SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576

represented by the Land
Registration Authority,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 8, 2006

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision[1] and August 20,
2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development

Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located

behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in

1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of

prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the

property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and

135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508

registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land

Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the
Land Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar
of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT
No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on

September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation
of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented
by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch
114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly

signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons,
the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against
him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes

of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss,
motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation
on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative
investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how
respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those
summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he
prepared respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents
president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his.
He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally
signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion
on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default,[2]predicated on its failure
to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the
answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the
answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court,[3] it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the
Republics motion.[4] It found respondents answer to be sham and false and
intended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer
stricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed the
Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case
and formally offered its evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999

resolution but the trial court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a

petition for certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of
the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in
default for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It
found Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since
they were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also
scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the answer[6] and concluded that
he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. This
supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the
appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting
of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed
to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which
declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers

statement.[7] Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to
or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible
against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another
person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of
something stated or implied by the other person.[9] By adoptive admission, a third
persons statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it.
Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;[10]

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11]
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;[12]
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but
ignores further points which he or she has heard the other
make[13] or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.[14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built

its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels
statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as
its implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the
answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered
invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who
signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically
authorized by him was immaterial. The important thing was that the
answer bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the

party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a

general authority for any person to sign the answer for him which

was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the

pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be

signed by another. This was similar to addressing an authorization

 letter to whom it may concern such that any person could act on it

even if he or she was not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned
its contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent
subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos
conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for

reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the
petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment[15] and
memorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its

own. Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was
conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed

either by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter.
It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing
him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel
operates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is
signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may
not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read

the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. [16] Under the
Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to
these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving

practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer[17] but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified

person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified

persons,[18] something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted

to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise
void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos
subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows
that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it
conformed to his draft. We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving
statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for
just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents
answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading.
Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed
to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if
it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was
a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as

mere technicalities have their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration
of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and
injustice.[19]

The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals[20] is relevant:

 Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was
never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most
persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive
reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty.
Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made
to account for his possible misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision
and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is
hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional
conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The signature of
counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading;
that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under Rule 45 as an appeal
to the ruling of the CA against the Republic and lifting the trial court’s
order of default against Kenrick for failure to file an answer to the
Republic’s complaint.

FACTS: Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land
behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO) claiming ownership over those lands. Its encroachment resulted to
the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime land.
Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its name and
which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the name of Alfonso
Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has
no record of them and that their ascendant title, allegedly in the name of
Concepcion, was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG filed a
complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of
title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick
filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre
Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located and be served with
summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by
publication against him.

While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and
Committee on Justice and Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition
of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was summoned and
testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned
draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature
appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized
anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not know who finally signed it.

Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion in

default for failure to file a valid answer because the person who signed it
was not the counsel for the respondents. Thus, the answer was effectively
an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the ROC, an unsigned
pleading is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be a

sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also
ordered that the answer be stricken from the records, declared Kenrick in
default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case
and formally offered its evidence.

Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the
matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.

CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for

certiorari and lifted the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick Then,
it ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. It ruled so
because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be
unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also
scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer and concluded
that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead.

Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this

petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground
that its pleading was unsigned by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.

HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the

party or counsel representing him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s
duty and authority to sign a pleading is personal to him and may not be
delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has

read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work

involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading
to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by

unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos

entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that
authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or
ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows
that Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another “as
long as it conformed to his draft.” We give no value whatsoever to such
self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for
just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that
respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the
Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that

even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading,
the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as
mere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly
administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in
arbitrariness and injustice[1].

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of

cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the
rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for
the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure[2]. In this case, respondent
failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from
strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by
Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he
should be made to account for his possible misconduct.

PETITION GRANTED
 THIRD DIVISION

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180197

Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,

Velasco, Jr.,

Nachura, and

Bersamin,* JJ.

VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and

INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING

CORPORATION CHANNEL-13,

Respondents. Promulgated:

June 23, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed is the August 10, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 81657 which reversed the October 29, 2003 Decision and February 2, 2004
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 finding petitioner
Francisco N. Villanueva entitled to damages. Also assailed is the October 16, 2007
Resolution[2]denying the motion for reconsideration.

On March 31, 1992, petitioner Francisco N. Villanueva, then Assistant

Manager for Operations of Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation-Channel 13
(IBC-13) was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for
purportedly selling forged certificates of performance. Contesting his termination,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission.

During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in
IBC-13 were published in the July 18, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the
Philippine Star, and in the July 19, 1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.

In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC-13,

was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his
tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged
certificates of performance.

In the Manila Times, on July 18, 1992:[3]

Anomalies at IBC-13 uncovered

INSIDER pilferage, malversation, overpricing and other

irregularities have cost government-owned Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) 13 more than P108 million in losses for
the period 1986-1989.

Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president, uncovered the anomalies after a

long and painstaking investigation when he took over the company in
1990.

The investigation uncovered irregularities ranging from selling

forged certificates of performance (CPs) to non-remittance of sales
collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailer
advertisements (MTAs), illegal leasing of electricity and machines to
friendly clients, millions worth of undocumented transactions to movie
suppliers, exorbitant fees against in-house productions, abused
overtime charges by certain employees.

The anomalies did not escape Balaguer when he came to IBC-13

backed by hands-on experience in television management work.
 IBC has had four presidents since 1986 after the EDSA
revolution. Balaguer is the fifth president.

A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the

anomalies in IBC. It led to the dismissal of an operations executive
who sold forged certificates of performance, a former supervisor who
pocketed IBCs sales collections, and station managers who did not remit
payments on radio advertisements.

Other anomalies committed against the government station

include the loose issuance of technical facilities orders (TFOs) which
practically leased the networks broadcast facilities to a friendly client
for free.

Balaguer, sources said, succeeded in staying as president because

of his technical expertise in media and communications and his
managerial will to cleanse the ranks of the firm. (Emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine Star, on July 18, 1992:[4]

IBC president uncovers anomalies at tv network

The government-owned International Broadcasting Corp.-

Channel 13 lost more than P108 million due to insider pilferage,
malversation, overpricing and other irregularities from 1986 to 1989.

IBC president Gil P. Balaguer uncovered the anomalies after a

long and painstaking investigation when he took over the television
station in 1990.

Balaguer, in a statement, said the irregularities uncovered

included the sale of forged certificates of performance, non-remittance
of sales collections, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie
advertisements, illegal lease of equipment to friendly clients, exorbitant
fees on in-house productions and abused overtime charges by some
employees.
 Balaguer, the fifth IBC president since 1986, easily detected the
anomalies as he has a vast experience in television management work.

A special investigative committee helped Balaguer uncover the

anomalies at IBC, which has resulted in the dismissal of an operations
executive who sold forged certificates of performance, a former
supervisor who pocketed sales collections and a station manager who
did not remit payments on radio advertisements. (Emphasis supplied)

In the Manila Bulletin, on July 19, 1992:[5]

Sequestered firms losses bared

The Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC) 13, a sequestered

firm, lost more than P108 million for the period 1986-1989 due to
pilferage, malversation, over-pricing, and other irregularities
perpetrated by a syndicate, according to Gil P. Balaguer, IBC president,
who took over the company in 1990.

He said the irregularities ranged from selling forged certificates

of performance to non-remittance of sales collections, illegal and
unauthorized airing of movie trailer advertisements, illegal leasing of
electricity and machines to friendly clients, millions worth of
undocumented transactions to movie suppliers, exorbitant fees against
in-house productions, and abused overtime charges by certain
employees.

IBC has had four presidents since 1986, Balaguer being the fifth.

A special probe committee that helped Balaguer said one

dismissed executive sold forged certificates of performance, a former
supervisor pocketed IBC sales collections, and some station managers
did not remit payments on radio advertisements.
 The loose issuance of technical facilities orders practically leased
the networks broadcast facilities to a friendly client for free.

Balaguer is credited with accelerating the networks rank from

number five in 1988 to number two or three under current ratings,
despite the efforts of some holdouts who tried to derail his
administration. (Emphasis supplied)

In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or

deny if he was the person alluded to in the news article as the operations
executive of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of
performance.[6] None of the respondents replied to the letter.

On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against Balaguer,[7] which was later
amended by impleading IBC-13 as additional defendant.[8]

Petitioner claimed that respondents caused the publication of the subject

news articles which defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the
IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance.[9] He
alleged that in causing these false and malicious publications, respondents
violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code.[10]

Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the

publications.[11] However, he argued that the publications are not actionable
because they are true and without malice;[12] are of legitimate public concern and
interest because IBC-13 is under sequestration; that petitioner is a newsworthy
and public figure;[13] and that they are privileged communication.[14] Balaguer filed
a counterclaim against petitioner for alleged malicious filing of the civil case.[15]

IBC-13 also denied participation in the publications. It claimed that

assuming press statements were issued during a press conference, the same was
done solely by Balaguer without its authority or sanction.[16] IBC-13 also filed a
counterclaim against petitioner[17] and a cross-claim against Balaguer.[18]

On August 31, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[19] finding

petitioners dismissal as illegal, which was affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission.The Commission, however, declared respondents to be acting in
good faith, hence, it deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages. On
December 6, 1994, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement,[20] with
IBC-13 proposing a scheme of payment for petitioners monetary claims, and with
IBC-13 and petitioner waiving any and all claims against each other arising out of
the labor case.

On October 29, 2003, the Regional Trial Court[21] of Quezon City held that
petitioner is entitled to an award of damages,[22] thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor

of plaintiff Francisco N. Villanueva and against defendants Balaguer and
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13).

Accordingly, defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff

jointly and severally, as follows:

1) the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos by way

of moral damages;

2) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and

by way of exemplary damages;

3) the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos by way of

nominal damages;

4) the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos by way of

temperate or moderate damages; and

5) the sum of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as and

by way of attorneys fees.

With costs against defendants.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[24] Hence, they

appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the herein assailed Decision on
August 10, 2007, disposing thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The October 29, 2003 Decision and the February 2, 2004
Resolution with Clarification issued by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 89,
National Capital Judicial Region, Quezon City, are hereby
REVERSED. The Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Cross-claim in
Civil Case No. Q-92-13680 are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[25]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant

petition raising the following issues:[26]

a) Does the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter

containing statements attributing to him commission of acts
constituting actionable wrong, hence, adverse to his interest, and
of such nature as would call for his reaction, reply, or comment if
untrue, constitute his admission of said statements,
consequently, may be used in evidence against him?

b) Is the admission by a principal admissible against its agent? Is

the admission by a person jointly interested with a party
admissible against the latter?

c) Does the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him

by newspaper publications, as the source of defamatory
newspaper reports, when he is free and very able to do so,
constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said
defamatory news reports?

The petition lacks merit.

As early as 1905, this Court has declared that it is the duty of the party
seeking to enforce a right to prove that their right actually exists. In varying
language, our Rules of Court, in speaking of burden of proof in civil cases, states
that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations and that the burden of
proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on
either side.[27] Thus, in civil cases, the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff,
with respect to his complaint.[28]
 In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the
newspaper articles, and the alleged admission of respondents. Based on the
above pieces of evidence, the Court finds that petitioner was unable to discharge
his burden of proof. As such, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the
complaint for damages.

The July 20, 1992 letter sent by petitioner to respondents reads as

follows:[29]

20 July 1992

Mr. Virgilio Balaguer

Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Dear Mr. Balaguer:

We write on behalf of our client, Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva.

You have caused to be published in the 18 July 1992 issue of The

Philippine Star and 19 July 1992 issue of Manila Bulletin, a news item
wherein you stated that you dismissed an Operations Executive
because he sold forged Certificate of Performance. Our immediate
impression is, you are referring to our client, Francisco N. Villanueva,
because he is the only Operations Executive in IBC, Channel 13 you have
illegally and despotically dismissed.

We urge you, therefore, to inform us, within forty-eight (48)

hours from your receipt of this letter that the Operations Executive you
referred to in your press statement is not our client, Francisco N.
Villanueva. We shall construe your failure/refusal to reply as your
unequivocal admission that you are, in fact, actually referring to our
 client, Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva, as the operations executive who sold
forged Certificate of Performance. Accordingly, we shall immediately
proceed to take appropriate criminal and civil court actions against you
without further notice.

Very truly yours,

(signed)

REX G. RICO

cc: Mr. Francisco N. Villanueva

Board of Administrators, IBC-13

Petitioner argues that by not responding to the above letter which

expressly urged them to reply if the statements therein contained are untrue,
respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule
on admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130,[30] and the disputable presumption
that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law or fact.[31]

Petitioners argument lacks merit. One cannot prove his claim by placing the
burden of proof on the other party. Indeed, (a) man cannot make evidence for
himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He
does not make the letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he
wishes to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more can impose a duty to
answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a
failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances
making an answer requisite or natural has no effect as an admission.[32]

Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements

in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the
declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is
relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a
denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response
can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.[33]
 In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the
part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure to protest or disclaim the attribution to
him by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained above,
the rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally
in ones presence or when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there
is no mutual correspondence between the parties.

As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state

what the defendant said are inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held
responsible for the writings of third persons.[34] As correctly observed by the Court
of Appeals, while the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the source
of the columnists, proving that he truly made such statements is another
matter.[35] Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.

Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher of
the alleged defamatory articles.[36] Contrary to petitioners assertion, he should
have at least presented the authors of the news articles as witnesses to prove his
case against respondents in the absence of an express admission by the latter
that the subject news articles have been caused by them.

Petitioner also claims that respondents have admitted that they held a
press conference and caused the publication of the news articles, based on the
following testimony of Balaguer:[37]

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Okay, Let me ask another question. Now Mr. Balaguer this

publication referred to so called anomalies of 1986 to 1989 now how
about the termination.

A: 1991.

ATTY. JIMENEZ:

Yes.

WITNESS:

I think the termination of Mr. Villanueva has nothing to do with

that press statement release because the period that covers that report
is from specific date 1986 to 1989. (TSN, 07 November 2000, p. 19)
 Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous[38] which can
hardly be said of Balaguers above testimony. If Balaguer intended to admit the
allegation that he conducted a press conference and caused the publication of the
news articles, he could have done so. Instead, Balaguer specifically denied these
allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his Answer.[39]

Petitioner next argues that IBC-13s Cross-Claim against Balaguer, in that:[40]

11. The acts complained of by the plaintiff were done solely by

co-defendant Balaguer.

Balaguer resorted to these things in his attempt to stave off his

impending removal from IBC.

is an admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec.

29, Rule 130[41] as an admission by a co-partner or an agent.

Petitioner is mistaken. IBC-13s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively

created an adverse interest between them. Hence, the admission of one
defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, as already
discussed, the alleged acts imputed to Balaguer were never proven to have been
committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer.Malice or bad faith implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.[42]

In sum, we find that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No

satisfactory evidence was presented to prove by preponderance of evidence that
respondents committed the acts imputed against them. As such, there is no more
need to discuss whether the assailed statements are defamatory.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 10, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81657 reversing the October 29, 2003 Decision
and February 2, 2004 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 89, finding petitioner entitled to damages, as well as the October 16, 2007
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is an assistant manager of the IBC-13 and was dismissed from employment for loss of confidence for
purportedly selling forged certificate of performance. Contesting the termination he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC. While the case was pending news articles regarding an alleged irregularities n the IBC
13 was uncovered by the petitioner and published in three newspapers: Manila Times, Philippine Star and Manila
Bulletin. The anomalies includes the an alleged selling of certificate of performance to non remittance of sales
collection, illegal and unauthorized airing of movie trailers advertisements, illegal leasing of electricity and among
others. In a letter petitioner urged respondents to conform or deny if he was the person alluded to in the news
articles but none of the respondents replied. Petitioner filed before the RTC complaint for damages against
Balaguer which was amended and impleaded IBC 13 as additional defendant. Labor Arbiter rendered s decision
finding petitioner’s dismissal as illegal and was affirmed by the NLRC.

Petitioner argues that by not responding to the above letter which expressly urged them to reply if the statements
therein contained are untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on
admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130, and the disputable presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact.

ISSUE:
a) Does the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing statements attributing to him commission of
acts constituting actionable wrong, hence, adverse to his interest, and of such nature as would call for his reaction,
reply, or comment if untrue, constitute his admission of said statements, consequently, may be used in evidence
against him?

b) Is the admission by a principal admissible against its agent? Is the admission by a person jointly interested with a
party admissible against the latter?

c) Does the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source of
defamatory newspaper reports, when he is free and very able to do so, constitute admission that he, indeed, was
the source of the said defamatory news reports?

RULING:
One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party. Indeed, "(a) man cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the
letter evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts [stated therein]. He no more
can impose a duty to answer a charge than he can impose a duty to pay by sending goods. Therefore a failure to
answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite or natural has
no effect as an admission."

Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a
mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is
relaxed on the theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were
orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a
written reply.

In the same manner, we also cannot assume an admission by silence on the part of Balaguer by virtue of his failure
to protest or disclaim the attribution to him by the newspapers that he is the source of the articles. As explained
above, the rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one’s presence or
when one still has to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.

As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are
inadmissible against him, since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, "while the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the
columnists, proving that he truly made such statements is another matter." Petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer
did make such statements.
Notably, petitioner did not implead the editorial staff and the publisher of the alleged defamatory articles.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, he should have at least presented the authors of the news articles as witnesses
to prove his case against respondents in the absence of an express admission by the latter that the subject news
articles have been caused by them.

Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous which can hardly be said of Balaguer’s above testimony. If
Balaguer intended to admit the allegation that he conducted a press conference and caused the publication of the
news articles, he could have done so. Instead, Balaguer specifically denied these allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5
of his Answer.

IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an adverse interest between them. Hence, the admission
of one defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, as already discussed, the alleged acts
imputed to Balaguer were never proven to have been committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer. Malice or
bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.

In sum, we find that petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No satisfactory evidence was presented to
prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents committed the acts imputed against them. As such, there is
no more need to discuss whether the assailed statements are defamatory.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

HERBERT SOLAS, G.R. No. 162332

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
-versus- Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
POWER & TELEPHONE REYES, JJ.
SUPPLY PHILS., INC., DERWIN
OTWELL, PELAGIO BATTUNG, Promulgated:
* *
JR. AND FRANKLIN QUIACHON,
Respondents. August 28, 2008
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated September 12, 2003[1] dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
Herbert Solas (petitioner).
The antecedent facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On 16 August 1997, Herbert Solas entered into a contract of

employment with Power and Telephone /Supply Philippines, Inc., to be
the Assistant Sales Manager of the company with a monthly salary
of P21,600.00, excluding bonuses and commission.

On 06 November 1998, private respondent company granted petitioner

Herbert Solas and Franklin D. Quiachon an amount
of P85,418.00 each, corresponding to their sales commission from the
month of January to June of 1998. From that time up to the present, no
other sales commission was ever again given to them.
Thus, on 04 February 2000, petitioner requested for the release of his
alleged commission which had already accumulated since July of
1998. However, in an inter-office memorandum, said request was
denied, and instead, petitioner was even mandated to settle his
outstanding obligation with the company.

On 07 February 2000, petitioner likewise received another

memorandum requiring him to return the issued cellular phone, car and
key to his office, which he allegedly all complied. Petitioner averred
that these were all forms of harassment including the non-payment of
his salary for the month of February 2000, and onwards. Hence, on 15
February 2000, he instituted a case for illegal constructive dismissal,
recovery of 10% sales commission on gross sales, and attorney's fees.
In response, private respondents maintained that there was no
agreement, written or oral, which talked of the grant of 10%
commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was there a CBA on the
matter. There was even no CBA to speak of, since the company had no
union, with its employees numbering only to less than 10, all being
fixed-salaried employees. The company gave bonuses when there was
an income, but these were purely on the liberality of the company,
subject to the availability of funds and profits. Besides, petitioner has
actually no client of his own from whom he could close sales, thus the
claim for commission was utterly baseless.

Private respondents maintained also that the claim of petitioner that he

was constructively dismissed, was without basis. Beginning 02
February 2000, petitioner's attendance was already irregular. On 11
February 2000, he was on absence without leave. He was sick and had
a growing lump on his left shoulder. It was this absence without leave
which prompted private respondents to write several memoranda to
petitioner, one advising him to return to work immediately, as his
continued absence was inimical to the company; the other, directing
him to explain his continued unauthorized absences within 24 hours
from receipt of the memo.

Private respondents asserted further that neither the order directing

petitioner to return the company car, the issued cellular phone and
keys, nor the deductions made on his salary, could constitute as basis
for his alleged constructive dismissal, all allegations being baseless and
without merit. Thus, private respondents prayed for an order directing
petitioner to pay the latter's debt with the company, and an award
amounting to P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the dismissal of
petitioner from employment.

The parties submitted their position papers. On 31 August 2000, the

Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding for the petitioner
Herbert Solas, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered

to pay the complainant the amount of P892,780.37 as sales
commission, and clearly computed appearing as Annex K-K1 and K-3
of complainant's position paper. Complainant is also entitled to six (6)
months backwages and separation pay of one month for every year of
service and 10% attorney's fees, as computed below by the Research
and Information Unit of the Commission:
 xxxx

SO ORDERED.[2]

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),

which reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The NLRC
ruled that that there was no constructive dismissal in this case, because petitioner
never resigned but merely filed an indefinite sick leave, even admitting during the
preliminary hearings that he was still an employee of respondents, and his principal
claim was for payment of his sales commission. Furthermore, the NLRC saw no
badge of constructive dismissal in respondents' action of applying petitioner's
salary for the month of February 2000 as payment for his debts to the company
amounting to P95,000.00. It was also held that petitioner failed to establish that
there was an agreement between him and respondent employer for a 10% sales
commission, and that he failed to establish the origin and authenticity of the
specific amount of the commission being claimed by him.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but the same
was denied per Resolution dated September 24, 2002.

From such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari. On September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision
affirming the NLRC ruling, stating thus:

An examination of the resolution of the public respondent shows no

patent and gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. In
reversing the labor arbiter, public respondent NLRC
rightly held that petitioner Herbert Solas did not really quit from
his employment, nor did he involuntarily resign from his
office. What he did was merely to file an indefinite sick leave. As
aptly observed by public respondent, if indeed petitioner resigned from
his post, he should have filed a resignation letter, not an indefinite sick
leave. His contention that the non-payment of his salary for the
month of February 2000 and onwards bolsters even more his
claim of constructive dismissal, is without merit. Petitioner has
outstanding loans with private respondent. Thus, it is more logical to
conclude that the reason why he did not receive his salary for the
month of February 2000, was due to the off-setting made by the
company of his cash advances amounting to about P95,000.00.

Anent the issue of 10% commission, We find no sufficient basis to

grant the claim of petitioner, having no satisfactory evidence to prove
his entitlement thereto. What the petitioner did in this case was merely
to present a certificate of employment which merely confirms the fact
that he is an employee of the company and is receiving the amount
provided therein as his salary, exclusive of any bonuses and
commission, and nothing more. Consequently, we cannot grant
petitioner's claim of commission on the basis of the certificate of
employment alone. Assuming, arguendo, that the certificate on its face
 speaks of petitioner's entitlement to commission, then, the same,
however, does not provide for its percentage. The records attest that
petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to bolster his claim
that he is entitled to a 10% commission. His self-serving allegations
are not sufficient to justify the claim.[3] (Emphasis supplied)

In its Decision promulgated on September 12, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.[4] Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision
was denied per Resolution dated February 12, 2004.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, alleging that:

I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

PATENTLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE NLRC FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE NLRC DELETING THE VARIOUS MONEY
CLAIM AWARDED IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.[5]
Respondents counter by stressing that the NLRC Decision has become final
and executory, and insists that the NLRC and the CA committed no error in ruling
that petitioner was not constructively dismissed.[6]

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

However, at the outset, respondents must be disabused of their belief that since no
appeal may be taken from the NLRC Decision, then the same can no longer be
altered. In Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc.,[7] the Court explained that:

x x x while under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor

Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after the
lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, the
adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and then to
this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule
45. x x x[8] (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 65 gives the adverse party, petitioner in this case, 60 days from the date of
receipt of the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration within which to
file a petition for certiorari with the CA. Thus, petitioner took the proper
procedural steps to question the NLRC Decision before the CA.
As to the merits of the petition, our oft-repeated ruling, reiterated in Reyes v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[9] must be emphasized, to wit:
x x x findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC,
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on
this Court, which is not a trier of facts.

xxxx

x x x Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial

bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect,
but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings
deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be
altered, modified or reversed.[10]
The CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC that petitioner's salary for February
2000 was applied as payment for his cash advances from the company amounting
to about P95,000.00. The CA likewise upheld the NLRC's finding that the evidence
on record was insufficient to establish either that there was an agreement between
petitioner andrespondents or that it was company policy to give commissions to
employees.

Considering that the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA, it behooves the Court
to re-examine the records and resolve the conflicting rulings between the LA, on
the one hand, and those of the NLRC and the CA, on the other.[11]

The Court's examination of the records reveals that such factual findings of the
NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are supported by substantial evidence; hence, there
is no cogent reason for this Court to modify or reverse the same.

In Duldulao v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court held that:

There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination,

insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the
part of the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except
to forego his continued employment. It exists where there is cessation
of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and
a diminution in pay.[13]
In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents committed acts of
harassment, i.e., the withholding of his salary for the month of
February and directing him to return the company car, cellphone and office keys,
have been rebutted and sufficiently explained by private respondent company in its
Position Paper.[14] Respondents were able to show that its acts were not intended to
harass or discriminate against petitioner.

There was valid reason for respondents' withholding of petitioner's salary for the
month of February 2000. Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted to his
employer in the amount of around P95,000.00. Respondents explained that
petitioner's salary for the period of February 1-15, 2000 was applied as partial
payment for his debt and for withholding taxes on his income; while for the period
of February 15-28, 2000, petitioner was already on absence without leave,
hence, was not entitled to any pay.[15]

With regard to the company car, respondents explained that the company car was
actually issued to Franklin D. Quiachon although petitioner and another employee,
Nelson Gatbunton, may borrow the car for company operations with the consent
of Quiachon as stated in an office memorandum dated March 10, 1999. Since
Nelson Gatbunton had to attend to official business in Clark, said employee was
then given use of the company car.[16]

The taking of the office key from petitioner was also justified, as respondents
stated that the company's office consisted only of one big room without separate or
individual offices, so it was only the main door that required a key. The key to the
office door could be borrowed by any employee from a co-employee in possession
thereof in case of overtime or weekend work, but not a single employee had the
exclusive use of the key to the office. Thus, when another employee,
Myrna Dumlao, had to work overtime, she borrowed the key from petitioner
on February 4, 2000. Thereafter, on February 18, 2000, respondents moved to
another unit in the same condominium building housing its office, so it was already
useless to return the key to the door of the former office to petitioner.[17]

As to the cellphone, respondents maintain that said phone remained the property of
the company, and it became company policy for its employees to pay for personal
calls. When petitioner's debts and advances accumulated, and he showed no
intention of paying for them despite receipt of bonuses, the company had to take
measures to regulate the use of the company cellphones.[18]

Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations for withholding his

salary and the reasons why he was required to return the company car, key
and cellphone. This constitutes admission by silence under Section 32, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 32. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration made in the presence and
within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the
act or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and
when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.

Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that respondents' explanations
are truthful and, based thereon, the NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse
of discretion in ruling that there was no constructive dismissal in this case.

Lastly, as to petitioner's claim for commissions, the NLRC and the CA were
correct in not sustaining the award thereof by the LA. It must be borne in mind that
there is no law which requires employers to pay commissions; [19] thus, it is
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that that there is indeed an agreement between
him and his employer for payment of the same.

The only evidence presented by petitioner to prove that he is entitled to sales

commissions are the employment certificate, stating that he is an employee of
respondents receiving P21,600.00 per month as salary, exclusive of bonuses and
sales commissions, and the undisputed fact that private respondent company gave
him and its other employees the amount of P85,418.00 sometime in
1998. However, the CA was correct in ruling that the employment
certificate was insufficient to prove that petitioner was indeed entitled to
his claim for sales commissions, as said document does not give the
details as to the conditions for payment of the same or the agreed
percentage, if any. As to the amount of P85,418.00, respondents assert
that said amount is actually a one-time bonus, not a commission. Thus,
even assuming arguendo that petitioner is entitled to sales commissions,
his evidence is inadequate to establish the amount to which he is
entitled. In Ropali Trading Corporation v. National Labor
[20]
Relations Commission, the employee presented a Memorandum from his
employer stating that he would be receiving a 20% overriding commission,
including sales commission and interest income on all sales he had successfully
obtained. Yet, the Court still struck down petitioner's claim for unpaid
commissions, stating that the employee should present evidence, such as credible
documents, to prove his claim. Vague and doubtful sales documents, the origins of
which have not been proven, are considered insufficient to establish a claim for
payment of commissions.

Here, the NLRC and the CA found that the computations for commissions were
determined and prepared unilaterally by petitioner. Thus, it was correctly ruled that
said computation, with its uncertain origin and authenticity, is self-serving and
cannot prove petitioner's claim for commissions in the amount of P892,780.37.

In sum, the Court sees no justification whatsoever to deviate from the ruling of
the NLRC and the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
On 16 August 1997, Herbert Solas entered into a contract of employment with Power and
Telephone /Supply Philippines, Inc., to be the Assistant Sales Manager of the company with a monthly
salary of P21,600.00, excluding bonuses and commission.

On 06 November 1998, private respondent company granted petitioner Herbert Solas and
Franklin D. Quiachon their sales commission from the month of January to June of 1998. From that time
up to the present, no other sales commission was ever again given to them.
 On 04 February 2000, petitioner requested for the release of his alleged commission which had
already accumulated since July of 1998which was denied, and instead, petitioner was even mandated to
settle his outstanding obligation with the company.

On 07 February 2000, petitioner likewise received another memorandum requiring him to

return the issued cellular phone, car and key to his office, which he allegedly all complied. Petitioner
averred that these were all forms of harassment including the non-payment of his salary for the month
of February 2000, and onwards. Hence, on 15 February 2000, he instituted a case for illegal constructive
dismissal, recovery of 10% sales commission on gross sales, and attorney's fees.

Private respondents maintained that there was no agreement, written or oral, which talked of
the grant of 10% commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was there a CBA on the matter. There
was even no CBA to speak of, since the company had no union, with its employees numbering only to
less than 10, all being fixed-salaried employees. The company gave bonuses when there was an income,
but these were purely on the liberality of the company, subject to the availability of funds and profits.
Besides, petitioner has actually no client of his own from whom he could close sales, thus the claim for
commission was utterly baseless.

The parties submitted their position papers. On 31 August 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision finding for the petitioner Herbert Solas

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The NLRC ruled that that there was no constructive
dismissal in this case, because petitioner never resigned but merely filed an indefinite sick leave, even
admitting during the preliminary hearings that he was still an employee of respondents, and his principal
claim was for payment of his sales commission. Furthermore, the NLRC saw no badge of constructive
dismissal in respondents' action of applying petitioner's salary for the month of February 2000 as
payment for his debts to the company amounting to P95,000.00. It was also held that petitioner failed to
establish that there was an agreement between him and respondent employer for a 10% sales
commission, and that he failed to establish the origin and authenticity of the specific amount of the
commission being claimed by him.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but the same was denied.

From such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On
September 12, 2003, the CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it did not sustain the award of the Labor Arbiter

Held:

NO.

The NLRC and the CA were correct in not sustaining the award thereof by the LA. It must be
borne in mind that there is no law which requires employers to pay commissions; thus, it is incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that that there is indeed an agreement between him and his employer for
payment of the same.The only evidence presented by petitioner to prove that he is entitled to sales
commissions are the employment certificate, stating that he is an employee of respondents receiving
P21,600.00 per month as salary, exclusive of bonuses and sales commissions, and the undisputed fact
that private respondent company gave him and its other employees the amount of P85,418.00
sometime in 1998. However, the CA was correct in ruling that the employment certificate was
insufficient to prove that petitioner was indeed entitled to his claim for sales commissions, as said
document does not give the details as to the conditions for payment of the same or the agreed
percentage, if any.