TRS10 17

ISSN 0219-3213
2017 no. 10
Trends in
Southeast Asia
THE INDONESIA NATIONAL SURVEY

PROJECT: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
POLITICS
DIEGO FOSSATI, HUI YEW-FOONG

TRS10/17s
AND SIWAGE DHARMA NEGARA
ISBN 978-981-4786-46-1
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace

Singapore 119614
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg 9 789814 786461
Trends in Southeast Asia
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 1 25/8/17 10:16 AM

The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (formerly Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies) is an autonomous organization established in 1968. It
is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security,
and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its
wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research
programmes are grouped under Regional Economic Studies (RES),
Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social
and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is also home to the ASEAN
Studies Centre (ASC), the Nalanda-Sriwijaya Centre (NSC) and the
Singapore APEC Study Centre.
ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued more
than 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of
research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing
works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to
disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast
Asia to the rest of the world.
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2017 no. 10
Trends in
Southeast Asia
THE INDONESIA NATIONAL SURVEY PROJECT:

ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND POLITICS
DIEGO FOSSATI, HUI YEW-FOONG AND

SIWAGE DHARMA NEGARA
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Published by: ISEAS Publishing
Singapore 119614
publish@iseas.edu.sg http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg
© 2017 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission.
The author is wholly responsible for the views expressed in this book which
do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher.
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Fossati, Diego.
The Indonesia National Survey Project : Economy, Society and Politics.
(Trends in Southeast Asia, 0219-3213 ; TRS 10/17)
1. Indonesia—Economic conditions.
2. Indonesia—Social conditions.
3. Indonesia—Politics and government.
I. Title.
II. Hui, Yew-Foong.
III. Negara, Siwage Dharma.
IV. Series: Trends in Southeast Asia ; TRS 10/17.
DS501 I59T no.10 (2017) September 2017
ISBN 978-981-4786-46-1 (soft cover)

ISBN 978-981-4786-47-8 (e-book, PDF)
Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd

Printed in Singapore by Mainland Press Pte Ltd
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FOREWORD
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast

Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular
rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn
greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in
international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967
towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has
had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most
of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes
domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new
international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out
in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious
analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at
encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and
dynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Tan Chin Tiong
Series Editor:
Ooi Kee Beng
Editorial Committee:
Su-Ann Oh
Daljit Singh
Francis E. Hutchinson
Benjamin Loh
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables......................................................................vii

Executive Summary................................................................................. ix
1. Introduction........................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background of the Study............................................................ 1
1.2 Survey Methodology.................................................................. 2
1.3 Purpose and Structure................................................................. 3
2. Economy............................................................................................. 4
2.1 Evaluation of the Economy........................................................ 4
2.2 Economic Policy........................................................................ 8
2.3 Infrastructure Policy................................................................... 9
2.4 Role of Government in the Economy....................................... 13
2.5 Internet and E-commerce......................................................... 13
3. Society.............................................................................................. 16
3.1 Islamic Practices....................................................................... 16
3.2 Islam in Society and Politics.................................................... 23
3.3 Chinese Indonesians................................................................. 24
4. Politics.............................................................................................. 27
4.1 Approval Rating of President Widodo..................................... 27
4.2 Trust in Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy............ 29
4.3 Decentralization....................................................................... 31
4.4 Political Participation............................................................... 35
4.5 National Identity....................................................................... 37
4.6 Globalization and International Relations................................ 37
5. Conclusion........................................................................................ 47
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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure
1. Evaluation of economic condition (country).................................... 5
2. Evaluation of economic condition (household)................................ 6
3. Evaluation of household economic condition by location,
education and income........................................................................ 7
4. Compared with the SBY years, has the economy improved
since Joko Widodo took office?........................................................ 8
5. On whether it is easier to find a job, by gender, location,
education and income...................................................................... 10
6. Satisfaction with government performance on infrastructure,
by location....................................................................................... 11
7. What kind of infrastructure should be a priority?........................... 12
8. Main obstacles to develop infrastructure in Indonesia.................... 13
9. Most important issues/problems facing Indonesia today................ 14
10. Role of government in the economy............................................... 14
11. Internet usage by gender, location, education and income............. 15
12. Cell phone ownership by gender, location, education
and income...................................................................................... 17
13. How important is it for a Muslim to go to haj?............................... 18
14. Should all Muslim women wear hijab?.......................................... 19
15. Do you personally wear hijab? (women respondents only)............ 20
16. Would there be any benefits to implementing shariah law?............ 21
17. What is the most important challenge facing Islam
in Indonesia?................................................................................... 22
18. Do you usually buy Islamic products and services from the
following categories?...................................................................... 23
19. Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Privileged............................. 25
20. Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Influence............................... 26
21. Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Exclusiveness...................... 26
22. Are you comfortable with a Chinese Indonesian in a position
of political leadership?.................................................................... 28
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Figure
23. Views of Chinese Indonesians as political leaders,
by ethnic group................................................................................ 29
24. President’s approval rating by gender, location, education
and income...................................................................................... 30
25. Trust in institutions in Indonesia..................................................... 31
26. On democracy................................................................................. 32
27. On pluralism.................................................................................... 33
28. Disagreement with statement “The rights of ethnic and
religious minorities are protected in Indonesia”, by ethnic
and religious group.......................................................................... 33
29. Support for decentralized governance, by location and region....... 34
30. What level of government should have most powers?
Results by location and region........................................................ 35
31. Political participation...................................................................... 36
32. Organization membership............................................................... 37
33. Are you interested in politics? Results by gender, location,
education and income...................................................................... 38
34. Attachment to national identity....................................................... 39
35. Support for globalization................................................................ 39
36. Perceptions of countries and ASEAN............................................. 40
37. Positive perceptions of the impact of China on neighbouring
countries, by ethnic group............................................................... 42
38. How much will Indonesia benefit by having close economic
ties with China? Results by location and income........................... 42
39. Share of respondents thinking Indonesia benefits “a lot”
from close economic ties with China, by ethnic group.................. 43
40. Attitudes over Chinese immigration. Chinese workers
should… ........................................................................................ 44
41. What do you think about Chinese investment in
strategic sectors?............................................................................. 45
42. How should Indonesia handle the South China Sea issue?............. 45
43. What’s your opinion on recent incidents in the Natuna Sea?.......... 46
Table
1. The Role of Islam............................................................................. 24
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The Indonesia National Survey
Project: Economy, Society and
Politics
By Diego Fossati, Hui Yew-Foong and Siwage Dharma Negara
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute commissioned a nationwide
survey in Indonesia, called the Indonesia National Survey Project
(INSP) to enhance understanding of economic, social, and political
developments in Indonesia.
• President Joko Widodo’s approval rating hovers at around 68 per
cent, and respondents generally think that the President has made
improvements to the economy, although there are concerns with
the price of necessities and job-seeking prospects. The Widodo
administration scores well in infrastructure development, which is
its signature policy thrust. Roads, education and electricity supply
remain the top priorities for respondents, while corruption is still
considered the most important problem facing Indonesia today.
• Some key issues that have emerged during the Jakarta gubernatorial
election, such as punishing blasphemy against Islam and voting a
Muslim leader into office, receive significantly high support from
respondents, suggesting that these issues have currency beyond
Jakarta and the election.
• On the political front, state institutions, especially the Army, are
more highly trusted than politicians. Key elements of Indonesia’s
political infrastructure, such as democracy, Pancasila, and
decentralization are supported by an overwhelming majority of
respondents.
• Indonesians identify strongly with Indonesia and consider traditional
economic partners such as Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and ASEAN
to be most important for Indonesia.
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17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 10 25/8/17 10:16 AM
The Indonesia National Survey
Project: Economy, Society and
Politics
By Diego Fossati, Hui Yew-Foong and Siwage Dharma Negara1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
The Indonesian economy, society, and politics have been undergoing
a number of crucial developments that may shape the country’s future
trajectory in important ways. The economy, although still crippled by
sluggish global economic expansion, has proven to be resilient to the
slump in commodity prices, and the current administration has ambitious
plans to expand infrastructure and promote a more open and investment-
friendly economic environment.2
In the social and cultural realm, Indonesia is facing seemingly
contradictory developments. On the one hand, there is a resurgence of
anti-liberal sentiments, ranging from a growth of conservative Islam
in some social sectors to increased animosity towards immigrants and
ethno-religious minorities. On the other hand, civil society organizations
are becoming more assertive, and they play a more influential role in
shaping policy direction.
In politics, the process of democratic consolidation continues without
substantial setbacks, despite unfortunate continuities with the past such
1
Diego Fossati is Associate Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and
Research Fellow, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University; Hui Yew-Foong
is Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Associate Professor,
Hong Kong Shue Yan University; and Siwage Dharma Negara is Fellow at the
ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
2
World Bank, Indonesia Economic Quarterly: Upgraded, June 2017.
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 1 25/8/17 10:16 AM

as pervasive corruption and the dominance of political parties with
close ties to oligarchic elites that have long entrenched themselves in
Indonesian politics.3 At the same time, how the political sphere unfolds
under the administration of President Joko Widodo (popularly known as
Jokowi), a non-military man who was not part of the Jakarta elite, will be
a test of the post-Reformasi (Reform Movement) institutions developed
after the fall of Suharto.
Against the backdrop of these important developments at a
critical juncture of Indonesia’s political history, the Indonesia Studies
Programme (ISP) at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute commissioned
a nationwide survey, called the Indonesia National Survey Project
(INSP). This project aims to enhance our understanding of economic,
social, and political developments in Indonesia by surveying public
opinion on a wide range of issues, including the economy, the state,
politics, infrastructure, Islam, ethnicity, and international relations. The
data were collected from a large sample of 1,620 respondents in all 34
provinces in Indonesia to ensure countrywide representation of opinions
and attitudes. The local research partner that administered the survey
was Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute),
which fielded the interviews between 20 and 30 May 2017. Conducted
in the wake of the Jakarta gubernatorial election, where certain religious
and ethnic fault-lines were accentuated, the findings of this survey
provide important and useful data for understanding recent cleavages in
Indonesian politics and society.
1.2 Survey Methodology

The survey was designed to obtain a representative sample of the
Indonesian population. Conventional quantitative tests conducted by
LSI using data from the 2010 Population Census suggest that this goal
was achieved, as our sample closely mirrors the composition of the
Indonesian population in terms of gender, region, location of residency
3
Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Also, Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential
Power after Democratic Transition”, Indonesia 78 (October 2004): 61–92.
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 2 25/8/17 10:16 AM

(urban versus rural), religion and ethnicity. Data were gathered through
face-to-face interviews with 1,620 adult Indonesian citizens (17 years
old and above and/or married), a method that allowed us to collect high-
quality information on a wider range of issues than typically allowed by
web-based surveys.
As for the sampling strategy, a multi-stage cluster sampling method
was employed. In the first stage, the population was stratified based
on the proportional population of each of the 34 provinces throughout
Indonesia, location of domicile (rural or urban; about 50 per cent each)
and gender (about 50 per cent each). In the second stage, villages or
kelurahan (the smallest administrative area in Indonesia) were selected
as the primary sampling unit (PSU), and systematic random sampling
was done on the villages (urban or rural) selected in each province
according to its respective proportion of population. In total, 162 rural
and urban villages were selected at random systematically. In the third
stage, all Rukun Tetangga (RT), dusun or lingkungan (the smallest
neighbourhood units) in the selected villages were listed, and 5 of them
were selected at random. In the fourth stage, all households in each
selected neighbourhood unit were listed, and two households were
selected at random. Finally, at the fifth stage, all household members
who were 17 years or older in each selected household were listed, and
one member selected to be a respondent with the aid of the Kish Grid. If
a female respondent was selected from one household, a male respondent
would be selected from another household. In case the selected respondent
could not be interviewed for various reasons (not available after two visits
during interview time in the village, refused to be interviewed, etc.), the
respondent was substituted by repeating stages 4 and 5 above. As a result,
from each selected PSU, 10 respondents were selected, which added up
to a total of 1,620 respondents for the survey.
1.3 Purpose and Structure

The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the survey results.
While we cover many topical issues, we are unable to comment on all
questions fielded in the survey due to space constraints. For questions
that are covered, we limit ourselves to presenting the results, and in some
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cases, we provide breakdowns by demographic factors such as gender,
location, region, education and income. While we sometimes speculate
on the meaning and implications of the findings, the main goal of our
discussion is to present the survey data to the reader without any systematic
attempt at drawing causal inferences. Other forthcoming publications
will take up the task of further analysing the data and discussing more
critically their significance in the context of the Indonesian economy,
society and politics.
In what follows, this paper covers the three major themes around
which the survey was designed, namely the economy, society and politics.
Section 2 reports on respondents’ evaluations of the economy, especially
with respect to infrastructure development, the role of the government in
the economy, and e-commerce. Section 3 examines societal dynamics,
in terms of prevalent patterns of Islamic practice, the role of Islam in
society and politics, and attitudes towards Chinese Indonesians. Section 4
engages with the debate on Indonesian domestic and international politics
by examining attitudes towards President Widodo’s performance, state
institutions, decentralization, political participation, democracy, nation,
and foreign relations. We conclude in section 5 by summing up some of
the major observations based on the findings.
2. ECONOMY
2.1 Evaluation of the Economy
Respondents are asked to evaluate the current condition of the Indonesian
economy, the condition of the economy as compared to the previous year,
and the expected condition of the economy in one year’s time. Figure 1
shows that 45.3 per cent of respondents perceives the current economic
condition as “average”, 28.7 per cent perceives the economic condition
as “bad”, while only 26 per cent perceives the economic condition
as “good”. However, 41.5 per cent thinks that the current economic
condition is “better” as compared to the last year, exceeding those who
think that there is “no change” (34.4 per cent) and those who think that it
is “worse” (24.2 per cent). When asked about the outlook of the economy
in one year’s time, 66.5 per cent thinks that it will be better, exceeding by
a large margin those who think that there will be “no change” (23.3 per
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 4 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 1: Evaluation of economic condition (country)
Right now Compared to last year In one year

80
80
80
66.5
60
60
60
45.3
41.5
Percent
40
40
40
34.4
28.7
26 24.2 23.3
20
20
20
10.3
0
0
0
ge
se
ge
se
tte
tte
or
or
an
an
d
ge
Be
Be
W
W
oo
Ba
ch
ch
ra
G
o
Av
cent) and those who think that it will be “worse” (10.3 per cent). Thus,
while respondents may seem slightly pessimistic about the current state
of the economy, they are more optimistic when comparing the economy
to the last year and when forecasting the performance of the economy for
the year to come.
The survey also asks respondents to evaluate their current household
economic condition, compare it to the previous year and their expected
condition in one year’s time. Overall, their responses are more optimistic
than their assessment of the national economy. Figure 2 shows that
37.8 per cent of respondents perceives their household economic
condition to be “good”, almost twice those who perceive their household
economic condition to be “bad” (19.9 per cent). More strikingly, 75.4 per
cent of respondents thinks that their household economic condition will
be “better” in one year. This greater optimism with respect to household
economic condition demonstrates the perception that President Widodo’s
handling of the economy will not only lead to growth for the national
economy, but more importantly, will bring real benefits to individual
households.
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 5 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 2: Evaluation of economic condition (household)
Right now Compared to last year In one year

80
80
80
75.4
60
60
60
45
42.2
Percent
40
40
37.8
40
32.8
22.2
19.6
19.9
20
20
20
5
0
0
0
ge
se
ge
se
tte
tte
or
or
an
an
d
ge
Be
Be
W
W
oo
Ba
ch
ch
ra
G
o
Av
Figure 3 breaks down, according to location, education and income,

perception of household economic condition as compared to the previous
year. It shows that rural respondents (47.3 per cent) are more likely than
urban respondents (42.6 per cent) to consider their household economic
condition to have become “better”. In addition, the higher the educational
level of respondents, and the higher their income levels, the more likely
they are to consider their household economic condition to have become
“better”.4
4
We group respondents into three main categories according to their reported
income level and education level. Low-income respondents report incomes
below Rp1.6 million, middle-income respondents between Rp1.6 million and
Rp4 million, and high-income respondents above Rp4 million. Meanwhile, low-
education respondents are defined as having only primary education, if any;
medium-education respondents have completed middle-school or high school;
high-education respondents have at least some college education, a college or
a postgraduate degree. This follows Diego Fossati, The State of Local Politics
in Indonesia: Survey Evidence from Three Cities, Trends in Southeast Asia
No. 5/2016 (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016).
6
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 6 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 3: Evaluation of household economic condition by
location, education and income
By location
Rural Urban
50
50
47.3
42.6
40
40
35
30.6
30
30
Percent
22.1 22.4
20
20
10
10
0
Better No change Worse Better No change Worse
By education
Low education Medium education High education
57.8
60
60
60
47.6
39.7
40
40
40
Percent
32.9 32.6 33.3

27.3
19.8
20
20
20
8.89
0
0
r
ge
se
ge
se
ge
se
tte
te
tte
or
or
or
an
an
an
t
Be
Be
Be
W
W
ch
ch
ch
o
o
N
By income
Low income Middle income High income
58.5
60
60
60
44.4
39.4
40
40
40
35.5
Percent
32.5
27.4
25.1
23.1
20
20
20
14.2
0
0
r
ge
se
ge
se
ge
se
tte
tte
tte
or
or
or
an
an
an
Be
Be
Be
W
W
ch
ch
ch
o
!
N
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 7 25/8/17 10:16 AM

2.2 Economic Policy
This subsection looks into how respondents appraise Joko Widodo’s
economic achievements in comparison with his predecessor, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Widodo’s targets include achieving faster
economic growth and making it easier to get business licences.5 Figure 4
reveals that 52.1 per cent of respondents agrees that the economy has
grown faster; 55.2 per cent agrees that the economy has become more
Figure 4: Compared with the SBY years, has the economy

improved since Joko Widodo took office?
Economy has grown faster Economy more competitive Easier to do business

60
60
60
55.2
52.1
47.7
40
40
40
Percent
27.5 28.7
25.3
22.6 23.5
20
20
20
17.3
0
Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree
Easier to find a job Prices are cheaper Improved condition for the poor
60
60
60
47.8
43.2
41.3
40
40
40
Percent
29.9 28.8 27.9 28.9

27.5
24.8
20
20
20
0
Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree
5
Estu Suryowati, “Jokowi Yakin Pertumbuhan Ekonomi RI Bisa Tembus
7 Persen”, Kompas, 15 June 2014 <http://ekonomi.kompas.com/read/2014/
06/15/2127459/Jokowi.Yakin.Pertumbuhan.Ekonomi.RI.Bisa.Tembus.
7.Persen> (accessed 7 August 2017).
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 8 25/8/17 10:16 AM

competitive;6 47.7 per cent agrees that it has become easier to do
business; and 43.2 per cent agrees that Widodo has improved conditions
for the poor.
However, what can be worrying is that for two of the indicators, more
people opt for “disagree” than “agree”: 41.3 per cent of respondents
disagrees that it is easier to find a job, and 47.8 per cent disagrees that the
Widodo administration has been able to lower the prices of goods. Thus,
although official inflation rate is low, people’s perception is that goods
are still too expensive.7
On the question of whether it is easier to find a job under the Widodo
administration, Figure 5 shows that respondents who are female, live in
urban areas, have higher education and high income are more likely to
disagree that it is easier.
2.3 Infrastructure Policy

Developing infrastructure is the signature agenda of Joko Widodo. The
survey asks respondents how satisfied they are with Widodo’s efforts
in developing infrastructure, and finds that 74 per cent are satisfied
while 26 per cent are not satisfied. Moreover, the survey finds that rural
respondents are more likely to be satisfied with Widodo’s handling of
infrastructure development, most likely because Widodo’s development
focus is more targeted at rural areas (Figure 6).
Further, the survey asks respondents what kind of infrastructure
should be prioritized, and 70.5 per cent indicates that roads should be
the top priority for infrastructure development, followed by 15.9 per cent
for schools and 5.82 per cent for electricity and power plants (Figure 7).8
6
In general, this relates to the perception that the economy has become more
competitive in comparison with other economies.
7
Fabian Januarius Kuwado, “Inflasi 2016–2017 Terendah dalam 7 Tahun, Jokowi
Apresiasi Kepala Daerah”, Kompas, 27 July 2017 <http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2017/07/27/13010491/inflasi-2016-2017-terendah-dalam-7-tahun-jokowi-
apresiasi-kepala-daerah> (accessed 7 August 2017).
8
Roads include toll roads, highways and general roads.
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 9 25/8/17 10:16 AM

10
Figure 5: On whether it is easier to find a job, by gender, location, education and income
By gender By location
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 10
Male Female Rural Urban
50
50
50
50
46.3
43.9
38.8
40
40
40
40
36.4
33.1
31.6 30.5
29.5 29.3
28.1
30
30
28
30
30
24.4
Percent
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree
By education By income
Low education Medium education High education Low income Middle income High income
48.5
50
50
50
50
50
50
44.9
41.7 40.4 40.4
39.5
40
40
40
40
40
40
32.6 31.3 31.8 31.6 31.6 31

27.9 28 27.9
30
30
30
30
30
30
27
24.1
Percent
Percent
19.7
20
20
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
ee er ee ee e r ee ee er ee ee er ee ee er ee ee er ee
gr th gr gr th gr gr th gr gr th gr gr th gr gr th gr
isa ei A isa ei A isa ei A isa ei A isa ei A isa ei A
D N D N D N D N D N D N
25/8/17 10:16 AM
Figure 6: Satisfaction with government performance on
infrastructure, by location
Rural Urban
80
80
76
71.8
60
60
Percent
40
40
28.2
24
20
20
0
Not satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied Satisfied
While the order of the top three priorities — roads, then schools, then
electricity and power plants — is consistent across rural and urban
respondents, rural respondents are more likely to prioritize roads and
electricity, while urban respondents are more likely to prioritize schools.
This is probably because roads and electricity are less readily available
in rural locations, and the urban population is more likely to have
better education and higher income and therefore greater demand for
educational facilities.
Concerning the main obstacles to infrastructure development,
respondents are asked to choose up to three answers (this is why the
percentages add up to more than 100). Figure 8 shows that 97 per cent
of respondents thinks that corruption is the main obstacle to developing
infrastructure in the country. The option that attracts the second highest
proportion of votes is the “lack of human and financial resources” at
33.1 per cent, and coming in third is the lack of support from the local
government at 11.1 per cent.
11
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 11 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 7: What kind of infrastructure should be a priority?
Whole sample
Electricity & power plant 5.82
Roads 70.5
Railways & MRTs .647

Dams 4.6
Seaports 1.36
Airports 1.08
School 15.9
0 20 40 60 80
Rural
Roads 73.7

Dams 6.12
Seaports .556
Airports 1.11
School 11.5
0 20 40 60 80
Urban
Roads 67.2
Dams 2.97
Seaports 2.23
Airports 1.04
School 20.7
0 20 40 60 80
Percent
12
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 12 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 8: Main obstacles to develop infrastructure in Indonesia
There is too much corruption 97.0
There is a lack of human and financial resources 33.1
Local government is not cooperative 11.1
Anti-corruption regulations slow down the process 7.62
DPR & political parties are not supportive 4.7
The goals are too ambitious 2.8
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Corruption is perceived not only as the biggest obstacle for

infrastructure development, but also as the most important issue facing
Indonesia today. When respondents are asked to list up to three of the
most important issues facing Indonesia today, corruption is at the top
with 38.8 per cent listing it (Figure 9). Coming in second is “economic
management and growth” at 30.7 per cent, and third is “infrastructure
and transportation” at 24.6 per cent.
2.4 Role of Government in the Economy

Regarding the role of the government in the economy, setting the price
of gas and staple food and setting a minimum wage have the most
support at 90.1 per cent and 89.1 per cent respectively (Figure 10). The
former accords with the finding in section 2.2 that respondents perceive
the prices of goods to be too high. Next is that the government should
provide unemployment subsidies for those who lost their jobs (71.1 per
cent) and finally, support for spending more to help the poor, even if this
requires higher taxes, stands at 64.6 per cent.
2.5 Internet and E-commerce

The survey also investigates respondents’ exposure to the Internet,
smartphone technology and e-commerce, a new global economic
phenomenon. The survey finds that 31 per cent of respondents has ever
13
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 13 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 9: Most important issues/problems facing Indonesia
today
Corruption 38.8
Economic management & growth 30.7
Infrastructure & transportation 24.6
Price stability 22
Poverty 20.9
Social welfare 20.03
Education 18.8
Unemployment 16.3
Crime, law enforcement & security 16
Healthcare 9.53
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Figure 10: Role of government in the economy
Spend more for the poor Set price for gas and staple food
100
100
90.1
80
80
64.6
Percent
60
60
35.4
40
40
20
20
9.91
0
Don't agree Agree Don't agree Agree
Provide unemployment subsidy Set minimum wage

100
100
89.1
80
80
71.1
Percent
60
60
40
40
28.9
20
20
10.9
0
Don't agree Agree Don't agree Agree
14
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 14 25/8/17 10:16 AM

used the Internet, which is within the range of the reported average
for Indonesia’s Internet penetration at 22–34 per cent.9 Further, not
surprisingly, Figure 11 reveals that respondents who are male, live in
urban locations, have higher education and higher income are more
likely to have used the Internet before.
Figure 11: Internet usage by gender, location, education and

income
79.1
80
80
80
80
70.7
66.4
58.2
60
60
60
60
Percent
Percent
41.8
40
40
40
40
33.6
29.3
20.9
20
20
20
20
0
0
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
By education
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
92.9
84.3
Percent
56.7
43.3
15.7
7.12
Yes No Yes No Yes No
By income
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
81.4
69.4
Percent
61.1
38.9
30.6
18.6
9
McKinsey, Unlocking Indonesia’s digital opportunity, 2016.
15
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 15 25/8/17 10:16 AM

With respect to the ownership of cell phones, although the number
of mobile SIM cards in use in Indonesia has steeply risen in the past
decade to exceed the population,10 only 74 per cent of respondents claims
to own a cell phone. Among those who own a cell phone, only 41.4 per
cent owns a smartphone. As with Internet users, respondents who are
male, live in urban locations, have higher education and higher income
are more likely to own cell phones in Indonesia (Figure 12).
Concerning e-commerce, the survey asks if respondents have been
buying products and services through online/Internet channels. Three
categories of online businesses are of interest here: first, e-commerce
and online shopping (Lazada, Zalora, Blibli, Tokopedia, Bukalapak,
etc.); second, ride services (Gojek, Uber, Grab, etc.); and third, online
traveling/hotel booking and ticketing services (Traveloka, Tiket.com,
TripAdvisor, Agoda, etc.). As the rate of Internet penetration is still
relatively low, it is not surprising that only 7.1 per cent of respondents
has shopped online before, while 4.9 per cent has used ride services,
and 4.6 per cent has used online ticketing services. This indicates the
relatively small size of the e-commerce sector in Indonesia today despite
the recent high expectations that the sector will serve as a new engine of
growth for the economy.11
3. SOCIETY
3.1 Islamic Practices
This subsection looks into the influence of Islam in society, especially in
view of Indonesia being a majority Muslim country. Muslims constitute
86.2 per cent of the sample,12 and it is their responses that we examine
10
“Special Report Indonesia”, The Economist, 27 February 2016.
11
Stefani Ribka and Dylan Amirio, “E-commerce boom here to stay, industry
players say”, Jakarta Post, 27 May 2016 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2016/05/27/e-commerce-boom-here-to-stay-industry-players-say.html>
(accessed 7 August 2017).
12
The 2010 Census put Muslims at 87.5 per cent of the population. See Aris
Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi Handayani and
Wahyu Pramono, Demography of Indonesia’s Ethnicity (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2015).
16
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 16 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 12: Cell phone ownership by gender, location, education
and income
77.7 78.5
80
80
80
80
70.1 69.3
60
60
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
40
40
29.9 30.7
22.3 21.5
20
20
20
20
0
0
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
By education
97
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
86.1
Percent
56.6
43.4
13.9
2.96
By income
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
0 20 40 60 80 100
87.7
78
64.6
Percent
35.4
22
12.3
in this subsection. The first series of questions addresses the issue of

religiosity by examining the frequency with which certain religious
activities are performed. Of all religious activities that Muslims perform,
prayers at obligatory times have the highest frequency, where “often”
and “always” are the answer 82 per cent of the time. This is followed
by the giving of alms at 61.8 per cent and attendance of Friday prayers
at 46.4 per cent. From the foregoing, it appears that the more personal
17
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 17 25/8/17 10:16 AM

practice of prayers at obligatory times is more commonly practised than
the communal religious rituals.13
Where the performance of the haj is concerned, 95.1 per cent has
never done it, 1.2 per cent is on the waiting list, while only 2.7 per cent
has gone on the haj. Nevertheless, the haj is considered an important part
of a Muslim’s life, as only 5.4 per cent considers it “not very important”,
and 10.8 per cent considers it “extremely important” (Figure 13). The
majority of 59.5 per cent considers it “very important”, but accepts that
there are practical constraints that may prevent Muslims from making
the trip.
Figure 13: How important is it for a Muslim to go to haj?
It is not very important

5.41
but it is good to do it
It is important, but there are

24.2
many other more important things
It is important, but you need to be

59.5
realistic on whether it can be done
It is extremely important and it

10.8
should be done no matter what
0 20 40 60
Percent
13
As our data are not longitudinal, this does not preclude the possibility that
communal religious practices may be getting more prevalent.
18
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 18 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Concerning the wearing of the hijab (Islamic headscarf), 82.1 per cent
of respondents agrees that all Muslim women should wear it. While the
proportions differ very slightly where gender and location are concerned,
those with low education (83.8 per cent) and high education (88.9 per
cent) are more likely to agree that women should wear the hijab, and the
lower the income of respondents, the more likely it is that they would
agree that women should wear the hijab (Figure 14).
When female Muslims are asked if they wear the hijab, 78.2 per cent
answered “yes”. Those with low education (78.4 per cent) and especially
those with high education (94.5 per cent) are more likely to wear the
Figure 14: Should all Muslim women wear hijab?
By education
88.9
83.8
79.3
80
80
80
60
60
60
Percent
40
40
40
20.7
16.2
20
20
20
11.1
0
By income
85.1
80.4 78.5
80
80
80
60
60
60
Percent
40
40
40
19.6 21.5
20
20
20
14.9
0
19
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 19 25/8/17 10:16 AM

hijab (Figure 15). And contrary to the pattern for opinion on wearing
hijab, women with higher income are more likely to don the hijab. Thus,
not only does it seem that wearing the hijab has become an accepted
outward sign of Islamic religiosity for women in Indonesia, it may have
also come to be associated with social status for Muslim women.14
Following these questions that measure Islamic religiosity are
questions that consider the role of Islam in everyday life. To the question
of whether there will be any benefits to the implementation of shariah
Figure 15: Do you personally wear hijab? (women respondents

only)
By education
94.5
78.4
80
80
80
75.2
Percent
60
60
60
40
40
40
24.8
21.6
20
20
20
5.45
0
By income
84.9
78.2
80
80
80
75.6
Percent
60
60
60
40
40
40
24.4 21.8
20
20
20
15.1
0
14
There is evidence that the hijab has been getting popular among young
professional Muslim women. See Annisa R. Beta, “Hijabers: How Young
Urban Muslim Women Redefine Themselves in Indonesia”, International
Communication Gazette 76, Issue 4-5 (June 2014): 377–89.
20
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 20 25/8/17 10:16 AM

law, 90.9 per cent agrees that there will be various benefits, while only
9.07 per cent considers that “benefits would be very limited or null”
(Figure 16). The most popular reason for implementing shariah law,
chosen by 67.2 per cent of respondents, is that “shariah law would help
strengthen moral values in society”. In other words, shariah law is seen,
not so much as the imposition of a certain socio-legal system, but as a
measure for safeguarding moral values in society.15
Figure 16: Would there be any benefits to implementing

shariah law?
No, benefits would be

9.07
very limited or null
Yes, it would help

67.2
strengthen moral values
Yes, it would help

9.24
increase public safety
Yes, it would help

4.62
fight corruption
Yes, it would help

9.85
propagate Islam
0 20 40 60 80
Percent
15
Identifying with shariah can mean identification with Islamic values in general,
and not necessarily support for the implementation of hudud, punishments
mandated to be carried out with the infraction of shariah law.
21
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 21 25/8/17 10:16 AM

In terms of challenges faced by Islam, interestingly, Christianization
efforts are among the least of respondents’ concerns at 2.13 per cent
(Figure 17). Moreover, the next lowest concern, at 10.4 per cent of
respondents, is with non-Muslim leaders becoming too powerful. Rather,
what are considered most challenging are divisive debates among
Muslims (42.7 per cent) and Islamic leaders’ involvement in politics
(20.6 per cent). In short, it appears that what are perceived as challenges
to Islam are not so much external factors, but factors that challenge the
internal integrity of Islam.
In recent years, there has been growing demand among the Islamic
middle class for Islamic products and services. Figure 18 shows the
products and services in terms of their popularity among Muslim
respondents. Not surprisingly, a majority of 83.1 per cent insists on
consuming food that is Islamic or halal. Other than that, education
(39.1 per cent), music (31.7 per cent) and cosmetics (27.4 per cent) are
the most popular Islamic products and services.
Figure 17: What is the most important challenge facing Islam

in Indonesia?
Debates among Muslims

42.7
are too divisive
Islam is becoming less

11.5
tolerant and too radical
Non-Muslim leaders are

10.4
becoming too powerful
State support for the practice

11.7
of Islam is not enough
Christianisation efforts
2.13
are growing
Islamic leaders are

20.6
too involved in politics
Other .966
0 10 20 30 40
Percent
22
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 22 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 18: Do you usually buy Islamic products and services
from the following categories?
Food Banking
Yes 83.1 Yes 26.1
No 16.9 No 73.9
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
Education Housing
Yes 39.1 Yes 15.9
No 60.9 No 84.1
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
Music Healthcare
Yes 31.7 Yes 20.8
No 68.3 No 79.2
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
Cosmetic Magazine
Yes 27.4 Yes 18.4
No 72.6 No 81.6
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
3.2 Islam in Society and Politics

Table 1 features statements on the role of Islam in society and politics,
and the degree of support (percentage of respondents that chooses
“somewhat agree” and “strongly agree”) among respondents for these
statements.
Not surprisingly, the statements that suggest the most radically
dominant roles for Islam in political life, such as items 2, 4, and 7, receive
the least support at below 40 per cent. On the other hand, in the aftermath
of the Jakarta gubernatorial election in April, where the incumbent,
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, was embroiled in a case of blasphemy against
Islam and eventually lost his seat as governor, item 5 receives the most
support at 63 per cent. This survey result supports anecdotal evidence
from the electoral campaign and anti-Purnama rallies that the blasphemy
charges were considered serious not just by Jakarta voters but also by
23
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 23 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Table 1: The Role of Islam
Item Support
1 The government should prioritize Islam over other 49%
religions
2 Islamic religious leaders should play a very important 37%
role in politics
3 Indonesian regions should be allowed to implement 41%
shariah law at the local level
4 Shariah law should be implemented throughout 39%
Indonesia
5 Blasphemy against Islam should be punished more 63%
severely
6 When voting in elections, it is very important to choose 58%
a Muslim leader
7 Islam should become Indonesia’s only official religion 36%
Muslims across the country. Moreover, a good majority of respondents

(58 per cent) supports item 6, suggesting that voting Muslims into
political office is important. This figure coincides with the approximate
percentage of votes that Purnama’s opponent, Anies Baswedan, won at
the polls. Thus, the socio-political views evinced by the Jakarta election,
where Islam is concerned, has broad national currency.
3.3 Chinese Indonesians

Studies of Chinese Indonesians seldom examine what indigenous
Indonesians think of them. The survey features a list of long-held
prejudicial statements concerning Chinese Indonesians to measure the
degree to which these sentiments are still held. The first set of statements
suggests that Chinese Indonesians are privileged. For all statements,
those that agree exceed those that disagree (Figure 19). However, one
24
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 24 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 19: Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Privileged
48.0
Life is easier for Chinese Indonesians 31.6
20.4
Chinese Indonesians are more likely to be wealthy than 59.8

22.2
pribumi 18.1
60.1
Chinese Indonesians are usually at least middle-class 23.9
16.0
Chinese Indonesians have a natural talent for success in 68.1

20.6
making money 11.4
Chinese Indonesians have more opportunities in life 48.7

23.9
than the indigenous 27.5
0 20 40 60 80
Agree Neither Disagree
statement – “Chinese Indonesians have a natural talent for success in

making money” – exceeds the rest in terms of respondents that agree
(68.1 per cent).
The second set of statements measures perception of Chinese
Indonesians’ influence. In terms of both the economy and politics, more
respondents agree than disagree that Chinese Indonesians have too
much influence (Figure 20). However, respondents that acknowledge the
excessive influence of Chinese in the economy (62 per cent) far exceed
those that consider the Chinese’s influence excessive in politics (41.9 per
cent). In other words, Chinese Indonesians are still considered to be
playing a bigger role in the economy than in politics, despite their less
visible role in the economy and more visible participation in electoral
politics following Indonesia’s political liberalization post-1998.
The third set of questions deals with the perception that Chinese
Indonesians tend to be exclusive. For every statement except the first
one, respondents that agree exceed 40 per cent (Figure 21). What is
interesting is that a considerable 47.6 per cent of respondents agree
that “Chinese Indonesians may still harbour loyalty towards China”,
25
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 25 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 20: Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Influence
41.9
Chinese Indonesians have too much influence in the
31.3
Indonesian politics
26.8
Agree
Neither
62.0
Chinese Indonesians have too much influence in the Disagree
23.2
Indonesian economy
14.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Figure 21: Stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians: Exclusiveness
33.7
It is inappropriate for indigenous Indonesians to
30.6
inter-marry with Chinese Indonesians
35.8
47.6
Chinese Indonesians may still harbour loyalty
34.5
towards China
17.9
44.1
It is hard to be a close friend with a Chinese
26.6
Indonesian
29.3
42.4 Agree
Chinese Indonesians have their own religion that do
30.0
not fit well in Indonesia Neither
27.6
Disagree
42.6
Chinese Indonesians have different culture that does
30.9
not fit with Indonesian values
26.5
46.3
Chinese Indonesians are too greedy and ambitious 29.5
24.2
48.4
Chinese Indonesians only care about their own kind 24.0
27.6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
even though almost all Chinese Indonesians are Indonesian citizens.

Meanwhile, 35.8 per cent of respondents disagree that “it is inappropriate
for indigenous Indonesians to inter-marry with Chinese Indonesians”,
and this is the only statement where those who disagree exceed those who
26
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 26 25/8/17 10:16 AM

agree. Apparently, although Chinese Indonesians are largely perceived as
being exclusive, indigenous Indonesians are not averse to inter-marrying
with them. The sentiment here is reminiscent of the position of the Assaat
Movement in the 1950s, which argued that it was not that indigenous
Indonesians were unwilling to accept the Chinese, but that the Chinese
stubbornly chose to maintain their foreign loyalty and exclusiveness.16
Finally, respondents are asked if they are comfortable with a
Chinese Indonesian in a position of political leadership. A majority of
the respondents (64.4 per cent) are uncomfortable with the notion, with
no significant differences where gender and urban–rural locations are
concerned. In terms of educational level, there is a clearer correlation,
where the more educated the respondent, the more likely he or she will
be comfortable with a Chinese Indonesian as political leader (Figure 22).
Where income level is concerned, those with middle income are the most
uncomfortable with the notion, perhaps because they are most likely to
encounter competition from Chinese Indonesians.
Of the different ethnic groups, only the Bataks (60 per cent) and
Balinese (100 per cent) are more comfortable than uncomfortable with
Chinese Indonesians in political positions (Figure 23).17 On the other
hand, the Malays, Cirebonese, Minangkabau and Sundanese are the most
uncomfortable with the notion of Chinese Indonesians in political office.
4. POLITICS
4.1 Approval Rating of President Widodo
One of the key questions of the survey is to ask respondents whether
they approve of how Joko Widodo is handling his job as President of
16
See A.J. Muaja, The Chinese Problem in Indonesia (Djakarta, Indonesia: New
Nusantara Publishing Coy, 1960).
17
As our research design does not produce representative samples of ethnic
groups, our inferences regarding variation across ethnic groups should be
interpreted with caution. The largest groups in our sample are the Javanese (685
respondents), Madurese (227) and Malay (66). For other minority groups, the
figures are based on a lower number of respondents, given the smaller size of
such groups as a share of the general Indonesian population.
27
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 27 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 22: Are you comfortable with a Chinese Indonesian in a
position of political leadership?
By education
80
80
80
66.8
64.2
60
60
60
53.4
46.6
Percent
40
40
40
35.8
33.2
20
20
20
0
0
No Yes No Yes No Yes
By income
80
80
80
67.4
63.6
60.7
60
60
60
Percent
39.3
40
40
36.4 40
32.6
20
20
20
0
Indonesia. The majority of the respondents (68 per cent) approves of

Widodo’s performance, while 32 per cent disapproves. This finding is
very similar to the opinion poll conducted by Saiful Mujani Research and
Consulting (SMRC) in June 2017, which finds that 67 per cent of their
respondents is satisfied with Widodo’s performance, while 31 per cent is
not satisfied.18 It also appears that support for Jokowi cuts across gender,
income, education and urban/rural cleavages, as the differences are really
small (Figure 24).
18
Cici Marlina Rahayu, “Survei SMRC: 67% Masyarakat Puas terhadap Kinerja
Jokowi”, Detiknews, 8 June 2017 <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3524763/
survei-smrc-67-masyarakat-puas-terhadap-kinerja-jokowi> (accessed 6 August
2017).
28
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 28 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 23: Views of Chinese Indonesians as political leaders,
by ethnic group
100
1
86
82 83
80
78
80
76
63 64
61 60
60
Percent
39 40
40
37 36
24 22
20
18
20
17
14
0
0
se
ay
an
li
en
n
gi
es
es
ta
an
bo
Ba
ne
al
vi
nt
Bu
Ba
an
ur
in
re
M
ta
Ba
va
ad
nd
Ci
Ba
Ja
M
Su
Uncomfortable Comfortable
4.2 Trust in Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy

Respondents are asked how much they trust different institutions in
Indonesia. The Army is by far the most trusted (90.2 per cent), followed by
the Corruption Eradication Commission (83.1 per cent) and the national
government (81.6 per cent, see Figure 25). In general, state institutions
are highly trusted. On the other hand, the least trusted are political parties
(45.8 per cent) and the House of Representatives (55.4 per cent), which
suggests that respondents have much lower trust in politicians.
In general, respondents value democracy as a political system, as
79.8 per cent considers democracy to be the best form of government
for Indonesia, although less people think that democracy can solve
29
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 29 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 24: President’s approval rating by gender, location,
education and income
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
68.7 67.6 68.9 67.4
Percent
Percent
31.3 32.4 31.1 32.6
ve
ve
ve
ve
ve
ve
ve
ve
ro
ro
ro
ro
ro
ro
ro
ro
p
pp
pp
pp
pp
Ap
Ap
Ap
Ap
a
a
is
is
is
is
D
D
By education
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
67.5 68.8 67.7
Percent
32.5 31.2 32.3
Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove
By income
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
69.5 67.3 66.7

Percent
30.5 32.7 33.3
Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove
the nation’s problems (71.6 per cent, see Figure 26). Moreover, when

respondents are asked if they consider democracy to be more important
than development, those who agree drop drastically to 49.9 per cent.
Thus, while democracy is seen as an important part of Indonesia’s
political system, its relative importance drops when respondents consider
the pragmatic concerns of the nation.
30
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 30 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 25: Trust in institutions in Indonesia
National government 81.6
Province government 79.9
District government 78.8
Mass media 67.2
Electoral Commission 79.3
Civil service 78.4
Corruption Eradication Commission 83.1
Political parties 45.8
Courts 65.7
House of Representatives 55.4
Police 70.3
Army 90.2
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0
Figure 27 shows the importance that respondents place on pluralism.

A strong majority of 78.3 per cent agrees that the rights of ethnic and
religious minorities are protected, while an even larger 87.7 per cent of
respondents agrees that Pancasila, the state ideology that supports ethnic
and religious pluralism, should remain the most important national
ideology of Indonesia. Thus, it seems that pluralism continues to be a
value held onto by a significant majority of Indonesians.
However, when we break down the results by ethnicity and religion,
significant variation emerges. Not surprisingly, the Chinese feel the most
politically marginalized, as 31 per cent of respondents disagree that
minorities are protected, far exceeding other ethnic groups (Figure 28).
Where religious groups are concerned, it is the Catholics that feel most
politically marginalized, as 25 per cent of respondents disagrees that
minorities are protected, followed by Protestants at a distant second of
9 per cent.
4.3 Decentralization
Respondents are asked to assess if having multiple levels of government
is a system that is working for Indonesia. In response, 80 per cent of the
31
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 31 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 26: On democracy
Indonesia is a democratic country Indonesia more democratic now than 10y ago
77.4
80
20 40 60 80
71.6
60
Percent
40
16.6 19.3
20
5.97 9.12
0
0
Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree
Democracy best form of govt. for Indonesia Democracy can solve Indonesia's problems
79.8
80
80
71.6
40 60
60
Percent
40
15.5 18.3
20
20
10.1
4.69
0
Democracy more important than development

49.9
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent
26.4
23.8
Disagree Neither Agree
sample says that the system is working “quite well” or “very well”, while
the remaining 20 per cent chooses “not well at all” or “not very well”.
This suggests that a strong majority of respondents is satisfied with the
current system of decentralized governance.
When we consider location as a factor, rural respondents are more
likely than urban respondents to think that the current decentralized
system is working well (Figure 29). Where region is concerned, it
appears that the furthest reaching regions of Eastern Islands (91 per cent)
and Papua (88 per cent) and the most populated region of Java and Bali
(83 per cent) have the highest proportion of respondents that considers
32
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 32 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 27: On pluralism
Rights of ethnic/religion minorities are protected Pancasila should be national ideology

100
100
87.7
78.3
80
80
60
60
Percent
40
40
20
20
16.8
11.6
4.87
.672
0
Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree
Figure 28: Disagreement with statement “The rights of ethnic

and religious minorities are protected in Indonesia”, by ethnic
and religious group
By ethnic group
Javanese 4
Sundanese 6
Malay 9
Bugis 4
Betawi 4
Batak 11
Minang 3
Chinese 31
0 10 20 30
By religious group
Islam 4
Catholic 25
Protestant 9
0 10 20 30
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 33 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 29: Support for decentralized governance, by location
and region
By location By region
83
100
78
80
91
88
83 82
77
80
69
60
60
Percent
40
40 31
22 23
18
20
17 17
20
12
9
0
Java and Bali Kalimantan Easter Islands

0
Urban Rural Sumatra Sulawesi Papua
Not well at all/Not very well Quite well/Very well
the decentralized system to be working well, while Sumatra (69 per cent)

has the least proportion of respondents that thinks that the system is
working well.19
When respondents are asked which level of government should
have the most power, given a choice among provincial, district/city
and village levels, 53 per cent chooses the provincial level, 28 per cent
chooses districts/cities and 19 per cent chooses villages. When we
take location into consideration, rural respondents are more likely to
prefer the lower levels of government (village and district) than urban
19
As our research design does not produce representative samples at the region/
provincial level, our inferences on variation across regions should be interpreted
with caution. Of the 1,620 face-to-face interviews we conducted, 950 took place
in Java or Bali, 330 in Sumatra, 100 in Kalimantan, 130 in Sulawesi, 80 in the
Eastern Islands (Nusa Tenggara and Maluku), and 20 in Papua.
34
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 34 25/8/17 10:16 AM

respondents (Figure 30). Where region is taken into consideration, the
pattern becomes quite varied. Most regions prefer the province to hold
the most power, especially Kalimantan (66 per cent) and Papua (63 per
cent). Sulawesi, however, is an outlier where a majority of respondents
(54 per cent) prefers the district or city to hold the most power. Among all
regions, Eastern Island respondents (33 per cent) are most likely to prefer
the most power to reside with the village level of governance.
4.4 Political Participation

To measure the degree of political participation, a series of activities is
listed and participants answer if they have participated in such activities
in the last few years. It appears that voting in local, legislative and
presidential elections are the most common forms of political activity
that respondents have participated in, since more than 90 per cent of
Figure 30: What level of government should have most powers?

Results by location and region
By location By region
59
60
80
66
63
47
60
56
54 54
40
42
Percent
30
40
26 33
32
24 30
25 25 25
24
20
20 21
15
20
17
9
5
0
Java and Bali Kalimantan Easter Islands

0
Urban Rural Sumatra Sulawesi Papua
Village District Province
35
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 35 25/8/17 10:16 AM

respondents report having voted in these elections (Figure 31).20
However, beyond that, political participation drops significantly, with
only 13.4 per cent having participated in a campaign event, 6.4 per cent
having volunteered for a political candidate or campaign, 5.3 per cent
having contacted a politician and 5.2 per cent having used social media
to talk about politics.21
In terms of membership of organizations, religious groups or
organizations are the most popular at 27.7 per cent, with farmer
organizations at a distant second at 11.9 per cent (Figure 32). Significantly,
political parties are least popular, where only 1.1 per cent of respondents
are members.
When we ask if respondents are interested in politics, 28.1 per cent
expresses interest, while 71.9 per cent expresses a lack of interest. When
Figure 31: Political participation
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Voted at local elections (pilkada) 93.1
Voted at legislative elections 91.5
Voted at presidential elections 94.0
Contacted a politician 5.3
Donated money to candidate/campaign 1.1
Volunteered for candidate/campaign 6.4
Participated at event during campaign 13.4
Used social media to talk about politics 5.2
Participated at demonstration/protest 2.6
20
Here, voting behaviour is over-reported, as the percentages are higher than
official turnout. For 2014, the turnout for parliamentary and presidential elections
were 75.11 per cent and 69.58 per cent respectively. See International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter turnout data for Indonesia” <http://
download.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=101> (accessed 7 August 2017).
21
The last corresponds with the degree of e-commerce participation of
respondents.
36
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 36 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 32: Organization membership
Sports/hobby club or art/cultural organization 7.1
Political party 1.1
Alumni association (school, university, etc.) 5.3
Parents-School Association 6.7
Cooperative 8.0
Business or professional association 3.6
Farmer organization 11.9
Labor union 2.9
Charity or volunteering organization 5.4
Religious group or organization 27.7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
we break down the data further, it appears that respondents who are male,
based in rural locations, and have higher education are more interested
in politics (Figure 33). Where income is concerned, respondents with
middle income are least interested in politics.
4.5 National Identity

Where national identity is concerned, respondents display great pride in
being Indonesian, where 97.1 per cent is proud to be Indonesian, 96.8 per
cent prefers to be citizens of Indonesia than of any other country, and
95.2 per cent holds the strong view that, while Indonesian people may
not be perfect, their culture is superior to that of other nations (Figure 34).
However, significantly less respondents (82.4 per cent) feel that the world
will be a better place if other nations are more like Indonesia, suggesting
that although most are proud to be Indonesians, less think that Indonesia
has the best living conditions.
4.6 Globalization and International Relations

The survey seeks to understand respondents’ openness to globalization.
Figure 35 shows that respondents are most open to foreign development
and infrastructure projects (77.2 per cent) and foreign trade (75.4 per cent),
37
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 37 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 33: Are you interested in politics? Results by gender,
location, education and income
78.1
80
80
80
80
74.3
69.3
65.9
60
60
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
40
40
34.1
30.7
25.7
21.9
20
20
20
20
0
0
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
By education
75.9
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
70.4
59.8
Percent
40.2
29.6
24.1
By income
76
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
0 20 40 60 80
70.9 66.7
Percent
29.1 33.3
24
and slightly less open to foreign investment (66.7 per cent). However,

when it comes to foreign workers, marginally more respondents disagree
(40.8 per cent) than agree (40.1 per cent) that Indonesia should be open
to them. This may be due to the perception that while the former three
may improve the lives of Indonesians or generate income and jobs for
them, the last introduces competition for jobs with Indonesians.
38
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 38 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 34: Attachment to national identity
World a better place if other nations were more like

82.4
Indonesia
Indonesian culture is superior to others 95.2
I'd rather be a citizen of Indonesia than any other

96.8
country
I am very proud to be Indonesian 97.1
75.0 80.0 85.0 90.0 95.0 100.0
Figure 35: Support for globalization
More open to trade More open to foreign investment

80
80
75.4
66.7
60
60
Percent
40
40
18.2
20
20
15 15.1
9.55
0
More open to migrant workers Welcome foreign infrastructure project

77.2
80
80
60
60
40.8 40.1
40
40
19
20
20
14.5
8.34
0
39
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 39 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Where international relations are concerned, the survey asks
respondents if they admire certain countries. Figure 36 shows that
Singapore (85.6 per cent), Malaysia (85.3 per cent) and Thailand
(82.8 per cent) are most likely to be admired by respondents. On the
other hand, China (76.7 per cent), the United States (79.3 per cent) and
Australia (79.5 per cent) are least likely to be admired. It seems that
respondents are more likely to identify with Southeast Asian countries in
the list, and less likely to identify with countries beyond Southeast Asia.
As admiration may differ from importance, respondents are also
asked how important certain countries are for Indonesia. In this regard,
Malaysia, Japan and Singapore are more likely to be considered important
countries for Indonesia. On the other hand, China, Thailand and Australia
are less likely to be deemed important for Indonesia.
Figure 36 also shows that 83 per cent of respondents consider the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to be important
for Indonesia, just behind Malaysia at 84 per cent. This response is
surprisingly high given that Indonesian businesses as well as government
Figure 36: Perceptions of countries and ASEAN
88
85.6
86 85.3
83.6
84 83.0
82.5 82.8
82.1
81.8
82 81.2
80 79.5
79.3 78.6
77.8
78 77.3
76.7
76
74
72
tes ina an sia ore and ali
a N
Sta Ch Jap lay gap ail str EA
ited Ma Sin Th Au AS
Un
I admire this country This country is important for Indonesia
40
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 40 25/8/17 10:16 AM

officials are widely perceived to be having waning commitment towards
ASEAN.22
In the context of the global rise of China, respondents are asked if
they think the rise of China will have a positive or negative impact on
neighbouring countries such as Indonesia. Those who think that the
rise of China will have a positive impact on Indonesia are only slightly
more (41 per cent) than those who think it will have a negative impact
(39 per cent). This balance between respondents who think there will be a
negative impact and positive impact respectively is a pattern that emerges
consistently across gender, location, and income level differences.
However, perception on China’s impact on Indonesia does differ
significantly across ethnic groups. While the Madurese, Bantenese and
Malays are least likely to have positive perceptions of China’s impact,
the Balinese, Chinese, Batak and Cirebonese are most likely to have
positive perceptions of China’s impact (Figure 37).
Respondents are asked if they think Indonesia can benefit from
close economic ties with China. Interestingly, Figure 38 shows that the
majority of respondents (62.4 per cent) thinks that close economic ties
with China will only bring a little benefit to Indonesia. Only 27.7 per cent
of respondents believes that it will bring a lot of benefits to Indonesia. It
is important to note that respondents who are from urban locations and
who have higher income are more likely to think that closer economic
ties with China will bring a lot of benefits. However, overall, the majority
of respondents still think that the benefit is small.
Not surprisingly, Chinese respondents are most likely to see a lot of
benefits from closer economic ties with China (67 per cent), followed by
the Cirebonese (50 per cent) and Bataks (40 per cent) (Figure 39). Malays
(6 per cent) and Sundanese (20 per cent) are least likely to perceive a lot
22
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Is Indonesia Turning Away from ASEAN Under
Jokowi?”, The Diplomat, 18 December 2014 <http://thediplomat.com/2014/
12/is-indonesia-turning-away-from-asean-under-jokowi/> (accessed 7 August
2017).
41
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 41 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 37: Positive perceptions of the impact of China on
neighbouring countries, by ethnic group
80
70
60
54
51
50
48
45
43
Percent
41
40
40
38
29
20
20
17
0
se
ay
an
li
en
er
gi
es
es
es
ta
an
bo
Ba
th
ne
al
vi
nt
Bu
Ba
an
ur
in
in
re
O
M
ta
Ba
va
Ch
ad
nd
Ci
Ba
Ja
M
Su
Figure 38: How much will Indonesia benefit by having close

economic ties with China? Results by location and income
By location
Whole sample Rural Urban
64.7
62.4
60.3
60
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
40
32
27.7
23
20
20
20
12.3
9.9
7.7
0
Not at all A little A lot Not at all A little A lot Not at all A little A lot
By income
80
60.6
66 58.2
60
60
60
Percent
40
40
33.9
40
29.9
22.8
20
20
20
11.2 9.49 7.97

0
Not at all A little A lot Not at all A little A lot Not at all A little A lot
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 42 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 39: Share of respondents thinking Indonesia benefits
“a lot” from close economic ties with China, by ethnic group
80
66.7
60
50
Percent
40
38.5
40
37.5 37.5
33.3
31.4
25
23.8
22.4
20.1
20
6.4
0
se
ay
an
li
en
er
gi
es
es
es
ta
an
bo
Ba
th
ne
al
vi
nt
Bu
Ba
an
ur
in
in
re
O
M
ta
Ba
va
Ch
ad
nd
Ci
Ba
Ja
M
Su
of benefits. Nonetheless, only a small proportion of respondents (9.9 per

cent) thinks that having closer economic ties with China will bring no
benefits at all for Indonesia.
Concerning Chinese migrant workers, who often participate in
Chinese investment projects in Indonesia, 50.2 per cent of respondents
thinks that they should be allowed to work but the government should
limit their numbers (Figure 40). Another 19.9 per cent thinks they should
be allowed to work in Indonesia, but only if they have high qualifications,
and 26.6 per cent thinks that they should not be allowed to work in
Indonesia at all. Only 3.26 per cent thinks that these migrant workers
should be allowed to work in Indonesia with no restrictions.
Respondents are also asked what they think about Chinese investment
in strategic sectors such as infrastructure, telecommunications, mining,
and gas. 25.2 per cent thinks that such investments should never be
43
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 43 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 40: Attitudes over Chinese immigration. Chinese
workers should…
Be allowed to work in
Indonesia with no restrictions 3.26
Indonesia but in limited numbers 50.2
Indonesia, but only if high-skilled 19.9
Not be allowed to
work in Indonesia 26.6
0 10 20 30 40 50
allowed, 54.9 per cent thinks that they should be allowed in some cases,
and 19.9 per cent thinks that they should be allowed (Figure 41).
The survey also asks respondents about their opinion in relation to
what role Indonesia should play in view of China’s disagreements with
its neighbours over its maritime territory in the South China Sea. 53 per
cent of respondents does not select an answer, which suggests general
lack of awareness of this issue. Among those who give an answer to
this question, 37.7 per cent thinks that Indonesia should not be involved,
because it has no territory in the South China Sea (Figure 42). A majority
of 50.7 per cent thinks that Indonesia should mediate between China and
Southeast Asian countries. 10.2 per cent thinks that Indonesia should
support or lead Southeast Asian countries in this dispute, and only
1.45 per cent thinks that Indonesia should side with China.
44
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 44 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Figure 41: What do you think about Chinese investment in
strategic sectors?
It should never
be allowed 25.2
It should be allowed
only in some cases 54.9
It should
be allowed 19.9
0 20 40 60
Figure 42: How should Indonesia handle the South China Sea
issue?
Indonesia should not be involved

37.7
because it has no territorial claims
Indonesia should mediate

50.7
between China and SEA countries
Indonesia should support/lead

10.2
SEA countries in their dispute
Indonesia should side with

1.45
China on this issue
0 10 20 30 40 50
17-J02520 01 Trends_2017-10.indd 45 25/8/17 10:16 AM

Finally, the survey asks respondents for their opinion on the recent
disputes between China and Indonesia in the Natuna Sea.23 As with the
previous question, there is lack of awareness of this issue, as 59 per cent
of respondents does not answer this question. Of the respondents who
answer the question, 50.6 per cent thinks that the incidents are alarming
as China is encroaching on Indonesia’s territory. 41.6 per cent thinks
that the incidents are serious, but caused by illegal fishing (Figure 43).
This indicates that respondents are slightly more likely to consider the
Natuna Sea issue a national security issue rather than a dispute based on
economic interests.
Figure 43: What’s your opinion on recent incidents in the

Natuna Sea?
These incidents are alarming, China

50.6
is encroaching on Indonesian territory
The incidents are serious

41.6
but only caused by illegal fishing
This is a minor matter,

7.76
the Indonesian government overreacted
0 10 20 30 40 50
23
China and Indonesia have been clashing over fishing rights in the waters off
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands since 2015.
46
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5. CONCLUSION
The survey covers a wide range of issues, from the economy to Islam,
Chinese Indonesians, political attitudes and attitudes towards other
countries. Not all questions are reported in this paper, but we have given
an overview of the key initial findings of this survey.
In terms of the economy, the outlook is mainly optimistic, especially
where household economic condition is concerned. President Joko
Widodo’s approval rating hovers at around 68 per cent, in line with
current opinion polls. In general, respondents think that Widodo has made
improvements to the economy since taking office, although there are
concerns in terms of the price of necessities and job-seeking prospects.
Indeed, when considering the role of the government in the economy,
setting the price of gas and staple food and setting a minimum wage are
the two items with overwhelming support from respondents.
The Widodo administration, which has made infrastructure
development its signature policy thrust, scores well in this aspect
of governance. Roads, education and electricity supply remain the
infrastructural facilities seen by most respondents as top priorities, while
corruption is considered the key impediment to the successful delivery of
these facilities. Indeed, corruption is also considered the most important
issue facing Indonesia today.
The survey finds that use of the Internet and smartphones, both at
around 30 per cent, is not very high. Thus, it is not surprising that the
prevalence of respondents’ involvement in the most common e-commerce
transactions, such as online shopping, ordering of ride services, and
online travel and ticketing, is not high either. This implies that there is
still a lot of room for growth in the e-commerce sector of the economy.
Where Islamic piety is concerned, the most common religious
practice is prayer at obligatory times, followed by the giving of alms
and attendance at Friday prayers. The haj is considered important, but
respondents acknowledge that there are practical constraints in fulfilling
it. The donning of the hijab is now considered an important outward
sign of Islamic religiosity for women in Indonesia, supported by more
than 80 per cent of respondents. Indeed, almost 80 per cent of Muslim
women surveyed wears the hijab and interestingly, it is becoming more
47
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common the higher the education and income, suggesting that the Islamic
headscarf is getting more popular among Muslim women of higher social
class.
An overwhelming 90.9 per cent of Muslim respondents thinks that
there will be various benefits to the implementation of shariah law, the
most important being that it will safeguard the moral fabric of society.
At the same time, the greatest challenges to Islam are not external, such
as Christianization or non-Muslim leaders becoming too powerful, but
rather, factors that challenge the internal integrity of Islam, such as
divisive debates and Islamic leaders’ involvement in politics.
Being conducted in the aftermath of the Jakarta gubernatorial
elections, the survey results echo some of the key issues that emerged
during the hotly contested electoral campaign in the capital. Punishing
blasphemy against Islam is most highly supported by respondents, and
58 per cent of them consider it important to vote a Muslim leader into
office, coinciding with the level of support that Purnama’s opponent,
Anies Baswedan, received at the polls. This suggests that these issues
have currency beyond Jakarta and the gubernatorial election.
It continues to be common for Chinese Indonesians to be perceived as
privileged, overly influential and exclusive in Indonesia. One surprising
finding is that about 48 per cent of respondents still thinks that Chinese
Indonesians may still harbour loyalty towards China, underlining the
continuing perception that they are foreign. This is probably why a
majority of respondents (64.4 per cent) are uncomfortable with the notion
of Chinese Indonesians in positions of political leadership. Nevertheless,
more respondents find it acceptable rather than unacceptable to inter-
marry with Chinese Indonesians.
On the political front, state institutions, especially the Army, are more
highly trusted than politicians. Democracy continues to be seen as a
cornerstone of the Indonesian political system, but not considered as being
able to solve all of the nation’s problems. Pluralism, as represented by a
belief in Pancasila, continues to be a value held onto by an overwhelming
majority of respondents, although certain ethnic and religious minorities
disagree that minority rights are adequately protected. In terms of
decentralization, the majority (80 per cent) of respondents thinks that the
48
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current system is working well, and a slight majority (53 per cent) prefers
decentralized power to reside at the provincial level.
Where political participation is concerned, it is very much limited to
voting at elections. This is not surprising since only about 28 per cent
of respondents reports being interested in politics, and it is reminiscent
of political behaviour in most other democracies around the world. As
for participation in associational life, membership in political parties is
least common, while membership in religious groups or organizations is
the most common, suggesting that civic life is most active in religious
circles.
While respondents are proud of their country and identify strongly
with Indonesia, they are also relatively open to globalization and having
an open economy, although they have more reservations where foreign
workers are concerned. Respondents also consider traditional economic
partners such as Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and ASEAN to be most
important for Indonesia.
With respect to the rise of China, respondents are almost equally
divided on whether this has a positive or negative impact on Indonesia.
Nevertheless, around 90 per cent thinks that close economic ties with
China will bring at least a little benefit. On Chinese migrant workers,
around 70 per cent agrees that they should be allowed to work in
Indonesia, but with qualifications. Similarly, concerning Chinese
investment in strategic sectors of Indonesia, about 75 per cent agrees that
it should be allowed, but more than two-thirds of these respondents also
feel that such investments should be guided by conditions.
The results from this survey are wide-ranging and suggestive, and we
have proposed some preliminary inferences in this report. What has been
presented are the major trends, in terms of attitudes and behaviour, with
respect to the economy, society, and domestic and international politics.
Forthcoming publications will examine this rich data with more rigorous
analysis.
49
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ISSN 0219-3213
2017 no. 10
Trends in
Southeast Asia
THE INDONESIA NATIONAL SURVEY

PROJECT: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND
POLITICS
DIEGO FOSSATI, HUI YEW-FOONG

TRS10/17s
AND SIWAGE DHARMA NEGARA
ISBN 978-981-4786-46-1

Singapore 119614
http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg 9 789814 786461

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DIEGO FOSSATI, HUI YEW-FOONG

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace

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THE INDONESIA NATIONAL SURVEY PROJECT:

DIEGO FOSSATI, HUI YEW-FOONG AND

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© 2017 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

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The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast

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List of Figures and Tables......................................................................vii

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By Diego Fossati, Hui Yew-Foong and Siwage Dharma Negara

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By Diego Fossati, Hui Yew-Foong and Siwage Dharma Negara1

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1.2 Survey Methodology

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1.3 Purpose and Structure

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Right now Compared to last year In one year

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Right now Compared to last year In one year

Figure 3 breaks down, according to location, education and income,

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Better No change Worse Better No change Worse

32.9 32.6 33.3

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Figure 4: Compared with the SBY years, has the economy

Economy has grown faster Economy more competitive Easier to do business

Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree

29.9 28.8 27.9 28.9

Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree Disagree Neither Agree

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2.3 Infrastructure Policy

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32.6 31.3 31.8 31.6 31.6 31

Not satisfied Satisfied Not satisfied Satisfied

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Railways & MRTs .647

Railways & MRTs .417

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There is too much corruption 97.0

There is a lack of human and financial resources 33.1

Local government is not cooperative 11.1

Anti-corruption regulations slow down the process 7.62

DPR & political parties are not supportive 4.7

The goals are too ambitious 2.8

Corruption is perceived not only as the biggest obstacle for

2.4 Role of Government in the Economy

2.5 Internet and E-commerce

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Economic management & growth 30.7