1

[G.R. No. 135874. January 25, 2000]

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES

AGUSTIN P. UY and PACITA TANG* IOC TEN, DOMINGO UY, and Hon.
PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO JR. in his capacity as presiding judge of the Quezon
City RTC (Branch 220), respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Litigation should not be carried on in the dark. Courts are given great latitude in enabling
the parties to inform themselves of all relevant facts, including those known only to their
adversaries. For this reason, the rules on discovery are accorded broad and liberal
interpretation.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 8, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA),[1] which affirmed the trial courts grant of the Motions, filed
respectively by Domingo Uy and Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten, for the
production and inspection of several documents.

Also assailed by petitioner is the October 7, 1998 CA Resolution, which denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.[2]

The Facts

The facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals (CA) in this wise:[3] Esmmis

"Petitioner Security Bank Corporation (SBC) is a domestic banking

corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. It is one of
the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-97-30330 entitled [S]pouses Agustin P.
Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten versus Security Bank Corporation, Domingo P.
Uy and the Ex-Oficio City Sheriff of Quezon City, for injunction and damages
with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction.

"Plaintiffs Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten sought to enjoin
Security Bank Corporation (SBC for brevity) and the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of
Quezon City from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage over a piece of property registered under the respondent spouses
names located at Cubao, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. RI-8731
(281736).
 2

"On February 25, 1997, a temporary restraining order was issued by Hon.
Pedro M. Areola of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 85)
where the case was originally assigned. The temporary restraining order
was lifted on April 8, 1997 when Judge Areola resolved to deny the spouses
application for a preliminary injunction. This denial prompted the said
plaintiffs to file a motion for the inhibition of Judge Areola from hearing the
case, hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 220 presided over by
respondent judge, Hon. Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr.

"On April 7, 1997, SBC filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim and
cross-claim while defendant Domingo P. Uy filed on April 18, 1997 his
answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim. SBC filed its answer
to defendant Domingo Uys cross-claim on April 28, 1997.

"Before filing his answer to defendant SBCs cross-claim, defendant

Domingo P. Uy filed an Omnibus Motion (Production of Documents and
Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim) on the
ground that all documents, papers and instruments made and executed by
SBC on the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi
Trading Center, Inc., the real estate mortgages (REM) and the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) themselves must first be produced before he
[could] prepare and file the answer to SBCs cross-claim. SBC filed its
opposition to the aforesaid motion of Domingo Uy. In return defendant
Domingo Uy filed a motion to admit reply with the reply attached and on
June 3, 1997 SBC filed its rejoinder. Ms-esm

"Acting on defendant Uys Omnibus Motion (Production of Documents and

Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim) the
trial court issued an Order on June 25, 1997 denying the motion.

"On July 16, 1997, Domingo P. Uy moved for the reconsideration of denial
by filing an Omnibus Motion (Motion for Reconsideration and/or Extension
of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim).

"On the other hand, plaintiffs also filed their Motion (For Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents) praying for the issuance of an order
directing SBC to produce and allow them to inspect and copy the original
and additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi Trading Center, Inc.
and/or Jose Tanyao. Defendant SBC opposed the motion on July 25, 1997
by filing its Consolidated Opposition to the spouses Motion for Production,
Inspection and Copying of Documents and Urgent Motion for a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent spouses
filed their reply to the aforementioned consolidated opposition of SBC.
 3

"On August 3, 1997, SBC filed its opposition to respondent Domingo Uys
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 25, 1997.

"On October 2, 1997, the trial court issued the first assailed Order, the
dispositive portion of which states, thus: E-xsm

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Security Bank

Corporation is hereby ordered to produce and permit
defendant Domingo P. Uy to inspect, copy or photograph the
documents, papers and instruments made and executed on
the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi
Trading Center, Inc., during usual business hours and day
after at least three (3) days notice in advance by defendant
Domingo P. Uy to defendant Security Bank Corporation.
However, the filing of the answer to cross-claim need not
await the production of the documents. Defendant Uy is
given, for the last time, ten (10) days from receipt within
which to file answer to the cross-claim of defendant Security
Bank Corporation, stating only the ultimate facts without
including evidentiary matters.

Defendant Security Bank Corporation is hereby ordered to

produce and permit plaintiff[s] to inspect, copy or photograph
the original and additional mortgage contracts executed by
Jackivi Trading Center, Inc. and/or Mr. Jose Tanyao within
which (sic) usual business hours and day after at least three
(3) days notice in advance by plaintiff to defendant Security
Bank Corporation.

The application for issuance of temporary restraining order is

hereby DENIED. In the meantime, set the case for hearing on
the application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
on October 31, 1997, at 8:30 oclock in the morning.

Furnish the parties and counsels with a copy of this Order.

SO ORDERED.

"SBC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order, claiming that
said order [did] not explain the basis for requiring it to produce the
requested documents, and that there was no good cause for their
production, hence, it cannot be compelled to produce the same. Ky-le
 4

"Acting on the aforesaid motion, respondent judge issued the second

assailed Order on November 25, 1997 denying the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:[4]

"It will be noted that the only condition imposed by the Rules is that the
production of the documents must be for good cause.

"Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that respondent Domingo Uy ha[s]

not shown good cause for the production of such documents, said
respondent has sufficiently shown the good cause on which his motion is
anchored [--] that of being able to intelligently prepare his defenses against
the cross-claim of petitioner SBC.

"On the other hand, the motion for production filed by the respondents
spouses Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten is likewise for good cause, it being
necessary for a full determination of the issues raised in Civil Case No. Q-
97-30330.

"Good cause does not relate to the substance in the document but to the
reason for producing relevant or material matters therein; so that the
enforcement of the rule entails exercise of sound discretion. The burden is
on the moving party to demonstrate the need for the documents sought
beyond the relevancy or materiality of the evidence therein."

Hence, this Petition.[5]

The Issue

In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone issue for the consideration of the Court:[6]

"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion[7] when it sustained the Orders of the Respondent Regional Trial
Court dated 02 October 1997 and 25 November 1997 which granted the
respective Motions [For Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents]
of Respondents Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten and
Domingo Uy."

In the main, the Court is being asked to determine whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the grant of the two Motions for production and inspection of documents.

The Courts Ruling

 5

The Petition is bereft of merit. Ky-calr

Main Issue: Grant of Motions for Production and Inspection of Documents

Petitioner Security Bank Corporation (SBC) maintains that, in sustaining the grant of the
Motions for production, inspection and copying of documents filed by private
respondents, the CA grossly misconstrued and misapplied Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioner stresses that the CA erred in focusing only on the requirement of
"good cause" and in ignoring the prerequisite of relevancy.

Moreover, petitioner contests the "good cause" invoked by the CA. Specifically, it
contends that the "good cause," which Respondent Domingo Uy relied upon to be able
to prepare an answer to the cross-claim against him, was negated by the rulings of both
the trial court and the CA requiring him to file such answer without awaiting the
production of the documents sought.

We disagree with petitioner. Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

"SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of

any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking
copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as
are just."

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[8] the Court discussed exhaustively the significance of the

various modes of discovery, an example of which is the aforecited provision. In sum, the
Court held that the said Rule aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before
the trial, of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other
litigants. Through this procedure, "civil trials should not be carried on in the dark." We
quote:

"x x x Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties--before
the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial--should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to
them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words,
 6

the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and
the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions
has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplishes one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure: it not
only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them
considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on
the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably
increased. x x. Calr-ky

"As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to

remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore
performed primarily by the pleadings.

"The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as

a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to
repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark."

It is clear that courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to
enable parties to prepare for trial or otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.
Thus, in the same case, the Court further held:

"What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information

which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.
No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude
a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponents case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing
the possibility, of surprise. x x."[9]

In the present case, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court ruling that there was
"good cause" for the grant of the Motions for inspection of documents. The latters holding
 7

that the documents were not indispensable to the preparation of the answer of Uy to the
cross-claim did not militate against respondents availment of this important mode of
discovery. As he himself averred in his Motion, the subject documents were "material and
important to the issues raised in the case in general, and as between defendant and
defendant SBC in particular."[10]

Verily, the CA noted that the documents would enable Respondent Uy to "intelligently
prepare his defenses against the cross-claim of petitioner SBC,"[11] and not merely to
formulate his answer. Likewise, we agree with the appellate court that the Motion of
Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten was for a good cause, because the said
documents were "necessary for a full determination of the issues raised in Civil Case No.
Q-97-30330."[12] Me-sm

Indeed, litigation is essentially an abiding quest for truth undertaken not by the judge
alone, but jointly with the parties. Litigants, therefore, must welcome every opportunity
to achieve this goal; they must act in good faith to reveal documents, papers and other
pieces of evidence material to the controversy. In Alonzo v. Villamor, [13]the Court ruled:

"A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply

schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps
and destroys the other. It is, rather a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should be no vested right in technicalities. x x.

Materiality of the Subject Documents

Petitioner points out that a party may be compelled to produce or allow the inspection of
documents if six procedural requisites are complied with, viz.:

"(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of
documents or things, showing good cause therefor;

(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;

(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to
be produced and inspected;

(d) Such documents, etc. are not privileged;

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(e) Such documents, etc. constitute or contain evidence material to any

matter involved in the action; and

(f) Such documents, etc. are in the possession, custody or control of the
other party."[14]

Petitioner contends that Requisite "e" has not been satisfied, arguing that respondents
have not shown the relevancy or materiality of the documents subject of the Motions.
Specifically, it maintains that the documents sought by Spouses Uy and Tang Sioc Ten
"the original and additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi Trading Center,
Inc.[15] and / or Mr. Jose Tanyao"[16] -- were not relevant to Civil Case Q-97-30330, which
was for the declaration of the nullity of the January 27, 1993 and August 16, 1995 Real
Estate Mortgages between Jackivi and petitioner. The existence or the absence of other
mortgages executed by Jackivi, petitioner insists, has absolutely no bearing on the said
case, because it does not in any way determine the validity or the invalidity of the subject
Real Estate Mortgages. S-l-x

Petitioner also argues that the documents sought by Respondent Domingo Uy -- "all the
documents, papers and instruments made and executed by [Petitioner] SBC in the
evaluation, processing and approval of the loans to Jackivi x x x" [17] were not relevant,
because the trial court itself ruled that he could prepare his answer to the cross-claim
without those documents.

These arguments are not persuasive. Section 1 of Rule 27 clearly provides that the
documents sought must be "material to any matter involved in the action." Respondents
have shown that the subject documents are indeed material to the present action.

Indeed, the factual backdrop of the case strengthens respondents cause. The civil action
instituted by the Spouses Uy sought the annulment of two deeds of Real Estate Mortgage
between Jackivi and petitioner. They allegedly issued a Special Power of Attorney to
Respondent Uy to mortgage their property only for their benefit, not for that of Jackivi.
Because he mortgaged the property as security for Jackivis loan, they contend that he
exceeded his authority and that the contracts of real estate mortgage were consequently
invalid. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a cross-claim against him, because it "relied
on the representations and documents submitted by [the latter] that he was duly
authorized to mortgage the subject property."[18]

In this light, the relevance of the documents sought by Respondent Domingo Uy is readily
apparent. The papers executed by the petitioner bank in evaluating and processing the
real estate mortgage are manifestly useful in his defense against its cross-claim. The trial
courts ruling that he could file his answer without examining those documents does not
prove that they are immaterial to the present action. The CA has held that those
documents would enable him to "intelligently prepare his defenses against the cross-claim
of Petitioner SBC."
 9

So also, the additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi are material to the present
action. Because a witness of petitioner admitted in court that there was a third mortgage
contract between Jackivi and the bank, fair play demands that herein respondents must
be given the chance to examine such additional mortgage contracts. In so doing, they
can determine why petitioner was going after their property which was invalidly
mortgaged by Respondent Uy, while the properties of the actual borrower, Jackivi, have
not been touched or foreclosed by the bank.

Indeed, the rule is that courts, in passing upon a motion for discovery, should be liberal
in determining whether the documents in question are relevant to the subject matter of
the action.[19] To repeat, the rule on discovery "requires the parties to play the game with
cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably
increased."[20]

All in all, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
The Motions of respondents were for a good cause, and the documents sought were
material to the action pending before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.2/18/00 8:49 AM

 10

Rules of Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Written Interrogatories. - The

landmark case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (204 SCRA 212, 200)
highlighted the significance and importance of the various modes of discovery. The
Philippine Supreme Court said, thus: “now, if appears to the Court that among far too
many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even
outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery,
at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination and adequate use of the
deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial procedure, could, as the
experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period
of litigation and speed up adjudication.”

Under Section 2, Rule 25 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the written interrogatories
must be answered by the party to whom it is directed, thus: “Section 2. Answer to
interrogatories. – The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed
and sworn to by the person making them. The party upon whom the interrogatories have
been served shall file and serve a copy of the answers fifteen (15) days after service
thereof, unless the court on motion and for good cause shown, extends or shortens the
time.”

Perforce a party served with the written interrogatories is bound to answer the questions
propounded therein under pain of the penalties provided for in Rule 29 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure among which is the dismissal of the complaint.

The various modes of discovery enumerated and provided for in the Rules of Civil
Procedure is expressly made applicable to criminal proceedings (Agpalo, Handbook on
Criminal Procedure, 2001 Edition, p. 351; citing Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure).

It is of no moment that the questions are a sort of “fishing expedition” considering that
the new rules explicitly allow it. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has repeatedly
reminded the trial courts that they should encourage the use of deposition procedure and
allow the adverse party to serve interrogatories to expedite the proceedings of the case.

In the aforementioned case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (supra), it

was pronounced that “no longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he
has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility of surprise.”

The case of Elena S. Ong versus Hon. Francisco V. Mazo, etc., et al. (G.R. No. 145542,
June 04, 2004), is enlightening for both the bench and the bar. The Philippine Supreme
 11

Court said that “the thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of
discovery – depositions, interrogatories and request for admissions – without much court
intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such modes after an
answer to the complaint has been served. The rationale behind the recognition accorded
the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse
party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case. Thus,
to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his opponent,
as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a “fishing
expedition,” is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ can no
longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the
opposing party’s case through the discovery procedures. The trial court’s orders, not
being in accordance with law and jurisprudential dictum, are therefore correctible by writ
of certiorari.”

The trial judges were earlier reminded in the case of Koh vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(G.R. No. 71388, September 23, 1986), that they should encourage the use of different
modes of discovery; and that it is indeed “the duty of each contending party to lay before
the court all the material and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing
nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical
rules of evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.” (Regalado:
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Sixth Revised Edition, pp. 305, 306)

The purpose of taking depositions as explained In the case of People vs. Webb (312 SCRA
573 [1993]; cited in Agpalo, Handbook on Civil Procedure, 2001 Edition, pp 274, 275),
are to: (1) assist the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing
perjury; (2) provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims
and defenses; (3) make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts
which otherwise could not be proved except with greater difficulty; (4) educate the parties
in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging
settlements; (5) expedite litigation; (7) prevent delay; (8) simplify and narrow the issues;
and (9) expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

The time within which to file and serve written interrogatories is explicitly fixed by the
rules, that is, in civil cases before responsive answer is filed with leave of court or without
leave of court after the filing of responsive answer; and in criminal cases before the
setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference. The admissions made in the verified
answer to the written interrogatories may already be considered during the pre-trial
conference and would definitely aid the parties for purposes of a plea-bargaining.

Further, it is expressly stated under Section 6 of Rule 25 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by
the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give deposition pending appeal.
 12

Indeed, the various modes of discovery allow a party to uncover the opponent’s cause
and will thus obviate further proof on facts elicited in the written interrogatories; and that
the proceedings will be expedited with the use of the various modes of discovery.
 13

[G.R. No. 145542. June 4, 2004]

ELENA S. ONG, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO V. MAZO as Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, ELVIRA C.
LANUEVO and CHARITO A. TOMILLOSO, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review is the Court of Appeals August 17, 2000
Resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Elena S. Ong and October
10, 2000Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.
The facts originative of the petition are as follows:
Respondents Elvira C. Lanuevo (Lanuevo) and Charito A. Tomilloso (Tomilloso) filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner along with Iluminado J. Caramoan
(Caramoan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern Samar,[1] docketed
as Civil Case No. 887. The complaint which was raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC, arose
from a vehicular accident whereby a bus owned by petitioner and driven by Caramoan
allegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by respondent Lanuevo, with respondent
Tomilloso as her passenger at the time.
After petitioner filed her Answer with Counterclaim,[2] and later a motion to
dismiss[3] the complaint, respondents filed a motion[4] for leave of court to file an
amended complaint[5] which was granted.[6]
On November 14, 1996, petitioner served written interrogatories[7] upon respondents
and on November 21, 1996, she filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion [8] seeking,
among other things, an order from the trial court directing respondents to answer the
interrogatories.
To the motion bearing on the written interrogatories, respondents filed their
objection.[9]
By Order of May 6, 1999,[10] the trial court denied the motion to compel respondents
to answer the interrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a fishing expedition
which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference.
Following petitioners receipt on May 26, 1999[11] of said May 6, 1999 Order, she filed
on July 19, 1999[12] a motion for reconsideration thereof where she also manifested that
her original answer to the complaint would serve as her answer to the amended
complaint. The motion for reconsideration was denied by Order of July 4, 2000.[13]
After her receipt on July 18, 2000[14] of the aforesaid July 4, 2000 Order, petitioner
filed on August 4, 2000 with the Court of Appeals a petition captioned as Petition for
 14

Certiorari [15]assailing the above twin orders of the trial court as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
By the now assailed Resolution of August 17, 2000,[16] the appellate court
dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it was belatedly filed. Read
the Resolution:

An examination of the petition for certiorari shows that the assailed order dated May 6,
1999 was received on May 26, 1999 and that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 10, 1999, hence petitioner had only 15 days left from
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on July 18, 2000 or
until August 2, 2000 within which to file the petition. When the instant petition was filed
on August 4, 2000, the same was late by two (2) days without any explanation being
made by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved to reconsider the appellate courts dismissal of her petition, arguing
that what was filed was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, not an appeal, which special civil action was timely brought within the 60-day
reglementary period.[17]
By Resolution of October 10, 2000, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[18]
Hence, the present petition, petitioner insisting that the appellate court erred in
treating her petition as an ordinary appeal to thus lead it to conclude that it was belatedly
filed.[19]
To the present petition, respondents filed their Comment,[20] explaining that the
appellate court considered petitioners petition thereat as an appeal because it found the
assailed orders of the trial court as not warranting the remedy of the special civil action
of certiorari.
On the denial by the trial court of petitioners motion to direct respondents to answer
the written interrogatories, respondents justified the same, it contending that the trial
court had jurisdiction to pass upon the propriety of such mode of discovery under Section
3, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court and that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing since what
is traversed is an error of law or fact that is properly the subject of an appeal.
Insisting that the trial court erred in refusing to compel respondents to answer her
written interrogatories, petitioner, in her Reply[21] to respondents Comment, invokes this
Courts plenary power to resolve not only the issue of the appellate courts dismissal of
her petition but also the question of whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion
in disallowing the written interrogatories.
 15

In their respective memoranda,[22] both parties raise the issue of the propriety of
availment of written interrogatories.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2001, the trial court suspended indefinitely the
proceedings in the initiatory civil case between the parties in light of petitioners appeal
before this Court.[23]
The appeal is impressed with merit.
On August 4, 2000, when petitioner filed her petition for certiorari before the
appellate court, Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 read:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court
or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency,
and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice
of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from such notice of
denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing rule, when petitioners counsel received on July 18, 2000 the trial
courts order of July 4, 2000 denying her motion for reconsideration of the Order of May
6, 1999, she still had 15 days left of the 60-day period to file the petition for certiorari.
Section 4 of Rule 65 was subsequently further amended, however, by A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000 as follows:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. (Emphasis supplied)

In Systems Factors Corporation v. NLRC[24] and Unity Fishing Development Corp. v.

Court of Appeals,[25] this Court applied retroactively the above-quoted amended rule
on a fresh 60-day period for the filing of certiorari petitions from notice of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration. Thus, a petition for certiorari admittedly filed past the 60-
 16

day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, but filed on time
where considered under the amendment in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, was held to be
seasonably filed.
Applying retroactively too Sec. 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC,
since petitioners petition for certiorari was filed with the appellate court on August 4,
2000, after receipt on July 18, 2000 by petitioner of the order of the trial court denying
her motion for reconsideration from which latter date the 60-day period should be
reckoned, the petition was seasonably filed. It was thus error for the trial court to dismiss
the same.
Contrary then to petitioners protestation that the appellate court erred in treating her
petition for certiorari as an appeal which was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period, as reflected above, the 15-day period left for petitioner to file the petition referred
to the remaining number of days left after computation of the 60-day period in Section 4
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as then amended by Circular No. 39-98
With the setting aside of the appellate courts questioned orders, the resolution of the
present petition should have been accomplished. Nonetheless, considering that the
relatively simple case for damages, which was instituted by respondents against petitioner
way back in 1996 or eight long years ago, had virtually come to a halt due to the lingering
legal issue respecting the trial courts order stopping petitioner from availing of her written
interrogatories as a mode of discovery, instead of remanding this case to the appellate
court as anyway both parties have advanced and argued the sole issue which is purely
one of law, in the overriding interest of justice, this Court shall now resolve the issue as
if it had been raised via a special civil action for certiorari with this Court.[26]
No doubt, the twin orders denying the written interrogatories were interlocutory in
nature for they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case.[27] And the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory
order of a trial court, the proper remedy in such cases being an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment where incorporated in said appeal are the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.[28] Nonetheless, this by no means is an absolute rule. If the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari may be allowed as a mode of redress.[29]
This Court finds that the orders disallowing petitioners written interrogatories are
patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is warranted. In denying petitioners
availment of interrogatories, the trial court was of the view that

. . . in as much that the written interrogatories is (sic) a sort of fishing expedition, said
questions and answer would be properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference for which this
court direct the defendant Elena Ong to file her answer to the amended complaint anent
thereto, both parties are required to file their respective pre-trial briefs after which this
case will be calendared for pre-trial conference.[30]
 17

This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of the various
modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Revised Rules
of Court.Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[31] it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts
relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known
to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the
deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery
depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions without much court intervention
since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such modes after an answer to
the complaint has been served.[32] The rationale behind the recognition accorded the
modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse
party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case.[33]
Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his
opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a
fishing expedition, is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case
of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of fishing expedition can no
longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the
opposing partys case through the discovery procedures.[34]
The trial courts orders, not being in accordance with law and jurisprudential dictum,
are therefore correctible by writ of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated August 17,
2000 and October 10, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE as are the orders of Branch 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Guiuan, Eastern Samar in Civil Case No. 887. The Presiding Judge
of said branch of the court is ORDERED to REQUIRE respondents to serve their answers
to petitioners written interrogatories and to proceed with dispatch the disposition of said
case.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
 18

G.R. No. 214054, August 05, 2015

NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a direct recourse from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) via petition1 for
review on the question of whether Section 52 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) applies
to hostile or adverse witnesses. The petition seeks to annul and set aside the May 28,
20143 and August 27, 20144 Orders of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City in Civil Case No.
08-1028.

This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking Corporation (China Bank)
against Ever Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente
Go, George Go and petitioner Ng Meng Tam sometime in December 2008. China Bank
alleged that it granted Ever a loan amounting to P5,532,331.63. The loan was allegedly
backed by two surety agreements executed by Vicente, George and petitioner in its favor,
each for P5,000,000.00, and dated December 9, 1993 and May 3, 1995,
respectively. When Ever defaulted in its payment, China Bank sent demand letters
collectively addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner. The demands were
unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for collection docketed as Civil Case No. 08-
1028, which was raffled off to RTC Branch 62, Makati City.

In his Answer, petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and void since
these were executed before the loan was granted in 2004. Petitioner posited that the
surety agreements were contracts of adhesion to be construed against the entity which
drafted the same. Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive any demand letter.

In the course of the proceedings, petitioner moved that his affirmative defenses be heard
by the RTC on the ground that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations and
laches.5 The motion was denied by the court.6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in
its December 22, 2010 Decision7 ruled that a preliminary hearing was proper pursuant to
Section 6,8 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court due to the grounds cited by petitioner. There
being no appeal, the decision became final and executory on August 28, 2011.9redarclaw

On March 15, 2011, petitioner served interrogatories to parties 10 pursuant to Sections

111 and 6,12Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap,
Account Officer of the Account Management Group, to answer.

On June 22, 2011, George Yap executed his answers to interrogatories to

parties.13redarclaw
 19

In the meantime, having failed mediation and judicial dispute resolution, Civil Case No.
08-1028 was re-raffled off to RTC Branch 139, Makati City.

Petitioner again moved for the hearing of his affirmative defenses. Because he found
Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner
applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against George
Yap pursuant to Section 6,14 Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On April 29, 2014, when the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a
witness, China Bank objected citing Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot
be compelled to testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George
Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC required the parties to submit their motions on the issue
of whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or hostile
witness is an exception to the judicial affidavit rule.15redarclaw

Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it specifically excludes
adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its application. Petitioner insists that
Yap needed to be called to the stand so that he may be qualified as a hostile witness
pursuant to the Rules of Court.

China Bank, on the other hand, stated that petitioner’s characterization of Yap’s answers
to the interrogatories to parties as ambiguous and evasive is a declaration of what type
of witness Yap is. It theorizes that the interrogatories to parties answered by Yap serve
as the judicial affidavit and there is no need for Yap to be qualified as a hostile witness.

In its May 28, 2014 Order, the RTC denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion to examine
Yap without executing a judicial affidavit. The RTC in interpreting Section 5 of the JAR
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x The aforementioned provision, which allows the requesting party to avail himself
of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court finds applicability to: (a) a government
employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse
party nor a hostile witness and (b) who unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial
affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other
things under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in
court.

In the case at bar, witness George Yap is being utilized as an adverse witness for the
[petitioner]. Moreover, there was no showing that he unjustifiably declines to execute a
judicial affidavit. In fact, it was [China Bank]’s counsel who insisted that said witness’
judicial affidavit be taken. Thus, Section 5 of the [JAR] which [petitioner] invoked to
exempt him from the Rule finds no application. Unless there is contrary ruling on the
matter by the Supreme Court, this court has no choice but to implement the rule as
written.
 20

On this note, this Court also finds no merit on the contention of [China Bank] that the
answer to the written interrogatories by witness George Yap already constitutes his
judicial affidavit. Inasmuch as the Court strictly implemented the [JAR] on the part of
[petitioner], so shall it rule in the same manner on the part of [China Bank]. As correctly
pointed out by [petitioner], the said answer to interrogatories does not comply with
Section 3 of the [JAR] which provides for the contents of the judicial affidavit.16

In essence, the RTC ruled that Section 5 did not apply to Yap since he was an adverse
witness and he did not unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial affidavit. It
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

In view of the foregoing, the motion of the [petitioner] that witness George Yap be
examined without executing a Judicial Affidavit is hereby DENIED FOR LACK OF
MERIT.17

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its August 27, 2014
Order.18 The RTC reiterated its position and stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

It must be pointed out that the [petitioner] [was] the [one] who invoked the provisions
of Section 5 of the [JAR] to compel the attendance of witness George Yap and as such,
it is their duty to show the applicability of the said provisions to the case at bar. As stated
in the challenged Order, Section 5 of the [JAR] finds applicability to: (a) a government
employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse
party nor a hostile witness and (b) who unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit
or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things
under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in
court. In the case at bar, [petitioner] [does] not deny that witness George Yap is to be
utilized as [his] adverse witness. On this score alone, it is clear that the provisions
invoked do not apply.19

The RTC stressed that Section 5 of the JAR required the requested witness’ refusal to be
unjustifiable. It stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x the [JAR] requires that the refusal must be unjustifiable and without just cause. It
must be pointed out that [China Bank]’s previous motions to quash the subpoena was
grounded on the claim that having already submitted to this court his sworn written
interrogatories, his being compelled to testify would be unreasonable, oppressive and
pure harassment. Thus, witness’ refusal to testify cannot be considered unjustifiable since
he raised valid grounds.20

Hence, this petition.

 21

Petitioner contends that the RTC committed a grave error when it interpreted Section 5
to include adverse party and hostile witnesses. Based on the wording of Section 5,
adverse party and hostile witnesses are clearly excluded.

China Bank asserts that Yap neither refused unjustifiably nor without just cause refused
to a judicial affidavit. It cited the RTC’s August 27, 2014 Order where the court said that
Yap had answered the interrogatories and to compel him to testify in open court would
be “unreasonable, oppressive and pure harassment.” Moreover, it stated that based on
the language used by Section 2 of the JAR the filing of judicial affidavits is mandatory.

The petition is anchored on the following arguments:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

RTC BR. 139-MAKATI COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT INTERPRETED SEC. 5

OF THE [JAR] CONTRARY TO ITS WORDINGS.

II

RTC BR. 139-MAKATI COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT INTERPRETED SEC. 5

[OF THE JAR] CONTRARY TO ITS PRACTICAL INTENTION AND COMMON SENSE.

III

RTC BR. 139-MAKATI COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY

DISREGARDED THE RELEVANT RULES ON MODE OF DISCOVERY WHICH GOVERN THE
PRESENTATION OF ADVERSE WITNESSES.

IV

ON A POLICY LEVEL AND IN THE EVENT RTC BR. 139-MAKATI’S INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF SEC. 5 OF THE [JAR] IS CORRECT (I.E., THAT OPPOSING PARTY WHO
INTENDS TO PRESENT ADVERSE OR HOSTILE WITNESS MUST GET AND SUBMIT THAT
WITNESS’ JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT NO MATTER WHAT) IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED, WITH
THE UTMOST INDULGENCE OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, THAT THE SAME
RULE BE IMPROVED OR AMENDED BY PROVIDING SANCTIONS IN THE EVENT THE
ADVERSE OR HOSTILE WITNESS REFUSES TO ANSWER OR EXECUTE JUDICIAL
AFFIDAVIT AS REQUIRED BY THE OPPOSING PARTY.21

We grant the petition.

THE JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

APPLIES TO PENDING CASES

On September 4, 2012, the JAR was promulgated to address case congestion and
 22

delays in courts. To this end, it seeks to reduce the time needed to take witnesses’
testimonies.22 The JAR took effect on January 1, 2013 and would also apply to pending
cases pursuant to Section 12 to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sec. 12. Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its
publication in two newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15,
2012. It shall also apply to existing cases. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court En Banc gave public prosecutors in first and second level courts one year of
modified compliance.23 The JAR thus took full effect on January 1, 2014.

Here, parties were presenting their evidence for the RTC’s consideration when the JAR
took effect. Therefore, pursuant to Section 12 the JAR applies to the present collection
suit.

SECTION 5 OF THE JAR DOES NOT

APPLY TO ADVERSE PARTY WITNESSES

The JAR primarily affects the manner by which evidence is presented in court. Section
2(a) of the JAR provides that judicial affidavits are mandatorily filed by parties to a case
except in small claims cases. These judicial affidavits take the place of direct testimony
in court. It provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sec. 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies . – (a)
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by
licensed courier service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference
or the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and incidents, the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses’
direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties’ documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the
judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant
or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant.

xxxx

Section 324 of the JAR enumerates the content of a judicial affidavit.

Under Section 10,25 parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the provisions
of the JAR. Parties are however allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena
 23

pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Court in Section 5 of the JAR in certain

situations. Section 5 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sec. 5. Subpoena. – If the government employee or official, or the requested witness,

who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines
to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books,
documents, or other things under his control available for copying, authentication, and
eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules
governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as
when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be
understood to be ex parte.

While we agree with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as he was presented
as a hostile witness we cannot agree that there is need for a finding that witness
unjustifiably refused to execute a judicial affidavit.

Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a) government employee
or official or (b) requested witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness nor (2) a
hostile witness. If this person either (a) unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial
affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause to make the relevant documents available to
the other party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to
avail of issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being excluded they are
not covered by Section 5. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius: the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.26redarclaw

Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s witness. Regardless of
whether he unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just
cause to present the documents, Section 5 cannot be made to apply to him for the reason
that he is included in a group of individuals expressly exempt from the provision’s
application.

The situation created before us begs the question: if the requested witness is the adverse
party’s witness or a hostile witness, what procedure should be followed?

The JAR being silent on this point, we turn to the provisions governing the rules on
evidence covering hostile witnesses specially Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses
referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not
allowed to impeach his credibility.
 24

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may
be impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and
cross-examined by the adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief.

Before a party may be qualified under Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
party presenting the adverse party witness must comply with Section 6, Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court which provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter allowed by

the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served
with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony
in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

In Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,27 this Court stated that “in civil cases,
the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless
written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.”28 There petitioners Spouses
Afulugencia sought the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to
compel the officers of the bank to testify and bring documents pertaining to the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of a certain parcel of land. Metrobank moved to quash
the issuance of the subpoenas on the ground of non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 25
of the Rules of Court. In quashing the issuance of the subpoena, the Court reminded
litigants that the depositions are a mechanism by which fishing expeditions and delays
may be avoided. Further written interrogatories aid the court in limiting harassment and
to focus on what is essential to a case. The Court stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed
that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand
will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse
party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a
fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant
result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,
compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party
damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery,
then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its
 25

own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony,
which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from straying
or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition or
bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own
in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court
practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases.
Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious
time, if not pointless entertainment.29 (Citation omitted)

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered
interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore
complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before the present controversy
arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for Yap to testify and produce
documents. He was called to the witness stand when China Bank interposed its objection
for non-compliance with Section 5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse
party witness, is not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules in presentation of
adverse party witnesses as provided for under the Rules of Court shall apply. In keeping
with this Court’s decision in Afulugencia, there is no reason for the RTC not to proceed
with the presentation of Yap as a witness.

In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse party and
hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions on the
Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules
including the modes of deposition and discovery rules shall apply.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 28, 2014 and August 27, 2014
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 26

*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, per Special
Order No. 2084 dated June 29, 2015.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 3-21.

2 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE, Section 5 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sec. 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness,

who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably
declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the
relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available for copying,
authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself
of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this
case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial
affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

3Rollo, pp. 22-A to 24. Signed by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Pozon.

4 Id. at 25-27.

5 Id. at 65.

6 RTC Order dated January 4, 2010, id. at 66.

7Rollo,pp. 63-75. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with

Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

8 Rules of Court, Rule 16, Section 6 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. – If no motion to dismiss has been

filed, any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.

9Rollo, p. 76.

10 Id. at 77-79.

11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 25, Section 1 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SECTION 1. Interrogatories to parties; service thereof. – Under the same conditions

specified in section 1 of Rule 23, any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts
from any adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories to
 27

be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer thereof competent to testify
in its behalf.

12 Id., Section 6 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter allowed by

the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served
with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give
testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

13Rollo, pp. 80-85. Sent via registered mail on June 23, 2011.

14 Supra note 12.

15Rollo, pp. 86-87.

16 Id. at 23.

17 Id.

18 Supra note 4.

19 Id. at 26.

20 Id.

21 Id. at 9-10.

22 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE, 4th Whereas Clause provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of
witnesses in cases under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved
for piloting by trial courts in Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in
place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;

xxxx

23 Resolution dated January 8, 2013, rollo (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC), pp. 37-39.

24 JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE, Section 3 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

 28

Sec. 3. Contents of Judicial Affidavit. – A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the

language known to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a
translation in English or Filipino, and shall contain the following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;

(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of
the witness and the place where the examination is being held;

(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully
conscious that he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false
testimony or perjury;

(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively
numbered, that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he
testifies;
(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents;
and
(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and

(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer
who is authorized by law to administer the same.

25 Id., Section 10 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Sec. 10. Effect of non-compliance with the Judicial Affidavit Rule. – (a) A party who fails
to submit the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission. The court may, however, allow only once the late submission
of the same provided, the delay is for a valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the
opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than Pl,000.00 nor more
than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.

(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid
cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's right to confront by
cross-examination the witnesses there present.

(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the
content requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above.
 29

The court may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant
replacement affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason
and would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or
private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less
than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.

26 Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
(IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM), G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602, 649.
27 G.R. No. 185145, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 399.

28 Id. at 412.

29 Id. at 413-414.