ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

GALLANT CASE DOCTRINES

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

(1) Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees

(249 SCRA 162)
An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms
governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either of
them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or
function is performed. The word “instrumentality,” with respect to a state contemplates
an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a
state function.

The voluntary arbitrator performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power

delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality” in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The decision
or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should be appealed to the
Court of Appeals.

(2) Iron and Steel Authority v. CA (249 SCRA 538)

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and
functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-
assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such as e.g., devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first
instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions
of the Corporation Code.

(3) Solid Homes v. Payawal (177 SCRA 72)

Regarding to awarding of damages of HLURB
PD 957. Section 1(b): “ Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision
lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman”

The phrase “any other claims” is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all
claims which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases
specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under
the subject provisions.

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to
create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified

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activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth
department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed

to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative
purpose.

(4) Christian General Assembly v. Ignacio (597 SCRA 266)

Administrative Agencies; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject
matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’ consent or by
their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the nature of an action.—The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a
tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law
governing at the time the action was commenced. The jurisdiction of the tribunal over
the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law, not by the parties’
consent or by their waiver in favor of a court that would otherwise have no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the nature of an action. Thus, the determination of whether
the CGA’s cause of action falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB necessitates a
closer examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority.

(5) Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission (223 SCRA 747)

The rule is that the findings of fact of administration bodies if based on substantial
evidence are controlling on the receiving authority.

While the rules governing judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their
strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases.
A. Having been given all the opportunities to be heard, which she fully availed of, she
cannot now complain that she was denied due process.

B. Charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution.

C. Constitutional requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which a decision is based applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative
bodies like the Civil Service Commission.

(6) Lianga Bay Logging, Co. v. Enage (152 SCRA 80)

it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the
authority specifically vested in them by law, unless there is a clear showing that the

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latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a
capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or
lack of jurisdiction.

CHAPTER 2. NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF ADMIN AGENCIES

(1) Larin v. Executive Secretary (280 SCRA 713)

A presidential appointee who belongs to the career service of the Civil Service comes
under the direct disciplining authority of the President. Under the law, Career Executive
Service officers, namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the
direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle
that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” conferred to the President
by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

However, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing
authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that
he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial
protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural
due process.

(2) Dario v. Mison (176 SCRA 84)

At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of
office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by
reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the
Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply
with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove
anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in “good faith” if
it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that
as it may, if the “abolition,” which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith,
no valid “abolition” takes

(3) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary (360 SCRA 718)

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes
the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or

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by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself,
it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of
a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.

To “deactivate” means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or

reassigning personnel,13 while to “abolish” means to do away with, to annul, abrogate
or destroy completely.14 In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the
office wholly and permanently.15 Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the
same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining
dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both
reorganization measures.

(4) Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration (323 SCRA 312)

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes
the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or
by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself,
it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception,
however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of
a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.

It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for
us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction,
reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Reorganization is carried out in ‘good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil
service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the
original offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

(5) Domingo v. Zamora (397 SCRA 56)

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This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition
of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employee’s cessation in office, but in
such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist.
On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the
employee’s cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another
department, agency or office.

CHAPTER 3. NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF ADMIN AGENCIES

(1) Makati Stock Exchange v. SEC

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.

In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision
expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power is “necessary for
the execution of the functions vested in it”; but it makes no explanation, perhaps relying
on the reasons advanced in support of its position that trading of the same securities in
two or more stock exchanges, fails to give protection to the investors, besides
contravening public interest. (Of this, we shall treat later)

(2) Taule v. Santos

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Election Law; The jurisdiction of the Comelec is
over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate.—The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined
through the will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote. Specifically, the term “election,” in the
context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes
which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
“Election contests” would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the
title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner,
is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute and in the case
of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of
the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng
mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises
only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited
jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is
limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan

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concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective
organization.

(3) Solid Homes v. Payawal

Same; Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Statutes conferring powers on
administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their
duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.—Statutes conferring powers on their
administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their
assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Fol-lowing this policy in
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the
competence of the respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive
jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the
parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; National Housing Authority; Presidential Decree

No. 957; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; The Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business
and practices under Sec. 1, of PD 957.—The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended
by PD No. 1344, entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of
Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957.”
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its
function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real
estate business practices;B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. (Italics supplied.) The language of this
section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that “exclusive
jurisdiction” over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested
not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.

CHAPTER 4. INVESTIGATORY POWERS

(1) Carino v. Commission on Human Rights (204 SCRA 483)

Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like
alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. In other words, to
instigate is not to adjudicate/adjudge.

(2) Villaluz v. Zaldivar (15 SCRA 710)

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Power of control of President may extend to power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department (presidential
appointees).

The Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, being a presidential appointee, belongs
to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can
only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the
Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint" as can be implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Consequently, the
Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass upon
questions of suspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with reference to
permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which classification the
administrator does not belong.

(3) Ruiz v. Drilon (204 SCRA 483)

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any
investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled
only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. There is no
doubt that be has been accorded his rights.

(4) Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (343 SCRA 377)

Due process rights of notice and hearing may be invoked at evaluation stage of
extradition proceeding because of its peculiarity.

(5) Pefianco v. Moral (322 SCRA 439)

Respondent in administrative case is not entitled to be inform of the findings and
recommendations of investigating committee.

(6) Camara v. Municipal Court (387 US 523)

Search warrant need not be obtained in the conduct of search of the purpose building
safety regulations as long as it is made during reasonable hours. However, when search
warrant is demanded by the owner of the placed to be searched, a search warrant is
needed.

(7) Salazar v. Achacoso (183 SCRA 45)

Article 38 of the Labor Code which grants the Secretary of Labor authority to issue
orders of arrest, search and seizure is unconstitutional. According to the Constitution,
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. The Secretary of Labor is
not a judge.

(8) Catura v. CIR (37 SCRA 303)

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Accounts, records, reports or statements may be required to be delivered and deposited
with administrative body at the hearing. Documents required to be produced constitutes
evidence of most solid character as to whether there was failure to comply with
mandates of the law.

(9) Evangelista v. Jarencio (69 SCRA 99)

Administrative agencies have no inherent power to: (1) require attendance; (2) put
under oath; require to testify witnesses.

(10) Office of the Court Administrator v. Canque (588 SCRA 226)

In administrative agencies, formal/trial type hearing is not required.

(11) Carmelo v. Ramos (GR No. 13378)

The following are the requisites to issue contempt: (1) Statutory Grant; (2) The one
exercising is performing quasi-judicial functions.

Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to Administrative Body.

(12) Masangcay v. COMELEC (6 SCRA 27)

The following are the requisites to issue contempt: (1) Statutory Grant; (2) The one
exercising is performing quasi-judicial functions. Contempt was proper. COMELEC was
exercising it in a quasi-judicial capacity.

(13) Bedol v. COMELEC (606 SCRA 554)

The following are the requisites to issue contempt: (1) Statutory Grant; (2) The one
exercising is performing quasi-judicial functions. Contempt was improper. COMELEC
was exercising it in a ministerial function, because contempt is inherently judicial in
nature.

(14) Gaoiran v. Alcala ( 444 SCRA 428)

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings.

(15) Ang TIbay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 PHIL 636)

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3)
The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be
substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing;
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal
or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The
Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason
for the decision rendered.

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CHAPTER 5. RULE MAKING POWERS

(1) KMU v. Garcia

Same; Same; Political Law; Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers; Power of
Subordinate Legislation; The Legislature has delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission, and presently the LTFRB, the power of fixing the rates of public
services.—Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct
Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent
LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under
Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order
authorizes LTFRB “to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust,
reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public
land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the task of determining sensitive and
delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible
regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation, under which such
administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide.—
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to
adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental
regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and
delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible
regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority,
an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Legislature may neither have time
nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are
the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a
common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial
bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal
and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority; Potestas
delegata non delegari potest.—In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB
to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized
existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tanta-mount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of
another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly.

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 (2) PASEI v. Torres
Political Law; Administrative Law; Quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers; The
vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the
growing complexity of the modern society.”—The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the growing complexity of the modern society”
(Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative
bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society’s ramified activities.
“Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or
the courts of justice” (Ibid.).

(3) Santiago v. Comelec

Same; Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; What has been delegated cannot be
delegated; Exceptions.—The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the
President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of
emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5)
Delegation to administrative bodies.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In every case of permissible delegation, there must
be a showing that the delegation itself is valid; Tests of Valid Delegation.—Empowering
the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under No. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected.

(4) US v. Ang Tang Ho

THE POWER TO DELEGATE.—The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to
enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing
mor£ than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it
into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is
valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the

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doing of which is vested in the Governor-Geheral, the act is a delegation of legislative
power, is unconstitutional and void.

(5) Ynot v. IAC

Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property conf iscated is
denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the of ficers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem
needs immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are
occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded
that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural
due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however,
there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct
it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se
as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice,
with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No.
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose
the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

(6) DAR v. Sutton

Administrative Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Agencies; Delegation of Powers;
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to
make rules and regulations. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions.—
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to
make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to
issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-
making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.

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They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the
administrative body concerned.

Same; Same; The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,

administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not
contravene the provisions of the Constitution.—The fundamental rule in administrative
law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority
of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making
power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it
by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.

(7) Sol. Gen. v. MMA

Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of legislative power.—The Court
holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures,
it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are: 1)
the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a
sufficient standard. Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature
complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when
the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion
to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be
enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the
enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function
of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the
delegation from running riot.” This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the
“convenience and welfare” of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the
case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.

Same; Same; Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance; Measures under

consideration do not conform to existing law.—According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance,
to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures
under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to
existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow either the removal of
the license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila.

Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate
existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue

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of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us,
the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the
decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

(8) BOIE-Takeda v, Dela Serna

Same; Same; Administrative Law; An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress.—In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the
second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of
the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of “basic salary” as defined in
P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from
the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope.
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

(9) United BFHA v. BF Homes

Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The power to promulgate rules in the implementation of
a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.—As
early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators
(PVA), we ruled that the power to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Its terms must be
followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. “The rule-
making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.” If
a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is
the former that prevails.

Same Same; Same; Same; The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a
delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it
by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.—In
the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it
promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly
expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as
the association’s franchise or corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the
“general public or other entity” that could question this. The appellate court correctly
held that: “The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a
matter which HIGC cannot legally do x x x.” The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to
abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power

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beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules
and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what
fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it
is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat the purpose
of a statute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Where the legislature has delegated to
an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry
out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which
have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not
represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate.—Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an
executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out
an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which
have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not
represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate. “A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.” It is
axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the
provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid.

(10) Lupangco v. CA
Administrative Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Orders or resolutions of the Professional
Regulations Commission fall within the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court;
Absence of provision in the law creating the Commission that its orders and resolutions
are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court.—Upon the other
hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to
question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike
Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in
Presidential Decree No. 223, the law creating the Professional Regulation Commission,
that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86–37950, which was
filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professionai
Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Professionat Regulations Commission is attached to

the Office of the President, and even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the Court ofFirst Instance, now Regional Trial Court.—What is clear from
Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached
to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our
jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed
by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).

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Same; Same; Same; To invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court
ofAppeals under BP 129, there must be a final order or ruling by an administrative body
exercising quasi-judicial functions; Meaning of “quasi-judicial adjudication"—In order to
invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in
Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which
resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-
judicial functions. In Black’s Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to
the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which
applies to a specific situation. This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative
policies and functionB like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent
PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

Same; Same; Same;Axiom In administrative law that administrative authority should not
act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations.—It is an axiom
in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to
bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued,
then they must be held to be invalid.

Same; Same; Same; Resolution No. 105 prohibiting examinees from attending any
review class, briefing conference conducted by or shall receive any hand-out, review
materials or any tip from any school, college or any university or any review center
infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution; Reason.—
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They
have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.
They should be allowed to eDjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will
promote their personal growth.

(11) People v. Que Po Lay

CRIMINAL LAW; PENAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IMPOSING PENALTIES, NEED
BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE IT MAY BECOME
EFFECTIVE.—Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central

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Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation, should be published before becoming
effective.

Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.

(12) Tanada v. Tuvera

Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal instructions issued by an administrative
agency are not covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal
ordinances which are governed by the Local Government Code.—However, no
publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.

Same; Same; Same.—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

(13) People v. Maceren

Fishing; Administrative law; Fishery Adm. Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing is null
and void because the Fishery Laws under which it was issued (Act 4003 and R.A. 3512)
did not expressly prohibit electro fishing.—We are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those
orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Law, Act No. 4003, and under the law
creating the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing
is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis.

Same; Same; Lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to
declare what act constitute a criminal offense.—The law making body cannot delegate
to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself.

Same; Same; An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not
amend an act of the legislature.—Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,

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and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such
relations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra).
An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. x x x The rule-making
power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.

Same; Same; In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly

appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by law.—A penal
statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules
and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have
only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon it. x x x In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must
clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority
conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special
care.

(14) US v. Panlilio
ID.; QUARANTINE REGULATIONS OF BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE.—While Act No.
1760, entitled as aforesaid, authorizes the Director of Agriculture, among other things,
"to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable' diseases or
have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as
may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease," a violation of
the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made in pursuance of such authority will not be
held to be criminal unless the statute expressly makes it so and provides a punishment.

ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF.—Said Act, although it authorizes the Director of Agriculture to
do certain things, as aforesaid, nowhere makes a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture unlawful or criminal, nor does it provide a punishment for such violation.

ID.; ID.; ID.—Although the Act provides that "any person violating any of the provisions
of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense," such provision is not
broad enough to eover a violation of an order of the Bureau of Agrieulture lawfully made
and promulgated under the authority conferred upon said bureau by said Act, the
violation of such an order not being a violation "of the provisions of this Act."

ID.; ID.; ID.—Orders of the Bureau of Agriculture issued in pursuance of the authority
conferred by Act No. 1760, while they have, in a sense, the force of law, are not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense under said Act, the statute
itself not expressly making it so.

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(15) People v. Santos
FlSHING IN ZONE PROHIBITED BY A REGULATION OF THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE; EXCESS OF REGULATORY POWERS
CONFERRED BY ACT No. 4003 AND EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The
conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an
excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an
exercise of a legislative power "which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.

(16) SEC v. LPG Refillers

Administrative Law; Penalties; For an administrative regulation to have the force of
penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself, and, (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the
statute itself.—For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to
have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be
made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must
be provided by the statute itself.

Same; Liquefied Petroleum Gas; The enabling laws on which the Department of Energy
(DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-010 is based specifically designed to provide the
Department of Energy with increased administrative and penal measures with which to
effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest.—It is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,
which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which
set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for
refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended
to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to
effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving
petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this
case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming
public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.

CHAPTER 6. ADJUDICATORY POWERS

(1) Pres. Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA

Appeals; Where the law provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative
bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal in terms of rank
and stature with the Regional Trial Courts.—As a rule, where legislation provides for an
appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and
stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

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Same; Quasi-Judicial body, defined.—A quasi-judicial body has been defined as “an
organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making.

Same; Same; Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions.—As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to
adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably
appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidental Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force’s organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces
the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is,
to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President’s arm called upon
to combat the vice of “dollar-salting” or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign
exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities,
but nothing more.

Same; Same; Same; Its undertaking is simply to determine whether or not probable
cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper Court.—The Court sees
nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force’s powers to
issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with
quasijudicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No.
1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct
an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action “of appropriate
authorities.” It is not unlike a fiscal’s office that conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine whether or not prima facie evidence exist to justify haling the respondent to
court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.

(2) Cojuangco v. PCGG

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Presidential Commission on Good
Government; Executive Order Nos. 1 & 14; The PCGG has the power to investigate and
prosecute ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates,
and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the
PCGG; The PCGG's power to investigate includes the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations.—From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a)
of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that
the PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of
the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases
that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG includes the authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to

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conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the promulgation of the
said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent
jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to
prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan. The power of the PCGG to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the aforementioned types of cases has been recognized by
this Court in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) vs. PCGG.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Since the PCGG had already found a prima
facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when it caused the sequestration of the
properties and the issuance of the freeze order of the properties of petitioner, it cannot
possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as it has prejudged the matter.—The Court cannot close
its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had already found a prima
facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a judge, it caused the
sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of the properties of
petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the Solicitor General,
the PCGG gathered the evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor filed the
aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series of criminal
complaints. It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation
the PCGG could even make a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier
findings of a prima facie case against petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated
in the undue haste with which I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 was investigated and the informations
were filed in court even as the petitioner and intervenors questioned its authority,
invoked the denial of due process and promptly informed the PCGG of ,the filing of this
petition. In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal
investigation, gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of
preliminary investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of
his own complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust. It is in such instances that
We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same time." Having gathered the
evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle
with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public
prosecutor. The circumstances of the instant petition are even worse. To repeat, the
PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against
petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject
of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for
preliminary investigation. While ostensibly, it is only the Solicitor General who is the
complainant in the criminal cases filed with the PCGG, in reality the PCGG is an
unidentified co-complainant. Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and
freeze orders against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding
that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of
coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the
preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. Add to this the fact that there are many
suits filed by petitioner and the intervenors against the PCGG and vice versa.

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(3) Santiago Jr. v. Bautista
“The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative
or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions
may involve the performance of legisla tive or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the
exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with
respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority,
and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.’”2

(4) Smart Comm. v. NTC

(5) Guerzon v. CA
Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Powers of; An administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof.—As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the
leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer
or accion publiciana [Secs. 19(2) and 33(2), B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.] There is
nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar
jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof [Makati Stock
Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. L-23004, June 30,
1965, 14 SCRA 620; Sy v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-41480, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA
570.] That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any illegal
trading in petroleum products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise,
adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless.

Same; Same; Same; Bureau of Energy Utilization; The BEU has no power to decide
contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies in the absence of an
express provision of law granting to it such power.—Moreover, contrary to the Solicitor
General’s theory, the text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was
issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent
Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its predecessor, the
defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between
gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law
granting to it such power [see Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Oil Industry
Commission, G.R. No. L-41315, November 13, 1986, 155 SCRA 433.] As explicitly
stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau’s
jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or
condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders,
decisions, rules or regulations.

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Same; Same; Same; Due Process; PD 1206 requires that notice of hearing and
opportunity to be heard be given to the offender before any administrative penalty
provided under Sec. 7(e) may be imposed.—Even if the issuance of the order to vacate
was within the authority of respondent Caasi, Jr., still its nullity is apparent because of
the failure to comply with the requirement of notice and hearing. That P.D. No. 1206, as
amended, requires notice and hearing before any administrative penalty provided in Sec.
7(e) may be imposed is patent. Sec. 7(e) provides for a gradation of penalties of which
the imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding P1,000.00 is the least severe, and
requires that even before a fine is imposed notice and an opportunity to be heard be
given to the offender.

(6) Antipolo Realty v. NHA

Government Corporations; Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to

administrative agencies well recognized in our jurisdiction.—It is by now commonplace
learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers
and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-
judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our
jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has
been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized
character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts
have remained crowded and clogged.

Same; Same; Extent of exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of administrative

entity depends on provisions of the statute creating such agency.—In general, the
quantum of judicial or quasijudicial powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to
which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly,
on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of
such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the
multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by our regular courts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been
vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of
Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree." Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: "National Housing Authority.—The
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate
trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree."

CHAPTER 7. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

(1) Bantolino v. Coca-Cola

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law; Under the
Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing.—To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC
are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in
courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be
given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in
a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a
quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the
Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as
the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents
and their affidavits.

(2) First Lepanto v. CA

Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Appeals; Administrative Law; Judicial Review;
Jurisdiction; Statutes; The Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) is subject
to Art. VI, § 30 of the Constitution which requires the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court in the passage of laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction.—When the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated on July 17, 1987,
the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court
was again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect. The
Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that “No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its
advice and concurrence.” This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a
measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can
unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

(3) Villa v. Lazaro

Judgment; Due Process; Administrative Law; Appeal; Requirements of administrative
due process; Judgment rendered without due process was null and void.—All of the
foregoing translate to a denial of due process against which the defense of failure to
take timely appeal will not avail. Well-esconced in our jurisprudence is the rule: “x x that
administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in
investigations and trials. And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a)
the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that
may affect a person’s legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so
constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of

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competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or
disclosed to the parties affected.”

(4) Paterok v. Bureau of Customs

Administrative Law; Due Process; Notice and Hearing; The elementary rules of due
process require notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully
deprived of his rights.—As regards the first assignment of error, we agree with the
petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the public respondent
in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known
does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural
due process. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for
administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. And no rule is
better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that which
requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived
of his rights.

(5) Lumiqued v. Exevea

Administrative Law; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial investigation and may not be invoked by a
respondent in an administrative investigation.—Petitioners fault the investigating
committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing.
They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in
writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have
suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure
a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. These arguments are untenable and
misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected
in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the
committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if
he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against
him.

Same; Same; Department of Justice; While it is true that under the Administrative Code
of 1987, the DOJ shall “administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system,” conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function—by its power to “perform such other functions as

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may be provided by law,” prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative
investigations.—Petitioners’ misconception on the nature of the investigation conducted
against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall
“administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes
thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and
administration of the correctional system,” conducting criminal investigations is not its
sole function. By its power to “perform such other functions as may be provided by law,”
prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly,
the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.

Same; Same; Public Officers; The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.—While investigations
conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish
the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the
one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging
the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 202 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by
Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent
himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that
merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Same; Same; Due Process; The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or the law.—The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v.
Auditor General, the Court said: “x x x There is nothing in the Constitution that says that
a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was
not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that
helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

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Same; Due Process; An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due
process—as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity
to be heard is the very essence of due process.—In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more
creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual
hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have
been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of
due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

(6) Casimiro v. Tandog

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the case
at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[19] To be
heard does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[20]
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include
the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[21]
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01
October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions
propounded by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that
the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer
to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the
committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of
Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even
brought the matter to this Court for final adjudication.
Kinship alone does not establish bias and partiality.[22] Bias and partiality cannot be
presumed. In administrative proceedings, no less than substantial proof is

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required.[23] Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof.[24] Mere suspicion of partiality is
not enough. There should be hard evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of
bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or some other basis.[25] Thus,
in the case at bar, there must be convincing proof to show that the members of the fact-
finding committee unjustifiably leaned in favor of one party over the other. In addition to
palpable error that may be inferred from the decision itself, extrinsic evidence is required
to establish bias.[26] The petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In
effect, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty prevails.[27]
(7) Lozano v. Delos Santos

(8) Globe Telecom v. NTC

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National Telecommunications
Commission; The NTC is at the forefront of the government response to the avalanche
of inventions and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field; Judicial review of
actions of administrative agencies is essential, as a check on the unique powers vested
unto these instrumentalities.—The NTC is at the forefront of the government response
to the avalanche of inventions and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field.
Every regulatory action it undertakes is of keen interest not only to industry analysts and
players but to the public at large. The intensive scrutiny is understandable given the
high financial stakes involved and the inexorable impact on consumers. And its rulings
are traditionally accorded respect even by the courts, owing traditional deference to
administrative agencies equipped with special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters. At the same time, judicial
review of actions of administrative agencies is essential, as a check on the unique
powers vested unto these instrumentalities. Review is available to reverse the findings
of the specialized administrative agency if the record before the Court clearly precludes
the agency’s decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony
of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence, or both.
Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly empowered agencies
act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due
process and equal protection.

CHAPTER 8. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

(1) Villaflor v. CA
Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Jurisdiction; Evidence; Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.—Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine applied to cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies even if the question
involved is also judicial in character.—In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential
trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in
character. It applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the doctrine is clearly applicable, the court
cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.—In cases
where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Machete vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over the payment of back rentals
under a leasehold contract. In Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System vs. Vasquez, the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the best
position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project was compatible
with its development plan.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction finds application in this case.—The rationale underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the questions on the identity of
the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a
sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the
administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these
issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even
when they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.

Same; Same; Evidence; Factual findings of administrative agency must be respected as

long as they are supported by substantial evidence even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.—Reliance by the trial and the appellate courts on
the factual findings of the Director of Lands and the Minister of Natural Resources is not
misplaced. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts. The findings of fact of an administrative agency
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of an

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appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative
body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency in respect
of sufficiency of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Rule that factual findings of an administrative agency are accorded
respect and even finality by courts admits of exceptions.—However, the rule that factual
findings of an administrative agency are accorded respect and even finality by courts
admits of exceptions. This is true also in assessing factual findings of lower courts. It is
incumbent on the petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual issues by the
administrative agency and/or by the trial court falls under any of the exceptions.
Otherwise, this Court will not disturb such findings.

(2) Commissioner v. Navarro

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya,28 decided in
1971. Thus: “The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and
forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance
from assuming cognizance over such a matter.”29 Reference was then made in the
opinion to previous cases.30 Then it continued: “Papa v. Mago likewise deserves to be
cited. The opinion of Justice Zaldivar for the Court emphatically asserted the doctrine
anew in the following language: ‘It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of
Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of
enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in
question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs
laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First
Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so,
it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only
an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the
goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was
no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it
follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.”31 Lopez v. Commissioner of
Customs,32 as well as Luna v. Pacis,33 both 1971 decisions, speak to the same effect.
The latest categorical declaration of such a rule appears in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee, speaking for the Court, in Señeres v. Frias34 in these words: “It is the
settled law and jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the customs authorities acquire
exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be imported into the Philippines, for the
purpose of enforcement of Philippine customs laws, from the moment the goods are

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actually under their possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or detention
thereof has previously been issued by the port collector of customs.”

(3) Centeno v. Centeno

Administrative Law; Agrarian Reform: Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB); Jurisdiction; Where a case is related to and is a mere offshoot of a
previous case for cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), the DAR
continues to have jurisdiction over the same; The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction
to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.—Having found therefore, that the instant
case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case for cancellation of
CLTs which was decided in favor of herein respondent, we believe and so hold that the
DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As aptly stated by the Court of
Appeals, under Section 50 of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Same; Estoppel; Participation by certain parties in administrative proceedings without

raising any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.—Petitioners are barred by estoppel from raising the
issue of jurisdiction of the DARAB. A perusal of the records will show that petitioners
participated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking for
affirmative relief in their answer. This Court has ruled that participation by certain parties
in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from
any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.

(4) Nuesa v. CA
Same; Jurisdiction; While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that
administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries
set by the enabling law for each agency.—While it bears emphasizing that findings of
administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts,
care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the
jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case,
respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their
legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and
private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the
Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARAB’s unjustified
action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

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(5) Regional Dir. v. CA
The court cases and the administrative matters being closely interrelated, if not
interlinked, it behooves the court, in the interest of good order and conformably with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the
final outcome of the administrative proceedings.

(6) Laguna CATV v. Maraan

Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Labor Law;
Appeals; An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of
Labor may be appealed to the latter.—As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, earlier quoted, an order issued by the duly authorized representative of
the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have first
appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the Court of Appeals a motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review.

Same; Same; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures an orderly

procedure which favors a preliminary shifting process, particularly with respect to
matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of
interference with functions of the administrative agency by withholding judicial action
until the administrative process had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp
the courts by a resort to them in the first instance.—Courts, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the
administrative forum. Observance of this doctrine is a sound practice and policy. As
succinctly explained by this Court in Carale vs. Abarintos. “It (the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies) ensures an orderly procedure which favors a preliminary
sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the competence of
the administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of the administrative
agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process had run its course,
and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them in the first instance.”

Same; Same; The party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the
prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate
conclu sion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.—This Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held
that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its
appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the

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administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The underlying principle of the rule rests
on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to
pass upon the matter will decide the same correctly. Therefore, petitioner should have
completed the administrative process by appealing the questioned Orders to the
Secretary of Labor.

Same; Same; Exceptions.—Although this Court has allowed certain exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as: 1) when there is a violation
of due process; 2) when the issue involved is a purely legal question; 3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; 4)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; 5) when
there is irreparable injury; 6) when the respondent is a Department Secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter; 7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; 9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; 10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy, adequate remedy; 11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention; 12) when no administrative review is provided by law; 13) where
the rule of qualified political agency applies; and 14) when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has been rendered moot, petitioner fails to show that the
instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Its contention that an appeal to the
Secretary of Labor would be futile as “it will surely be disapproved,” is purely conjectural
and definitely misplaced.

Same; Same; Absent any finding of waiver, estoppel, or any of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the case is susceptible of dismissal
for lack of cause of action.—In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Express Telecommunication Co., this Court held that “the premature invocation of the
court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.” Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver, estoppel, or any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.

(7) Corpus v. Cuaderno

Administrative law; Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; When it does not
apply.—"On the other hand, the doctrine (of exhaustion of administrative remedies)
does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an
administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that
the .legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative
remedy has not been exhausted". (42 Am. Jur. 583.)

(8) Madrigal v. Lecaroz

Same; Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; In a case where
pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

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cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by administrative
officers.—And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any
administrative remedy (Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436). Actually, the recourse by
Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case where
pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions
of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers cannot decide such
issues with finality (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Drilon, et al., G.R. No.
82849, August 2, 1989, citing Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466;
Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). In the present case, only a legal question is to be
resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal’s position was in accordance
with law.

(9) Cabada v. Alunan

(9) Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito

Courts; Administrative Law; Fisheries Act; Prohibition; The rule of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where an administrative officer has not rendered
any decision because his act to investigate conflict of leasehold rights over fishpond is
the very thing sought to be prohibited.—It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie
against an executive officer, the petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies.
This doctrine rests upon the assumption that the administrative body, board or officer, if
given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error, may amend its/his decision on a
given matter. It follows therefore that there has to be some sort of a decision, order or
act, more or less final in character, that is ripe for review and properly the subject of an
appeal to a higher administrative body or officer, for the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to operate. In the present case, however, there is no
administrative order or act as above described, that can be appealed from. The
respondent Regional Director has not rendered any decision, or made any final finding
of any sort, and is in fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the
very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must be
exhausted, although available, cannot be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping
public respondent Guieb’s investigation but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, petitioner’s recourse to the respondent court for relief by way
of a petition for prohibition was proper.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Courts can issue writs of prohibition or
injunction against officials administering the State’s natural resources despite P.D. 605
which bans judges from issuing injunctions against them where questions of law are
involved.—The issuance of said decree (No. 605) does not, however, mean that courts
cannot exercise jurisdiction where questions of law are involved, as in the case at bar.
Here, what was assailed before respondent judge is Regional Director Guieb’s move to
conduct an investigation on Deypalubos’ formal protest, the petitioner’s theory being

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that to investigate the matter is to go beyond what the Director of the Bureau of
Fisheries had authorized in his 3 January 1975 Memorandum, which is “to cause an
immediate formal investigation of those issues involved in the foregoing resolution and
the protest x x x and not touched upon in Civil Case No. 1389.”

(10) NFA v. CA
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedy; Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to some limitations and exceptions.—The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and
exceptions. In this case, private respondents’ contracts were terminated in the midst of
bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination.
In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was
preparing for the public bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded
by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987
was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The
urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the
implementation of these negotiated security contracts.

(11) Gravador v. Mamigo

Administrative law; Factual findings of administrative officials.—Factual findings of
administrative officials are binding on the courts if supported by substantial evidence.

Quo warranto; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Action should be filed within one
year.—The argument that a school principal, who was replaced by another allegedly
because the former had already reached the retirement age of sixtyfive years, did not
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his action for quo warranto is not
meritorious, considering that such action should be brought within one year. The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its
observance would result in the nullification of the claim asserted.

(12) Almine v. CA
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Failure to appeal to the Office of the President from a decision of the Minister of
Agrarian Relations does not violate the doctrine of exhaustion because the latter is the
alter ego of the President.—The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the
decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the latter is the alter ego of the President.

(13) Smart Communications v. NTC

(14) UP Board of Regents v. Rasul

Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Exception; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies will not apply if it would result in irreparable

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damage.—Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella’s failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies, We hold that this case has special circumstances that made it
fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show,
respondent Dr. Estrella was about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He
must have believed that airing his protest with the Board of Regents would only be
fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts, irreparable damage or injury on his part
will be caused by the implementation of the proposed reorganization.

(15) Arrow Transportation Corp. v. BOT

Same; Exhaustion of administ rative remedies; Certiorari; Although a motion for
reconsideration is pending before the Board of Transpo rtation, Court will go into the
merits of the controversy and grant certiorari where there is strong public interest to
have issue raised settled.—The question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination was likewise argued by the parties. For it is undeniable that at the time
the petition was filed, there was pending with the respondent Board a motion for
reconsideration. Ordinarily , its resolution should be awaited, x x x This Court was
impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the
importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having
the matter settled, x x x To paraphrase what was said in Edu vs. Ericta where the
validity of a legislation was passed upon in a certiorari proceeding to annul and set
aside a writ of preliminary injunction, to so act would be to conserve both time and effort.
Those desiring to engage in public utility business as well as the public are both vitally
concerned with the final determination of the standards to be followed and the
procedure that must be observed. There is to repeat, a great public interest in a
definitive outcome of the crucial issue followed.

(16) Tan v. Veteran’s Backpay Commission

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE OF EXHAUSTION NOT TO BE INVOKED IF
PARTY is IN ESTOPPEL.—The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the
rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it
declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were "advisory in nature, which
may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved
party has the court for recourse", thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a
final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.

ALBA LT 2016