“What role does the UNHCR play in the management of refugee flows through Indonesia to

Australia, and how successful has the organisation been? Discuss with
reference to IO theory”.

Traditionally, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has played a
pivotal role in the management of refugee flows through Indonesia to Australia. In more
recent times, however, this role has become increasingly less pronounced, to the point that
now they effectively have no power in this situation. This comes as a result of the Australian
Government tightening their border and immigration policies. Now, those refugees who had
largely planned on Indonesia being a mid-way point before moving on to generally Australia,
either by boat or more official channels, are forced to wait until another receiver country
accepts them. Through the processes of the UNHCR, and the increasing recalcitrance of the
Australian Government some of the most significant weaknesses of IOs become evident,
falling in line with the theories of neoliberal institutionalism. As such, it becomes evident that
while the UNHCR has conventionally played an important role in the management of refugee
flow through Indonesia to Australia, the bureaucracy within the IO and the inherent weakness
of IOs in general have meant that in more recent times the UNHCR has struggled to achieve
much on the spectrum that might be defined as success.

Over the course of this essay, a refugee shall be understood to be a person, as defined by the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(who) owing to (a) well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country.
With this understanding of what the UNHCR classifies as refugees, we begin to see how the
organisation works to manage the flow of refugees globally, and not just within this case
study.

The UNHCR is the branch of the UN that works towards the protection and assistance of
those seeking asylum as a refugee within the international arena. This is outlined within the
IOs statute as
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, acting under the authority of
the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international
protection, under the auspices of the United nations, to refugees who fall within the
scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problems of
refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments
concerned, private organisations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such
refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities (UNHCR 2010: 6).
In addition to, and in coordination with, the mandate the UNHCR utilizes international
instruments, in particular the UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
supplementary 1967 Protocol that provide the IO with a basis for their power. These two
instruments are the most significant of those utilized by the UNHCR as they provide the
cornerstones within which the UNHCR can go about working on their mandate of protection.
It is important to understand the mandate of the UNHCR, and the instruments within which
they work, as it is with this base knowledge that we come to comprehend what it is the
UNHCR does, and with it we begin to see the initial elements of just some of the issues that
the UNHCR faces in attempting to manage the flow of refugees through Indonesia to
Australia.
The biggest factor that influences the flow of refugees to Australia from Indonesia via the
UNHCR revolves around the power given to the International Organisation by states, as
expected within a neoliberal institutionalist framework. When a refugee receives their
‘refugee status determination’ (RSD), one of the next steps is to be recommended to a
receiver state, who then have the option to accept or deny the referral. In this way, states are
the actors with the final say, and thus the power. This reality aligns with the neoliberal
institutionalist argument that states are the central actors within the international system and
as such IOs have as much power as states allow them to have (Keohane 1989: 1-2). This
extends further with the understanding that the UNHCR acts on behalf of the international
community, putting it in a relatively unique position. The UNHCR effectively “exercises…
quasi diplomatic and consular protection” for those seeking refugee status, working to ensure
that “governments take the necessary action to protect refugees within their territory or
seeking to enter their territory” (Turk 2010: 163), and it is when governments fail or a
reluctant to act that the role of the UNHCR becomes more prominent. Or at least, as much as
the state might allow it too. As shall be seen in greater detail later, this is particularly evident
in the example of the relationship between the UNHCR, Indonesia, Australia, and the flow of
refugees.

When all goes to plan, one of the major elements to the UNHCR’s control of refugee flows
through Indonesia to Australia is predicated upon their RSD process for potential refugees
who apply for protection, however the sheer number of people applying for RSD is
impossible for the organisation to keep up with. While only the first step in the procedure, the
RSD works to ascertain the validity of individuals claims to be a refugee, and can be
implemented by either governments or the UNHCR, which is particularly common within
Asia. Largely, this comes back to there being very few governments within the region that are
party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocols, and as a result refugees have no choice
but to approach the UNHCR for RSD (Alexander 1999: 251). In years past the RSD system,
while full of bureaucratic delay, was regarded as relatively successful. The UNHCR system
though, is under incredible stress and faces an extremely difficult future.

While the RSD system used to be relatively effective, in recent years the sheer number of
refugees around the world is causing major issues for the UNHCR’s work. In 2013 alone, the
UNHCR registered 203, 200 individual asylum applications around the world, almost a 100%
rise from the year before. This in turn led to a significant increase in the backlog of
applications, as it rose to a new high of 252, 800 applications pending decisions (UNHCR
2016). In 2014, the UNHCR submitted 103, 890 refugee files for consideration to
resettlement countries, and managed to resettle over 73,000 of those (UNHCR 2016). These
numbers are, unsurprisingly, unsustainable, and when the number of refugees is ever
increasing (there are now over 60 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, comfortably
the highest since World War II), the UNHCR finds itself in a difficult situation where it is
evident that they simply do not have the resources to keep up with these numbers.

When it comes to this particular case study, the UNHCR has ultimately had limited impact
upon the flow of refugees in recent times, through little to no fault of their own or
Indonesia’s. In this instance, the blame lies squarely on the shoulders of the Australian state.
Following announcements in 2013 that anyone arriving ‘illegally’ in Australia by boat would
be transported to offshore detention facilities, and in 2014 that any refugee who had arrived
in Indonesia after June 2014 would not be accepted into Australia, and accompanied by the
ratcheting up of anti-refugee sentiment within ongoing policies (such as ‘Operation
Sovereign Borders’ and the ongoing offshore detention regime), the Australian Government
has taken repeatedly smaller numbers of refugees and asylum seekers over time. In the face
of such a recalcitrant actor, the UNHCR is relatively powerless to act. This is despite
Australia having signed on to the 1951 Declaration, and the 1967 Protocol, which in theory
provided some kind of international obligation that Australia was supposed to abide by. This
violation of Australia’s signatory obligations speaks to one of the wider issues that IOs across
the board, and not just the UNHCR, face. International organisations tend to have extremely
limited capabilities to enforce any particular course of action should a state decide that it is
not within their interests to do so, further echoing the centrality of states within the
international system and how the power of IOs is provided to them only by the states.

Another element that restricts the work of the UNHCR is that of the 1951 Refugee
Convention itself, thus further impinging upon the organisations power. In a world that
appears to believe largely that the “convention-based asylum system” is ‘broke,’ there are
plenty of criticisms to be found of the convention and the UNHCR (Millbank 2001).
Ultimately though, the refugee convention and the supplementary protocol were written in,
and for, a different time. With the world facing the greatest number of displaced people
around the globe since the Second World War, the Convention was in no way designed for an
issue of this magnitude. Another issue that they face is where the people are Considering
many of these criticisms began to strengthen prior to the Invasion of Afghanistan following
the September 11 attacks in 2001, it is little wonder that the criticisms are not diminishing. Commented [angus107@1]: Not sure if it’s worth detailing
the criticisms in more detail, or simply saying ‘as discuss by
Millbank’
It must also be observed that the lack of refugee flow through Indonesia, not just to Australia http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_
but in general, can be blamed at least partially upon the UNHCR and Indonesia’s position as Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0001/01RP
a non-signatory to the 1951 Convention. Over the past seven years, the number of ‘illegal 05#conclusion
immigrants’ has increased more than fivefold. As of January 2016 there were 13,679 refugees
registered with the UNHCR in Indonesia. Criticisms of the work of the UNHCR in Indonesia
include asylum seekers having difficulty gaining access to the UNHCR, RSDs that failed to
meet minimum standards of procedural fairness, and delays throughout the determination
process. These criticisms have led to an increased risk of asylum seeker protection claims
being rejected wrongly, or remaining unidentified (Taylor 2012). Indonesia’s position means
that refugees are unable to resettle within the country, thus requiring other states to receive
refugees from them.
Refugee status determination in Indonesia is undertaken by UNHCR. Our research
found asylum seekers experienced difficulty in accessing UNHCR, delays all the way
through the determination process, and refugee status determination which fell short
of minimum standards of procedural fairness. All this gave rise to the risk of
protection claims remaining unidentified or being wrongly rejected. – turn this quote
into the para
/use these two articles - http://theconversation.com/asylum-seekers-in-indonesia-
why-do-they-get-on-boats-8334 - http://www.smh.com.au/world/indonesia-
appeals-to-australia-to-accept-more-refugees-20160314-gnimon.html

In the face of these issues, the UNHCR has limited courses of action. Primarily, all they can
do in this situation is to continue to refer refugees to the Australian government and make
public statements that decry Australia’s policies and request that they do more. They can
continue to attempt to provide protection to those stuck in limbo, waiting to get out of
Indonesia and
"We understand the discretion of every country to develop its own resettlement policies but
given the state of the world we live in it is very important for countries to be taking a broader,
more inclusive approach that shares the responsibility of what is happening in the world
today," (Vargas in Topsfield 2016)

The increasing apathy, and more often deterrence, by states globally, rather than just
Australia, is putting the UNHCR in an unenviable position. The current refugee regime
internationally consists of the “UNHCR, individual refugees, host states, donor states and
source states [perceiving] their interests in divergent ways and [pursuing] them in different
forums, via different interpretations of international law” which presents significant issues to
overcome (Luxford 2014). On top of this, the UNHCR has been criticized in the past for
applying its extended mandate by states who viewed the organisations actions as attempting
to undercut the sovereign rights of states (Zieck 2010: 14-15).

Ultimately though, the UNHCR is in a relatively impossible position. They face a recalcitrant
Australian government, who wants little to do with the international organisations work on
Indonesia, an international refugee crisis of epic proportions, and having to work within the
limitations that come inherent as an international organisation as outlined within neoliberal
institutional theory. When they only have as much power as ceded to them, and can only
work with the resources provided, by states it is little wonder that

Bibliography

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010. Statute of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Communications and Public Information Service,
Geneva

Keohane, International Institutions and State Power chapter 1

UNHCR website
Refugee convention

Turk, V. Strengthening accountability in UNHCR

http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/losing-control-unhcr-and-australias-contestation-of-
the-international-refugee-regime/

http://jn8sf5hk5v.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
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rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Refugee+status+determination+conducted+by+UNHCR&rft.jtitle
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a+Problem&rft.au=Zieck%2C+Marjoleine&rft.series=VOR+Rechtsgeleerdheid%2C+363&rf
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This was the recommended outline by lecturer… Not sure how accurately I get that/whether
what I’m doing works better
The UNHCR has a range of powers and (I assume) states have some
obligations with regard to its work. You can use NLI to characterise these
powers, and perhaps describe what is supposed to happen in the context of
refugee flows through Indonesia to Australia. You would then describe what
has (and has not happened), and ask why - is it a violation of
Australia’s obligations and a failure of enforcement, or is it a
cooperation problem that is just too hard to solve? What has the UNHCR
done to try to shape the outcome (even if they’ve failed), and how did the
two states respond? What does this case say about when (and when not) this
particular institution will be effective? In other words, what are the
characteristics of this situation which have caused its failure?

(I.e. You could jump straight in by going directly

to what specific tools the UNHCR has in this situation, where they come
from, and whether they’re working).