1.

Modularity in generative grammar

Chomsky’s mental process of speaking -

SYNTACTINESS?>
The principles of constructing sentences (PSRs) in relation
with vocabulary (LEXICON) is a base for the DEEP

SURFACE STRUCTURE >

STRUCTURE, from which we can deduce the meaning
(SEMANTIC COMPONENT) and later for the SURFACE

DEEP STUCTURE >

PSRs
STRUCTURE, where we will find recipes for how to construct
sounds and vibrations for a particular structure

BASE
(PHONOLOGICAL COMPONENT). It describes what we know LEXICON
about language, where grammar is a finite set of rules
(PSRs), which generates an infinite number of sentences.
Generative Grammar is syntactically oriented, where groups semantic components phonological components

of sentences are categorized into nouns, verbs, adjectives

and etc … as a basis to conduct a scientific research. A way of portraying such theoretical assumptions of
generative grammar, a linear string of words was replaced with hierarchal trees, which construction is based on
PSRs and the lexicon. Cognitive linguists deny that the mind has any module for language-acquisition that is
unique and autonomous. This stands in contrast to the stance adopted by Noam Chomsky and others in the field
of generative grammar. Although cognitive linguists do not necessarily deny that part of the human linguistic
ability is innate, they deny that it is separate from the rest of cognition. They thus reject a body of opinion in
cognitive science suggesting that there is evidence for the modularity of language. Departing from the tradition
of truth-conditional semantics, cognitive linguists view meaning in terms of conceptualization. Instead of viewing
meaning in terms of models of the world, they view it in terms of mental spaces.

2. Imagery in Cognitive Grammar

Our embodiment (uosobienie) is directly responsible for structuring concepts.

As Johnson argues, embodied experience gives rise to image schemas within
the conceptual system. Image schemas derive from sensory and perceptual
experience as we interact with and move about in the world. For example, given
that humans walk upright, and because we have a head at the top of our bodies
and feet at the bottom gives rise to an image schema: the UP-DOWN schema,
according to our experience. What is more, image schemas are emergent
because of experience which is a function of our bodies and of our interaction
in the world (develops in childhood), so it is not innate. In language, imagery is
a way of portraying (construing) reality in ultimate ways, so we end up with the
following:

 Level of specificity – Language expressions has different levels of specificity, which reveals how we portray
reality, by using particular level of particular notions, like it is much more common to say: I saw a snake!;
rather than I saw a siteslider, or She has a long hair, instead of She has a six ½ feet long hair, because we
tend to be as specific as it is necessary in a particular moment.
 Background assumptions and expectorations – meaning is dependent on our sensory experiences and
expectations, like saying that the glass is half full or half empty. It is associated with a particular person’s
expectations, whether he is an optimist or a pessimist person.
 Secondary activation – it occurs when we view one domain in terms of the other. Source domain of JOURNEY
in a reference to Life is a journey, reflects basic, linguistic meaning of this phrase. However, the second
domain of LIFE, which is much more abstract to humans, activates another meaning, conceptual metaphor
of a given sentence, leading us to the conclusion of the target domain, the way we look on reality. In case of
metonymy, one domain is within the other, saying for instance: Warszawa odmówiła komentarza.
 Scale and scope of predication – essential to the characterization of terms like head, arm and leg is the
position of a profiled entity relative to the body as a whole, whose conceptions thus functions as their
domain and immediate scope of predication. In turn, the same designated entities are scope of predication
for other body-part terms defined on a smaller scale, like arm – hand, elbow and forearm, correspondingly
in hand to palm, thumb and finger, and etc … It has a consequence in construction of sentences, like in the
following: A finger has 3 knuckles and 1 nail, but we won’t say A body has 56 knuckles and 20 nails.
 Perspective – the way human perceive world is strongly associated their embodiment (experiential realism),
so using a word rise to imply a movement, would be associated with their sense of experience. For instance,
we can observe a balloon that is rising, but also a cliff is rising, but in slightly different dimension, not
observable. The prior represents virtual movement, based on our visual experience, the latter would be
associated with fictive movement, based on human encyclopaedic knowledge saying that cliffs tends to rise
a few cm a year, but is not observable.
 Subjectification - Langacker argues that the parameter of perspective also gives rise to focal adjustments
(adjust focus on a particular element) as a result of the distinction between subjective construal (EVA – ego-
centric viewing arrangement) and objective construal (OVA – objective viewing arrangement), which
relates to the asymmetry between perceiver and perceived. In order to
illustrate this distinction, Langacker uses the example of a pair of glasses. If STAGE (RING)
the wearer of the glasses takes them off, holds them in front of his or her · ME (EVA)
face and looks at them, the glasses become the object of perception VIEW
(perceived). In contrast, if the wearer has the glasses on and is using them
to see some other object, the attention focused on the glasses themselves
becomes far weaker to the extent that they become a subpart of the · ME (OVA)
perceiver. Exemplifying this matter, if we observe a fight on a ring, it is
objectively construed, but when we join on the stage or have an empathy
to one of the members of the fight, then the whole scene is subjectively construed.

3. Categorization in Cognitive Grammar and Prototype-based categorization

Wittgenstein’s discussion of the category GAME from 1958, against traditional definitional structure considered
the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so on.
What is common to them all? It appears to be impossible to identify a definitional structure that neatly defines
this category. So, we need something like family resemblance categories.

In classical tradition (Fregan tradition) there are two important classes of consequences of categorisation.
Namely, clear boundaries (shared properties) along with uniformity and inflexibility and objectivism with
reductionism. Cognitive approach is different, presented as in the following.

Prototype theory is most closely associated with the experimental research of cognitive psychologist Eleanor
Rosch and her colleagues. Prototype theory posits that there are two basic principles that guide the formation
of categories in the human mind: the principle of cognitive economy, and the principle of perceived world
structure. These principles together give rise to the human categorisation system. The prior states that an
organism, like a human being, attempts to gain as much information as possible about its environment while
minimising cognitive effort and resources, which maintains economy in cognitive representation. The latter says
that humans rely upon correlational structures in order to from and organise categories, like wings that are most
frequently co-occur with feathers and the ability to fly, rather than with fur or the ability to breathe under the
water. One consequence of the existence of correlational structure in the world is that cognitive categories
themselves reflect this structure: the category prototype reflects the greater number of correlational features.
Recall that categories often exhibit typicality effects, where certain members of the category are judged as
‘better’ or more representative examples of that category than other members. Members of a category that are
judged as highly prototypical (most representative of that category) can be described as category prototypes.
The more frequent a particular attribute is among members of a particular category, the more representative it
is. Moreover, the birds like Robins are judged to be highly prototypical: they possess a large number of attributes
found across other members of the BIRD category. Conversely, ostriches, which are judged not to be very good
examples of the category BIRD, are found to have considerably fewer of the common attributes found among
members of the category. Therefore, while OSTRICH and ROBIN are representative to different degrees, they
nonetheless share a number of attributes and thus exhibit a degree of family resemblance. The claim that
category members are related by family resemblance relations rather than by necessary and sufficient conditions
entails that categories are predicted to have fuzzy boundaries. In other words, we expect to reach a point at
which, due to the absence of a significant number of shared characteristics, it becomes unclear whether a given
entity can be judged as a member of a given category or not. In Rosche’s idea of prototype there is only one core
category (the others are called peripheral members) to reflect its members (anthropocentric).
Conceptual fuzziness: A second problem with the classical view is that definitional structure entails that
categories have definite and distinct boundaries. In other words, an entity either will or will not possess the ‘right’
properties for category membership. However, many categories are not so clearly defined but instead have
‘fuzzy’ boundaries. Consider the category FURNITURE. While TABLE and CHAIR are clearly instances of this
category, it is less clear whether CARPET should be considered a member. If the classical theory of categorisation
is correct, this problem should not arise. In cognitive linguistics occur fuzzy categories, definitions without
boundaries that give us a lot of space to account different characteristics and domains to our item of reference.

4. Meaning in cognitive grammar

Cognitive linguists argue that all linguistic signs not only have dictionary meaning but also encyclopaedic meaning
in that linguistic signs, such as words and constructions, evoke systems of additional encyclopaedic knowledge
which is required in order to understand the sign in question. In Chomsykan linguistics, meaning is a peripheral
notion of study, whereas in cognitive linguistics it is a central point. Instead of postulating logical rules and
objective definitions based on theoretical considerations, this approach focuses on what might be going in the
minds of speakers when they produce and understand words and sentences. So, meaning is seen as a cognitive
structure embedded in our patterns of knowledge and belief.

5. A cognitive grammar approach to morphology

6. Absolute contrual of events

7. Profiling in syntax and morphology

8. Subjectification

9. A/D asymmetry in syntax and morphology

The asymmetry between autonomous and dependent components, referred to as A/D-alignment, is a general
feature of language design. Our main interest lies with A/D-
alignment in bipolar semantic organization, at the semantic
pole of grammatical constructions. Here a component
structure is said to elaborate whatever schematic portion of
the other component its profile corresponds to. Thus, in
figure 7.10, representing the prepositional object
construction, the nominal component elaborates the
preposition’s landmark. Since a landmark is salient as a
matter of definition, and the object nominal specifies it in finer-grained detail, the preposition is dependent with
respect to its object. This nominal is generally autonomous with respect to the preposition. It does not feel
conceptually “incomplete” if used in some way other than as a prepositional object. Thus, in a prepositional
phrase like near the door, the component structure near is dependent with respect to the more autonomous
component the door, which elaborates its schematic landmark. But can we not also say that near elaborates the
door, since near the door represents a more detailed and elaborate conception than just the door? Certainly, we
can. Part of our encyclopaedic knowledge of doors is that, as physical entities, they participate in spatial
relationships with other such entities. Near can therefore be taken as instantiating this schematic specification.
These two elaborative relationships are depicted in figure 7.12. A/D-alignment is thus a relative matter. One
structure is dependent on another to the extent that the latter elaborates a salient substructure within it. The
key notions here are salience and elaboration, both of which are matters of degree. When, based on these
factors, the degree of dependence is substantially greater in one direction than the other, we can reasonably
simplify by focusing just on that direction. Autonomy dependence dimension – is one of the gestalt perspectives
(derivation morphology). Morpheme is a below word lever lexical unit that future meaning. A morpheme is
“dom”. Free-morpheme (autonomous) can stand alone, but bound-morpheme (dependent) like “ek” future
meaning only in correspondence with other morphemes. Some suffixes have more meaning than the other like
“ing” which future hundreds of meanings, so it cannot stand alone. Stem is a part of lexical unit, which cannot
be inflected (changed), like affixes can on 100%. It leads us to the AD asymmetry scale.
dom reka ek ing
stem-like affix-like

A phenomenon of morphological alternation is irregular. “Ek” is less dependent stem than “domek”, which in
this terminology is completely autonomous. “Ing” has practically no meaning at all, so it needs additional lexical
unit and meaning in order to mean something itself as portrayed in the following graph.

+ing full meaning

into (required meaning)

10. A cognitive grammar approach to modal verbs

11. The Grammar as Viewing metaphor