 In exercising their functions,
the executives are politically responsible to the European Parlia.:::
mentary Assembly, either generally - the two Commissions - or
through the discussion of the annual general reports submitted to the
Assembly - the High Authority. 2 The "acts" of the organs of the
Communities - other than opinions of the High Authority, and recom-
mendations and opinions of the Commissions and the Councils of
Ministers of EEC and Euratom - are subject to review by the European
Court. The Court is competent to give judgment on appeals by member
States, the Councils of the three Communities or the Commissions, on
grounds of incompetence, of errors of substantial form, of infringement
of the treaties or any legal provisions relating to their application, or
of "detournement de pouvoir." 3 Certain decisions emanating from the
organs of the Communities are direct1y binding on member States.
Among them "decisions par voie generale" adopted by the High
Authority, and regulations adopted by the Commissions and the
Councils of Ministers, have a general application; "decisions par voie
individuelle" adopted by the former, and "decisions" adopted by the
latter organs are binding for the adressees named therein. 4
The elements combined constitute the characteristic of superposition
in the law of the treaties. It appears to a limited extent in this law. The
ECSC Treaty, as a "traite-Ioi," specifically sets out the roles deter-
mining the development of the common market. The High Authority is
its executi've organ "chargee d'assurer la realisation des objects fixes
par le present Traite dans les conditions prevues par celui-ci." 5 The
EEC Treaty, as a "traite-cadre," confers the power to enact measures
of a legislative character, or of recognized political importance (e.g.
"decisions" adressed to member States) mainlyon the Council of
Ministers, whereas it confers on the Commission executive and ad-
ministrative powers" en vue d'assurer le fonctionnement et le develop-
1 Traitl inslituant la Communault! Europlenne du Charbon et de Z' Acier. Publicatie dienst
van de Europese Gemeenschap 163SN-SSH.A. (ECSC Treaty), artic1e 9 (5).
Trailt! instituant la Communaule Economique Europlenne et documents annexes. Publie par
le Secretariat du Comite Interimaire pour le Marche Commun et l'Euratom, Bruxelles. (EEC
Treaty). artic1e 157 (2).
Traite inslituant la Communault! Europlenne de l'Energie Alomique. ibid. (EAEC Treaty).
artic1e 126 (2).
I EEC Treaty, artic1e 144; EAEC Treaty, artic1e II4; ECSC Treaty, artic1e 24.
8 ECSC Treaty, artic1e 33; EEC Treaty, article 173; EAEC Treaty, artic1e 146.
, ECSC Treaty, artic1es 14, 15; EEC Treaty, artic1e 189; EAEC Treaty, artic1e 161.
I article 8.
70 J. ALTING VON GEUSAU
pement du marche commun." 1 The Euratom Commission is charged

"d'assurer le developpement de l'energie nuc1eaire dans la Commu-
naute." 2 It shall execute the provisions favouring the development of
nuc1ear energy laid down in the Treaty together with those of a
regulatory character adopted by the Council of Ministers in pursuance
of the Treaty. 3
The differences in the law of the three treaties disc10se that the
characteristic of superposition in ECSC is more apparent in the de-
cision-making structure envisaged, whereas in EEC and Euratom, it is
more apparent in the external force of decisions taken by the organs
of the Communities and in the judicial review of the acts of those
organs.
Coordination
The characteristic of coordination in the law of the treaties can be
found in the composition of the European Parliamentary Assembly, in
the functions of the ECSC Council of Ministers, and in the participation
of the Commissions of EEC and Euratom in the preparation of acts
emanating from the Councils of Ministers.
The European Parliamentary Assembly is composed of delegates
appointed from among the members of national parliaments. 4 This
"dedoublement de fonction" can ensure simultaneous supervision over
the activities of the European executives and the national govern-
ments. 5
The Council of Ministers of ECSC coordinates the activities of the
Community with those of member governments "en vue d'harmoniser
l' action de la H aute Autorite et celle des gouvernements responsables de
la politique economique generale de leurs pays." 6 To this end, "l'avis
prealable" or, in certain cases "l'avis conforme" of the Council is
required for a number of decisions to be taken by the High Authority.
In exceptional cases, the Council shall act, on a proposal of the High
Authority or after having consulted the latter. 7
1 article 155.
2 article 1Z4.
3 See for instance: articles 7,50-51,54-53.
4 ECSC Treaty, artic1e Z1; EEC Treaty, artic1e 138; EAEC Treaty, artic1e 118; Convention
relative a certaines institutions communes aux Communautes europeennes, Traite instituant
la CEE, ibid. artic1e z.
5 See Regelingen Euromarkt. IJmuiden, Vermande Zonen. Band I, Deel I B. Bills of
approval in member States: Belgium, artic1e z; German Federal Republic, article z; France,
artic1e z; Netherlands, article 5. The Luxembourg bill does not contain a similar provision, the
text of the Italian bill is not inc1uded.
6 article z6.
7 article 59 (z).
LAWAND POLITICS 7I
The shifted powers in EEC and Euratom - as compared to ECSC -
are reflected in both the functions of the Couneil and in the relations
between the Council and the Commission. The EEC Counci1 "assure la
coordination des politiques economiques generales des Etats membres." 1
The Euratom Council "prend toutes mesures relevant de sa compe-
tences en vue de coordonner les actions des Etats membres de la Commu-
naute." 2 Conceming the relations between the Councils and the
Commissions, the characteristic of coordination is expressed in the
participation (initiative, proposal, recommendation) of the Commissions
in decisions on major questions, which shall now be taken by the Coun-
cils of Ministers. Moreover, the Council may amend a Commission
proposal by means of a unanimous vote only. 3
Finally, the power to adopt recommendations in ECSC and di-
reetives in EEC and Euratom - aets binding member States as to the
result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence
as to forms and means 4 - is another expression of the charaeteristic
diseussed with regard to the unification of measures to be taken by
municipal authorities within the scope of the treaties.
Cooperation
Inter-govemmental cooperation, to be effeeted in the framework
of the Councils; through meetings of govemmental representatives;
or through conferences of representatives of member States, is a third
characteristic of the law of the treaties.
It appears with regard to i.a. the appointment of the members of the
executives, the Court and subsidiary organs; the fixation of the seat of
the Communities' institutions ; and the revision of the treaties. In EEC
and Euratom, the need for inter-govemmental cooperation has been
clearly stressed by articles I45 and I;I5, discussed above. In EEC,
moreover, cooperation is required for such questions as e.g. the fixation
of duties applicable to the products in List G; 5 a more rapid aligning of
national duties to the common customs tariff; 6 the formulation of the
guiding lines of a common agricultural policy; 7 and the coordination
1 articl.e I4S.
a artic1e IIS.
a artic1e 149 and II9 respectively. Mutual consultation is provided in EEC Treaty, artic1e
162; EAEC Treaty, artic1e 131.
4 ECSC Treaty, artic1e 14 (3); EEC Treaty, artic1e 189 (3); EAEC Treaty, artic1e 161 (3).
& article 20.
s articl.e 24.
7 artic1e 43 (I).
of commercial relations with thirdcountries during the transitional

period. 1 .
Furthermore, the power of the High Authority to formulate 0-
pinions and that of the organs of EEC and Euratom, to formulate
recommendations and opinions, can be considered as means to spur
cooperation.
The characteristics combined: balance or unbalance?

The three characteristies (superposition, coordination, cooperation)
combined, reveal interesting compromises between several legal
conceptions, and between such conceptions and the social substmcture
of inter-State relations. 2
In transferring powers to the organs of the European Communities
compromises have been found between the conception of democratie
control - deri'ved from municipal law - and that of "oligarchie"
regulation of intercourse between States (through the intermediary
of governments only) - derived from traditional international law.
Owing to the fact that the treaties confer power on the institutions to
rule on matters which originally belonged to the domain of municipal
legislation or administration, this compromise has resulted in an
unequal transfer of power and responsibility, and in the institution of a
rather figurative democratie contro!. Powers of a legislative character
have been assigned mainly to the CouncH of Ministers - following the
oligarchie practiee in respect to treaty-making. This body can not be
held responsible for measures taken. Its members only - according to
the same conception - can be held responsible in national parliaments.
The conception of democratie control extends to the activities of the
executives only, whose powers are confined within narrow limits.
Consequently, techniques of parliamentary control are laid down in the
treaties or worked out in the subsequent mIes of procedure of the
European Parliamentary Assembly; adequate powers of control are
denied to the Assembly, however. The Assembly, for instance, can
force the members of the executives to resign their offiee in a body;
new members can be appointed by the governments only, acting in
common agreement. In ECSC, an ex post lacto parliamentary control
can be effected over the activities of the High Authority, whereas
preliminary consent of the Council (unanimously, by two-thirds
1 article III (I).

2 In discussing the characteristics, we made use of the execellent study on federalism in:
Scelle, Pricis de Droit des Gens. Paris, RecueilSirey. I932. Tome Premier, p. I87 ff.
LAW AND POLITICS 73
majority, or by an absolute majority) is required in several cases. In
EEC and Euratom, the powers of parliamentary control - in the
drafting of decisions of a political or legislative character - extend no
further than to the proposals of the Commissions. The Councils-subject
to articles 149 and II9 respectively - are free to amend these proposals
subsequently.
The compromises, found between legal conceptions and the social
substructure of inter-State relations, can be traced back in several
articles of the treaties. In some cases, the power to find workable
solutions had to be left to the States, although the solution of the
relevant questions is bound to affect significantly the development
and functioning of the Communities. 1 In other cases, complicated and
divergent procedures have been envisaged to take measures required
by the treaties. To this end, various majorities are prescribed for the
Councils to take decisions; in some majorities (absolute majority in the
ECSC Council, and qualified and special majorities in the Councils of
EEC and Euratom) a weighted voting system is introduced, taking into
account the relative importance of the members. 2 As regards the
concurrence of several organs in the decisionmaking process, a wide
variety of procedures has been laid down in the treaties. In some cases
the characteristic of superposition and coordination are combined.
In other cases, Commission participation in inter-govemmental
cooperation has been provided for, and - in EEC and Euratom -
techniques of parliamentary control (the requisite of consulting the
Assembly) have been envisaged to take "coordinated" decisions.
In conc1usion, we may say that no c1ear balance exists in the law of
the treaties, between the three characteristics, except perhaps, for the
organization öf justice in the Communities. An uncertain balance
between the thiee characteristics has been achieved in the decision-
making structure, to reach decisions whose effects can reveal either
three characteristics.
POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
During the years in which the three Communities have operated,

practice has challenged the characteristics of superposition and coordi-
nation, and stressed the need for inter-govemmental cooperation
1 For instance: ECSC Treaty, Chapter X (Commercial poliey); EEC Treaty, articles I04ff.
(Balance of payments policies); EAEC Treaty, articles 5, 6 (Coordination of nuc1ear re·
searehes).
a ECSC Treaty, artic1e 28; EEC Treaty, artic1e 148; EAEC Treaty;artic1e u8.
74 J. ALTING VON GEUSAU
beyond the extent envisaged by the treaties. The interplay of actual

politica1 forces has tended to shift the uncertain balance to another
level than the treaties suggest. A few examples may suffice to explain
these trends.
Superposition and coordination challenged

Superposition and coordination are to be seen as those characteristics
of the law of the treaties that diverge significantly from the law of
other international organizations. Practice, so far, in the Communities
has not confirmed the law in this respect.
With regard to the relations between the executives and national
governments, either directly or indirectly through the intermediary
of the Councils, mutual consultation in all cases, has significantly
affected the independent decisionmaking of the executives.
In the first place, members of the executives maintain elose contacts
with national governments and especially with the government of their
"own" State. In EEC, for example, members of the Commission are
reported to visit regularly or weekly the capitals of their "own" States.
Frequent discussions with national governments precede the taking of
initiatives by the executives. As a consequence, national viewpoints
can be compared within the framework of the executives in an early
stage of policy-formulation. I t is significant in the light of this situation
that e.g. the mandate of the President of the Euratom Commission shall
not be renewed, owing to his independence from the French Govern-
ment.
Secondly, the executives associate national governments with the
drafting of decisions or proposals throughout the whole process of
preparation, even in cases in which an "avis conforme" of the ECSC
Council or a unanimous decision of the Councils of EEC and Euratom
is not required. 1 The executives either consult regularly the Council
(e.g. the drafting of an agreement associating Greece to the Common
Market), or they invite the Committee of Permanent Representatives to
examine the principles of a policy to be elaborated (e.g. concerning
the establishment of joint enterprises in EAEC) , or they associate
experts from national governments to the preparatory work (e.g. the
1 Concerning ECSC, see Lagrange, "L'ordre juridique de la CECA vu 11 travers la juris-

prudence de sa Cour de J ustice." Revue du droit public ct de la science politique en France ct a
l'etrangcr. I958, pI 84I-865 ; Haas, The Uniting 01 Europc. London, Stevens and Sons Ltd.
I958 (Library of World Affairs). Concerning EEC, see Alting von Geusau, European Organi-
zations and Foreign Relations 01 States. Leyde, Sijthoff. I962 (Thesis). Concerning EAEC, see
Quatrieme Rapport General dc la Commission.
LAWAND POLITIeS 75
Consultative Transport Committee during the preparation of a regu-
lation in e;xecution of artic1e 79 (3) of the EEC Treaty).
Although these practices substantially weaken the independent role
of the executives, this evolution must be considered to be a logical
result of the fact that national governments still are predominantly
responsible for the implementation of measures taken by the Com-
munities. This latter fact also explains the tendency in the Councils to
prefer the negotiation of a compromise (in all cases) above the taking
of decisions by the majorities provided for in the treaties.
The above evolution has also changed the character of parliamentary
control in the Communities. The elose association of the executives
with the Councils is bound to diminish the effect of parliamentary
supervision over the activities of the executives. In several cases, the
European Parliamentary Assembly can hardly but acquiesce in the
failure to take certain measures (e.g. the failure to take adequate
measures to meet the coal crisis), or accept the results of a laboriously
reached compromise (e.g. the decision to accelerate the execution of
the EEC Treaty). The Assembly, however, disposes of two means to
secure a certain influence on the functioning of the Communities: I. It
can give its general support to the initiatives of the executives; 2. it
can exercise indirect control through national parliaments. As to the
first, the Commission asked and the Assembly gave its support on
severaloccasions (e.g. the transformation of the convention concerning
the social security of migrant workers into a regulation pursuant to
artic1e 51 of the EEC Treaty). As to the second, indirect control has not
been applied with any consistency in national parliaments with the
exception of the Dutch Parliament. Instead, the Assembly has at-
tempted to supervise the activities of the Councils. Notwithstanding
the acceptance, however, of techniques of parliamentary control (the
reading of statements by the chairmen of the Councils in the Assembly,
the right of the Assembly to address resolutions to the Councils, the
right of the Assembly and its members to ask questions to the Counci1s),
these techniques cannot conceal the absence of any effective super-
vision over the activities of the Councils. 1
1 The statements of the Councils are vague, and replies to questions are evasive. An exam-
pIe may illustrate this point: During the debate following the statement by Minister Wiguy
in name of the Council, Mr. Pleven asked the Council: "Nous aurions voulu savoir, par
exemple, si les achats de petrole sovietique par l'Italie entrent dans la coordination des
politiques etrangeres ou dans une politique energetique commune, dont aucune mention n'a
ete faite dans la declaration collegiale." Minister Wigny replied: "M. Pleven a parle de
I'importation du petrole russe et .... , d'autres ont evoque la coordination des politiques
Cooperation stressed
The examples given suggest that inter-governmental cooperation
remains crucial for the functioning of the three Communities. Practice,
so far, has amply confirmed tbis fact.
In an increasing number of cases are the permanent missions charged
with the preparation and elaboration of Council decisions; inter-
governmental advisory committees are set up to "advice" the execu-
tives during the drafting of their proposals and decisions. Matters on
which the Councils cannot reach agreement, are invariably referred
back to these bodies. The overloaded agendas of the Council meetings,
moreover, have induced the Councils to enlarge the preparatory
functions of the permanent missions. Since the task of these bodies -
which cannot be considered to be Councils in permanent session -
is to "compare" national viewpoints, decisions can be taken by them in
common agreement only. The strengthening of the powers of these
bodies thus confirms the tendency in the Councils to prefer the taking
of decisions by common agreement. Although both the Assembly and
the executives have opposed tbis development in Community decision-
making, it clearly results from the unequal transfer of power and
responsibility to the organs of the Communities, and, subsequently,
from the absence of effective redoubling of control in national parlia-
ments.
Inter-governmental cooperation, however, is deve10ping further
beyond the extent envisaged by the treaties. In some cases, it has
developed in defiance of the provisions of these treaties (e.g. the
procedures employed to draft adecision in application of article 44 of
the EEC Treaty, the signature by the Community and member States
of the agreement associating Greece to the Common Market, the
procedures employed to prepare the establishment of a European
University).
Furthermore, the attempt to substitute inter-governmental cooper-
ation for institutional decision-making, has found general expression in
the proposals introduced to organize closer political cooperation among
governments of member States. 1 Political cooperation - i.e. inter-
governmental cooperation - is designed to deal with any matter of
energetiques. Tous ont eu raison de rappeIer cette necessite. Mais, Messieurs, rappelez-vous
l'importance de notre prochaine täche. J'en terminerai par la." (Assemblee Parlementaire
Europeenne, Deöats. 17 janvier 196I, Edition provisoire. p. 178I, 18oz).
1 See 1959 Communique, and the proposals subsequently introduced by the French
Government, discussed by the Heads of State or government (February and july 196I) and
in the Commission-Fouchet.
LAW AND POLITICS 77
"political" significance, whether going beyond or falling within the
scope of the activities of the Communities.
Balance shifted
Politics in the European Communities have shifted the uncertain
balance in the law of the treaties to a new one in which inter-govern-
mental cooperation has become the main point in Community decision-
making. Coordination is upheld, or even strengthened in some cases,
by the fact that the initiative to take measures is predominantly
springing from the executives. It is upheld to a lesser degree by the
fact that the Assembly is not withholding from the executives its
general support.
With regard to the effect of decisions taken, practice suggests so far
that the balance has shifted to a smaller extent than is the case in
respect of decision-making. Several shifts, nevertheless, have also
occurred (e.g. the signature of the agreement associating Greece to the
Common Market, the decision to accelerate the execution of the EEC
Treaty, the modified decisions taken by the High Authority to meet the
coal crisis).
This divergence between the decision-making balance and that in the
effect of decisions, underlines the unequal transfer of power and re-
sponsibility and leads, in our opinion, to a derangement of power and
responsibility at the national as well as at the European level. National
parliaments see their powers diminished in favour of inter-govern-
mental bodies instead of executives duly supervised by a European
Parliamentary Assembly.
LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INTEGRATION
Actual political forces still largely determine - though to a lesser

degree than in general 'international society - relations between
member States of the European Communities. Consequently, European
law - as general internationallaw 1 - is bound to be c10sely connected
with the existing social substructure. The independence of the law
from the relations it has to regulate, cannot yet exist to the extent
it does within States.
La tentation (therefore) du formalisme, le penchant a la generalisation par
1 Huber, Die soziologische G1-undlagen des Völkerrechts. In: Gesammellte Aufsätze, Band
III. Zürich, Atlantis Verlag. 1947-.
concepts abstraits et a une systematisation prematuree representent l'un des

plus serieux dangers auxquels reste exposee la doctrine du droit international. 1
The doctrine of European law is exposed to the same danger.

L'ecueil de cette orientation juridique se trouve dans les facilites qu'elle ouvre
a la planification formelle.Le projet de Communaute politique europeenne fut
un exemple de ces architectures nees de l'esprit speculatif. Les minuties d'une
technique federale y formaient un singulier contraste avec l'incerlitude qui
subsistait au sujet des competences et des attributions des autorites suprana-
nationales. 2
This same orientation - aIthough more adjusted to the social

substructure - can be found in the treaties instituting the three
Communities. Practice, so far, has drawn the limits within which
federal techniques, in the absence of a c1ear attribution of power and
responsibility to the organs of the Communities, can be applied.
Practice, however, has also revealed that law and politics converge in
the necessity of an economic order in Europe. Among the organs of the
Communities, the European Court is especially qualified to apply the
law in concrete circumstances.
La necessite de l'ordre est ainsi le point de coincidence Oll la politique et la
justice peuvent se rencontrer et se completer mutuellement.
The wide competences of the European Court en;, ble this body to
develop such a "converging" law, contributing in this way to a "juste
rapport entre les donnees sociales et les normes destinees ales regir." 4
The basis upon which the Court can effectively develop the law, lies
in the fact that the principle of nemo iudex in re sua and that of res
fudicata are accepted by member States to an unprecedented extent,
thus giving a wide competence to the Court for settling disputes that
may arise between organs of the Communities, and between these
organs and member States. Moreover, the right of enterprises and
associations in ECSC and of natural and legal persons in EEC and
Euratom to lodge an appeal against decisions taken, 5 is an important
factor in depolitizing existing conflicts, and thus in developing the
law of the Communities. 6 Finally, articles 177 of the EEC Treaty, ISO
1 de Visscher Charles, TMories et Realittfs en Droit International Public. Paris, Editions A.

Pedone. X955. (Deuxierne Edition). p. X76.
2 Ibid. p. X38, note (x).
3 Leibholz, "Le But du Droit." Annuaire de l'Institut international de philosophie du droit.
Torne III, p. 86.
4 de Visscher, ibid. p. X76.
5 ECSC Treaty, article 33; EEC Treaty, article x73; EAEC Treaty, article 146.
6 See for instance: Affaires jointes nos. 24-58 et 34-58 (Charnbre syndicale de la siderurgie
de l'est de la France et autres contre la Haute Autorite de la C.E.C.A.). Cour de Justice des
LAW AND POLITICS 79
of the EAEC Treaty and 41 of the ECSC Treaty enable the Court to
make preliminary decisions concerning the Iaw of the Communities,
on arequest by domestic courts. 1
The wide competences of the Court, following from the unprece-
dented acceptance of the two principies mentioned above, enable the
Court to contribute substantially to the development of the Iaw of the
Communities. Through such development, the administration of
justice converges with the "politique" in the attempt to create an
economic order. It completes the interplay of political forces by
balancing the social substructure with the legal rules envisaged to
regulate it.
In so developing the law, law can be an instrument of integration
in the European Communities.
Communautes Europeennes, Recueil de la ]ul'ispl'udence de la COUI'. Vol. VI, Deux ieme partie.
I960. p. 573ff. Instead of a Franco-German dispute the question was treated as a dispute
between enterprises and the High Authority,.
1 Mention should also be made of the advisory opinions the Court has given concerning
article 95 (3-4) of the ECSC Treaty. See Cour de Justice, ibid. Vol. V p. 533ft. and Vol. VI,
Premiere partie. p. 93ff.
DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
by
HUGH BEESLEY
Whatever the ultimate future of the European Communities, two

important developments can be predicted with confidence for the
relatively near future: the fusion of the Executives, and the election by
direct suffrage of the European Parliament. The former will almost
certainly precede the latter, which may indeed not take place for
another five or six years. The author would personally hope for
another major development: the entry into the Community of several
more Council of Europe States, 1 and the possibilities this would offer
for a re-grouping of the European institutions, on the basis of an
extended Community. This event - the geographical extension of
the Community - is, as will be seen further on, of relevance to the
subject of this paper: the problems arising from the organisation of
elections to the European Parliament, given more especially the
limited competence, and yet more limited powers, which this Parlia-
ment possesses, and will possess for some time to come.
The Case tor Direct Elections

The reasons militating in favour of the organisation of direct
elections to the European Parliament are various and powerful.
In the first place, "building Europe" has to date been the job of an
astonishingly small number of individuals, working, for the most part,
out of the public eye. A few members of Governments, aided by a
limited number of national civil servants; a few parliamentarians
working in the European Assemblies or in their own Parliaments; a
few international civil servants in Brussels, Luxembourg and Stras-
bourg: at the most 5.000 people have been directly associated with a
movement that is going to affect profoundly the lives of 300 million.
True, as an effectively integrated Europe has begun to take shape,
1 These lines were written in May 1961. Since that time the decision of three countries to
seek membership of the European Community has of course increased my grounds for hope.
DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 81
more and more categories of persons - businessmen, lawyers, trades

unionists, teachers and a dozen more - have commenced to take those
practieal steps by which they will seeure power and influence at the
new, transnationallevel. In doing so, they have laid the basis and begun
to secure the operation, at least within the Six countries, of an embry-
onie European society at least as effectively as any number of diplo-
matie instruments. And, as we shall see, it may be argued that it is this
configuration of interests which in practiee provides, in a highly
technical, highly organised megasociety, that element of representation
and control of which, it is claimed, Parliament is increasingly a mere
shadowy form.
Nonetheless there is something profoundly shocking in the spectacle
of the overtly technocratic structure of presentday United Europe (the
technocrats would themselves be the first to assert it!). The European
Commissions in Brussels, the High Authority in Luxembourg are
theoretieally responsible to the European Parliamentary Assembly,
composed of persons who were not elected to fulfil this function. In fact
they are obliged to pay heed, except on rare occasions, only to the
Council of Ministers. The latter is responsible to no-one. If called to
account in his own Parliament a member of the Council may, quite
justifiably, take refuge in diplomatie secrecy, or the "European
interest" or, most simply of all, in a majority vote that went against
him.
Thus it may be said, without denigrating the work of the European
Parliamentary Assembly which has on the whole behaved with a high
seriousness and a deep sense of responsibility, that there is hardly any
real democratic control in the European institutions of today. And yet,
more and more, the decisions that affect the standard of living, the
comfort, perhaps the peace of Europeans, are taken outside the centres
where sit the "representatives of the people." L'Europe unie sera
democratique, ou elle ne sera pas. It may be argued that Parliaments are
no more than sounding-boxes or rubber stamps, that elections are
shams devoid of real signifieance, that "parliamentary democracy"
was suited to the 19th century rather than to the 20th. But to neglect
the "forms" of democracy - if forms they be - is nonetheless hazardous
in the extreme, given that to most persons these forms represent the
reality and their sole chance to participate in the choiee of their rulers.
The stresses and strains that will surely develop in the European
Community may weIl become unmanageable without the safety-valve
HUGH BEESLEY
of a democratically elected Parliament, whose members are necessarily

sensitive to their electors' discontents.
The second reason in favour of an elected Parliament may seem in
contradiction to the first. In reality it is its corol1ary. The peoples of
Europe are, though vaguely benevolent to the European idea, ignorant
of its implications and on the whole very little interested therein. 1
There is not, and has never been, a "grass roots" movement in favour
of European unity; throughout it has been the affair of a few thousand
militants. This is a highly insecure basis for an effectively unified
continent, whose component parts may one day be called upon to
make sacrifices one for another; unless at such times there is a deep-
rooted recognition of a "community of destiny" Europe could disag-
gregate more rapidly than it has coalesced. A certain amount can and
must be done through a vast campaign of education and information.
But the holding of direct elections to a European Parliament is by far
and away the best method of stimulating public interest and public
awareness in the process of European unification. By this means the
Frenchman, Britisher or Belgian will be brought to appreciate
something of the immensity of what is now happening, of what is
happening to him; by this means he can influence the process, in
however small a measure.
Only direct elections can produce what Fernand Dehousse has well
called the necessary choc salutaire. 2 They alone can lead to the for-
mation of political parties organised at European level, elected for
their ability to cope with problems at the only level where solutions
may be found, responsible to electors from many different States. They
alone can generalise and make comprehensible - the subject of faiths
and of passions - what are now the arcana of a largely self-chosen few.
Finally, direct elections should certainly increase the authority,
perhaps the powers, of the European Parliament. The authors of tbe
draft Convention approved by the European Parliamentary Assembly
(see below) wisely did not make an increase in powers a necessary
condition for the holding of direct elections, mainly on the realistic
grounds that, given the great difficulties of obtaining the consent of the
Governments to such elections, there was little point in reducing the
chances further by insisting simultaneously on the grant of substantial
legislative powers for the elected. Nonetheless (as the Governments will
be the first to realise) an elected Parliament will be in a strong position
1 See below.
2 In his report to the European Parliamentary Assembly (pag. 24).
to make its views feIt, whatever its prerogatives on paper. The Execu-
tives already listen attentively to the warnings and counsel of the
E.P.A. ; they will redouble their attention when its members have been
elected specifically to control them. And the Council of Ministers?
Here there is a neat dilemma. The "good Europeans" urge that the
Assembly's powers of control should extend to this organ also. But,
leaving aside the redoubtable constitutional complications of a system
under which the same Ministers can be forced to resign by two different
bodies of elected parliamentarians, do they realise that in effect they
are arguing in favour of a unitary state rather than of what would
seem, as most, possible and desirable in Europe today, namely a
federation? 1 Surely the aim must be two bodies with co-ordinate
responsibilities and powers, an Upper and a Lower House, with the
former representing the interests of the national States in the same
way as does the present Council of Ministers. It remains certain that
the European Parliament will not attain to anything near equal status
with the Council unless it can rest on the firm foundation of direct
elections. Even then, doubtless, it will take time to achieve this status.
But unless its members are elected it will remain forever in essence a
consultative body, having powers to express its discontent with the
administration rather than the Government, and reflecting only at
second hand the desires, fears and troubles of those from whom,
theoretically, power still springs. This third argument rejoins the first.
If "Europe" is not to be dictated from above but is to mirror the often
inarticulate aspirations of those who have paid in their flesh the price
of half a century of nationalism-run-mad, then the people must
participate in its construction, and their part must be areal one. Those
they elect must have the power to bring their wishes to fruition.
Slowly perhaps, the elected will achieve this power, because in the last
resort their credentials will be better than those of the Executives they
seek to control.
The case against Direct Elections: (a) theoretical

At The Hague it was urged strongly by the political scientists, in
opposition to the politicians and the international civil servants, that
posed in these terms the problem was unreal. Echoing and going
beyond Burnham they argued that the nominal power-structure in the
Western "democracies" bore little if any relation to the facts of life
within a highly industrialised "'managerial society." The forms of
1 But on this point see U. Kitzinger, The Challenge 01 the Common Market, pp. 48 et seq.
HUGH BEESLEY
democracy elected parliament, source of all power; Government,

aided by an obedient administration, and responsible to Parliament;
independent judiciary - existed, to be sure. The reality however was
an oligarchy dependent upon experts and subject to no possible
control; for control would demand a degree of expertise possessed by
very few parliamentarians. Indeed the primary purpose of the latter
had become, ineluctably, to elect a government and so to identify its
fate with the administration's that, despite occasional grumbles, the
majority party would so far forget its task of control as to sanction,
almost blindly, whatever action was proposed by the Government.
Applied at European level this doctrine amounted to denying that
the question of direct elections was in any way relevant to the future
of a united Europe. As one participant put it: "National Parliaments
have very little importance. Why should a European Parliament fulfil
any more glorious role? And if so, what possible importance has the
fact that its members are, or are not, directly elected? What matters is
that those who really ron society - the various organised interested
groups - should be able to influence executive decisions."
It may be admitted at once that what Burnham wrote twenty years
ago is the more valid in Europe today 1: -
lt is no news to anyone to point out that during the generation since the first
world war sovereignty has been slipping away from Parliaments. No develop-
ment of this period is more obvious and indisputable; yet, for some reason, it has
received far less attention than its unquestionable major importance deserves
.... Though in re cent decades hundreds of books and articles have been written
on the history of how Parliaments won sovereignty, there is scarcely a handful of
serious studies of how, today, Parliaments are losing it, or of the implications of
the loss.
In four of the major nations of the modern world (Germany, Russia, ltaly,
France) sovereignty has already altogether departed from Parliament; in two
(Japan and England) Parliament retains a small shred; and even in the last
refuge, the United States, parliamentary (Congressional plus Supreme Court)
sovereignty is more than halfway into its grave ....
In the new form of society sovereignty is localised in administrative bureaux.
They proclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees. The shift from Parlia-
ment to the bureaux occurs on a world scale. Viewed on a world scale the battle
is already over. The localisation of sovereignty in Parliament is ended ....
There is no mystery in this shift. It can be correlated easily enough with the
change in the character of the State's activities. Parliament was the sovereign
body 01 the limited state 01 capitalism ....
C. P. Snow, in his recent Science and Government, has also warned
eloquently against the dangers of assuming that, because the States of
Western Europe are formal democracies, real power springs from the
1 J. Burnham, The Managerial Society. PeJican Books, 1945, pp. 123 et seq.
people and is held by their representatives. After commenting that
"the cardinal choices have to be made by a handful of men, in secret,"
he continues:
I know that we can draw diagrams of political responsibility which are able to
make us feel that everything can be reconciled with the principles of parlia-
mentary Govemment. But if we do, we shall not even begin to understand what
is really happening. We shall fool ourselves, as we do too often, with that
particular brand of complacency, of lack of gravity, which is one of the liabilities
of the West .... The first thing, it seems to me, is to try to understand what
really happens. We must leam to think without making use of the patterns or
models taken for granted by most of the textbooks. It is harder than it sounds.
Now, though we may point to the re-establishment of parliamentary

democracy in Italy and West Germany at the expense of authOlitarian
government, Burnham's analysis c1early remains, by and large, true;
events since the war have indeed powerfully reinforced its truth. A
substantial majority of the world is now under "rule by executives,"
whether in the Communist countries or in the underdeveloped lands.
The Parliaments in these countries serve, if at all, only to give the
stamp of legitimacy to executive decisions; whatever the theoretical
situation, power in such communities resides elsewhere than in Parlia-
ment. In the United Kingdom a Member of Parliament is one who has
"just enough strength to walk to the division lobbies, and just enough
sense to choose the right one." And so on.
The relevance of these considerations to the organisation ofdirect
elections to the European Parliament is dual. First, if the European
Parliament, even one on which paper powers have been bestowed, is in
fact merely the democratic gilt on a functional facade, is it worth the
considerable trouble and expense of organising the election of its
members? May we not even, following Snow, be blindly blinding the
peoples of Europe as to the realities of Government in mid-20th
century Europe? Second, if we concede that within our individual
nation states the growth of "administrative bureaux" and the dec1ine
of Parliament are facts, can we make the apparently reasonable
assumption that, in the very nature of things, this trend will continue;
that it will not be affected, much less reversed, even momentarily, as
the administrative bureaux and the Parliament shift their operations
to European level; and that it may even be accelerated as the unit of
government becomes larger?
The answer to the first question is, in my view, undoubtedly 'Yes.'
We have seen that direct elections are the best, perhaps the only way of
stimulating mass interest and participation in European unification
86 HUGH BEESLEY
(just as it is, to adduce an argument probably more sympathetic to the

politica1 scientists, the best and perhaps the only way of securing
the organisation at a genuinely European level of those "organised
interests," the political parties). But is it necessary or useful to promote
this interest and participation? Again, 'Yes.' The first reason for this is,
quite simply, that the people, as they come to realise that the locus of
power has shifted from national to European institutions, will demand
some, possibly nominal, say in the control of that power. Given the
already existing propensity to grumble at the "bureaucrats in Brussels"
and the very real possibility of orators and newspaper-owners of the
Right and of the Left fomenting this vague distrust and dislike into
much more explosive sentiments in, for instance, a time of economic
crisis, there is a strong case for educating people both to know when to
"blame Brussels" (as distinct from blaming their own Governments, or
some quite other sources of power; at the moment of course poor
Brussels is, necessarily, almost entirely blameless) and for providing
them with a democratic "form" which they can use in the hope of
obtaining redress. This largely defensive argument reduces itself in
fact to: "Do this; you may have trouble if you do not." So long as the
electorate, and Parliament, and perhaps the Government have not
firmly subscribed to the - doubtless true - version of political realities
presented by Sir Charles Snow, it would seem perilous merely to ignore
the version in which they still happen to believe.
But the argument has a stronger and more positive side. Despite the
increase in the coercive powers of the State and in its readiness to use
them, contended and efficient societies rest on the consent and loyalty
of the governed. But what in the world is there capable of calling up
loyalty - or even consent at periods of sacrifice - in the European
Communities? The European Commissions ? The Special Council of
Ministers? The European Parliamentary Assembly? At a study-
meeting on the subject of direct elections, held in Belgium in April
1960,1 an international trade unionist, M. Buiter, put it forcibly:
Au lieu d'avoir un Gouvernement europeen contröle par un parlement, nous
avons affaire a une technocratie europeenne qui soumet chaque annee un rapport
a une reunion seIectionnee d'actionnaires.
It will certainly be no easy task to make of the institutions of the
Community a possible focus of loyalty. But the risks of having no such
1 Les Elections europeennes au suffrage universei direct, p. 146. Published by Les
Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Brussels 1960. The work constitutes one of the
most useful and wide-ranging introductions to the whole subject.
focus are enormous. And none will be created unless those required to
give their loyalty and consent participate directly in the formation of
one of the 'Community organs. The European flag, a European Uni-
versity, a European satellite, goods trains marked "Europe" - a11 these
will help in the gradual growth of a European patriotism. But a sense
of personal interest in and personal responsibility for the Community's
legislators is of infinitely greater importance. The number of action-
naires in the European enterprise must be vastly increased - or at least
the number of those entitled to discuss and take decisions through
proxies.
The answer to the second question - will the shift towards executive
government and the decline of Parliament necessarily continue in
Western Europe - must be more cautious. I would suggest that, though
there is most likely a long-term trend in this direction (a world of
"managerial societies," or perhaps a"managerial world," seems a11 too
probable), the short term may offer some surprises.
One of the reasons why the lot of the Member of anational Parliament
in Europe "is not a happy one" is precisely that a large and increasing
proportion of the problems with which he is called upon to deal cannot,
of necessity, be solved within the national framework. This is in fact
probably already true of most of the major problems; it applies, for
instance, to defence, to full or un-employment, to trading patterns and
the level of monetary reserves. In a11 these matters no single European
country (certainly not if it wishes to remain an "open society") can
decide, alone, the measures which will bring about the desired result.
It follows that, whether or not there has been a formal commitment to
accept the consequences of a majority vote in an international organi-
sation. Ministers are not free to take effective unilateral decisions, and a
fortiori national parliamentarians cannot in any real sense call them to
account. Doubtless this is true also of larger and more important
countries than the European. The United States is probably already no
longer free to take genuinely unilateral decisions in the field of eco-
nomic policy (the OECD may offer supporting evidence for this view).
In Europe, certainly, no Government has true freedom of action;
the advice and consent of Parliament loses its meaning correspondingly.
N ow there seems a chance that in a United Europe the Executive will
recapture some of its former powers, and the Parliament its former
powers of initiative, effective criticism and a control. It is very much
to be hoped that the European Community will be, in the British
phrase, "outwa,rd-Iooking" - in, other words, tb,a,t it wiU rea,lise ib~
88 HUGH BEESLEY
world-responsibilities and permit itself to be influenced by the interests

of the developing countries, the Commonwealth, the United States and
indeed all the world. Yet it is true that in some very important fields
the Community will be able to take decisions - and to make them
stick - to a degree which is quite impossible for even the greatest
European state. Thereby the possibility is opened up of meaningful
European parliamentary contro!.
The likelihood of such control is increased by a fact already mentioned,
namely that the powers of the Assembly will probably increase pari
passu with those of the non-Ministerial executive. Theoretically the
Assembly is the "enemy" of the Commission; democracy ranged against
technocracy; the watchdog baying at the leash. In practice the two
are natural allies. Each will work to increase the power of the other, and
at least in the short run the attempt seems likely to succeed. As and
when the Council of Ministers assurnes a different role and a true federal
function, the relationship between Strasbourg and Brussels may
change. 1 But at the moment each needs the other, appreciates the
other, and the result can only be an enlarged measure of effective
control on the part of the European Parliament.
Finally, the European Parliament will be technically weIl organised
to assurne its controlling functions. Already the EPA has - following
the Continental model, not the British - a system of inter-Party
committees, each specialising in one aspect of the Community's work
and thus capable of bringing informed and expert criticism to bear
upon it. 2 Already parliamentarians work harmoniously with civil
servants; no fearful consequences appear to have flowed from the
practice. It may e'ven be that the European Parliament will employ,
apart from the usual retinue of parliamentary clerks and procedural
advisers, its own staff of experts, putting it in a position to riposte to
the executive on terms more equal than those on which most national
parliaments find themselves vis-a-vis their Governments.
All in all, a directly-elected European Parliament may offer the
surprising spectacle of at least a temporary setback to the managerial
trend.
1 In view of current susceptibilities on this matter, I would point out that this is not
a disguised plea for the status quo in respect of the seat of European institutions. I believe
that, on the contrary, sooner or later the executive and the Assembly will have to be brought
together in the one place.
S Professor Beloff's New Dimensions in Foreign Poliey, a book noticeably anxious to
eschew judgments, nonetheless implies one when he points out that, whereas the proposals of
the European Assemblies regularly go to the foreign affairs committees of Continental
Parliaments, in Britain "there is no appropriate recipient for them."
The case against them: (b) practical

There exists already a blueprint for elections to the European
Parliament, in the form of a draft Convention drawn up by the Euro-
pean Parliamentary Assembly in conformity with Artic1e 138 of the
E.E.C. Treaty (and of parallel provisions in the ECSC and Euratom
Treaties) and adopted by it on 17th May 1960. This Convention
provides inter alia for a two-stage advance to a fuHy elected Parliament.
During the first stage, one-third of the Parliament's members will
continue to be appointed by national Parliaments; the proportion of
Deputies with a national mandate who are also members of the Euro-
pean Parliament may in fact - and, one may hazard, will - be con-
siderably higher, since during the transitional period it is suggested
that there be no incompatibility between the two mandates.
This provision should largely obviate what has been represented 1
as a possibly serious disadvantage of an elected European Parliament,
namely the lack of links between it and the national Parliaments,
precisely at a time when the supports 01 the latter (or at the very least, the
absence of hostility and jealousy) will be essential.
There remains, howe'Ver, a number of other practical difficulties. To
dweIl on them is not to deny the necessity of direct elections. Rather
is it that these difficulties are real, merit sober consideration, and must
be met if the elections are to succeed in their immediate and long-term
objecti'Ves. Seemingly among the most fundamenta1 is the objection of
principle raised by Salvador de Madariaga 2 in his artic1e, "Critique de
l'Europe":
L'Assemblee elue au suffrage universei presuppose une nation. L'Europe n'est
et ne sera jamais une nation. Elle est une grappe de nations. Son Assemblee doit
donc etre elue par Ies parlements nationaux.
In tmth, this is less a difficulty to be met than an argument to be

rebutted.
The size of constituencies may give rise to more real problems. The
working party presided over by Mr. Dehousse, and whose suggestions
were very largely incorporatedinto the draft Convention approved by
the EPA, proposed a system whereby there will be on the average
400,000 voters for each representative; in the larger countries the
figure rises to over six, or even (in the case of West Germany) seven
1 On this point see K. Lindsay in Towa,ds a Eu,opean Pa,liamenl and Eu,opean

Assemblies and W. Birke, EUl'opean Elections by Di,ect Suttl'age.
8 Printed in the Eu,opean Yeal'book, Vol. V.
90 HUGH BEESLEY
hundred thousand. The number of representatives cannot be increased;

a Parliament of 426 members from six countries may be thought a
maximum, having regard to the probability that in the future more
countries will send representatives. 1 Thus there is certainly a risk that
contact between a "European Deputy" and his electors will be in-
frequent and slight. It should be remembered however that a similar
situation already prevails in the United States (where there are more
than 300,000 electors for each member of the House of Representa-
tives) and that it does not apparently give rise to difficulties there.
Modern means of mass communication enable the representative to
show himself and make himself known to even a large electorate, while
(given adequate secretarial and other facilities) he should find time
enough to devote himself to the concerns of his constituents arising
out of the initially rather limited activities of the administration which
he has been elected to control.
Be it noted in passing that large constituencies will help to overcome
the danger mentioned by Haas, 2 that local pressure groups opposed
to integration will exert their influence in direct elections to return
deputies with national(ist) views. It may indeed weIl be that a directly
elected Parliament will be less European-minded than the present
EP A (particularly if it contains Communists, now excluded, and mem-
ber of extreme Right Wing parties), but no good democrat could
complain if this were so.
The lack of a genuine Europe-wide party system is also a drawback.
The Sodalists have perhaps gone some way towards formulating, and
attempting to implement in their respecti've countries, a "European
party line"; it seems likely that they will obtain real agreement on a
fairly detailed platform, at least by the time that the first direct
elections are imminent. The Christian-Democrats, Sodal Christians,
etc. might also reach agreement on an electoral programme. The task
of the Liberals will be, it may be thought, less easy. However, alt the
parties are as yet far removed from having evolved, at European level,
the clear-cut policies and effective organisational structures that are
found at national level. The possibility exists, of course, that the
present Christian Democrat - Socialist - Liberal (and, in certain
1 "Broadly, I should argue that no legislature ought to exceed five hundred members, if
it is to perform its function efficiently" - Harold Laski, Grammar 01 Politics (4th edition,
1941, page 344). The House of Commons does not meet this requirement and is con-
demned accordingly.
2 See The Uniting 01 Europe, page 439.
DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 9I
countries, Communist) cleavage will be found inappropriate when
transferred to a European Parliament: deputies may differ on points
quite other than those that now divide them. The fact remains that the
first elections, at least, will be fought by the traditional parties - not
least because they alone will be able to finance the participation of
candidates on a large scale.
Financing the elections will give rise to several problems. The
Socialists have already expressed misgivings lest the funds at their
disposal to fight the elections will be smaller than those available to
their rivals : their attempts to amend the Convention so as to limit
electoral expenditure by the parties were unsuccessful (at elections
held during the first stage, nationallegislation will govern expendi-
ture). The Socialist case in this matter commands some sympathy. It
comes up, however, against two practical arguments: to control
expenditure in the European elections will be far from easy; to limit
such expenditure at all may be undesirable! - so great will be the need
to inform, to educate and (why not?) to "propagandize" the electorate.
Apart from the question of raising the money, there is that of
allotting it. Political parties, which have to fight elections at local,
regional and national levels, will have an awkward choice to make
when deciding what proportion of available funds to allocate to
expenditure on a European electoral campaign.
To conclude this brief survey of the difficulties attending the first
direct election, mention may be made of the danger of a deliberate
abstention campaign. In Birke's words 1:
Till now the adversaries of European unification have mainly fought the idea by
ignoring it. In a direct election this silent choir will be noticeable by the number
of abstentions.
An interesting suggestion, designed to take care of the very real

difficulty that participation in the European elections may be em-
barrassingly, perhaps disastrously low, is that these elections should be
coupled with national. 2 The voter going to the polls would be pre-
sented with a list containing, firstly, the names of candidates for the
national Parliament, secondly those of would-be "MPs for Europe"
(who might or might not be the same people). It is advanced, plausibly
enough, that in these circumstances the voter, who might wen not have
1 op. cit., p. 25.
a As for instance in some countries (Austria) national elections are coupled with some
provincial elections.
92 HUGH BEESLEY
bestirred himself to participate in European elections, would at least

take the trouble of putting a second cross on his voting-paper. And if
this procedure tends somewhat to relegate the choice of a member of
the European Parliament to a matter of secondary importance, riding
on the coat-tails of elections to the National Assembly, does not this
in truth reflect the relative status of the two choices?
Without arguing the point in detail it should be pointed out that this
proposal runs directly counter to that proposed by the EPA which,
while in no way denying (in fact insisting upon) the importance of the
links between national and European parliamentarians, yet wishes to
separate national from European elections precisely in order to confer
a special solemnity upon the latter. The significance of holding Euro-
pean elections upon the same day in all the participating countries is
obvious. Perhaps more weighty is the consideration that existing
national parties (which, it has been pointed out, will bear the brunt of
organising and financing European elections, at least until new
constellations appear in the European political firmament) will
inevitably devote more time and money, and attach greater im-
portance, to the struggle for power at national level than to that of
securing votes for their future representation to the European Parlia-
ment, if these related but different battles reach their c1imax at one and
the same time.
On the whole, one's view of these opposing theses derives in the last
analysis from an imponderable: What percentage of the electorate will
bother to "vote European"? If three-quarters of the electorate go to
theurns, thearrangement suggested by the EPA seem c1earlysuperior.
If the figure, as suggested by the pessimists, is nearer to 25%, then
there is an undeniable danger that the elections will have proved a
farce and that the position and prestige of those elected will be less
than that they now possess as delegates of national Parliaments.
Finally, a quite particular difficulty arises from the fact that what is
in question is the first election. Psephologists are agreed that many
voters (insofar as they do not vote for one or another party from sheer
habit) express less confidence in the parties' precepts and promises for
the future than satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the Government's
re cord over the preceding years. The European Parliament will not
form a Government, nor - insofar as that "Government" is made up of
Councils of Ministers - will it control it. Thus the elector's task will
already be subtly different from that of anational elector. Add to this
that in the first election he cannot cast his vote essentially for or
against the maintenance of the status quo ante .. .. for in this context
there is no status quo!
The Present State of Public.Opinion

The electorate to which candidates for election to the European
Parliament will have to address themselves, has virtually no knowledge
of the process and progress of European unification. 1 A high per-
centage of persons will answer YES to the single and general (and
probably meaningless) question: "Are you in favour of a United Eu-
rope." The experience ofall observers is, however, that both goodwill
and knowledge diminish sharply as soon as questions are put designed
to test attitudes towards and awareness of specific issues of European
integration. It is exc1usively the degree of knowledge that concems us
here. Some recent examples, chosen from many:
A poIl conducted by the Institut für öffentliche Meinung, Lausanne,
shortly after Switzerland had joined the EFTA, revealed that 36% of
those answering had never heard of an "economic division" in Europe,
I2% were able to name the members of the Six, 3% the members of
the Seven. 2
In May I957, 47% of those Frenchmen interviewed had never heard
of the Euratom project. Among the 53% that asserted they had heard
of it, only 35% knew that France was a participant. 3 A polI held nine
months later in the Federal Republic showed that 75% of West
Germans had "neither heard nor read" of the word Euratom. 4
In November I955, 56% of West Germans c1aimed to know what
NATO was, while 44% had no idea. However, more detailed questions
showed that only I2% had an exact idea of the difference between
NATO and the United Nations, a further I8% having vaguer notions. 5
In a poIl held at the same period in France, 63% of the French public
had heard of the Saar Referendum, but less than half those interviewed
knew the result of this Referendum. 6
There is nothing whatsoever surprising, or even dismaying, in the
1 The evidence for this statement is taken from public-opinion poils. Since these may be
suspect to many readers it should be pointed out that the poils quoted were designed to test
knowledge (not attitudes or opinion). In this field they are a reliable gnide - at least no-one
has invented a better.
S Result published in the Neue Züncher Zeitung, I2 May 1961.
8 Sondages, 1958, Nos. 1-2, page 170.
4 J ",h,.buch der Dlfentlichen Meinung, 1957, p. 363.
5 [dem, p. 341-
8 Sondages, p. 41.
94 HUGH BEESLEY
discovery that the European electorate is ill-informed regarding the

questions on which, probably sooner rather than later, it will be ca11ed
upon to give an opinion. Indifference to political matters is a fact in all
our countries - a fact assumed by the great majority of newspapers
owners and editors, who give to politics in their columns the part
congrue. International affairs attract less interest than national,
national less than local. The combined effect of these two factors is
dramatically shown in the recent revelation by a member of the staff
of a very well-known and "serious" newspaper which, in the period
I950-54, conducted an energetic campaign to inform the public and
influence it in favour of the E.D.C. During this period it received six
letters only on the subject (of which two from Members of Parliament) !
There is no cause for surprise. Neither Govemment, nor Parliament,
nor political parties, nor the press, nor education authorities have ever
undertaken seriously and steadfastly to educate public opinion on the
problems and progress of European unification. When at last they
undertake to do so, as they must, they will find it an uphilI task: the
matter is complex, often somewhat abstract in character, and apt to
seem far removed from the preoccupations of the man-in-the street.
The beginning of wisdom is the realisation that the "European edu-
cation" of the public is an immense and urgent problem, and that the
educators start virtually from nothing. Unfortunately there is con-
siderable evidence of a wilful, and occasionally an angry, refusal on the
part of the elites to believe that public ignorance is as great as it iso
This refusal is understandable; the parliamentarian who has laboured
conscientiously in the European Assemblies, the national civil servant
who has participated in the painstaking elaboration of a European
Treaty or Convention, his international colleague whose life and hopes
are centred in a European institution: it is hard for these to accept
that their work is so little known. Understandable also is the reaction
of the editor of a newspaper, which has always striven to keep its
readers fully informed of developments in European unification, to the
results of an enquete recently conducted in Belgium by the Council of
Europe. The enquete revealed that only 47% of those who completed
the questionnaire could name the member countries of the European
Economic Community. The newspaper's comment: "Either the poIl
was badly conducted or those who answered were making fun of the
organisers." 1
1 Quoted in the Report of the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe, European Co-
operation in I960 (Strasbourg, April 1961).
DlRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 95
But although it is easy to sympathise with this refusal to admit the
ignorance, probably the indifference of public opinion, this deliberate
eye-shutting is dangerous. The sooner the elites acknowledge frankly
that the public knows exceedingly little of what has happened in
Europe since the war, of what is happening and what is planned; the
sooner they resolve, on the basis of this realisation, to make the huge
effort required to educate those who, in a few years, will be asked to
cast their votes in European elections; the better the prospects that
these elections will live up to the hopes now placed in them.
Particular ditticulties arising trom the limited powers and competence ot

the European Parliament
One major difficulty has been touched upon already. Parliaments are
elected to form and control Governments, to carry on existing policies
or to push through alternative ones. The first directly elected European
Parliament will have no such powers. It will be able to influence - and
it is to be hoped that its powers of influence will increase considerably
once its members are elected - but its powers to legislate will be almost
non-existent, and even its powers of control will be strictly limited.
Thus the candidate for election will not be able to say: "If you elect
me, my party will do this," but mere1y: "We shall endeavour to
influence the Governments to do this." 1 It is conceivable that the
electors might decide, in the light of the very restricted powers of
"their" Deputy, that it was not worth the trouble of going to the voting
booth. It is conceivable, though less likely, that men of the highest
calibre will not be attracted to stand for election. 2
So much for the difficulties arising from the limited powers of the
European Parliament. Its limited competence (= purview) will also be a
hindrance. The matters discussed at the moment by the EPA are
certainly vital, but they have little appeal for public opinion and are
frequently highly technical: debates on agricultural policy, or cartels,
or association with overseas territories, do not hit the headlines or
indeed interest anyone at all except the specialist and those like1y to be
affected by decisions taken subsequently. Now that the Ministers have
agreed to discuss foreign policy (though not strictly "within the
framework of the Community") and the Parliament has been invited to
1 He can of course promise no more in some European countries at the moment, i.e. those
where multi-party coalitions are the rule.
2 Here the wise provision that there will be no incompatibility, at least during the tran-
sitional stage, between national and European parliamentary mandates, is of particular
importance.
96 HUGH BEESLEY
debate the same subject,l their discussions should attract greater

attention in the Press, and hence probably among the public. But
economic questions are feIt, rightly or wrongly, to be dry fare - even
occasionally by parliamentarians.
Finally, it is at the moment uncertain that the political parties will
be able to organise themselves successfully at European level and,
above all, to reach agreement on aims that separate them c1early in the
public eye. Clear-cut differences are probably essential to ensure an
animated electoral campaign and full voter participation. It may,
however, prove difficult to formulate them and here the limited
competence and powers of the European Parliament will not be
helpful. At the moment, though there are of course differences between
the parties represented in the EPA, what is striking is the similarity of
outlook between representatives. 2 They tend to be federalist in
persuasion, willing to give the High Authority or the European Com-
missions the benefit of any doubt that may arise, united in criticism of
alleged nationalism, or vacillation, or back-sliding, on the part of the
Council of Ministers. That they adopt this attitude is to be explained in
part by the weakness of their position. The (non-Ministerial) Execu-
tives are their natural allies against the defenders of the national
interests which, the Parliamentarians feel, it is at the moment no part
of their task to assert. The majority has no power of decision, and it is
nearly always considered more important to unite in favour of one or
another "European" solution than to score debating points against
member of other parties. Far from possessing an "Opposition," the
EPAis the Opposition. 3
Insofar as the EPA is in the vanguard of the movement towards
European integration, the tacit decision taken by its members as to the
most useful role which they can at this moment fuUil is almost certain-
Iy right. But it does not conduce to the formulation of Europe-wide
party policies. There is even some danger that, when it comes to
drawing up such policies for presentation at the first direct elections,
the differences stressed may be rather artificial.
1 Decision taken by the Heads of State or of Government of the Six at Bad Godesberg,
18 July 1961.
2 One is reminded of the remark that there is more in eommon between two Deputies, one
of whom is a Communist, than between the two Communists one of whom is a Deputy ....
8 A generaIisation to whieh there are eertainly exeeptions. Cf, the attitude of the Socialist
Group on several aspeets of Exeeutive poliey.
Conclusion
The first direct elections to the European Parliament will certainly
be attended by many difficulties; they will be aggravated by lack of
knowledge on the part of the electorate, as also by the limited compe-
tence and powers of the Parliament itself. As a firm believer in the
necessity of such elections, I cannot think that to indicate these
difficulties is a disservice to the cause of a united Europe. There is a
problem; it is areal one; it must not be eluded or glossed over; it must
be solved. I have not attempted to suggest a solution. At most I may
venture some lines of approach:
(I) There is a pressing need for a vast information campaign, to
complete ("to initiate" might, unfortunately, be nearer the mark) the
"European education" of the public. In this campaign, national
Governments must take the lead, aided by the European institutions -
specifically, the European Communities and the Council of Europe.
(11) Political parties must push ahead with organising themselves,
as effectively and rapidly as possible, at European level. This must
include the formulation of a clear and definite "European platform,"
which parties of the same persuasion in the various countries will
accept and be prepared to implement.
(III) The chances that the elections will centre on real issues and
will stimulate the interest and participation of the electorate will
increase in proportion as the EPA is entrusted with greater respon-
sibilities, rights and powers.
The fact that, nonetheless, the competence and powers of the
European Parliament will be severely limited poses the problem of how
best to present the eleotions to the voter. How can the latter be
persuaded of the importance of his participation, at the same time as
he is not misled as to the powers of the Parliament and of its individual
members? My tentative view is that candidates for election would be
advised to take the voters into their confidence, explaining that the
adventure is only beginning, but asking them to participate fully
from the start.
Needless to say, this is not to say that the elections should be
fought on emotional rather than on concrete issues. On the contrary,
they should concern real differences between the parties regarding
such practical points as agricultural policy, cartels, the pace of inte-
gration and so on. It has been pointed out that the establishment of
real, as opposed to fictitious, differences may be no easy matter, but
there are already some encouraging signs. Thus it would seem that at
98 DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
least the Socialists are making good progress towards the formulating
of a "platform" at European level, which is unlikely to be endorsed
totally by the Christian-Democrats and Liberals.
But issues are one thing, the candidates' approach to the electorate
another. The members of the European Parliament will have strictly
limited powers, and it would be dangerous for them to try to pretend
otherwise to the voter. How then to counteract the latter's reasonable
and probable reaction: "Why should I bother to vote?" Surely by
giving him the feeling that he is taking part in a new, exciting and
worthwhile enterprise which merits his participation from the start.
On this point all candidates can be at one, perhaps even the Commu-
nists. Thereafter their unanimity will, and should, end.
This paper has been written on the basis of the existing situation i.e.
with the Communities extending to six countries only. I have, however,
recorded my hope (and my belief) that the Communities will soon be
enlarged. The countries which, it seems, are now summoning their
courage to join the Six and to participate in its institutions, are
psychologically ill-prepared to do so. Suffice it to say that, in the
United Kingdom, neither of the major parties has thought fit to
mention its policy towards Europe in their election manifestoes ....
For these countries the preparation of public opinion with a view to
its intelligent participation in European elections will be attended by
yet more massive difficulties than those that confront the Six. A hope-
ful element is that, by undertaking this educative task, the Govern-
ments concerned will thereby carry out the difficult but necessary duty
of bridging the gap that lies between their countries and those which,
in Paris in 1951, in Rome in 1957, opened a new chapter in the story
of Europe's struggle towards unity.
LES RISQUES DE CHEVAUCHEMENTS ET
D'IMBRICATIONS DE STRUCTURES
L' APPLICATION DU DROIT EUROPEEN 1
par
CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRAN<;OIS BORELLA
N otre recherche sur le probleme du chevauchement des superpositions

des structures sera effectuee dans une perspective critique. Il s'agit
d'etudier les dangers de chevauchements de structures dans l'appli-
cation de la legislation europeenne.
Mais, ici, il convient de faire une remarque importante : les imbri-
cations, chevauchement ou superposition, sont interessantes a degager
non en ce qui concerne les structures au sens organique precis mais en ce
qui concerne les competences des organisations europeennes. Ce sont
celles-ci qui peuvent se penetrer. Certes, le probleme doit ~tre envisage
dans le cadre d'un droit international organique. Mais c' est a partir de
la theorie des competences des organes internationaux qu'il convient
de deduire les elements d'analyse des difficultes tenant ades competen-
ces concurrentes.
Ceci permet d'ailleurs de souligner l'inter~t de l'etude.

Les concurrences sont le signe d'une insuffisance de rigueur dans
un systeme juridique. Elles impliquent des difficultes d'application du
droit. Degager ces concurrences c'est donc prendre la mesure exacte du
degre d'achevement d'un systeme juridique. C'est preciser l'ampleur
des difficultes dans l'application d'un droit, ce qui peut eventuellement
permettre de chercher a travers des remMes.
D'autre part, les imbrications et chevauchements caracterises
d'abord dans leur aspect juridique, plus immediatement perceptible,
peuvent reveler des maux politiques plus profonds : Ils peuvent ~tre
la traduction de contradictions dans les politiques ou d'oppositions non
reglees par les accords internationaux.
1 Le titre anglais du theme est "Dangers of overlapping structures - The enforcement of
European legislation." Le mot overlapping est difficilement traduisible en franc;ais. 11
implique une idee de superposition et d'interpenetration. Le mot chevauchement est utilise
dans certaines etudes et declarations sur le fonctionnement des institutions europ6ennes.
100 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRANC;OIS BORELLA
Ni les auteurs, ni les hommes politiques ne sont restes indifferents

devant ces difficultes d'application du droit europeen. Les premiers
evoquant "le scandale constitue par le devancement des institutions
europeennes" montrait I'origine de ces imbrications et les difficultes
de les resoudre:
la rationalisation des institutions europeennes pose des problemes politiques
bien connus et presque insolubles: ils procedent du defaut de coincidencs des
limites geographiques, des competences et des pouvoirs des diverses constel-
lations diplomatiques superposees en lesquelles s'analysent les institutions
europeennes .... et un refus absolu de ces diverses constellations de se ramener
l'une a l'autre. 1
Les seconds, surtout a I'AssembIee consultative du Conseildel'Euro-
pe, ont etudie la question et tente de lui apporter des solutions. Dans
son rapport sur "le regroupement des organisations europeennes inter-
gouvernementales autour du Conseil de I'Europe," M. MOMMER
proposait ainsi, le IO Aout 1954, a l' Assemblee consultative de Stras-
bourg, de faire du Conseill'organisation commune "groupant d'une
part les membres originaires, et de l'autre, les Etats qui partieipent
d'une maniere ou d'une autre a la tä.che d'imbrication" 2
Les causes de cet etat de droit international europeen sont faciles

a mettre en evidence. 11 est possible iei d'opposer deux groupes de
causes les unes "politiques" les autres "techniques" ou "juridiques."
La structure de l'Europe actuelle n'est pas le resultat d'une politique
rigoureuse des Etats qui la composent, sur la base d'options ide-
ologiques qui ne seraient plus discutees. En fait, m~me I'Europe
oceidentale n'est qu'une entitee geo-politique definie par son oppo-
sition a l'Europe orientale ou centrale. Au surplus, elle n'est pas une.
Elle est a ce point inachevee, en l'etat actuel de son organisation par les
traites internationaux conc1us entre les pays membres qu'il existe en
fait plusieurs Europes .... pour n'en eiter que deux il y a la "Grande
Europe" et la "petite Europe." 11 n'y a donc pas unite de conception.
C'est, au contraire, l'empirisme qui caracterise l'edification euro-
peenne. Or l'empirisme, le pragmatisme des solutions, le fait que les
actessesuccMent dans le temps ou resultent d'elaborations parallele-
ment, ineitent a penser que de teIles techniques d'elaboration peuvent
laisser place ades chevauchements. La cause en est alors pratique et
politique.
2P. Duc1os, La re/orme du Conseil de l'Europe, Paris L.G.D.]. 1958 p. 219-220 et p. 227.
1Rapport preliminaire de la commission des Affaires generales sur le message special du
comite des Ministres - 10 aout 1954 - document no 264.
CHEVAUCHEMENTS ET IMBRICATIONS DE STRUCTURES 101
Elle peut, au contraire, decouler du droit lui-m~me, c'est-a-dire

des techniques juridiques utilisees par les signataires des traites.
lci, la determination theorique des risques de chevauchement est
relativement aisee par l'analyse des competences des organisations.
Celles-ci etant fondees sur un accord international, la determination
de leurs competences s'opere par le texte m~me de I'accord. 11 est
relativement facile alors de mettre en evidence ces conflits de compe-
tences par analyse des textes. Les superpositions de competences
d'organisations internationales peuvent ~tre la consequence soit de la
redaction des actes internationaux eux-m~mes soit du developpement
de I'activite des organismes internationaux a partir des divers traites.
Car certaines necessites resultant de la vie internationale ou decou-
lant des institutions elles-m~mes conduisent parfois les organisations a
developper leur action, a la faveur d'interpretations des dispositions
des traites.
Dans le premier cas, il suffit de constater que deux ou plusieurs
traites attribuent aux organes qu'ils creent des competences communes
ce qui ne peut rest er sans consequences des lors que ces traites con-
cernent des m~mes etats, que les Etats parties aux traites en cause
soient rigoureusement les m~mes ou que seuls certains etats soient
interesses par plusieurs traites. La situation peut se presenter d'abord si
les traites sont rediges successivement, tout ou partie de I' objet d'un de
ceux-ci reprenant l'objet d'un texte precedent. Plus illogique est la
situation dans laquelle des traites elabores et conclus paralleIement se
recoupent. La solution n'est pas inconcevable cependant car les parties
peuvent ne pas ~tre toutes les m~mes et la technique de redaction
conduit souvent a utiliser des formules larges pour definir les compe-
tences.
En effet, les textes usent ici souvent de la methode qui consiste
a definir les buts de l'organisation. Portant souvent sur des matieres
economiques ils decrivent les objectifs de l'organisation. Cette finallte
de l'organisation ne determine pas avec une precision suffisante les
competences au sens juridique du terme, possibilite pour I' organisation
d'accomplir des actes generateurs d'obligations. La prise en consider-
ation du seul but, pour peu que celui-ci, au surplus, soit exprime en
termes generaux, conduit a une determination fort large des compe-
tences.
Celle-ci s'elargit encore par le jeu des techniques d'interpretation
en droit international. En effet, d'une part, les institutions peuvent
ici chercher a tirer le maximum des definitions larges de leurs compe-
102 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRAN<;OIS BORELLA
tences si aucune resistance politique ne vient y mettre obstacle.

D'autre part, si large que soit le texte, i1 est susceptible d'~tre etendu
car on ne le tiendra pas pour inutile, pour simple declaration de princi-
pe ou d'intention. En droit international, on ne peut pretendre que de
tels textes sont sans portee juridique. Et la jurisprudence en deduit des
competences en pouvoirs implicites. Par exemple a son avis sur la
reparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies la Cour
internationale de Justice declare:
Les droits et les devoirs d'une entite telle que l'organisation doivent dependre
des buts et des fonctions de celle-ci enonces ou impliques par son acte constitutif et
developpes dans la pratique .... Selon le droit international, l'organisation
doit etre consideree comme possedant ces pouvoirs qui, s'ils ne sont pas expresse-
ment enonces dans la Charte, sont par une consequence necessaire, conferes a
l' organisation en tant qu' essentiels aI' exercice des fonctions de celle-ci ....
En fait ce sont les "fonctions" qui dominent l'activite des organisa-

tions internationales.
TeIles sont les causes juridiques.
Ces concurrences de competences des institutions europeennes et les

imbrications de structures se presentent toutefois de fa«ons differentes
malgre les analogies qu'elles doivent ades causes identiques, precedem-
ment analysees, selon qu'elles apparaissent en des Traites liant les
m~mes parties ou non. 1
La societe internationale europeenne la plus large se caracterise
pour l'etat inacheve de son evolution vers l'unite, par son in organisation
eneore grande. Divers Traites se recoupent groupant en des associations
plus ou moins larges des participants qui sont assez souvent mais
1 On peut eiter, comme exemples de definitions larges les formules des art. 1 et 2 du Pacte
de Bruxelles du 17 mars 1948, art. 1 "organiseront et coordonneront leurs activites economi-
ques en vue d'en porter au plus haut point le rendement par l'elimination de toute di vergence
dans leur politique economique .... " art. 2 "Les Hautes Parties contractantes assoeient
leur efforts .... afin d'elever le niveau de vie de leurs peuples et de faire progresser, d'une
maniere harmonieuse, les activites nationales dans le domaine soeia!." Le Statut du Conseil de
l'Europe en date du 5 mai 1949 s'ouvre sur un article 1 ainsi redige: "Le but du Conseil de
l'Europe est de realiser une union etroi te entre ses membres afin de sauvegarder et de pro-
mouvoir les ideaux et les prineipes qui sont leur patrimoine commun et de favoriser leur
progres economique et soeial"; L'art. 2 du Traite du 18 avril 1951 instituant la communaute
Europeenne du Charbon et de l' Aeier assigne a la communaute la "mission de contribuer .... a
l'expansion economique, au developpement de l'emploi et au relevement du niveau de vie
dans les Etats membres." L'art. 2 du Traite du 25 mars 1957 instituant la Communaute
economique europeenne dispose "La communaute a pour mission ... , de promouvoir un
developpement harmonieux des activites economiques dans l'ensemble de la communaute,
une expansion continue et-equilibnle, une stabilite accrue, un relevement acceIere du niveau
de vie, et des relations plus etroites entre les Etats qu'elle reunit."
On pourrait encore eiter les art. 2, 3, 5 et II de la convention de cooperation economique
europeenne du 16 avril 1948; 1 du Traite du 25 mars 1957 instituant la C.E.E.A. (Euratom).
pas toujours les m~mes. Dans cette situation les concurrences et inter-
penetrations se comprennent aisement. Elle s'expliquent par des
raisons techniques: des redactions successives d'actes ne liant pas
toujours les m~mes parties; Elles s'expliquent aussi par l'empirisme
qui preside a l'elaboration des solutions europeennes et m~me par les
reticences, les oppositions politiques entre Etats. On comprend des lors
que dans cette situation les difficultes se resolvent difficilement puisqu'-
elles sont la resultante d'une insuffisance de formation de la societe
internationale Europeenne.
Tel n'est deja plus le cas pour certaines communautes plus etroites.
Alors l'identite totale des parties aux differentes organisations euro-
peennes ou une identite partielle tres large attenue le risque de compe-
tences concurrentes entre organisation, la rend m~me peu vraisemblable.
Tel est le cas pour la petite Europe. Pourtant les imbrications de
structures et les competences concurrentes, qui paraissent plus illogi-
ques encore dans cette situation, sont concevables et existent effective-
ment, soit qu'elles resultent de redactions successives de textes soit qu'-
elles decoulent d'une imperfection des definitions, des fonctions dans
les differents traites soit qu'elles proviennent d'interpretation des
compHences. Elles sont plus simples aregier que dans la situation prece-
dente car il existe deja entre des memes parties liees par plusieurs
traites une solidarite certaine, un esprit communautaire, qui tend souvent
a depasser le stade des collaborations techniques internationales pour
realiser d'authentiques accords politiques renfon;ant une communaute
en constitution. 1
L'opposition entre les deux situations degagees ici par analyse a He,
d'ailleurs, soulignee par certains membres des institutions europeen-
nes. 2
1 Ainsi le plan Schuman; d'ou est issue la C.E.C.A .• avait parmi ses objectifs de preparer
la voie au progres de 1'unification europeenne. La C.E.C.A. devait participer. et a participe
par son experience ä la preparation de nouveaux traites (Rappele par le 7e rapport general
sur 1'activite de la C.E.C.A. introduction I).
M. G. Cansacchi a pu ecrire des quatre traites " .... formant un ensemble normatif unitaire
ayant pour but de proceder par degres successifs 11 1'unification totale des trois communautes
europeennes actue1lement distinctes" ("Les elements federaux de la C.E.E .... in Milanges en
l'honneur de G. Gidel. Sirey 1961. P.93). Le 22 novembre 1960 le president de la Haute
Autorite de la C.E.C.A. M. P. Malvestiti rappelle que le but final de la politique europeenne est
la creation d'un authentique pouvoir europeen unitaire (Piero Malvestiti "E pluribus unum."
discours prononce devant l' Assemblee parlementaire europeenne 11 Strasbourg. services des
publications des communautes europeennes 2568/2/60/1).
2 M. Mommer: " .... toute integration organique entre les deux types de cooperation
europeenne etant comme le montre 1'experience impossible. (rapport precite p. 100).
I
Les concurrences de competences entre Communautes europeennes
d'inspirations politiques differentes sont fort nombreuses, mais il semble
qu' on puisse les regrouper en deux categories. On rencontre d'une part
des chevauchements de structures d'organisations europeennes consti-
tuees sur la base du respect de la souverainete des Etats-membres. Ces
organisations europeennes peuvent, d'autre part, entrer en concurrence
avec les Communautes de l'Europe des Six fondees au contraire sur
une certaine delegation de souverainete des Etats membres.
S'll est assez facile de regler les concurrences de competences entre
les organisations europeennes de caractere inter-etatique, il est
actuellement difficile de coordonner des organisations inter-etatiques
avec les organisations de l'Europe des Six. L'opposition est ici autant
juridique que politique. Dans le permier cas le reglement de difficultes
est politiquement sans difficultes et juridiquement realisable sans
bouleversements complets des organisations existantes. Dans le second
au contraire l'opposition politique entre deux conceptions antagonistes
de l'avenir de l'unite europeenne se conjugue avec la difficulte juridique
a' coordonner des organisations irreductibles entre elles. Peut-~tre
cependant cette opposition n'est-elle que provisoire. L'eventualite
de l'entree de la Grande Bretagne et du Danemark dans la Communau-
te Europeenne 1 a titre de part entiere posera la question, en des
termes entierement nouveaux.
(A) Le reglement des concurrences entre organisations europeennes inter-
etatiques
L'Europe inter-etatique, si l'on peut ainsi s'exprimer n'etant pas
une construction rationnellement structuree d' organisations specialisees
et differentes, les chevauchements sont inevitables. Bien entendu
certaines organisations tres specialisees ne se concurrencent pas, il ne
s'agit cependant que de formes secondaires de la cooperation europeen-
neo Les grandes organisations europeennes se sont en fait revelees
concurrentes. A cet egard, il faut poser le probleme par rapport au
Conseil de l'Europe non seulement parce qu'il est la meilleure expres-
sion institutionnelle de l'Europe occidentale, au sens geopolitique,
puisqu'il comprend les 15 Etats attaches a la notion de democratie
liberale 2 mais aussi parce que son statut lui attribue une competence
definie d'une maniere tres large.
1 Sera designee par les initiales C.E.E.
2 A cet egard seuls manquent la Suisse et la Finlande qui sont egalement attaches a cet
ideal democratique.
(a) Le Traite de Londres du 5 mai 1949, portant statut du Conseil de

l'Europe, dispose, en effet, que le Conseil poursuivra des buts en parti-
culier par "l'adoption d'une action commune dans les domaines econo-
mique, sodal, culturel, scientifique, juridique et administratif .... " 1
Or en matibe economique et sociale, le Conseil rencontre la competence
de l'Organisation Europeenne de Cooperation Economique 2 qui de
1948 cl 1960 realise entre dix-huit Etats Europeens dont quinze sont
dejcl membres du Conseil de l'Europe "une economie europeenne saine
par la voie de la cooperation economique." 3 Cette concurrence peut
~tre resolue par l'application du statut lui-m~me. L'art. Ier prevoit en
effet que
La participation des membres a ses travaux oe doit pas alterer leur contribution
.... a l'oeuvre des autres organisations ou unions m~me internationales auxquels
ils sont parties.
L'artic1e 236 dispose que, en soumettant une question cl l' Assemblee

consultative, "le Comite tient compte de l'activite des autres organisa-
tions intergouvemementales europeennes aux quelles sont parties tous
les membres du Conseil ou quelques-unes d'entre eux".
Le probleme se pose tres tOt, des 1949. L' Assemblee consultative
de Strasbourg, suivant une regle permanente qui veut que toute
assemblee deliberante tente d'accroitre son röle et ses competences,
conc;oit le reglement de cette concurrence sous la forme d'une fusion de
l'O.E.C.E. dans le Conseil de l'Europe. 4 Mais le Comite des Ministres
est hostile cl 1a fusion pour des raisons cl la fois juridiques et politiques
tenant notamment au fait que le Portugal et la Suisse (et cl l'epoque
l'Autriche) ne sont pas membres du Conseil de l'Europe et n'accepter-
ont pas de sieger au Comite des Ministres pour y debattre des questions
economiques. 5 L'Assemblee d'abord insatisfaite de cette reponse, va
peu cl peu admettre que la collaboration etablie entre le Conseil
et l'O.E.C.E. sont suffisantes pour lui permettre de remplir le
but qu'elle a fixe au Conseil dans le celebre amendement Mackay,
1 Art. Ier, al. 6.

a Sera design~e par les initiales O.E.C.E.
8 Art. ler de la convention du 16 avril 1948.
, "La fusion est devenue le 'leit motiv' de l'Assemblee" eerit M. B. Benar, ]uris-classeur
international, tome I fase. 155 D no 19. Des le 23 novembre 1950 l'assembIee vote une resolu-
tion dec1arant que le but final est l'integration de 1'0.E.C.E. dans le Conseil de l'Europe
(Recueil des recours et resolutions, 2eme session, 2e partie, p. 25). Le 30 mai 1952, elle" adopte
a l'unanimite une reeommandation no. 25 tendant ades negoeiations en vue de eonvenir
des mesures a prendre pour integrer dans le Conseil de l'Europe les organisation creees en
vertu de la Convention de cooperation eeonomique europeenne (V. aussi les rapports sur la
question du 23 juin 1953 - doeument no. 160 - et du 24 septembre 1953 - doeument no. 215).
I 5e rapport du Comite des Ministres. 20 mai 1954. Doeument no. 237 D 76.
adopte Ie 6 septembre 1949, c'est-a-dire "de creer une autorite politique

europeenne dotee de fonctions limite es mais de pouvoirs reeIs." 1
Finalement le 21 avril 1956 elle se felicite de la cooperation fonction-
nelle etroite qui s'est creee entre les deux organisations. 2 Lereglement
des concurrences de compHences entre les deux organisations a, en
effet, ete effectue par des liaisons fonctionnelles et personnelles. Ces
liaisons ont He Hablies notamment par un accord entre I'O.E.C.E. et
le Conseil de l'Europe conclu en 1952 et plusieurs fois remanie. 3 La
collaboration est etablie sur la base d'echanges reciproques, deux
comites de liaison sont crees et proposent les amenagements neces-
saires. Ainsi l'O.E.C.E. transmet au Conseil ses rapports d'activites
qu'elle presente a I'Assemblee oralement et par ecrit. Le Conseil
transmet a I'O.E.C.E. les resultats de ses travaux en matiere econo-
mique, par exemple depuis 1957 des membres de l' Assemblee peuvent
assister aux reunions du Conseil de I'O.E.C.E. et fournir des explica-
tions sur les recommandations de l' Assemblee de caractere economique.
D'une maniere generale les textes echanges sont etudies par les com-
missions de liaison qui peuvent tenir des reunions communes pour
aplanir des difficultes et eventuellement dHerminer laquelle des deux
organisations est la mieux placee pour agir efficacement dans les
questions soulevees. Ensuite, le Comite des Ministres et le Conseil de
I'O.E.C.E. prennent les decisions definitives et s'en informent mutu-
ellement. L'Assemblee consultative en est egalement informee. En
dehors de cette collaboration sur les grandes questions economiques,
une collaboration permanente s'instaure par le truchement des secre-
taires generaux des deux organisations, par des echanges de vues entre
experts de I'O.E.C.E. et commissions specialisees de I'Assemblee
consultative et par des communications constantes entre les deux
organisations portant sur les informations les documents statistiques
ou autres, des reunions communes se tiennent si necessaire.
Cette collaboration soupie sera-t-elle maintenue avec la nouvelle
organisation de cooperation et de developpement economique 4 creee le
15 decembre 1960 par les membres de I'O.E.C.E., les Etats-Unis et le
Canada? Il y atout lieu de le penser, mais la nouvelle organisation se
veut plus ouverte sur le monde exterieur et notamment les pays en
1 Resolution 87 du 6 septembre 1949 (debats 1949. Volume III p. 1033).

2 Resolution 198 du 21 avril 1956 et resolution 124 du 3 mai 1957.
3 Voir 5e rapport du comite des Ministres, 20 mai 1945. Document no. 237 - Rapport
supplementaire au 7e Rapport. 6 octobre 1956 - document no. 543 annexe - 8e rapport 1957
document no. 623.
4 Sera designee par les initiales O.C.D.E.
voie de developpement et en ce sens, son assise territoriale n'est plus

aussi "europeenne" que celle de l'O.E.C.E., mais le Conseil de l'Europe
n'a jamais voulu limiter son action aux affaires europeennes internes et
il cherchera sans doute cl. travailler en collaboration avec cette O.C.D.E.
comme ille faisait avec l'O.E.C.E.
(b) A cet egard les liaisons entre le Conseil de I' Europe et les organisa-
tions militaires europeennes et occidentales manifestent bien la volonte
du Conseil de ne pas restreindre sa competence, mais au contraire de
l'interpr~ter dans le sens le plus large possible.
En effet l'artic1e ler d) du statut du Conseil prevoit que
les questions relatives a la dMense nationale ne sont pas de la competence du
Conseil de l'Europe.
N ous ne reviendrons pas ici sur les raisons politiques de cette
exc1usion,l ni sur les controverses concernant I'expression "defense
nationale," 21'important est de constater que l' Assemblee consultative,
sur l'incitation d'ailleurs du Comite des Ministres, a donne cl. cette
interdiction une interpretation teIle qu'une nouvelle competence lui a
ete reconnue en matiere militaire, qu'il a fallu coordonner avec les
competences concurrentes de l'organisation du Traite Atlantique
Nord 3 et de I'Union de l'Europe occidentale. 4 Initialement c'est la
guerre de Coree qui est la cause de cette interpretation. Lors de la 2e
session de l' Assemblee en 1950, le Comite des Ministres demanda cl.
l'Assemblee de voter un voeu soutenant I'action des Nations Unies en
Coree; certes il rappelait en m~me temps l'art. ler d), mais l' Assemblee
passa outre et, apres une intervention de M. W. Churchill vota une
resolution demandant la creation immediate d'une armee europeenne. 5
Le comite des Ministres prit acte de cette resolution en rappelant que
les questions militaires n'etaient pas de la competence du Conseil de
l'Europe. L'assembIee en convint mais rappela que:
tout en admettant que les decisions sur des questions relatives a. la dMense
nationale ne relevaient pas de la competence du Conseil rien ne s'opposait a. ce
que l' Assemblee exprim~t son opinion sur les aspects politiques de ce probleme. 6
Cette formule devait permettre cl. I' Assemblee de connaitre du
probleme de la defense commune occidentale sous ses aspects politiques
1 V.: M. Sörensen, "Le Conseil de l'Europe," Rec. des COIWS de l'Ac. de nroit international
de la Haye I95z. 11. p. I3I.
Z V.: G. Benar, ]uris-classeur international, tome I fase. ISS d. no ii.
a Sera designee par les initiales O.T.A.N.
4 Sera designee par les initiales U.E.O.
5 Recueil des Recommandations et Resolutions - ze session - Iere partie I950 p. I3.
8 zeme rapport de la eommission permanente. Ass. consult. ze session - doeuments IV p.
IIz7-z8.
et non purement militaires. Mais, ce faisant, le Conseil de l'Europe se

preoccupait de questions dont traitaient d'autres organisations inter-
nationales.
En effet, on sait que la competence de I'O.T.A.N. (instituee, rappe-
lons-Ie, un mois avant le Conseil de I'Europe) n'est pas limite aux ques-
tions strictement militaires. 1 Certes 1'0.T.A.N. n'est pas une organisa-
tion europeenne au sens strict, les Etats Unis et le Canada jouant un
röle determinant dans les structures et le fonctionnement de I'organi-
sation, mais une collaboration etait neanmoins necessaire. En effet,
s'il n'y a pas double competence, du point de vue de la technique
militaire, entre les deux organisations, il convient d'harmoniser les
conceptions politiques de la defense commune 2 sous peine d'aboutir a
des distorsions fAcheuses.
C'est pourquoi par une recommandation no. 50 votee en 1953
rAssemblee consultative avait demande que I'O.T.A.N. soumette a
l' Assemblee un rapport periodique sur les questions d'interet commun.
Le Comite des Ministres ayant estime que l'art. ler d) du Statut
interdisait cet echange d'informations, I' Assemblee precisa qu'il
s'agirait des activites non proprement militaires, mais politiques de
1'0.T.A.N. en vue de la paix et de la securite en Europe. 3 Aucune suite
ne fut donnee a ce voeu sans doute parce que la creation de rUnion
de I'Europe occidentale posait en termes nouveaux cette concurrence
de competences.
On sait de quelle maniere le traite de Bruxelles du 17 mars 1948 a ete
modifie par les accords de Paris du 23 octobre 1954 pour donner
naissance a l'U.E.O. groupant les 7 Etats europeens les plus influents
au Conseil de l'Europe. La competence de rUnion est tres largement
definie:
poursuivre une politique de paix, renforcer leur securite, promouvoir l'unite,
encourager l'integration progressive de l'Europe .... (nouvel art. 8),
or du fait m~me de sa composition et de sa structure rUnion concur-

rence directement le Conseil: identite partielle des membres et des
competences similitude des organes (Conseil des Ministres Assemblee).
C'est la raison pour laquelle l'article 5 du protocole no. I du 23
octobre 1954 prevoit que l'AssembIee de I'Union est composee "des
1 Voir l'art. 2 prtlcite du traite du 4 avril 1949.
2 Voir se rapport du Comite des Ministres - Document no. 2371 § 86 et Reponse au se
rapport - Document 261.
3 Il suffit d'evoquer ici le projet de communaute europeenne de dMense (traite de Paris du
27 mai I9S2) qui prevoyait une integration de l'armee europeenne dans l'O.T.A.N., mais ne
resolvait pas les liaisons avec Ie Conseil de I'Europe.
representants des Puissances du Traite de Bruxelles ä. l'Assemblee

eonsultative du Conseil de l'Europe." 11 y a done "union personnelle, "
et I'Assemblee de I'U.E.O. n'est qu'une seetion de I'Assemblee consul-
tative, ce qui assure evidemment une tres efficace coordination des
debats. Restait cependant le probleme de la concurrence des compe-
tences entre les deux Assemblees et les deux organisations. Les solu-
tions trouvees sont tres completes et tres satisfaisantes. 1 Elles corre-
spondent ä. peu pres aux desirs de l'Assemblee consultative, exprimes
dans la resolution 67 du 22 novembre 1954 "sur l'organisation de
l'Assemblee de l'U.E.O. et la liaison ä. etablir entre cette union et le
Conseil de I'Europe." 11 y a approximativement repartition des compe-
tences. L'U.E.O. transfere au Conseilies activites sociales et culturelles
et conserve ses competences en matiere de defense, de desarmement et
de securite collective.
Un accord passe le 5 juin 1956 entre les bureaux des deux Assemblees
et ratifie par les AssembIees, definit cette collaboration d'une maniere
soupie:
chaque Assemblee devrait limiter son activite mais non sa competence, de la
maniere suivante:
Assemblee de l'U.E.O.: questions militaires et eventuellement considerations
politiques s'y rattachant directement;
Assemblee consultative: aspects politiques des questions de defense (y
compris les aspects economiques et sociaux).
L'accord ajoute que
si la repartition des travaux devait faire apparattre un risque de chevauchement
d'activite, les bureaux des deux Assemblees se concerteraient sur une proposition
de l'un d'eux.
Ainsi les solutions aux chevauchements de competences entre les
grandes organisations europeennes inter-etatiques ont ete trouvees dans
des liaisons soupies et une collaboration etroite. D'une maniere generale
le Conseil de l'Europe s'est vu reconnaitre un röle de coordination et
d'organisation politique, comme ille souhaitait dans l'amendement
Mackay et en depit de la lettre du Statut de 1949.
Le probleme a ete et reste plus delicat dans les relations entre
l'Europe inter-Etatique et l'Europe des six.
1 Il ne peut ~tre traite de cette question en detail ici, voir A. M. Robertson, "The creation
of Western European Union," European Yearbook, vol. II p. 125-138 et du m~me auteur
"Problems of European integration," Ru. Acad. armt international 1957 - I - notamment p.
184-192.
IIO CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRANC;OIS BORELLA
(B) Les concurrences de competence entre les organisations super-etati-

ques et I' Europe des six
La creation par les 6 Etats de la petite Europe d'organisations super-
etatiques a pose de tres difficiles problemes de coordination. Tant que
les communautes de ce genre ont ete limitees au marche du Charbon et
de l' Ader, il a semble possible de resoudre les concurrences de compe-
tence. Par la suite le rejet par la France du traite de Paris du 27 mai
1952 instituant une communaute de Defense qui entraina l'abandon
du projet de traite du 10 mars 1953 creant une communaute Politique
europeenne sembla donner un eclatant dementi aux partisans de la
supra-nationalite, et renfors;a la position du Conseil de l'Europe et de
ses methodes soupies. Mais les traites de Rome du 27 mars 1957 creant
la C.E.E. et Ia communaute Europeenne de I'energie atomique 1 font
passer le dynamisme politique du Conseil de l'Europe aux communau-
tes supra-nationales. Un premier groupe de solutions avaient ete
envisagees par Ie Conseil de l'Europe avant m~me l'apparition des
communautes des six, elles consistaient a reconnaitre des Autorites
specialisees et a collaborer avec elles.
Le Conseil de l'Europe etait en effet preoccupe tres töt au probleme
de la creation d'organisations europeennes groupant tout ou partie de
ses membres et specialisees dans telle ou teile tache. Dans une recom-
mandation no. I du 28 aout 1950, l'Assemblee consultative demandait
qui puissent ~tre creees
dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe .... des autorites specialisees, chacune
dotee de sa competence propre dans les domaines politiques, economiques,
social, juridique et culturel, chaque Etat membre du Conseil
demeurera libre d'acceder aux autorites specialisees ou a l'une ou plusieurs
d'entre elles les autorites seront ouvertes a l'adhesion ulterieure, les organes de
gestion et de contröle devaient etre integres dans ceux du Conseil de l'Europe.
Reprenant cette proposition en le developpant le comite des Ministres

adopta une resolution statutaire, lors de ses 8e et ge session en mai
et aout 1951, qui reconnait ces autorites specialisees, creees soit sur
!'initiative du Conseil de l'Europe, soit de la propre initiative de
certains de ses membres. Un systeme tres complet de liens entre ces
Autorites et le Conseil est prevu, liens qui pourront Hre precises dans
des accords speciaux et qui vont de !'integration pure et simple au
simple echange d'informations et de documents. 2
1 Sera designee par les initiales C.E.E.A.
2 En fait le Conseil de l'Europe a suscite de nombreuses conventions entre ses membres
portant sur une competence precise. A la fin de 1961, il avait ete conclu 32 conventions ou
accords portant sur les questions les plus diverses et groupant tout ou partie des Etats
CHEVAUCHEMENTS ET IMBRICATIONS DE STRUCTURES III
Mais ces solutions sont-elles applicables aux concurrences de compe-

tences entre le Conseil de l'Europe et les Communautes de l'Europe des
six? 1
Dans un avis no. 3 du 30 septembre 1952, l'Assemblee consultative
avait propose des liaisons organiques etroites entre le Conseil et la
Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'acier 2 notamment
identite des delegues nationaux aux Assemblees du Conseil et de la
C.E.C.A., participation reciproque cl titre d'observateurs des membres
d'une Assemblee aux travaux de l'autre, participation reciproque des
organes executifs des deux organisations aux travaux de I'autre etc ....
En fait les rapports sont moins etroits mais plus soupies. Un protocole
annexe au traite du 18 avril 1951 a prevu certaines liaisons: l' Assemblee
de la C.E.C.A. sera composee de preference de membres de I' Assemblee
consultative 3; la C.E.C.A. communiquera chaque annee un rapport
d'activite au Conseil de I'Europe et celui-ci transmettra cl la C.E.C.A.
les resultats des ses travaux sur les questions de sa competence.
La pratique arenforce ces liens. Durant la periode anterieure cl
1957 l'Assemblee de la C.E.C.A. s'est reunie quatre fois en commun
avec l' Assemblee consultative, les bureaux des deux assemblees ont
cree des liens etroits entre eux, les executifs se sont m{\me reunis, en
commun une fois 4 les echanges de rapports, documents, travaux ....
ont ete constants et des reunions de commissions specialisees ont eu
lieu. Mais, comme la note M. DucLOs, "La C.E.C.A. semble mue par
membres du Conseil (V. tableau des signatures et ratifications in ]urisclasseur international,

Tome I fasc. 155 G).
Sur le probleme general de la creation d'organes subsidaires par les organisations europeen·
nes: V. P. Reuter, Les organes subsidiaires des organisations internationales," in Hommage
tl/une generation de ] uristes au President Basdevant (Paris, Pedone 1960) p. 415 et s.
Plusieurs organisations europeennes ont egalement He mises sur pied sur la proposition du
Conseil de 1'Europe ou spontanement par les Etats membres: Conference europ6enne des
ministres des transports; Conference europeenne de 1'aviation civile; Comite ministeriel pour
1'agriculture et 1'alimentation; Organisation europeenne de la recherche nucleaire; Agence
europ6enne de l'energie nucleaire, Organisation europeenne des postes et telecommunications
etc .... et meme des organes juridictionnels ont He crees: Cour et commission europeenne
des droits de l'homme. La coordination de l'action de ces diverses organisations inter-etati-
ques avec le Conseil de l'Europe ne posent pas de problemes particuliers.
1 Il n'est pas possible dans le cadre restreint de cet article de traiter tous les problemes de
coordination entre les organisations europeennes specialisees et les communautes des six. Sur
la question la plus grave c'est a dire la coordination entre la C.E.E.A. et les organisations
atomiques inter-etatifs V. le traite C.E.E.A. art. 199-200-201, 1'article de G. Fischer, iuris-
classeur international, tome II fasc. 165 no 12-31 et le ler rapport general d'Euratom p. 74-83.
2 Sera designe par les initiales C.E.C.A.
8 En 1956, c'est a dire, avant que l' Assemblee de la C.E.C.A. ne soit transformee en Assem-
blee commune des trois communautes, sur 78 membres, 25 etaient membres de l' Assemblee
consulta tive.
4 Le 15 janvier 1955.
II2 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRANc;(OIS BORELLA
des sentiments de deference plutöt que d'obedience ci. l'egard du Conseil

de l'Europe." 1
Ces rapports efficaces allaient-ils ~tre maintenues avec la creation de
nouvelles communautes de type supra-national? Certes, comme on l'a dit,
les Communautes economiques et atomique realisent "un supra-
nationalisme ci. terme," elles tendent ci. l'instauration progressive d'une
autorite commune supra-nationale plutöt qu' elle ne la creee immedia-
tement, et, en ce sens, elles sont plus proches du Conseil de l'Europe que
la C.E.C.A. Mais au moins pour la C.E.E., les competences sont si
larges qu'il n'est plus possible de parler d'autorite specialisee; il y a
veritablement concurrence de competences.
Lors de l'elaboration des traites de Rome, il avait ete envisage de
creeer une 4e Assemblee europeenne. Aussitöt les assemblees existantes
s'emurent de ce chevauchement d'organes deliberants et des dangers
qu'il presentait: divergences dans les positions ci. prendre, impossibilite
materielle des parlementaires nationaux de sieger dans 4 assemblees
europeennes et d'y travailler serieusement, eclatement de l'unite
europeenne en organes deliberants multiples, confusion introduite
dans l'esprit public par cette proliferation .... Pour eviter ces dangers
les bureaux des trois Assemblees europeennes reunies en trois nouvelles
le 2 fevrier 1957 adopterent une recommandation marquant une
hostilite acette quatrieme assemblee et proposant de confier le con-
tröle parlementaire des nouvelles communautes soit a l' Assemblee de la
C.E.C.A. soit a une Assemblee commune a la C.E.C.A. et aux nouvelles
communautes et dont les membres seraient egalement membres de
l'Assemblee consultative. Une demarche fut faite le 4 fevrier aupres des
negociations en ce sens. Elle aboutit, comme nous le verrons, ci. la
convention annexe du traite de Rome sur certaines institutions
communes. Dans leur communique de Rome du 25 mars 1957, les
ministres des Affaires Etrangeres de six confirmerent d'ailleurs leur
volonte de realiser une certaine union personnelle partielle entre cette
Assemblee commune et les deux autres Assemblees europeennes. 2
Les liaisons fonctionnelles sont moins etroites. Le traite de la C.E.E.
prevoit bien que "La communaute etablit avec le Conseil de l'Europe
toutes cooperations utiles," (art. 230), mais il prevoit par ailleurs une
"etroite collaboration" avec l'O.E.C.E. (art. 231). La difference de
1 P. Duc1os, La l'etol'me du Conseil de l'Eul'ope (Paris I958) p. 72.

2 Cette identite partielle avait He pn\vue sur 1a base suivante: 1a moitie des membres des
delegations franyaises allemandes et italiennes et 1e tiers des delegations du Bene1ux sont
membres de l' Assemblee commune et de l' Assemblee consultative.
force dans les expressions utilisees ici et la n'a pas ete sans indisposer
le Conseil de l'Europe. D~s relations soupies ont eM instaurees, du
m~me type que celles existant entre le Conseil et la C.E.C.A., mais ces
relations ont ete absolument insuffisantes pour em~cher la grave crise
qu'a connue l'Europe lorsque 7 Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe
ont cree en 1959, sur !'initiative britanique, une association europeenne
de libre Echange. 1
11 n'est evidemment pas possible de montrer ici comment une opposi-
tion si grave a pu se faire jour et se developper entre deux groupes de
pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe mais il faut souligner que le röle
coordinateur que celui-ci avait joue dans de nombreux cas entre des
organisations europeennes specialisees n'a pu ici ~tre rempli. Sans
doute les liens qu'il possede avec la C.E.E. etaient-ils insuffisants pour
cela mais surtout les questions politiques en causes etaient trop dif-
ficiles a resoudre pour qu'il ait pu le faire avec succes. 11 y a la un
echec tres net de la cooperation europeenne. Certes juridiquement,
la C.E.E. et l'A.E.L.E. ne sont pas en concurrence puisque les membres
de l'une sont entierement differents des membres de l'autre, mais
politiquement il s'agit d'une opposition tres grave qui entraine des
competences importantes en matiere de politique economique allant
jusqu'a la divergence complete.
Aussi faut-i! considerer comme decisif le changement d'attitude de
la Grande Bretagne et d'autres Etats europeens a l'egard de la C.E.E.
Cela est evidemment vrai en ce qui conceme les politiques economiques
des 5 etats europeens et les chances d'une cooperation europeenne en ce
domaine, mais c'est egalement exact en ce qui conceme les concurren-
ces de competences en Europe. Un danger majeur de chevauchement
des stmctures europeennes est ecarte si la Grande Bretagne adhere
au Marche Commun. Les negociations en cours entre la C.E.E. et de
nombreux Etats europeens (Irlande - Danemark - Norvege - Suede-
Autriche - Suisse - Espagne - Turquie), l'association de la Grece a la
C.E.E. mettant a neant l'opposition entre la C.E.E. et l'A.E.L.E. 11 est
certain que si les negociations aboutissent la situation de la C.E.E. par
rapport au Conseil de l'Europe sera modifiee profondement. Restera
alors a resoudre les chevauchements de competences a l'interieur de ces
Communautes supra-nationales.
1 Sera d6sign~ par les initiales A.E.L.E.

II4 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRANc;OIS BORELLA
II
Six Etats font actuellement parties de trois communautes: la Commu-
naute Economique du Charbon et de l'Ader depuis I952, la Commu-
naute economique europeenne et la Communaute europeenne de
l'energie atomique dont les traites ont He signes a Rome le 25 mars
I957. Ils constituent ainsi une veritable communaute politique deja
constituee et en mutation constante vers une realisation plus parfaite.
Entre ces traites des concurrences, des imbrications etaient et sont
encore nombreuses constituant autant de difficultes d'application dues
essentiellement ades reactions successives dans le temps. Certaines
difficultes ont ete evitees lors m~me de la conc1usion des derniers
traites en date. D'autres ont ete reglees car elles ne mettaient pas en
cause d'options politiques fondamentales pour les Etats. Dues a des
causes juridiques la procedure d'elaboration des textes ou les con-
ditions de fonctionnement des institutions ont He resolues par les
excutifes. D'autres par contre sont seulement en cours de reglement
ou ne sont pas reglees.
(A) Les problemes ayant lait l'objet d'un reglement

Les traites de Rome du 25 mars I957 ont, des l'origine, evite de
facheuses solutions en transformant la Cour de J ustice et l' Assemblee
parlementaire de la C.E.C.A. en Cour et Assemblee communes aux trois
communautes. Les deux traites du 25 mars I957 ont des redactions
rigoureusement identiques sur l'AssembIee et la Cour. Une convention
du 25 mars I957 dHermine les modalites de fonctionnement, des
organes communs et modifie le Traite de la C.E.C.A. 1 du I8 avril I95I a
compter du 7 octobre I958 en ses articles 2I et 32. Par contre les
textes ont prevu une simple collaboration des executifs. 2
Quoique les Traites n'explidtent pas les motifs des solutions sur
l'assembIee et la Cour de Justice communes ceux-ci sont aises a deter-
miner. Une cour de Justice est un corps de "techniciens" que leur
formation de juristes met a m~me de trancher des litiges quelqu'ils
soient ne seraitce, lorsqu'il s'agit de nouveaux domaines, qu'apres une
adaptation, une mise au courant. La Cour de J ustice de la C.E.C.A.
Hait une cour specialisee en droit international et en matiere econo-
1 Comparer: Traite C.E.E. du 25 mars 1957 art. 137 a 144 et Traite CEEA du 29 mars 1957
art. 107 a II4 en ce qui concerne l'AssembIee et pour la Cour de ]ustice les art. 164 a 188 du
Traite C.E.E. et 136 a 160 du Traite C.E.E.A.
2 Pour la Cour de ]ustice. Celle·ci a tenu une seance solennelle d'installation le 7 october
I958.
mique: sa vocation pouvait ~tre elargie sans difficulte a de nouveaux

problemes internationaux dans de nouvelles communautes "economi-
ques."
11 n'etait pas concevable d'autre part, qu'il y eut trois assembIees.
En effet deja
la coexistence en Europe seule de nombreuses Assemblees internationales oll.
siegent des parlementaires pose de reels problemes du point de vue de leur
participation effective. 1
La multiplication des assembIees pouvait presenter des avantages
techniques de specialisation. I1s eussent ete minces. Les inconvenients
l'auraient emporte de beaucoup: obligation de repartir deputes et
senateurs entre les instances internationales, peut-~tre au detriment
des competences et de la coordination des travaux ou obligation de
cumuler en droit des mandats sans pouvoir en fait cumuler ceux-ci, ou
obligation lors de l'organisation d'elections directes par les populations
de prevoir de multiples scrutins propres a favoriser l'absenteisme.
Sur des matieres techniques, sans implications politiques pour les
Etats qui ne constituent pas, par aiHeurs, l'essentiel des activites des
communautes europeennes ceHes-ci ont tres bien su harmoniser des
solutions et concilier des competences par des accords d'autant plus
faciles que les g~nes pratiques sont sensibles aux hommes qui ont des
activites de techniciens et que ceux-ci savent tres bien realiser entre
eux une entente, presque une complicite, alors surtout qu'ils sont
portes par un ideal europeen commun.
La Haute Autorite de la C.E.C.A. s'est attache a mettre au point
une collaboration efficace avec les commissions des nouveHes commu-
nautes pour eviter, dans toute la meSUl'e du possible, les doubles emplois
administratifs ou techniques: des groupes de travail interexecutifs
fonctionnent regulierement, des services communs ont ete crees, des
liaisons organiques ont ete etablies, un executif peut accomplir cer-
taines taches pour le compte d'un autre. 2 Dans le but de mieux coor-
donner les contacts entre eux les trois executifs des communautes
europeennes sont tombes d'accord sur un systeme de reunions periodi-
ques al'echelon des membres de la Haute Autorite de la C.E.C.A. et des
commissions des C.E.E. et C.E.E.A. Effectivement apres une reunion
des Presidents le 6 octobre 1958 a Luxembourg deux reunions des trois
1 P. Ve1las, les AssembIees d'organisations internationales, in Milanges en l'honnell" de

lrllberl Gidel, Sirey 1961, p. 557 et s. (eitation p. 569).
S Bullet in C.E.C.A. oet. nov. 1958 -7e rapport general de la Haute Autorite sur l'aetivite
de la C.E.C.A. ehap. I p. 27, p. 35, 36.
II6 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRAN<;OIS BORELLA
colleges ce sont tenues les 10 octobre et 8 decembre a Bruxelles. Depuis

toutes les questions interessant la cooperation interexecutive sont
examinees aces occasions, soit en reunion presidentielle soit en reunion
de groupes de travail specialises, 1 soit en reunion pIeniere. Toutefois
ces rencontres ont ete genees par la dispersion des sieges des institutions
europeennes.
Les executifs ont envisage des le debut en 1958, la mise sur pied
de services communs. L'accord s'est fait sur la creation de trois
services. 2 Ce desir s'est heurte aux obstacles nes de la dispersion des
sieges 3 mais ces services communs constitues cependant fonctionnent
effectivement. 4
Par ailleurs des liaisons organiques ont ete amenagees, lorsqu'il
n'etait pas possible de creer des services communs. Ainsi l'etude de la
conjoncture generale s'effectue sous la direction de la C.E.E. avec la
partieipation de la C.E.C.A. et de la C.E.E.A., un accord de cooperation
a ete conclu en matiere de transport entre la Haute Autorite de la
C.E.C.A. et la commission de la C.E.E., pour les questions soeiales des
contacts organiques entre executifs existent. 5
11 est possible de eiter encore des cas dans lesquels des accords ont
ete realises apparemment sans difficultes entre les communautes.
Ainsi en est-il en matiere de transports. Deja en ce domaine on avait
assiste a une floraison d'organismes de 1945 a 1952. Leur aspect
institutionnel etait souvent seduisant, Mais les tä.ches n'etaient pas
rigoureusement definies. La C.E.C.A. a meme pose ici l'elimination des
discriminations tarifaires et l'harmonisation mettant fin aux distor-
sions. Le Traite de Rome comprend lui aussi des clauses relatives aux
transports 6 parmi lesquelles la suppression des discriminations 7 des
1 En 1958, groupes ad hoc (problemes g{meraux de cooperation), groupe presse information,

groupe relations exterieures, groupe economie-energie, groupe transports, groupe questions
sociales - v.: 7e rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. chap. 1 § 2, p. 33 - 3e rapport
general sur l'activite de la C.E.E. chap. 11 p. 65 et s. - 4e rapport general sur l'activite de la
C.E.E., chap. VI p.
2 Service juridique, service statistique, service commun de presse et d'information 7e
rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. Chap. 1 § 2 p. 34.
3 Rapport prec. p. 36 - 8e rapport general de la Haute Autorite sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A.
chap. 1 § 2 P. 36-37.
4 Sur le statut des bureaux d'information: J.O. des communautes europeennes 6 dec. 1958
sur l'ensemble des services communs: 8e rapport general de la Haute Autorite sur l'activite de
la C.E.C.A., chap. I, p. 37 et s. - 3e rapport general sur l'activite de la CEE, chap. I, p. 68
et s. - ge rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. chap. 1 § 2 p. 48 et s. - Bulletin C.E.C.A.
6e annee no. 3-4e rapport general sur J'activite de la C.E.E. chap. V p. 256 et s.
5 Sur les liaisons organiques: 7e rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. chap. I § 2,
p. 3435 - 8e rapport chap. I § 2 p. 41 - ge rapport chap. I § 2, p. 55 et s.
6 Art. 74 11 84 du Traite du 25 mars 1957.
7 Art. 79.
CHEVAUCHEMENTS ET IMBRICATIONS DE STRUCTURES II7
protections, 1 la limitation des taxes en redevances. 2 11 Y a donc des
concurrences entre C.E.C.A. et C.E.E. en ce domaine. Mais un accord de
cooperation est intervenu ici entre Haute Autorite et cOInmission de la
C.E.E.3
D'autres accords se realisent apparemment sans difficultes entre les
communautes pour des travaux en commun en des domaines OU elles
ont des competences concurrentes. Ainsi, le 21 septembre 1961, la
Haute Autorite a decide de participer 4 par l'intermediaire de ses
services aux travaux d'un comite d'experts qui elabore un projet
d'organisation d'un institut africano-malgache d'etudes et de develop-
pement aI'intention des Conseils de la C.E.E. et de la C.E.E.A. 5
Enfin sur certaines questions communes les solutions ne sont pas
encore degagees mais elles semblent pouvoir ntre car les difficultes ne
sont pas insurmontables et restent tres techniques. 11 en est ainsi du
statut des fonctionnaires des communautes pour lesquels l'elaboration
d'un statut commun se poursuit 6 souhaite par resolution du 19 octobre
1961 7 de l'Assemblee Parlementaire.
(B) Concurrences et imbrications en cours de reglement ou non regtees

Si les redacteurs des Trat tes instituant les communautes Europeen-
nes ont chercM a prevenir des illogismes et des double emplois en
organisant une COU1 unique et une Assemblee parlementaire unique,
ils n'avaient pas regles certains problemes qu'ils n'avaient sans doute
pas m~me vus ou penses. Ceux-ci seraient sans doute regles, ce n'est
pas faire preuve actuellement d'un optimisme excessif que de la penser.
Mais il a fallu et il faudra encore pour cela du temps. 11 s'agit de deux
questions d'un ordre different: celle dite de la coordination des politi-
ques energetiques et celle dite de la "fusion des executifs." 8
La C.E.C.A., premiere des institutions communautaires de la petite
Europe, a competence en matiere d'energie en ce qui conceme la
1 Art.80.
I Art. 81.
3 7e rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. No 10; 8e rapport general sur l'activite de
la C.E.C.A. no 8.
4 Bulletin de la C.E.C.A. - 6e annee no. 4 kp. 13.
i La creation de cet institut avait ete proposti en juin 1961 lors de la conftirence
commune de l' Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne et des Parlements d'Etats Africains et de
Madagascar (Bulletin C.E.C.A., 6e annee no. 3 p. 12.
8 8e rapport general de la Haute Autorite sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A. chap. I, § 2 p. 43.
7 J. O. des communautls du 15 nov. 1961 4e annee no. 73.
I La collaboration entre executifs laisse entiere la question de leur fusion. Elle se justifie
par 1'existence de plusieurs executifs mais n'implique pas que celle-ci soit une solution
heureuse qu'il ne convient pas de changer. Sur cette collaboration voir supra.
II8 CLAUDE DURAND-PRINBORGNE ET FRANc,(OIS BORELLA
politique charbonniere. Elle a favorise une large politique d'expansion,

en partie par suite d'erreurs de precision dont la responsabilite est
imputable a la Haute Autorite. La crise charbonniere est le resultat de
la concurrence des autres sources d'energie. Ceci ne fait qu'apparaitre
plus inconcevable la creation posterieure de la C.E.E.A. competente en
matiere d'energie atomjque et de la C.E.E. qui au sein de competences
larges se trouve competente pour la politique du petrole et de l'energie
hydraulique sans que les ~olutions aux problemes de concurrence des
sources d'energie qui sont realite quotidienne aient ete veritablement
prevues. IntellectueUement on peut concevoir que cette institution
s'occupe du charbon, teUe autre du petrole, teUe autre de l'atome, la
distinction des fonctions selon les sources d'energie parait d'une logique
rigoureuse. Economiquement, ceci est du plus grand illogique s'il n'y
a pas harmonisation des politiques energetiques. 11 a faUu improvisEr
les solutions.
Une resolution du Conseil des Ministres en date du 13 octobre 1953
avait institue un comite mixte 1 qui en 1955 avait mis ses travaux en
toute et en 1957 avait realise une "etude sur la structure et les tendan-
ces de l'economie energetique dans les pays de la communaute." Lors
de la 45e session du Conseil de la C.E.C.A. tenue le 8 octobre 1957 est
signe entre le Conseil des Ministres et la Haute Autorite un protocole
sur les moyens d'assurer une politique coordonnee dans le domaine de
l'energie. 2 La Haute Autorite est chargee de poursuivre les etudes
entreprises en s'entourant de l'avis d'experts en y associant le Comite
mixte institue en application de la Resolution du Conseil des Ministres
precitee, du 13 octobre 1953. Le texte du protocole prevoit "La Haute
Autorite s'efforeera d'etablir avee la eommission de la Communaute
Economique Europeenne et avee la eommission de la Communaute
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique, des leur institution, les formes de
eoUaboration les plus appropriees a l'examen des problemes interessant
les trois eommunautes. 3 La Haute Autorite a done ici un röle qui ne
s'explique que par les liens de fait entre les sourees d'energie. 4 De
l'aveu m~me de la Haute Autorite il a d'ailleurs faUu "clarifier les
proeedures a suivre dans un domaine OU la situation etait devenue
1 Representants des gouvernements et representants de la Haute Autorite sous la Presi-

dence du Directeur de la Direction Economique de la Haute Autorite.
2 J.O C.E.C.A. 7 dec. 1957.
3 Protocole du 8 octobre 1957 art. 2, al. 2.
4 Sur la question de la coordination des politiques energetiques: v.: Piero Malvestiti,
discours devant l' Assemblee Parlementaire a Strassbourg, services des publications
europeennes 2424 2.60.1.
CHEVAUCHEMENTS ET IMBRICATIONS DE STRUCTURES II9
assez eompliquee au point de vue institutional. 1 Les travaux de
l'Assemblee Parlementaire eommune fa vorisent, eertes, la marche vers
une politique energetique commune 2 mais il s'en faut que eelle-ci soit
deja realite
il est indispensable que la Haute Autorite, la commission de l'Euratom et la
commission economique europeenne etablissent un commun les directives pour
une politique energetique europeenne ... " 3
C'est seulement en effet le 10 janvier 1961 que la Haute Autorite a
remis en son nom et au nom des Commissions de la C.E.E. et de la
C.E.E.A. une note concernant les premieres mesures en vue de la
eoordination de la politique energetique des Etats membres. 4 Eneore
convient-il de noter que le eadre de l'Europe des six est lui-meme
etroit pour une eoordination des politiques energetiques eommunes.
Lors des travaux de reforme de l'O.E.C.E. la Haute Autorite a
fait eonnaitre l'interet qu'elle porte a la eooperation efficace en ce
secteur et a meme suggere la ereation d'un eomite de l'energie. 5
Done en ce domaine les solutions qu'il a faHu sans eesse ameliorer
par une eoordination plus etroite sont un palliatif eneore partiel ades
activites et des eompetences qui restent eoneurrentes. Entre la C.E.C.A.
et le C.E.E. il existe d'ailleurs d'autres eoneurrences, du moins de
delicates delimitations de fron tieres.
La C.E.E. par l'applieation des dispositions de l'art. ur du Traite
de Rome 6 tend a realiser une eoordination de plus en plus effective de
la politique eommerciale des Etats membres: les institutions de la
C.E.C.A. devront en tenir compte pour les questions de politique
eommerciale de leur eompetence. 7
Delimitations delieates encore ou eooperations a mettre en oeuvre
pour l'assistance aux pays sous developpes et l'association des pays et
territoires d'outre-mer ce qui a conduit I'Assemblee Parlementaire a
des echanges de vue avec les executifs des communautes. 8
Le probleme de la fusion des executifs a ete parfaitement pose par
1 8e rapport general sur l'activite de la C.E.C.A., chap. I, § z, 8, point C.

2 Resolution sur le developpement de la politique energetique europeenne J. O. des
communautes europeennes du 15 juillet 1959.
3 3e rapport general sur l'activite de la CEE, chap. II, no. 31.
4 ge rapport general sur l'activite de la CECA, chap. I, § I, no. 21.
5 Bulletin C.E.C.A. 6e annee no. I p. 8. 8e rapport general sur l'activite de la CECA no 8.
Gart. III, I: "Les Ttats membres procedent a la coordination de leurs relations commer-
ciales avec les pays tiers .... La commission soumet au Conseil des propositions relatives a
la procedure a appliquer au cours de la periode de transition pour la mise en oeuvre d'une
action commune, et a l'uniformisation de la politique commerciale.
7 Bulletin de la C.E.C.A. 6e annee no. I P. 7.
8 8e rapport general sur l'activite de la CECA chap. I § I no. 3.
M. MALVESTITI presentant en novembre 1960 la position de la Haute

Autorite. 1 On sait que le Traite C.E.E. prevoit un conseil 2 et une
commission 3, le traite Euratom prevoit un consei1 4 etunecommission
executive 5 lors de la conclusion des traites de Rome, au lieu de confier
les tä.ches des nouveaux executifs cl la Haute Autorite il a paru prefe-
rable d'avoir des organismes distincts ou demarrage.
Mais tres vite des voix ont exprime !'idee que ce qu'avait ete
necessaire pour deux ou trois ans ne I'etait plus et surtout que ceci
etait generateur de graves difficultes. La premiere est sans nul doute
que de nombreux problemes interessent tout naturellement les trois
executifs. La seconde est que la co-existence peut entrainer des "con-
tradictions ou d'incoherences." 6 Enfin la multiplication des organismes
est onereuse.
L'initiative de la proposition de fusion des executifs a ete presentee
officiellement pat M. HIRSCH alors president d'Euratom. Les arguments
avances cl I'appui de cette these etablissent a contrario les inconve-
nients des solutions actuelles
Je crois que personne ne peut contester l'importance qu'il ya pour l'efficacite, la
rapidite de l'action et la qualite des decisions a avoir un college unique. Ceci
s'ajoute a l'interet de rationalisation .... 7
Et M. FAURE dans son rapport cl l'Assemblee Parlementaire allait
plus loin encore et voyait dans la fusion un moyen de
pallier les inconvenients qui resultent de l'existence des trois traites differents .. 8
L'accueil des parlementaires a ete tres favorable et cl une forte

majorite l'Assemblee s'est prononcee pour une resolution invitant les
Conseils et les executifs cl prendre les initiatives necessaires pour
realiser cette fusion 9
Au plan gouvernemental certains gouvernements n' ont pas pris
position nettement et, dans I'ensemble, les Ministres ont souligne lors
des debats cl l' Assemblee parlementaire que la question devait etre
1 P. Malvestiti, E pluribus unum, op. eit., supra.

2 Art. 145 et s. du Traitci du 25 mars 1957.
3 Art. 155 et s. du Traite du 25 mars 1957.
8 La formule est de M. Malvestiti, discours precite.
7 M. Hirsch intervention devant l' Assemblee Parlementaire novembre 1960.
8 Rapport al' Assemblee Parlementaire.
9 On doit eiter: MM FAURE (liberal, Brance), DUVIEUSART (democrate chretien), Bohy
(socialiste)
Le congres national du M.P.R. a approuve le rapport du Senateur J. Lecuanet preconisant
cette fusion.
M. Spierenburg vice Pnlsident de la Haute Autorite de la CECA a approuve celli·ci.
examinee avec soin. Toutefois au nom des Pays Bas M. LUNS se dec1a-
rait favorable.
Effectivement en 1961, le Gouvernement neerlandais a soumis a
l' Assemblee parlementaire un projet de convention tendant a 1'insti-
tution d'un Conseil des Ministres unique et d'un executif unique pour
les trois communautes. A l'issue des debats qui devaient faire apparai-
tre le peu de differences entre le projet d'une part et de 1'autre le
rapport de la Commission politique de l' Assemblee, l' Assemblee a
adopte une resolution proposant un texte de convention, instituant un
Conseil des Communautes Europeennes auquel seraient devolus les
pouvoirs.
Des objections peuvent cependant etre formuIees et parmi elles,
principalement, le fait que
des colleges distincts. competents pour des secteurs differents constituent
en definitive une structure plus soupie et. de ce fait. plus dynamique 1
car
Un executif unique ne peut suivre avec assez de celerite les problemes les plus
disparates .... 2
Mais aces objections leur auteur formule lui-meme des reponses: il
suffit de trouver une methode de travail permettant de prendre pour le
tout des mesures systematiques et moins rapides et par secteur des
mesures fragmentaires et plus rapides.
Mais le veritable probleme 3 n' est pas la et sa presentation peut
fournir une conclusion acette etude. Il est de savoir si la question des
executifs peut servir la cause europeenne, le renforcement des institu-
tions europeennes ou si, au contraire, les pouvoirs supra-nationaux que
dHient la Haute Autorite dans le Traite de la C.E.C.A. ne s'affaibli-
raient pas progressivement dans une union avec des executifs qui ne
sont pas encore supranationaux.
1 P. Malvestiti discours precite.

2 idem.
3 Tres bien pose par M. Malvestiti.
IN HOW FAR IS THE EXPECTATION OF
INCREASING CONSUMER-DEMAND JUSTIFIED? 1
by
F. HARTOG
(I) I ntroduction
The heading of this subject is formulated as a question, which is
being put in the framework of a symposium on "Limits and problems
of European integration." We are confronted in this article with one of
those problems. Why is the development of private consumption a
factor that could threaten European integration? This is the first
point about which we shall have to make up our minds. And in order to
be able to answer this question, it will be necessary to pay some at-
tention to the economic objectives of European integration, or better
said, those aspects in which economists are primarily interested.
There are in this connection especially three points which are of
paramount importance: increase 01 productivity, decrease 01 confunctural
vulnerability and improvement 01 bargaining position in trade relation-
ships with the outer world. On each of these objectives a short expla-
nation may be given.
(a) Increase 01 producttvity. European economic integration may
be expected to increase productivity by a refinement of the existing
specialization between the partner countries. It is difficult to predict the
probable extent of this productivity effect, but the American example
and the already developing strong increase in mutual trade between
the E.E.C. countries suggest that the creation of a large economic space
will exert an important influence.
(b) Decrease 01 confunctural vulnerability. A country of average
European size is strongly dependent on outside conjunctural ups and
downs. This also limits the efficacy of trade cycle policy. Separate
countries can easily thwart each other's policy by uncoordinated
measures. On the other hand, a common European trade cycle policy,
1 The author is indebted to Professor F. J. de Jong fo r valuable suggestions on the first

draft of this contribution.
INCREASING CONSUMER-DEMAND 123
or at least a harmonization of national policies, can be a powerful

influence in checking or eliminating conjunctural disturbances. What
up till non has been largely achieved by good luck, can be made safe by
a common European trade cyde policy. 1
(c) Strengthening bargaining positions. An economist is usually
strongly inclined to regard projects of regional economic co-operation
as interim regulations for world-wide cooperation. An economically
united Europe is in principle as well an artificial unit as aseparate
country. But it can be an important stepping-stone by increasing the
bargaining strength for bringing down trade impediments of outside
countries. Especially versus the U .S.A. more equivalent concessions in
trade-policy can be offered against a substantial dismantling of Ameri-
can protectionism. Also, the creation of the E.F.T.A. was a direct
response to the E.E.C., and it is only a question of time when the
politicians, who are still maintaining the division between the "seven"
and the "six," will recognize the economic logic of the facts.
It will be dear that these points are to a big extent interrelated. So it
appeared already that the third objective lies in a direct line with the
first, for if specialization on a European scale is advantageous, than
the more so with specialization on a world scale. The second objective
comes in when we realize that a permanent high level of employment
is the prerequisite for the reaping of the froits of increased productivity.
The last-mentioned factor in itself only creates the possibility of an
improved standard of living. A better use of productive capacities has to
be accompanied by a lutz use of them. It is quite possible, as the thirties
have shown, that the economic mechanism falls in bringing about a
high utilisation of the productive apparatus. In such a situation the
men, the machines and the factories are available, but they are partial-
ly idle. There is poverty amidst plenty.
After the last war unemployment has largely disappeared. This
is a happy circumstance, and there are many indications that for the
time being this will last. But what about the consequences of the
strong increase in productivity which can be expected from European
economic integration? Will the development of private demand be
able to keep pace with the increase in supply? If not, then the first
(and third) objectives would, as time goes on, ron contrary to the
second objective, and European economic integration would, on the
one hand, exert a favourable and, on the other hand, an unfavourable
1 This has been worked out further in my booklet European Trade Cyele Poliey, 1959.
124 F. HARTOG
influence. This is. the problem with which we are confronted for this
moment and which will be dealt with in the following sections.
('2) Some simple models

The foregoing comes down to the distinction of a twofold relation-
ship between production and consumption (or, if formulated broader:
spending). On the one hand, production gives rise to income, because
the total sum of value added equals the total sum of income. In so
far supply creates its own demand. (if we may formulate in this way
Say's law). On the other hand, spending creates its own supply, in so
far as production is only undertaken in response to demand. This
last-mentioned relationship is the one that was first analysed by
Keynes.
If all income is spent, we have to do with Say's situation. If part of
the income is saved, Keynes' point of view comes to the foreground. It
will need no further argumentation that the law of Say only holds good
in borderline cases and that the real world is usually characterized by
the Keynesian relationship.
In this frame of mind, spending, which is the ultimate aim of all
economic activity, becomes at the same time a means, viz. to maintain
production and employment at the highest possible level. Employment
is not so much seen as aprerequisite for consumption. but consumption
as aprerequisite for employment.
In the opinion of Keynes, investment was considered the item which
had to make good the too low level of consumption. At present we are
more inc1ined to the view that investment, too, is dependent on con-
sumption, so that consumption indeed is the key item of expenditure.
Largely on the basis of Keynesian theory, a group of American
economists came to the conc1usion in the thirties that investment
opportunities would gradually dwindle away, so that investment would
more and more fail as a compensating category of expenditure. A
mature economy would be characterized by a high degree of unem-
ployment. 1
This thesis of the stagnationists up till now has not come true. Their
gloomy picture was based on the Keynesian concept of a fixed re-
lationship between income and consumption and an autonomous
investment activity. In the modern version, a stagnationist theory
1 A. H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, 1941. An opposite point of view gives
G. Terborgh, The Bogey 01 Economic Maturity, 1945. See also the discussion in The Review 01
Economic Statistics, 1946.
would rather take the propensity to consume as the decisive figure,
investment activity being largely a derived factor. Maturity then
would primarily manifest itself in a decrease in the propensity to
consume, because of a constantly growing degree of satisfaction. Or,
put in an other way: not the autonomous decline of investment, but
the increase of saving would delay and in the end stop economic
development.
After this verbal exposition of the main relationships and points of
view it may be interesting to formulate the different possibilities in
some simple models, with artificial figures but with a view to mecha-
nisms which can easily operate in reality. Besides consumption and
investment, public expenditure is introduced as a category of spending.
Foreign trade is in the first instance neglected, so that we are dealing
with a closed economy.
The following symbols are used.
Y = income or production
C = private consumption
I = investment
E = public expenditure
(a) Fult employment situation. Let us assume that a level of Y = 100
representsthe fullemployment situation. Thisobjecti've can be achieved
under thef ollowing conditions, which are the four equations, deter-
mining the four unknowns of our system.
C = 0,50 Y + 15
1= 0,15 Y + 5
E = 15
Y==C+I+E
Expressing the relevant categories of expenditures in Y with the
help of the first and second equations and substituting them together
with the figure for E in the fourth equation, we get the following
reduced form:
Y = 0,50Y + 15 + 0,I5Y + 5 + 15, from which can be deduced
Y = 100, C = 65 and I = 20.
The first equation is the consumption function. It defines con-
sumption as dependent on income. The constant 15 is that part of
consumption which is not determined by income (largely consisting of
the necessities of life). The coefficient 0,50 is the marginal propensity
to consume. It states that of every change in income with say one
guilder, 50 cents is used to change consumption in the same direction.
126 F.HARTOG
In the investment equation, too, there is a constant term which

represents the autonomous investment. For the rest, investment is
dependent on income and via the income largely on consumption,
being the most important income-determining factor.
Public expenditure is assumed to be completely autonomous.
Finally, the last equation represents the necessary balance equality
(identity) between total supply and total demand at the equilibrium
level.
(b) Keynesian situation. The assumed constancy of the marginal
propensity to consume and the viewing of investment as an item, which
had to elose the otherwise existing deflationary gap, are characteristic
for the Keynesian system. Investment is completely considered as an
autonomous category of expenditure.
In our example the fuU employment level of investment would have
to be 20:
C = 0,50Y 15 +
1=20
E = 15
Y= C + +
I E = 100.
The stagnationist thesis may be interpreted as a gradual decrease of
investment, with the resulting increase in the level of unemployment. 1
At an investment level of e.g. 15 the result would be as follows:
C = 0,50Y +15
1=15
E = 15
Y = C + I + E = 90 and C = 60.
It appears that a decrease of investment by 5 leads to a decrease of
income by 10. This relationship reveals us the working of the so-called
multiplier, which in this case is 2. It is larger than I, because when
income decreases as a consequence of diminishing investment, a
secondary decrease in income-determined consumption takes place,
which ultimately comes down to another 5 points.
It is of importance to remark that the decrease in income will
probably be larger than the decrease in employment, because a partial
adaptation will take place by a fall in prices (ineluding prices of
productive resources). Thus, it is not justified to calculate in constant
prices. On the other hand, prices are to a large extent rigid in case of
1 Alternatively if we interpret the stagnationist point of view as a folling investment

coefficient, the same result can be achiwed in the model of section a.
downward movements, so that the price adaptation will not be suf-
ficient to maintain full employment. In general it can be said that the
conduct of prices deponds on the supply schedules and the market
forms (more or less competitive,less or more monopolistic).
(c) Decrease in marginal propensity to consume. If we return to the
modern version of Keynesianism, with the possibility of changes in the
marginal propensity to consume, and investment assumed to be de-
pendent on income, a certain decrease of the marginal propensity to
consume would result in the following figures.
C = O,45Y + 15
1= o,15Y +5
E = 15
Y = C + +E =
I 87,S, C = 54,375 andI = 18,125
From this example we clearly see that a decrease in the marginal
propensity to consume drags along with it the level of investment.
It is this development which is feared when doubt is expressed on the
possibility to maintain consumption at the full employment level in
case of a constant improvement in the standard of living.
Now we have kept public expenditure at the same level. However,
modern government looks at this category of expenditure as a compen-
sating item, much like Keynes treated investment.
In the relationships which are presented by our model, indeed a level
of public expenditure can be found which maintains the fun em-
ployment situation in spite of a decrease of the marginal propensity to
consume. In order to calculate that level, we simple have to introduce
Y = IOO as a target and solve for the instrumental variable E. The
model then becomes a so-called decision model.
So the following outcome is found.
C = o,45Y + 15
1= o,I5 Y + 5
Y=C+I+E
Y= 100
These relationships are satisfied when E = 20.
If the coefficient of the consumption equation falls to 004°, E will
have to be increased to 25 in order to maintain full employment
equilibrium. Clearly, in our example for every percent decrease in the
marginal propensity to consume, public expenditure has to be increased
by I point.
The fact that the consumption function is assumed to be independent
128 F.HARTOG
from the increase in public expenditure means that this increase is not
financed out of taxes. If this were the case, disposable income would
diminish pari passu and the growth in public expenditure would
partially leak away in a further decrease of private consumption, in
stead of compensating the shift in the marginal propensity to consume.
If we look at the complementary act of consumption (being saving),
the described policy can also be indicated as a maintenance of the
equilibrium rate of saving, in this way that the state by way of con-
sumption dissaves what private savers oversave.
In this phase of the argumentation we can already draw the con-
clusion that in principle there is no necessity of structural under-
consumption in case of a constantly increasing standard of living. It
might indeed be possible that the marginal propensity to consume
shows a downward trend, but it is the factuallevel of consumption that
counts, and this can be influenced at will by the level of public expen-
diture. As in this situation spending is merely a means for maintaining
full employment, it principally does not matter on what projects the
additional public expenditure is spent. It could even be completely
spent on waste. This is of course not to say that this is recommendable
as long as there are still collective needs to be satisfied, but it serves
only to show that as an utmost remedy the digging and filling of holes
is always available as an instrument to maintain total spending at full
employment level.
And if we introduce now the relationships with the outside world, it
appears that the effects of a structural decrease of the marginal
propensity to consume will probably be further mitigated. In this
connection it must be remembered that we are speaking of a
strongly improving standard of living because of economic integration,
with which private consumption cannot keep pace. So it may be
expected that a deflationary process in Europe - taking the public
expenditure as given - will not be accompanied by a corresponding
development in the outside world. This means that the European
balance of payments will tend to improve, with an ensuing inflationary
counter-effect.
At this point it seems advisable to pass from the formal exposition
to the factual situation and probable future development, keeping in
mind the working of the mechanism which in very broad lines was
analyzed in this section.
(3) Factual tentlencies anti policies

(a) Instruments. The figures which were used in the brief expose
of the previous section do not pretend to describe the empirical
facts, although they are not necessarily contrary to them. Especially
the distinction, within the categories of consumption and in-
vestment, of a constant part and adependent part, seems to be in
conformity with common experience. The constants in these equations
are the stabilizors, in the sense that they restrict a possible downward
movement to a certain level, but not in the sense that they keep
economic activity always at full employment level. Moreover, it is
difficult to see how the government can increase to a considerable
extent the constants of these equations, given the fact that social
security in Europe has already been achieved to a very high extent. So
indeed in this field the principal instrument in cases of downward
movements are deliberate increases in the constant element in total
expenditure, which is given by government spending.
In the second place it is possible to work via the income-dependency
of the private categories of expenditure. This comes down to tax policy
as a stabilizing element.
A third instrument is the monetary policy in the strict sense, viz. in
the influencing of private expenditure via regulation of the liquidity of
banks and discount rate.
In fact in prevailing circumstances usually all three groups of
instruments will be used, so that the problem is attacked from as many
sides as possible. In a sense the variation of public expenditure may be
said to give the most direct contribution. The other measures do not in
themselves increase total expenditure, but merely give incentives to
increase them. Thinking for this moment only of the marginal pro-
pensity to consume and so assuming the investment level as given, in
our case of a marginal propensity to consume of 0,50, a tax decrease
as a reflationary instrument will have to be used in a double dose in
comparison with an increase in public expenditure, in order to attain
the same effect. This can be proved by adding a tax equation to our
model, say of section b. Consumption is in this case not dependent on
total income, but on total income less taxes (disposable income). The
taxes are assumed to be income taxes, where the progression is ex-
pressed as a negative constant (only incomes above this minimum are
taxed).
13° F.HARTOG
In this way the following model is obtained:

C = 0,50 (Y-T) +
15
1= 20
E = 15
T=0,30 Y -5
Y=C+I+E
From this it follows that Y = 80,8.
N ow if we want to increase Y to IOO, this can be done by a decrease of
taxes (o.a. an increase of the negative constant in the tax equation) or
by an increase in public expenditure (E).
Putting Y at IIO and solving for the negative constant of the tax
equation, it is found to be 30, Le. a tax decrease of 25. By solving for E,
however, a level of 27,5 is found i.e. an increase of 12,5.
This result is obtained with a marginal propensity to consume of
0,5°·
The smaller this marginal propensity to consume, the less efficient the
tax instrument becomes as a reflationary device. So the same process
which reduces the propensity to consume, also diminishes the efficacy
of the tax instrument. This means that our ultimate hope of keeping
the economy going at a full employment level in case of a sagging of
consumer demand, is to compensate the deficiency of private expendi-
ture by public expenditure. Therefore in the following this instrument
will be especially put into the foreground.
(b) Experiences. Let us now try to see if indeed the tendency to a
decreasing propensity to consume may be deemed an important future
development in the European context. It may be recalled that this
problem was raised in connection with the strong increase in the
standard of living, to be expected from the further expansion of the
European economy in the framework of economic integration.
The most obvious answer is to point to the situation in the United
States, where consumption per head is approximately two times as
high as in the industrial countries of Europe, so that there appears to
be still a large potential expansion. But we cannot escape our problem
so easily, for if we may believe the authorative economist Hansen, it is
the drying up of consumption opportunities which causes the pro-
longed underemployment in the American economy. 1 In the same way,
it offers little consolation to look at the consumption levels of the high
income classes as a perspective for the possible development of average
1 See A. H. Hansen, Economic Issues 0/ the I960, pp. 65, 75 (Hansen was onee the leader
of the stagnationists I).
consumption. Indeed consumption increases with income when we

move from lower to higher incomes, but not proportionately. And this
is exactly our difficulty.
But is it permitted to derive information for the propensity to
consume over time (in case of increasing average income) from differ-
ences between income classes? At this point Duesenberry 1 has
pointed out that this leads to wrong conclusions. His argumentation
is directly relevant for our purpose, because the challenge for his study
is the fact that the rate of saving (and thus the rate of consumption) in
the U .S.A. does not change importantly over time even for a very long
period, although real income has risen considerably. In this connection
the rate of consumption is defined as consumption divided by income.
We can denote this as the average propensity to consume. If this has
remained constant, probably the marginal propensity to consume has
also remained about constant, so that the constant part of consumption
(to be interpreted as minimum standard of living) will have increased
proportionately to income. Should this last mentioned development not
have taken place, or to a less extent, marginal propensity to consume
wouldhaveincreased over time, which seems an improbable hypothesis.
How does Duesenberry explain this asymmetrie conduct of con-
sumption on the one hand over time and on the other hand over
income classes? By considering the consumption and saving pattern of
a certain income class largely as a function of its relative position in the
total income pyramid. If this is the case, an increase of the average
income by say 50%, without changing the income distribution, does
not lead to an imitation of spending habits from income classes which
were situated 50% higher, because everybody's relative position
remains the same.
Whatever this explanation - which seems rather plausible - the
fact itself of a rate of consumption which in the richest country of
the earth is almost stable, is a reasuring phenomenon. But how to
reconcile this with the complaint of Hansen regarding the too low
consumption level in the last 7 or 8 years? Does this mean that after
the period that was studied by Duesenberry nevertheless the tendency
to consumptive satiation has set in? Not necessarily. For Hansen at
the same time reproaches the govemment that it has restricted its
expenditure too much. So it is private reservedness in combination
witk public reservedness which has caused the relative stagnation.
There is a second point which follows from the comparison between
1 J. s. Duesenberry, Income, Saving and ehe Theory 01 Consllmer Beh4vior, 1949.
132 F. HARTOG
development over time and differences between income c1asses. It

appears that the rate of consumption is an average of different rates
by income c1asses, high for low and low for high c1asses. This means
that the rate of consumption can be increased by an equalization of
income distribution. Is this areal possibility in the present European
situation? Probably not. Income distribution has already been equal-
ized to such a !arge extent that the political atmosphere within a
measurable space of time will not favour a further development in this
direction. We can only say that this instrument of a further levelling
down of income distribution is in principle available if it has to be
weighed against underemployment.
In the third place it appears that - at any rate by way of a plausible
hypothesis - the constant part of consumption tends to rise with the
standard of living. This happens because the minimum standard of
living in developed countries is largely a conventional concept, which
is dependent on time and average income itself. In so far as the last-
mentioned relationship obtains, it is c1early for the long-run con-
sumption function not necessary to distinguish aseparate constant
item.
Is all this enough to conclude that there is not any indication of a
falling marginal propensity to consume in the industrial European
countries ? This would be a too hasty inference, because the question
was especially raised in view of the accelerated European expansion as a
consequence of economic integration. It must be deemed more difficult
for consumption to keep pace with a yearly expansion of real per capita
income with 4% than with 2%, to quote the approximate figures
between which the difference falls. The increase in consumption as a
reaction to the increase in income is a process of adaptation, and
adaptation takes time. Thus, it is not very probable, in view of existing
experience, that the consumption will more and more approach a
certain level of general satiation, which will mark the beginning of
stagnation. What seems in fact possible, however, is that the equili-
brium rate of growth will, because of a lag in demand increase, lie
under the maximum rate of growth, which could be achieved with the
employment of all available resources. It remains to be seen whether
such a situation, which up till now has not presented itself, depicts a
very probable development and if there are no counter-tendencies at
work. Especially the instrument of public expenditure is to be mentioned
again, but first some more spontaneous positive factors can be indi-
cated.
(c) New goods and advenising. According to Say's law every pro-
duction creates its own demand. This appeared to be true only in
exceptional circumstances. What can always be said is that every
production creates its own purchasing power. Whether this purchasing
power will also be spent, depends on the wants of the consumers. It is
not sure beforehand that every production also creates its own wants.
Yet there is a tendency in this direction. At any rate it is not permitted
to assume a fixed level of maximum consumption, beyond which
demand no longer increases. The maximum, if it exists, is a constantly
moving ceiling, and its movement is strongly influenced by the pro-
duction of new goods and new varieties of existing goods. A more
diversified supply creates more diversified wants and so continuously
postpones the moment when marginal utillities in all directions have
become zero.
To this must be added the phenomenon of advertising, which is a
pushing power that is constantly at work to adapt demand to supply.
Wants can be created, not at will, but nevertheless to a big extent.
Moreover, advertising itself is spending and in this way contributes to
economic activity.
In the third place the tendency exists to broaden the category of
durable goods which are liable to fluctuations in fashion and style.
Not only c1othing, but more and more also furniture and motor-cars
are touched by the phenomenon of fashion. Together with this develop-
ment, the average duration of life of these types of goods is diminishing.
It needs no argumentation that this is a force which increases yearly
consumption of durables. Of course, this is strongly connected with
advertising activities.
In asense, all this spending for the creation and satisfaction of wants
that do not come into existence in a spontaneous way can be considered
as waste. This refers to the situation of scarcity, in which supply is the
limiting factor. We are thinking, however, of the possibility of a too
low demand. In these circumstances spending is primarlly a means to
assure full employment.
(d) W01'kl,ng week. An important corrective factor can be a further
shortening of the working week. When marginal utility of goods and
services diminishes it becomes more and more attractive to increase
leisure. I t is a common device in economics to consider leisure also as an
economic (i.e. scarce) good, the acquisition of which must be bought by
giving up the utility of other goods and services. A decrease of this
marginal utility makes leisure relatively more attractive, and so total
134 F.HARTOG
satisfaction after a certain point is served more by an mcrease in

leisure than by an increase in production.
To this must be added that a decrease in working time in two ways
works toward balance in a situation of demand deficiency. Not only is
production influenced in a negative way, but also consumption is
stimulated. More leisure increases the opportunity and disposition to
consume, and especially favours the sale of goods and services in the
amusement sphere. In technical economic terms we can say that leisure
and these types of goods are to a big extent of a complementary
character.
(e) Public expenditure. Finally we have again to occupy ourselves
with public expenditure. In this section we will not call attention to
its role as an instrument of reflationary policy, but we have to look at
spontaneous developments in this field.
The general formulation is that by the influence of public opinion on
government, marginal utility of collective goods and services is
equalized to marginal utility of individual goods and services. Con-
sumers of both types of goods and services in a democracy, are gener-
ally speaking, the same persons.
N ow in several cases the increase of private consumption entails with
it a growth of collective needs. This is again a complementary phe-
nomenon which we met already when discussing the effect of a shorter
working week. Examples are the growing need for roads and other
infrastructure investments in the transport system as a consequence of
the increasing number of cars, and the desirability to expand the
general cultural education as a response to increasing leisure. As
Galbraith 1 has pointed out, the process of weighting collective against
individual needs not always works in such a way as to guarantee a
more or less equilibrated relationship between the two. It is difficult
to judge this view, because we have no independent yardstick to
compare the factual situation with some standard of "real" needs.
But it is at any rate probable that a possible satisfaction of collective
wants will only grow as a consequence of an increase in private con-
sumption, which means that, perhaps with some lag, public expenditure
will tend to follow private consumption in several directions.
Apart from this natural adaptation of collective consumption, there
are collective needs which are developing in a more independent way.
Under this head should be mentioned investments aid to underde-
veloped countries. This is not only very important, but also capable of
1 J. K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 1960, eh. 18 and 19.
INCREASING CONSUMER-DEMAND I35
keeplng the economics of satiated industrial countries going for many
years to come. And in the European countries themselves there are
still large possibilities in the cultural and recreational sphere (uni-
versities, libraries, theaters, parks), slum clearance, public buildings
andso on.
On the other hand the possibility exists that disarmament talks will
lead to a settlement between East and West, aiming at a gradual
reduction and ultimate abolition of all military power. This would be a
critical moment for the Western economy. Probably disarmament will
take place so gradually that it will be possible to adapt other expendi-
tures in order to maintain fuU employment. It will be clear from the
foregoing that a corresponding decrease of taxation need not be an
adequate instrument in view of the relatively small size of the marginal
propensity to consume. So a possible "disarmament race" would
increase the necessity to prepare a substantial program of collective
provisions.
The European countries have not yet achieved the stage where
public works - apart from temporary conjunctural setbacks have to be
called in as a support for private expenditure. On the contrary, in most
countries urgent projects have to be postponed because of strained or
even overstrained employment of existing resources. As far as can be
seen now, it is only in the distant future that things could by way of
structural development turn in the other direction. In that case there
seems to be no reason to expect an insufficiency of instruments to cope
with such a situation. Stagnation is as far off as we ourselves put it.
CONSUMERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
by
In recent years a great deal has been written about consumption and
the problems of consumers. Numerous volumes dealing with consumer-
economics and consumer behaviour have been published. It has been
said that the consumer "holds the spotlight" nowadays, and yet in the
literature dealing with future European integration consumption
problems are often more or less neglected.
To state that the ultimate object of production is to provide con-
sumers with various commodities and services is hardly a new point of
view. Yet it seems necessary to stress this weH known truism from
time to time and to remind politicians and economic writers that
European economic integration implies the necessity of watching
developments in the field of consumption. The treaty of Rome in-
stituting the European Economic Community refers to this important
object of economic life in stating (par. II of the Treaty). "That one of
the tasks of the community is to promote an accelerated raising of
the standard of living in the member countries."
Writers dealing with the economic and social problems of the com-
mon market however often pay littIe attention to this aspect of the
economy with the notable exception of some publications by consumer
organizations. 1
The development of economic integration in Europe is expected to
bring about an expansion of industry and trade, a rising income of
large groups of the population and an increasing supply of consumption
goods.
The consumption pattern is bound to change with growing affluence,
and consumption is supposed to improve in quantity as will as in
quality. The future development of consumption is of the greatest
interest to the productive sector of the E.E.G. countries and the
question how exactIy is consumption going to react to the progressing
1 See the monthly BuUetin d'inlormation, Union federale de la consommation, Paris.
CONSUMERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 137
economic integration is an important one. As the structure of pro-
duction will gradually change, a corresponding change in the structure
of consumption should go hand in hand but production and consumption
do not adjust automatica1ly.
Estimates of the quantitative development of the national product
and of consumption trends in the separate E.E.G. countries are
published regularly, but no predictions are (officially) made of future
total consumption in these countries. The principal reason for this
omission is the difficulty of comparing and of adding the varlous data
provided by individual countries.
United Nations rules which should make comparisons easy are not
applied in the same way in every country. Differences in purchasing
power of currencies in E.E.G. countries and differences of the con-
sumption pattern of the population in these countries add to the trou-
bles of researchers. 1
Nowadays in all West-European countries some economic planning
is considered a necessity. As European integration progresses economic
estimates and plans will have to be made for a greater economic unity.
This will have to be done either by a supra-national body or through
coordination of national institutions. In both cases national data will
have to be comparable internationally. Committees of experts are
studying the subject and progress is made but the work seems to be ex-
ceedingly laborious.
Of the many problems, which arlse when an attempt is made to
unite several more or less unequal countries in an economic community,
the consumption problem is not the least interesting one nor is it the
least difficult to solve.
Structural changes 01 the economy in E.E.C. countriesandtheinterests01

private consumers
It is impossible to give an extensive description of the important
consequences of European economic integration, but some remarks
will have to be made on the subject.
We know that in aperiod of several years the internal trade barriers
of the participating E.E.C. countries will have to be abolished and
West-European countries will be confronted byan internal market of
160 million consumers, a market of nearly the same size as the popu-
lation of the United States. If some of the E.F.T.A. countries are going
to join E.E.C. this market will even surpass the U.S. consumer market.
1 A standal'dilled system 01 nationat accounts, O.E.E.S., Paris, 1959.
Although trade between member countries will be in principle free of

duties, an external tariff system is planned, that will in some cases be
higher than present tariffs. This is going to be of special importance to
the agrlcultural sector. However, the last word has not yet been said
on the subject and as the agrarian integration has barely started at
the moment, only the industrial integration will be discussed here.
This part of economic integration is in itself of the greatest importance
to consumers.
The removal of trade baITiers and the creation of a large West-
European economic unity is expected to mark the beginning of a
new period of prosperity, similar to the prosperity that has been
enjoyed in the United States after worldwar 11.
Since the treaty of Rome came into being a remarkable economic
expansion has been observed in the various E.E.C. countries, this
expansion exceeds the economic growth in most other countries.
Between 1958 and 1960 total trade within the six countries expanded
by no less than 35% while in E.F.T.A. the percentage was only 23.
Tariff reductions, a result from the beginning of the Treaty of Rome
must have been partly responsible in this case, as a notable change of
trade occurred in the year 1958.
In regard to the external trade relations, (trade of E. E.C. with foreign
countries as compared with Efta's foreign trade f.i.), it is evident that
E.E.C. has done much better both in expansion of the value of trade
than in the development of a favorable trade balance. 1
The internal situation in each country has improved as weIl. The
national product has been increasing as follows in the first year of
E.E.C;
Percentage 01 growtk 01 gross national product 1 as compared witk
preceding year. (at constant prices)
Germany France Italy N etherlands Belgium
B.M. N.F. Lira Guilders B.Fr.
1959-1 95 8 6·7· 2·3 7·7 6.0 3·7
1960-1 959 8.0 6.2 6·9 8.2 4.2
These figures show that in all E.E.C. count ries with the exception of
I taly the gross national product rose very fast. Figures on national
expenditure (not represented here) show that in the same time in-
vestment expenditure continued to rise more rapidly than con-
1 General Statistical Bulletin 0/ E.E.C. I96I 7/8.
sumption expenditure. Private consumption in Belgium was relatively
higher than in the other countries. 1
A growing tendency towards large scale industry is developping by
the merging of industries, and various forms of cooperation between
large and middle-size industries. This means that the structure of
European economic life is being modemized.
Rationalization of production and distribution have better prospects
in an economically united Europe than before. The European countries
have become too small for modern technical renewal.
The technical revolution that rapidly changed production methods
after worldwar II has hardly been introduced in our Western-European
economy. Automation for instance has not yet been applied extensively
up to the present time. Nuclair energy for peacetime production has
not been introduced except in research laboratories. A great im-
provement of productivity is to be expected in the near future.
One of the necessary conditions for modernizing industry is a large
European consumers market, and for the consumer himself expanding
production may mean important changes in his daily life.
In speaking about consumption, only private consumption in
individual consumption households is meant, which in our country
forms 80% of total consumption (the latter inc1uding all public
consumption) .
The improvement that may be expected in the consumption
patterns of private consumers in the near future concerns both the
quality and the quantity of products. The assortment of wares
offered to the choice of the consumer will be more varied than before.
The female consumer f.i. is hoping that labour saving household
appliances may make her task easier in the future without undue stress
on the budget.
Prices are supposed to be falling unless this tendency is offset by
other factors. Increasing costs of transport may weIl prove an obstac1e
in this respect. Concentration of production means at the same time
that production will be at a greater distance geographically and
functionally from its markets, so that costs of transport and costs of
distribution will have to be higher. This is not always realized in
discussions about advantages of the common market to consumers. 2
Moreover tariff reductions should be followed by lowers prices, and
this has hardly been the case up to now.
1 General Statistical Bulletin 0/ E.E.C. x96x 7/8.
I See report of O.E.E.C. The problem 0/ rising prices, Paris 6x.
140 M. ROHLING VAN SPANJE
It is doubtful whether the consumer will make fuU use of the possi-
bilities offered to him through European integration.
Carlo Hemmer 1, the director of Industry and Trade of the European
Economic Commission, rightly calls the consumer a giant who as a rule
does not know his own power. In a democratic time (and even economic
life should be democratic) the consumer is the man (or woman) who
has a voting paper in his hand by means of his purchasing power. It is a
pity that he often does not make the right use of this power and makes
similar mistakes as the voters in the political field. Consumers are
wayward in their choice of products, and they are the indirect cause of
many wrong decisions in the productive sector. Production might be
better geared to consumption and also be better adjusted to public
welfare if the consumer did realize his own interest, but his competence
in this respect is not what it should be.
The production of harmful merchandize f.i. would not be under-
taken if people refused to buy them. Losses through partial over-
production could be avoided if consumers were more stable in their
behavior.
Consumers are becoming more and more conscious of their own
problems and have joined consumers organizations in an West-
European countries. Incidentally these organizations can be useful to
producers as weH, though sometimes it is difficult to "harmonize" the
interests of both parties.
To the consumer in general three things are of special importance:
the quality of the product, services offered and the prices which have to
be paid. Consumer-organizations try to give guidance in these matters
on an objective basis.
The object of these organizations is usually twofold. In the first
place, they show the way to consumers in a complicated world of many
new materials and new products. The technical revolution has not yet
come to an end, and as the European integration is expected to stimulate
this development, more new materials will be marketed, as the larger
enterprises are still continuing research for innovations in their
laboratories.
The consumer cannot be expected to have an expert knowledge of
these new products. He cannot judge their quality nor even (in many
cases) their usefulness. About a hundred man-made fibres exist
nowadays and are used in several combinations. A consumer cannot
1 Europäische Studientage, Luxemburg 15 june, 1960.

CONSUMERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
judge their quality as he should. Many buyers have found this out to
their disadvantage.
A second objective of consumers organizations is to represent the
interest of consumers wherever it may be useful.
As producers are joining forces and have formed a very great number
of new organizations in E.E.C., also the consumers have been forming
European organizations in order to counter-act the possible dangers of
"cartels" in E.E.G. and especially to avoid what the French call a
"blocage des prix."
National organizations in common market countries have of late
united their forces. The Netherlands ex-minister of agriculture Dr. S.
Mansholt, now vice-president of the E.E.G. Commission, has on several
occasions pointed out the necessity of the collaboration of consumers.
In a world where social groups are organized and using their influence
in European institutions, it seems only right that consumer-interests
as such should be represented as well. It may be true that every one -
man and woman - is a consumer at times. Nevertheless the interests of
"representatives" of the productive sector and the interests of the
totality of consumers do sometimes c1ash.
In connection with the coming agricultural integration several
advisory committees will be instituted. In these, the European con-
sumer organizations will be represented, and they may have an
important task.
Growing prosperty as a new problem.
The growing prosperty of the European population may be the cause
of increased difficulties in the scientific analysis of the economic
behavior of consumers.
The consumption problem does not only concern the individual
consumer. Poorly arranged consumption may be of vital interest to the
individual household, it may be instrumental in loss of satisfaction, but
this in itself does not regard the economist.
To the productive sector of our economy, information about the
consumer's wants and wishes is imperative to insure the right use of
productive capacity. Our complicated productive mechanism has made
it necessary to seek- if possible- a reliable prognosis about the consumer
market.
It is a well known that in the last decennia consumer-research has
become extensive and is being undertaken on a large sca1e both by
government institutions and by private business. The studies of private
business usually deal only with a particular sector of the consumer
market. Theyare concerned with certain products only, and as a rule

findings are not made public.
Macro-economic consumer-research as undertaken by various
Government institutions aims at finding a reliable basis for government
policy in the social economic sphere. Prognoses have been fairly
satisfactory in many countries. As the law of averages is applicable in
macro-economics it has been possible to establish regularities in the
behavior of the totality of consumers, a regularity that is notably
absent in the behavior of the individual.
Though the private producer may often deplore the lack of stability
of his customers, in macro-economics stability of consumer-behavior
is sometimes remarkable. From a macro-economic point of view
consumption in a particular country is more or less predictable, at
least this was the case up to the present time.
Experience in the prosperous Unites States has shown that consumer
research and especially macro-economic prognosis has to deal with
greater difficulties in a prosperous country than in a poor one.
Growing prosperity means that the consumption pattern of most
consumers becomes less fixed, and prediction of the future macro-
economic demand becomes less reliable than before.
Up to now, prognosis of consumption has been based on typically
objective factors. By means of mathematical methods which cannot be
discussed here, changes in private consumption are related to changes
of income of various groups of the population. The relation between
income expenditure for food, clothing, housing etc. is analysed,
changes in income go hand in hand with more or less predictable changes
in expenditure. Household composition, the age of the members of the
households and other objective factors are taken into account. The new
science of econometrics which combines theoretical and statistical analy-
sis has been the principal means of developing new methods for
predicting macro-economic consumption-tendencies for the near
future.
Recently the relation between income and expenditure for certain
types of products has become very unstable. This phenomenon has
been observed in the United States, and the same may be expected in
the European countries when the income of the masses improves and
mass-consumption expands. 1
Even the working of the famous "law of Engel" seems to be un-
1 F. Burns, The instability 0/ consumer spending. Report of the national Bureau of eco-
nomic research, New York 1952.
reliable nowadays. This law says that with lower income a higher
percentage of income will be spent on food. Lately however a rising
income and at the same time a rising percentage of expenditure for
food have been observed at the same time.
The reason of modem instability of consumer spending is the
following:
Growing prosperity means a more varied choice of goods for the
consumer. When the income is small a large percentage of this income
(or may be even the whole income) will have to be spent on bare necessi-
ties. Freedom of choice barely exists for the poorer consumers.
The part of a person's income that need not be spent on necessities or
on fixed obligations like taxes, insurances, or the like, is often called
the "discretionary" income which means the income that can be freely
used for luxuries, for traveling etc.
When large sums of discretionary income can be spent, an instability
of consumption becomes possible that disturbs the "classical" ideas
about regularity of consumers reactions to changes in income. The
addition of credit facilities of the installment system and other credit
institutions have added to this disturbing changeability.
Human economic behavior in general and the activity of consumers
in particular, cannot be explained by objective factors alone. Con-
sumption is not mechanically related to income changes. The objective
factors like income-which are traditionnally supposed to be decisive
factors which "cause" the amount of consumption, form in a rich
society only a very flexible frame, and within this frame expenses for
consumption are planned.
This planning varies with different psychological attitudes of
consumers, at least when they are planning expenses for non-necessities
and expenditures of this kind are extremely variable.
Nowadays millions of people in the U.S.A. can, if they so choose,
increase their rate of spending. They have a certain freedom to delay or
to advance their purchases and to spend either above or below their
current income, hence the difficulties in making forecasts and in
planning.
According to Keynes, the propensity to consume is supposed to be a
fairly stable function of income. This has been contradicted by research
after the last war.
According to new theories 1 the variations of macro-economic con-
1 G. Katona, Psychological analysis 01 economic behavi01', Hill Book Cy, New York·Londen.
See also. The powerlul COMU_, by the same author.
144 CONSUMERS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
sumption should be explained by psychological "causes." The pioneer

of this economic psychological school, George Katona, has been the
first researcher to relate psychological factors to macro-economic
consumption forecasts.
Recent observations show that psychological attitudes of great
numbers of consumers often change at the same time in the same way.
This has been happening in perfectly normal times, not only in periods
of political stress (as at the time of the Korea war). Changes in psycho-
logical attitudes (increasing pessimism or optimism about the eco-
nomic situation, for instance) go hand in hand with great changes in
spending.
On request of the Board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank,
these psychological-economic theories have been tested since 1949. The
results are published regularly in the "Federal Reserve Bulletin" under
the.heading "Surveys of Consumer Finances."
-It seerris likely that our European economy will shortly have to deal
with similar difficulties as the U.S.A. Consumer problems are becoming
increasingly interesting, both from a theoretical as from a practical
point of view.
As to the role of the consumer in the E.E.G., one aspect of the
consumer organisation on a European scale should be considered by
those who are working towards European unity. It has often been said
that the European is not aware of Europe as such, but the consumer
(that is the man or woman in the street), may be made conscious of the
importance of European integration when it is pointed out to him that
this is going to be of practical importance to his daily life. The practical
and even more or less materialistic approach of consumers organi-
sations towards European questions may wen become a great help in
forming the necessary psychic basis for European unity.

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STICHTING GROTIUS SEMINARIUM

LIMITS AND PROBLEMS

SPRINGER-SCIENCE +BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

The Grotius Seminarium has as its purpose the study of international

1963. IV and 144 pages. Guilders 13.15

LIMITS AND PROBLEMS

ERNST B. HAAS, DAVID MITRANY,

Copyright I963 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

International Integration: The European and the Universal Process 6

Delusion 0/ Regional Unity 37

M. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS

La portee de l'integration europeenne. Point de vue juridico-politique 47

Possible Forms 0/ European Integration 56

J. ALTING VON GEUSAU

Law and Politics in the European Communities 68

Direct Elections to the European Parliament 80

Les risques de chevauchements et d'imbrications de structures

In how tar is the Expectation ot increasing

M. ROHLING VAN SPANJE

Consumers and European Integration I36

The Grotius Seminarium has as its purpose the study of international

as it reduces the propensity to power-thinking which also occurs in

1 Goethe, FtJlISt. transl. by Bayard Taylor. Leipzig (Brockhaus) :1:872., p. 60.

will, and overconscious striving tends to increase tensions rather than

European and Universal Integration

re-emergence of this happy state of affairs. Itmay indeedemerge, but in

Where ean these modes of aeeommodation be identified in the history

(z) The Lesson 01 European Integration

in constant contact with supranational voluntary associations and

Not merely economic tasks, therefore, but the degree of functional

I reject the teleological aspects of this statement. In terms of a social

1 Jan J. Schokking and Nels Anderson, "Observations on the European Integration

the difference," but involving the upgrading of common interests in

( z) F unctionally, specific economic tasks resolving policy differences

(3) The Lessons Applied to Other Regions

Soviet Bloc. There are no supranational organizations in the bloc

of this process c1early depends on the observation by the sate1lite rulers

lack of success in other pursuits, the prevalence of the Illilllmum

spur to regional unity? When one super-developed power confronts

regional organizations grouping underdeveloped countries is minimal.

(4) The Lesson Applied to the United Nations

elusive or temporary; it is based on certain common needs experienced

responsibility for integration, and that functional contexts tend toward

basis of majority pressure mobilized by parliamentary diplomacy,

(5) Integration as a Discontinuous Pro~ss

overwhelming evidence that the members of a cohesive regional

Regional Coverage 0/ ILO Conventions. August I960 *

Occupational Hazards (13. 62) 24 67 29 33 19 28

Covet'age 01 Council 01 EUt'ope Conventions *

* "Coverage" is the ratio of aetual to possible ratifications of each eonvention in eaeh

Cohesion 0/ Regional Caucus Groups in the United

Cohesion 01 MembMs 01 Regional Pacts in the United Nations

Summa,,, 0/ Integ,ation Experience 0/ Eu,opean O,ganizations

OEEC-EPU inter-govern- upgrading common remove trade mixed ideologi-

The round table organised by the Grotius Seminarium had as its

What was said before of individual and national emancipation in the

standing and influence except through her leadership in political and

That seems a cool-eyed appraisal of the material side. On the

It is difficult to come to any other conc1usion than this - that the

expectations arnong the experts; especially in the long ron, if the

M. VAN DER GOES VAN NATERS

Esse aliquod inter populos ius commune.

(I) Les donnees en presence

faculte de developpement, son dynamisme, san avenir. Sa force interne,