LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENCIO VDA.

DE SIMEON
G.R. No. 118387

Facts of the Case:

On June 25, 1965, Emiliano Simeon and Alberta Vicencio, husband and wife, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel spouses Vita Uy Lee and Henry Lee to resell to
them a parcel of land situated in Sitio Parugan-Iba Barrio San Jose, Antipolo, Rizal. The land, a
homestead with an area of about 27, 342 hectares, is presently covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 57279 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of defendants Vita Uy
Lee and Henry Lee. Defendants filed in due time their answer with affirmative defenses. After
trial, the court decided in favor of Simeon and Vicencio. The counterclaim of the defendants are
dismissed. Defendants (now petitioners) filed a motion for new trial and later an urgent motion
for reconsideration which were both denied by the trial court in its orders of March 23, 1964
and June 25, 1964. The case is now before Us on a petition for certiorari filed by spouses Vita
Uy Lee and Henry Lee. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was affirmed in toto. A timely motion for reconsideration was filed by
defendants-appellants (now petitioners) to no avail. Petitioners maintain that the Court of
Appeals erred in not making "sufficient and complete findings of fact on all issues properly
raised as to fully conserve petitioners' right to appeal to this Supreme Court on questions of
law. before it."

Petitioners assail the failure of the Court of Appeals to include in its decision the complete text
of the three letters sent by respondent ( now substituted by surviving spouse) Emiliano Simeon
to petitioner Vita Uy Lee before the expiration of the period within which redemption could be
made petitioners intimating that such omission has impaired their position on appeal as anot
her question is raised by them on the basis of the terminology of the three letters.

Issue:

Whether or not the period to reconvey the property, subject of this case, under the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has prescribed (expired or lapsed).

Ruling:

Yes it has prescribed (expired or lapsed). The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase
price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, in the absence of an applicable provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 141, furnishes the guide, to wit: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of
repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale ...".

It is clear that the mere sending of letters by vendor Simeon expressing his desire to repurchase
the property without an accompanying tender of redemption price fell short of the
requirements of law. Having failed to properly exercise his right of redemption within the
statutory five-year period, the right is lost and the same can no longer be revived by the filing of
an action to compel redemption after the lapse of the period. Petitioner Vita Uy Lee was
justified in ignoring the letters sent her by respondent Emiliano Simeon because the mere
mention therein of respondent's intention to redeem the property, without making tender of
payment, did not constitute a bona fide offer of repurchase. The rule that tender of the
repurchase price is dispensed with where the vendee has refused to permit the repurchase is
premised on the ground that under such circumstance the vendee will also refuse the tender of
payment. From petitioner Lee's silence which we have shown above to be justified, no such
deduction can be made. Unlike a fat refusal, her silence did not close the door to respondent
Simeon's subsequent tender of payment, had he wished to do so, provided that the same was
made within five-year period. Yet he neglected to tender payment and, instead, merely filed an
action to compel reconveyance after the expiration of the period. The Supreme Court,
therefore, in the light of the above ruling reversed the decision oif the Court of Appeals.

Ke Hong Cheng vs CA
G.R. No 144169

Facts:

Petitioner is the owner of Butuan Shipping Line. In one the vessels owned by the petitioner,
Philippine Agricultural Trading Corporation boarded 3,400 bags of copra to be shipped from
Masbate to Dipolog City and which said shipment of copra was insured by PhilAm. While on
board, the ship sank amounting to total loss of the shipments. Because of the loss, the insurer
paid the damages to the consignee. Having subrogated the rights of the consignee, PhilAm
instituted a civil case to recover the money paid to the consignee based on breach of contract
of carriage. While the case was pending, petitioner executed deeds of donations of parcels of
land to his children. The trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner Ke Hong Cheng in
the civil case on December 29, 1993. After the decision became final a writ of execution was
issued but it was not served, Therefore an alias writ was was applied for which was granted.
The sheriff did not found any property under Butuan Shipping Lines and/or Ke Hong Cheng. In
1997, PhilAm filed complaint for annulling the deeds of donation made by herein petitioner to
his children and alleged the donation was to defraud his creditors including PhilAm. Petitioner
filed an answer stating that the action had already prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the action to rescind the donation had already prescribed.

Held:

According to the trial court, the period began from December 29, 1993 when the civil case was
resolved. Thus, The CA maintained that, that the four year period began only on January 1997,
the time when it first learned that the judgment award could not be satisfied because the Ke
Hong Cheng had no more properties in his name. Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provide
that "The action to claim rescission must be commenced within four years." When the law is
silent as to when the prescriptive shall commence, general rule must apply that it will
commence when the moment the action accrues. An action for rescission must be the last
resort of the creditors and can only be availed after the creditor had exhausted all the
properties. The herein respondent came to know only in January 1997 about the unlawful
conveyances of the petitioner when together with the sheriff and counsel were to attach the
property of the petitioner and it was then only when they found out it is no longer in the name
of the petitioner. Since the respondent filed accion pauliana on February 1997, a month after
the discovery that petitioner had no property in his name to satisfy the judgment, action for
rescission of subject deeds had not yet prescribed.

Banco Filipino vs CA
GR No. 129227, 30 May 2000
332 SCRA 241
FACTS
Elsa and Calvin Arcilla secured, on 3 occassions, loan from petitioner as evidenced by
promissory note. REM was also executed. Under said deeds, Banco Filipino may increase rate of
interest on said loans, within the limits allowed by law. at that time, under Usury Law, the
maximum rate of interest for loans secured by REM was 12% pa. later, the Central bank issued
Circular No. 494 provinding for the maximum interest of 19%pa. meanwhile, Skyli Builders, thru
President Calvin Arcilla secured loans from BPI with FGU Insurance as surety. Banco Filipino
issued an account statement with 17% pa as interest. The Arcillas filed for annulment of the
loan contracts because the rate of interests charged were usurious.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents are entitled to refund of the alleged interest overpayments.

HELD
Yes. Private respondents aver that they are entitled to the refund inasmuch as the escalation
clause incorporated in the loan contracts do not have a corresponding de-escalation clause and
is therefore, illegal.

In Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank vs Navarro, the Court ruled that
Central Bank Circular 494, although it has the force and effect of law, is not a law and is not the
law contemplated by the parties which authorizes the petitioner to unilaterally raise the
interest rate of loan. The reliance on the circular was without any legal basis.

VIRGILIO G. ANABE vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION (ASIAKONSTRUKT)

G.R. No. 183233
December 23, 2009

FACTS:

The petitioner was hired by respondent Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt) as radio

technician/operator . His services were terminated on the ground of retrenchment. He thus
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of his pay.
Because Asiakonstrukt failed to submit financial statements to prove losses, the Labor Arbiter
ruled that petitioner was not validly dismissed. Respondents are ordered to pay Virgilio Anade
his 13th month pay, illegal deductions and overtime pay. NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision by holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed and reduced the reimbursable
amount of illegal deductions. However, later on employer also claimed that petitioner’s right to
claim has already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He then appealed to the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decision rendered by the NLRC.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the period of prescription of action for illegal dismissal has prescribed.

HELD:
NO. It has not prescribed.
As a general rule, the seafarer is only allowed to recover any and all monetary claims within a
period of three years from the date the cause of action accrues. The exception is illegal
dismissal cases which can be filed within four years.
The Labor Code does not provide for a provision on when the counting will start. It simply
states that money claims become due “from the time the cause of action accrued.” A cause of
action accrues only when “the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its
duty.” A cause of action consists of three elements. How do we determine cause of action?
… a cause of action has three elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff.
It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.
Thus, the counting will vary depending on when the employer denied the employee’s monetary
claim. Consequently, even if the monetary claim is beyond 3 years from the formal demand but
there is no denial thereof within that time, the employee may still recover the monetary claims
within the prescriptive period after the employer finally makes a denial. In the case at hand...
“the complainant repeatedly demanded payment from respondent Maersk [on different dates
earlier than the October 1993 letter], respondent Maersk warded off these demands by saying
that it would look into the matter until years passed by. In October 1993, Serrano finally
demanded in writing payment of the unsent money orders. Then and only then was the claim
categorically denied by respondent A.P. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993. … [the
employee’s] cause of action accrued only upon respondent A.P. Moller’s definite denial of his
claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5) months thereafter or in April 1994, we
hold that it was filed within the three-year (3) prescriptive period provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code.