FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 1
QUORUM
AVELINO VS CUENCO
FACTS: On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked
his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against
the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so
on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about
two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco,
Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to
open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all
dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering
his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and
Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp
then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad
however countered and they requested the said adjournment to
be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly
left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers.
Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made
of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment
of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate
President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining
members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently
recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to
Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the
Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed
a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take
cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply
to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the
Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will
be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a
minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a
hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of
the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two
sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such
session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as
evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23
senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,
excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority
of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a
quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House”
and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number
than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore,
even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one
had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and
one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March
14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take
cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind
themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong.
Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when
Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two
are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad
but this does not change the number of senators nor does it
change the majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1;
in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only
12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no
quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume
jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which
justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of
the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground
that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere
formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session
with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as Senate
President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the
dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by
issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts
to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason,
the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy
the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling
is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements
of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as
Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the
majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a
quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority,
not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution,
but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other
causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each
house is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a
mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the
members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5
(5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required
“concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National
Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article
VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as
Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its
session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and
therefore 12 constituted a majority.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 2
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
PACETE V COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Facts: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was
appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31,
1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his
duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the recess
of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments at its next session in 1965.
On February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice, whom he
likewise included in his petition, through the Judicial
Superintendent, advised petitioner to vacate his position as
municipal judge, the ground being that his appointment had been
by-passed.
Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he
was filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of
the appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato, in view of derogatory information which he had
received.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus
was led to notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly,
following what he considered to be the prevailing practice of such
body that the mere presentation of such letter "automatically
vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question . . ."
Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial
Superintendent then advised petitioner that he should vacate his
position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly confirmed.
The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice was likewise
named respondent as he had, as a consequence, withheld
petitioner's salaries.
Issue: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become
final and executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular
session of the Fifth Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965;
Whether the petitioner's appointment was not duly confirmed; and
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: WHEREFORE, petitioner is entitled to the writ of
mandamus and the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments is commanded to issue the certificate of
confirmation prayed for by petitioner.
The right of petitioner to perform his functions as municipal judge
of Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, his
confirmation having been duly confirmed. No pronouncement as
to costs.
Ratio: For respondents to argue that the mere filing of a motion
for reconsideration did suffice to set it aside, even in the absence
of any further action, is, as stressed by petitioner, to lose sight of
what is provided in the Constitution. That would be moreover
tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member of a
collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority
were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what
respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
contends, is infinitely worse. It is indefensible in principle and
pernicious in operation. It can find no shelter in the constitutional
prescription.
In view of confirmation
In petitioner's memorandum submitted on August 1, 1966, it was
contended that his confirmation became final and irrevocable
upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth
Congress on May 21, 1965.
In view of construction
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v.
Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, which reads: "Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion
by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their
approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and
submitted anew to the Commission. Any motion to reconsider the
vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a
final disposition of such a motion."
1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the
argument that the motion for reconsideration of Congressman
Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the effect of recalling the
confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that, accordingly, it
should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued:
"Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members
present in favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to
'reopen' the appointment — and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation
— and to require a resubmission of the appointment for
confirmation."
2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have
the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a
single member of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad
enough if the minority were to prevail. A one-man rule, which is
the effect of what respondent Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are
not invaded. Thus even legislative acts and executive orders are
not beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing
sacrosanct about a rule of the Commission on Appointments,
especially so, when as in this case, a construction sought to be
fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual to a public
office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from
the express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the
judiciary. So it is in this case. It is a truism that under the
circumstances, what cannot be ignored is the primacy of what the
fundamental law ordains.
As due process is impressed with both substantive and
procedural significance, the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not
unduly limited.
ARROYO V DE VENECIA G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14,
1997
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives.
They brought this suit against respondents charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the
end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified
by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as
having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the
law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.
Held: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court
finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 3
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be
to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the established
rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made
by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction".
In view of House Rules
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval
of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this
House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after
the debate, then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except
only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of
a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
“Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.”
(In view of justiciability according to PUNO, J.)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
the case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment
against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving
breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule
to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or
even more just.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 4

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that

neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely
withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the
ALEJANDRINO V QUEZON G.R. NO. L-22041.
Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive
SEPTEMBER 11, 1924
member of the Legislature.
Facts: "Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino, Senator
In view of effects of punishment
for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby, declared guilty of
Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged
disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of
Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente
representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates
de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of certain,
the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency
phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate
an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the
regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.
electoral district of representation without that district being
afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By suspension,
Issue: Whether resolution above quoted is unconstitutional and
the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension
entirely of no effect, for five reasons. He prays the court:
for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
(1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution;
In view of no remedy
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void;
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
and
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of
an appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel
to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed
Senator
for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme
Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the
Held: As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state
Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that
a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs. Such is the
conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is
judgment of the court. So ordered.
that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power.

Ratio: We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR. VS SALIPADA PENDATUN
thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative
powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks
FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.
jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be
delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said
sustained.
speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was
The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to
passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges
abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may,
made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations
nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty
were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to
of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution,
disciplinary actions by the lower house.
and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a
department has been transcended. The courts must determine
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before
the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all
the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his
private and official acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
other departments.
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer
where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over
In view of the propriety of mandamus
the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members,
or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their
legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control.
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
The final arbiter in cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this
enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the
extent at least the executive department may be said to be
legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
dependent upon and subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator
office of the person to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
the nature of the thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
a mandamus is to be determined."
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not
In view of the Organic Law vs Power to Discipline House
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
Members
whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition
Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine
is dismissed.
Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to
represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by
the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.)

They may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However,

to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is
granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective
member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish
an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may
expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the
power to "suspend" is then included in the power to "punish," a
power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the
Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted to the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 5
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(2001)
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was
the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the
stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was
tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of
such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits
the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two
other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this
information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of
Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of
a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each
“… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the
case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from
the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not
a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he
is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office”
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she
still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against
him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to
quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of
the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
DE VENECIA V SANDIGANBAYAN GR 130240, 5
FEBRUARY 2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal
Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the
accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6
June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered
the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not
comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997
at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through
counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may
be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution
116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C.
de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a
fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de
Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma.
Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M.
Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed
the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a
penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR
118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in the Anti-
Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose.
It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary
measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the
doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members
of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of
suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed
upon a determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from
frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering
with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal
proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension
or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed
sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 6

disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed
to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic
Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
that each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs
of either branch.
be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses
the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde”
— is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system —
the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.

JOURNAL AND RECORD PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY US VS PONS

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS PEDRO FACTS: Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On
GIMENEZ April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels
FACTS: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was
to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities
engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily
noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
in the production of plywood. The main components of the said
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so
glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported
the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby
abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of
required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde.
opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act
Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and
No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material
agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were
to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act
submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who
2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress)
denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and
was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said
formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not
law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special
tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the
session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February
synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No.
2609 which provides:
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the
Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the
February 28, 1914.
provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of
adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the
xxx xxx xxx
legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear
users.
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde”
into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot
Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the
be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals
terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of
which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde”
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a
beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements
of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof.

The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be

construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.

HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the

synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea
formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently
distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as “urea formaldehyde”.

The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during

the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of
the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 7
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE VS ENROLLED BILL THEORY
HERMINIO ASTORGA VS ANTONIO VILLEGAS
FACTS: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers
of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions
of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief
of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then
filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply
with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining
the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been
enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3rdreading in the
lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate
which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some
minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back
to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations,
Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent
back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter.
The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA
4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent
to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact
the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the
Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President
of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that
they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that
the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate
the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While
it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked
upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same
text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill
was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done
by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive,
when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares
that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made
into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law
would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
ENRIQUE MORALES VS ABELARDO SUBIDO
FACTS: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
department of a city for at least three years but does not possess
a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of
the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant
colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually
rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former
Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido,
Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of
Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to
meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other
persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
– No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the
police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate
who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least
eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who
has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for
said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was
being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the
following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation
or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high
school graduate who has served the police department of a
city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least
8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was
actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from
the conference committee the only change made in the provision
was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by
producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate
bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the
bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into
the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative
secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section
10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form
by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled
Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the
other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon
the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest
to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise
the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a
sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all
cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there
are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the
validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 8
such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC
can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case
at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.
SALARIES, PRIVILEDGES AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.
(PHILCONSA) VS. MATHAY
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor
General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing
or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House
of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by
RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec.
14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that
the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in
the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December
30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30,
1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that
not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of
all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully
expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period
before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully
effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence,
as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them.
This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision
speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular
form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent
to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term”
in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the
members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the
application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the
Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation
provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969,
when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
BENJAMIN LIGOT VS ISMAEL MATHAY
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second
term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the
salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the
national government” was enacted into law and took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00
to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim
for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c)
as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
“in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”
The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose
Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue
certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also
disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while
the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the
basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim
cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement
gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of
the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired
on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by
the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would
be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase
the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar
case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson,
“Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 9
FREEDOM FROM ARREST
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness
is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and
the need for his constituents to be represente.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years
is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days
or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE
NICANOR JIMENEZ VS BARTOLOME CABANGBANG
FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication
of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged
that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of
some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had
collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,
Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the
president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or
may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such
an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers
of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a
member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is
covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said
letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege
communication endowed to members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in
all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and
for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression
which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced
in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session
when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 10
DISQUALIFICATIONS
HOMOBONO ADAZA VS FERNANDO PACANA, JR.
FACTS: Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province
of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his
oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial
governor on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected
vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,
1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner
won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost.
Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July
19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said
office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as
governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and
started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza
has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues
that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires
on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context
of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New
Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he
had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the
Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously.
Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can
assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of
succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides
as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, during
his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet
. . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence
Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when
Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private
citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul
against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the
BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides
that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering
that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN, JR.
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as
directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was
subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed
a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC
Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to
have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez
entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as
he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear
as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as
the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from
appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion
for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as
a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI,
can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating the
constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under
the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he
is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks
before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that
he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented
himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and
is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself
involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not
likewise be done indirectly.
NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before
the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of
justice, regardless of rank, composition, or jurisdiction. The
disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and
to all administrative bodies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative
agencies, are included.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 11
LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON
THE FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed
with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors
during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a
member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case
of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049,
decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC,
in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted
and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-
5, held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he
is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate
government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC
because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-
run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board
of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector
individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during
his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95,
as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates
the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of
the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except
by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are
owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National
Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the
PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to
intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with
regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
THE ISSUE
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on
the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily:
What is the nature of the PNRC?
THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the
dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of
the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither
strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the
parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the
Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it
is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should
not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left
for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . .
. the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some
other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not
even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and
incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty
(60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several
times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December
15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A.
No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The
passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional
proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a
recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is
none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of
history, public service and official status accorded to it by the
State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s
contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of
this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in
March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The
PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in
this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC
in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva
Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized
with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the
latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize
under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s
special status under international humanitarian law and as an
auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its
obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 12

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
ABBAS ET AL VS THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law
FACTS: In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the
and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or
11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET
instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was
Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation”
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that
policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more than four (4)
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute
accordance with its commitments under international law. This
a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and
Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave
that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters
the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would
since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not
of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
sought.
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the
core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due
negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
weight.
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on
the image of the Philippines in the international community. The
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in
sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must
the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its
therefore stay.
Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.
The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Constitution.]
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both

Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative”
components commonly share the duty and authority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of
a senatorial election contest.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 13
EMIGDIO BONDOC VS MARCIANO PINEDA
FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4thDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While
Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda
won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the
HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc
won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the
winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito
Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose
Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though
Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed
in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted
to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that
they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that
a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be
appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for
Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was
then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme
Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official
act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the
validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine
of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar
without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial
question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is the
act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura
was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made,
members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the
electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc
won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the
HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They
cannot hold the same election since the issue has already
become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their
representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura
should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful
or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura
violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the
SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from
the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.”
CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA
If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the
disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot
divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity
Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the
winning candidate
FACTS: Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin,
the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was
filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus
Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles
owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-
ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting
them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification
case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of
candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest
number of votes. However, his proclamation as winner was
suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his
disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered
disqualified.
Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus
proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently
took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for
Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the annulment
of Locsin’s proclamation.
ISSUES: Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the
proclamation of a Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize
Codilla as the legally elected Representative
RULING: First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation
was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation
and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus,
be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent
as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the
COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent
Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his
Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling
that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect
has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an
election contest involving members of the House of
Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 14
to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC,
whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and
qualification of respondent Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of
ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the
case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is
no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one
who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained
the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at
the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin
cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET.
She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her
proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to
office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was
void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to
unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a
winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the
petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that
the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant
the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration
of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte
is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got
53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC
Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent
Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set
aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en
banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent
Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the
COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on
the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
PIMENTEL, ET AL. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect.
On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act,
national elections were held which included, for the first time, the
election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the
House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives
from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and
Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO),
Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE).
Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups
had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent
by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies.
In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it
does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-
list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to
the HRET or the CA.
As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the
House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed
solely of district representatives belonging to the different political
parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F.
Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the
HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to
cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to
include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January
2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal
to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary
Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto
P. Nazareno.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction
(with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET,
its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2
or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They
charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator
Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc
directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11
February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend
their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an
additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both
motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel
filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,
defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as
taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-
list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 15

COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

Issue: [1] Whether the present composition of the House
DAZA VS SINGSON
Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because there are no party-list
FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was
representatives in the hret.
reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house.
LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute
Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP
themselves to include party-list representatives constitutes grave
member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
abuse of discretion.
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which
consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced
Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
on Appointments.
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the
authority to elect among their members those who would fill the
HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a
12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each
Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to
House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of
choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s
of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly
respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are
complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not
reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
subsequently thereto NOT the court.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET
COSETENG V MITRA
and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However,
Facts: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to
under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker
interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or
Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
nine congressmen.
jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers
calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority
its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on
parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added
what action the House may take if party-list representatives are
Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the
duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA.
Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was
also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House
The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents
majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it
appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a
party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for
or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from
election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA
participating in the election process. The party-list representatives
members null and void on the theory that their election violated
did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not
the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members
consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or
must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further
the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives
alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support
lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve
of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was
a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court,
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the
was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause
HRET and the CA in response to the letters of Senator Pimentel.
in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the
Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any
power to reconstitute themselves.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional
representation.

Held: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not

because issue raised was a political question but because
revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional
representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are
160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House
membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA
and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest
parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is
bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition
party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 16
House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the
12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential
because they are not members of her party and they signed
identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members
should have been nominated and elected by their parties because
of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by
the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza
vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with
expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by the other government branches.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS NEPTALI GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15
LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1
LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each
house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of
such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor
leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should
represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the
proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the
elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-
PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He
alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a
party’s representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them
is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on
proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads
to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with
the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The
LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding
one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the
Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no
longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one
political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-
members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in
Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties
may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have
affiliations with the other party.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE
VENECIA, et al 594 SCRA 743 (2009)
FACTS: Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the
Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the
respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court.
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their
respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA).
In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to
respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for
the Liberal Party in the CA.
However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the
Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a
report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence
spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal
Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty (20)
members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1)
seat in the CA.
Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-
Laban wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the
CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and
KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the
CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be
represented in the CA.
The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar,
advised Senator Madrigal that CA ―has neither the power nor
the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House,
and that any complaints about the election of a member or
members should be addressed to the body that elected them.‖
Villar further explained that instructions have been given to
―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal‘s letters to the
Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of
Business of the Session of the Senate.‖
Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA‘s action, filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of
preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President
and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA.
The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al.
and Madrigal et al.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been
rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of
the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition
is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails.
Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as
a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact
allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of
a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal
and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.
Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the respective
Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is
necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator
Villar‘s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 17
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS AS TO THE BILLS
AS TO TITLES OF BILLS
TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
FACTS: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which
gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale
of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue
being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may
be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD
imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross
receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the
law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB,
an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to
deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to
assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In
the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane
to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general
subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB.
VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the
VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in
the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the
law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of
the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited
period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to
the direction and control of the [VRB].”
LIDASAN VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic
Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan
however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were
included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in
favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to
establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of
Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified
for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly
indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including
in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes
barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared
from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the
defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part
of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province
and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted
for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own
province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against
the constitutionality of RA 4790.
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ VS EDGARDO PARAS
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the
Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la
Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage
in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and
are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however
lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938
which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled
that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote
general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan
can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night
clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in
pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: NO. The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were
merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify
under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure
that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance
on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought
to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the
title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate
not prohibit the business of cabarets.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 18
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
FACTS: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong
whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was
unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed
violations to the 1987 Constitution.
Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong
is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-
subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not
impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis
on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of
Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation is not unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd
since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO CERTAIN LAWS
APPROPRIATIONS LAWS
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the
Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister
of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977.
Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44
of the said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly
overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities
render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department
from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the
interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from
one department to another here.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 19
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
Facts: Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget which
was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD
1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2)
restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend that the
petition involves a political question (repeal/amendment of said
laws)
Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed
by the 1987 Constitution
Held: NO.
(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by
implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle
that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are
complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient
standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed
should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic
of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other
normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as
the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the
government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all
loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by
PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An
Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the
Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out
of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the
budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.
HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of
the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and
to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process
Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that
said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
BELGICA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R.
No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as
the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down
to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects”
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds
whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes
from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and
(b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet
Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling
their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are
in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by
the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with
the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others,
filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 20

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It
is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated
to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called
as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where
their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is
a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government
– and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is
happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section
29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from
the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which
created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended
by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress
alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power
but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated
to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this
shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes
which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part
of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section
29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be
a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator
to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is
a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power

of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to
be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator
can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF.
Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation
made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode
of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their

local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs),
the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the
part of the members of the House of Representatives, what’s
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate
a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 21
ARAULLO V AQUINO
FACTS: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The
World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds
from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by
a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be
withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then
be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work
to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported
and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are
standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made
an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of
the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary
Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the
DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out
that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M
for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each,
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to
file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule
which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws
particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution). -
NO
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive. - NO
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional. - NO
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the
DAP is constitutional. - NO
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable. -
YES
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is
not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely
being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional.
It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also
contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the
GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are
still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided
for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is
an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer
to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as
money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds
may only be used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification
was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the
legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely
helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects.
If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no
longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked
to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may
not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents
of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 22
TAX LAWS
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine
Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association) seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling
dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law. The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter
or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling
price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA)
contends that the imposition of VAT on sales and leases by virtue
of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would
violate the constitutional provision of “non -impairment of
contracts.”
Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not “srcinate exclusively” in
the HoR as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The Senate allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings,
instead passing its own version.
Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House bill by
striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of its
own bill, so as to conform with the Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having “srcinated”
from the Senate, and not the HoR.
HELD: Petition is unmeritorious. The enactment of the Senate bill
has not been the first instance where the Senate, in the exercise
of its power to propose amendments to bills (required to scrinate
in the House), passed its own version. An amendment by
substitution (striking out the text and substituting it), as urged by
petitioners, concerns a mere matter of form, and considering the
petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would
make if Senate applied such substitution in the case, it cannot be
applied to the case at bar. While the aforementioned
Constitutional provision states that bills must “srcinate exclusively
in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.”
The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute
measure. Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be
an independent and distinct bill. Without the House bill, Senate
could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a mere
amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the
Senate on second and third readings.
Petitioners question the signing of the President on both bills, to
support their contention that such are separate and distinct. –NO
The President certified the bills separately only because the
certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue
bill which AT THE MOMENT was being considered.
Petitioners question the power of the Conference Committee to
insert new provisions. -NO
The jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to
resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It may
propose an entirely new provision, given that such are germane
to the subject of the conference, and that the respective houses
of Congress subsequently approve its report.
Petitioner PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise by
the withdrawal of its exemption from VAT is not expressed in the
title of the law, thereby violating the Constitution. -NO
The Court believes that the title of the R.A. satisfies the
Constitutional Requirement. Petitioners claim that the R.A.
violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having removed
them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since
the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. By granting
exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process,
equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on taxation.
Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the VAT was
already provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was
enacted. The latter merely EXPANDS the base of the tax.
Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate,
the taxing power having authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. It is enough that the
statute applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations
placed in similar situation.
TOLENTINO V SEC. OF FINANCE
FACTS: This case was filed by PAL because before the EVAT
Law, they were exempt from taxes. After the passage of EVAT,
they were already included. PAL contended that neither the
House or Senate bill provided for the removal of the exemption
from taxes of PAL and that it was only made after the meeting of
the Conference Committee w/c was not expressed in the title of
RA 7166
HELD: (1) YES. Court said that it is not the law which should
srcinate from the House of Rep, but the revenue bill which was
required to srcinate from the House of Rep. The initiative must
come from the Lower House because they are elected in the
district level – meaning they are expected to be more sensitive to
the needs of the locality. Also, a bill originating from the Lower
House may undergo extensive changes while in the Senate.
Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the
one the Lower House proposed. The Constitution does not
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the House bill, so long as action by Senate is withheld
pending the receipt of the House bill.
(2) NO. The Pres. certified that the Senate bill was urgent.
Presidential certification dispensed the requirement not only of
printing but also reading the bill in 3 separate days. In fact, the
Senate accepted the Pres. Certification
(3) No. Court said that the title states that the purpose of the
statute is to expand the VAT system and one way of doing this is
to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions
granted before. It is also in the power of Congress to amend,
alter, repeal grant of franchises for operation of public utility when
the common good so requires. One subject rule is intended to
prevent surprise upon Congress members and inform people of
pending legislation. In the case of PAL, they did not know of their
situation not because of any defect in title but because they might
have not noticed its publication until some event calls attention to
its existence.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 23
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHIL V. ORTIGAS
FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is the
registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon City and
erected in the middle is a hospital known as the Lung Center of
the Philippines.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also
renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-
paying, as well as private leases.
Both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were
assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4, 554,860 by
the City Assessor of Quezon City.
The petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption5 from real property
taxes with the City Assessor, stating that it is a charitable
institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the
context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
RULING: YES. The Court held that the petitioner is a charitable
institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it
exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable
or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private
advantage. Hence, the Lung Center was organized for the
welfare and benefit of the Filipino people.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its
character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it
derives income from paying patients, so long as the money
received is devoted to charitable objects and no money inures to
the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution. As well as the reason of donation in the form of
subsidies granted by the government.
(2) Whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from
real property taxes.
NO. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private
entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The petitioner failed to prove that the entirety of its real property
is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them,
whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being
leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen.
Hence, the portions of the land leased to private entities as
well as those parts of the hospital leased to private
individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other
hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and
portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or
non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
TAN V DEL ROSARIO
FACTS:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which
amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it
allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 26(1) — every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
b. Article VI, Section 28(1) — the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
c. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of .
. . property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded
their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general
professional partnerships.
4. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of
RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession"
(Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title
actually reads, 'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending
Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,'
as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due
process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public
respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for
violating due process.
HELD: NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only
when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional
limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression
is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection,
merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly
situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long as:
(1) The standards that are used therefor are substantial and not
arbitrary,
(2) The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose,
(3) The law applies, all things being equal, to both present and
future conditions, and
(4) The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to
the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative
intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduler approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers
and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification
to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is just an amendatory provision
of the code of taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four
main groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 24

Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have JOHN HAY PAC VS LIM
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496 was an
independent law. But since it is attached to a law that has already
classified taxpayers, there is no violation of equal protection
clause.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their

authority in promulgating the RR

NO. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after

the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in
significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who
practice their respective professions individually and of those who
do it through a general professional partnership.

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued

Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other
duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported
into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax.

This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported
articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported
into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional
duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the
previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative
from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for
they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase

of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to

enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which
are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: YES. Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the

enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other
bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than
the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that
therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they
may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be
exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by
the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President “subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific
limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President to issue the said EOs.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT
FACTS: Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president
of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business with a certain
Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of
the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between
Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship,
but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which
eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman,
Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred
to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme
Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 25
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot
validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional
prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the
SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states
that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to
be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,”
that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It
does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF
BILLS
1. FILING/ PREPARATION OF THE BILL
The Member or the Bill Drafting Division of the Reference and
Research Bureau prepares and drafts the bill upon the Member's
request.
2. FIRST READING
The bill is filed with the Bills and Index Service and the same is
numbered and reproduced.
Three days after its filing, the same is included in the Order of
Business for First Reading.
On First Reading, the Secretary General reads the title and
number of the bill. The Speaker refers the bill to the appropriate
Committee/s.
3. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION/ACTION
The Committee where the bill was referred to evaluates it to
determine the necessity of conducting public hearings.
If the Committee finds it necessary to conduct public hearings, it
schedules the time thereof, issues public notics and invites
resource persons from the public and private sectors, the
academe and experts on the proposed legislation.
If the Committee finds that no public hearing is not needed, it
schedules the bill for Committee discussion/s.
Based on the result of the public hearings or Committee
discussions, the Committee may introduce amendments,
consolidate bills on the same subject matter, or propose a
subsitute bill. It then prepares the corresponding committee
report.
The Committee approves the Committee Report and formally
transmits the same to the Plenary Affairs Bureau.
4. SECOND READING
The Committee Report is registered and numbered by the Bills
and Index Service. It is included in the Order of Business and
referred to the Committee on Rules.
The Committee on Rules schedules the bill for consideration on
Second Reading.
On Second Reading, the Secretary General reads the number,
title and text of the bill and the following takes place:
Period of Sponsorship and Debate
Period of Amendments
Voting which may be by:
 viva voce
 count by tellers
 division of the House; or
 nominal voting

5. THIRD READING
The amendments, if any, are engrossed and printed copies of the
bill are reproduced for Third Reading.
The engrossed bill is included in the Calendar of Bills for Third
Reading and copies of the same are distributed to all the
Members three days before its Third Reading.
On Third Reading, the Secretary General reads only the number
and title of the bill.
A roll call or nominal voting is called and a Member, if he desires,
is given three minutes to explain his vote. No amendment on the
bill is allowed at this stage.
The bill is approved by an affirmative vote of a majority of the
Members present.
If the bill is disapproved, the same is transmitted to the Archives.
6. TRANSMITTAL OF THE APPROVED BILL TO THE SENATE
The approved bill is transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence.
7. SENATE ACTION ON APPROVED BILL OF THE HOUSE
The bill undergoes the same legislative process in the Senate.
8. BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
A Conference Committee is constituted and is composed of
Members from each House of Congress to settle, reconcile or
thresh out differences or disagreements on any provision of the
bill.
The conferees are not limited to reconciling the differences in the
bill but may introduce new provisions germane to the subject
matter or may report out an entirely new bill on the subject.
The Conference Committee prepares a report to be signed by all
the conferees and the Chairman.
The Conference Committee Report is submitted for
consideration/approval of both Houses. No amendment is
allowed.
9. TRANSMITTAL OF THE BILL TO THE PRESIDENT
Copies of the bill, signed by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and certified by both the
Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House,
are transmitted to the President.
10. PRESIDENTIAL ACTION ON THE BILL
If the bill is approved the President, the same is assigned an RA
number and transmitted to the House where it originated.
If the bill is vetoed, the same, together with a message citing the
reason for the veto, is transmitted to the House where the bill
originated.
11. ACTION ON APPROVED BIL
The bill is reproduced and copies are sent to the Official Gasette
Office for publication and distribution to the implementing
agencies. It is then included in the annual compilation of Acts and
Resolutions.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 26
12. ACTION ON VETOED BILL
The message is included in the Order of Business. If the Congress
decides to override the veto, the House and the Senate shall
proceed separately to reconsider the bill or the vetoed items of
the bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is passed by a vote of two-
thirds of the Members of each House, such bill or items shall
become a law.
TOLENTINTO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB
of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress
on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills
as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said
bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663,
entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President
delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt
reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt,
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated
pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI
of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the
creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines
in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the
appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior
approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which
states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used
for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-
260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in
the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994:
(a) For the Supreme Court
(b) Commission on Audit (COA)
(c) Ombudsman
(d) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR),
(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S)
(f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional;
whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of
funds therefore is constitutional.
HELD:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts
on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt
to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and
E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by
the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done
in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that
purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No.
4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities
and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of
Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2
of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can
be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health
is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of
medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by
the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund”
for the AFP modernization program that the President must
submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for
its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or
legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto
as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore,
being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3
were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of
the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for
by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on
the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art.
III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government
itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find
anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision
that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 27
the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate
11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is
the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for
such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested
in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation
of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions
relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional
commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to
complain when the President said that the expenditures shall
be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are
issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or
inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President
has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into
execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in
the guidelines.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question
the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the
pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund.
PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they
cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied
for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some
provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took
steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada
and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona
et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on
four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National
Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress
acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the
Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and
granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant
to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly
vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994
commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other
legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the
debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president
cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted
therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the
vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc
found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the
Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling
legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of
income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there
were already funds allotted for the same in the National
expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in
compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract)
ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result
to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may
result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled
that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows
the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the
items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase
of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition
and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-
impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund
to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize
the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension
funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI
of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use
savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per
reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including
the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his
Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision
to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC
ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the
repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B
of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am,
therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall
maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-
established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et
al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto:
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The
Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to
law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders
that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated
as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 28

legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen,
being representatives of their local districts know more about the
problems in their constituents’ areas than the national
government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that
knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
GONZALES VS MACARAIG
amended by RA 6670 that authorizes the president and
the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item
of appropriations in the exec branch of government
(page 460)
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of
GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is
unconstitutional.

FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY
’90). Gonzalez averred the following:
(1) The President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills
is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision;
(2) When the President objects to a provision of an appropriation
bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the
entire bill;
(3) The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike
out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and
(4) The power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the
1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
HELD: The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners
contend that the veto exceeded the mandate of the line-veto
power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are
provisions the court held that inappropriate provisions can be
treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and therefore can be vetoed
validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions
must be struck down because they contravene the constitution
because it limits the power of the executive to augment
appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The ‘provisions’ are inappropriate because:
 They do not relate to particular or distinctive
appropriations
 Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found
on the face of the bill
 It is more of an expression of policy than an
appropriation
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be
logrolling on the part of the legislative à the subject matter of the
provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete
legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT
passed in that manner they attempt hide it in the GAB

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the invalid then congress SHOULD resort to their constitutionally
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill. vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION:
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.
in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate
provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.

The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to
veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.

GONZALES VS MACARAIG

 December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186

(GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by
the president

 December 29, 1988 à President signed bill into law (RA

6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec 55, a general
provision.

 February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 à Senate as

an institution decided to contest the constitutionality of the
veto of the president of SEC 55 only.

 April 11, 1989 this petition was filed

 January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to
admit supplemental petition à same issues but included
SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA
6831)
 SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several
department to augment any item in the GAB thereby
violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
 SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and
the reason for veto remains the same with the additional
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 29

BENGZON VS DRILON MILLER VS MARDO

FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e.

Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and
members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need
to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits
among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition

with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by
P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished
PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence,
the repealing law never existed due to non-publication and in
effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General

Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional
budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are
allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of the
government; among such obligations is the allotment for the
pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which

provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges

and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by
the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion

of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD: NO. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power
to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is

unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This
cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in
its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the
entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did
not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 30

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
is fixed by the legislature.
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners
filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees,
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it
finds it impractical.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
legal personality to bring the instant petition.
possible.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
J. Cruz:
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
blade is drawn.
of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the
height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A
published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein
REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
validity.
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided
. . .;"
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in
declared that presidential issuances of general application which
Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29,
have not been published have no force and effect.
1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view
that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA (DECEMBER 29, 1986)
considering its erratic release and limited readership";
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly,
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
function of communicating the laws to the people as such
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership,
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
and come out regularly"; and
ISSUES:
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
of general circulation in the country;
general circulation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the
HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
Constitution, do hereby order:
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
otherwise provided.
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
accordingly.
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after
whole.
its publication in the Official Gazette.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 31
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
QUESTION HOUR
What is the Question Hour?
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the
question hour is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as
the question period. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to
conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. This
is provided in Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution:
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.
Is the power of inquiry in aid of legislation the same as the
“Question Hour”?
No. Section 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) and Section 22
(question hour) of Article VI of the Constitution are closely related
and complementary to each other, but they do not pertain to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of the oversight function
of Congress. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in
the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation.
If a person is cited in contempt and imprisoned in relation to the
Congressional exercise of inquiry in aid of legislation, how long
will the imprisonment last?
This is tackled by the Supreme Court in Arnault vs. Nazareno,
where the petitioner argued that the Senate lacks authority to
commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session. According to the Supreme Court:
That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal
of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent
to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the
committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By
refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the
performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the
Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling
the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty
until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long
as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing
the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may
punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which
investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the
Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it
an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside
from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt
terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate
would have to resume the investigation at the next and
succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings
against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd,
unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner
that the power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the
Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we
must assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the
power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this
assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this
Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION
ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
FACTS: The Senate investigated the purchase by the
government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and
Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate
sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged
interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The
Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the
Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to
whom he gave the amount of Php440, 000.00, which he withdrew
from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was
committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed
a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination?
RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience
has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 32
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the
matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged
by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other
things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of
the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in
said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has
no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have
already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body
to show that every question propounded to a witness is material
to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the
range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2.YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body
to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The
very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions
may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical
to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life
to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted
by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not
cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . .
There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against
self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal,
and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on
the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his
general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The
fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has
violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the
protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against
an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts
and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in
refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering
merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate
him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
ARNAULT VS. BALAGTAS
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean
Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was
incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person
with whom he transacted business in relation to a government
purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the
companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the
Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or
refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess
D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with
Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of
the resolution states:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND
DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA,
RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED
HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
xxx
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the
said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was
committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to
hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and
confinement, said power and authority having been held to be
coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean
L. Arnault should have given the information which he had
withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made
by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to
constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added
affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be
condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate
to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual
because they could be defied by any person of sufficient
stubbornness and malice;
xxx
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and
ordered his release.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-
imposed incarceration.
2. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of
the Senate.
3. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive
measure.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 33
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review
the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the
Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and
continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave
the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has
not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly
shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to
deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to
review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered
the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista
and Tambobong deal.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that
the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to
review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the
prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or
their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The
Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this,
in the same manner that the legislative department may not
invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the
application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the
judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the
Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may
lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary
exercise of the legislative discretion.
2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or
incarcerate him as a punitive measure.
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the
confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the
petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the
continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive.
This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution
that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and
constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.
The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses.
This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must
be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a
legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which
to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative
department should not be constrained to look to the courts
whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act
of contumacy with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject
to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and
absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary
power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed,
and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail
is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to
be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost
against the petitioner-appellee.
BENGZON VS SEN. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by
the government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged
anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government
corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres.
Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging
the Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was
conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the
Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they
know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case
before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that
the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He
contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the
defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The
Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in
intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of
the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must
be respected, including the right to due process and the right not
to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the
Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain
of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the
Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only
pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.
Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to
all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One
of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-
incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes
of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence
before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if
pursued would be violative of the principle of separation of powers
between the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 34
SENATE VS ERMITA
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions
about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced.
This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing
in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations
to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due
to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of
Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate
president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in
the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such
hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited
by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded
with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality
was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To
determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought
to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although
there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true –
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour.
The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the
members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation,
under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he
refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction
was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the
question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary
in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related
and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the
aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article
VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear
in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid
of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
SABIO VS GORDON
FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in
aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC)
due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006,
Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the
PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 35
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in
Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information
to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation.
SABIO VS GORDON
ISSUES:
WON Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the
power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the
need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the
unhampered performance of its duties under its charter.
HELD:
Petition for Habeas Corpus has become moot because Sabio was
allowed to gohome. Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987Constitution granting respondent
Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads: The
Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O.
No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative
or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
Arnault vs. Nazareno:
“The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting theconditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and wherethe legislation body does
not itself possess the requisite information – whichis not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess
it."
The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that
" employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
The power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in
Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and
that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive withthe power to
legislate."
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, The Court find
Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress'
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress
and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly,
a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI,
Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives."
NERI VS SENATE
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed
by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using
their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) Whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between
GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3)
questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate
v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 36
executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed
by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim
of executive privilege on the ground that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials”
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process”
and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
GARCILLANO VS HOR
FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci"
tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her
favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the
public at the Senate’s internet web page.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s
website, satisfies the due process requirement of law. -NO
HELD: The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website
of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form
of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because
the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who
violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained
by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the
internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary
purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the
internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation
by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 37
OTHER POWERS:
OVERSIGHT
ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
Facts: Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335
was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau
of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of
rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites
corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction
as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the
power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient
standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335
provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at
least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to
be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives limitation to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power
to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has
been violated in the creation of a congressional
oversight committee.
Discussions:
1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “
2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative
power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test
and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission
on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is
not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral
to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid
classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the
law should logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises
one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy
the demands of equal protection.
2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to
guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the
Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and
welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public
interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was
created for the purpose of approving the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it
approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 38
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered
moot and academic.
ACT AS A BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
PIMENTEL, JR. VS JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS
(TO CANVASS THE VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE
PRESIDENT IN THE MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS)
FACTS: By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential
and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.
The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the
Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
Issue: Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice
as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports
Pimentel’s arguments against the existence and proceedings of
the Joint Committee of Congress after the adjournment of
Congress.
Held: NO. Pimentel’s claim that his arguments are buttressed by
“legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the
rules of both Houses of Congress” is directly contradicted by
Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of
which he is an incumbent member.
Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential
Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing
by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential
elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992.
Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eight Congress convened in
joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on
even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito
Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively.
CALL OF A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR
PRESIDENCY
ART VIII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to
be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election
shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article
VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section
25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall
act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
DECIDE ON DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Section 7. If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice
President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the
Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen
or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have
been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a
Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent
disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of
both the President and Vice-President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or
Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President
in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President.
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTIES
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
CONCUR IN TREATIES
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 39
Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
LEGISLATIVE VETO OR EXTENSION OF WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS/DECLARATION OF
MARTIAL LAW
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts
are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members;
or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of
all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling
such a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency
of the petition.
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 40

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is

filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the

same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment, according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 41
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
SUCCESSION
IN CASE OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY
ESTRADA V. ARROYO
FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman
from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a
Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner
to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to
be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
HELD:
FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.
The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that
“it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is . . .”
The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and
EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the
new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the
succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions.
SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner
resigned as President.
The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he
would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day
period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop
to clear his name.
"If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by
Monday.
"The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. (I am very tired. I don’t want any more of this – it’s too
painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
"I just want to clear my name, then I will go.”
The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner
has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said “x x x
Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.” “ Ayoko na” are words of
resignation.
During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was
treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were
the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
transition period.
ACTS OF RELINQUISHMENT: His resignation was also
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of’ the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense.
THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.
Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses
of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President.
The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. l75 which states: “RESOLUTION EXPRESSING
THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO
THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR
HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE NATION’S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.” The
Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states:
“RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO’S NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES”
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability
of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove
that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is
a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot
be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the
events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001,
the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that
the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 42
The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment
process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he
lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that
he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser.
FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was
given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do
not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of
the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
EXCEPTIONS TO PROHIBITION FROM HOLDING
ANOTHER OFFICE
1. Vice-President as member of the cabinet
2. Sec. of Justice as member of Judicial and Bar Council
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in
the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as
a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii)
the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent
and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to
Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
DELA CRUZ VS COA
FACTS: The NHA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of
Disallowance on October 23, 1997 disallowing the payment to the
petitioners, who are the members of the Board of Directors of the
National Housing Authority (NHA), of their representation
allowances and per diems for the period from August 19 199 to
August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P276, 000.00.
Such disallowance was pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-
038 issued by the COA, directing all unit heads/auditors/team
leaders of the national government agencies and government-
owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment
of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet
secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a)
immediately cause the disallowance of such additional
compensation or remuneration given to and received by the
concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the
time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the
consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive
Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22,
1991.
The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme
Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19,
1991, declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar
as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to
hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to
receive compensation therefor.
The petitioners appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the
COA, claiming that the aforementioned Supreme Court decision
applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants and does not cover other appointive officials with
equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary. They added that NHA Directors are not Secretaries,
Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy
positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-38
denying petitioners' appeal, stressing that the petitioners €œwere
not sitting in the NHA Board in their own right but as
representatives of cabinet members and who are constitutionally
prohibited from holding any other office or employment and
receive compensation therefor, during their tenure (Section 13,
Article VII, Constitution; Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 43

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to their
representation allowances and per diems as members of the NHA
Board of Directors.
RULING:
NO. Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National
Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies,
defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and
for other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides that the persons
mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the
following:
(1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of
Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry,
(6) the Executive Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the
NHA.
While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are
alternates of the said officers, whose acts shall be considered the
acts of their principals. On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution, provides: SEC. 13. The President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.
They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office.
The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers
to an authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position
NAC VS COA
FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a
government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President
Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked
to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is
composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of
Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as
ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings,
the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to
their representatives who paid honoraria were beginning
December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of
honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the
period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment
intended for ex-officio members
RULING: The representatives in fact assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and
functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or
grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation
does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position.

Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or

as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or
authority than that conferred by the office. An ex-officio member
of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain
office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by
express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the
Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio
members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving extra
(additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem
or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates
cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A
contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their
principals. We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision,
the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 44
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE POWER
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL
MANGLAPUS
FACTS: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the
presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed,
petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue
their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the
President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that
the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode
because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by
law.” Nor, according to the petitioners, may the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines?
Ruling: NO
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise
of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of the “executive
power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Having sword to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a
social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for common good. The State,
through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-
emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect
the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as
protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that
their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if,
though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious
and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of
the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the
petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting
their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
ALMARIO VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee and the NCCA
decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists
Award. There were three deliberations for determining the
nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four names
was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro
Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
They submitted this recommendation to the President. According
to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the
Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile,
the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly
endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were
issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and
private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former
President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection
process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her
own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave
abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the right to
equal protection
RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents
was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director
of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas
did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno
was not included in the second shortlist.
Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening
process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny. No real
and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner
Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents
in an exceptional position.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads
right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to
confer him standing in this case.
DENR VS DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES
FACTS: Petition for review assailing CA decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari and denial of motion for consideration.
November 15, 1999 – Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region
XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum [3] directing the
immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato—
Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of
Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Office so Sec 1.
Realignment of Administrative Units. 1.6. The supervision of the
Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred
from Region XI to XII
Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional
Executive Director from transferring the offices.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 45

DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting thato CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in
BLAQERA VS ALCALA
nature.

 The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
Executive Order No. 429, which reorganized Region XII. granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent
to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which
 The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
Honorable Supreme Court in theCase of Chiongbian vs.
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and
 Since the power to reorganize the Administrative
financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting
Regions is Executive in Nature citing Chiongbian, the
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years
Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this
pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by
petition.
the Office of the Pres.
RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
enforcing their Memorandum Order xxx for being bereft of legal
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive
basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres.
or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered
Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
Cotabato City.
P1, 000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268,
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
errors:
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
(1) Failure to submit a written explanation why personal service
productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1,
was not done on the adverse party;
000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
(2) Failure to attach affidavit of service;
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
(3) Failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the orders
of the government concerned caused the deduction from
of the lower court were received;
petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
(4) Failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying
cover the alleged overpayments.
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration;
(5) For improper verification, the same being based on petitioner’s
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
knowledge and belief, and
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments?
(6) Wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute a lost
YES.
appeal.
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental
Motion for Reconsideration denied.
power and authority are exercised and implemented through him.
His power includes the control of executive departments as
Hence this petition.
provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
(1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
same were valid; -YES
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his
2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to
subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices
reorganize the DENR.
under him.
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi): PETITION GRANTED.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
(1) Yes:
benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
(2) Yes: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
just exercising his power of control over executive
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
departments.
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity
control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec.
incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of
demoralization among government personnel by committing
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
limited resources of government for the equal payment of
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his
power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the
In this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize
government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their
the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the
government resources.
DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
repudiated the same.
So, too, is his control of executive departments.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 46
HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED (HPPL)
V SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
FACTS: In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) won
a public bidding made by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a modern
marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
The SBMA Board of Directors already declared HPPL as the
winner but later on, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding
however, HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders.
Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA
from conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction
case against SBMA.
HELD: No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring
HPPL as the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable.
Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the SBMA are
subject to the approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the
Board of SBMA is under the control and supervision of the
President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration made by
the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign
corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
It did not register here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated
transaction. The conduct of bidding is not an isolated transaction.
It is “doing business” here in the Philippines. The Supreme Court
emphasized that as a general rule, “doing” or “engaging in” or
“transacting” business in the Philippines is a case to case basis.
It has often been held that a single act or transaction may be
considered as “doing business” when a corporation performs acts
for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for
which it was organized. The amount or volume of the business is
of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental
or casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do
business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business”
because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in
business here. The bidding for the concession contract is but an
exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or existence.
Therefore, HPPL has done business here without license. It
cannot now sue in the Philippines without license because its
participation in the bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a
foreign corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines
to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to
enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the
regulation of their activities in this country.
Facts: On 12 February 1996, the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) advertised in leading national daily newspapers
and in one international publication, an invitation offering to the
private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern
marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
Out of 7 bidders who responded to the published invitation, 3 were
declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the pre-
qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMA's Technical
Evaluation Committee (SBMA-TEC) These are: (1) International
Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI); (2) a consortium
consisting of Royal Port Services, Inc. and HPC Hamburg Port
Consulting GMBH (RPSI); and (3) Hutchison Ports Philippines
Limited (HPPL), representing a consortium composed of HPPL,
Guoco Holdings (Phils.), Inc. and Unicol Management Services,
Inc. All 3 qualified bidders were required to submit their respective
formal bid package on or before 1 July 1996 by the SBMA's Pre-
qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (SBMA-PBAC).
Thereafter, the services of 3 international consultants
recommended by the World Bank for their expertise were hired by
SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the
bidders, and to ensure that there would be a transparent and
comprehensive review of the submitted bids.
The SBMA also hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah
Philippines, Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the bids and in the
negotiation process after the winning bidder is chosen. All the
consultants, after such review and evaluation unanimously
concluded that HPPL's Business Plan was "far superior to that of
the two other bidders." However, even before the sealed
envelopes containing the bidders' proposed royalty fees could be
opened at the appointed time and place, RPSI formally protested
that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a second port in the
Philippines based on Executive Order 212 and Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863. RPSI
thus requested that the financial bid of ICTSI should be set aside.
Nevertheless, the opening of the sealed financial bids proceeded
"under advisement" relative to the protest signified by RPSI. The
financial bids, more particularly the proposed royalty fee of each
bidder, was as follows: (1) ICTSI, US$57.80 TEU; (2) HPPL,
US$20.50 TEU; and (3) RPSI, US$15.08 TEU. The SBMA-PBAC
decided to suspend the announcement of the winning bid,
however, and instead gave ICTSI 7 days within which to respond
to the letter-protest lodged by RPSI. The HPPL joined in RPSI's
protest, stating that ICTSI should be disqualified because it was
already operating the Manila International Container Port (MICP),
which would give rise to inevitable conflict of interest between the
MICP and the Subic Bay Container Terminal facility. On 15
August 1996, the SBMA-PBAC issued a resolution rejecting the
bid of ICTSI because "said bid does not comply with the
requirements of the tender documents and the laws of the
Philippines."
The following day, ICTSI filed a letter-appeal with SBMA's Board
of Directors requesting the nullification and reversal of the
resolution rejecting ICTSI's bid while awarding the same to HPPL.
But even before the SBMA Board could act on the appeal, ICTSI
filed a similar appeal before the Office of the President. On 30
August 1996, then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC)
Renato L. Cayetano submitted a memorandum to then President
Fidel V. Ramos, recommending that the President direct SBMA
Chairman Gordon to consider re-evaluating the financial bids
submitted by the parties, taking into consideration all the following
factors: (1) Reinstate ICTSI's bid; (2) Disregard all arguments
relating to "monopoly"; (3) The re-evaluation must be limited to
the parties' financial bids. Considering that the parties' business
have been accepted (passed), strictly follow the criteria for bid
evaluation provided for in pars. (c) and (d), Part B (1) of the
Tender Document; (4) In the re-evaluation, the COA should
actively participate to determine which of the financial bids is more
advantageous; (5) In addition, all the parties should be given
ample opportunity to elucidate or clarify the
components/justification for their respective financial bids in order
to ensure fair play and transparency in the proceedings; and (6)
The President's authority to review the final award shall remain."
The recommendation of CPLC Cayetano was approved by
President Ramos. A copy of President Ramos' handwritten
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 47

approval was sent to the SBMA Board of Directors. Accordingly,
the SBMA Board, with the concurrence of representatives of the
Commission on Audit, agreed to focus the reevaluation of the bids
in accordance with the evaluation criteria and the detailed
components contained in the Tender Document, including all
relevant information gleaned from the bidding documents, as well
as the reports of the three international experts and the
consultancy firm hired by the SBMA.
On 19 September 1996, the SBMA Board issued a Resolution,
declaring that the best possible offer and the most advantageous
to the government is that of HPPL, which was awarded the
concession for the operation and development of the Subic Bay
Container Terminal. In a letter dated 24 September 1996, the
SBMA Board of Directors submitted to the Office of the President
the results of the re-evaluation of the bid proposals.
Notwithstanding the SBMA Board's recommendations and action
awarding the project to HPPL, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres submitted a memorandum to the Office of the President
recommending that another rebidding be conducted.
Consequently, the Office of the President issued a Memorandum
directing the SBMA Board of Directors to refrain from signing the
Concession Contract with HPPL and to conduct a rebidding of the
project. In the meantime, the Resident Ombudsman for the DOTC
filed a complaint against members of the SBMA-PBAC before the
Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019 for awarding the contract to HPPL. On 16 April
1997, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution absolving the
members of the SBMA-PBAC of any liability and dismissing the
complaint against them.
cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign
corporation's intention to do business. Participating in the bidding
process constitutes "doing business" because it shows the foreign
corporation's intention to engage in business here. The bidding
for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation's
reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that "a
foreign company invited to bid for IBRD and ADB international
projects in the Philippines will be considered as doing business in
the Philippines for which a license is required." In this regard, it is
the performance by a foreign corporation of the acts for which it
was created, regardless of volume of business, that determines
whether a foreign corporation needs a license or not. The primary
purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign
corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines to
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to
enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the
regulation of their activities in this country. If a foreign corporation
operates a business in the Philippines without a license, and thus
does not submit itself to Philippine laws, it is only just that said
foreign corporation be not allowed to invoke them in our courts
when the need arises. "While foreign investors are always
welcome in this land to collaborate with us for our mutual benefit,
they must be prepared as an indispensable condition to respect
and be bound by Philippine law in proper cases." The requirement
of a license is not intended to put foreign corporations at a
disadvantage, for the doctrine of lack of capacity to sue is based
on considerations of sound public policy. Accordingly, HPPL must
be held to be incapacitated to bring the petition for injunction
before the Supreme Court for it is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without the requisite license.

On 7 July 1997, the HPPL, feeling aggrieved by the SBMA's

failure and refusal to commence negotiations and to execute the
Concession Agreement despite its earlier pronouncements that
HPPL was the winning bidder, filed a complaint against SBMA
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch
75, for specific performance, mandatory injunction and damages.
In due time, ICTSI, RPSI and the Office of the President filed
separate Answers-in-Intervention to the complaint opposing the
reliefs sought by complainant HPPL. While the case before the
trial court was pending litigation, on 4 August 1997, the SBMA
sent notices to HPPL, ICTSI and RPSI requesting them to declare
their interest in participating in a rebidding of the proposed project.
On 20 October 1997, HPPL received a copy of the minutes of the
pre-bid conference which stated that the winning bidder would be
announced on 5 December 1997. Then on 4 November 1997,
HPPL learned that the SBMA had accepted the bids of ICTSI and
RPSI who were the only bidders who qualified. In order to enjoin
the rebidding while the case was still pending, HPPL filed a motion
for maintenance of the status quo on 28 October 1997. The said
motion was denied by the court a quo in an Order dated 3
November 1997. HPPL filed the petition against SBMA, ICTSI,
RPSI and the Executive Secretary seeking to obtain a prohibitory
injunction.

Issue: Whether HPPL has the legal capacity to even seek

redress from the Court.

Held: HPPL is a foreign corporation, organized and existing

under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. While the actual bidder
was a consortium composed of HPPL, and two other
corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings (Phils.) Inc. and Unicol
Management Services, Inc., it is only HPPL that has brought the
controversy before the Court, arguing that it is suing only on an
isolated transaction to evade the legal requirement that foreign
corporations must be licensed to do business in the Philippines to
be able to file and prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to
what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business
in the Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light of its
peculiar circumstances. Thus, it has often been held that a single
act or transaction may be considered as "doing business" when a
corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises
some of the functions for which it was organized. The amount or
volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 48

NEA VS COA GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS/AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
PIMENTEL VS AGUIRRE
Facts:

In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all

government departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs
and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that
will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to
LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada
issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld
from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of

discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction
program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10

percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of
the President's power of general supervision over local
governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy.

Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with
national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat,
is the head of the economic and planning agency of the
government, primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and
economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the
implementation of such policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various
private sectors, and local government units." The President
cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of
Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and
Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary
adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government
units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the
third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may
interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector
deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the
presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives
and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and
Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the
allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these

requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372.
At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national
government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector
deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with
the different leagues of local governments. Without these
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 49
requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to
reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local
governments. It is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country,
which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain
any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further
that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term
"shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs.
Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY VS.
PAREDES
Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and
manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy
to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in
the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars
which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue
interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is
not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge
contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction
over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of
Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the
supervisory power of the DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has
power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local government, which exclude the power of control. As the
entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority
is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot
lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify
or replace the same.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
BERMUDEZ VS TORRES
Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of
Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private
respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then
Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was
appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and
assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties
and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner
Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the
Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres.
upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”
Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of Quiaoit
Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of
designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an
individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an
office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last
act required of the appointing authority has been complied with
and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render
it effective.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power
to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be
understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of
whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all “executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority
of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set
aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of
his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as
and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has
the power to assume directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that
the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials
under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in
Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative
Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not
binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The
recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in
nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department,
could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of
discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 50
SARMIENTO VS MISON
FACTS: This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution.
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino.
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the
bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned
the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the
new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the
COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague,
the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing
the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of
Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus”
needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads
of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups are:
 First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
 Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
 Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
 Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the
president which require confirmation by the COA. The second,
third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA.
The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does
not belong to the first group, hence, he does not need to be
confirmed by the COA.
MARY CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA VS SENATOR
JOVITO SALONGA
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary
Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission
on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation
of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on
Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents
for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista
then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito
Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of
the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down
in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the
COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of
the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista.
COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s
actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked
Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment
of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since
Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to
confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as
chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to
COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of
the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself,
unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The
President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR
pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without
the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers
of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make
appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for
confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law
or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made
without the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of
submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without
or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such
appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or rejection, such
submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the
office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant –
as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the
incumbent CHR chairperson.
There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s
appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and
members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all
appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be
ad interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the
chairman and members of the CHR may be removed at the
pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A
is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the
chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7
years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot
be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed
that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed
upon cause and with the observance of due process.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 51

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

PETER JOHN CALDERON VS BARTOLOME
CARALE
FACTS: In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law
amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the
Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the
President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (COA).
government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison,
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for
appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for
such appointments, the officers are considered as among those
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed MANALO VS SISTOZA
Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not
Facts: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law
submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon
created the Department of Interior and Local Government. Said
questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation
law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the
by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715.
manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to
Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted
be appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as
that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of
certain police officers including Directors and Chief
the executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as
Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said
on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in
officers can take their office.
addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of
Article 7 of the Constitution.
In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza
et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of
appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on
public officers required to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of
Appointment as listed in the Constitution.
the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation
HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there
by the Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction,
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975.
These four (4) groups are:
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out
the provisions of the said law. Manalo also insists that the law is
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
hence, it must be carried out by the courts.
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are
valid.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
HELD: No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior
to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys the
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by
appoint;
Congress must be respected by courts and as much as possible,
courts must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law.
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the
may by law vest in the President alone.
Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by Congress is not
repugnant to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General:
confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four
executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls,
groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
President:
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation
Constitution;
by the Commission on Appointments is required.
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments
“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of
are not otherwise provided for by law;
officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
so by adding the phrase “and other officers required by law” at the
appoint;
end of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments” at the end of the second sentence.
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for
may by law vest in the President alone.
such additions.
The first group are the only ones whose appointments are
This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting
required by the Constitution to be affirmed by the Commission on
Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
Appointments. All others need not be confirmed. Officers of the
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required
PNP are not included therein. There is also no merit to the
only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
contention that PNP officers are akin to officers of the armed
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose
forces.
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the
president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and
Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the
members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
provisions set forth in the Constitution.
and Election).
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 52

Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute

enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the
fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike
down such unconstitutionality.

ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA

FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 53
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
Facts: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as
acting secretaries of their respective departments without the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is
in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as
secretaries of the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioner senators assailing the constitutionality of the
appointments, assert that “while Congress is in session, there can
be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant
position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue
appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even
while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of
appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise
the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the
Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The
President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to
which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly
appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason
of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy [.]
Issue: WON the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session.
Held: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity
is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill
an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied
by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint
an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while
Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s
issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of
the undersecretary?
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive
power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope of the
legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive
office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise
of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person
to an office.
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet,
then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur
Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They
were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino
Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against
the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot
make such appointment without the consent of the Commission
on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of
the respective departments should be designated in an acting
capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session.
Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA
issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously
appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is
valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further,
EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not
be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation
shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after
the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress
was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this
also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos
of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the
president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She
cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the
option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the
permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed.
EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 54
designate an officer already in the government service or any
other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person competent.
IN RE: VALENZUELA
Facts: On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of
RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These
appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly
prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar
Council to discuss the constitutionality of appointments to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential
elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado,
Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that “election ban had no
application to the CA based on the Commission’s records”. This
hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration
together with the Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official
communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the
appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March
11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban
on appointments), which implies that the President’s Office did not
agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998
the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the vacancy in
view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13,
date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the
reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May
elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the
same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the
uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it
appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of the
Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This
prompted CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ
received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter
where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only
applied to executive appointments, the whole article being entitled
“EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that appointments in the
Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
“The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.”
Article 8 Sec 9
“The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from the list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the appointments of
the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned. Considering the pending
proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved
by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However,
Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so
without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be
noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had
been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the
latter’s office and had not been transmitted yet. According to
Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacañang
copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential
elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC shall be filled
within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered
where the President shall not make any appointments. According
to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the
hands of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
Issue: whether, during the period of the ban on appointments
imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary,
in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can make
appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the
interest of public service.
Held: The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at
bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion,
in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the
Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end his term” — the President
is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed
to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean
that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15
of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives,
offer or promises money or anything of value gives or promises
any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or
makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association,
corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold
his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 55
the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar
selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any
head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency
or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or
hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the
authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled
is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner
that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article
VII consist of the so-called “midnight” appointments. There may
well be appointments to important positions which have to be
made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such
appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of
the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,”
can be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not
only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously for
partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their
making — but also appointments of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the
making of temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing
power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling
vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President’s
power of appointments, it is the Supreme Court’s view that, as a
general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to
the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court
vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies
can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier
pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled
temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-
lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier
pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need
for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the
executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case
should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have
no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important
question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such
a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII
nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
DE CASTRO V. JBC
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election.
Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
“vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position
of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from
political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the
JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from
some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so
once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 56

President shall not make appointments, except temporary VELICARIA-GARAFIL VS OFFICE OF THE
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies PRESIDENT
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in

Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in

Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to
assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in
respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition
in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 57

DE RAMA VS CA
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC
seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees.
Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of
the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of
the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC
dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight”
appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied
upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an
outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly
issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the
appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing

Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition

on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made
within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There
is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO

FACTS: Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the

constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo of
Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora
and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She questions the
legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director
IV of the Comelec’s EID and reassigning her to the Law
department.

ISSUES:
1. Instant petition satisfies all requirements
2. Assumption of office by Benipayo, Bora and Tuason; ad
interim appointments amounts to a temporary appointment
prohibited by Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
3. Renewal of ad interim violated the prohibition on
reappointment under Sec 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution
4. Benipayo’s removal of petitioner is illegal
5. OIC of COMELEC’s Finance Services Department acting in
excess jurisdiction
6.
Matibag’s Argument:
1. Failure to consult for reassignment
2. Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No 7;
transferring and detailing employees are prohibited during
the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001
3. Reassignment violated Sec 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258
4. Ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Bora and Tuason
violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of
the COMELEC
5. Illegal removal or reassignment
6. Challenges the designation of Cinco
7. Questions the disbursement made by COMELEC
8. No ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to Civil
Service Commission and COA
9. Sec 1 (2) of Article IX-C; an ad interim appointee cannot
assume office until confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments

Benipayo’s Argument:
1. Comelec Resolution No. 3300
2. Petitioner does not have personal interest, not directly
injured
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 58
3. Failure to question constitutionality of ad interim
appointments at the earliest opportunity. She filed only after
third time of reappointments
4. Ad interim is not the lis mota because the real issue is the
legality of petitioner’s reassignment.
ISSUE: Real issue is whether or not Benipayo is the lawful
Chairman of the Comelec?
HELD: Petitioner has a personal and material stake. It is not the
date of filing of the petition that determines whether the
constitutional issue was raised at the earliest point. The earliest
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleading.
Questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments
which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional
issue before a competent body.
Ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn. It is not
the nature of appointment but the manner on which appointment
was made. It will avoid interruptions that would result to prolonged
vacancies. It is limited the evil sought to be avoided.
Termination of Ad interim appointment (Sword of Damocles); (1)
disapproval (2) recess
Two modes of appointment: (1) in session (2) in recess
By-passed appointments – (1) lack of time/failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize, (2) subject of
reconsideration, (3) can be revived since there is no final
disapproval
Four situations in for a term of seven years without replacement:
(1) serves his full seven-year term, (2) serves a part of his term
and then resigns before his seven-year term, (3) served the
unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, (4) served a
term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death
or resignation. Not one of the four situation applies to the case of
Benipayo, Borra or Tuason
Reappointment cannot be applied; (1) appointed by president, (2)
confirmed by Commission on Appointments
Without reappointment means: (first phrase) prohibits
reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of
seven years (second phrase) prohibits reappointment of any
person previously appointed for a term of 5 or 3 years pursuant to
the first set of appointees
Reasons for prohibition of reappointments: (1) prevent second
appointment (2) not serve beyond the fixed term
Two important amendments: (1) requiring the consent by
Commission of Appointments (2) prohibition on serving beyond
the fixed term of 7 years
Twin Prohibition (ironclad): (1) prohibition of reappointments (2)
prohibition of temporary or acting appointments
Third issue not violation because the previous appointments were
not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman. He is not required
by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc. The
petitioner is acting only temporary because a permanent
appointment can be issued only upon meeting all the
requirements.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 refers only to COMELEC field
personnel not to head office personnel.
MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO
Facts: The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the
“Acting Director IV” of the EID. Some time after, President Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as Comelec
Chairman and Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the
respondents for confirmation. However, the commissions did not
act on said appointments.
Once more, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim
appointments for the respondents and made them took their oaths
for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their
appointments to the Commission for confirmation. Congress
adjourned before the Commission could act on their
appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad interim
appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The
Office submitted their appointments for confirmation to the
Commission.
They took their oaths of office anew. In his capacity as Comelec
Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum addressed to
petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner
asked for a reconsidered of her reassignment but was denied of
it.
Hence, the petition herein questioning the validity of the
appointment of the respondents.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is
a temporary appointment that is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution
(2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or
not the renewal of the ad interim appointments of the respondents
is a violation of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Held: (1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution uses the word “effective only until.”
LARIN VS EXEC. SECRETARY
Aquilino Larin was an Assistant Commissioner in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). He was in charge of the office of the
Excise Tax Service. In 1992, the Sandiganbayan convicted Larin
for grave misconduct. His conviction was reported to the Office of
the President, at the same time, an administrative complaint was
filed with the same office. The President then, based on the
Sandiganbayan conviction, created a committee to investigate
Larin. Eventually, Larin’s removal was recommended. The
President dismissed Larin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Larin was removed from office properly.
HELD: No. Larin is a presidential appointee who belongs to the
career service of the Civil Service. Although it is a general rule
that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, such
power to remove I with limitations. In the case at bar, the limitation
can be found in the fact that Larin is a career service officer and
under the Administrative Code of 1987, such officers who fall
under career service are characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career
service whose tenure is co-terminus with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified
by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
the employment was made. As a career service officer, Larin
FINALS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 59

enjoys the right to security of tenure. He can only be removed

from his office on grounds enumerated in the Administrative Code
of 1987. In the case at bar, the basis for his removal was his
conviction in the Sandiganbayan – this is not one of those grounds
enumerated in the Administrative Code. Further, the Supreme
Court notes that when Larin’s conviction was appealed to the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court actually absolved Larin.