E-FILED 2018 JAN 05 10:54 AM BUCHANAN - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BUCHANAN COUNTY

THE STATE OF IOWA, )

)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. FECR081656
)
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS SOULES, ) RULING ON DEFENDANT’S
) MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendant. )

On November 27, 2017, a hearing was held on the motions to dismiss filed by the
defendant on September 19, 2017 and November 13, 2017. Mr. Scott Brown, Mr. Harden, and
Ms. Zaputil appeared for the State of Iowa. Mr. Parrish, Mr. Brandon Brown, Ms. Messamer,
and Mr. Montgomery appeared with the defendant.

In his September 19 motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the requirements of
Iowa Code Section 321.263(2) violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and article I, sections 8 and 9, of the Iowa Constitution.

The Amended and Substituted Trial Information accuses the defendant of Leaving the
Scene of a Personal Injury Accident Resulting in Death, a class D felony, in violation of Iowa
Code Sections 321.261(1), 321.261(4), 321.263(1), and 321.263(2), on or about April 24, 2017.

Iowa Code Section 321.261(1) provides that the driver of any vehicle involved in an
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the
scene of the accident or as close as possible and, if able, shall return to and remain at the
scene of the accident in accordance with section 321.263. Iowa Code Section 321.261(4)
states that a person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of 321.261(1) in the event
of an accident resulting in the death of a person is guilty of a class D felony.

The Iowa Supreme Court has stated, “The gist of the offense is in concealing or
attempting to conceal the identity of one involved in an automobile accident wherein personal
injuries are sustained.” State v. Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1981), quoting State v. Sebben,
185 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Iowa 1971). The intent of section 321.261 is to prevent a motorist
involved in a personal injury accident from evading liability as a result of the accident by
escaping before his identity can be established and protect persons from distress or danger
from additional mutilation and exposure for want of proper treatment. Sebben, 185 N.W.2d at
774.

The first duty of a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident under section 321.261 is to
stop and, from there, he has the additional duties specified in section 321.263, each of which is
separate and distinct under the statute, with the omission of any one of them constituting a
violation of the statute. State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1983).

Iowa Code Section 321.263(1) states:

The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or

death of a person or damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by a
person shall give the driver’s name, address, and the registration number
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of the vehicle the driver is driving and shall upon request and if available
exhibit the driver’s driver’s license to the person struck, the driver or
occupant of, or the person attending the vehicle involved in the accident
and shall render to a person injured in the accident reasonable
assistance?.

Iowa Code Section 321.263(2) provides:

If the accident causes the death of a person, all surviving drivers shall
remain at the scene of the accident except to seek necessary aid or to
report the accident to law enforcement authorities. Before leaving the
scene of the fatal accident, each surviving driver shall leave the surviving
driver’s driver’s license, automobile registration receipt, or other
identification data at the scene of the accident. After leaving the scene of
the accident, a surviving driver shall promptly report the accident to law
enforcement authorities, and shall immediately return to the scene of the
accident or inform the law enforcement authorities where the surviving
driver can be located.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution safeguards the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution likewise provides that the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated.

The section 321.263(2) requirements do not amount to an unreasonable seizure under

either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8. The fact that a seizure occurs only when an
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty
of a citizen is well-established Iowa law. State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1981)(officer’s
initial observations of defendant after walking up to stopped car not a seizure); see also State v.
Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 2008). The existence of a statute that imposes duties upon all
surviving drivers of vehicles involved in accidents causing the death of a person as part of a
chapter regulating motor vehicles and their use in this state is not a “seizure” under either the
United States or Iowa Constitution.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Article I, section 9, of the Iowa
Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. The defendant argues that section 321.263(2) infringes upon his constitutional
privileges against compulsory self-incrimination.

Only evidence that is testimonial in nature is protected by the Fifth Amendment. State v.
Decker, 744 N.W.2d 346, 354 (Iowa 2008). The act of remaining at or returning to the scene of
an accident causing a person’s death is no more testimonial than a person in custody’s
submission to fingerprinting, photographing, or other physical measurements, writing or
speaking for identification, standing, walking, or making a particular gesture, or submission to a
blood test. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431-432, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 1539, 29 L.Ed.2d 9
(1971); Decker, 744 N.W.2d at 354-355. Requiring a surviving driver of a vehicle involved in an
accident causing the death of a person to remain at or return to the scene of the accident does
not compel evidence that is testimonial in nature from the driver.

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Iowa Code Section 321.266 requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury to or death of any person to report the accident: the driver must “immediately
by the quickest means of communication give notice of such accident to the sheriff of the county
in which said accident occurred, or the nearest office of the state patrol, or to any other peace
officer as near as practicable to the place where the accident occurred.” Iowa Code Section
321.263(2) authorizes a surviving driver of a vehicle involved in an accident causing the death
of a person to leave the scene of the accident either (1) to seek necessary aid or (2) to make
the report required by section 321.266 to law enforcement authorities. If the surviving driver
leaves the accident scene for one or both of those purposes, the surviving driver must promptly
make the required report to law enforcement authorities and then must either immediately return
to the scene of the accident or inform the law enforcement authorities where he can be located.
Nothing in section 321.263(2) compels the surviving driver to choose the option of
communicating his location to law enforcement authorities. The statute gives the surviving
driver the option to immediately return to the scene of the accident—an option that does not
compel the surviving driver to give evidence that is testimonial in nature. Section 321.263(2)
does not violate defendant’s rights against compulsory self-incrimination under the United
States Constitution or Iowa Constitution.

In his November 13 motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the charge brought
against him must be dismissed pursuant to Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6)(a). As part of his
argument, the defendant contends that the prosecution’s interpretation of Iowa Code Section
321.263(2) renders the statute unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to the
defendant.

Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, (1) a statute cannot be so vague that it does not
give persons of ordinary understanding fair notice that certain conduct is prohibited, (2) due
process requires that statutes provide those clothed with authority sufficient guidance to prevent
the exercise of power in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion, and (3) a statute cannot sweep
so broadly as to prohibit substantial amounts of constitutionally-protected activities, such as
speech protected under the First Amendment. State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539 (Iowa 2007).
In order to provide due deference to the state legislature, “avoidance theory” is applied in the
context of due process challenges to legislative acts: the statute is presumed to be
constitutional and is given any reasonable construction to uphold it. Id. The party challenging a
statute on vagueness grounds must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute
might be upheld. Nail, 743 N.W.2d at 540. In an as-applied challenge, the statute is examined
on its face to determine whether the defendant’s conduct clearly falls outside the statute under
any construction. State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306, 314 (Iowa 2000). If a statute is not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, the defendant lacks standing to make a
facial challenge to the statute unless a recognized exception applies. See State v. Price, 237
N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1976).

A statute may be saved from constitutional deficiency if its meaning is fairly

ascertainable by reference to other similar statutes or other statutes related to the same subject
matter. Nail, 743 N.W.2d at 540. The interpretation or construction of a statute by reference to
other related statutes is appropriate where the legislature established code sections with
interconnecting provisions and presumably was striving to create a “symmetrical and
harmonious system of laws”. Nail, 743 N.W.2d at 540-41.

Iowa Code Sections 321.261 to 321.273 constitute a system of laws regulating the
reporting of motor vehicle accidents and responsibilities of drivers of vehicles involved in
accidents. Section 321.266 is concerned with the initial reporting of fatal accidents. Section

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321.266(1) requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of any
person to “immediately by the quickest means of communication give notice of such accident to
the sheriff of the county in which said accident occurred, or the nearest office of the state patrol,
or to any other peace officer as near as practicable to the place where the accident occurred.”
Section 321.263 is concerned with the responsibilities of drivers of vehicles involved in fatal
accidents to provide information and aid. One of the purposes of the statute is to ensure that
the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal accident stays at the scene of the accident until his
identity can be established. See State v. Sebben, 185 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Iowa 1971); State v.
Miller, 308 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Iowa 1981). The information required by the statute is information
identifying the driver. If the accident causes the death of a person, section 321.263(2) requires
all surviving drivers to remain at the scene of the accident except to seek necessary aid or to
make the immediate report of the accident to law enforcement authorities required by section
321.266(1).

A statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the statute’s

purpose and avoids absurd results. State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Iowa 2006).
Section 321.263(2) cannot be interpreted to require all surviving drivers involved in a fatal
accident to remain at the accident scene endlessly, a result that is unreasonable. By referring
to 321.266(1) and 321.263(1), however, the meaning of section 321.263(2) is fairly
ascertainable: all surviving drivers involved in an accident causing the death of a person must
remain at the accident scene until law enforcement authorities have responded to the required
immediate accident report, arrived at the accident scene, and had the opportunity to see the
surviving drivers and obtain other non-testimonial information from them in order to identify
them.

Under this construction the defendant’s conduct does not clearly fall outside the statute.
The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant. No recognized
exception applies that gives the defendant standing to make a facial challenge to the statute.
When the facts alleged in the trial information and attached minutes are accepted as true for the
purposes of considering the motion to dismiss pursuant to Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(6)(a), the facts
charge a crime as a matter of law. The defendant has not shown that the trial information
should be dismissed under Rule 2.11(6)(a).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions to dismiss filed by the defendant on

September 19, 2017 and November 13, 2017 are denied.

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State of Iowa Courts

Type: OTHER ORDER

Case Number Case Title

FECR081656 STATE OF IOWA VS SOULES, CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS

So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2018-01-05 10:54:17 page 5 of 5