RIGHT TO BAIL

80. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs PURGANAN

FACTS: In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to
the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is “No.” The explanation of and the
reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999 :
(1) conspiracy to defraud the United States 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal
campaign contributions,

II. “The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and
in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:

ISSUE: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

“Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”

Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only
exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of
PD 1069.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion[68] and
tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.[69] Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough
to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is “dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”[70]

HELD:
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if
given the opportunity.

81. JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, March 17, 2000
Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for
reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial.
Thereafter, he filed an ‘Urgent Ex-Parte’ to allow him to Post Bail’. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It was opposed by
respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her ‘Motion To Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail’ private complainant (respondent herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA erred when it
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence
or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves
recommended the grant of bail.

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the application
for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The
absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has
never been reposed upon the prosecutor."

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the
trial judge in such petition:

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental
is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or
awareness thereof."

Additionally, the court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion
on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and
the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him

82. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs VASQUEZ (Jan. 27, 1993)

FACTS: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked
for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold
departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S.
to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered. The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due
process, right to travel and freedom of speech.
ISSUE: Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired? NO
RULING: On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the
contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first
instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof.
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**Right to Bail