[G.R. Nos. 135667-70[1].
March 1, 2001] took off his shorts, pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his penis against her thighs,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
TO TIE A CHILD of tender years spread-eagled to her bed to abuse her in the privacy of her home is
despicable enough; to encroach on her innocence unashamedly in front of her younger brother is to
descend to the deepest recesses of depravity. Thus the incorrigible lothario transgressed all norms of
decency, morality and rectitude when he molested his nine (9)-year old victim in the presence of her six
(6)-year old brother and severed all strands of gratefulness to her parents who gave him food, shelter and
livelihood for four (4) years.
Messeah is the daughter of Jose Noli Dumaoal, a seaman. His household was composed of his wife
Julie, and their three (3) children, Reggie, Messeah and Metheor. The accused Jessie Ventura Collado, son
of Jose Nolis cousin Benjamin, was living with them since 1989. While waiting for an opportunity to
become a seaman himself like his uncle Jose, Jessie served as the family driver. Aside from driving Julie,
Jessie would also drive the school service vehicle operated by the Dumaoal spouses. Since Jose was almost
always at sea and having no househelp, their children were oftentimes left in the care of Jessie. But,
instead of taking care of them as their surrogate father, he took advantage of Messeah by sexually
molesting her at home, and worse, even in the presence of her younger brother.
The first of four (4) unfortunate occasions was on 27 April 1993 when Julie and her oldest son Reggie
went to Cubao. Messeah was resting in her bedroom upstairs when Jessie suddenly barged into her
room. "What are you doing here?" she demanded, knowing fully well that he was not allowed upstairs
without her parents permission. Jessie simply smiled and said, "Wala," and added that her mother was
not around to get mad at him. Then he left only to return after three (3) to five (5) minutes with a straw
rope in hand. Messeah asked him why he was holding the rope, and Jessie told her to keep quiet and not
to ask questions or else he would hurt her. Alarmed, Messeah rushed to the window and screamed for her
brother Metheor, but Jessie reached out to cover her mouth with one hand while he closed the window
with the other. She heard Metheor call out from downstairs, "Whats going on?" but Jessie stopped her
from answering.
Hearing no response from Messeah upstairs, Metheor went up to her room and discovered that
Jessie had tied Messeahs hands to the bed and was about to tie her feet down. Metheor asked, "What are
you doing to my Ate?" Messeah screamed to her brother to call for help from the neighbors, but Jessie
threatened to hurt him if he left the room. Jessie then moved the bed to block the way to the door. At
some point, he also punched Messeah on her right cheek. Jessie then parted her legs and tied them apart,
pulling down her garterized shorts and panties until her ankles. He tried forcing his penis into her vagina,
but when he failed in his attempt, he inserted it into her anus instead.
Messeah felt pain in her anus and something sticky "like paste" flowed out from his penis. Her
vagina ached from Jessies earlier attempt to defile her. She saw Jessie close his eyes as though he was
enjoying himself. She cried out and Metheor, unable to bear what Jessie was doing to his sister, told the
older man, "Let my Ate go," and boxed him futilely with his baby fists. Jessie punched Metheor in the
stomach and the latter was rendered helpless by the pain. Jessie told Messeah to dress up and threatened
to set them and their house on fire if they said anything.
When Julie and Reggie arrived home in the afternoon she noticed that Messeahs cheek was red. She
asked her what was the matter, but Messeah saw Jessie listening close by and looking at her with dagger
eyes, so she simply lied and told her mother that she hurt herself while playing. Metheor also gave their
mother the same excuse. That night, although she knew that Jessie was no longer on the second floor
where she and her family slept, she could not muster enough courage to tell her mother what happened
because of Jessies threats.[2]
Because of this incident, Messeah asked her mother to buy a lock for her bedroom door, but her
mother passed the errand on to Jessie, who, predictably did not buy the lock. Messeah began to hate
Jessie and asked her mother to find another driver without however telling her what he did, but her
mother only told her that it would be difficult to find another one.
That was not the end of Messeahs ordeal. On 5 June 1993 Julie and Reggie went to the Marikina
public market, again leaving Messeah and Metheor alone with Jessie. Messeah was resting on the sofa
while Metheor was in the garage when Jessie grabbed Messeah and dragged her upstairs. She screamed
and Jessie tried to cover her mouth. She was crying as Jessie told her to take off her shorts and panties,
until it touched her vagina. She told him to stop because she was hurting but he did not heed her plea.The
intimate encounter went on for some ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes. Metheor heard her screams for
help, went upstairs and saw what Jessie was doing. He told Jessie to let his sister go, but Jessie merely
ignored him. Metheor went downstairs and got a 7" to 8"-inch breadknife which had a narrow point at the
end. Metheor again told Jessie to let his sister go, and threw the knife at Jessies back. Jessie felt the knife
hit his back that left a reddish mark, and let Messeah go. Before he left, he told the children that he would
throw them into a volcano if they told anybody about what happened.[3]
The third molestation happened on 7 July 1993. Again, only Metheor, Jessie and Messeah were at
home. Metheor was upstairs sleeping while Messeah was resting on the sofa when Jessie suddenly
entered the living room armed with a knife. Messeah called for her older brother twice, but Reggie had
already gone out. She only stopped when Jessie pointed the knife at her and threatened to stab her if she
shouted again. He then forced her to walk backwards to the kitchen where he told her again to remove
her shorts and panties. She resisted but Jessie insisted and even tried twice to stab her if she did not
comply. He used one of his hands to remove his shorts and briefs. He forced Messeah to sit on a steel chair
and told her to spread her legs. She sat with her legs closed together but he got mad and threatened to
stab her if she did not open her legs. She reluctantly opened her legs slightly and Jessie spread them wider
with his free hand as the other hand was holding the knife. Jessie then told Messeah to sit at the edge of
the steel chair, like before. He stood with one hand holding on to her shoulder, the other holding the knife,
and stood straddling her legs. He then inserted his penis between her thighs and used his legs to press her
thighs together (apart?). Then he rubbed his penis against her thighs for some three (3) to five (5) minutes
until it touched her vagina. She could then feel something sticky coming out from his penis and reaching
her vagina. Although her hands were free, she could not slap, box or scratch him because she was afraid
that he might stab her as he threatened. Jessie only stopped when he heard a noise.It was Reggie entering
the gate. Jessie ordered Messeah to get dressed immediately. Although she did not want to, Messeah
stood up, got dressed, and met her brother in the living room. As she walked away, Jessie, who had also
put his clothes back on, threatened to kill her whole family and Messeah knew that she could not get any
help from her brother Reggie, who was only thirteen (13) years old and no match for Jessie who was much
older and bigger.[4]
In August 1993 Jose came home for his annual vacation, but Messeah and Metheor were too afraid
of Jessie and his threats that they did not tell their father about the ongoing abuse by Jessie. Once Jessie
even borrowed a video tape of the Vizconde Massacre and forced Messeah and Metheor to watch it,
telling them that the same thing would happen to them if they revealed to their parents what he was doing
to them.[5] Not even the arrival in May 1993 of Julies relative, Alipio Martin, could prevent Jessie's sexual
assaults as he always waited until he was alone in the house with the children.
Jessie again took advantage of the situation on 17 October 1993 when everybody in the Dumaoal
household, except for the two (2) youngest children, were away from home. Messeahs parents had gone
shopping, while Reggie was playing computer with his friends at a neighbors house. Julies parents, who
were staying for a visit, were busy with other things. Her mother was at the parlor having a cold wave,
while her father was talking to a neighbor at the latters house some distance away. Alipio was also out of
the house and Metheor was playing in the garage. Messeah was aware of how alone she was and felt
afraid that she might be molested again, but she could not do anything since the door of her room still had
no lock. She had wanted to go to Cubao with her parents but Jessie had convinced them to leave her and
Metheor behind since they had been invited to go to a birthday party. By the time they returned from the
party, Jose and Julie had already left for Cubao.
As Messeah was changing her clothes after coming from the party, Jessie again entered her room,
told her to remove her panty, and inserted his smallest finger (kalingkingan) into her vagina while telling
her to keep silent. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top of her. This time, he was not
able to touch her vagina with his penis because Messeah cried and screamed and called for Metheor who
again went up and told Jessie, "Get away from my sister." Jessie stopped but threatened to throw the
children to the sharks if they told their parents what happened.[6]
That night Messeah learned from her father that he was about to board his ship again. The next
day, 18 October, she waited until Jessie left to drive the schoolbus to school. She was crying, and it was
only after some prompting that she told her mother, "Tinorotot ako ni Jessie."[7] Julie brought her to Jose
and asked her what she meant by "tinorotot." Messeah replied, "Jessie was forcing his penis into [my]
vagina." She also mentioned that Jessie had inserted his penis into her anus, and that he had also inserted
his finger into her vagina.[8]
Jose was shocked because he had treated Jessie as if he were his own child, and that morning, had
even told Jessie to make sure his papers were in order because he might be able to bring him along with
him to sea.[9] After promising Messeah that they would talk to Jessie, Jose and Julie brought her to school,
then went home and talked to Jessie, who denied everything. However, Jessie looked pale, and told the
Dumaoal spouses to just send him back to Paoay, Ilocos Norte. They were not able to talk to Jessie further
because it was time for him to fetch the other children from school. The Dumaoal spouses went back to
school where they found Messeah crying. When Messeah saw them, she asked them why they did not
stay with her so they could have protected her. Apparently, Jessie had tried to bring her out of the school
but was prevented from doing so by the school guard. The Dumaoals asked the principals permission to
bring her home. But before going home, they went to church and again asked her what happened, and
reminded her that no one was supposed to tell a lie in church. Messeah insisted that she was telling the
truth, and even offered to draw Jessies penis for them. She also told them to talk to Metheor, who had
witnessed the incidents, and insisted that they confront Jessie before a policeman.
Since they did not know what to do, the Dumaoal spouses consulted a lawyer, as well as Jose's
uncle, Anastacio Dumaoal. The latter suggested that they talk to Jessie in the presence of Jessie's father,
Benjamin Collado. Since they did not know Benjamin's exact address in Valenzuela, Bulacan, they left a
message with his employer. Benjamin came on 22 October, and in the presence of Benjamin, Anastacio,
and Julie Dumaoal's father Geronimo Martin, the Dumaoal spouses reached an agreement with Jessie
whereby they would not press charges provided that he kept away from the Dumaoal family, and not
threaten, coerce or do harm to any of them. The agreement was reduced to writing, and after signing the
document, Jessie boarded a bus for Paoay.
Because of Jessie's threats, the Dumaoals were forced to transfer residence even though they did
not have money to spend for the purpose. Before All Saint's Day, Jose went to the province to visit his
parents' grave. While in Paoay, he learned from his cousin Josephine Collado, Jessie's aunt, that Jessie only
stayed in Paoay for four (4) days after which he returned to Manila. Jose hurriedly returned to Manila and
went to their former residence and learned from bystanders that Jessie had been seen drinking in front of
the house. When Messeah learned about this, she got angry and told her father that he should have
reported Jessie to the police since she had seen him lurking outside her school. Since Jessie violated his
undertaking, they decided to file complaints against him for one (1) count of consummated rape and three
(3) counts of acts of lasciviousness.
Jessie denied all the allegations against him and attacked instead the credibility of Messeah and
Metheor. But the trial court found accused-appellant Jessie Ventura Collado guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, it found him guilty of three (3) counts
of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correctional in
its maximum period for each count. It also ordered him to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of P50,000.00, and P100,000.00 for moral damages.[10]
In his appeal, the accused Jessie Ventura Collado, aside from attacking the credibility of Messeah
and Metheor, insisted that Messeah clearly testified that there was no penetration whatsoever in her
vagina. But assuming arguendo that he was found guilty of acts of lasciviousness, the trial court erred
nonetheless in imposing a penalty that did not take into account the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The trial court in its assailed Decision ruled that it found "Messeahs testimony of her harrowing
experience, although not absolutely consistent in all their details, to be still credible and thus entitled to
full faith and credit."[11] And we agree with the trial court in this regard. In People v. Dado[12] the Court held
that "assessing the credibility of witnesses is an area within the almost exclusive province of a trial judge
whose findings and conclusions are normally accorded great weight and respect. In determining the
credulity of testimony, significant focus is held to lie on the deportment of, as well as the peculiar manner
in which the declaration is made by the witness in open court. Hardly can an appellate court come close
to a trial court in making, from a mere reading of the transcript of stenographic notes, that kind of
evaluation."[13]
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. We take exception however to its finding that statutory rape was committed by him on 5
June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records will show that accused-appellant Jessie Ventura Collado
should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for consummated rape.
It is clear from Messeahs testimony that when Jessie carried out his lecherous intent on 5 June 1993,
he did not commit rape, consummated nor attempted, despite the victims testimony that he succeeded
in touching her genitalia with his private parts -
Q: And what happened when he brought you to your room?
A: He told me to take off my shorts as well as my panty.
Q: Then what happened after that?
A: And while my legs were apart, he pressed them apart.
Q: Now, you said that Jessie pressed your legs apart, with what part of his body did he press your
legs apart?
A: With his two legs, sir.
Q: And after he pressed your legs apart, what did he do?
A: He rubbed his penis between my thighs.
Q: Near your private part?
A: Yes, sir, near my private part x x x x
Q: You said that kinukuskos, or he was rubbing his penis near your vagina, what happened when he
was rubbing his penis near your vagina?
A: I told him dont, because I was hurt, because he is pressing his legs on my legs.
Q: And what did he do?
A: He told me to shut up.
Q: And what did he do after he told you to shut up?
A: He continued what he was doing.
Q: And what was he exactly doing at that time?
A: Rubbing his penis near my vagina.
Q: How near was it to your vagina?
A: It touches my vagina (emphasis supplied)
Q: If you can calculate the time, how long did it last?
A: Maybe 10 - 15 minutes.[14]
Nowhere can we find from the foregoing any indication that accused-appellant successfully
penetrated at least the labia of the victim; neither can we glean therein any grain of intent on his part to
invade Messeahs privities. The victim only said in her testimony that Jessie initially "pressed her legs apart
with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his penis against her thighs, until it touched her vagina." Further, Messeah
might have told the accused-appellant to "stop because she was hurting" yet she did so only because "he
was pressing his legs on her legs." She did not mention having felt pain in her vagina. As narrated by
Messeah, "the intimate encounter went on for some 10-15 minutes." If accused-appellant was penetrating
her or trying to penetrate her for such a considerable period, she should have likewise cried out in anguish
for the pain in her sex organ. To compare, she cried out in pain when accused-appellant tried forcing his
penis into her vagina and anus during the first incident.
We recall that during the first incident of 27 April 1993, accused-appellant tried forcing his penis
into her vagina, but when he failed in his first attempt, he inserted it into her anus instead. This could have
been attempted rape, or even consummated rape but the Complaint filed was only for acts of
lasciviousness. Thus, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of attempted or consummated
rape. Noteworthy is that the victim was already in a spread-eagle position yet he was unsuccessful in his
attempt to defile her. By then he must have realized that it was difficult to penetrate his victims sex organ
such that during the second incident of 5 June 1993, he merely "rubbed his penis between her thighs"
although in the process "touched her vagina."
We recall further that during the third incident of 7 July 1993, accused-appellant "inserted his penis
between her thighs and used his legs to press her thighs together, then he rubbed his penis against her
thighs for some three (3) to five (5) minutes until it touched her vagina and she felt something sticky
coming out of his penis." As in the second incident, there was no showing he inserted his penis into
herlabias, much less tried to do so. This recourse to a "simulated means" of achieving orgasm is another
manifestation of his realization of, or resignation to, the difficulty of penetrating his preys sex organ.
In according significance to the word "touched," it would be instructive to revisit our ruling in People
v. Campuhan[15] where we said -
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking
or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or
the mons pubis x x x x There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for the accused
to be convicted of consummated rape x x x x
x x x Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e. touching of either the labia
of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
In other words, "touching" of the female organ will result in consummated rape if the penis slid into
or touched either labia of the pudendum. Anything short of that will only result in either attempted rape
or acts of lasciviousness. Significantly, People v. Campuhan did not set a demarcation line separating
attempted rape from acts of lasciviousness. The difference lies in the intent of the perpetrator deducible
from his external acts. Thus when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate, attempted rape is committed. Otherwise, it is merely acts of lasciviousness.
Inasmuch as the touching of the victims organ by the penis of accused-appellant on 5 June 1993
was but a mere incident of the "rubbing against or between the victims thighs" which in no way manifests
an act preliminary to sexual intercourse, accused-appellant should only be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness instead of consummated rape.
Messeah's testimony regarding the other acts of lasciviousness committed against her person on
different instances by Jessie is also credible, more so when we consider how Metheor's testimony
corroborated the appalling tale of molestation and assault. Messeah told the trial court how on several
occasions Jessie had inserted his penis into her anus, and also his smallest finger into her vagina, and how
he straddled her legs between his legs with his penis pressed between her thighs. The defense tried to
show that it was impossible for a man to have inserted his penis into the anus of a young girl tied spread-
eagle to the bed with her garterized shorts and panties pulled down to her ankles, but the garter would
stretch to allow the victims legs to spread far apart and Jessies beastly act would not have been a physical
impossibility. Further, Messeah testified that both her anus and vagina hurt during the first
incident,[16] which could only have resulted from the penetration.
On his part, Metheor testified as to how he heard his sister scream for his help, how he saw her tied
down on the bed like an animal, how he twice saw Jessie lie on top of his sister, first on 27 April 1993, and
again on 5 June 1993, and how Jessie pushed and threatened him if he ever said a word about what he
had seen.[17] He also told the court how on 17 October 1993, he saw Jessie insert his smallest finger into
Messeahs vagina.[18]
Neither Messeah nor Metheor had any motive to implicate Jessie except to stop the abuses. It
should be noted that these are children forced to live in fear for a long time, and had suffered many
indignities at the hands of Jessie. In fact, in his desire to prevent Jessie from hurting his sister, young
Metheor repeatedly tried to push Jessie away from his sister's helpless body by punching him and even
attempting to stab him with a bread knife, the only weapon he could handle.
Messeahs failure to reveal the sexual abuses to her mother does not taint her credibility. Her silence
was impelled by both fear for her life and shame for the degradation that had befallen her. It is not
uncommon for a young girl of tender age to be intimidated into silence by the mildest threat against her
life. Silence is not an odd behavior of a rape victim.[19] In fact, the burden of keeping such a secret took its
toll on her health. Jose Noli testified that when he arrived for a vacation in August 1993, he noticed that
his children looked blank and pale, especially Messeah who looked thin, complained of dizziness and
headaches and sometimes threw up. He and his wife had brought Messeah to several doctors, before one
finally diagnosed Messeah as suffering from nervous breakdown and psychological trauma.[20]
The rule is that affirmative testimony is far weightier than a mere denial, especially when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness.[21] Jessie's alibi that he was driving the family car on the disputed
occasions cannot stand up to his positive identification as the perpetrator of the crime by both Messeah
and Metheor.
Neither can we believe Jessie's allegation that Julie only wanted him out of their house because she
favored her own relative over him. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation,
disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for her child's defilement.[22] Furthermore, it is highly improbable that
a rape victim and her family would publicly disclose the incident and thus sully their honor and reputation
in the community unless the charge is true.[23] In fact, if Julie only wanted Jessie out of her house,[24] then
why would the Dumaoal family file the complaints against him only on 13 April 1994, when it is clear that
he had already left the household as early as 22 October 1993. Neither does this explain why the Dumaoal
spouses felt compelled to change residences in such a short period of time. As Jose Noli testified, they
made the move even before All Saints Day,[25] which shows that they left their familiar surroundings and
uprooted their family all within ten (10) days just so they could ensure Messeahs safety.
Moreover, we agree with the Solicitor General that the only reason why the Dumaoal spouses
agreed to let Jessie go home to the province instead of filing charges against him was because they were
"torn between seeking justice for their daughter and preserving her and the familys reputation. There was
also the Christian desire to forgive and give a blood kin a new chance at life knowing the gravity of the
penalty that would be meted out to him. To interpret their actuation any other way would be most unfair
to parents who are equally suffering with what befell their only daughter."[26]
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the trial court failed to consider the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law when it imposed the penalty of "imprisonment of six (6) years of prision
correccional in its maximum period."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty provided by Art. 336 of The Revised
Penal Code is prision correccional the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. With
the presence of one (1) generic aggravating circumstance, i.e., obvious ungratefulness, the maximum shall
be taken from the maximum period of the imposable penalty, which is, four (4) years two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is, arresto mayor the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267, finding accused-
appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO guilty of Statutory Rape in G.R. No. 135667 (Crim. Case No. 106257)
and three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in G.R. Nos. 135668 - 70 (Crim. Cases Nos. 106258-106260)
is MODIFIED as follows:
In G.R. No. 135667 (Crim. Case No. 106257), accused-appellant is found guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness (instead of Statutory Rape) under Art. 336 of The Revised Penal Code, aggravated by
obvious ungratefulness. In G.R. Nos. 135668-70 (Crim. Cases Nos. 106258-106260), accused-appellant is
likewise found guilty of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under the same Art. 336, also aggravated
by obvious ungratefulness in each count.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant JESSIE VENTURA COLLADO is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
mayormaximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accused-appellant is further
directed to pay the private complainant Messeah M. Dumaoal P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P40,000.00
for moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four (4) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 94953 September 5, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Tan, Manzano & Velez for accused-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila in Criminal Case No.
94953, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by B.P. Blg. 179.
I
The Information charged appellant as follows:
That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell or
 offer for sale two (2) foils of flowering tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic bag of
flowering tops of marijuana, which are prohibited drugs (Rollo, p. 6).
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the information
(Records p. 5).
II
On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of
the Western Police District (WPD), instructed Sgt. Enrique David to conduct a surveillance operation in
the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-
pushing in that area (TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).
In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted a surveillance operation on
December 15 and 17, and confirmed the reported drug-pushing activities in that area by the group of
appellant and a certain Ricky alias "Pilay" (TSN, December 2, 1987, pp. 5-6). No arrest was made because
the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only (TSN, January 11,
1988, p. 28).
On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People's Tonight (Exh. "K"), reported that there were rampant,
drug-pushing activities in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila, prompting Gen.
Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to reprimand the NCIS office (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 2).
On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan a
buy-bust operation and to form a
six-man team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6, January 11,
1988, p. 6).
At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their confidential informant, went to
Garrido Street. Upon arriving threat, they strategically positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the
confidential informant proceeded to the house of appellant located at No. 2267 Garrido Street, where
they saw him standing outside. The confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as an
interested buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How much will
you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr., replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the marked twenty-peso bill
(Exh. "E") to appellant. The latter, after placing the money in the right pocket of his pants, went inside his
house (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 7-9). Minutes later, appellant came back and handed two foils (Exhs.
"D-1-a" and "D-1-b") wrapped in onion paper (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 8). It was after he handed the
two foils to Pfc. Orolfo Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. He then tried to retrieve
the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him from doing so. During the scuffle, one foil was torn.
Appellant then ran inside his house with Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. in pursuit. The latter was able to subdue
appellant. Sgt. David confronted appellant, who admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house.
Appellant showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with white lining containing prohibited drugs.
A receipt of the articles seized (Exh. "F") was made by Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-15).
Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD headquarters for investigation.
Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to commence the investigation of appellant (TSN, January 11,
1988, pp. 19-21).
During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so
pending arrival of his lawyer (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 23).
The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for chemical analysis. A report and
certification of Ms. Aida Pascual, Forensic Chemist of the NBI (Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the drugs to be
positive for marijuana.
Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely planted
the marijuana on his person. He testified that on January 9, 1987, he arrived home from work as a
security guard of the Vergara Brothers Agency at around 3:00 P.M. After changing his clothes, he went
out to fetch his son, who was left in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son, he
was arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his house, without any search warrant shown
to him. After the search, he and his wife were brought to the WPD headquarters. He claimed that inspite
of his protestation that he would like to wait for his lawyer before giving any statement, the police
continued their interrogation.
Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the poseur-buyer. He claimed that he was
merely forced to sign his name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill (Exh. "F") and that the first time
he saw the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was when he was at the police station (TSN, June
14, 1988, pp. 1-11).
To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother, Gerry de Lara.
On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sec 4, Art II of R.A. 6425 as amended as charged
in the Information; and this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer a
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 (Rollo,p. 24).
Hence, this appeal.
III
In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found
inside his house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not assisted by counsel during his custodial
interrogation (Rollo, pp. 55-57).
As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we find that the police operatives acted within the bounds of law.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedures dealing with warrantless arrests provides:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat.
Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was
lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation
to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest" (People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644
[1991]; People vs. De Los Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).
Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only by newspaper publications about
the rampant sale of drugs along Garrido and Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53). If appellant
implies that the police merely stage-managed his arrest in order to show that they were not remiss in
their duties, then appellant is wrong. A surveillance on the illegal activities of the appellant was already
conducted by the police as early as December 15 and 17, 1986. The newspaper reports concerning the
illegal drug activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987, long after the police knew of the said
illegal activities. Appellant's eventual arrest on January 9, 1987 was the result of the surveillance
conducted and the buy-bust operation.
The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon sensing the presence of the police
operatives. The testimony of Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer, is as follows:
FISCAL:
Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he
do?
A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back,
sir.
Q: When he came back what happened?
A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected
marijuana leaves wrapped in onion paper.
Q: And what happened next when he returned with those
items?
A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence
of the operatives and he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir,
and I prevented him and during the scuffle one piece of foil
was broken, he tried to run inside the house, so I subdued
him immediately and apprehended him while he was inside
the house.
Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
 A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he
voluntarily admitted that he was still keeping prohibited
drugs inside his house?
Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that
he was keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored
blue with white lining containing prohibited drug" (TSN,
January 11, 1988, pp. 12-14).
The policemen's entry into the house of appellant without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5[a]).
We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside appellant's house.
The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside his
house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made (People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant's claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh.
"E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that
appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec.
3[2]).
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant in view of
the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. The ruling in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732
(1992) is apropos:
It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant's conformity to the
questioned documents has not been a factor at all in his conviction. For even if
these documents were disregarded, still the accused-appellant's guilt has been
adequately established by other evidence of record. The trial court's verdict was
based on the evidence of the prosecution not on his signatures on the questioned
documents. Accused-appellant's denial simply can not prevail over the detailed
and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who caught him red-
handed selling marijuana and who have not shown to have any ulterior motive to
testify falsely against accused-appellant.
IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by B.P. Blg.
179. However, said law was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for selling, administering, delivering or
distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range from "prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity."
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or
distributing marijuana in excess of 750 grams or more shall be "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to Ten Million Pesos."
We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum
penalty when the quantity of the marijuana involved in the offense is less than 750 grams and at the
same time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It is
the duty of the Court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law (Rufino Lopez
and Sons v. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court's primordial
responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the intention of the
legislature so as to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456
[1912]). Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 should
be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal only.
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds meaning in this case.
Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we first divide the amount of 750 grams
into three to correspond to the three applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If
the marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if the
weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional.
Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one plastic bag of flowering tops of
marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude that the
quantity involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People vs.
Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028,
July 29, 1994, the minimum penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range
of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant shall suffer
an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
"BOBOY", accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend.1
For automatic review is the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio
Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,3 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation
against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca,
SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police
detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in
person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest.
Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1
Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning.9 Consequently, at
around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao
City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon
pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and
overtook the "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-
appellants were accosted.12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was
holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina
replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.16 The
demurrer was denied by the trial court.17 A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants,
but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a
joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,18 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both
accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and
GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal
injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by
law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records
of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of
their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE
PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the
acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of a
probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.21
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in
a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a
freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be
reversed.26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The
Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b)
when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in
hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped
prisoners ).27
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace officers, are valid
because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This
brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall
within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As
discussed in People v. Doria,30 probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are
not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus,
in People v. Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :.. [while]
holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court,
"[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting
officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada,33 the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable
from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1âwphi1.nêt
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes
'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'"35 In declaring the
warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light
of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.36
It went on to state that –
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions
were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which
allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an
inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in
the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not
be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the
arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is
worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him
by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded
SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a
motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before the
arrest, to wit –
"Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did
you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina,
when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one
who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could not
have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who
allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior
to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting
officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all
indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even
before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that
the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence
did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode
the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under
such bare circumstances."40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent
at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed
by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants,
and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement
of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,
264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
Malagura alias "Boboy", are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are
validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174774
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias Botong, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias Mac-Mac,
Accused-Appellants. Promulgated:
August 31, 2011
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DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court of Appeals
found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:
On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession,
sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug
commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, in its Resolution dated
March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de Claro, for
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so far as
Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel de
Claro, filed with the RTC, reads:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES y SANTOS
@ BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE
CLARO y ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL.
TO SEC. 16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the manner herein
narrated as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any
regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, commit to sell,
deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten (10) heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with the following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6,
93.5, 98.3, 99.5, 99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of
980.9 grams, which substance when submitted for drug
examination, were found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as
shabu, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license
and prescription.[3]
On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom, insisting
on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said trial court granted
in an Order[4] dated March 15, 2000.
After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2000,
recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de
Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom. The Office
of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented by the parties during the
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except accused-appellant Reyes who did not participate in
the proceedings), which it summarized as follows:
In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the
Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National
Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on 17 February 2000 a confidential
informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of
the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were
dispatched to verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m.
after meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves
at the vicinity parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent
Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with
accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and
Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular phone; that
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then
proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom was
waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed
the box in a plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers
accosted the accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted
having in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10)
pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a
total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
In his Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay, accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes
claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City,
together with a neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was
to pay his indebtedness; that while looking for a parking space, several men with
firearms suddenly appeared, with one shouting, buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan
at kung hindi babasagin ko ito; that he and Marlon David were forced out of their
vehicle with one of the armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart,
asking where the said bag allegedly containing shabu came from; that
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes answered hindi ko alam, that he and
Marlon David were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and
continuously asked who the source of the shabu was, with respondent/accused During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the arresting
[Rolando] delos Reyes replying, hindi ko alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan; that officers manifested that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March
Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and 2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was submitted.[5]
later released on 18 February 2000; that when accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
Taguig, Metro Manila.
The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute
xxxx
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in
To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was arrested
Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as
in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and
Restaurant in Mandaluyong City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn statements
submitted a certified true xerox copy of barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan,
Pasig City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000 made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City Prosecutor also observed that
the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:
Lantion-Tom was merely in the company of the other respondents without performing any overt act
BLOTTER
showing her to be part of the illicit transaction and her drug test revealed negative results. On the other
Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng.
Virginia Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally arrested and that
kanyang asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa
17 ng Pebrero taong dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the
pamangkin na si Marlon David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang
seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle) would be best ventilated during
lalaki sa Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang
alamin kung ang nasabing insidente ay coordinated dito sa the trial on the merits.
himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay.

(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes

Nagpapahayag In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with leave of

The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos court to admit amended information.
Reyes of the incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one
Joel Navarro, claims having seen the actual incident confirming the events as
narrated to by accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon David.
In its Order[6] dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions motion. Contrary to the finding of the
Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against accused-
Lantion-Tom, submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the
charges and claiming that they were at the Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.
to respondent Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy Milan regarding the Mayors
Permit, Business Location Clearance issued by the Office of the Barangay Captain,
insurance documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business; that they were
with accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,[7] while Emmanuel de Claro was arraigned on July
James, with the two remaining outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom
went to accompany Ms. Milan, while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was 12, 2000.[8] All three pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
left inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio Santiago,[9] Senior
surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police officers and were
arresting them for being the source of shabu in a drug deal; that all of them, Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,[10] PO3 Angel Yumul,[11] and SPO1 Benjamin David,[12] members of
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and James were likewise
arrested and continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National Capital Regional Police
were taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further
investigation; that Roberto and James were released the following day. Both Office (NCRPO) who apprehended and/or investigated the case against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de
respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting officers as to the
circumstances on the alleged drug deal leading to their arrest are unfounded and Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, Jr.[13] (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
purely fabricated.
Laboratory.
 PO3 Santiago related that their team leader sensed that the drug deal had already been

PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom consummated, so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the suspected drug dealers. PO3

on February 17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar, Santiago and PO3 Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura and the remaining police

received information from a confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that would take place team members arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag containing the box was seized from Mac-

between Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in Madaluyong City. Botong and Mac- Mac. The arrested suspects were brought to the police office for investigation. The plastic bag, the box,

Mac were identified during the investigation as accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes, and the 10 heat-sealed sachets of white crystalline substance inside the box, were marked for

respectively. identification and physical examination at the police office.

As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was organized by Major According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each of the 10 heat-

Aguilar, composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1 Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer Corbe, sealed sachets yielded positive test results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago

PO3 Marcelo Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3 Edwin dela Cruz. At around then signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other arresting police

1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using four vehicles, to the location of the drug officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.

deal and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential informant to arrive. When the confidential

informant arrived at around 3:30 p.m., he told the police team that the drug deal would possibly take place On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the

between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would utilize a red Toyota Corolla with plate plastic bag and that he did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3

number TRP-868 and a white Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police team then positioned Santiagos position, he could not conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as he had

their cars strategically in such a way that they could see the vehicles coming from St. Francis Street and no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other arresting officers just

EDSA. relied on the information relayed by the confidential informant. Also, the police team did not recover any

money from the arrested suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the police the following

PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected vehicles arrived, both morning that the money for the illegal drugs was already deposited in the bank. The police, however, failed

stopping along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to each to make further queries from the confidential informant about the bank.

other. The confidential informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and the driver

of the red Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on his cellular phone and then SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a confidential informant

proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked about an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in

to another person, who was identified during the investigation as Emmanuel de Claro alias Cocoy. PO3 Mandaluyong City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader of the team that will

Santiago was about three to five meters away. Thereafter, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant bust said illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team proceeded to the subject location.

and approached a car parked right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on identified as

Lantion-Tom, handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who, The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at around 3:30 p.m. SPO1

in turn, handed the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant. Lectura conducted a short briefing then positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The

confidential informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00 p.m. and
11:00 p.m. At around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected drug in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Fuentes, PO3

dealers Botong and Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a moment with Mac- Padpad, and several other police officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City,

Mac, Botong went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-off illegal drug deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura and

the restaurant and approached another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from the car, which he handed PO3 Padpad in the car parked in front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and their

to Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant, while [Botong] proceeded to his car near confidential informant were in another car also parked along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3

[Mac-Mac]. SPO1 Lectura was positioned at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15 meters Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Corbe were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant. PO3

away from the suspects. At that moment, SPO1 Lectura sensed that the drug deal had been consummated, Yumul could not recall where the other members of the team were located.

so he decided to already arrest the suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the

white plastic bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate cars, stopping in

apprehended Cocoy. The police team brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. front of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each other. At that

time, PO3 Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects. Moments later, Botong called

SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat- someone on his cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-

sealed plastic sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles with his Mac behind. PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the restaurant and saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3

initials. After physical and chemical examinations revealed that the contents of the sachets were shabu, Yumul though did not hear the conversation

SPO1 Lectura signed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000. between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a

parked car. From his position about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the back seat of

During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David was the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over a white plastic bag with carton inside

with Botong when the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also arrested Marlon to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned inside the restaurant and

David. Marlon David was brought to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested [Botong] went back to [Mac-Mac]. PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside the restaurant. A few minutes later,

suspects, for verification, and was released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted that during the PO3 Santiago also went inside the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that they would be arresting Cocoy,

preliminary investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier, answered that it was PO3 and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already arrested outside the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted by

Santiago who seized the shabu from Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the investigating PO3 Yumul, approached Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the police office with all

prosecutor actually asked during preliminary investigation was who saw where the shabu came from and the arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3 Yumul, however, failed to join the other arresting

that he signed the minutes of the preliminary investigation without reading the same. SPO1 Lectura officers in signing the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

maintained that it was he who recovered the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly, SPO1 Lectura acknowledged

that his team heavily relied on the information given by the confidential informant in identifying the SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the RMG at

suspects in the illegal drug deal, who were eventually arrested. Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant case following the arrests of accused-

appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for inquest to the Office of the

PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and SPO1 City Prosecutor.

Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division of the RMG based
 SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon David,[22] accused-

containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu inside.SPO1 Lectura told SPO1 David that appellant Rolando delos Reyes,[23] Emmanuel de Claro,[24] Roberto de Claro,[25] and Mary Jane Lantion-

the articles were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked his initials BSD on the Tom.[26] Accused-appellant Reyes did not testify.

confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination of the
Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal High School in
specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of the arresting officers.
Pasig City. He recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant

Rolando delos Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, to collect
The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Insp.
some money.
Cruto was the forensic chemist who conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of

the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-NCRPO on February 18, 2000.
While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside their car at the

parking area of said market, another car suddenly arrived, from which an armed male passenger alighted
P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents of each sachet,
and approached them. Four other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-appellant
revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2
Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM plastic
grams; two sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams; and one sachet,
shopping bag and questioned accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes if he knew the owner of said plastic
93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each plastic sachet and proceeded with
bag.Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic bag. Marlon David
his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested
was also asked and he answered that he knew nothing about the plastic bag.
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto recorded the

result of the examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000.[14]

Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police officers, pulled accused-

appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon David
The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint Affidavit
to the back seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men sat in the front seats of
of Arrest[15] dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3
the car, while one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon
Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura;[16] the 10 heat-sealed plastic
David. The armed men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The armed men then separated accused-
sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants;[17] the PNP-RMG Request for Laboratory
appellant Rolando delos Reyes from Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David to alight from the car and
Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets;[18] the PNP Crime Laboratory Physical
transfer to another vehicle. While in the other car, the armed men boxed and mauled Marlon David to
Sciences Report No. D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the contents of the 10 heat-
force him to admit to be the source of the plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one
sealed plastic sachets positively tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride;[19] and the Letter (Referral
punch. Marlon David remained blindfolded until they arrived at the police camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where
of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor)[20] dated February 18, 2000. The RTC admitted all the
he again saw accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David was released the following morning,
aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its Order[21] dated March 1, 2001.
leaving accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes behind at the police camp. Marlon David went home and

told Virginia delos Reyes, the wife of accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about the incident.
 Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with the name Mac-

Mac. Marlon David additionally relayed that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own car was in the auto

the latter was likewise mauled by the armed men. shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las Pias City to check

on Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop. From there, they proceeded to Libertad in Pasay City and ate

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of the incident that dinner at the Duty Free Philippines.Afterwards, the group made their way to Mandaluyong City where

took place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with Daisy Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de Claro

Cainta, Rizal. Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked their guns at him and and Lantion-Tom met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong

Marlon David, shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car window and the armed men City. Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters pertaining to the business permit. Emmanuel de Claro

opened the car door. The armed men forced him and Marlon David to get down from the front seats of stepped outside the restaurant for a moment to smoke a cigarette, then, returned inside to wait for the

the car and to transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who were the owners of the meeting between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-Tom walked Milan outside

SM plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market, he noticed that they were just driving around. The car the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for Lantion-Tom inside.

stopped only when Marlon David was taken out and transferred to another car. It was already late in the

evening when the car finally stopped. He then realized, after his blindfold had been removed, that he was Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and introduced themselves as

at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig. police officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro not to make a scene and just go with them

peacefully. Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced to get into

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police that he was selling a waiting car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, and told to

or delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in bow down his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something about the shabu, but he denied

Mandaluyong City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Accused-appellant knowing anything about it.He heard from the radio inside the car that the police officers were waiting for

Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-appellant Reyes agreed to meet another car. After three hours of traveling, the car finally stopped and when his blindfold was removed,

at Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan, but the meeting did not take place because the he learned that they were already at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

armed men arrived. He further claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa in

Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that time, and he found out the latters name Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an hour, until he was

only when they were already detained at the Mandaluyong City Jail. called into another room where he met his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the

office of one of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police and being forced to admit that

Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around 10:00 a.m., he was the drugs being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was ignored. The

at the Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody should be held responsible for

Lantion-Tom to follow up their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at the shabu so they were made to choose whether both of them or only one of them would be

Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-Tom passed by the house of charged. Emmanuel de Claro was compelled to choose the latter option.

his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for them. James, Roberto de Claros friend, also

went with them.

 Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On February 17, 2000, Roberto
de Claro was at home playing video games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife,
Lantion-Tom, arrived and requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was not feeling well. James,
Roberto de Claros friend, rode with them.They first went to Las Pias City to check on Emmanuel de Claros
car at the auto shop, then they proceeded to Libertad, Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty Free
Philippines. They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet
Ms. Milan. Only Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and
James stayed in the car.
Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and Ms. Milan walking towards them. As
the two women were approaching, armed men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed
guns at them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery (hold-up) was taking place. The
armed men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened the window, then the door
of the car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of
the armed men sat on the front seats of the car, while one sat at the back with Roberto de Claro, James,
and Lantion-Tom. The armed men introduced themselves as police officers.
Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de Claro, James, and
Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering them to keep their heads bowed down.The police officers drove the
car for two hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment, Roberto de Claro was
able to raise his head but was immediately told to bow down his head again. Roberto de Claro also heard
from the police officers radio that they were still waiting for somebody. They travelled again for quite a
long time and stopped in a dark place. The police officers took Roberto de Claros wallet
containing P7,000.00 cash. Early in the following morning, they arrived at the police station where Roberto
de Claro saw his brother Emmanuel de Claro once more. They stayed in one room until Roberto de Claro
and James were released by the police the next day.
When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense agreed to consider
her Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her direct
examination.
On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those arrested on February
17, 2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an illegal
drug deal. At the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and James. She
was also brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was interrogated without a lawyer. She was
shown a box containing shabu which she had never seen before. Lantion-Tom insisted that she was in
Mandaluyong City to meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application for a business permit. Lantion-
Tom pointed out that the charge against her was eventually dismissed.
The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claros Counter Affidavit
dated March 23, 2000,[27] Lantion-Toms Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,[28] Emmanuel de Claro
and Lantion-Toms Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,[29] Roberto de Claros Witness Affidavit
dated March 29, 2000,[30] Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,[31] Virginia delos
Reyes Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,[32] Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
2000,[33] accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay dated March 14,
2000,[34] and a Barangay Blotter dated February 19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes.[35] The RTC admitted all
these documentary evidence for the defense in its Order[36] dated September 13, 2002.
In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de
Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering,
transporting and distributing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known
as shabu, a regulated drug, without lawful authority in violation of Sections 15 and
16 of Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00 each and the costs of suit.
Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and
seized from the accused during the aforesaid operation are forfeited and
confiscated in favor of the government shall be turned over to the PDEA pursuant
to law for proper disposal without delay.[37]
Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal[38] on October 23, 2003. Accused-appellants Roberto delos
Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of appeal[39] on October 29, 2003 and December 30, 2003,
respectively.
Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of appeal,[40] instead, filing
before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant [to] Section
24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[41] on October 30, 2003, and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration[42] on November 3, 2003.Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its judgment of
conviction based on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ACCUSED DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED
IN ADOPTING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL THE THREE
(3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA
PLAZA HOTEL.
II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED WERE
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE, DELIVERY AND
TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION ON THE BASIS MAINLY OF A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.
V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO
CONSIDER THE FACT THAT ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT
AFFORDED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.[43]
Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal
drug deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul was
suspicious, if not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these police officers testified
that Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu,
the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges against Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly
argued that the prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and his brother
went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his wifes accountant, so they could attend to several
documents pertaining to a business permit. Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC should have
highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony which directly contradicted the police
officers statements.
In its Order[44] dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de Claros motion to
withdraw his notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for
reconsideration.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition[45] on December 19, 2003, objecting to
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration and maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical,
consistent, and straight-forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order[46] dated
January 12, 2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged.The RTC explicitly admitted that it
erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago,
and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense. Thus, the RTC disposed:
WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby
GRANTED and a new one entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime
charged. Consequently, his immediate release from detention is hereby ordered
unless he is detained for other cause or causes.[47]
Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants, the RTC
forwarded the complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course to the said
appeals in our Resolution[48] dated June 21, 2004.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief[49] on September 15, 2004,
while accused-appellant Reyes filed his Appellants Brief[50] on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[51] we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.[52] Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its Consolidated Brief[53] on January 21, 2005.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-
appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accused-
appellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption that the police
officers regularly performed their official duties.
The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution[54] dated January 31, 2007,
we required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants
Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes filed their manifestations[55] on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and April
13, 2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already filed before the Court of Appeals.
In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the following errors of
the RTC:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTORY
TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE ARREST IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF PO3
VIRGILIO SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.
 III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PROSECUTIONS I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN WITNESSES HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND
THE COURT A QUO GRANTED BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.[56] REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID SINCE

IT FALLS SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED
Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief: RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN SUFFICE TO

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.
IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS VALID,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR V. MERE DENIAL AND HULIDAP, WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT EXCULPATE
VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425.[57] APPELLANTS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL

DUTY UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them
COURT HAD NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE EVIDENCE.
by the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the material
VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF
inconsistencies in the prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct examination that WITNESSES COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.[58]

accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes handed the plastic bag with box inside to accused-appellant Reyes,

but he admitted during cross-examination that he did not see such transfer. The prosecution was unable Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers statements, as pointed

to present any evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu, out by accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-

and the money paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused- appellants defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked upon

appellant Rolando delos Reyes straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by Marlon with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal, since

David, that he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in consideration is not an element of the crime charged.

Mandaluyong City.

Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a

Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of the arrests of the crime or in flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the

suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants Rules of Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without

fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of

circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the absence

without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers enjoy the

criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining that: We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to
the facts surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom
from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the Office of the City
Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause against
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.[59]
Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision[60] dated
September 23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order[61] dated January 12, 2004,
totally reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight to the
evidence presented by the defense.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de
Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its
assailed decision that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment is
entitled to great weight.[62]
Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations,
one consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to
meet the test of moral certainty,[63] we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its subsequent
Order[64] dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with the
evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented against
Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is
also insufficient to convict the latter.
Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly observed
that:
Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the
insistence by the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or
reassessment of the evidence by the prosecution be considered, this court has
decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the prosecution through the crucible
of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration of every circumstance
of the case.
It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution
and that of the defense are diametrically opposed to each other. While this court
had already made its conclusion that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3
Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are given full faith and credit and reject the
frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro], nonetheless,
upon reassessment of the same it appears that the court erred.
In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, all of them police officers, with regard to the material facts of how
the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt as to their credibility. Firstly,
the court noted that these police officers gave identical testimonies of the events
that happened from the moment they arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until
the arrest of the accused at 10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA Shangri-La
premises. This uniform account given by these witnesses cannot but generate the
suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts
of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. Because of the close camaraderie
of these witnesses who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them
to make the same story. Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which
shows only too clearly that they testified uniformly only as to material facts but
have not given the particulars and the details having relation with the principal
facts. While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to
10 in the evening, they were not able to tell the court how their group positioned
strategically at the premises without being noticed by their target.They could not
also gave (sic) an explanation how their confidential informant was able to obtain
information regarding the drug deal that was supposed to take place on that date
involving several personalities. Except for their bare allegation that they have that
information regarding the drug deal they were not able to present any proof of
such report, say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot
report. Even their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was
presented. Worth remembering in this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136,
where it is said that: . . . [i]t often happens with fabricated stories that minute
particulars have not been thought of. It has also been said that an honest witness,
who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot
be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case
incomplete, but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a
witness may be honest, but his testimony is not reliable.[65] (Emphasis supplied.)
There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements
following accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers attested in
their Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that upon sensing suspicious transactions being
undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and introduced
themselves as Police Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their
possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus
they were placed under arrest.[66] Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified
that they brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office after
arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of the suspects purported
admission.

We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement
even when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver
the shabu. This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.
In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their
defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for
possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and Navarros Sinumpaang
Salaysaydated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de Claro consistently
testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Toms accountant, regarding documents
for a business permit (photocopies of the said documents were presented during trial); and that they were
illegally arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These
pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the
performance by the arresting police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-
appellants favor.
Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the
night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their arrests,
resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3,
paragraph 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, thus:
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations.[67]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be
reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules
of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).[68]
In People v. Molina,[69] we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding
the search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:
 In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante
delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore,
must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive
of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus,
in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do
so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . .
darting from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded
street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse
suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch
of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the
Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding
a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that
petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of
Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking
at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In declaring the warrantless
arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer,
or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being committed
or was going to be committed.
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior
or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline"
of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu.
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.[70] (Emphases supplied.)
Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify
the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.
A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal
that they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal
was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Without any
other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white plastic
bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the box
contained shabuand sensed that an illegal drug deal took place.
SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:
Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?
A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.
Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do after briefing?
A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of xxxx
Shangri-La Plaza, what happened next, if any?
A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the Q: What did you do?
informant that they were the personalities involved. A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx xxxx

Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next? Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?
A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir. A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.

xxxx Q: How about De Claro?

A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.
Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?
A: No, sir. xxxx

Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong? Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?
A: Through our informant, sir. A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.[71] (Emphases supplied.)

Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?

A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after that
they went out, sir. PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the warrantless arrest of

xxxx accused-appellants and search of their persons:

Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the place
Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant? where blue Mazda car was parked, what happened next?
A: One (1) minute, sir. A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic bag
with a box inside to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel
xxxx de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos Reyes [Botong], sir.

Q: When you say they who is the companion? Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from inside
A: Cocoy, sir. that Mazda car?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?
Q: What happened next after they went out to the car? A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.
A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and handed to
Botong, sir. xxxx

xxxx Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what happened after
that?
Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car? A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro [Cocoy]
A: White plastic bag, sir. returned back inside the said restaurant, sir.

Q: What happened after that? Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?
A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir. A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.

Q: With the bag? Q: After that what happened next?

A: No, it was left with Botong, sir. A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box inside
to Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: What happened next after that?
A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir. Q: What happened after that?
A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we
Q: What happened next after that? apprehended them, sir.
A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.
 Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular place
and time?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.
Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a
drug-deal, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what did you do?
A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.
Q: At your office, what else did you do?
A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory
examination was made and other pertaining papers regarding the arrest
of the accused.
Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated
evidence that you are saying?
A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white crystalline
substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?
A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.
Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from Mac-
Mac?
A: They were placed inside the box, sir.[72] (Emphases supplied.)
PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago:
Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?
A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.
Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential
informant?
A: The identities of the persons, sir.
Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the confidential
informant at the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?
A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived together with
their car, sir.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the
information?
A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically positioned
ourselves in the place where the drug-deal will occur, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA Shangri-La
Plaza and Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened next after that?
A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .
Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?
A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.
Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?
A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?
A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Then, what happened next, if any?
A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.
Q: When you say nag-usap sila to whom are you referring?
A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.
xxxx
Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?
A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.
Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?
A: No, sir.
xxxx
Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was the
subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.
Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each other?
A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir. A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went inside
and told me that we will going to get them, sir.
xxxx
Q: Why are you going to get them?
Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop? A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac and
A: He talked to somebody inside, sir. Botong, sir.

xxxx xxxx

Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation? Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?
A: No, sir. A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago to
avoid commotion, sir.
Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the Whistle
Stop? Q: Then what did you do next after that?
A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to the A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.
side of Whistle Stop in front of the blue car, sir.
Q: And then what did you do, if any?
xxxx A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office,
sir.[73] (Emphases supplied.)
Q: What did you do then?
A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.

Q: And then what happened next, if any? Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and
A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.
searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro
xxxx
momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside
Q: And who received that item or article from the car? being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and
A: Cocoy, sir.
finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative
xxxx
of a felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the
Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to Cocoy the
white plastic bag? suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the
A: Yes, sir.
suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that
Q: Who was that person?
A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir. the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to

confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized
xxxx
from their possession,contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to Cocoy, what
did you do? circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that
A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they walked in
different direction, Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and then accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or
Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir.
is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
xxxx

Q: And then what happened next after that?

Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity
A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
of the shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.
xxxx

Q: So what did you do then?

 All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team
In People v. Sy Chua,[74] we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the cannot simply validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent
warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of regularity
same one presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In
it was taken, to wit:
People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:
Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized
from accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this
The presumption of regularity in the performance
case. The record shows that the initial field test where the items seized were
of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles
appellant's conviction because, first, the presumption is
City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were
precisely just that a mere presumption. Once challenged by
taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the
evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding
identity of the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where
truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
they were seized, thus:
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown
The narcotics field test, which initially identified
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at
the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There
xxxx
is thus reasonable doubt as to whether the item allegedly
seized from accused-appellant is the same brick
The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every
of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters
citizen. But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as
and given by them to the crime laboratory.[75] (Emphases
enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against warrantless
supplied.)
arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded
as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution
and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their
In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the good intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy
RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3 a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.[78]
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic

bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding to the police
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is
office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination[76] that he saw the shabu for the first time
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes
at the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu was marked by SPO1
are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from
Benjamin David only at the police office.
custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
of accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in
DECISION
evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320
of accused-appellants is inevitable. which affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno Villareal y
Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (RA 9165) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua[77]: (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.
The Factual Antecedents
On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was
driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8
to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a
member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted
from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously
arrested for illegal drug possession.4
Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a
tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant
onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon
brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the
SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06,"
representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.5
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the
investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment
receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2
Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic
chemist.8
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control,
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which, when subjected to
chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged.11
In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date and time
of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th
Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the
person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his
wallet which contained ₱1,000.00.12
Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by eight
other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the Sangandaan
Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were "Michelle" and "Hipolito,"
took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle" and "Hipolito" forced him to answer
questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his ear each time he failed to answer and
eventually mauling him when he continued to deny knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant
sustained head injuries for which he was brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper
treatment.14
The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed him that
he was being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11."15 The first charge was eventually dismissed.
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established, to wit: (1) the appellant is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possesses said drug. Finding no ill
motive on the part of PO3 de Leon to testify falsely against appellant, coupled with the fact that the
former had previously arrested the latter for illegal possession of drugs under Republic Act No.
642516 (RA 6425), the RTC gave full faith and credit to PO3 de Leon’s testimony. Moreover, the RTC
found the plain view doctrine to be applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 de Leon
at the place and time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the RTC gave scant consideration to the defenses of denial and frame-up proffered
by the appellant, being uncorroborated, and in the light of the positive assertions of PO3 de Leon. It
refused to give credence to appellant’s claim that PO3 de Leon robbed him of his money, since he failed
to bring the incident to the attention of PO3 de Leon’s superiors or to institute any action against the
latter.
Consequently, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably
arouse suspicion,"18aggravated by the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee
when PO3 de Leon approached him.
Citing jurisprudence, the appellate court likewise ruled that the prosecution had adequately shown the
continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the seized item, from the time it was confiscated from
appellant by PO3 de Leon, marked at the police station, turned over to PO2 Hipolito and delivered to the
crime laboratory, where it was received by PSI Arturo, the forensic chemist, up to the time it was
presented in court for proper identification.
The Issue
The sole issue advanced before the Court for resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the
RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.20
In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph
(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case
of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.
The Court disagrees.
A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:
FISCAL LARIEGO: While you were there at 5th
Avenue, was there anything unusual that transpired?
PO3 DE LEON: Yes Ma’am.
Q: What was this incident?
A: While I was on board my motorcycle on my home, I saw a man looking at the shabu in his hand,
Ma’am.
Q: And exactly what time was this?
A: Around 11:30 in the morning, Ma’am.
Q: How far were you from this person that you said was verifying something in his hand?
A: Eight to ten meters, Ma’am.
Q: What exactly did you see he was verifying? A: The shabu that he was holding, Ma’am.
Q: After seeing what the man was doing, what did you do next?
A: I alighted from my motorcycle and approached him, Ma’am.
Q: In the first place why do you say that what he was examining and holding in his hand was a shabu?
A: Because of the numerous arrests that I have done, they were all shabu, Ma’am.21 (Underscoring
supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his
presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about
8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of
powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had
previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what
he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.
Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be
properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along
the street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In
fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared
suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule
113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a
crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was
merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same
offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:
It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon
saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance.
PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same
illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had
reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also
contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal
record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper
away. For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally
familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid
of a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable
suspicion that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to
satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful
warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been
committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past
criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and
power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous
criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.
It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on
"personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is
unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be strictly
construed.24
Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be
construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to
one’s consciousness of guilt.25It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even
in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking
to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty
party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations; it
could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they
appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify
a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.28 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer
or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act
or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to
liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:31
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by
some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144037. September 26, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO
BOLONG y NARET, accused-appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
. It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be
used. It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they
are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by
crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no
importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will
pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S.[1] On this occasion, this Court is made
to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.
 Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received
a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.[2]Solier related that his
neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area.[3]
Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1
Villalonghan,[4] all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance
in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.[5] For five days, they gathered information and learned
that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.[6] According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling
marijuana.[7]
On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.[8] Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and
usually wore a hat.[9] At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto,
PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to
await Tudtuds arrival.[10] All wore civilian clothes.[11]
About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton[12] marked King Flakes.[13] Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta
observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description.[14] The same man also toted a plastic bag.[15]
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers.[16] PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal
drugs would be arriving that night.[17] The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was
carrying any drugs.[18] PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box.[19] Tudtud obliged,
saying, it was alright.[20] Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on.[21]
The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped
plastic bag[22] and another in newspapers.[23] PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.[24] They
contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.[25]
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them
to the police station.[26] The two did not resist.[27]
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination.[28] Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police
officers suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers
contained another 890 grams.[29] Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical
Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999.[30]
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged[31] before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. [32] Upon arraignment, both
accused pleaded not guilty.[33] The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their
arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them.[34]
Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta,
their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3
Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing
narration of facts.
The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.
Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs
of Levis pants, which was his sideline.[35] At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by
bus.[36] Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus.[37]
Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber
revolver.[38] The man told him not to run.[39] Tudtud raised his arms and asked, Sir, what is this
about?[40] The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and
instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis pants.[41]
The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away.[42] According to Tudtud,
the box was already there when he disembarked the bus.[43] Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but
proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him.[44] Tudtud discovered
pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane.[45]
What is that? the man asked.[46] Tudtud replied that he did not know.[47] Without even unwrapping
the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.[48]
Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street,
some eight meters from Tudtud.[49]
Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousins wedding
in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted.[50] After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the
street.[51] Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him.[52] The man ordered him not to move
and handcuffed him.[53] Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go with
them.[54]
The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each
other for the first time.[55]
Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia
Julaton,[56] Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia,[57] Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita
Abunda,[58] Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified and
presented court documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong Ramirez was charged in their respective
branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and robbery. The
defense asserted that the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the
informant Bobong Solier.[59]
Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00.[60]
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of
the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of the above-quoted
constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.[61] Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable searches and
seizures. The following instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the absence of a warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62]
The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a
search incident to a lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Courts rulings in People v. Claudio,[63] People
v. Tangliben,[64] People v. Montilla,[65] and People v. Valdez.[66] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases of People v. Maspil, Jr.,[67] People v.
Malmstedt,[68] and People v. Bagista.[69]
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000,
Section 12,[70] Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:
SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
. Sy Chua,[87] this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching
It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds
that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.[71]Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.[72] The question, therefore, is whether the police in this case
had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the
peace officers making the arrest.[73]
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable
information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the leading case of People v. Burgos,[74] this Court held that the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that
fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.[75] In Burgos, the authorities
obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New
Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon finding the accused, the arresting team
searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive documents. This Court, in
declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellants wife.
At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.[76]
Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accuseds
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In People v. Aminnudin,[77] this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of
appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.[78]
Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search
yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding ones abdomen,[79] or of
standing on a corner with ones eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near,[80] does not
justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does putting something in ones
pocket,[81] handing over ones baggage,[82] riding a motorcycle,[83] nor does holding a bag on board
a trisikad[84]sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se.[85]
Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.[86] Recently, in People v. Binad
a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient.
In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of suspicious
circumstances: People v. Tangliben[88] (accused was acting suspiciously), People v. Malmstedt[89] (a bulge
on the accuseds waist), and People v. de Guzman[90] (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was
wearing tight-fitting clothes).
There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify
a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this
class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr.,[91] People v. Bagista,[92] People v. Balingan,[93] People v.
Lising,[94] People v. Montilla,[95] People v. Valdez,[96] and People v. Gonzales.[97] In these cases, the arresting
authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious
circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come under some other exception to
the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a
search of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more
faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase in his presence therein, connoting
personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any
unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic
and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest
is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.[98]
The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio,[99] the
accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus
arousing the latters suspicion. In Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.
As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics. There, majority of the Court
held:
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should
not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in
the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers
and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow
suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in
appellants luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright absurd under the
circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a wait and see attitude at the risk of eventually losing
the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the
search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in
the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating
the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was
then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it
is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his
belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.[100]
While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the
warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices
Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.
Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of
his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental
to a lawful arrest. He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers
making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the appellant did not exhibit any overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some felonious
enterprise.
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant
than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have actually
witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that
had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from testimonies of
witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.
. A About a month.
To say that reliable tips constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my opinion, a
dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many decisions made by
this Court, in its effort to zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called
informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out
to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to search and possible
arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under
oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests
and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without
warrants, for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or
afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an
arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majoritys ruling would open loopholes that would
allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.[101]
Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganibans concurring opinion in People v.
Doria, supra, where this Court ruled:
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-
accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangits) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria
did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he
left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant
Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her
house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Dorias word, the Narcom agents had
no showing that the person who affected the warantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.[102] [Italics in the original.]
Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Punos ponencia, Justice Panganiban said that Doria rightfully
brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly
been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.[103]
Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to
lawful arrest under similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a consented search.As will be
demonstrated later, the same could not be said of this case.
That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an on-the-spot
information. The urgency of the circumstances, an element not present in this case, prevented the
arresting officer therein from obtaining a warrant.
Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that
would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers
testimonies are to be believed, appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although
appellant Tudtud did appear afraid and perspiring,[104] pale[105] and trembling,[106] this was only after, not
before, he was asked to open the said box.
In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in
possession of marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their informant
Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends
of appellant Tudtud:
Q What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get
stocks of marijuana?
A Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou
[sic] would point to him because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood
because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of marijuana in our
place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.
Q Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him
particularly?
A His friends were the once who told me about it.
Q For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of
marijuana?
.
Q Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led
to his apprehension sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report
[which] is based on your report my question is, how did you know that Tudtud will
be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?
.
A Because of the information of his neighbor.[107]
In other words, Soliers information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors
or Tudtuds friends acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs
in their neighborhood.
Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliablility of their informant. He testified
on cross-examination:
Q You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?
A He is trustworthy.
Q Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?
A (witness did not answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
Never mind, do not answer anymore. Thats all.[108]
The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1 Floreta
for his telling silence.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own
surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch
him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gather[ing] of information from the assets
there.[109] The police officers who conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or
the basis of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
the requisite warrant, PO1 Desiertos assertions of lack of time[110] notwithstanding.Records show that the
police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant, having received Soliers information at around 9:00
in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same
day.[111] In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was sufficient time to procure a warrant
where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report that the accused, who
was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00 a.m.:
Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there was
sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00
a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants even after
office hours:
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant may be
filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or
during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under
oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays; . . ..
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled
Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas:
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search
warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and
order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these
amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against
public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled
and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be
searched is located.
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of
and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the
application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is
filed.
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched,
but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the
judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the
examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall
observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in
this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.[112] [Italics in the original.]
Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floretas testimony that the real
reason for their omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes
greater significance. This was PO1 Floretas familiar refrain:
Q When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get
that (sic) stocks, you did not go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the
report of Bobot Solier?
A No.
Q Why?
A Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.
Q When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to
search Tudtud and Bulong at that time?
A Yes, sir.
. Q How did he point it at you?
Q And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was 9:00 a.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant
or the prosecutor do [sic] not assist?
A They help.
Q But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?
A As I said, we do not have sufficient basis.[113]
It may be conceded that the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence
of probable cause is not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the objective facts
to determine the existence of probable cause and that a court may also find probable cause in spite of an
officers judgment that none exists.[114] However, the fact that the arresting officers felt that they did not
have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-gathering efforts, raises serious
questions whether such surveillance actually yielded any pertinent information and even whether they
actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the
following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[115]
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when
the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of
the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist
and opened the box himself.
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence
in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed.[116] The fact that a person failed to object to a
search does not amount to permission thereto.
. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law.[117][Underscoring supplied.]
Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag[118] or the chairs[119] containing
marijuana to the arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.
On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented.[120]
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation
of appellants in this case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the
subject box. Appellant Tudtud testified as follows:
Q This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What]
was that something?
A A 38 cal. Revolver.
A Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something
towards somebody).
Q This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?
A He said do not run.
Q What did you do?
A I raised my hands and said Sir, what is this about?
Q Why did you call him Sir?
A I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.
Q Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?
A Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a
policeman.
Q When you asked him what is this? What did he say?
 A He said I would like to inspect what you are carrying.[]
Q What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?
A I told him that is not mine.
Q What did this man say?
A He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.
Q What did you do?
A So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot.[121]
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.[122] Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.[123]
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is
no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction
of appellants cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains
why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in
the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.[124]
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of
rights,[125] next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected
by the due process clause.[126] This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom
advocates,[127] the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the
right against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing. Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.[128]
Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an
ignoble part, the answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel
Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The
Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from
confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region,
Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 9, in relation to General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree
No. 885, and considering that the firearm subject of this case was not used in the
circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as
minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-
paragraph B, of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade
revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
Likewise, the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are
ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao
del Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused
with intent to possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority
issued by the proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his possession, control and
custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol
for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
through lawless and violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and
which firearm was used by the accused in the performance of his subversive tasks
such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA and collection of
contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears
that by virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock
A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening
him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice
and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units,
composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC),
on the following day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where through the help of
Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate accused, who was
plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco
asked accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt.
Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place
below their house where a gun was buried in the ground. (TSN, page 8, Hearing-
October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds,
after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A"
for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive
documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of
three (3) meters apart from his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified
beneath said cogon grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of
notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution; a
pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers
entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan
ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980,
marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa
Habagatang Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages,
marked as Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily
admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's
Army, responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late Mayor Llanos and
Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert
was presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at
Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house
at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon, accused told
Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise,
he and his family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the
government authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar
Masamlok joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar
scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation, accused pulled gut from his
waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok really saw, being only about two
(2) meters away from accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as
that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and 74,
Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father,
Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos,
Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an
NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he
encouraged the group to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then
finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution.
(TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who
likewise expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in
said seminar that a certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of
the contribution from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the
Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19,
1982, he administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused
Ruben Burgos, marked as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal
Lovitos, realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the
services of Atty. Anyog, whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to
Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by
an inserted certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his
having understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his
constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any
question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty.
Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who
escorted the accused, but were sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while
waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt.
Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that
among the lists of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name
of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among the lists of
persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm under Presidential Decree No.
1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its
exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by
counsel for accused, which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the decision as
follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought
him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00
o'clock, on the same date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with
respect to the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but
accused denied its ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him unconscious.
Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity, crying and with emotional
attachment, described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals he was
subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject
firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as
his own firearm, he was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical
agony. Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with pungent
effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold, pungent water poured in
his body and over his private parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis
and testicle, terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating,
mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and
14, 1982. intercepted only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he
was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the
pain and agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to
sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages, including the certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of
explanation and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations
and/or contents of his alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to
those questions involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of
his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain he was subjected
by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify and was able to obtain
his admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and
also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession,
particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs
answers to those questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said
Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the above-questions
embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the extrajudicial confession of
accused, involving her to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc.,
were not true because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the persons
mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor
able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was
personally charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander,
Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed
without reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao
del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally aware of any subversive activities of accused,
being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally
attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio,
being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made
by the authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were
released and were not formally charged in Court because they publicly took their
oath of allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page
136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos,
was presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by
Cesar Masamlok and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the
two left the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it behind,
temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones who buried it. She said,
her husband, the accused, was not in their house at that time and that she did not
inform him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities,
for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the
firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-
November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in
support of accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence
of the prosecution, or in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal
possession of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel for accused. (TSN,
pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL
ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of
a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the
evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben Burgos for
the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused allegedly
recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search
warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained in Villanueva vs.
Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
US 293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose
who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind
of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from
any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber
v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616,
630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long
reach of government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy
 must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only
under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under one of
the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of
Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities
received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report
of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive
documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which
states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact,
plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond
the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic
right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section
6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar Masamlok was
sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information
from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful
at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it
lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant
of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime.
There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was
not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully
his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to
go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear.
The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search
and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such
a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they
hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."
(Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is
evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you
were not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house
when you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt.
Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is
buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped with a
cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his
rights under the constitution considering that he was
purposely under arrest?
 A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was
buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained in
violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that
they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the prosecution
presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted ownership of the
gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused
himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and
pointed to the location of the subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights
winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in
evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions made by the
appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in evidence.
The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and
third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that indeed
torture and physical violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the
custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog,
to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents inadmissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It is true
that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are not
necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated
in People vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the
findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious
reason th+at it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of
the witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is not absolute
for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must
reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of
weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges
on how much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said
testimony stands uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on
the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate
depended upon how much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then
engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus,
whose testimony We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok
surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the
authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982
i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who
could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA
59), where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf.
People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People
v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v. Nazareno, 80
SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and
People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there appears to be a
well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien
system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted
in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as
we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate
efforts to maintain peace and national security, we must also remember the dictum in Morales vs.
Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives,
the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework
of our Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he
has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial
No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength
mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he
pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized
and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver
was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was
doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run
away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were
then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as
Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan,
who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house
in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the
robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part,
Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted
over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led
to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have
been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having
been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the
alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial
court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the
Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule,
maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote
and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to
the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as
Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them
the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The
question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had
no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine
about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were
darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion
was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he
thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused
because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a
bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat
in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently
upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion
other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could
it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances
no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not
even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had
committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that
had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were
they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had
appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's
supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person,
the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later
revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact
(or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of
Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113,
Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis
supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police
state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer
may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make
is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time
of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The
testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not
only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to
stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with
no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights,
the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their
over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid
search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the
acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically
enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and
Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier,
together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez,
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners
went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon.
Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but
said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said
complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant
to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the
denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.17 The CA ruled
that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a
command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY
INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued;
they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the
Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers
actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless
arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the
petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings
and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case
the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules
for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case
presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the
feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It
provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him,
but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny
or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does
not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were
not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on
the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of
Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers
established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of
public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for
the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth
with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case.
This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its
interpretation in our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule
28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom
there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well
as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of
confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that
he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient
bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be
presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no
formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a
crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest
without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably
tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the
peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons
walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested
person turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary
for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was
necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase
"reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would
be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or
circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless
arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion
(probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in
its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the
1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual
commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too,
the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to
whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of
the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed
the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion
in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded
and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission
of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering
information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section
S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word
"just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested
should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on
mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not
whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless
arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on
the information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical
questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to
be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his
fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of
showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable
cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the
arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for
triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge
of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review
in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable
ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the
case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same
standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the
rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination
on the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one
should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must
act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that
these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests
that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only
on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the
supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be
said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be
arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a
threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to
arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed
and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was
arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the
arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They
became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on
the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held
invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The
information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this
case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the
man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime
found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the
death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless
arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately
responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort
Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was
valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about
the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby
area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was
held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident.
SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita
III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to
go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him
up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it
appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and
''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended
on the particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances
may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the
police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone
actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the
circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause
and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime
to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for
a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause
objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the
crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would
a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the
present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of
the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police
Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour
from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2)
hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of
the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in
self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by
East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty.
Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth
digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible
abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion
hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1)
hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and
the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood;
more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso
in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who
mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with
the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider
if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough
that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion,
the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place,
the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second
issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and
the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners
as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of
the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article
VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving
the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary
incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required
to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's
order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby
AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with
the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information,3 the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or about the
11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) bricks of dried
marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3
EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked for police
assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while driving a towing
truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a white
taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street corner C-3
Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of them was accused Calantiao,
alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but continued his driving until he
reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1
Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th Avenue
corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two
armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. PO1
Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao
a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the bricks of
marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were forwarded to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination conducted by P/SINSP.
JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he
personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he was with
PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that while PO1
Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he confiscated from
accused’s companion a .38 revolver.
MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented in open
court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date, two (2)
persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3) shots and ran
away.
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered the following
documentary evidence to boost their charge against the accused:
Exh. "A" – Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "B" – Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "C-1" – Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "C-2" – Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops
Exh. "D" – Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003
Exh. "E" – Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo
Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano
Exh. "E-1" – Their respective signatures
Exh. "F" – Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")
EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE
The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding almost
collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against the
persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught in a
traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and kicked their
taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered, "Putang ina mo bakit
mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun again[st] Reyes and when
Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to
the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and their wallets and money were
taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed them that they will be charged for
drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and said police officer told them that it
would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained and subjected to medical examination
before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutor’s office.4
Ruling of the RTC
On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused MEDARIO
CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section
11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops. Henceforth, this
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was
discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and
firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly
established by the prosecution.6
Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed7 his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:
I reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS’ PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.
III
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction. It found that there was
sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate
complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators
of the offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent seizure of the
marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.9 Finding that all the
elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to be present and duly proven,10 the
Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the RTC’s ruling.
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the following arguments
in support of his position:
First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.
xxxx
Finally, the seized items’ custodial chain is broken.11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as
evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its
custodial chain was broken.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s arguments.
Search and Seizure of
Marijuana valid
This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be
admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been within
the apprehending officers’ "plain view."12
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable
exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on
them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It
seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control
and within the reach of the arrestee.
In People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order
to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise,
the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. (Citations omitted.)
In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be used
against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being detained, and
was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one within his immediate
control that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its discovery
was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The doctrine
is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior
justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused
– and permits the warrantless seizure."17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black
bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
Inventory and Chain of
Custody of Evidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still
inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules on
chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.18
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can
proper disposition in the following manner: easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to bolster
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of his allegations.24
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers were
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full faith and
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state: credit.25
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of the
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, SO ORDERED.
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, G.R. No. 164815
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for Petitioner,
proper disposition in the following manner: Present:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in Chair
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or person,
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the CHICO-NAZARIO,
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and NACHURA, and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the REYES, JJ.
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these THE PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of PHILIPPINES,
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render Respondent. February 22, 2008
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.) x--------------------------------------------------x
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody DECISION
because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.19 REYES, R.T., J.:
Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory, and
(2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective,
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are not retroactive, effect.[1] However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal,
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the
effectivity of laws.
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.21 This Court has no reason to overrule Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong batas
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not
been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence. ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing
the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with
regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari of the
to discharge such burden.22
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits
this.23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.
However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:
 without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
The Facts authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation

Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order[2]from the desk officer.[3] The order

directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest[4] issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.[5]
(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts Assistant City Prosecutor[18]

in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.[6] Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP)

Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty

tricycle.[7] SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.[8] They put him under arrest, informed him when arraigned on October 9, 1996.[19] Trial on the merits ensued.

of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.[9] Found tucked in his waist[10] was a Charter Arms,

bearing Serial Number 52315[11] with five (5) live ammunition.[12] SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.

Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.[13] Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of

petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.

A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children located

it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[14] Epifanio at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.[20] He was roused from his slumber when four (4)

Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification[15] to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room.[21] They trained their guns at him[22] and pulled him

records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.[16] out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet.[23] The raiding team went back

inside and searched and ransacked the room.[24] SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.[25] Moments

Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob![26]

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,[17] as amended. The Information read:

Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that we are authorized to shoot you because theres a shoot to kill
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now.[27] He was also told that there
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her custody and
was a standing warrant for his arrest.[28] However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for
control
it.[29] Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.[30]
One (1) cal. 38 Charter Arms revolver bearing Serial No. 52315
with five (5) live ammo.
 According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:

him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the
documentation relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further
lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel. Neither
was he allowed to see or talk to his family.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).

The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP.
Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation
SO ORDERED.[46]
involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the

Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the

search in his boarding house.[32]

SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt
Petitioner moved to reconsider[47] but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.[48] He
dated July 1, 1993[33] covering the subject firearm and its ammunition.This was upon the verbal instruction
appealed to the CA.
of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature[34] on the said receipt.[35]

On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification

Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified
the RTC disposition. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school.[36] They

grabbed his shoulder and led him out.[37] During all those times, a gun was poked at him.[38] He was asked Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant
is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioners room.[39]
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Four (4) policemen then entered the room.[40] He witnessed how they pointed a gun at
SO ORDERED.[49]
petitioner, who was clad only in his underwear.[41] He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner

out of his room.[42] While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went
His motion for reconsideration[50] having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3,
back inside the room.[43] They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,[44] which
2004,[51] petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.
yielded the subject firearm.[45]

Issues
RTC and CA Dispositions

Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:

 The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS possession of illegal firearms.[59] The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.
OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE
VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED
The certification is outside the scope
THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS THE
of the hearsay rule.
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN

NOT UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE
ISSUANCE OF THE MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGE
(SIC).[52] (Underscoring supplied)
The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.[60]Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable
for being hearsay.[61]

Our Ruling On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the

hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the

twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.[53]
The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated.

It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts

The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the presumption
unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
of SPO2 Disuanco.[54] Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.[55] Its existence was likewise

admitted by no less than petitioner himself.[56]

Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.

As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification The assessment of credibility of
witnesses lies with the trial court.
of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp

Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.[57] As proof, Deriquito presented a certification
conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he was occupying.[62]
signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.[58]

This contention deserves scant consideration.

Petitioners version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by the trial Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded

court and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties,[68] it is only a presumption; it may be

in People v. Rivera:[63] overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it

proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular.
x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had
the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the
the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The demeanor of the
person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy or evince if the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.[69] However, a reading of Timbols testimony on
witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. We have consistently ruled
that when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the cross-examination[70] would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to
prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial courts
petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued
are generally viewed as correct and entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an
appeal, where the culpability or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of to petitioner under questionable circumstances.
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
court are given the highest degree of respect if not finality.[64] (Underscoring
supplied) Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm
as evidence is not fatal provided there
is competent testimony as to its
existence.
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no

compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.

Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded

as evidence because they were not formally offered by the prosecution[71] in violation of Section 34, Rule
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be
132 of the Rules of Court.[72]
highly decorated,[65] but have effected a number of successful arrests[66] as well. Common sense would

dictate that he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor
We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the
General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had the arresting officers
Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its
really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up, they could have easily planted a
ammunition. Petitioners act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared
more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme easier,
valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
assuming that there indeed was one.
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.
The pieces of evidence show that
petitioner is not legally authorized to
possess the subject firearm and its five In any case, petitioners contention has no leg to stand on.
(5) ammunition.

Contrary to petitioners claim, the subject firearm [73] and its five (5) live ammunition[74] were
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its
offered in evidence by the prosecution.[75] Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioners
ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNPNarcotics Command.[67]

stance must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even
without its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,[76] the non-presentation of the pistol did not
prevent the conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.[77]
As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.[78] Yuson also identified said firearm.[79] Petitioner
even admitted its existence.[80]
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented
during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not
offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that [t]he penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,[81] during the pendency
of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used
in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as
rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was
committed. (Underscoring supplied)
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.[82] An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous
to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is not as a right of the offender, but founded
on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice.[83]
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its
maximum period[84] from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua[85] under P.D.
No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which
is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years
and two [2] months).[86] Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the Courts ruling in Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals[87] and Barredo v. Vinarao.[88]
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be
made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code[89] which provides, among others, that the proceeds and
instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156320 February 14, 2007
RODOLFO ABENES y GACUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
HE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision1 dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, Branch 19, dated
June 5, 2000, finding Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Possession of High Powered Firearm and Ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (P.D. No.
1866) in Criminal Case No. 4559-98, and of violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P.
Blg. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, vis-à-vis COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 (Gun
Ban) in Criminal Case No. 4563-98.
Petitioner was charged under the following Informations:
In Criminal Case No. 4559-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of the offense
of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF HIGH POWERED FIREARM & ITS AMMUNITIONS (Violation of P.D. No. 1866,
as amended by R.A. No. 8294), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m., in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, said RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
without any prior authority, license or permit to possess or carry the firearm hereunder described, have
in his possession and control the following firearm classified as high powered, with its corresponding
ammunitions and accessory, viz:
- one (1) cal. 45 pistol (NORINCO) bearing SN 906347;
- one (1) magazine for pistol cal. 45
- seven (7) rounds live ammunitions for cal. 45,
in gross violation of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No. 4563-98 —
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor hereby accuses RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN of Election
Offense in violation of Sec. 261 (9)3 , BP 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE), vis-à-vis COMELEC
RESOLUTION # 1958 (GUN BAN), committed as follows:
On May 8, 1998, at about 10:30 a.m. within the Election period which is from January 11, 1998 to June
30, 1998, in Danlugan, Pagadian City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said
RODOLFO ABENES Y GACUTAN did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully, carry in his person a cal. .45
(NORINCO) pistol, bearing serial number 906347, and loaded with seven (7) rounds of live ammunitions,
without any prior authority from the COMELEC in gross violation of Sec. 261 (9) of BP 881 (OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE) in relation to COMELEC RESOLUTION No. 2958 (GUN BAN).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the RTC and summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The prosecution showed that three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City, through its Company Commander Major Pedronisto
Quano, created a team composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a checkpoint
in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being
implemented by the COMELEC. SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua was the designated team leader.
The team proceeded to Barangay Danlugan, arriving thereat at 8:15 in the morning of May 8, 1998. Team
leader SPO3 Pascua coordinated with the Barangay Chairman of Danlugan, and the team put up a road
block with the marking "COMELEC GUN BAN". Vehicles passing through the road block were required by
the team to stop and their occupants were then politely requested to alight in order to allow routine
inspection and checking of their vehicles. Motorists who refused the request were not forced to do so.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX trying to pass through the check point
was stopped by the team and directed to park at the side of the road. As the occupants within the
vehicle could not be seen through its tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo, a member of the team,
knocked on the vehicle’s window and requested the occupants to step down for a routine inspection.
The eight occupants, which included the accused-appellant Rodolfo Abenes who is the Barangay
Chairman of Tawagan Norte, Labangan, Zamboanga Del Sur, alighted from the vehicle. At this juncture,
SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes.
The firearm was readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn by Abenes. Abenes
was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a license and authority to carry the firearm, and
whether his possession was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC. Accused
answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded for the pertinent documents to be shown to
support Abenes’ claim. He could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’ firearm, which
was later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine
containing seven live ammunitions.
Subsequently SPO3 Pascua, using his privately owned jeep, brought Abenes to the PNP Headquarters at
Camp Abelon in Pagadian City. Upon reaching the Headquarters, SPO3 Pascua indorsed Abenes to Major
Quano who in turn referred Abenes to a certain SPO2 Benvienido Albon for further investigation (TSN,
August 24, 1998 [SPO3 Cipriano Q. Pascua] pp. 5-27, [SPO1 Eliezer Requejo] pp. 29-50).
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives License Processing Section of the
PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder (Record of
Criminal Case No. 4559-98, p. 56).
After the prosecution presented its evidence, [the] accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to
Dismiss (supra, pp. 72-79), which was denied by the trial court in a Resolution dated March 5, 1999
(supra, pp. 80-82).
In his defense, accused-appellant tried to establish that the firearm did not belong to and was not
recovered from him; that the firearm was recovered by the policemen from the floor of the vehicle
inside a clutch bag which was allegedly left by an unidentified person who hitched a ride somewhere
along the national highway of Tawagan Norte Zamboanga Del Sur and alighted near the Mabuhay Bazaar
in Pagadian City (TSN, July 12, 1999 [Noel Rivera], pp. 7-13; September 15, 1999 [Rodolfo Abenes], pp.
11-15; September 27, 1999 [Manuel Sabado Gengania], pp. 9-16).5
On June 5, 2000, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision convicting the petitioner on both charges, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, this Court hereby finds accused Rodolfo Abenes y
Gacutan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act
No. 8294, having been found in possession without license/permit of a Norinco .45 caliber pistol bearing
Serial No. 906347 and 7 rounds of ammunitions and sentences him to imprisonment ranging from TWO
(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its MEDIUM PERIOD, as
MINIMUM, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR in its MINIMUM, as MAXIMUM and a FINE of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00), Philippine currency. Insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned.
The .45 Caliber Pistol aforementioned and the seven (7) rounds of ammunitions are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government the same being effects of the Violation of P.D. 1866, amended.
As regards Criminal Case No. 4563-98, this Court also finds herein accused Rodolfo Abenes y Gacutan
GUILTY of Violation of Section 264, in relation to Section 261, paragraphs (p) and (q) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code and sentences him to imprisonment for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR, and in addition thereto, herein accused is disqualified to hold any public office
and deprived [of] the right of suffrage. It shall be understood that the sentence herein imposed shall be
served simultaneously with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 4559-98.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC found that, as between the positive and categorical assertions of facts by the two policemen –
the witnesses for the prosecution – and the mere denial of the accused and his witnesses, the former
must prevail over the latter; that the prosecution successfully proved that the petitioner had no license
or permit to carry the firearm through the officer-in-charge of the firearms and explosives office who
testified that, based on his records, the petitioner had not been issued a license, and whose testimony
had not been impugned by the defense; and that the testimonies of the accused and his two witnesses
to the effect that while aboard their private vehicle and on their way to attend an election campaign
meeting, they simply stopped and allowed a complete stranger to hitch a ride who was carrying a clutch
bag, left the same in the vehicle when he alighted, and which later turned out to contain the subject
firearm, were flimsy and unbelievable. The RTC ruled that the defense of alibi or denial cannot prevail
over the positive identification by eyewitnesses who have no improper motive to falsely testify against
the petitioner, especially where the policemen and the petitioner do not know each other; and, that the
petitioner failed to show any license or any other document to justify his lawful possession of the
firearm.
The petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the checkpoint was not shown to have been legally set
up, and/or that the frisking of the petitioner who was ordered to alight from the Tamaraw FX, along with
his companions in the vehicle, violated his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure; and,
that the trial court erred in believing the version of the incident as testified to by the policemen instead
of the version presented by the defense’s witness which is more consistent with truth and human
experience.7
On November 29, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that with respect to Criminal Case No. 4559-98, accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 7 years and
4 months of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.8
With respect to the validity of the checkpoint, the CA found that not only do the police officers have in
their favor the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed, but also that the
proximity of the day the checkpoint had been set up, to the day of the May 11, 1998 elections,
specifically for the purpose of enforcing the COMELEC gun ban, gives a strong badge of the legitimacy of
the checkpoint; that after a review of the records, the evidence adduced by the prosecution prevails over
the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of the petitioner that he had been "framed"; and, that with
respect to the admissibility of the firearm as evidence, the prosecution witnesses convincingly
established that the .45 caliber pistol, tucked into the right waist of the petitioner when he alighted from
the vehicle, was readily visible, and, therefore, could be seized without a search warrant under the "plain
view" doctrine.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
I.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the check-point validly established?
II.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, was the petitioner’s constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure violated?
III.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, did not the honorable court of appeals
commit a grave abuse of discretion for adopting the trial court’s unsubstantiated findings of
fact?
IV.
Given the circumstances, and the evidence adduced, is not the petitioner entitled to an
acquittal, if not on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, on the ground of reasonable doubt itself . . . as to where the gun was taken: from the
floor of the vehicle or from the waist of petitioner?9
The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court reverses the CA’s finding of his conviction in Criminal Case
No. 4559-98.
After a thorough review of the records, this Court is of the view that the courts a quo – except for a
notable exception with respect to the negative allegation in the Information – are correct in their
findings of fact. Indeed, the version of the defense, as found by the lower courts, is implausible and
belies the common experience of mankind. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.10In addition, the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.11 For this reason, its observations and
conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.12
The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and
binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.13 Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the
result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses
deserves high respect by appellate courts.14 Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the lower courts that the police found in plain view a gun tucked into the waist of the
petitioner during the Gun Ban period enforced by the COMELEC.
So too must this Court uphold the validity of the checkpoint. The petitioner insists that the prosecution
should have produced the mission order constituting the checkpoint, and invokes Aniag, Jr. v.
Comelec,15 where the Court purportedly held that firearms seized from a motor vehicle without a
warrant are inadmissible because there was no indication that would trigger any suspicion from the
policemen nor any other circumstance showing probable cause.
On both points the petitioner is wrong. In the present case, the production of the mission order is not
necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint was established three days before the May 11, 1998
elections; and, the circumstances under which the policemen found the gun warranted its seizure
without a warrant.
In People v. Escaño,16 the Court, through the ponencia of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend
that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also
complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution imposing a gun ban during the
election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the
second Monday of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the
election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption,"
but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the
vehicle’s occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search
of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to
bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were
carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without
opening the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in
this as this is what the situation demands.17(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s reliance on Aniag is misplaced.
In Aniag, the police officers manning the checkpoint near the Batasang Pambansa complex stopped the
vehicle driven by the driver of Congressman Aniag. After stopping the vehicle, the police opened a
package inside the car which contained a firearm purportedly belonging to Congressman Aniag. In
declaring the search illegal, the Supreme Court stated that the law enforcers who conducted the search
had no probable cause to check the content of the package because the driver did not behave
suspiciously nor was there any previous information that a vehicle hiding a firearm would pass by the
checkpoint.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in plain view, the policemen saw it
tucked into his waist uncovered by his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.18 The "plain view"
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to
the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.19
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law enforcement officers lawfully
made an initial intrusion because of the enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position
from which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, the policemen came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked into
his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the
vehicle.
As accurately found by the CA:
xxx It must be emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm [on] the person of the [petitioner]
shortly after he alighted from the vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3 Pascua’s testimony[,]
corroborated by that of SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly established that the holstered .45 caliber pistol
tucked at the right waist of the [petitioner] was readily visible to the policemen (TSN, August 24, 1998,
pp. 18, 37). Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a Search Warrant, the policemen may validly seize the
firearm and the same is admissible in evidence against the [petitioner] pursuant to the "plain view
doctrine" xxx.20
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s claim that he could not have freely refused the "police orders"
issued by the police team who were "armed to the teeth" and "in the face of such show of force." The
courts a quo consistently found that the police team manning the checkpoint politely requested the
passengers to alight from their vehicles, and the motorists who refused this request were not forced to
do so. These findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence in the record.
However, the Court must underscore that the prosecution failed to satisfactorily prove the negative
allegation in the Information that the petitioner possessed no license or permit to bear the subject
firearm.
It is a well-entrenched rule "that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the subject firearm, and the fact that the
accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess the same."21
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be
shown by the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.22
Witness for the prosecution SPO4 Gilbert C. Senados admitted that his records were outdated, i.e., that
his Master List of holders of firearms only covered licenses up to 1994; that it was possible for the
petitioner to acquire a license after 1994; and that he issued the Certification, dated May 18, 1998,
stating that the petitioner carried no license or permit to possess the guns because he was ordered to do
so by his superiors.23
There is no evidence that between 1994 and May 8, 1998, the date the crime was allegedly committed,
no license was issued to petitioner.
While the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police
from the possession of the petitioner, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry
such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the
lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification from
the government agency concerned.24
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was carrying a
firearm without prior authority, license or permit, the latter must be exculpated from criminal liability
under P.D. No. 1866, as amended.
With respect to the charge of violating Section 261(q) of B.P. Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, the Court is constrained to affirm the conviction of the petitioner, since the
prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof.
Section 261 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), as originally worded, provides:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although possessing a
permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of business during the
election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That a motor vehicle, water or
air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or extension hereof.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (R.A. No. 7166), amending Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code, provides:
SEC. 32. Who May Bear Firearms. – During the election period, no person shall bear, carry or transport
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or
public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the
Commission. The issuance of firearm licenses shall be suspended during the election period. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, the
burden to prove the negative allegation that the accused has no license or permit to carry a firearm lies
with the prosecution; under the Omnibus Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that
accused is exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 is clear and unequivocal25 that the prohibited act to which this provision
refers is made up of the following elements: 1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms
or other deadly weapons; 2) such possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is
carried in a public place. Under said provision, it is explicit that even if the accused can prove that he is
holding a valid license to possess such firearm, this circumstance by itself cannot exculpate him from
criminal liability. The burden is on the accused to show that he has a written authority to possess such
firearm issued by no less than the COMELEC.
On this point, the petitioner failed to present any form of such authority, and, therefore, his conviction
must be affirmed.
Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 264. Penalties. – Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished
with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which
shall be enforced after the prison term has been served.
The CA affirmed the penalty imposed by the RTC. However, the RTC failed to apply Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law26 which provides:
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty that should be meted out to petitioner should have a minimum and a maximum
period. The Court deems it reasonable that petitioner should suffer imprisonment for a period of one (1)
year as the minimum and two (2) years, as the maximum.
Furthermore, under Section 34 of R.A. No. 7166, the subject firearm shall be disposed of according to
existing laws, which, in this case, must be read in light of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime.— Every penalty
imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forefeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,
unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not
subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.1awphi1.net
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Criminal Case No. 4559-98 is concerned. Petitioner
Rodolfo Abenes Y Gacutan is ACQUITTED from the charge of illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond unreasonable doubt.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 4563-98, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year of imprisonment as minimum to two years of imprisonment as maximum, not subject to probation;
and he shall suffer DISQUALIFICATION to hold public office and DEPRIVATION of the right of suffrage.
The subject firearm is CONFISCATED and FORF
[G.R. No. 112659. January 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at large), accused, FATI
OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,[1] YAMBA LISASI
BHOLA,[2] and ZARIATU AMIDU[3] pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section 4, Article II,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425[4] embodied in an Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and other parts of Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without authority of law, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act as brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions
with or without consideration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay City Jail before the
arraignment. He remains at large.[5]
The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993, accused
Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was in the
act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin[6] hidden under the false bottom of a black
suitcase.[7] He informed the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people[8] at the
Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.[9]
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA
for further investigation.[10] The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO SABLAYAN, formed a team,
headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA,[11] to conduct follow-up operations in the case.[12] The team and
agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas Hotel,[13] where they allowed Leangsiri to
check into Room 504 with the confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.[14]
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri received a telephone
call from his contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that
night.[15] He relayed the information to his escorts, NARCOM agents SPO3 FABIAN
GAPIANGAO[16] and SPO4 ELPIDIO BALNEG.[17] Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned
themselves inside the washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual access to the rest of
the hotel room.[18]
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and other NARCOM
and Bureau of Customs agents were watching for unusual and suspicious events.[19]From where he sat at
the hotels coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu paced around the lobby for nearly an hour.[20] At
about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel.[21] As Amidu flashed
a thumbs up sign to them, they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel.[22]
They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he sat,[23] opened
the door, and let the three appellants in.[24] Leangsiri took the black suitcase[25] and brought it to the dining
area of the room where appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri
opened the suitcase and displayed its contents to his visitors.[26]
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags which contained
the heroin.[27] After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to
appellants.[28] Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when Gapiangao and Balneg
barged out of the washroom, identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.[29]
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four foreigners in
Room 504.[30] Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by presenting their respective
passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in Room 413 of the same
hotel.[31] Further questioning of appellants revealed that Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted at the
Royal Palm Hotel, also located in Manila.[32]
Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidus room.
Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name SUCHINDA
LEANGSIRI written on it.[33] The paper and Amidus other possessions were confiscated.[34]
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the security officers of the hotel, who
stood as witnesses when the former entered and searched said appellants room. Their efforts yielded two
black suitcases each with false bottoms and both smaller than that confiscated from Leangsiri.[35] Masking
tape and an empty transparent bag were also found in the room.[36]
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told a different
tale.[37]
Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that fateful night
of March 31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu and an American named
David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as they made their way to Room 413 (Amidus
room), they were accosted by some people who forcibly brought them to Room 504. They explained that
they were at the hotel to meet Amidu. Some of those who intercepted them left the room and returned
with Amidu. Appellants money and jewelry were taken from them. Those who dispossesed them turned
out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered its premises as
appellants and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were brought to NARCOM
headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were presented to the media as members of an international
drug syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of conspiring to
transport heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the accused (herein
appellants) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and ZARIATU AMIDU, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime described in the Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer a
penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of P30,000 for each of (them).
The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.
The Heroin of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the following
I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE TRIAL PREJUDICIAL
TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN APPELLANTS);
II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED WHICH THE ACCUSED (APPELLANTS)
COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE HAVE DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND
WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE THE JUDGMENT.
The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita Thach Camerino, a
Thai citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:
1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid Prison Compound, Sta.
Cruz, Manila;
2. That on or about 11:00 oclock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed the arrival of
inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;
3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the concrete wall, but after
a few attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another woman;
4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was behaving that way,
and found out that she and the two other male detainees were just sentenced by the Court of very
severe penalty of life imprisonment;
5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience rebelled and started
tormenting (her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the crime charged against them of
transporting heroin into the country;
6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered (her) help, if it is still
possible under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could extend to let justice prevail and reveal the
truth out of that incident on the evening of 31 March 1993, at Las Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with
the police at the NAIA, acting as an interpreter between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the
former was being interrogated at the NARCOM Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) in the afternoon of 31 March 1993, and into the evening of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;
7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them) that he was going to
deliver his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not identify the person whom he was
going to meet at the hotel nor mention the name/s of the same;
8. That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda Leangsiri, and the
police team arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri were instructed to proceed to the
desk counter and check-in, and got Room 504 to occupy;
9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went to Room 504 to
await for someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the claim or testimony that SPO3
Gapiangao and SPO4 Balneg were also inside Room 504 together with Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely
false;
10.That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black males whom (she)
later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;
11 . That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi,
protesting and complaining to the police why they were brought inside Room 504;
12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady friend billeted at
Room 413 of the same hotel;
13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to go with him, and
(they) immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu Amidu to Room 504 to join with
the two male black nationals already inside;
14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel, where (they) search
the room of the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;
15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at NAIA, where (she)
divested the three black nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn them over to Sr. Insp.
Dela Cruz for safekeeping;
16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in court during my
testimony in the trial of the case against (appellants);
xxx xxx xxx[38]
The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and the pertinent laws
and jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and conclusions regarding the
guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well as the sufficiency of the evidence against them, are
amply supported by the evidence, and the present motion did not ventilate any new matter as to
warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set aside.
With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the stance taken by the
accused (appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could not be considered
newly discovered, as said person was brought to the premises of the Court for identification during the
trial of this case. Besides, her testimony, summarized in the undated Affidavit submitted by the accused
(appellants) on September 24, 1993, does not inspire confidence, considering that this witness was
convicted by this Court for violation of the dangerous drugs law, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx[39]
Appellants now impugn the trial courts decision and its denial of their motion for new trial, and
raise the following assignments of error:
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXISTENCE OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;
II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT AND/OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES AND
OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE ACCUSED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDS MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.[40]
We affirm appellants conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.
One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to
transport eight-and-a-half kilos of heroin.
Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The first prong urges
that there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the transport of heroin by
Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiris testimony can prove their alleged conspiracy. The
running fault in appellants line of reasoning is obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.[41] It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence.[42] Proof of previous agreement to commit the crime is not also essential to
establish conspiracy. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before,
during, and after the commission of the crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld
the finding of conspiracy where it is shown that the accused acted in concert to attain the same objective.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses Gapiangao,
Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants aimed at carrying out the unlawful design
of transporting the heroin confiscated from Leangsiri. When Leangsiri was interrogated after his arrest,
he revealed to the authorities that he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas
Hotel. Later, while in Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri received a telephone call in the presence of
Gapiangao and Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin would be picked up from him at ten
oclock in the evening. Shortly before the designated pick-up time, Samala saw appellant Amidu (who
had been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour) flash a thumbs up sign to appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola when they arrived at the hotel. The three (3) appellants then took the elevator
and went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room 504, and Leangsiri let them into the
room. In full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants examined Leangsiris heroin, and took it and the
suitcase with the false bottom in which it was hidden. Appellants were on their way out of the room
with the suitcase and heroin when they were arrested by Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show
beyond doubt that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, from Leangsiri
to appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the control of the NARCOM on the
evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the fringes of reason is appellants argument that since the
NARCOM agents had already taken Leangsiri and the heroin into their custody and control, it is the
NARCOM agents who should be liable for transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri and the heroin
to Las Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in furtherance of their follow-up
operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend appellants to whom delivery of the illegal drug was to be
made.
 Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in possession of the heroin,
they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were neither delivering nor
transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not penalize the recipient of the delivered
contraband.[43]
The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho Wing.[44] In Lo Hong
Wing, the authorities gathered from their intelligence and surveillance activities that the accused were
going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the country. The accused were arrested while on-board a taxi cab
which they hailed and boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense argument that there was no delivery,
transporting or dispatching of shabu made by the accused therein, we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56) tea bags
containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction or was used, thereby implying that the
accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the alternative. Appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted of delivery because the term connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being
absent under the facts of the case. It is also argued that dispatching cannot apply either since appellant
never sent off or disposed of drugs. As for transporting, appellant contends that he cannot also be held
liable therefor because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is
non-existent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which appellant and
his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law enforcers
caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a prohibited drug. The term
transport is defined as to carry or convey from one place to another. The operative words in the
definition are to carry or convey. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached.Furthermore, the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co-
accused did not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was interrupted by the
search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act had already been
commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel carrying the
suitcase with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were arrested by the NARCOM
agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying the heroin to an unknown destination. Their act
was part of the process of transporting the heroin. They were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of
Leangsiri in transporting the heroin is appellants act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from
Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. C and its sub-exhibits) and the suitcase with false
bottom (Exh. F) are admissible against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally offered only
against Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted by the Solicitor General in his
Brief:
xxx xxx xxx
The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo and State
Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits A to Q and their submarkings against Leangsiri,
(Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original Records, pp. 67-71). xxx[45]
Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in Amidus hotel
room, with the name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it,[46] should not have been admitted by the trial
court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.[47] We interpreted this provision in Nolasco vs. Pao,[48] thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided xxx that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time
of and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than
the place of arrest.
We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accuseds apartment which
was located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal for being an untenable violation,
if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we validated warrantless
searches made not only on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible area within his
reach.[49] We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless search goes beyond the person of the one arrested
and includes the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.[50] The immediate control
test was enunciated in the American case of Chimel vs. State of California.[51] In that case, defendant was
arrested in his home for burglary of a coin shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers conducted a search of
his entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, a small workshop, and drawers. Various
items -primarily coins - were found through the search, and were admitted in evidence against him by the
trial court, which convicted him of burglary. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction as
it struck down the warrantless search on the ground that the search of the accuseds home went far
beyond his person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside
the suspects person and the premises under his immediate control admits of an exception. The exception
obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies as explained in People vs. Musa,[52] in this wise:
xxx Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the
defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a
passkey to defendants apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living
room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself,
observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, as small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay
a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package
of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The
admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing
that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge therefrom, that the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a
search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. x x x The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the plain view
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecutions evidence.
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The
plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. x x x Furthermore, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification - whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper
bearing Leangsiris name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and
found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless
search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does
not destroy the prosecutions case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a quo. The trial
court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand, and his findings are
entitled to great weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangaos, Balnegs, and Samalas testimonies alluded to by appellants hardly
relate to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved the elements of the crime at
bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that corroborative testimonies, in order to be credible, need
not coincide on all aspects. Given the natural limitations of the human senses, the immaterial and slight
discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses, far from weakening their probative value, serve to
strengthen their credibility. Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect testimonies.[53]
Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the testimonies of
some prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally reflected in their Joint Affidavit,
dated April 1, 1993.[54] We have held before that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit
and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are
generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations
because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the
incident which has transpired. xxx[55]
In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The story
proffered by appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and incredible to be
believed. His story begins in February, 1992, with his wife and two children being killed in a civil war in his
native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to migrate to the United States of America.[56] He first flew
to Thailand, where he stayed for six months without managing to learn a single Thai word.[57] Despite his
language inadequacy, he was able to land a job in a cargo company in that country. He did not befriend
any Thai national. Neither did he apply for an American visa in Thailand.[58]
He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to obtain an American
visa from the United States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan flew from Thailand to our
country. He stepped on Philippine soil on March 16, 1993, only to learn that Jabar and Samsi had long left
the country.[59] Instead of going to the United States embassy at Roxas Boulevard or any of the many travel
agencies doing business in the country, he spent his first two weeks here making the rounds of bars and
clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to meet fellow Africans and American citizens who could help him obtain
an American visa. In this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-appellant Bhola[60] and an American named
David whom he was supposed to meet on the fateful night of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon moved
in with Bhola at the Royal Palm Hotel, and David promised to help him obtain his American passport.[61]
Omogbolahans story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a convenient defense and
to elicit sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-appellants are equally incredulous. They are
also tattered with inconsistencies. As observed by the Solicitor General, they could not even get their
occupations straight, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she testified, a widow and
as shown in her passport, a seamstress by occupation. However, in her testimony, she stated that she is
a plain housewife. (tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)
On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central Africa, 37 years
old at the time he testified, married and a high school graduate xxx. In his testimony, he stated that he is
a trader xxx. Later on, he stated that he was working for the New Star Investment in Thailand as
marketing officer.[62] (tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)
Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an elementary graduate and
plumber according to his passport. In his testimony, however, he claimed to be a technician.[63](tsnJuly
13, 1993 p. 4).
Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying appellants
motion for new trial.
We find appellants first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As discussed above, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against the substantive rights of
appellants do not exist.
Appellants second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise unmeritorious. Section 1,
Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved party the right to move for new trial on the
ground, among others, of (n)ewly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result
(thereof).[64] Newly discovered evidence, in order to warrant a new trial, must meet three
requirements, viz: (1) it must have been discovered after trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial despite reasonable diligence; and (3) if presented, it would probably alter the results
of the action.[65]
In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of reasonable diligence,
they could not have obtained Camerinos testimony during the trial. On the contrary, as correctly noted by
the trial court, Camerino was identified in open court by appellant Bhola on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerinos prospective testimony would acquit appellants. Firstly,
her affidavit embodies a narration of events almost identical to that presented by appellants. As has been
discussed earlier, the defense version of what occurred on the evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and
difficult to believe. Secondly, Camerinos claim that she was a member of the team that arrested appellants
is belied by the testimony of prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused through
counsel claim she was a member of the team which arrested the three Africans now the
accused in this case.What can you say to that?
A: I dont know that person, sir.
Q: Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when you met this
Julita Camerino?
A: I dont know, sir.
Q: You dont recall any?
A: I dont recall any, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Cross?
ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your interpreter during the
custodial investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the person of Suchinda
Leangsiri?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the police
headquarters or at the Las Palmas Hotel?
A: I dont know that person, sir.[66]
Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been previously convicted of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order, dated October 11, 1993,
of the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-118913 are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28,
1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being
authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and
chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector
Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station
10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet
inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried
leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately
1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks
of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by
his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave
their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men
in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in
the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder
was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was
withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed
.45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant
was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified
that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other
valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding
the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is
hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months
of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding
the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is
hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are
hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this
Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to
law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A.
NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN
ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized
from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force
by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant
unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V.
AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe
that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void
because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not
have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted
as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about
drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember
if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established
contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me to the
former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff
(shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that
the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine
shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and
reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of
shabu I bought from the subject.Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result
for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-
414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger
quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus,
in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described
other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other
articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named
books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these
books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so
holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in
character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might
be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property
specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the
judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold
that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug
paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar
case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of R.A.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No. 628 Comia St.,
Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which
is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is
not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a
basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425, without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence,
in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling
by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession
of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the
search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there
should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for
illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is
pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs
which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1)
search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was
issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several offenses. We
held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be
subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one
warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the trial court
took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents
which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated
that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose,
Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to
be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants house under the leadership of Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same
neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants
place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it
was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant
that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a
search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six
apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each
floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the
warrant that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on record,
there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence, Search
Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the
drug was seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[35] For this
doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.[36] The question is whether these
requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis
for admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant
to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.[38] The rationale
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit
violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior
to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-
appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during
the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had
no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant
refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within
their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes
to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching
party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself
or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry
and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
 In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot
be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite
the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching partys
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under
16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120670. October 23, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HEDISHI SUZUKI, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of marijuana, defined
and penalized under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended,[2] and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00.
The Information[3] against appellant reads:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess, prepare,
administer or otherwise use any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his custody and control 1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or less, of
marijuana which is a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforementioned laws.
Acts contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial followed.
The prosecution presented P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of the Police Aviation Security
Command (PASCOM), PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the PASCOM, and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM), all of Bacolod City. Their testimonies, woven together, established the following
facts:
Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all Chiefs of
Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas of
responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate
with local airport authorities and the PASCOM.
In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the prosecution witnesses were in their respective stations,
appellant and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod
Airport Terminal. Appellant was bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was
carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked Bongbongs piaya.[4] At the pre-departure area, upon the
advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM, appellant proceeded to the walk-through
metal detector, a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence
of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Poyugao to
frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piayaand passed
it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered appellant to go to
the hand-carried luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were
present. SPO1 Casugod requested appellant to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and started
to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him.Eventually he consented, saying in faltering English, open, open.
SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found therein eighteen (18) small packs, seventeen (17) of which were
wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which looked
like marijuana. Upon seeing this, appellant ran outside the pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3
Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.
They apprehended appellant near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the PASCOM
office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as
conspirators with appellant in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre
Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised appellant of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total
weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a
confiscation receipt which appellant, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to
acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over appellant to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions were brought to the prosecutors office for inquest and
placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office.The box with its contents
was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Inspector Villavicencio conducted three tests on the specimen
samples which proved positive for marijuana.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony is as follows: On April 9, 1994,
he and Takeshi Koketsu arrived in Manila from Osaka, Japan. The purpose of his trip was to collect from
Takeshi Y2.5 million or P500,000.00 which the latter owed him. Waiting for them at the airport was
Takeshis wife, Lourdes. On the same day, the three flew to Bacolod City. Appellant stayed at the house of
Takeshi.
Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay. When Takeshi admitted he had no money, appellant
got angry and went to the Casino Filipino where he stayed until 10:30 in the evening. Upon leaving the
casino, he met Pinky who enticed him to have sex with her. They then proceeded to the Moonlight
Motel. Moments later, Pinky left, while appellant stayed there for the night. He told her he was leaving
the following morning.
The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant went to the airport. Pinky, who was there waiting,
gave him a box of Bongbongs piaya as pasalubong from Bacolod City. He did not ascertain the contents of
the box since he trusted Pinky although he just met her the previous night.
Appellant found and joined Takeshi and Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi apologized for his
failure to pay his debt, assuring him that he would settle his obligation next month.
When it was time to leave, appellant, accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the pre-departure
area. When he passed through the metal detector, a policeman frisked him, got the box and placed it
inside the metal detector. The machine produced a red light, hence, the policeman brought the box to the
inspection table, with appellant following him. Thereafter, the policeman, whom he later knew as SPO1
Arturo Casugod, pointed to the box uttering something appellant did not understand. Appellant said, wait
a minute, (in Japanese) and went outside to ask Takeshi and Lourdes to interpret for him, but they did not
respond. When PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called him back to the pre-departure area, he found Takeshi near
the table and the box containing something wrapped in aluminum foil already opened. Takeshi told him
that he was carrying marijuana. He replied it was given to him by a woman that morning. Then he and
SPO1 Casugod went to the PASCOM office where the latter weighed the contents of the box. He did not
sign the Confiscation Receipt presented to him. They then proceeded to the NARCOM office with
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1 Linda, PO3 Poyugao, and three other officers. From the NARCOM
office, appellant was brought to the Bacolod Police Station.
Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya Restaurant owned by Takeshi where appellant saw
C/Inspector Alcantara and Lourdes talking. When he inquired from Takeshi what was going on, he was told
they needed money in dealing with the police. Appellant was then brought to the prosecutors office. There
Takeshi told him to keep silent as he would make a deal with the prosecutor. Then they went to Takeshis
house where appellant stayed for two days.
On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and SPO1 Linda brought appellant to the Bacolod City
Jail. Takeshi visited him twice, advising him to ask someone from Japan to send him money and be
discreet, otherwise he would be killed; and to admit he has in his possession less than 750 grams of
marijuana so he could post bail. However, he refused.
 Five days later, appellant, escorted by the police, went to Takeshis house to retrieve his money
(Y120,000 equivalent to P30,000.00), but Takeshi told him that it was already spent for the food and drinks
of the NARCOM agents and the airport policemen.
On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to pay a fine of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00), and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of Republic Act No.
7659, let the 1,547.07 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject matter of this case, be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government and be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian,
NBI, to be disposed according to law.
SO ORDERED.
Hence the instant mandatory review.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I conducted was not incidental to a lawful arrest.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENTS HAD THE LEGAL
AUTHORITY WHEN THEY OPENED AND SEARCHED THE SMALL CARTON IN QUESTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE
OPENING AND SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND IN DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE SEIZURE OF
SAID CARTON AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA CONTENTS OF THE
SUBJECT CARTON AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE CARTON IN QUESTION WAS
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
V On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE SUBJECT CARTON WAS MADE
UNDER THE EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE APPELLANT WAS VALID AS HE
WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS UNQUALIFIED, VOLUNTARY AND
AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT GIVEN BY THE APPELLANT TO THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
VIII
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS CAUGHT IN POSSESSION OF
MARIJUANA, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
IX
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
CARTON IN QUESTION (CONTAINING MARIJUANA), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANT INTENDED TO POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA.
X Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attach case with the following limitation:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS PETITION TO BE RELEASED ON BAIL
CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM FROM
QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT, CONSIDERATION AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT AND IN DECLARING THE SAME SELF-SERVING AND NOT AMPLY PROVEN.
XII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT.
XIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
IN SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING APPELLANT.
XIV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH
AND IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.
XV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BY
THE PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM.
Considering that the above assigned errors are interrelated, they will be discussed jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, contending that:
(1) the authority to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes under Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6235[5] does not apply to PASCOM and NARCOM agents but is limited only to aircraft companies or
operators of aircraft for hire; (2) he did not consent to be searched by the authorities; (3) the prohibited
substances confiscated by the authorities were not actually in their plain view; and (4) the search they
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads:
SECTION 8. Aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for
hire are authorized to open and investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in the presence of the
owner or shipper, or his authorized representatives if present, in order to help the authorities in the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, That if the owner, shipper or his representative
refuses to have the same opened and inspected, the airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the
loading thereof.
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court correctly upheld the PASCOMs authority to open
packages and cargoes, thus:
This Court does not subscribe to the contention of the accused. The Police Aviation Security Command
(PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which
is a creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 399, dated April 28, 1976.
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director
General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed. The
purpose was to establish a working arrangement among cognizant agencies, set up guidelines and
procedures for the security of the airport complex throughout the Philippines particularly handling,
coordination and disposition of hijacking and other criminal incidents that may occur thereat (PAFM 3-
9, page 1-3).
Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the
following functions and responsibilities:
1. Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;
2. Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;
3. Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport security operations;
4. Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and provide other pertinent
public safety services within the airports;
xxx
One of its guidelines before the passenger can enter the sanitized area (pre-departure area) is to check
the hand-carried luggage and personal effects of passengers (PAFM 3-9, page 2-3).
a. x x x x x x
b. x x x x x x
c. It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2-4).
Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to R.A. 6235,
the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or
hand-carried bags.
Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful
Interference, particularly paragraph 3.6.4 when x-ray inspection is not possible or when the x-ray image
of a bag gives rise to suspicion, x x x, a manual search must be carried out (Memorandum of the
Prosecution, pp. 15-16; underscoring supplied).
The prosecution correctly argued that the PASCOM established a system of checkpoint at the pre-
departure area of the Bacolod Airport to quickly inspect or screen persons or hand-carried baggages for
illegal items pursuant to said Memorandum of Agreement, which in turn derived its life from LOI 399. In
short, the setting up of checkpoint at the Bacolod Airport on April 12, 1994 does not have only
jurisprudential basis (Valmonte vs. De Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83288, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 211,
more popularly known as the checkpoints cases) but also statutory basis.
Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting the authority to open and search
suspicious luggages would result to absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their authority to
perform their duty of maintaining order, preserving peace, protecting life and property and other police
works such as crime detection, while within the airport premises. The construction given by the accused
conveniently omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235 which reads in order to
help the authorities in the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. The word authorities evidently
refers to police officers and other law enforcers such as the PASCOM officers. It follows that in allowing
or authorizing aircraft companies which operate as public utilities or operators of aircraft which are for
hire, to open and investigate suspicious packages and seizures, the authors of the law does not disallow
or prohibit law enforcement agencies of the government from assisting or conducting the opening and
investigation of suspicious packages and cargoes. Otherwise, they will be remiss in their sworn duty of
protecting the public in general and more particularly those in the aviation industry. x x x. It becomes
crystal-clear that the PASCOM officers and personnel had the legal authority when they opened and
investigated the box in the presence of the accused and his counsel.
This is not the first time we recognize a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security
procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs.
Canton,[6] and People vs. Johnson,[7] we validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and
the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons, thus:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased
security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray
scans.Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials
or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure
area, as claimed by appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning
impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society.[8]
It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right
by giving consent to the search or seizure.[9]
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents. The
testimony of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is quite revealing, thus:
Q And when the said carton box was passed for the second time thru the walk-through
machine it indicated this metallic element by flashing a red light, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of that, what did you do?
A Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the inspection table.
Q What happened then?
A And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr. Donato Barnezo, asked the passenger Mr.
Hedishi Suzuki, saying, kindly open your box for inspection.
Q What happened after he asked the accused to open the box?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He signaled no, no.
Q What happened then?
A At that juncture, sir. I advised the said passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: Very sorry, sir, we
need to open your luggage because it indicated a red light.
Q When you say open the luggage you are referring to the box?
A Referring to the small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.
Q What happened then?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the pre-departure area instead of opening the
box.
Q Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?
A Before he could get out of the door of the pre-departure area I called his attention to come
back.
Q Did he come back?
A He came back and I explained to him again, sir, that we are very sorry but we need to open
your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya. I told him, I am very sorry, sir, but we need
to open your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya.
Q And what did Mr. Suzuki do?
A Mr. Suzuki answered me, open.
Q What did you do?
A I said kindly open your carton and he repeated, open.
Q For the second time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do then because he said open?
A I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again, sir, I am going to open this and he told me
you open.
Q Then, what did you do?
A I got hold of the carton and opened it by means of cutting the masking tape that bound
both ends of the carton.
Q And what did you find inside the said box?
A When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it contained suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops wrapped in an aluminum foil, sir, and transparent cellophane.
x x x.[10]
That appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked him to open the box was confirmed by
SPO1 Linda and PO3 Poyugao.[11] As succinctly found by the trial court, appellant cannot deny that he
consented by feigning ignorance of the English language, thus:
Accused through counsel would want this Court to believe that the opening of the carton containing
marijuana fruiting tops was without the consent of the accused. The defense relied on the alleged
inability of the accused to understand nor speak the English language because he is a Japanese
national. It made capital on the presence of Japanese interpreters, Tsuyushi Tsuchida and Hideo Agarie,
who assisted during the trial.
The Court has no doubt in the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their categorical
declaration that accused Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent not only nodding his head but also by saying
Open. Open. Open. There was even a third-party consent given by his Japanese companion Takeshi
Koketsu.
The allegation of the accused that he does not understand English is indeed incredible to believe. As
aptly observed by Assistant City Prosecutor Rafael Guanco, the trial prosecutor, the accused might not
be able to speak straight English yet he might understand English (Memorandum of the Prosecution,
page 21). The prosecution witnesses categorically declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki was speaking
English during the airport encounter with the PASCOM and NARCOM operatives and while being
investigated at the PASCOM Office. While it may be true that Lourdes Linsangan participated on some
occasions, her participation merely facilitated the conversation.
The Court cannot believe accuseds protestation of ignorance of the English language. There are several
indications that accused understand the English language. It may be noted that in filing a motion to
terminate the legal services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it appeared that accused caused its preparation or
filing without the assistance of a lawyer (Motion To Terminate Services of Counsel, page
53, expediente). The accused testified that his wife is proficient in English. Accused was able to play
games in the casino, the night before the airport incident. He was able to give direction to the driver
from the motel to the airport. He has traveled to the Philippines about ten (10) times. He claims to be an
owner and manager of a company where some clients or customers are non-Japanese such as Germans
and Americans. During the trial accused appeared to be an intelligent witness and this Court has keenly
observed that accused had shown eagerness and readiness to answer the questions propounded in the
English language even before the Japanese translation. Above all, accused answered in the affirmative
when queried by the Court whether he was able to attend English classes while in college. In short, the
Court was literally taken for a ride when initially made to believe that the accused could not read, speak
and understand the English language.
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.[12] Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional
rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[13] The packs of marijuana obtained in the course
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.[14]
Nonetheless, we find the trial courts reliance on the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine
finds application only when the incriminating nature of the object is in the plain view of the police
officer.[15] Here, it is beyond cavil that the marijuana seized from appellant is contained in the box
of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and not immediately apparent to the airport authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at the time
of the search. To be considered a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there must be
a lawful arrest before the search can be made.[16]
At this point, it bears stressing that mere possession of the prohibited substance is a crime per
se and the burden of proof is upon appellant to show that he has a license or permit under the law to
possess the prohibited drug.[17] Here, appellant failed to prove that he has a license to possess the
marijuana. In People vs. Bongcarawan,[18] we held that such possession constitutes prima facie evidence
of animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court should have sustained his unrebutted testimony
that he was a victim of frame-up contrived by Takeshi in connivance with the arresting officers, especially
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, accused in several criminal charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellants testimony, not a shred of evidence was presented by
the defense to prove his claim that he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who allegedly gave him the box
of piaya containing marijuana was presented as a witness to confirm his story. We have ruled that clear
and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense of frame-up because in the absence of proof of
any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against appellant, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands.[19] Also, allegations of frame-up are
easily fabricated, making it the common and standard line of defense in prosecutions involving the
Dangerous Drugs Law.[20]
We are not swayed by appellants reference to C/Inspector Alcantaras criminal records. Suffice it to
state that he is neither an accused in this case or a prosecution witness.
We have carefully reviewed the records and found no cogent reason to overthrow the findings of
fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. That this is a matter exclusively within its competence, since
it had the unique opportunity of observing the witnesses and their manner of testifying during trial, had
long been established. Hence, its findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, except
when there is a clear showing that facts of weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the
case have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied.[21] This exception is not present here.
However, the trial court imposed the wrong penalty.
Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 shall be imposed if the quantity
of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.[22] Section 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be
applied in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. [23]
In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, appellants possession of
1,547.70 grams[24] of marijuana does not merit the supreme penalty of death but only reclusion perpetua.
While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal
drugs,[25] we, however, reduce the fine imposed by the trial court to P1,000,000.00, considering that courts
may fix any amount within the limits established by law.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case No.
94-16100 finding appellant Hedishi Suzuki guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article
II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in the sense that he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and fined One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law
enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing
to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently,
drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.[1]
The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo.Based on their testimonies,
the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume
of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt.
Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December
14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue
and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello,
P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited
near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front
and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day
from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the
team Aling Rosa who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked
Cash Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for
investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said
specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-
judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had
just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an
old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo
arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman
and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested.Moreover, she added
that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they
were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search
of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a
general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-
appellant violated the latters constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
which provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time
prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable
unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of
arrest.[4]
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was later
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the
houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision
guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed
and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated.[7]
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers
to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before
a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers
to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[12]
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are
in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the
place to be searched.[13]
In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be
present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence
against the person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may
commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30
in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who
was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves.Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot
tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as
their business address. More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously.His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a
crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially
since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would
be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly
ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving
vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement.Aruta, on the other hand, was searched
while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles
coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from
their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants
belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid
warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is
admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a
moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of
the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the
place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying
to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to
resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting
the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when
taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches
and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988,
the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling
Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the
same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988,
accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed
her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she
gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-
appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before
the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had
received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When
the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from
Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing
in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This
intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This
Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the
lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one
cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have
been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx.
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not
acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and
conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.
The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of
the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever
for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these
are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the
Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken,
and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]
As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed that:
x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
 In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure
of accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second
exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM
agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was
apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the
middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted
by government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused
the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate,
accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned
cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified
themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that the
building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at
by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open
the door despite repeated requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the
building. Nearby courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances
sufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a
warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to
search and inspection citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p.
631.)The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened
after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with
our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she
was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]
This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable
to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the
warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most essential
element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the
warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless
arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal.Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not
be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing
over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26] where this
Court held:
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless
search. This he gleaned from Bolonias testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he
carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent
to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the
search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on
the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v.
Barros:[27]
x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion
of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-
x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an
actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
(Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.[28](Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As
clearly illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.
Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).
Q - When he said that, what did you do?
A - We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?
A - He said you can see it.
Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was
contained in the bag.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
 A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed
it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.If one had been made,
this Court would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior consent
to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the
case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the
police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it couldbe secured only
if accused-appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in
the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those,
particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without
too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched
has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to
be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to
be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents
purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any
way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In
any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in
the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant
case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not
guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the
courts jurisdiction.[32] The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
search and transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend
this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless
arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is
that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of
arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused
from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a
preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes,
or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a
warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against
unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at
bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton
box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution. We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made
clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the
premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]
While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based
on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.[35]
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees
afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.[36]
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself.[37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, G.R. No. 182010
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent. August 25, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram

DECISION Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen

gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous
CARPIO MORALES, J.: drug. x x x

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) challenges

the November 27, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July

28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02- With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the results

2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-4128[5] reading:

(R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) possession of methamphetamine
xxxx
hydrochloride or shabu.
SPECIMEN:
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting petitioner reads:
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of no. 1159 Bo.
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay City, Metro Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City.
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully xxxx
and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).[2](underscoring supplied) F I N D I N G S:

Volume of urine = 60 mL.

At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary
evidence of the prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports issued by National
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the
presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen (de Belen),[3] subject to her defenses, to x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
thus dispense with the testimony of de Belen.

De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1 Cruzin), [6] a
Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,[4] viz: member of the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the prosecution established its

version as follows:
xxxx

SPECIMEN:
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2 Aguas),
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
marked SRE and further placed in bigger marked transparent plastic sachet. proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct

xxxx surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as Ryan.

F I N D I N G S:
 As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target
area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside
a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious
when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a
police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette
case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely
restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the plastic
sachet[7] on which he marked her initials SRE. With the seized item, petitioner was brought for
investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug
Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum[8] dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic
Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance contained in the
plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person of
petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension[9]recounting the
details of their intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.
Repudiating the charges, petitioner[10] gave the following tale:
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting at home,
several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and asked her whether she
knew one named Ryan who they claimed was a notorious snatcher operating in the area, to which she
replied in the negative. The police officers then forced her to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-
SOG office where she was detained.
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which they claimed
contained shabu and recovered from her.
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was planted, stemming from an all too
obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her family.
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee[11] and family friend Ma.
Stella Tolentino,[12] corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that the police officers never
informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of petitioner.
By Decision[13] of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court
hereby renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y Romines GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of par. 3 of Section 11, Article II
of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
and absent any modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal
liability of the same accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs.
The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu involved in this
case is declared forfeited in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate
disposition in accordance with the provisions of the law.[14] (underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to thus
render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court, citing People v.
Chua, [15]
held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner under the stop-and-frisk
concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches.[16]
Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that petitioner failed
to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil motive to falsely charge her, and
that she was even found positive for substance abuse.

In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the stop-and-frisk
principle in light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having
merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct
that would arouse the suspicion.[17]
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance of the
appealed decision but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent provisions of R.A.
No. 9165.
Appellants conviction stands.
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her arraignment. Neither did
she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest
as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal
before the appellate court.[18] By such omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the
legality of her arrest.[19]
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender the
belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were on a surveillance operation
as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as
a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That
petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about
the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid search warrant
is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels
and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of
moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6)
where the prohibited articles are in plain view; (7) searches of buildings and
premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop and
frisk operations.[20] (emphasis underscoring supplied)
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, the
determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial
question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[21]
Elucidating on what includes stop-and-frisk operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court
in People v. Chua[22] held:
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly
introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must
have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the Court
in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen chanced upon the
accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to
be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-
frisk. In People v. Solayao, we also found justifiable reason to stop-and-frisk the
accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of
the accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw
the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence
mission to verify reports that armed persons w[h]ere roaming the
vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves
a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[23]
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted
a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected shabuinitially noticed in petitioners
possession later voluntarily exhibited[24] to the police operative was undertaken after she was
interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to
petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior
and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dangerous
Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available defenses she would raise. While
such admissions do not necessarily control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure,
they nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge by which petitioners credibility as a witness can be
measured, or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Courts attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by adopting two
completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she argues that the stop-and-frisk
search upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in
violation of the Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her
version that she was at home resting on the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the
house by the police operatives and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason than to try and
extort money from her. That her two witnesses a daughter and a friend who were allegedly present at the
time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were not informed why she
was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of petitioners,
that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been held as a shop-worn
defense of the accused in drug-related cases, the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this
claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
of regularity of official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect
to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.[25]
A word on the penalty.
While the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision, it overlooked the error in the
penalty imposed by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day, as maximum.
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:
xxxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine
or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA
or ecstacy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possesses is far behind therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300)
grams of marijuana. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is punished by a
law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is thus in
order.
The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.
[G.R. No. 142356. April 14, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LITA AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 29, 2000 decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Angeles City in Criminal Case no. 99-1261 convicting the appellant of violating Section 4, Article 2 of RA
7659, as amended, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana in an
information[2] that read:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1999, in the Municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LITA
AYANGAO y BATONG-OG, without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously dispatch in transit or transport fifteen (15) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with the actual
total weight of FOURTEEN KILOGRAMS AND SEVENTY FIVE HUNDREDTHS (14.75) of kilogram, a
prohibited drug.
The appellant, through counsel, filed a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did
not constitute an offense. This was denied by the trial court. Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded not
guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO3 Nestor Galvez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and Chief
Forensic Chemist Daisy Panganiban-Babor. The prosecutions version[4] of the facts, as aptly summarized
by the trial court, was:
Two weeks before August 13, 1999, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and PO3 Nestor A. Galvez, members of the
Criminal Detection and Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City,
received information from one of their informants that a certain woman from Mountain Province
delivers dried marijuana leaves for sale at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga to some drug pushers.
Said information was also relayed by the informant to C/Insp. Rhodel O. Sermonia who instructed the
two operatives to conduct surveillance operation against their target female who was described by their
informant as about 50 years old, 5 feet in height, straight long hair and coming from Kalinga province.
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to their headquarters and
informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. PO3 Sagum and PO3
Galvez, together with the informant, immediately went to Sapang Biabas and parked their car near the
entrance of the road going to Sapang Biabas. While they were in their car, the informer pointed to them
a woman bearing the same description given by the former. The woman alighted from the tricycle and
subsequently loaded two sacks with camote fruits on top. The two officers proceeded to the place where
the woman was and noticed marijuana dried leaves protruding through a hole of one of the sacks.
Sagum and Galvez introduced themselves as police officers and requested the woman to put out the
contents of the said sacks. The sacks yielded sweet potatoes mixed with 15 brick-like substance wrapped
in brown paper and masking tape. A brick, which was damaged on the side and in plain view of the
officers revealed dried marijuana leaves. The woman who was arrested identified herself as accused Lita
Ayangao y Batong-Og of Lacnog, Agbanawag Tabuk, Kalinga Province. Ayangao and the suspected dried
marijuana leaves were brought to the police officers headquarter at Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City.
The evidence confiscated from the accused were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas
where it was examined by Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babor. The Initial Laboratory Report issued
indicated that the specimens from the 15 bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing 14.75
kilograms were found to be positive for marijuana.
The defense, through the testimonies of the appellant and Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio
Makabakle, presented a different version, again summarized by the trial court:[5]
Accused Lita Ayangao denied the charge made against her and alleged that she has nothing to do with
the marijuana allegedly found in her possession. She went to Sapang Biabas Marimar, Camachile,
Mabalacat, Pampanga from Tabuk, Kalinga Province on August 13, 1999 only upon the request of a
certain Magda Dumpao. Allegedly, Magda bought a house in Mawaque, Mabalacat and learned that it
was being sold again. Magda then requested her (accused) to talk to Jaime Alarcon who acted as Magdas
agent in buying the house. It was Magda who instructed her on how to go to the house of Jaime Alarcon.
She arrived at the house of Alarcon at around 3:00 oclock in the morning and was welcomed inside by
Gloria and Jocelyn Alarcon, Jaimes wife and daughter-in-law. As Jaime was not around, she asked the
Alarcons permission if she can have a nap. Gloria and Jocelyn allowed her to sleep on the sofa and while
she was resting, at around 6:00 oclock in the morning, somebody knocked at the door. Gloria opened it
and two men, who identified themselves as CIS agents, told Gloria that they were looking for somebody
who came from Baguio City. One of the men went to where she was then lying and asked Gloria who she
was. Gloria answered that she came from Tabuk. The police officers asked her (accused) to go with them
as they wanted to talk to her. When she refused, the policemen forced her out of the house and boarded
her to their car. While she was inside the car, she saw a sack and a carton box. The police brought her to
their headquarters at Diamond Subd., Angeles City. She was made to sit in a chair and in her view, the
sack was opened and its contents were placed in (sic) a table. She then heard from the policemen that
the contents of the sack were marijuana and accused her of owning it.
Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle, Marimar, Biabas, Mabalacat, Pampanga, testified
that, as tricycle driver whose terminal is near the house of Jaime Alarcon, he did not see any unusual
incident that happened in said vicinity in the morning of August 13, 1999. He also did not see how the
accused was arrested and did not see the policemens car.
The trial court found the prosecutions version to be credible, reasoning that appellants defense of
frame-up was not supported by evidence and thus could not prevail over the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. The law enforcers testimonies carried the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Lita Ayangao y Batong-og is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 by transporting
fourteen kilograms and seventy five hundredths (14.75) of a kilogram of marijuana, a prohibited drug,
without authority. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused
Lita Ayangao-Batong-og (sic) is further ordered to pay a fine of five hundred thousand (P500,000.00)
pesos.
SO ORDERED. [6]
The following assignments of error are raised in this appeal:[7]
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE EXISTING SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES AND INCREDIBILITY THEREBY
CREATING DOUBT REGARDING THEIR TRUTHFULNESS AND CREDIBILITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING FAVORABLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI AS A GROUND FOR A He told us that somebody will be delivering marijuana at Sapang Bayabas and the informer
ACQUITTAL OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN SPITE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION knew the person.
EVIDENCE WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR. Q Give us the complete report?
III. A Sinabi po ng hepe namin na sinabi ng informant na merong babaeng magdedeliver ng
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF marijuana sa Sapang Bayabas at babalik daw po siya kung kailan magdedeliver.
REASONABLE DOUBT. Q On the date in question August 13 at around 6:00 oclock in the morning you were in your
IV. office?
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS VIOLATED A We were already at Sapang Bayabas, sir.
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS MIRANDA RIGHTS. Q Which is which now?
After a thorough review of the records, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge A Nasa Sapang Bayabas na po, sir.
its burden of proving the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial court was Q Before going to Sapang Bayabas where did you come from?
supported by the evidence on record. A We were in the office, sir.
Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that this is a matter best Q What time where you in the office?
assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and A That is where we were sleeping.
deportment on the stand.[8] Besides, in this case, the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor Q You were sleeping there?
ones involving negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor detract A Yes, sir, we are stay-in.
from their credibility.[9] Q And then what happened?
Appellant also assigns as error the illegality of her arrest because she was not read her Miranda A Our informant came, sir.
rights. (This is in addition to her argument that the 15 bricks of marijuana were inadmissible since the Q What time?
warrantless search was invalid, not having been made pursuant to a lawful arrest.) This contention is A 5:00 oclock, sir.
without merit since this Court has repeatedly ruled that, by entering a plea upon arraignment and by Q What was the purpose of the informant?
actively participating in the trial, an accused is deemed to have waived any objection to his arrest and A Sinabi po niya sa amin na darating na raw po iyong ano.
warrantless search.[10] Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the Q I thought that your superior already informed you that the suspect or the accused will be
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[11] Here, in arriving at 6:00 oclock the first time?
submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she entered a plea of not guilty and A Sabi po sa amin noong magpunta iyong informer sa office namin August 13 darating daw
participated in the trial, the appellant waived any irregularity that may have attended her arrest.[12] po iyong babae.
Assuming, however, that there was no such waiver, pursuant to People vs. Barros,[13] reiterated Q It was on August 13 when he said that?
in People vs. Aruta,[14] the waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and A Yes, sir.
warrantless search and seizure is not to be casually presumed for the constitutional guarantee against Q Who was he talking with then?
unreasonable searches and seizures to retain vitality. The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as A Iyong Chief po namin tapos kinausap ko rin po siya.
appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, are act Q What time was that?
prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also A Before 5:00, sir.
valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize Q So they were talking before 5:00 with your Chief?
from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the A Yes, sir.
commission of the offense.[15] Q Where were you?
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was lawful because it fell under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of A I was outside, sir.
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This section provides that a peace officer may arrest a person Q So you were not listening to them?
even without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually A No, sir.
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. However, the police officer should be spurred Q So you do not know what they have talked about?
by probable cause in making the arrest. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies A Yes, sir.
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant Q And then what were the instruction given by your superior?
a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[16] The A He said we will proceed to Sapang Bayabas because there is a lady going there bringing
determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of each case. In this case, the marijuana.
arresting officers had probable cause to make the arrest in view of the tip they received from their Q Did you ask the identity of the woman?
informant.This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a A Yes, sir.
warrantless search.[17] Although the apprehending officers received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, Q What did he say?
they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellants A About 50 years of age, 5 feet and with straight long hair?
arrival was not known by the informant. Apprehending officer PO3 Sagum testified[18] as follows: Q How about the name, was the name given to you?
Q So what were the information given you by your informer? A No, sir, he just said she came from Kalinga.
A Ang kausap po nila iyong hepe namin[g] si Maj. Rhodel Sermonia tapos po sinabi lang po Q Aside from that, was the quantity of the drugs given to you that was to be brought?
sa amin ni Maj. Sermonia ang sinabi ng informant. A No, sir.
Q So you did not hear the report of the informant? Q So you just learned that the woman will be arriving at Sapang Bayabas at 6:00 oclock?
A Yes, sir. A I do not know the time she is arriving.
Q What was the information given by your superior? Q He did not tell you?
A He does not know, sir.
 Q The informant did not tell you?
A Yes, sir, he just said she will be coming in Sapang Bayabas.
Q You did not ask for the time?
A He does not know, sir.
Q What about the particular place where the woman will deliver the drugs?
A Hindi niya po alam basta doon sa entrance daw po ng Sapang Bayabas doon na po kami
mag-istambay. (Emphasis and Italics supplied).
Although there was testimony by PO3 Galvez that the informant told them the exact date of arrival,
the trial court gave more weight to the testimony of PO3 Sagum that stated otherwise, as evidenced by
his finding that the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and informed
them that the appellant was arriving at 6:00 A.M.[19] The judgment call of the trial court on which of these
two conflicting testimonies to believe should prevail because it involved the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses.[20] Thus, without proof that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance having a
bearing on the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied, this Court will not
overturn such finding as the judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor of the two
witnesses.[21]
In those cases where this Court invalidated a warrantless search on the ground that the officers
could have applied for a search warrant, the concerned officers received the tip either days prior to the
arrival or in the afternoon of a working day. In People vs. Aminudin,[22] this Court found that the officers
received the tip two days prior to the actual date of arrival of accused Aminudin. In People vs.
Encinadak,[23] the police officers were tipped off at 4:00 P.M. on May 20, 1992 that accused Encinada
would arrive at 7:00 A.M. the next day. Thus, the officers had time to obtain search warrants inasmuch as
Administrative Circulars 13 and 19 of the Supreme Court allowed the application for search warrants even
after office hours. In People vs. Aruta,[24] the police officers received the information on December 13,
1988 that accused Aruta would arrive on a Victory Liner Bus at 6:30 P.M. on December 14, 1999, giving
them a day to obtain a warrant.
In the present case, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 A.M. on August 13, 1999 and
informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 A.M. (just an hour later) that day. The
circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers. In People vs. Valdez,[25] this Court
upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest and corresponding search of accused Valdez as the officer
made the arrest on the strength of a similar on-the-spot tip. In the case at bar, though all other pertinent
details were known by the officers except the date, they could not have applied for a search warrant since
the validity of a warrant was only for 10 days.[26] Considering that the officers did not know when the
appellant was going to arrive, prudence made them act the way they did.
The appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give weight to her defense of alibi. Appellants
alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution.Alibi as a defense is
inherently weak[27] and for it to serve as basis for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and
convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime.[28] The appellant failed to meet these two
requirements. Jaime Alarcons house where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was
only 10 meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers.[29] Thus, the trial court
was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to acquit her of the charges.
With the effectivity of RA 7659, Section 4 of RA 6425, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 if the marijuana involved weighs 750 grams or
more. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the rules for applying the penalties in
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable, pursuant to the ruling in People vs. Simon[30] wherein
the Court recognized the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code and
the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by RA 7659. Thus, as
the appellant was found to be transporting 14.75 kilograms of marijuana, the trial court was correct in
imposing the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua since there was no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, and in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law which is not applicable when indivisible
penalties are imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, of Angeles City, finding the
appellant guilty of transporting a prohibited drug and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
fine of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127753. December 11, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
For automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan convicting appellant Domingo Valdez y Dulay guilty of two crimes: (1) murder for which he was
sentenced to suffer the death penalty and (2) illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunition under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for which he was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the
following criminal indictments:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719
That on or about 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San Manuel, Province
of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack
and shot one Labrador Valdez y Madrid, hitting the latters chest and the gunshot wounds inflicted being
mortal, caused the direct and immediate death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.
Contrary to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.[1]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720
That on or about the 31st day of October, 1995 at barangay San Roque, Municipality of San Manuel,
Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said accused did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody a firearm of an
unknown caliber, make and brand without authority of law, and which he used in shooting to death
Labrador Valdez y Madrid.
Contrary to Presidential Decree No. 1866.[2]
On October 31, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at Sitio Laclac, Barangay San Roque, San
Manuel, Pangasinan, Marcelo Valdez was under his nipa house talking with his son Labrador Valdez. At
that time, Marcelos other housemates his wife, son Rolando Valdez, daughter-in-law Imelda Umagtang
and an eight-year-old boy named Christopher Centeno were staying upstairs preparing to sleep. In the
course of their conversation, Labrador was lying sideways on a carabao sled, placed under the
family nipa house. He was facing his father at the eastern side of the house, at a distance of about less
than two (2) meters from each other.[3] TSN, June 13, 1996, pp. 14 and 17. 3 Suddenly, two consecutive
gunshots were fired coming from the western side of the house by an assailant.[4] The first shot landed on
the left forefinger and thumb of Labrador, while the second shot hit him two (2) inches from the left
shoulder, below the neck which exited at the right side just below his breast.[5] After firing, the assailant
immediately ran away towards the west direction.[6]
Marcelo Valdez who was talking to his son, immediately called for help while the victim managed
to walk upstairs towards the kitchen. The stunning sound of the two gunfire and Marcelos cry for help
alerted Imelda Umagtang and her common-law husband Rolando Valdez, who were both lying on bed, to
verge upon the kitchen where they saw the victim bathed in his own blood. When Rolando inquired from
the victim who shot him, the latter replied that it was the appellant. At this time, the victims brother and
in-laws arrived. They also asked the victim what happened and the latter once more said that it was
appellant who shot him. At such time, the search for the passenger jeep that will transport the victim to
the hospital continued. After an hour, they were able to find a passenger jeep but the victim already
succumbed to death prior to his transport to the hospital.
The next day, on November 1, 1995, Dr. Asuncion Tuvera of San Manuel Rural Health Unit
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the deceased in the latters house. The medical examination
revealed the following gunshot wounds-
A. External findings:
Chest - gunshot wound at the left sternal line 2 inches below the left clavicle, 2 cm in diameter
penetrating
- gunshot wound at the right enterior axillary line at the level of the lumbar area.
Extremities lacuated wound on the left thumb and index finger with fracture of the phalanges.
B. Internal findings:
Chest fracture of the 3rd enterior left rib.
Abdomen placuated wound of the liver.
Cause of death:
Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the chest and
lumbar area. (Exhibit E; records, p. 7)
Thereafter, appellant was charged before the trial court with two separate information for murder
and illegal possession of firearms to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, judgment was rendered
convicting appellant as earlier mentioned. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8719:
The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
defined and penalized under republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, the
offense having been committed with the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and nighttime, hereby sentences him the ultimum supplicium of DEATH to be
executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the
victim LABRADOR VALDEZ in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity; P23,500.00 as actual
damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8720:
The accused DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as The law is harsh, but that is the law.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Appellant questions his conviction arguing that the court a quo erred -
I. in convicting the accused of murder notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
II. in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and nighttime on
the assumption that indeed accused appellant shot the victim.
III. in not applying the provision of R.A. 8294, amending P.D. 1866
IV. in convicting the accused for two separate offenses
V. finding the accused guilty of violating P.D. 1866[8]
After a careful examination of the records, appellants conviction should be upheld. The elements
of murder concur in this case. Appellant shot the victim twice. The wounds sustained by the deceased at
the left thumb, index finger and at the left shoulder below the neck exiting to the right side just below the
breast were caused by bullets. As a result of these gunshot wounds, the victim suffered Cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound on the chest and lumbar area which
was described in the medico-legal report as the proximate cause resulting to his death.
Appellants defense is premised primarily on denial and alibi. He argues that on the day of the
incident he was hauling and transporting 27 cavans of palay with Reymante and Conrado Centino[9] from
6 to 9 oclock in the evening of October 31, 1995, to the house of Mrs. Juanita Centino. Thereafter, they
took supper at Conrados house and drank wine and went home around 11 oclock in the evening. His
version was corroborated by Reymante and Conrado and the latters mother, Mrs. Centino, a
sexagenarian. Such defenses, however, aside from being inherently weak, cannot prevail against a positive
and explicit identification of him not only by Marcelo Valdez but also by the victim himself. To exculpate
himself, appellant must not only show that it was impossible for him to be at the place where the crime
was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[10] The
distance between the place where the crime happened, to the Centinos house where appellant claimed
he was, is more or less one (1) kilometer, which could be negotiated by walking for thirty (30) minutes,
and twenty (20) minutes by riding a vehicle.[11] Appellants whereabouts at the time of the incident was
insufficient to foreclose any possibility for him to be present at the scene of the crime, given the proximity
of the two places.
Appellant further contends that witness Marcelo Valdez could not have positively identified him
because there was only a single kerosene lamp lighting the area and the witness was already seventy years
old, who, at such age, would have a nebulous identification of the assailant. Appellants assertion of
impossibility of identification in a period of a few seconds look at the time of the second shot, which was
fired successively, was negated by the fact that appellant shot the victim at a distance of around two
meters from the kerosene lamp. The distance of the appellant from the kerosene lamp does not preclude
the possibility of identification since the place was properly illumined capacitating the witness to identify
the assailant. In fact, both Marcelo and the deceased were able to identify appellant.
Appellant capitalizes on the alleged failure of Lilia Valdez (wife of the deceased) to mention to the
officer who investigated the killing, that she heard her husband say that the appellant was his assailant. He
argues that her testimony in court that she heard her husband say that it was appellant who shot him, was
merely an afterthought. In support thereof, appellant quotes the following answers of Lilia Valdez during
cross-examination -
ATTY. VIRAY-
Q: Now, in the sworn statement Madam witness which you gave to the police authorities of San
Manuel, Pangasinan, you never mentioned that your husband told you that he was allegedly
shot by the accused, is this correct?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VIRAY:
The answer is not responsive, we request the question to be read back.
COURT: She said, she did not tell that to the police.
ATTY. VIRAY:
Q: Why did you not tell to the police authorities that your husband told you that your husband was
shot by Domingo Valdez?
A: I forgot, sir. [TSN, July 3, 1996, pp. 24-25]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records and studied the alleged contradiction between the court
testimony and the sworn statement of Lilia Valdez only to find that appellant is misleading the court. In
her sworn statement Lilia Valdez stated -
15. Q: Was you (sic) husband able to identify his assailant?
A: Yes, sir. He identified Domingo Valdez as his assailant when asked by brother-in-law Rolando Valdez
before he was brought down to kitchen on the way to the hospital, sir. [Exhibit D, Folder II,
Records, p. 3]
It is also clear from the records that as early as November 1, 1995, the day after the killing, the
principal prosecution witness Marcelo Valdez (father of the deceased), along with Lilia Valdez (wife of the
deceased), Imelda Umagtang (sister-in-law of the deceased) alluded to appellant as the killer before police
officer Avelino Sandi, Jr. who conducted the investigation.Their respective sworn statements were
reduced into writing denouncing and identifying appellant as responsible for the death of Labrador Valdez.
Imelda Umagtang[12] testified to these utterances of the deceased in court.
The victims septuagenarian father Marcelo Valdez likewise affirmed the identity of the appellant as
the assailant. He testified in court that he recognized the assailant with the lighting coming from the
kerosene lamp hanging on the wall, which illuminated the whole ground of the nipa hut.[13] He claimed
that he recognized appellant at the second shot[14] at a distance of around three meters (3) away from
him.[15] At the time appellant fired the second shot, appellant was less than a meter away from the
victim[16] and around two meters from the kerosene lamp.[17]
Lilia Valdez, the victims wife, recounting that fateful day, similarly attested appellants culpability in
court. She testified that when her husband was shot she was in her house with her children, about 25 to
30 meters[18] from the victims location. When she heard the gunfire and the summons of her parents-in-
law that her husband was shot, she rushed to her husband and saw him bloodied, lying prostrate in the
kitchen. She asked the victim what happened and the latter answered that appellant shot him.
Appellant likewise debunks the probative value given to Imelda Umagtangs testimony that she
heard the victim say that it was appellant who shot him because such statement was not directed to her
by the victim but to Rolando Valdez.[19] This according to appellant finds support in the following testimony
of Imelda
ATTY. VIRAY
Q: So it is very clear from your statement that it was your live-in boyfriend, Rolando Valdez, who asked
question from the victim not you, is this correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You never asked questions from the victim, is this correct?
 A: No, sir. I heard what he revealed to my live-in boyfriend, sir.[20]
There is no rule that a person who hears something cannot testify on what she heard. A dying declaration
need not be particularly directed only to the person inquiring from the declarant.Anyone who has
knowledge of the fact of what the declarant said, whether it was directed to him or not, or whether he
had made inquiries from the declarant or not, can testify thereto.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, possesses no probative value unless the proponent
can show that the same falls within the exception to the hearsay rule.[21] The statement of the deceased
uttered shortly after being wounded by the gunfire is a dying declaration, which falls under the exception
to the hearsay rule.[22] It may be proved by the testimony of the witness who heard the same or to whom
it was made.[23] Appellant contends that the identification by the deceased of his assailant, which was
admitted as a dying declaration under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, cannot be admitted
because when the said statements were uttered the declarant was not conscious of his imminent
death,[24] relying on the following testimony of Imelda Umagtang and Lilia Valdez, thus
Q: What was your observation when he was lying down waiting for the ride to come?
A: He was already very weak, sir.
Q: Did somebody ask of his physical condition at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: Lago Valdez, sir.
Q: What did he ask?
A: He asked if he can still manage, sir.
Q: What did Labrador Valdez answer?
A: He said, no more, sir.
Q: What do you mean by he cannot manage anymore?
A: He was already very weak at that time, sir.
Q: And?
A: And he was dying, sir.
Q: He said he was dying?
A: No, sir.
Q: But he was feeling weak already?
A: Yes, sir.[25]
and
Q: When you were there near your husband lying in the kitchen in the house of your father-in-law,
what was your observation regarding his physical condition?
A: He was shot, Your Honor.
Q: Did you ask him what was he feeling at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he answer?
A: He said, he was weak, Your Honor.
Q: Did he tell you that he is going to die?
A: No, Your Honor.[26]
The victims statements prior to his death identifying appellant as his assailant have the vestiges of
a dying declaration, the elements for its admissibility are:
(1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of his impending death; (2) the
deceased was at time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; and (4) it offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death
is subject of inquiry.[27]
These requirements are present in this case. The deceased made, before his death, more than one
statement, naming the person who shot him. The statements uttered by the deceased were in response
to the queries about the identity of the assailant. Such utterances are admissible as a declaration of the
surrounding circumstances of the victims death, which were uttered under the consciousness of an
impending death. That the victim was conscious of his impending death is shown by the extent and
seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the victim. The victim, prior to his death, was competent to be a
witness in court and such dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was
himself a victim.
In a further but futile attempt to exculpate himself from liability, appellant contends that he has no
motive to kill the victim. While he admitted that the victim eloped with his wife, he was not the only
suspect having a motive to kill the victim. Suffice it to say that the evidence on motive is inconsequential
when the identity of the culprit has been positively established[28] as in this case.
Ultimately, the issues raised by appellant fall within the sphere of credibility of witnesses which, the
reviewing court on appeal, ordinarily gives deference to the assessments and conclusion of the trial court
provided it is supported by the evidence on record. Findings of facts by the trial court are usually not
disturbed on appeal on the proposition that the lower court had the unique opportunity of having
observed the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying.
The killing was attended by treachery when the deceased was shot at his back while lying on a
carabao sledge conversing with his father, in a sudden and unexpected manner giving him no opportunity
to repel it or defend himself against such attack,[29] and without any provocation on his part. With respect
to the other aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and
nighttime, this Court cannot appreciate the same against the appellant for lack of factual basis. There is
no evidence on record that appellant contemplated and took some time of cool reflection before
performing his evil act for evident premeditation to set in. The abuse of superior strength, assuming there
is any, is already absorbed in treachery. Nighttime as an aggravating circumstance was not established for
lack of proof that appellant specifically sought the darkness of night to perpetuate his deed. In the absence
of any evidence that nocturnity was specifically sought for by the offender in the commission of the crime,
such aggravating circumstance may not be validly appreciated.
In criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[30] The prosecution ably discharged its duty by
establishing its case against appellant through the required quantum of proof.
In Criminal Case No. U-8720, appellant was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition punished under P.D. 1866 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the costs. His separate indictment was on account of the unlicensed firearm used in
the killing. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294,[31] if homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Although the crime in this case was committed in 1995, the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8294)
which became effective on July 6, 1997, fifteen (15) days after its publication in Malaya and Philippine
Journal on June 21, 1997, since it is favorable to appellant,[32] shall be given a retroactive effect. Therefore,
the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm may no longer be separately charged[33]and only one
offense should be punished, viz., murder in this case, and the use of unlicensed firearm should only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.[34] Considering that appellant is liable for murder, the illegal
possession case can no longer be pursued because it is merely treated as an aggravating circumstance.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
killing was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such circumstance will be treated merely as
an aggravating circumstance under R.A. 8294. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, such as reclusion perpetua to death, there
being one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty (death) shall be applied. However, the
aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be appreciated in this case because its
retroactive application would be unfavorable to the accused, since the higher penalty of death would
necessarily be imposed. Thus, we could only impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with the
ruling in People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr.[35] -
It must be underscored that although R.A. No. 7659 had already taken effect at the time the violation of
P.D. No. 1866 was allegedly committed x x x there is nothing in R. A. No. 7659 which specifically
reimposed the death penalty in P.D. No. 1866. Without such reimposition, the death penalty imposed in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 for aggravated illegal possession of firearm shall remain suspended pursuant
to Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution. Conformably therewith, what the trial court could
impose was reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
 1. In Criminal Case No. U-8719 for MURDER, the penalty imposed on accused-appellant
DOMINGO VALDEZ Y DULAY is reduced to reclusion perpetua. In addition to the death
indemnity of P50,000.00, the P200,000.00 moral damages awarded by the trial court to
the heirs of Labrador Valdez y Madrid is reduced to P50,000.00, and the P23,500.00
awarded as actual damages is likewise reduced to P19,000.00, the amount actually
proved.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-8720 for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS, the sentence imposed
on accused-appelant DOMINGO VALDEZ y DULAY is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the
case is DISMISSED, the act charged therein being considered merely as an aggravating
circumstance pursuant to P.D. 1866, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8294.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO
y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama
@ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic
bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of
the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As
arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December
5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha
composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and
four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and
SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro
Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover
operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and
six (6) one hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of
marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial
numbers in the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in
buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got
the marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in
plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to
help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed
that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to
"Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman
as his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He
saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic
wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion
aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and
found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth."[8] The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its
contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then
that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.
The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from
"Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found
to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta
Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the
morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him
if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were
strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his
house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge,
the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5)
minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified
as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house
for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out
of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy"
was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding
them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still
at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw
a box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and
Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters where they
were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995,
she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5)
children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged
3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried
her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door
open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for
about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch
water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and
grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man
was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a
box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece
of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of
her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied
the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The
trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-
appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of
the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of
Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555,
the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also
of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @
"Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND
THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND
INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES
NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE
THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND
BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE
RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT
WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO
THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence
obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act
of the commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American
doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of
crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel
and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of
criminal law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of
government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose
of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated
by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the
concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of
its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of
the officer."[23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law
enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the
criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such
that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment
the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent
person into a criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind
of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state,
or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused
is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there
is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the
nature of a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established,
the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as a defense,
American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination
before his initial exposure to government agents.[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and
character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the
accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt
to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."[35] If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity,
the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.[36] Some
states, however, have adopted the "objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the
case of Grossman v. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] The inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to
commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.[40]The test of
entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-
abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;[41] for purposes of this
test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that
is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an
opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, [43] or
appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are
not.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not
because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established,
the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by
condoning law enforcement improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the
interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's
inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are
considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed
that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an accused was
predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices
will be deemed impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the
more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have
committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme,
the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular accused's
predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important bearing upon
the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper. [49] The undisputed fact
that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a
criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the
United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida
Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective
test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the
crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by
holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing
lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the
standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the
accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the
offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced
him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps'
apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some
occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who
went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could
smoke this drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."[58] In People v.
Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price,
xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement,
"direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61] we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated
that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to
Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending
to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to
prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will
not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the
detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to
the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny
is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary."[65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.[67] In People
v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People
v. Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed
contrary to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense
available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.[72] To
determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of
the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test
first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless,
adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective"
test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-
bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and held
that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence
against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have
any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to
his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to
engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-
narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of convenience designed
to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson,
etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to
many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how
furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon
the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that
the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or
through informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
 Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant
system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the
apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the
police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For
whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld
and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious
is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the
informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance,
blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice
of this ugly reality in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of
corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial
hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs
may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug
cases.[86]Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of
the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful
search.As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false
arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from
common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the
sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the
employment of illegal means."[88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from
the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves
to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually
severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer
to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether
to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that
law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at
all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into
ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look
at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit
who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant
Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when
he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-
presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and
there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,[94] or there are reasons to
believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,[95] or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the
informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The
source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the
prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and
delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants'
apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria
inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box
contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered
from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify
that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of
marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing
with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by
Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box
showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what
was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite
reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the
court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought
it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought
it to the PCCL, your Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as
Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this
plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95,
also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record
that there are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with
a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our
Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by
whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth,
sir.
x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at
the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping
were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970)
grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for
almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00
strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the
case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires
that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-
buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure
of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is, however,
not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;[107] (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle;[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search
warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot
pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth,
sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was
there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the
house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
 A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily
chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached
her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place,
you were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you
your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the
amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who
retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you
are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the
finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to
justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."[115] The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.[116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by
her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named
his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the
marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant
Doria may have left the money in her house,[119] with or without her knowledge, with or without any
conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to
believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed
legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found
that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.[121] The "plain view"
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and
hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty
arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.[127] In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. [128] It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR Q You were only able to verify according to you...
Can we describe it? PROSECUTOR
ATTY. VALDEZ Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
Yes. ATTY. VALDEZ
PROSECUTOR That's a piece of plastic.
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible. PROSECUTOR
COURT By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
Noted. ATTY. VALDEZ
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house? What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
A Yes, sir. PROSECUTOR
Q And got hold of this carton? With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may
A Yes, sir. be big or a small one, for record purposes.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth? COURT
A I asked her, what's this... Leave that to the court.
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton? PROSECUTOR
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo Leave that to the court.
galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir. Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun? that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the
A Yes, sir. Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]? A Yes, sir.
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir. Q Siopao?
Q Who got hold of this? A Yes, sir.
A I was the one, sir. Q Canned goods?
Q You were the one who got this? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
retrieved by Badua? Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A Yes, sir. A It's the same plastic, sir.
Q You went inside the house? ATTY. VALDEZ
A Yes, sir. I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let
Q You did not have any search warrant? the prosecutor do that for you.
A Yes, sir. COURT
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was Continue. Next question.
in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether x x x."[130]
Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her? PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by
A Yes, sir. appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until
Q How far was this from the door? appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house,
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view. PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table
Q Under the table according to you? and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in
A Yes, sir, dining table. plastic.
Q Somewhere here? In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
A It's far, sir. marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination, however,
PROSECUTOR he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it? wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was
A Here, sir. not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of
Q What you see is a carton? marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white,
A Yes, sir, with plastic. pink or blue in color.[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?" box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had
A Yes, sir. to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton? the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the
A Yes, sir. requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous
Q That is all that you saw? tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.[136]
A Yes, sir. The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of
PROSECUTOR accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
For the record, your Honor... charged.[138]Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think
it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated
is the Constitution itself."[140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a
prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.
x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that
the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred
seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has
failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said
drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a
Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y
Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death and to
pay the heirs of the victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.[1]
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy Santos and John
Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed
Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her.[2]
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,[3] Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe alias
Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario
was tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul
Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the
side of Nitas Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a
distance of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del
Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking
hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the
woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man
returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man
was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag.The armed man
then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo
gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle.He also recognized the driver, after which
he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.[4]
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon
he was hired for P120.00[5] by a certain Boy Santos,[6] his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he
would drive him to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum.[7] However, despite their earlier arrangement boy
Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He (del
Rosario) acceded.[8] Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the
public market.[9] Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General
Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretest of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim
Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle
to help Dodong Bisaya.[10] Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos who stayed
inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before boarding the tricycle
Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the
shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario
and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma.While inside his tricycle, del Rosario
overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon
grasses.[11] Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the
police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.[12] Del Rosario then
went home.[13] Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle
nor to the barangay captain and the police.[14]
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced
him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the
presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos, Ernesto
Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy
among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery
with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not
considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules
of Court.[15]
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under
Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be
sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his
co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only
forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.[16]
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not
be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because
it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence.[17]
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me
against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.[18]
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those
less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an
armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened Q: x x x x On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo
with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under Nalagon?
the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the A: Yes, sir.
safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.[19] Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nitas Drugstore at Gen.
Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was Boy Tinio St.?
Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head, A: Yes, sir.
instantly killing her.[20] A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the case, xxxx
particularly the testimonies of the witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was Jun Marquez Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?
who ran after the victims helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination - A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time? Q: Then what did you do?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir x x x x A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men? Q: When you said they to whom are you referring?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir. A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady? Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir x x x x A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who grappled the Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
same from her? A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man was then Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir. A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: What happened to the lady who to the ground? Q: And after that what happened?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was then lying A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
on the ground, sir x x x x Court: Did you not see any shooting?
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag? A: There was, sir.
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir. Q: Who was shot?
Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir x x x x
of about one and a half meter? Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was wrong
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir x x x x and illegal?
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the possession of the A: Yes, sir.
bag? Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir. A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened? Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
A: They went away, sir x x x x A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the possession of Boy
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the tricycle? Santos x x x x
A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other man entered the Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
sidecar, sir.[21] A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to escape that
conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated was the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding the gun family?
fired at the victim? A: Yes, sir.
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding the gun chased Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
the helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir. A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards? Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the man A: Yes, sir.[24]
holding the gun shot the victim, sir.[22] On cross-examination, accused further stated
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified Q: After shopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle? A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
A: Yes, sir. Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle? bag of the woman?
xxxx A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given. Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
xxxx A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down x x x x
A: Yes, sir. Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the gun? A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.
A: Yes, sir.[23] Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old woman?
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that A: No, sir x x x x.
 Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the possession of
the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir x x x x[25]
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the incident
occurred is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you
should not do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your other
three co-accused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the
victim going towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.[26]
Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at
him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserted that it was Jun Marquez who shot the
victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was
grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the
victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, the bag was given to a person who was inside
the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it
can be deduced that Jun Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned
that a helper of the lady was chased by the other man and that this other man could not be Boy Santos
who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to
the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that Boy Santos stayed
inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and prevent him from fleeing; that there could
have been no other plausible reason for Boy Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a
conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle and helped in the commission of the crime,
particularly when he saw the victim grappling with Dodong Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her
bag; and, that Boy Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening
del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.[27]
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in front of the tricycle of
witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring
inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by Boy Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing
and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar
of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent.[28]
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at
him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making
him for the moment of automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any
more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal
liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused
away from the crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his participation in
the orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. According to the trial court, del
Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between
accused and his passengers was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper
of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito
del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;[29] that the accused did not
deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the
commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery,
killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime.[30]
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their
intent. There is need for concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose or for common and joint
purpose and design. Its manifestation could be shown by united and concerted action.[31]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were
in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[32] Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures,
but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime
is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[33]
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver
of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had
no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing
thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at
gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement
concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same."[34]Therefore, in order to
convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.[35] The only
incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply
explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the
prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-
accused that he would, be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is
absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting
although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim.[36]
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer
or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.[37] It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle
driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want
to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm
should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights
as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.[38] As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the
prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident,
during his cross-examination -
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's
name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to
name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the
bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these
findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding
a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the
school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the
accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the
police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera.[39]
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and
they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.[40]
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that
it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.[41] This concept of custodial
investigation has been broadened by RA 7438[42] to include "the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of
the same Act further provides that -
x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language
known and understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was
already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a
suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish
that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the
crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:[43]
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place
of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro[44] we held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule
113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted
rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence,
there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time
of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the
crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that
the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to
be taken into custody has committed the crime.[45] Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with
these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime
and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused
was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses
to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect
and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection, as in this case.[46]
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and
property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito
del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly
used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy
between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus
clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from
confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is
directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84715 October 17, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNULFO CENDANA y REYES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edmundo M. Manaois for accused-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
In the early morning of November 24, 1986, the Police Station at Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan received a
report that a man was found dead on the field near the ricemill of a Mrs. Thelma Bautista at Barangay
Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon investigation, policemen found the cadaver, Identified to
be that of Dominador Manongdo, lying prostrate on the ground with one gunshot wound on the head.
Subsequently, accused-appellant Arnulfo Cendana y Reyes was apprehended and later charged with the
crime of murder "thru illegally possessed firearm" on the basis of the following information:
That on or about November 23, 1986, in the evening at a
ricefield in barangay Ventinilla West, municipality of Sta.
Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed shotgun, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one
Dominador Manongdo y Loresco, inflicting upon him a
gunshot wound which caused his instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. [Record,
p. 1].
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial conference was terminated on
November 2, 1987 after which, trial proceeded.
The trial judge convicted accused-appellant in a decision dated June 3, 1988, the dispositive portion
reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Arnulfo Cendana y
Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder thru Illegally Possessed Firearm, and considering
 that the crime of Murder was committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm (shotgun, Exhibit "H"), the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with
all the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Dominador Manongdo y Loresco the
sum of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The firearm is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the Government, and the Clerk of this Court is ordered to
turn over the firearm to the nearest Constabulary
Command. [Record, p. 121].
Not agreeing with the findings of the trial court, accused-appellant appeals to this Court raising the
following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in convicting the accused even without proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of the accused.
III. The trial court erred in convicting the accused based on shaky and crude
circumstantial evidence. [Rollo, p. 43].
At the outset, it is noted that the Solicitor General filed a manifestation recommending the acquittal of
accused-appellant. He asserts that the alleged admission made by the accused-appellant and the gun
seized from him are both inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in violation of accused-
appellant's constitutional rights. He further asserts that after the exclusion of such evidence, the
remaining evidence of the prosecution is clearly insufficient to support a conviction based on proof
beyond reasonable doubt [Rollo, pp. 84-85].
We agree.
To support its judgment of conviction, the trial court relied mainly on the testimonies of the Police
Station Commander Sgt. Amadeo Asuncion, Pat. Alden Poserio, and Pat. Fernando Quinto, who were the
police officers investigating the case. Their testimonies sought to prove the following: After the cadaver
was brought to the morgue and later to a funeral parlor for autopsy, they went back to the place where
the body was found and after interviewing some people, received information that accused-appellant
was seen before the incident carrying a gun [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 8]. When they went to accused-
appellant's house, he was not around and so they picked up one of his brothers, Antonio Cendana, who
informed them that accused-appellant was at Pogo District in Dagupan City [TSN, November 3, 1987, pp.
8-9; February 1, 1988, pp. 5-6]. Not knowing where such place was, they forced Antonio Cendana to
accompany them to the house where accused-appellant could be found [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 9;
February 1, 1988, p. 6]. Upon their arrival, Sgt. Asuncion and Pat. Quinto entered the house while Pat.
Poserio remained outside [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 10]. They were able to arrest accused-appellant
who afterwards admitted to them that he was the one who shot the victim [TSN, February 1, 1988, p. 7].
They also recovered a homemade shotgun which, according to Pat. Quinto, was voluntarily handed to
them by accused-appellant [TSN, November 4, 1987, p. 4] but according to Sgt. Asuncion was handed to
them by a woman relative of accused-appellant upon the latter's instructions [TSN, February 1, 1988, p.
7]. They then proceeded to the NBI, Dagupan City where accused-appellant was subjected to a paraffin
test and the recovered firearm surrendered for ballistics examination [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 11;
February 1, 1988, p. 8]. From the NBI, they proceeded to the Sta. Barbara Police Station where accused
was thereafter detained [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 12; February 1, 1988, p. 8]. No written statement
was taken from accused-appellant [TSN, November 3, 1987, p. 12].
From the foregoing narration of events, we note the following:
(1) That there was no eye witness to the killing of the victim Dominador Manongdo;
(2) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police investigators on the basis of information
obtained from unidentified persons that accused-appellant was seen carrying a gun before the incident.
(3) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police officers without any warrant of arrest;
(4) That the shotgun was recovered without a search warrant from the house where accused-appellant
was arrested; and
(5) That the alleged statement made by accused-appellant to the police officers admitting to the
commission of the offense and made after his arrest, was used as the main basis for his conviction.
I A At the house of one of his relatives, sir.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when a peace
officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has commited is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The facts of the case do not warrant the applicability of paragraphs (a) and (c). Moreover, in paragraph
(b), the only instance under which accused-appellant's case could possibly fall, what is essential is that
the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the arrestee is
responsible for an offense which has just been committed [People v. Burgos, G.R. No. 68955, September
4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1]. Accused-appellant was arrested one day after the killing of the victim and only on
the basis of information obtained by the police officers from unnamed sources. These abovementioned
circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest.
Considering that the arrest of accused-appellant herein was unlawful, any search conducted on his
person or place of arrest which is an incident thereof, was also unlawful [People v. Burgos, supra].
Perforce, any evidence recovered during the unlawful search, being made without a warrant, becomes
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant and the shotgun which was allegedly the fatal
weapon cannot be presented against him [Nolasco v. Pano, G.R. No. 69803, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA
509].
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The Court elaborated on the scope of this right in the case of Morales, Jr. v. Enrile [G.R. No. 61016, April
26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538], thus:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible-or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it
that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be
in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. [At p. 554]
This procedure served as the guideline in subsequent cases [People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 59318, May 16,
1983, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Galit, G.R. No. 51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465]. In the present case,
if is clear from the record that at the time that accused-appellant was arrested, he was not apprised of
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such rights, before he supposedly
admitted to the killing of the deceased. As can be gleaned from the testimony of Sgt. Asuncion:
Q Were you able to locate Arnulfo Cendana?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
 Q What happened when you arrived in that house?
A When we arrived in the house I asked one of the
occupants of the house the whereabouts of Arnulfo
Cendana and I told one of my men to surround the house. I
tried to went (sic) up to the house but I saw Arnulfo
Cendana trying to escape so I told him "agka ombabatik ta
paltogen taka" which means don't run or else I will shoot
you''.
Q What happened when you warned Arnulfo Cendana not
to escape?
A He stopped and he raised his hands.
Q What happened next?
A I asked him if he was the one who is responsible about the
incident, the killing incident. At first he denied it but later on
when I talked to him in calm manner he admitted that he
was responsible and then I asked him where is the gun that
he used.
Q What did he tell you?
A At first he denied it but later on he told to one of his
relatives to get the gun, sir. [TSN, February 1, 1988, pp. 6-7;
Emphasis supplied]
The failure of the police investigators to apprise accused-appellant of his constitutional rights makes
inadmissible their testimonies that the accused-appellant admitted to the commission of the offense and
pointed to the location of the shotgun [Art. III, sec. 12, par. 3, Constitution].
With the exclusion of these alleged admission of the accused-appelant, we must look into the other
evidence taken against the accused-appellant which led to a judgment of conviction against him by the
trial court. Only if this is sufficient to convince the Court without any reasonable doubt that he
committed the offense charged can the judgment of conviction rendered against him be affirmed.
II.
The trial court took into account the following reports as clear indications that it was accused-appellant
who fired the shotgun which killed Dominador Manongdo: (1) the postmortem report, as testified to by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Leonard Carbonell, to the effect that "the cause of death of the
deceased is intracranial injuries with intracranial hemorrhage secondry to gunshot wound" [TSN,
November 5, 1987, p. 43]; (2) Chemistry Report No. C-86-1205, as testified to by Ma. Carina Javier, an
NBI Forensic Chemist, to the effect that the examination of the paraffin casts of accused-appellant
yielded positive results for specks in both hands, indicating that gunpowder nitrates were present [TSN,
December 22, 1987, pp. 53-54]; and (3) the ballistics report, as testified to by Irineo Ordiano, Jr., an NBI
Senior Ballistician, to the effect that the homemade shotgun allegedly recovered from the accused-
appellant is serviceable [TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 64].
A careful analysis of the postmortem report will show that the gunshot wound sustained by the
deceased Dominador Manongdo is indeed compatible with what could be inflicted by a shotgun.
However, such a finding assumes no significance in connection with a finding of the guilt of accused-
appellant unless the firing of the shotgun could positively be linked to him.
Neither is the ballistics report any support to the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of the
commission of the offense. All that the NBI ballistics report establishes is that the shotgun which was
submitted to it for examination is still serviceable. Although this could have been done facilely by the
crime laboratory, there was no finding as to whether or not the shotgun has just been recently fired.
Therefore, instead of bolstering the case for the prosecution, it instead raises the doubt that the tested
shotgun may not have been the same shotgun which was used to shoot at and kill the deceased
Manongdo.
The only other evidence left with which to establish the guilt of accused-appellant is the positive result
obtained from the paraffin casts taken from his hands. If this was supported by other evidence before
the Court, then the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of accused-appellant could have been
a strong indication that it was he who fired the gun which killed the deceased. However, this does not
obtain in the case at bar. Likewise of note is the plausible reason preferred by the accused-appellant that
he tested positive for gunpowder burns because he took a turn at firing at coconut fruits with an
armalite of a military man who was likewise a guest at a party given by his kumpare [TSN, April 6, 1988,
p. 7].
The absence of any eyewitness to the commission of the offense and the exclusion of the admissions
allegedly made by accused-appellant and the fruits thereof, calls into application Rule 133, section 5 of
the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 5. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
There being only one circumstance indicative of the guilt of the accused, i.e. the paraffin casts of
accused-appellant's hands yielded for gunpowder burns the above requisites are not satisfied. The case
of the prosecution definitely fails.
WHEREFORE, finding that
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial
Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon
Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car.
Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to
take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the
shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the
cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant
was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his
lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such
waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide,
filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the
bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail.
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion
itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action
on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on
the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was
in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended.
He stated that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by
Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The
Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation
and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded
its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following:
(1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of
the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and
set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme
Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of
Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was
arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not
guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on
2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged
that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him,
after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released
on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain
his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first
witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2)
petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been
established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station,
there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San
Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending
his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it
properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order
because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes
so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the
authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden),
the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the
Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal
case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second,
whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these
issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had
been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon
Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested
six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which
Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the
information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went
to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of
the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had
been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of
this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the
offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant
case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the
fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case
falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as
follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed
under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should
have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should
accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver
of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The
preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is
true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already
been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of
this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this
Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the
accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In
turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal
action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . .
. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation
and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the
Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a
copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in
effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a
preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire
of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the
Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the
(mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be
held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that
right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk
of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to
hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be
to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already
before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and
proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for
preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on
the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary
investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of
criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the
trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This
was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his
hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling
his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours
from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly
no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the
recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on
bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on
the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact
upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be
released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in
respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is
true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude
that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion
that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary
investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If
he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking .
During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of
petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and
objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic
and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During
the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated
his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his
"continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the
lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the
prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use
what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt
be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective
assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation
and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to
legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong
or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the
vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But
the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would
be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its
obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial
court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of
the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that
the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at
the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.]
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS. — Respondent judge is
correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings." [T]he hearing of an application for bail should
be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By ‘summary hearing’ [is] meant such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for the purpose of
bail. In such a hearing, the court ‘does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the
weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered is admitted.’ . . . The course of
the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence
as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN CANCELLATION OF BAIL. —
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to
cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an
application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings
since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which
the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. The
grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the
prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. In the
cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an
application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the
accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an
application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES. — The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a derivation and elaboration of the more
fundamental right to due process of law. The rule on the disqualification of judges is a mechanism for
enforcing the requirements of due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE. — "It is now beyond
dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a
judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required
primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and
more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people’s faith in the institutions they have erected when
they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" is an
imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the
courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, AND PETITION
CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. — Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion
for inhibition based on Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained
by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial
court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the
trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the
case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking in
merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE NOT PRESUMED.
— While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, the established rule is that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
the charge. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be
presumed especially if weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING HEARING OF CASE
AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION
CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE OUTSIDE METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. — In the
case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he
proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner’s Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore,
cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition
as proof of his claim that the judge is partial.
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF OVERRULING PETITIONER’S OBJECTION
TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT
TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS; REASON. — The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and
hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner’s objection
to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends
that respondent judge should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the
latter did not take the witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by
the prosecution. Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the
prosecution. This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner’s
objection to the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v.
Peñaranda, it was held that" [d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s
counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from
hearing the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." If petitioner disagrees with the judge’s
ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment
of conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection
raised by petitioner’s counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution’s evidence is not only baseless
because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because at that
stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece of evidence in
question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner’s conclusion that "the offer and admission
of Gonzaga’s hearsay ‘eyewitness’ statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength"
is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE CANCELLATION OF
BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER’S COUNSEL TO
PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS; REASON. — The other supervening event
allegedly demonstrating the judge’s partiality occurred during one of the hearings concerning the
prosecution’s motion for the cancellation of petitioner’s bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11)
witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge
considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow petitioner’s
counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1)
the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2)
the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the
defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out
by the record of the case . . . Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of
the nature of the bail proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit
the number of witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial
discretion." If the trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail
issue, after giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider
the bail proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner’s request
and allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the
respondent judge’s ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution’s motion for cancellation
of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented was not motivated by bias or
prejudice.
10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER’S ARRAIGNMENT
AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT NECESSARILY PROOF OF
PARTIALITY. — Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that
the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed
petitioner’s arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go
v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent
judge’s July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be conducted. But the
erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we held
that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the
pronouncement that" [t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on
two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge
against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact
that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case,
militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. — In the case at
hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his lawyers’ many
attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial court, petitioner
tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, but to suspend the trial of the
case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed either to
suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a particular
issue . . . Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of
respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present
petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions
docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary
restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance. The murder case
involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings
before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing of the
information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the case now
consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of one
thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted. When taken in
the light of petitioner’s repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and
his lawyers’ transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation
can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy
to stall hearings.
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS. — The Rules of
Court commands members of the bar" [t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers." Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of the Code further states:
"A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the
courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the record or having materiality to the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. — To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system
has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use
strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior
towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial
system, so necessary for the country’s stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with
various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court’s attention to the issues involved. The
language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."cralaw virtua1aw library
14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS LANGUAGE
TOWARD A JUDGE. — Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as
"unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge’s allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner’s
lawyers further stated: "Petitioner’s counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge’s
baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense. . ." The trial judge’s actions
were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." In the Urgent Motion filed by
petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (a) "generated belief of his being
under contract to do the prosecution’s bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for Supreme Court case law;"
and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and
render judgment on a man’s liberty only after a full trial of the facts.." . . In light of the above doctrines
and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar
in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the language used by petitioner’s lawyers
is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying
petitioner’s Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and June
26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305. 1 The CA Decision and Resolution
upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo’s Order dated September 4, 1991 which
denied petitioner’s Motion for Recusation; and (2) respondent judge’s Order dated September 17, 1991
denying petitioner’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge participated,
is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. After
conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified petitioner Rolito Go as the
prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On July 8, 1991, Petitioner, accompanied by two lawyers,
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station. He was arrested and booked for the shooting of
Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal.
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, 1991.
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion
praying for petitioner’s immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner’s being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.
The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12, 1991,
approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.

On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
to conduct a preliminary investigation.
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the July
12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c)
cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation; (d) treated petitioner’s omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the July
17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to
suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed before the Supreme Court. 3 This
motion was denied by respondent judge. 4
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner, the
respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused’s continued detention at the CAPCOM until
such time as the Court shall have properly determined the place where accused should be
detained."cralaw virtua1aw library
On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting that
custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal possession of
firearms involving petitioner.
On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI temporary custody of
petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his constitutional rights
during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted only during office hours and
petitioner is to be returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day; and (c) the NBI should
report to the trial court the status of the investigation.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order dated July 29,
1991 be nullified and recalled.
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full custody of
petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of firearms.
An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue concerning
the proper venue of petitioner’s detention.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
After the hearing on petitioner’s custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991
ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so that
a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued. The Commitment Order
13 ordering the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody of petitioner was issued
on August 5, 1991.
On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent judge inhibit
himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
September 4, 1991. 15
On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16
Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not Guilty"
was entered for him by the trial court. 17
In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals the
petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two
petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a
decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation; and (b) the release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial court may
issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 101837, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause to
charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor
who filed with the trial court a motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set the criminal
case for resumption of the trial on the merits.
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the Department
of Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and finally to this Court
(G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.
On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner’s Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed as G.R. No.
101772, was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the petition. As to
the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the denial of
petitioner’s motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
absent any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in support of
his motion for recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore speculations than
anything else.
In order to warrant a finding of ‘prejudicial’ publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must be allegation
and proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the "barrage" of
publicity (Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; Emphasis supplied). While there is such allegation in the
petition, the Court has however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to accept the petitioner’s claim
that the respondent judge has been unduly influenced by the alleged publicity.
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio v.
Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel v. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are
not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It ill
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a
party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed
the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No
act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what
respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had occasion
to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party ‘will not be given a fair, impartial
and just hearing’ is ‘premature.’ Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge’s
legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and to equal right to the
poor and the rich.’ To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is
concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement:cralawnad
"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in
denying petitioner’s motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4 of the
Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner’s motion
for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided by the
Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of venue was
first adopted, hence not applicable to the instant case." 19
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a petition under Rule
45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. On
September 9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the
Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a Resolution
denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in its assailed decision.
On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner reiterates
his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary mandatory
injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated December 9, 1992
denying petitioner’s Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation of bail proceedings) and to Present
Last Witness. It appears that after the presentation of eleven (11) witnesses by the prosecution and six
(6) by the defense, the trial court considered the question concerning the cancellation of petitioner’s bail
ripe for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But the
trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9, 1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In
the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on December 16, 1992, petitioner prayed "for the issuance
forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow
petitioner to complete his defense evidence by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 24
On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO)
restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner to
present his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed in another Resolution
issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26
On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration no longer
raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on what
petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on one hand,
and hostility against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only consider the
allegations and issues raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment thereon filed by the
OSG.
Petitioner’s Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of the
Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a
speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and elaboration of
the more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification of judges is a
mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute that due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play
favorites." 30
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of the litigants,
is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain
the people’s faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion
that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge
of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising
standard in the proper dispensation of justice.
While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established rule is that
mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge. 35 Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. 36 Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 37
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, Petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on the
part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency of this
petition stating that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge’s recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend
the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, in the context of his
questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a pre-determined
verdict of guilt." 38
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by the
judge before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the
official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and rules
favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed with
the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon
to account for his dereliction. Although this case was decided prior to the introduction of par. 2 of Rule
137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and applied in People v.
Moreno should not likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41
In fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure prescribed in Rule 137, sec.
2 when the trial judge denied a party’s motion for inhibition under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it is
within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed with
the trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her disqualification by the
appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, supra, at 76]. 43
Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he shall
proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The
mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will
not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such
motion or petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence
when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner’s Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot,
therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of
this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. This Court has not, in connection with the
petition, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from further hearing the
case. The TRO which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after the petition was denied and pending
this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from resolving the question on the
cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The TRO did not restrain the judge from
hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to hear petitioner’s last witness in the
cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to continue trying the case and there was no
order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge committed no impropriety evincing partiality when
he continued hearing the case during the pendency of the petition before this Court.
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court Resolution
dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating
partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand." 45
Petitioner alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary investigation,
petitioner’s arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily ordered
— which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February 1992) — the
unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra, clearly and
unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment of petitioner’s culpability." 46
The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge on
August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner’s objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo
Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have
admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to
affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected
that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner’s objection to
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Peñaranda, 47 it
was held that" [d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party’s counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case
on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the judge’s ruling, he may
still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of conviction
is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection raised by
petitioner’s counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution’s evidence is not only baseless because
there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature because at that stage, the
judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular piece of evidence in question but
was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner’s conclusion that "the offer and admission of Gonzaga’s
hearsay ‘eyewitness’ statement suggest a sinister concert to simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not
suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge’s partiality occurred during one of the
hearings concerning the prosecution’s motion for the cancellation of petitioner’s bail. On September 28,
1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two (2) for the defense,
respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for resolution and refused to allow
petitioner’s counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons given by respondent judge for his ruling
were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is summary and different from the hearing on the
merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the same number of witnesses from both the prosecution
and the defense; and (3) the counsel for petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as
borne out by the record of the case. 50
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings." [T]he hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By ‘summary hearing’
[is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court ‘does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered is admitted.’ . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable
minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing." 51
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to
cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an
application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings
since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order which
the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the bail. 52 The
grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the
prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of guilt. 53 In the
cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same issue as in an
application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the court that the
accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the hearings for an
application for bail and the cancellation of the same.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail
proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of
witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 If the trial
judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving
both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail
proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner’s request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings.
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge’s ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the
prosecution’s motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already
presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the
respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect allowed
petitioner’s arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court
nullified respondent judge’s July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In People
v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In Luciano v.
Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that" [t]he mere fact that the judge has erroneously ruled
against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a decisive pattern of
malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence in our
courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge can be remedied and was
actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias
or partiality. 59
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not only in
safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the judiciary the people’s
confidence, an element so essential in the effective administration of justice. The rule should, therefore,
not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant’s personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice. "While We are
exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for disqualification’s, We cannot, however,
tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge for their own
purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the
tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion for disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying
the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge." 60
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his
lawyers’ many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial court,
petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61 but to suspend
the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent judge all prayed
either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the disposition of a
particular issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila August 22, 1991
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
7. Motion to Suspend Action on
Formal Offer of Evidence and on
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of respondent
judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the present petition
which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as
G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining
order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance.
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated and
the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between the filing
of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the records of the
case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have reached a total of
one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being conducted.
When taken in the light of petitioner’s repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
suspended and his lawyers’ transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion
for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration
a further ploy to stall hearings.
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic
notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing jurisprudence, we reiterate
our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in affirming the respondent judge’s Order which denied petitioner’s Motion for
Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end to petitioner’s obvious attempts at deferring the
trial of his principal case by dwelling on incidental matters. The motion for reconsideration must,
perforce, be denied with finality.
In the Comment on the petitioner’s Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that Attys.
Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by this Court
for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge which betrays disrespect
to the trial court.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer
malevolence" 62 respondent judge’s allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner’s lawyers further
stated: "Petitioner’s counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge’s baseless, nay
despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge’s actions were also
branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." 64
In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have: (1)
"generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution’s bidding;" (2) "evinced contempt for
Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before he condemns,
proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man’s liberty only after a full trial of the facts." 65
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar" [t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule 11.03 of
the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer shall not attribute to
a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their
duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to
malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed,
not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the
maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country’s stability. "Time and again,
this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements,
disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure,
lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court’s attention to
The appellant, along with accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. and two others, was charged in an Amended
the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive." 67
Information[2] which reads, thus:
In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this
Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the The undersigned Fiscals accuses [sic] IGNACIO TONOG, JR. alias ABDUL TONOG,
language used by petitioner’s lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous. ALVIN ROLANDO SALAMILLO alyas [sic] ALLAN SALAMILLO, JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Attys.
Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a FINE of That on or about the 24th day of April, 1988, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines
P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and language will be dealt and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring
with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to their records. and mutually aiding one another, with the use of a motorvehicle [sic] in which they
brought said EFREN FLORES to an uninhabited place, and taking advantage of their
SO ORDERED. superior strength and with intent to kill said EFREN FLORES, and armed with a
deadly weapon, to wit: a Batangas knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 144497 and feloniously stab and wound therewith said EFREN FLORES during nighttime,
Appellee inflicting upon said EFREN FLORES the following injuries to wit:

Present: which injuries directly caused the death of said EFREN FLORES.

-versus- PUNO, J., That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of use of a
Chairman motorvehicle [sic], taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited
QUISUMBING, place and cruelty.
IGNACIO TONOG, JR., also known as ABDUL MARTINEZ,*
TONOG, JR., CALLEJO, SR., and Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[3]
ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO, also known as TINGA, JJ.
ALLAN SOLAMILLO, JOHN DOE, and PETER DOE,
Accused. Promulgated:
The accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. moved for a separate trial, because his co-accused were still at large.[4] The
June 29, 2004
ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO also known as
ALLAN SOLAMILLO, court granted the motion. The case as against the appellant was archived. After trial, the court rendered
Appellant
judgment convicting Tonog, Jr. of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion

x- - - ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
of the said decision reads:

DECISION WHEREFORE, the accused Ignacio Tonog, Jr. alias Abdul Tonog is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and the Court hereby
imposes on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim
the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.

The case filed against his co-accused Allan Solamillo and two other
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 34, unidentified individuals are hereby ordered archived, without prejudice to their
further prosecution, considering that until this time they have not yet been
Dumaguete City, finding the appellant, Alvin Rolando Solamillo alias Allan Solamillo, guilty of murder in apprehended and still remain at large.[5]

Criminal Case No. 8123.

 The ruling of the trial court was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 94533[6] on February 4, 1992, At around 7:00 p.m., Liberato and the appellant then went to Noras Store located

the dispositive portion of which reads: at Sitio Bacong. Ignacio Tonog, Jr. was also at the store. Liberato drank soft drinks, while the appellant and

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except

Tonog, Jr. drank beer. At around 7:30 p.m., the appellant requested Liberato to bring a certain Emil to the
with respect to the indemnity, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00. Costs
against accused-appellant, Ignacio Tonog, Jr.[7]
cockpit in Dumaguete City. Liberato did as he was told, and no longer collected the fare because the

More than six years later, or on April 8, 1998, the appellant was arrested in Cabato Road, passenger was a friend of the appellants. The trip from Bacong to Dumaguete and back took about forty-

Tetuan, Zamboanga City.[8] Upon motion[9] of the Assistant City Prosecutor, Criminal Case No. 8123 was five minutes.[13]

revived. The appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.[10] Trial
At around this time, Patrolman Remigio Biyok was watching a movie at the house of Charlie Yee with many
commenced as to the appellant.
others. The place was about one hundred fifty meters from Noras Store.[14] At 8:00 pm., Julian Valencia
The Case for the Prosecution[11]
approached Pat. Biyok and informed the latter that the appellant had fired a gun somewhere within the

vicinity of the store. Pat. Biyok went to the police station which was about a hundred meters away from
Thirty-eight-year-old Liberato Solamillo, Jr., the appellants first cousin, was a fish vendor in Tinago,

Noras Store, before proceeding to the place.[15] His companions, Patrolman Mendoza, Patrolman Tao and
Dumaguete City. In the year 1988, he worked as a driver of his fathers motorcab. He was also a part-time

Patrolman Tuballa had already gone ahead to investigate the matter. Pat. Biyok saw the appellant within
driver of Jun Salabante, and drove the motorcab owned by the latter, bearing sidecar number 0164. The

the vicinity of the Noras Store. He also saw Tonog, Jr., who asked to be conveyed to Tinago, Dumaguete
appellant was its regular driver.

City, to the house his brother was renting. Pat. Biyok obliged, since Tonog, Jr. also happened to be the
On April 24, 1988, Liberato started plying his route at around 6:00 a.m. and was still driving
brother of then Chief of Police Lt. Isaias Tonog.[16] Tonog, Jr. then left with Pat. Biyok on board the latters
until about 5:30 p.m. Liberatos uncle and the appellants father, Teodoro Solamillo, arrived from
Yamaha 80 motorcycle. It was about 9:30 p.m.[17]
Zamboanga and asked to be accompanied to look for his son. Liberato and Teodoro searched for the

When Liberato went back to Sitio Bacong, Dumaguete City, he saw the appellant and Tonog, Jr.
appellant using the motorcab with sidecar no. 0164, and found the appellant sleeping at the house of his

standing outside Noras Store. Divina, the store owners daughter, was also there. Three policemen were
grandmother, Felisa Solamillo. Teodoro awakened his son and the two of them conversed. Liberato was

within the vicinity. Liberator heard that one of them, either Tonog, Jr. or the appellant, had caused a
told to wait, so he stood by the motorcab and did as he was told. Thereafter, the appellant, Teodoro and

commotion by firing a gun.[18] He also saw Tonog, Jr. leave with Pat. Biyok.
Liberato boarded the motorcab and left. Teodoro alighted at the house of his father, Paulo Solamillo, in

Lawisid, Sitio Bacong. The appellant was then wearing a plain white shirt and maong pants.[12]
 Liberato then waited for a ride and saw his friend, Gorio, pass by in a motorcab. He requested

At about 9:30 p.m., Liberato and the appellant went looking for Tonog, Jr. using the motorcab Gorio to accompany him to look for the appellant in Sitio Tinago. They went around Dumaguete City, but

bearing sidecar no. 0164. They passed by Pat. Biyoks house in Banilad, Dumaguete City, which was about did not find the appellant. They then decided to go home. Along the way, they passed by the store owned

five kilometers from Sitio Bacong. Efren Flores, the son of former Philippine National Police Chief Nick by Liberatos aunt, Francisca Bueno, which was located along the national highway at Sitio Bacong, Banilad,

Flores, was then at Pat. Biyoks house, drinking beer with friends.[19] Pat. Biyok arrived from the trip to Dumaguete City. They saw the motorcab bearing sidecar no. 0164 and approached the vehicle. Liberato

Tinago, Dumaguete City, which was about five to six kilometers away[20] and saw Efren at his house. saw Tonog, Jr. inside.

Liberato and the appellant arrived and inquired on the whereabouts of Tonog, Jr. The appellant asked Pat.
Liberato then went into his aunts house. He saw the appellant buying sardines and one family-
Biyok where Tonog, Jr. had gone, and Pat. Biyok replied that he had already brought the latter
sized soft drink. He asked the appellant why he showed up only now, and the latter told him to keep quiet
to Sitio Tinago.[21]
and to let Gorio go ahead.[27] Thereafter, he saw the appellant and his other cousin, Elvis Bueno,

In the meantime, Efren Flores came near Liberato and the appellant, and said, I would like to conversing. They were about one meter away from each other.[28] Liberato then overheard the appellant

ride with you to Dumaguete. The appellant told Liberato to stay at Pat. Biyoks residence as he (the say Nakuha na gyod, Bes (Already taken Bes).[29] As the appellant uttered those words, Liberato noticed

appellant) would be the one to take Efren Flores to Dumaguete City. Stay here, the appellant told that the latters fatigue shirt had plenty of red stains. He then remembered that the appellant was wearing

Liberato.[22] The appellant promised that he would be back within five minutes.[23] Pat. Biyok saw Efren a white shirt while they were still at the store. He did not ask the appellant about the red stains, because

Flores on board the motorcab driven by the appellant.[24] The motorcab was about ten to fifteen meters the latter seemed fearful at the time. Nothing was said of the incident. It was by then past 11:00 p.m.[30]

away, and Pat. Biyok saw them as he was sitting on the porch of his house. The place was lit by a Meralco
Later, the group went back to the house of Liberatos grandfather, Paulo Solamillo. Paulo was
lamp post, about twenty to twenty-five meters away.[25]
angry at Liberato for going home so late. Tonog, Jr. and the appellant ate and conversed, while Liberato

slept. Liberato woke up at 6:00 a.m. and started plying his usual route, using the motorcab owned by Jun

Salabante.
Liberato waited in vain for the appellant to return. He watched an on-going amateur contest

and decided to leave the place about thirty minutes later.[26] At about 6:00 a.m. on April 25, 1988, the Dumaguete Police Station received reports that a

lifeless body had been found at the crossing of Cantil-e, Dumaguete City.[31]Upon receiving the report,

SPO1 Walter R. Leguarda immediately went to the place where the body was reported found and
conducted an investigation. He learned that the Flores family, who lived near the place where the body of connection with a tire he helped to recover, the appellant was promised reward money in the amount

the victim was found, spotted the motorcab bearing sidecar number 0164 within the vicinity. After learning of P5,000.00. However, Captain Flores was unable to give the money to the appellant. Captain Flores

that the vehicle belonged to Jun Salabante, SPO1 Leguarda proceeded to the latters house where he was narrated that the appellant threatened to kill him because of the incident.[34]

informed that the drivers of the vehicle were Liberato Solamillo and the appellant. SPO1 Leguarda then SPO1 Leguarda also recounted that Tonog, Jr. had a grudge on the victim, and learned of the

went to Liberatos place to investigate the matter further. Liberato told him that the appellant borrowed motive behind the killing from Tonog, Jr.s girlfriend. Efren Flores and Tonog apparently had an argument

the motorcab that day. Thus, the police operatives went toSitio Bacong to arrest Tonog, Jr., but did not while both were drunk, which led the victim to strangle the latter with his hands.

find the suspect there.

Liberato found out about the killing from some of his passengers, as he was plying his usual

Afterwards, however, Tonog, Jr. voluntarily went with the police authorities to the police route. He was then invited for questioning by the police in the afternoon of April 25, 1988. When the police

station for questioning. After the investigation, SPO1 Leguarda saw Tonog, Jr. seated on a bench, and asked him were he was the night before, he replied that he and the appellant were together.

appeared to be crying. SPO1 Leguarda approached him and asked why his pants had so many blood stains.
SPO3 Vilma Beltran testified she was on duty at the Police Station of Dumaguete City. At around
Tonog, Jr. looked surprised and asked where the station commander was. He then politely confessed to
11:00 a.m. of April 25, 1988, Sgt. Patricio brought Tonog, Jr. to the station. The suspect was made to
Police Captain Pedro Centeno that he was one of the killers of Efren Flores and that he used
remove his pants, which Sgt. Patricio handed to her. Tonog, Jr. also turned over a stainless knife. Both
a Batangas knife, which, however, he gave to the appellant.[32]
items were placed in a transparent plastic pack and labeled. The bag containing the items was then

SPO1 Leguarda also testified that he saw the appellant talking with Captain Nick Flores, the forwarded to Forensic Chemist Myrna Areola.[35]

father of the victim, near the kampanaryo at the Quezon Park, Dumaguete City, at the corner of Perdices
City Health Officer Urbano E. Diga examined the cadaver of the victim and documented the
and Colon Streets. According to Leguarda, he saw the two of them talking early in the morning, after their
following findings in his medico-legal report:
formation before reporting to their respective duties, on three or four occasions. He did not think much
1. Wound at the pre-auricular area 2 cm. from the right ear measuring 0.2 cm x
1.5 cm. non-penetrating;
about it at the time.[33] 2. Wound 3 cm. above wound no. 1 measuring 0.2 cm. x 1 cm. non-penetrating;
3. Wound at the angle of the right mandible measuring 1 cm. x 2.8 cm. x 9 c.m.;
4. Wound above wound no. 3 measuring 0.3 cm. x 1 cm. non-penetrating;
SPO1 Leguarda also recounted that he was able to talk to the late Captain Flores before the 5. Wound at the right lateral neck measuring 0.3 cm. x 1 cm. x 6.5 cm.;
6. Wound below wound no. 5 (4 cm. distance) measuring 0.5 cm. x 1 cm. x 6 cm.;
7. Wound 6 cm. below right middle portion of the clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 2
latter died. It was the first week of January, 1995. Captain Flores requested him to appear in court if ever cm. x 13.5 cm.;
8. Wound 4 cm. below medial 3rd of the right clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. x
the appellant would be arrested. He was told that the appellant was an informer or asset, and that in 13.6 cm.;
 The Case for the Appellant

9. Wound 4 cm. above the right nipple measuring 0.5 cm. x 1.4 cm. non-
penetrating;
10. Wound 2 cm. from the level of the right nipple measuring 1 cm. x 1.5 cm. The
The appellant, for his part, filed a Manifestation[42] submitting the attached Demurrer to Evidence,[43] with
direction of the wound is upward measuring 14 cm. deep.
11. Wound at the third medial portion of the left clavicle measuring 1 cm. x 3 cm. x
13.7 cm. a reservation that in the event an adverse decision would be rendered, such decision would be appealed
12. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 11 measuring 0.3 cm. x 1 cm.
13. Wound 2 cm. below wound no. 12 measuring 0.3 cm. x 1.5 cm. non-penetrating; to this Court. The appellant, through counsel, prayed that judgment be rendered acquitting him for
14. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 13 measuring 0.3 cm. x 7.5 cm.;
15. Wound 7 cm. above the left nipple measuring 1 cm. x 1.5 cm x 14.5 cm.;
16. Wound 1 cm. below wound no. 15 measuring 1 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 14.5 cm.; insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
17. Wound 1.8 cm. above and to the right of the left nipple measuring 0.5 cm. x 0.2
cm. x 2 cm. x 13.5 cm.
18. Wound just below the left nipple horizontally directed measuring 0.2 cm. x 2 The Trial Courts Ruling
cm. x 13.5 cm.;
19. Wound 2 cm. to the right of wound no. 18 measuring 0.6 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 15 cm.;
20. Wound just above the right subcostal region measuring 1.3 cm. x 4 cm. The The court thereafter rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder in its decision
wound is directed upward measuring 15 cm. deep;
21. Wound 3 cm. below the right subcostal region among (sic) nipple line measuring dated May 17, 2000, thus:
1 cm. x 2 cm. The wound is directed upward measuring 10.5 cm. deep;
22. Wound along right midaxillary line (lumbar region) measuring 1 cm. x 2 cm. x 2 WHEREFORE, accused ALVIN ROLANDO SOLAMILLO, alias ALLAN SOLAMILLO, is
cm.; hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and the court
23. Wound at the right 11th posterior rib measuring 0.8 cm. x 7.9 cm. non[- hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
]penetrating directed horizontally;
24. Wound 1.5 cm. above wound no. 23 directed obliquely 0.8 cm. x 1.5 cm.; Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim the sum
25. Wound right posterior lumbar measuring 0.5 cm. x 2 cm. directed horizontally. of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), and to pay the costs.
The wound is 15 cm. deep;
26. Wound 7 cm. above wound no. 25 measuring 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 4.5 cm.;
27. Hematoma and swelling of both lips.[36] There is no more need to pronounce judgment against co-accused Ignacio Tonog,
Jr. alias Abdul, considering the fact that in this case, he was earlier convicted by this
Court of the crime of Murder and meted the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, which
conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The doctor also testified that of the twenty-six (26) wounds inflicted on the victim, fourteen
(14) were fatal,[37] and that the weapon used by the assailant could have been a long, sharp, bladed
instrument.[38] The doctor also executed the victims certificate of death.[39] He testified that the victim was
his nephew by affinity, as his wife was the cousin of the victims father. The victim also happened to be
In line with Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the City Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Dumaguete City, is hereby directed to immediately transmit the living body of
accused Alvin Rolando Solamillo, alias Allan Solamillo, to the New Bilibid Prison at
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, where he may remain to be detained.
SO ORDERED.[44]

The Present Appeal

their neighbor in Banilad.[40]

Wilna Portugaleza, the custodian of the medical records at the Holy Child Hospital, testified
that the records of the victim Efren Flores were no longer available as of 1996. The blood type of the victim
as indicated in the certified true copy of the records of the hospital was Type O.[41]
The appellant now appeals the decision of the trial court, contending as follows:
A) THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION CONVICTING THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
 B) THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT WAS MANIFESTLY BIASED AGAINST
AND/OR HAS PREJUDGED THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED EVEN BEFORE [THE]
According to the appellant, the fact that he left Dumaguete City for Zamboanga City after the
PROSECUTION PRESENTED ITS EVIDENCE WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS;
C) THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE DURING THE
HEARING APPEARS TO BE UNETHICAL, UNPLEASANT AND UNCALLED FOR.[45] commission of the crime is not evidence of his flight. He was never in hiding in Zamboanga City. As a matter

of fact, the appellants father, Teodoro Solamillo, arrived in Dumaguete City in the afternoon of April 24,

According to the appellant, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the existence of 1988 for the purpose of fetching his son (the appellant) to help in the management and operation of their

circumstantial evidence to establish his participation in the crime. He avers that no bloodstain was found motorized tricycle transportation business in Zamboanga City. Liberato further testified that he even

in the motorcab bearing sidecar no. 0164, precisely because it was never inspected, verified, nor examined accompanied his uncle, Teodoro Solamillo, to look for the appellant that afternoon of April 24, 1988, and

by the police authorities. Furthermore, prosecution witness SPO1 Walter Leguarda testified that a certain found the latter sleeping in their grandmothers house.

Flores, the owner of the house near the place where the victim was found, told him that the said motorcab
The appellant also posits that he had no motive to kill Efren Flores, which, in this case, is
was seen that evening within the vicinity of the crime scene. However, the said Flores was not presented
relevant, considering that the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt. The motive presented by the
as a witness.
prosecution, that the appellant killed the victim because he was not given his share of the reward money

The appellant also points out that that there are inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution of P5,000, is incredible and farfetched. The prosecution witnesses failure to testify that the appellant was

witness Police Inspector Orlando Patricio, who testified that he found the knife in the morning of April 25, in fact an asset of the late Capt. Nick Flores (the victims father) when they testified in 1989 raises doubts

1988, but admitted that the knife presented in open court was not the Batangas knife recovered at the as to their veracity. Thus, such testimony was a mere afterthought on the part of the prosecution

crime scene. He also testified that he merely placed the said knife inside the tools compartment of the witnesses.

jeep, and never confronted the appellant with such knife.

In fine, the appellant questions the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses for the

The appellant also questions the trial courts reliance on the testimony of Medical Record prosecution. As such, the appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy and the guilt of

Custodian Wilna Portugaleza, as she candidly admitted in open court that she could not remember the the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

blood type of the victim as his medical records in the Holy Child Hospital in Dumaguete City were already
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, contends that the appellants guilt was
destroyed as of 1996. The appellant also points out that there is serious doubt as to whether the witness
proven beyond reasonable doubt by interlocking circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, the flight of the
Liberato Solamillo, Jr. actually heard the appellant utter the words Nakuha na gyod bes to Elvis Bueno,
appellant from Negros Oriental immediately after the incident, until he was finally arrested ten years later
considering that his testimony remained uncorroborated.
in Mindanao, is an indication of his guilt. The OSG concludes that the obtaining circumstantial evidence
against the appellant serves as sufficient basis to convict the appellant of the crime charged, as his Contrary to the appellants contention, the prosecution was able to prove his motive to commit the crime,

participation in the crime charged had already been established in Ignacio Tonog, Jr.s conviction. albeit belatedly. SPO1 Leguarda testified as follows:

Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court, when did you learn from the late Captain
Flores that accused Allan Solamillo was his informer or asset?
The Ruling of the Court
A Before [the] first week of January sir. Before he died, January 1995.
The appellants contentions are without merit.
Q Now, Captain Nick Flores is the father of Efren Flores, isnt it?
A Yes, Sir.
It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial courts findings of facts, its calibration of the collective
Q And, Efren Flores was murdered sometime in the evening of April 24, 1998, is it
testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties, as well as not?
A Yes, Sir.

its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded great weight, and even conclusive effect, unless Q And per your investigation, Allan Solamillo has something to do in (sic) the killing
of Efren Flores, isnt it?
the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance A Yes, Sir.

COURT:
which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. This is because of the unique advantage of the Lets clarify this.
Q In your investigation, was Allan Solamillo involved in the killing of the victim Efren
trial court to observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and the deportment of the witnesses as they Flores?
A Yes, Sir.

testify.[46] Upon a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes sir, because that was [what] Liberato Solamillo told me that he saw Allan
overrule the trial courts finding that the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood. Solamillo bought some sardines and pepsi cola at the store of Francisca
Buena with some blood stains on his T-shirt Sir.
The Circumstantial Evidence
Against the Appellant is ATTY. EDDING:
Sufficient to Sustain a
Conviction Q But did you not reduce in writing about (sic) this important informations (sic) that
you learned from Liberato Solamillo?
A I did not.

Q So, to your best knowledge, the late Captain Flores also knew that Allan Solamillo
The counsel for the appellant filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, which, under Section has involvement (sic) in the killing of his son Efren Flores as early as April
25, 1988?
A After his son was murdered Sir.
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, constitutes a waiver of the right to present
Q So he has knowledge already?
evidence. The case is then considered submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the A After his son was murdered Sir, he has knowledge already Sir.

prosecution. In fact, in his demurrer before the trial court, the appellant specifically prayed that judgment Q About the alleged involvement of Allan Solamillo?
A Yes, Sir.

be rendered in the case, and manifested that he was no longer presenting evidence on his behalf, on the Q And of course, even if you were not so closed (sic) with the late Captain Flores,
you were always seeing each other because you were at the same
ground that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict him. station?
A Yes, Sir.
 Q So, you would like to tell us that from 1988, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 up to sometime
January 1995 or for the period of eight (8) years, only [a] few days before
Captain Flores died, that they revealed to you that Allan Solamillo was
his former asset or informer?
A Because I was relieved in the Dumaguete Police Station Sir and was assigned in
Canlaon Sir.
24, 1988, this Allan Solamillo borrowed his motorcab. On the same date,
April 24, about twelve oclock in the evening, Liberato Solamillo told me
that he saw his motorcab parked in front of the store of Francisca Bueno
and he saw this Abdul Tonog sitting inside his motorcab while Allan
Solamillo bought some sardines and Pepsi-cola at the store of Francisca
Bueno, with some blood stains in (sic) his t-shirt.

Q The late Captain Flores told you that Allan Solamillo was his asset or informer, isnt Q So it was Liberato Solamillo that you questioned[,] and [you] identified one
it? suspect as one Mr. Ignacio Tonog, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir. A Yes.

Q And that, he also told you at one time [that] the police was able to recover lost Q And by information you identified Allan Solamillo as one of the suspects?
article[s] like [a] tire, and it was recovered because of the assistance A Yes.
provided by Allan Solamillo?
A Yes, Sir. Q Inasmuch as Allan Solamillo was supposed to be identified as one of the suspects,
did you effect an arrest against Allan Solamillo?
Q And, he also told you that Allan Solamillo was supposed to be entitled to Five A We were not able to locate Allan Solamillo.
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), a (sic) reward money, isnt it?
A Yes, Sir. Q How about Liberato Solamillo, did you not effect an arrest against him?
A We invited him for investigation.
Q And also Captain Flores told you that he failed to give the Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) to Allan Solamillo? Q You invited him?
A Yes, Sir. A Yes.[48]

Q And he also told you that he was able to make use of the Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00)?
A Yes, Sir.[47]
A comparison of the testimonies of SPO1 Leguarda taken during the trial for Tonog, Jr., and for the

appellant, reveals that there was no substantial variance between both accounts. Such consistency lends
SPO1 Leguarda could not be faulted for not having disclosed the matter earlier. The victims father, Captain
veracity to the testimony of SPO1 Leguarda, considering the ten-year interval of time between the
Nick Flores, revealed that the appellant was an asset, and threatened to kill him upon his failure to pay the
testimonies.
reward money of five thousand pesos (P5,000) only after eight years. Captain Flores was probably unsure

Liberatos account of the events on that fateful night seemed, likewise, to have been etched in his mind.
whether he would reveal such information, as it would incriminate him, having himself used the reward

His unwavering testimony, in both trials, was that the appellant took motorcab bearing sidecar no. 0164,
money intended for the appellant.

and volunteered to convey the victim to Dumaguete City. The appellant told Liberato that he would be
Furthermore, SPO1 Leguardas account of the investigation corroborates that of Liberato Solamillos version
back shortly, and instructed the latter to stay put and wait for him at the house of Pat. Biyok. His testimony
of the incident. Even during the trial of the case for Tonog, Jr., SPO1 Leguarda testified, thus:
during the trial of Tonog, Jr. was almost identical to his account during the trial for the appellant.
Q And where did you gather information that Abdul Tonog was one of the suspected
killers? From whom? ESCOREAL:
A When I asked Jun Salabante who the driver of the pedicab was, he told me that
the driver of that motorcab on that day, April 24, was Liberato Solamillo Q Upon arrival at the house of Patrolman Remegio Biyok at Banilad, Dumaguete
but the regular driver was Allan Solamillo. So I went to the house of City, Allan Solamillo asked Patrolman Biyok where Abdul was; can you
Liberato Solamillo and asked him if he was the driver of that motorcab remember what was your answer?
that day; and this Liberato Solamillo told me that in the early day of April A Patrolman Biyok answered that he conveyed Abdul Tonog to Tinago.
Q Then after that, what transpired next? Q When Allan Solamillo uttered these words, did you see Allan Solamillo?
A Efren Flores went near Allan, and Efren Flores requested that he be conveyed here A Yes.
in Dumaguete City.
Q Who were around when Allan Solamillo uttered these words Kuha na gyod vis?
Q Did Allan heed the request of Efren Flores? A The three of us, Elvis, Allan and myself.
A Allan said You stay behind Jun because I will first convey Efren Flores.[]
Q What did you notice in Allan Solamillo?
Q Who is this June (sic) whom Allan is referring to? A I noticed or observed that the t-shirt he was wearing before was no longer the
A Myself. same.

Q Why, what was the t-shirt that was worn by Allan Solamillo on that early evening?
Q Where was this Patrolman Biyok when Allan told you to stay behind? A It was a white t-shirt.
A He was at the gate of their (Biyoks) fence.
Q Was it a printed t-shirt?
Q How far was this fence of Patrolman Biyok from where you were situated? A Plain white.
A Less than one meter.
Q And on that particular place and time, what did you observe? What was the t-shirt
Q And after the request made by Efren Flores that he be conveyed to Dumaguete or what was Allan wearing during that time?
City proper, what transpired next?
A When Allan conveyed Efren Flores here in Dumaguete City, Efren remained in SEDILLO:
conversation with Patrolman Biyok at their place. It was already about
11:45 in the evening, Allan Solamillo had not returned yet. And so, Which particular time and place?
Patrolamn Biyok told me to go home.
ESCOREAL:
Q Did you heed the advice of Patrolman Remegio Biyok?
A Yes, Sir. At the time when Allan was already, when Allan and you were inside the
house of Francisca Bueno?
Q And what did you do next upon hearing the advice of Patrolman Biyok?
A We waited for a pedicab and fortunately Gorio happened to pass by, and so, I road A It was a fatigue t-shirt.
(sic) on his pedicab and made a search for Allan Solamillo.
Q What did you observe on the fatigue t-shirt of Allan Solamillo?
Q And where did you search for Allan Solamillo? A I noticed that there were many blood stains.
A Here in Tinago and at the pier.
ESCOREAL:
Q And were you able to locate Allan?
A No, Sir. Q Why did you notice that the fatigue t-shirt that was used by Allan Solamillo has
plenty of blood stains?

Q Then after you went inside the house of your aunt Francisca Bueno, what did you SEDILLO:
observe inside?
A I heard Allan said (sic): Kuha na gyod Vis. (He is already taken, vis.) We will object to that, there was still no basis of (sic) the word plenty.
The witness did not testify yet that there was plenty of blood stains.
Q To whom was he addressing that statement?
A Elvis Bueno. ESCOREAL:

Q And who is this Elvis Bueno? I will omit that word plenty, your Honor, and let the witness answer.
A My cousin, the son of Francisca Bueno.
WITNESS:
Q Was Elvis Bueno around when Allan Solamillo uttered that statement addressed
to Elvis Bueno? A Because it seemed that there were many red spots.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after that, what happened next?
Q What about this Francisca Bueno, was she also around? A Allan bought a family size coke and sardines and then we went home to Banilad,
A She was upstairs. Bacong.
Q And what happened to Abdul Tonog?
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,
A The three of us including Abdul went home together.

Q And did it not occur to your mind the whereabouts of your motorcab? all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
A No, Sir.
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
Q Did you not inquire from Allan or Abdul?
A I asked Allan but he got angry with me.
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.[52]
Q Why did you say that Allan got angry with you?
A Because I asked him why there seemed to be red spots on his t-shirt. In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to

Q How are you related to Francisca Bueno when you said she is your aunt?
A My father and Francisca Bueno are brothers (sic) and sisters (sic).[49] sustain a conviction: the victim was last seen in the company of the appellant; not long thereafter, the

victim was found dead; and, the appellant was nowhere to be found within the vicinity of the killing.[53]

The Appellants Flight From Dumaguete

Thus, the appellant failed to discredit the testimony of prosecution witness Liberato Solamillo To Zamboanga, Where He Was Arrested
Ten (10) Years Later, Is Evidence Of His
who saw him wearing blood-stained clothes. Neither did he succeed in discrediting the testimony of SPO1 Guilt For The Crime Charged

Leguarda, who saw him drive off with the victim in the motorcab bearing sidecar number 0164 owned by

Jun Salabante. In fact, even the late Elvis Bueno testified, Indeed, flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones

during the hearing of the case for Tonog, Jr., that the appellant told him thus: consciousness of guilt.[54] However, the flight of an accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would

Q Aside from that, were there other statements uttered by Allan Solamillo when be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established, for a truly innocent person would
you were conversing with each other?

A Only that he said, KUHA NA VIS, meaning it was already taken, VIS. normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.[55] Although the

Q Do you know what he mean[t] by those words. Kuha na Vis? appellants silence and refusal to testify, let alone refusal to present evidence, cannot be construed as
A I do not know.[50]

evidence of guilt, this Court has consistently held that the fact that an accused never testified in his defense

Doubtless, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for
even in the face of accusations against him goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent

which he is charged. There is, in fact, consensus that resort to the circumstantial evidence is essential since
man when accused of wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first opportune time.[56] In this case,

to insist on direct evidence would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection
the appellant has not even attempted to explain his absence, nor presented evidence to corroborate his

to the community.[51]However, for the accused to be convicted based on circumstantial evidence, the
claim that he went with his father to help in the latters tricycle business in Zamboanga. His bare claim, as

following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
against the evidence supporting his conviction, cannot be given credence by this Court.

inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce The Appellant was Correctly
Convicted Of Murder, Qualified
By Abuse Of Superior Strength
We agree with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, qualified by abuse of superior strength.[57] In this case, the appellant and Tonog, Jr.,
armed with a knife, attacked the victim, and took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense, considering that the victim sustained no less than twenty-seven (27) stab
wounds, fourteen (14) of which were fatal.
Conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.[58] The prosecution in this case, was able to show that
the appellant conspired with Ignacio Tonog, Jr. to kill the victim.
Although alleged in the Information, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be
considered against the appellant, since there is no proof that the appellant purposely sought the period
to facilitate the commission of the crime, or to prevent its discovery, or to evade capture.[59] Neither can
the aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle be appreciated, as there is, likewise, no evidence
that it facilitated the killing of the victim, whether directly or indirectly.[60] Furthermore, the fact that the
victim sustained numerous stab wounds does not necessarily mean that cruelty attended the killing. The
test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and
sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission and
inhumanely caused the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed at the victims corpse.[61]
The crime was committed in 1988, when murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, the appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, conformably to paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The appellant Alvin Rolando Solamillo
alias Allan Solamillo is found GUILTY of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In line with current jurisprudence,[62] the appellant is ORDERED to pay to
the heirs
of the victim, Efren Flores, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING
OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME;
CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of
the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the
killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law
as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO
LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because
it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is
about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was
ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against
the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be
seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no merit
in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the
fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales
stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the
victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in
the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the
act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she
overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked
their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence
indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes'
testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General correctly
pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito
Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,
which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which
crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the
appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No.
10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as
maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating
circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall
be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control
dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with
Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with
two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been
terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill
one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation
and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B.
Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries
which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in
the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness
who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill
Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito
Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan
mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of
the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing.
Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped
a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a place behind the
house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a
report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District
Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on
arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right
away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali,
proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the
three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come
out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves
were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to
be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin
Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the
two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the
absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in
violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried
marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do
not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found
the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to
bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen
and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day
after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the
rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the
most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani
A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be
frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles
found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired
and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin
Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block
on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two
co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina
Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert,
they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is
no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes'
testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling
in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA, Accused-Apellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of the
private complainant because it is essentially committed in relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is
usually only the victim who can testify of the unconsented coitus. Thus, the long standing rule is that
when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has indeed been committed. Since the participants are usually the only witnesses in crimes of this
nature and the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends on the private complainant's
testimony, it must be received with utmost caution. It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very
scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's testimony. Judges must free themselves of the
natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been sexually abused and
demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation
the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their
responsibility is to render justice according to law.1
Before Us is an appeal from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The present case involves eight (8) sets of Information for Forcible Abduction with Rape filed by private
complainant ("AAA") against appellant, Felimon Patentes.
The Prosecution’s Case
On 5 December 1998, at about 11:00 a.m., AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan, Davao City, to visit and bring
medicines to her sick grandmother. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat
next to her. It was the second time AAA met appellant; the first time was on 4 December 1998, when
appellant persistently courted her. She only knew appellant as he was a friend of her brother.
After a brief conversation, appellant suddenly showed her his bolo, covered by a red scabbard tucked in
his right side while he held a red steel pipe with Arabic markings, which he used to threaten to kill AAA
should AAA disobey him. Appellant then accompanied AAA to her grandmother’s place and returned to
Davao City proper by bus. As they walked around, appellant placed his right hand on AAA’s shoulder.
Appellant also held AAA’s right hand, which covers her mouth with a handkerchief.
Upon reaching Davao City, they rode a jeepney to Sasa and alighted at a nearby convenience store. Upon
arrival, a man gave something to appellant, which he immediately placed inside his pocket. Appellant
then brought AAA to his house in Hacienda Heights, Davao City, where his parents, sister, brother-in-law,
nephews and nieces live.
Upon entering the house, appellant dragged AAA to a room upstairs and tied her to a sewing machine.
Appellant then started to smoke something, which he also forced AAA to inhale, causing AAA to feel
light, weak and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back as appellant removed AAA’s clothes. Doffed
of his own clothes, appellant mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The following day, 6 December 1998, appellant again forced AAA to inhale the smoke from his cigarette,
causing her to feel weak and dizzy as appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA.
On 7 December 1998, appellant again had carnal knowledge of AAA using threats, force and
intimidation, causing bruises on AAA’s arms.
On 8 December 1998, while appellant was sleeping beside AAA, AAA slowly got up to escape. However,
AAA’s attempt, while feeble, woke up appellant. Appellant then punched her in the stomach, causing
AAA to lose consciousness. When AAA gained a little strength, appellant again mauled her and raped her
again.
On 9 December 1998, after AAA took a bath, appellant raped AAA while pointing a bolo to her neck.
On 10, 11 and 12 December 1998, appellant raped AAA while threatening her with bodily harm. He also
threatened to kill her family, in case she tells anyone of her ordeal.
On 13 December 1998, to free herself from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she will
marry him. Appellant agreed. Appellant’s mother accompanied AAA to the latter’s house to discuss the
marital plans with AAA’s family. Surprised by the marital plans, AAA’s mother asked for a private
moment with AAA. In their conversation, AAA confessed how appellant forcibly took her to his house on
5 December 1998 and raped her for more than a week. AAA’s mother then accompanied AAA to report
her ordeal to the police, where AAA was examined by a doctor, Dr. Samuel Cruz, the City Health Officer
of Davao City.
Dr. Cruz testified that he examined AAA. In his report, he noted the following observations about AAA:
(1) contusion on the breast caused by a kiss mark; (2) hymen was intact and can readily admit a normal-
sized erect male penis without sustaining any injury; and (3) vaginal canal was negative for spermatozoa.
Dr. Cruz also added that he cannot tell whether it was AAA’s first sexual intercourse as the vagina was
not injured but had healed lacerations.
The Accused-Appellant’s Defense
On 5 December 1998, pursuant to their previous agreement, appellant accompanied AAA to Bansalan to
visit and bring medicines to AAA’s grandmother. After going around Davao City, they went to his house
at about 7:00 p.m. Appellant then offered to bring AAA to her house but the latter refused, insisting that
she wanted to live with appellant because she was fed up with her mother, who often called her
"buntog" or prostitute.
AAA stayed in appellant’s house together with the latter’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and
nieces. AAA slept in the same room with appellant and had consented sexual intercourse. Throughout
AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and even helped in the household chores. Pursuant
to their marital plans, AAA’s grandfather went to appellant’s house on 7 December 1998. As a result,
they agreed to set the wedding date on 27 May 1999. Appellant’s mother also went to AAA’s house to
discuss the marital plans on 14 December 1998. However, AAA’s mother rejected the marriage proposal
because of appellant’s social standing.
Leonora Gerondio (Gerondio), appellant’s neighbor, testified that she first met AAA in appellant’s house
on 5 December 1998. The following day, Gerondio again saw AAA when she went to appellant’s house.
Appellant told her that he will marry AAA. Since then, Gerondio saw AAA everyday from 7 to 11
December 1998, cleaning the surroundings, doing the laundry, and walking around the vicinity. AAA even
visited her house and talked about AAA and appellant’s marital plans. In her observation, AAA and
appellant acted like a couple. Gerondio also accompanied appellant’s mother to AAA’s house to discuss
AAA and appellant’s marital plans. However, AAA’s mother rejected the marriage proposal.
Wilma Enriquez (Enriquez), a common friend of AAA and appellant, testified that between 5 to 12
December 1998, she went twice to appellant’s house upon AAA’s invitation to talk about the couple’s
marital plans.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) AAA, private complainant herself; (2)
Dr. Samuel Cruz; (3) PO1 Lennie Ronquillo; (4) private complainant’s mother; and (5) Julie Dayaday.
On the other hand, the defense presented: (1) Felimon Patentes, accused-appellant himself; (2) Leonora
Gerondio; (3) Wilma Enriquez; and (4) Francisca Patentes.
After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of Rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, Felimon
Patentes a.k.a. Arnold Patentes is hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 42,786-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
2. Criminal Case No. 42,787-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
3. Criminal Case No. 42,788-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
4. Criminal Case No. 42,789-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
5. Criminal Case No. 42,790-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
6. Criminal Case No. 42,791-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
7. Criminal Case No. 42,792-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
8. Criminal Case No. 42,793-99 - Reclusion Perpetua
The accused shall indemnify AAA Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) in each of the eight cases for a
total of Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (₱240,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision
of the trial court with modification. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED as to the conviction of appellant FELIMON PATENTES for
one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and seven (7) counts of eight (8) counts of Rape and as to
the imposition upon him of the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the eight (8) offenses. His civil
liability, however, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant FELIMON PATENTES is hereby directed to pay the following amounts:
1. ₱50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱400,000.00;
2. ₱75,000.00 each as moral damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱600,000.00; and
3. ₱25,000.00 each as temperate damages for one (1) count of Forcible Abduction with Rape
and seven (7) counts of Rape or a total of ₱200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.5
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court on the matter of credibility of the witnesses
for the prosecution. According to the appellate court, "AAA’s account of her ordeal in the hands of
appellant was straightforward, firm, candid and consistent. Notwithstanding the rigid, lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination by the defense, AAA remained steadfast in her narration of the details of her
harrowing experience. A thorough reading of the transcript shows that AAA’s testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and credibility."6
Hence, this appeal.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the
victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or
is demented.7 In the case at bar, appellant never denied having carnal knowledge of AAA. The only
matter, thus, to be resolved by this Court is whether appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her
will using threats, force or intimidation, or that AAA was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
was under 12 years of age or is demented.
Appellant argues that if AAA really was raped for more than an entire week, it is perplexing why she did
not escape, or even seek the help of the neighbors despite several opportunities to do so.8 Appellant
further alleges that AAA’s failure to escape and her helping in the household chores in appellant’s house
prove that she was not raped and that they had consensual sexual intercourse.9
About this position, the appellate court noted and reasoned that, "appellant threatened AAA with harm
in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled upon AAA
is understandable considering that appellant was always armed with a bolo and was constantly showing
it to AAA. The possibility of him making good his threat was not at all remote and the fear for her life
remained palpable."10
Behavioral psychology teaches us that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. There is no standard
form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident as the workings of the human mind
when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable.11 Nevertheless, the Court must be guided by
established principles.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is
easy, but to disprove the accusation is difficult, though the accused may be innocent; (2) inasmuch as
only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit and should not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.12 So long as the private complainant’s testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof.13
Following these legal precepts, AAA’s testimony, placed side by side with the prosecution’s evidence,
must stand the test of credibility.
1. Absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof of
injuries is not an essential element of the crime.14 And, it is also a precept that physical evidence is of the
highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. 15 In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to present any scintilla of proof to support its claim. In fact, contrary to the
prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the medical certificate
revealed no telltale sign of the prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the medical examination
was conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from appellant. As shown by the medical certificate,
AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark, to wit:16
EXTRAGENITAL PHYSICAL INJURY:
Contusion, reddish purple, breast, right side, lower-inner quadrant, 2.0x1.0 cm. xxx
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The above physical injury was noted on the body of the subject, age of which is consistent
with the alleged date of infliction.
2. That under normal conditions without subsequent complications and unless a deeper
involvement might be present but which is not clinically apparent at the time of examination,
said injury will require medical attendance of not more than seven (7) days from date of
infliction.
3. Hymen intact and its orifice, wide as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized
male organ in erection without causing hymenal injury.17
2. The time-honored test in determining the value of the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with
human knowledge, observation and common experience of man.18 Thus, whatever is repugnant to the
standards of human knowledge, observation and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside
judicial cognizance.19
As culled from the records, AAA lived with appellant’s family for eight (8) days – in the same house A: No, Sir. [Emphasis supplied]
where appellant’s parents, sister, brother-in-law, nephews and nieces also lived. AAA even called We are mindful that appellant’s bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be
appellant’s mother, "mama." As argued by the defense, "the members of the appellant’s family could corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos,
have noticed that she was being forced and raped by the accused if the accusations were really mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know the lovers.30 There is such corroboration in this
true."20 Indeed, it is incompatible with human experience to keep a sex slave for eight (8) days in a house case. To support its sweetheart theory, the defense presented appellant and AAA’s common friend,
where the abuser’s entire family, including the abuser’s minor nephews and nieces live. Enriquez, who attested to the veracity of appellant’s claim:31
When appellant and AAA arrived in the former’s house, they were greeted by appellant’s father. If AAA’s Q: When you arrived at their house did you see the complainant AAA?
account were true that appellant dragged her to a room upstairs and then tied her to a sewing machine, A: Yes, sir.
appellant’s father could have noticed and reacted to the obvious violence. To say the least, he would Q: Were you able to talk to her?
have talked to the appellant about the deed. Instead, and incredibly, appellant’s mother went to AAA’s A: Yes, sir.
house to propose marriage – contrary to the common experience. Q: Can you tell the court what was the subject of your conversation?
Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA only saw appellant on 4 December 1998, a day before the A: She told me that she and Felimon Patentes are getting married, saying where they will live and that
alleged commission of the crime, it was stipulated that AAA knew appellant as appellant was a neighbor they will go into the buy and sell business.
and friend of AAA’s brother.21 Furthermore, appellant’s mother was the midwife who assisted AAA’s Q: Did you notice AAA to be happy with Felimon Patentes?
housemaid in giving birth.22 Lastly, AAA and appellant have a common friend, Enriquez, who testified A: Yes, sir.
that she saw the two in appellant’s house, through AAA’s invitation.23 The TSN reflects the Q: And the second time you went to their place do you remember what was the subject of your
inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony:24 conversation?
Q: Do you know that his mother is a midwife? A: Regarding their plan of getting married. [Emphasis supplied]
A: No, Sir. Because she helped in the delivery of our housemaid. Appellant’s neighbor, Gerondio, corroborated the testimony:32
Q: When did your housemaid give birth? Q: Do you remember seeing the accused sometime on December 5, 1998?
A: When I went to Bansalan on December 5 I passed by the house she was about to deliver and I saw the A: Yes, sir.
mother of the accused that’s the time I came to know his mother. Q: Where did you see him?
Q: Is it not that your stepfather even went to the house where you stayed? A: In their house, he just arrived.
A: No, sir. Q: Was he alone?
Q: You will deny that? A: He is with AAA.
A: I did not see him. xxxx
xxxx Q: On the following day did you see again AAA?
Q: Is it not you said you were being locked? A: Yes, sir.
A: I was locked at the door when my father arrived. I do not know because he locked me at the room. Q: Where did you see her?
[Emphasis supplied] A: Inside their house, she was walking.
For several days that AAA had been missing, which would have caused worry and anxiety among AAA’s xxxx
family members, AAA’s father, instead of reporting the matter to police authorities, went to appellant’s Q: When was that when you saw her?
house to discuss AAA and appellant’s marital plans on 7 December 1998.25 Clearly, this is contrary to A: The next day, December 6, 1998.
human logic and experience, and inconsistent with the prosecution’s claim. xxxx
3. The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance in Q: On the succeeding days, from December 7 to 11 were you able to see AAA in the house of Felimon?
establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.26 In the case at bar, the actuations of AAA after the A: Yes, sir.
alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is contrary to normal human Q: Where did you see her?
behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abuser’s mother, and worse, to live with her abuser’s entire A: In the house of the accused, Felimon.
family in one roof for eight (8) days sans any attempt to escape. Q: What was she doing?
It goes against the grain of human experience for a woman who has been robbed of her honor and A: She was cleaning the surroundings of the house and did the laundry, and she was also going around.
chastity not to seize an opportunity to escape from the clutches of her malefactor.27 Instead of escaping Q: When you said going around or "suroy-suroy" where did she go around?
from her abuser, AAA visited appellant’s neighbor.28 Even if AAA had several opportunities to share her A: She also went to our house.
ordeal to be rescued by her friend, Wilma, AAA inexplicably failed and instead described the details of Q: Were you able to talk to her personally?
her marital plans. What is truly exceptional, however, is the testimony of AAA that she visited her A: Yes, sir.
grandmother during the period of her alleged abduction. Despite inconsistencies in her testimony as xxxx
shown in the TSN, AAA admitted the visit to her grandmother:29 Q: What did you observe from them?
Q: So you did not proceed to your grandmother’s house, where is the house of your grandmother? A: As if they are married.
A: Km. 81. Q: What were the actions that you saw in them?
Q: Near the Dulo? A: They were loving with each other.
A: A bit farther of Dulo. Q: What do you mean by loving?
Q: You rode in a jeep and the driver is your cousin? A: They are close to each other, they joke, and Felimon would place his arm on the shoulder of AAA.
A: No sir we rode (sic) pedicab going to my grandmother’s place. [Emphasis supplied]
Q: There were no people? A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a
A: We are used to ride (sic) pedicab. moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution.33 In the case
Q: So you rode a pedicab at that time? at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the
truthfulness of the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats,
force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted.34 Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a
claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not
corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to conflicting interpretations.35 While
judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim undergoes as she seeks
justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.36
The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt in
Our mind.1âwphi1In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of
appellant must be upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum
of proof to support a conviction.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, finding appellant FELIMON
PATENTES y ZAMORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Forcible Abduction with Rape, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. FELIMON PATENTES y ZAMORA is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is being detained for some other
charge.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120330. November 18, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WENCESLAO JAYSON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Accused-appellant Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City. The amended information alleged
That on or about March 16, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
possess, had in his possession and under his custody one (1) .38 caliber revolver (Paltik), with Serial
Number 91955 and four (4) live ammunitions inside the chamber of said revolver, without first securing
the necessary license to possess the same.
That the same .38 caliber revolver was used by the accused in killing Nelson Jordan on March 16, 1991.
Contrary to law.
Davao City, Philippines, July 12, 1991.
The prosecution evidence shows that in the evening of March 16, 1991, accused-appellant, then a
bouncer at the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub on Bonifacio Street, Davao City, shot one Nelson Jordan. He was
arrested after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber
revolver with serial number 91955,[1] four live bullets, and one empty shell.[2] The firearm and ammunition
were covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy
Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District
Command.[3] The mission order authorized accused-appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds
of ammunition [t]o intensify intel[ligence] coverage and was for a three-month duration (from February
8, 1991 to May 8, 1991), subject to the following restrictions:[4]
VII. The carrying of firearms is prohibited in places where people gather for political, religious,
social, educational, and recreational purposes, such as churches or chapels, carnival
grounds or fans, nightclubs, cabarets, dance halls, dancing places during fiestas and other
celebrations, bars, liquor drinking places, theaters or movies, cockpits, race tracks and the
like, except when the personnel concerned is on official mission in such places for which he
was authorized to carry firearms.
Accused-appellant was initially charged with murder[5] in an information filed on March 20, 1991
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 22,456-91 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Davao City but, after
plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.[6] In a decision dated
September 24, 1991, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[7]
On July 15, 1991, he was charged with illegal possession of firearm.[8] The information against him
was amended on October 8, 1991 in order to allege that the firearm subject of the charge had been used
in the killing of a person (Nelson Jordan) on March 16, 1991.
On June 17, 1993,[9] he was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court and sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment. The trial court found accused-appellant acted in good faith, believing that the mission order
and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals[10] increased the penalty on accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, 13 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, certified the case to
this Court for review. Both accused-appellant and plaintiff-appellee have filed supplemental briefs.
Accused-appellant maintains that he acted in the good faith belief that he was authorized to carry
the firearm by virtue of the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him by Major Francisco
Arquillano of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. He argues that the failure of the prosecution to
present as witness the government official who had certified that accused-appellant was not the holder of
a firearms license is fatal to the prosecution of this case.
I.
Although not raised as an error by the accused-appellant, it is pertinent to consider the
circumstances surrounding accused-appellants arrest and the seizure from him of the firearm in question
considering that both were made without any warrant from a court.
With respect to the arrest, SPO1 Loreto Tenebro[11] testified that at around 10:00 in the evening of
March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Reinerio Racolas were patrolling in their car, they
received a radio message from their camp directing them to proceed to the Ihaw-Ihaw on Bonifacio Street
where there had been a shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim,
Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one who had shot Jordan. They then
arrested accused-appellant. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955. The
firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering these facts, we hold that
the warrantless arrest and search were valid.
Rule 113, 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: . . . .
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found
the victim. Accused-appellant was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In
fact accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was
then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim
and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the assailant.
This Court has upheld a warrantless arrest under analogous circumstances. In People v. Tonog,
Jr.,[12] the police found the lifeless body of a person with several stab wounds. An informer pointed to the
accused as the person who had killed the victim. That afternoon, police officers arrested the accused. On
their way to the police station, a policeman noticed bloodstains on the accuseds pants which, when
examined, was found to be the same blood type O found on the fatal knife. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest and ruled that the blood-stained pants, having been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest, was admissible in evidence.
In People v. Gerente,[13] the police arrested the accused three hours after the victim had been killed.
They went to the scene of the crime where they found a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block used
by the killers in bludgeoning the victim to death. A neighbor of the accused who witnessed the killing,
pointed to him as one of the assailants. The warrantless arrest was held valid under Rule 113, 5(b).
In People v. Acol,[14] a group held up a passenger jeepney. Policemen immediately responded to the
report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. He pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they
ran in different directions. Three were caught and arrested. Each was found in possession of an unlicensed
revolver and charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused claimed that the warrantless seizure
of firearms was illegal.The Court rejected their plea and held that the search was a valid incident of a lawful
arrest.
The subsequent search of accused-appellants person and the seizure from him of the firearm was
likewise lawful. Rule 126, 12 states:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
In People v. Lua,[15] a buy-bust operation was conducted against the accused. After accused had
gone inside his house and returned with the three tea bags of marijuana and received the marked money,
the designated poseur-buyer gave the signal to his fellow police officers who closed in and arrested the
accused. In the course of the arrest, a police officer noticed something bulging at accuseds waistline, which
turned out to be an unlicensed .38 caliber paltik with two live bullets. Accused was charged with illegal
possession of firearm. The search was held to be a valid incident of a lawful arrest.
II.
We now come to the main question of accused-appellants liability for illegal possession of
firearm. There is no dispute that accused-appellant was in possession of the gun in this case. His defense
is that the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco
Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao
Metropolitan District Command.
The issuance of mission orders is governed by Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated October 16, 1986
of the then Ministry of Justice, which in pertinent part states:[16]
. . It is unlawful for any person or office to issue a mission order authorizing the carrying of firearms by
any person unless the following conditions are met:
1. That the AFP officer is authorized by the law to issue the mission order;
2. That the recipient or addressee of the mission order is also authorized by the law to have a mission
order, i.e., he must be an organic member of the command/unit of the AFP officer issuing the mission
order. If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), they must be
civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement
and are receiving regular compensation for the services they are rendering. (In this case, the agency
head or officials so designated by the law shall issue the mission order.) . . . .
As the Court of Appeals held, however, Major Arquillano, who had issued the mission order in
question, was not authorized to do the same. Neither was accused-appellant qualified to have a mission
order.
Admittedly, Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian agents of the
AFP as he was not any of the following officers mentioned in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866, 5(a), to wit:[17]
(1) The Minister of National Defense and such other Ministry officials duly designated by him;
(2) The Chief of Staff, AFP;
(3) Chief of the General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs of GHQ AFP;
(4) Commanders of the AFP Major Services including the Chiefs of their respective
General/Special/Technical and Personal Staffs;
(5) Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of AFPWSSU and major commands/units of the AFP and the Major
Services;
(6) Commanders of battalions and higher units and their equivalent in the Philippine Air Force and
Philippine Navy;
(7) Commanders of AFP intelligence units from GHQ AFP down to regional command levels;
(8) Provincial Commanders, METRODISCOM Commanders, company commanders and their equivalent in
the Philippine Air Force and Philippine Navy; and
(9) Detachment commanders in remote areas whose higher commanders are not easily available to issue
such orders.
Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him (Major
Arquillano) to exercise this function so that people would not be swarming [in Calidas] office.[18] As the
appellate court well stated, full faith and credit cannot be given to such bare assertion. Not only was there
no written delegation of authority to Major Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as
commander of the unit had authority to issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy.
Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a mission order because he was a mere reserve of
the Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly compensation. In fact he worked
as a bouncer in a nightclub, and it was as a bouncer that he used the gun seized from him.
Even assuming that the issuance to accused-appellant of the mission order was valid, it is clear that,
in carrying the firearm inside the nightclub where he was working as a bouncer, accused-appellant violated
the restrictions in the mission order. These restrictions prohibited him from carrying firearms in places
where people converge unless on official mission. Accused-appellants claim that he had been told by Major
Arquillano that he could carry the firearm anywhere in Davao City[19] was flatly denied by Major Arquillano
who testified that precisely he called accused-appellants attention to the restrictions.[20]
Nevertheless, it is argued that the prosecution failed to prove accused-appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution did not present SPO4 Welliejado S. Sim of the FAS/Explosive
NCO Davao Metropolitan District Command, who had certified that per records on file [in] this Command
Mr. Wenceslao Jayson does not exist/appear in the list of license holders as of this date. Accused-appellant
claims that the prosecution merely presented as Exhibit H the certification without calling the issuing
authority to testify so that he could be cross-examined with regard to his certification.
Objection based on this ground must be deemed waived in view of accused-appellants failure to
object to the presentation of the evidence. The certification in question was marked when the parties
entered into a stipulation of facts,[21] but accused-appellants counsel did not object. Neither did counsel
object when the certification was offered in evidence by the prosecution.[22]
In any event, accused-appellant does not claim to be the holder of a regular license but only of a
mission order and memorandum receipt. Considering the invalidity of these documents, both the Regional
Trial Court and Court of Appeals correctly held accused-appellant liable under P.D. No. 1866.
Nor can accused-appellant claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the documents issued
to him sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good
faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the offense committed is malum
prohibitum punishable by special law.[23]
III.
It remains for us to determine whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A. No. 8294,
amending P.D. No. 1866,[24] can be applied to this case on the theory that it is more favorable to accused-
appellant.[25] R.A. No. 8294, provides in pertinent part:
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
....
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis added)
Apparently, even though the penalty for illegal possession of firearm has been reduced in the new
law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to favor accused-appellant in view of the proviso in
1 that the first paragraph, providing for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has
been committed. Nor can the third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of firearm
as a mere aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the commission of a
crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The criminal case for homicide
is not before us for consideration.
Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with the ruling in People v. Quijada,[26] that
a person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder as the
case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No.
1866, 1, par. 2.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 106288-89 May 17, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger
jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious asportation, but for
possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental in
the commission of the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)
Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment (p.
23, Rollo) inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the Accused-
Appellant, p. 60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.
The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the
morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the
vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other
companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket
of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes
Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the
crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went
with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen
jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said persons. After
the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three
of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses
were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the
three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who
ganged up on the accused.
To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification
(Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm
holders.
On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them,
proferring a general denial.
Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay
City for about six months, he engaged in the business of vending "balut". During the incident in question,
he recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took his money,
"balut" and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to confess
ownership of one gun which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.
For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two months,
recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Parañaque on September 28, 1990, and that
he left Parañaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to him, the jeepney he
was then riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for no apparent
reason. When he was brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other
gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of the hold up.
The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials, observing:
As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the accused, the line of
defense they have adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms
and ammunition in question were found in their persons in the early morning of
September 29, 1989. They also denied the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado,
Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not cite any valid
reasons for the Court not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance,
the Court is constrained to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-
serving. In the face of the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
Court can only take their denials with the proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is simply
hard for the Court to believe that the accused are simple provincial who are lost in
the big city; that accused Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay City, does not know
well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South Super Highway and the Fort
Bonifacio-Nichols interchange; that he did not know the streets where he plied his
trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true when he himself admitted
that from 7:00 p.m. of September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the street
in the area and yet he never claimed he had ever lost his way.
The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on
the witness stand. He claimed that he was in the place where he was arrested
because he had just come from the residence of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the
passenger jeepney he had boarded on his way home just happened to break down
at that place. In the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much of a
coincidence, and too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In this
connection, the Court notes his testimony on cross examination that he was
unable to get in touch with his relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible
assistance and to get Genny Acol to corroborate his testimony, because the latter
had already left for the province and that none of his other relatives knew that he
had been charged in this case. But when queried how he was able to say this, he
testified that he had written to his uncle and that he received a reply letter from
him and that it was from this reply letter of his uncle that he learned that Genny
Acol had already left for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it
accomplished anything, helped convinced the Court that he is given to lying. For
sure, if he had written to his uncle and that the latter had replied to him, it is plain
that he must have informed his uncle about the case and that the latter knew
about the case and the fact that he was in jail and needed help. In any event,
established jurisprudence dictates that between the positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the denials of the accused the Court must place its
reliance on the former. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence also indicates that
greater weight must be given to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
when they are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA 906; People
vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below, thus obviating any
review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be
considered as having abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule
124, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).
With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial
court below erred:
I
. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO BOSES
TO REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS WITNESSES WHOSE
TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE THEREBY
AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
II
. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO BOSES
AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.
III
. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS "E",
"F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A SEARCH
WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND
PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.
IV
. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING THAT
EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED BY THE
ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.
(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)
But the appeal leaves much to be desired.
It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- appellant can not feign denial of due
process where he had the opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the witness
stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People, the omission of a
party to present witnesses to corroborate the principal basis for exculpation, on account of the
witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile proposition to support re-opening of the
case.
In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the
court a quoshould have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than giving
credence to the testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates that
they could not have been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it was
then still dark when the accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were apprehended. But counsel
for accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it was
not well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant) which does not entirely foreclose positive
identification of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and were thus seated within
the closed quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the prosecution that Rene Araneta's
jacket was one of the items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the felons, and that the
jacket was recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for Accused-
Appellant). To lessen the impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant, it is
argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the scene of the locus
criminis and not merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No.
80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight
from the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is equally true, we
proceeded to say, that culprits, in exceptional cases, have become bolder by returning to the scene of
the crime to feign innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the factual
findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded utmost respect since the
magistrate at the court of origin had the first hand impression of the demeanor and deportment of
witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).
With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search
falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant
prior to arrest:
When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been
robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since
accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid
(People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the
police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was
based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:
. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense,
the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicti.
Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the
lower court must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the proper
penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and
other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 123123. August 19, 1999]
EDWIN CADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal by certiorari are the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16312,
promulgated on June 30, 1995, and the subsequent Resolution[2] dated December 15, 1995, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The appellate courts decision affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-92-27261,[3] which disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Edwin Cadua guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charge (sic) against him, and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 12 years 5 months and 10 days of Reclusion Temporal as Minimum to 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum, and to pay the cost. The accused is entitled to
the benefits of the provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provided he does not
fall within the exceptions thereof.
SO ORDERED.[4]
This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms. The Information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses EDWIN CADUA Y QUINTAYO ov (sic) violation of PD
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions), committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority in law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody
one (1) .38 cal. revolver Smith and Wesson paltik, brown finished and wooden handle with four (4) live
ammunitions, without first having obtained the proper license therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law.[5]
Assisted by counsel de oficio, petitioner was arraigned in open court, waived the reading of the
Information, and entered a plea of not guilty.[6]
As culled from the records, the following factual and procedural antecedents are pertinent to this
appeal.
In the evening of January 2, 1992, between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening, PO3 Joselito Burdeos and
companions, all assigned with the Central Police District in Quezon City, were aboard mobile unit 118
patrolling the vicinity of Fairview, Quezon City. Their tour of duty was from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. While
deployed, they received a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed to Lot 10 Block 14, Alden Street,
North Fairview. Said dispatch was based on a report concerning an alleged holdup of complainants Lourdes
Bulos and her daughter Bernadette, who were in need of police assistance.[7]
At said address, police officers found both complainants who stated that the alleged holduppers
had just fled. PO3 Burdeos asked where the robbery took place. Complainants replied that they were held
up by two (2) men at the corner of Archer and Regalado Streets, near their house. The police officers also
asked in what direction the alleged holduppers fled and what they were wearing. Then, the police officers
requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for the two (2)
men.[8] As they were patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police officers that one of the
suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants. The
police officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and as the officers slowed down the
mobile unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of
which is the petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle,
and called out to the suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner Cadua
was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his
firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38
caliber paltik revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Caduas companion, who was later
identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilars possession was found a fan knife.[9]
Verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit revealed that petitioner-accused Edwin Cadua is
not a valid license holder of a .38 caliber paltik revolver.[10]
Originally, Chief Inspector Herminigildo Faustino referred to the City Prosecutors Office for
investigation the cases of Robbery, Violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and Violation of
PD 5121 (Concealment of a Deadly Weapon).[11] However, Assistant City Prosecutor Edgaro Paragua by
resolution dated January 6, 1992, found only the case for Illegal Possession of Firearms warranting the
filing of an Information. According to Prosecutor Paragua, during the investigation for robbery,
complainants manifested their doubts as to the identity of the respondents, hence he set this matter for
further investigation. As to the charge for Violation of City Ordinance 5121 against Aguilar, for
concealment of a deadly weapon, it was found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the filing of
an Information against him. But, considering that said violation falls under the Rules of Summary
Procedure, it could not be included in the Information[12] for alleged possession of firearms, which
concerned only herein petitioner. On the same day that this Resolution by Prosecutor Paragua was
released, the Information against petitioner was filed.[13]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued, resulting in his
conviction.[14]
Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause and that the
police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent search was
therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in
evidence. Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of prosecution witness Joselito Burdeos,
that the .38 paltik revolver was found in petitioners possession, already proved one of the essential
elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms.[15] The CA further held that:
. . . As between the positive declaration of prosecution eyewitness and only the negative assertion of
accused-appellant, the former deserves more credence and is entitled to greater evidentiary
weight. (People vs. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368) Besides, courts generally give full faith and credence to
testimony of police officers as they are presumed to have acted in the performance of official duty in a
regular manner.(People vs. Cabisada, 226 SCRA 383) Moreover, accused-appellant has not imputed any
ill motive on the said prosecution witnesses as to why they would testify against him, except to tell the
truth. (People vs. Lizada, 225 SCRA 708)[16]
Petitioner now comes before us on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assigning the
following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION AND NOT REVERSING THE SAME.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PALTIK WAS RECOVERED IN AN INCIDENTAL
SEARCH DURING A WARRANTLESS ARREST MADE BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, HENCE ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WHEN IT IS
CLEAR THAT THE APPREHENSION OF THE ACCUSED WAS ILLEGAL AND THAT THE FILING OF THE CHARGES
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IS BUT AN AFTERTHOUGHT SINCE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
ADMITTED THAT THE ACCUSED CADUA WAS NOT THE HOLDUPPER.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.[17]
Discussion of petitioners assignment of errors may first be subsumed into one principal
inquiry: whether or not his right to be protected from any unlawful warrantless arrest has been
violated. According to petitioner, since his arrest is null and void, the search conducted by the police
officers as an incident to his arrest is likewise defective. In support of his claim, petitioner seeks to invoke
his constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,[18] and the corresponding
prohibition against admitting into evidence anything obtained in violation of such right.[19]
Petitioner further claims that the police officers incorrectly premised their action on the instances
provided for in warrantless arrests. He adds that since the complainants later on disclaimed petitioners
identity as the holdupper and that no case of robbery was filed against him, any probable cause or personal
knowledge thereof, alleged by the arresting officers, had been totally negated. Thus, petitioner now posits
that, absent probable cause or personal knowledge by the arresting officers, the arrest and the incidental
search are illegal; hence, the paltik they seized is inadmissible in evidence.[20] According to petitioner,
despite lack of probable cause, he was still arrested because [k]nowing that the police officers committed
a blunder they concocted a story that they were able to recover a paltik from the accused, so that even if
the accused is freed from the robbery charge they can still keep him for alleged possession of firearms.[21]
When police officers realized that they caught the wrong persons, they would not [have] to (sic) go
home empty handed,[22] petitioner asserts. In order to bolster his claim of innocence, he cites findings on
record which showed that he was negative for powder burns, although the paltik at the time of its
confiscation was positive for gun powder residue.[23]
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintain that the search was an
incident to a lawful arrest. Ergo, they assert that the .38 paltik revolver recovered from petitioner is
admissible in evidence. They add that petitioners denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of PO3
Burdeos. The finding that petitioner was negative for powder burns is immaterial, according to
respondents.
Both the trial and appellate courts, according to respondents, found that at the time that petitioner
was arrested, the police officers had probable cause to arrest him based on the information which was
given by the complainants. Petitioner Cadua and his companion, Aguilar, were positively identified by both
complainants (mother and daughter) as the perpetrators of the robbery even before the police officers
alighted from the car to approach petitioner and his companion, according to respondents. When the
police officers effected the arrest, they already had probable cause and personal knowledge that
petitioner was a suspect in an offense just committed. As a logical consequence, according to respondents,
the search incidental to the arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered admissible in evidence.[24]
According to the Solicitor General, apart from the warrantless arrest covered under Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, wherein an offense has just been committed and the arresting person has
personal knowledge of such offense, warrantless arrest is also provided for under paragraph (a) of the
aforementioned section, that is, when in the presence of the arresting officer, the person is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense.
In this case, at the time petitioner was called by PO3 Burdeos, petitioner was actually committing
an offense when he made an attempt to pull the revolver which was tucked in his waist, according to the
respondents. Taking this circumstance into account, they add, the search and seizure are valid and lawful
for being incidental to the warrantless arrest.[25]
Petitioners denial regarding possession of the .38 paltik revolver has no independent support nor
corroboration, according to respondents. On this matter, the Solicitor General comments as follows:
... PO3 Burdeos clearly testified that he saw the .38 paltik revolver in the possession of petitioner when
he arrested the latter. Thus, petitioners defense of denial, which is uncorroborated and self-serving
negative evidence, cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of PO3 Burdeos who testified on
affirmative matters (People vs. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535). Moreover, no proof was shown that the
arresting officers had improper or ill motive to testify falsely against petitioner. Accordingly, PO3
Burdeos testimony should be given full faith and credit (People vs. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414). Besides, as
an arresting officer who is duty-bound to enforce the law, PO3 Burdeos is presumed to have regularly
performed his official duty (Section 3 [m], Rule 131 of the Rules of Court; People vs. Basilgo, 235 SCRA
191; People vs. Pacleb, 217 SCRA 92).[26]
Lastly, respondents refute petitioners arguments that the negative findings of gun powder residue
should be taken to mean that he did not have possession of the gun. Whether or not petitioner fired the
gun is not pertinent to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, respondents argue. It does not follow
that just because a person is found negative for powder burns, he did not fire a gun, they add. They also
cite the findings that even if one has just fired a gun, he may be negative for nitrates.[27]
From a careful study of the records of this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings by
the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Petitioners declaration that the police officers trumped
up a charge of illegal possession just so that they would not go home empty-handed is far from
persuasive. Findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution and the
lone testimony of the defense deserve, in our view, great weight. Jurisprudence has consistently held that,
in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case, its findings
on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[28] Furthermore, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty[29] strengthens
the foregoing doctrine on the credibility of witnesses. The uncorroborated claim of the accused that he
had been framed[30] is, to our mind, self-serving as well as baseless.
Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that there was sufficient reason to justify a
warrantless arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, provides that:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the pertinence of paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5 abovecited. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the
presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting
officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As explained by a
respected authority on criminal procedure:
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts, in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may
pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any
crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is
another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later
found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest and
detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground
to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would
be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to
mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the
streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and
crime.Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer must
not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the
necessities of life.[31]
Petitioner could not dispute that there was an initial report to the police concerning the robbery. A
radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the
authenticity of the radio message. When they reached said place, they met up with the complainants who
initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers invitation, both mother and daughter boarded
the mobile unit to join them in conducting a search of the nearby area. The accused was spotted in the
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the
offense just committed.
Moreover, at that time that PO3 Burdeos called out to petitioner, the latter was on the act of
drawing out his paltik revolver. Burdeos testimony on this matter reads:
WITNESS:
We alighted and approached and we noticed that there is something the accused is trying to hide and
also trying to pull out.
FISCAL:
Was he able to pull that something?
WITNESS:
No.
FISCAL:
And, what was that?
WITNESS:
The .38 paltik.
FISCAL:
When you saw [that] what did you do . . . when you saw the accused pulling out that .38 paltik?
WITNESS:
I pointed [at] him my gun [then] shouted dont move or Ill shoot! [32]
Nothing in petitioners testimony successfully rebuts Burdeos narration. Actual possession of an
unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense
in the presence of the arresting officer contemplated in paragraph (a), Section 5 of the abovementioned
Rule.
The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does not mean that the legality of the
arrest was tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the indubitable existence of the crime.[33] It is
not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as
legal. The legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission of the crime
but upon the nature of the deed, where from such characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of
suspending the liberty of the citizen.[34] Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that police authorities can
stop a person forcibly when such action is based on something more than a mere reasonable and
articulable suspicion that such a person has been engaged in criminal activity.[35] All told, the arresting
officers reasonably acted upon personal knowledge at the time, and not on unreliable hearsay
information,[36] to effect a lawful arrest.
That the victims of the reported robbery failed to pursue a formal complaint is not decisive in this
case. What is material is that the officers acted in response to the events which had just transpired and
called for the appropriate police response. As to the element of personal knowledge, the officers could
not be faulted. It is not correct to say they acted without observing standards of reasonableness and
probable cause. They responded promptly to a legitimate complaint of the victims and they had a
reasonable suspicion that the persons pointed out at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. This
in itself is sufficient justification for the officers to call the attention of the accused at that point in time
when he was identified as a suspect by the complainants.
The reason which prompted complainants to refrain from identifying the accused during the
examination by the police regarding the robbery is not determinative of the resolution of the present
case. It bears stressing that the case now before us is for the illegal possession of firearms, and not for the
robbery. Petitioner proceeds from a wrong premise when, in support of his assigned errors, he argues that
the arrest and the search should be considered invalid merely because the robbery charge was never
formally filed and prosecuted. In Rabaja vs. Court of Appeals,[37] a Department of Environment and Natural
Resources employee, Rabaja, was charged with and convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearms even
though the private complainant whom he threatened eventually dropped the charges against him. The
charge for illegal possession was pursued by the authorities.
Petitioner avers that complainants admitted that accused was not the holdupper.[38] A perusal of
the records shows no such admission. The resolution, issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Paragua in the
robbery case, stated that no information could yet be filed because complainants manifested doubts as to
the identity of their assailants.[39] The resolution should not be taken to mean an admission that petitioner
Cadua had been totally ruled out as a suspect in the crime. If petitioner wanted to impress the Court that
even on probable cause he could not be accosted, then that impression is inaccurate and wrong. On cross-
examination, petitioner himself did not object to the question but admitted the fact that the complaint
was withdrawn, but not for the reason that he was ruled out as the person who committed the offense.[40]
Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to affirm the finding below that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner is lawful. We also agree that the incidental search and subsequent seizure
of the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is actually being
committed, or soon after its commission. The right to search includes in these instances that of searching
the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means for its commission.[41]
 When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the paltik was found in his
possession, and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that
moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion
that petitioner was armed. Petitioners movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon tucked at
the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his service revolver was an
instinctive response to petitioners actions which, under the circumstances, indicated a high probability of
an offensive attack with a lethal weapon.
Petitioners counsel mistakenly relies on the case of People vs. Aminnudin.[42] In said case,
Aminnudin was acquitted on the charge of illegally transporting marijuana because the Court found that
the search could not be considered an incident to a lawful arrest considering that the circumstances did
not come under the exceptions provided for by applicable law and the Rules of Court. It was therein held
that the warrantless arrest and the subsequent search were illegal, hence the evidence thereby obtained
was inadmissible. However, Aminnudin differs radically from the case now before us. In Aminnudin, [i]t is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. And from the information they had received they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed to justify the issuance of a warrant.[43]
A situation involving a surveillance mission like that of Aminnudin could not compare to that of an
unexpected crime of holdup-robbery. Police behavior in the latter case would necessitate a different
course of action as well as different rules of engagement, compared to the former. In the case now before
us, there is no supervening event, much less considerable amount of time between reaching the scene of
the crime and the actual apprehension of the suspect.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, to the arrest, or question
concerning the defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
plea.[44]The records in this case shows no such objection to the arrest, nor any question as to the
irregularity of his arrest, raised by petitioner.
Petitioners arrest having been found valid and the seizure of the firearms lawful, we now focus on
the second issue for resolution, whether or not petitioner is liable for the offense of illegal possession of
firearms?
Here two elements must be proved: (a) positively, the existence of the subject firearm, and (b)
negatively, the fact that the accused did not have a license or permit to possess the same.[45] We find both
elements present in this case.
First, testimony of witnesses on record affirms that the paltik revolver was taken from the person
of petitioner at the time he was arrested. Further SPO1 Cesar Gabitan, of the Firearms and Explosive Unit,
testified without contradiction that petitioner had no license or permit to possess the gun. [46] This Court
has ruled in several cases that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
Philippine National Police- Firearms and Explosives Office (PNP-FEO) attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm suffices to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession
of firearms.[47]
Petitioners claim that since he was found negative for gun powder burns, he should be held
innocent and acquitted of the charge, considering that the paltik at the time of its confiscation was positive
for gun powder residue, does not quite add up logically. The appellate courts holding on the matter
deflates petitioners defense:
Neither do [w]e find accused-appellants assertion that he was negative for gun powder burns to be
relevant in this case. Whether or not accused-appellant fired the gun in question does not erase his
offense of illegally possessing the said gun. Besides, being negative of gunpowder burns does not
necessarily mean that accused-appellant has not fired the gun. . . .
xxx
As stated by the trial court:
On questioning by the Court, witness cited several factors wherein a person who has fired his firearm but
was negative for nitrates; the type of caliber of the ammunition of the firearm itself; a new firearm or
revolver type would be so close that nitrates could not escape from the bridge of the gun, whereas an
old firearm where the mechanism is already a little bit loose, more nitrates appear on the subject who
fired the gun; the direction of the wind if the subject is firing the firearm against the target, the nitrates
will be blown away from the scene and so he would also be negative of nitrates; depending on the
velocity of the wind, humidity of the area where the shooting happened; in a closed room or place and
[where] there is no wind on or against the firearm, he could be positive for nitrates; whereas outside the
room he would be negative and the less humid area the less fall of nitrates on the subject, and another
possibility is if the subject is using something to cover his hand firing the gun it would be negative for
nitrates and in using a .45 caliber gun, which has a close and tight compartment where the bullet is set
and with the revolver type firearm which has an open chamber, the former has a greater possibility that
he would be negative for nitrates.[48]
The penalty imposed upon petitioner, however, deserves a review. At the time that he was
convicted, the penalty for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree 1866 was reclusion
temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
imposed on petitioner the penalty of 12 years, 5 months and 10 days of reclusion temporal as minimum
to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[49] In view of the enactment of
Republic Act 8294 on June 6, 1997, certain provisions of P.D. 1866 have been amended. With the passage
of the aforementioned law, the penalty for simple illegal possession of a low-powered firearm, such as
paltik, has been reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period[50] and a fine of not less than fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00). Therefore following R.A. 8294, the penalty imposed on petitioner should
now be lowered to benefit the petitioner. For the penalty provided for simple illegal possession in the
amendment is lower than that provided for under the old law. Since the provision of R.A. 8294 is favorable
to petitioner, it should have a retroactive effect, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code.[51] Moreover, in conjunction with the new law, we should also apply the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Martin Simon[52] in relation to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[53] Although Illegal
Possession of Firearms is considered a special law, the penalty provided is taken from the range of
penalties in the Revised Penal Code, thus, in relation to Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is
covered by the first clause of said section. Here applicable by analogy and extension is the holding
in Simon:
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the
Revised Penal Code, states that if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the
penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in
the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the offense is punished under that
law. (Emphasis Supplied)[54]
Finally, consistent with the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open
for review, we find that the appellate court may, in applying the new or amended law, additionally impose
a fine which if unpaid will subject the convict to subsidiary imprisonment, pursuant to Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code.[55] Thus, here we find the imposition of a fine also in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional medium as
minimum, to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days of prision correccional maximum as maximum, there being
no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus a fine of P15,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
should petitioner fail to pay. However, since petitioner has already served more than seven (7) years, (5)
months in prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal penalty imposed at present for his offense,
even if a subsidiary penalty for unpaid fine is included, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless
he is being held for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.