EN BANC
and Boston streets and parked the cab there. The accused-appellant
G.R. No. 129970 April 5, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA and SOTERO SANTOS y
CRUZ, accused, EDUARDO PAVILLARE y VARONA, accused-
appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case no. Q96-65214
entitled People vs. Eduardo Pavillare y Varona, a prosecution for
kidnapping for ransom.
On March 14, 1996 the accused-appellant and his co-accused were
criminally charged as follows:
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses EDUARDO PAVILLARE Y VARONA and
SOTERO SANTOS Y CRUZ of the crime of kidnapping for Ransom,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of February, 1996, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
with another person, whose true name, identity and whereabouts had
not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, by
means of force, violence and/or intimidation did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one SUKHJINDER SINGH
at the corner of Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, this City, and
thereafter brought him at the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston
street, this City, for the purpose of extorting ransom money in the
amount of P20,000.00 Philippine currency, thereby detaining and
depriving him of his liberty for more than three hours, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
On April 29, 1996 both accused were arraigned and both pleaded "not
guilty".
The accused Sotero Santos y Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss the
charge against him for failure of the private complainant to identify him
as one of the malefactors. On February 28, 1997 the trial court granted
the motion and acquitted accused Sotero Santos. The trial of the case
proceeded only as against the accused-appellant Pavillare.
The private complainant, an Indian national named Sukhjinder Singh
testified in court that at about noon of February 12, 1996 while he was
on his way back to his motorcycle parked at the corner of Scout Reyes
and Roces Avenue, three men blocked his way. The one directly in
front of him, whom he later identified as herein accused-appellant,
accused him of having raped the woman inside the red Kia taxi cab
parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men
nevertheless forced him inside the taxi cab and brought him
somewhere near St. Joseph's College in Quezon City. One of the
abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside the
cab. Singh testified that the accused-appellant and his companions
beat him up and demanded one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) for his release but Singh told him he only had five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) with him. The accused-appellant forced
him to give the phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their
demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin
Lakhvir Singh and the appellant made the call. The private
complainant also stated in court that it was the accused-appellant who
haggled with his cousin for the amount of the ransom.1 When the
amount of twenty five thousand was agreed upon the complainant
stated that the kidnappers took him to the corner of Aurora Boulevard
and two of the male abductors alighted while the driver and their lady
companion stayed with the complainant in the car. When the
complainant turned to see where the accused-appellant and his
companions went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle and
together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the
kidnappers brought the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met
his relatives. The ransom money was handed to the appellant by the
complainant's cousin, after which the accused-appellant counted the
money and then, together with his cohorts, immediately left the
scene.2
Lakhvir Singh, the complainant's cousin, testified in court that the
kidnappers made about three to four phone calls a few minutes apart.
The kidnappers allowed him to talk to the private complainant to prove
that he is indeed in their custody. The kidnappers also told Lakhvir
that his cousin, Sukhjinder, raped their companion and threatened that
unless Lakhvir pays one hundred thousand pesos for Sukhjinder's
release "tutuluyan namin ito". Lakhvir told the kidnappers he does not
have that much money and after some haggling the kidnappers settled
for twenty five thousand pesos.3 The kidnappers also gave
instructions to deliver the money outside the Aurora Boulevard branch
of the Land Bank near the old Arcega's movie house. Lakhvir stated
in court that he did as instructed. When he and another relative
reached the designated place three men approached him and one of
them, whom he identified in court as the accused-appellant herein,
asked him "Ano dala mo ang pera?" Lakhvir said "yes" but he refused
to give the money until he saw his cousin. One of the kidnappers told
him to follow them and they proceeded to a mini-grocery nearby. A
few minutes later one of the kidnappers came with his cousin. Lakhvir
handed the money to the accused-appellant who counted it before
leaving with his companions.4
SPO1 Eduardo Frias testified for the prosecution that he was the
police officer who took the sworn statement of the private complainant
on February 14, 1996 pertaining to the February 12, 1996
incident.5 When the accused-appellant was apprehended in
connection with another case involving the kidnapping of another
Indian national the private complainant herein again showed up at the
police station on March 11, 1996 and identified the accused-appellant
as one of his kidnappers. Another sworn statement was executed by
the private complainant after he identified the accused-appellant at the
police station.6
For the defense, the accused-appellant testified that on the whole day
of February 12, 1996, the alleged date of the incident, he was at the
job site in Novaliches where he had contracted to build the house of a
client and that he could not have been anywhere near Roces Avenue
at the time the complainant was allegedly kidnapped. 7One of his
employees, an electrician, testified that the accused-appellant was
indeed at the job site in Novaliches the whole day of February 12,
1996. 8
On July 15, 1997 the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding EDUARDO PAVILLARE guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of kidnapping for the
purpose of ransom, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Death; to indemnify the private complainant in the amount
of P20,000.00, as actual damages, with interest at 6% percent per
annum from February 12, 1996; to pay him the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
The Branch clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately transmit
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.9
This case is before us on automatic review.
The accused-appellant Pavillare prays for an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt. On March 10, 1996 the accused-appellant was
apprehended in connection with the kidnapping of another Indian
national. While under police custody the appellant was required to
stand in a police line-up where he was supposedly identified by the
private complainant as one of his abductors. Five separate charges
arising from five separate incidents of kidnapping, all of whom were
Indian nationals, were filed against him. He claims that he was
identified by the private complainant as one of his abductors because
the Indians needed a "scapegoat" for the other four cases of
kidnapping of Indian nationals then pending.
The appellant argues that the private complainant could not identify
his captors by himself which is shown by the inconsistencies in his
testimony and by the improper suggestion made by the investigating
police officer pointing to the accused-appellant as one of the
malefactors. In court the private complainant stated that he described
his abductors to the police investigator while the latter typed his sworn
statement. He said that two of the abductors look like policemen, the
third one was "tall, a little bit aged" and the other one was the driver.
Their female companion was pretty. Pavillare points out however, that
the sworn statement given by the private complainant does not
contain a physical description of the kidnappers and that SPO1 Frias,
who took the complainant's statement, testified in court that the
complainant described one of his abductors as short, bejeweled and
with a pock marked face. The different descriptions allegedly given by
the private complainant and the absence of a physical description of
the kidnappers in his sworn statement supports the accused-
appellant's contention that the complainant could not describe his
abductors. Pavillare contends that his arrest in connection with a
different case for the kidnapping of another Indian national provided
the complainant an improper suggestion that he was indeed one of
the culprits in this case. The appellant claims that SPO1 Frias pointed
to him and conversed with the private complainant before the latter
was asked to identify the kidnappers. The time interval from the date
of the incident on February 12, 1996 up to the day the accused-
appellant was identified at the police line-up on March 11, 1996 further
weakened the complainant's vague recognition of the culprits.
Pavillare finally argues that he should not have been convicted of
kidnapping for ransom but only of simple robbery as it is borne by the
undisputed facts that the offenders were motivated by an intent to gain
and not to deprive the complainant of his liberty. The money
demanded by the offenders was not ransom money but one in the
nature of a bribe to drop the accusation for rape of their lady
companion.
The Solicitor-General filed brief praying for the affirmance in toto of
the appealed decision. The appellee contends that in court the private
complainant unhesitatingly and consistently identified the accused-
appellant Pavillare as one of the kidnappers. Throughout his narration
of the incident in court the complainant referred to Pavillare as one of
the kidnappers because he was the one who made the phone call and
the one who received the ransom money. The complainant had more
than adequate opportunity to observe his abductors and he testified in
court that Pavillare is one of them. As a sign of the complainant's
candor, he admitted in court that he does not recognize the other co-
accused, Sotero Santos, as one of his abductors and for which reason
the case was dismissed against him. The complainant's failure to state
an accurate description of the kidnappers in his sworn statement does
not belie his identification of Pavillare in court as it is the general rule
that affidavits are often inaccurate and incomplete. The argument of
the accused-appellant that his identification in the police line-up was
made with improper motive either from the other Indian nationals who
were at the police station or from SPO1 Frias is without evidentiary
basis. Moreover, the complainant's testimony is corroborated by the
testimony of his cousin who met the kidnappers and handed over the
ransom money to them. The trial court did not err in giving credence
to the complainant's identification of Pavillare as one of the abductors.
The Solicitor-General further contends that the accused-appellant's
alibi that he in Novaliches when the crime was committed cannot
stand against the positive identification of two witnesses and that his
alibi does not make it physically impossible for him to be at the crime
scene at the time it happened. As regards accused-appellant's plea to
be convicted instead of simple robbery is without legal nor factual
basis. The complainant was restrained of his liberty even if only for a
few hours and his captors demanded money for his release which in
fact they did after the ransom money was paid. Whether or not the
kidnappers only wanted money from the complainant the manner by
which they compelled him to give money, i.e. by restraining his liberty
until the ransom money was paid, constitutes kidnapping for ransom.
Finally, the submission that the offenders demanded a bribe and not
ransom money is likewise unfounded. There is no evidence that any
one of the kidnappers was a public officer in the performance of his
duties when they demanded money from the complainant in exchange
for his liberty.
Accused-appellant Pavillare filed Reply brief to reiterate his contention
that the prosecution did not controvert his testimony to the effect that
the complainant could not recognize his abductors and that it was
SPO1 Frias who pinpointed him to the private complainant as one of
the malefactors. Pavillare cites the complainant's failure to identify his
own relative who met him at the police station after the arrest of the
accused-appellant and argues that considering that the complainant
was held captive only for about two hours and the interval of almost
one month from the day of the incident up to the time the accused-
appellant was identified at the police line-up, the complainant was
deprived of any reliable recollection of his captors. The complainant's
failure to give a physical description of the abductors when he gave a
sworn statement to the police two days after the incident supports the
accused-appellant's contention that the complainant could not identify
his captors. It is also claimed that the improper identification of the
accused-appellant at the police line-up without the assistance of
counsel renders the said identification, including that made in court,
inadmissible in evidence.
The appeal is without merit.
The accused-appellant's defense that the identification made by the
private complainant in the police line-up is inadmissible because the
appellant stood at the line-up without the assistance of counsel is
without merit.
Sec. 12 (1) Art III of the Constitution states that "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Thus the
prohibition for custodial investigation conducted without the
assistance of counsel. Any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional mandate is inadmissible in evidence. 10 The prohibition
however, does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that
stage of an investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. 11 It
has been repeatedly held that custodial investigation commences
when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein
and which tend to elicit an admission. 12 The stage of an investigation
wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held
to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because
it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely
investigatory in nature. 13 It has also been held that an uncounseled
identification at the police line-up does not preclude the admissibility
of an in-court identification. 14 The identification made by the private
complainant in the police line-up pointing to Pavillare as one of his
abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant
was not assisted by counsel. In court, the private complainant
positively identified Paviallare as one of his captors and testified as
follows:
Q: Were you able to recognize the faces of the men and woman who
abducted you on the afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: Yes, sir I can recognize if I see them again. INTERPRETER:

Q: If you see them in court will you be able to identify them? Again, witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Pavillare.

A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q: Please point to them if the accused are inside the court room? ATTY. CRUZ:

A: That man, sir. Q: Could you tell us what did your abductors tell to Lakhvir while they
are talking over the telephone?
INTERPRETER:
A: They told him that they should pay the amount of money for my
release, sir.
Witness pointing at a man seated inside the court room and when
asked to identify himself he gave his name as Eduardo Pavillare.
Q: Incidentally, can you tell us who among your abductors who
ATTY. CRUZ: actually talked to Lakvir over the telephone?

Q: Other than the accused Pavillare, do you recognize anybody else A: He is the one, sir.
in this court room if among those who abducted you in the afternoon
of February 12, 1996? INTERPRETER:

A: None, sir. Again, witness is referring to accused earlier identified as Pavillare.

Q: Tell us how were you abducted by the accused Pavillare and his ATTY. CRUZ:
companions in that particular date in the afternoon of February 12,
1996?
Q: Why do you know that it was the accused Pavillare who was talking
to Lakhvir over the telephone?
A: While I was returning to my motorcycle, they blocked my way and
asked for my name, sir. A: Because I was near him and I saw him talking to Lakhvir, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ: xxx xxx xxx

Q: Who blocked your way and asked for your name? ATTY. CRUZ:

A: He was infront of his companions, sir.

Q: Where did the two of you go?

INTERPRETER:
A: Inside the mini-grocery, sir.

Witness referring to accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare. Q: After you went inside this mini-grocery, what happened next, if any?

xxx xxx xxx A: I saw my cousin Lakhvir. He asked me if I am okey and I told him
that they bit me up but I am still fine, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: After you told your cousin that you are okey except for the beating
Q: If you know, Mr. Singh, where were you taken by the accused after that you got but you are fine, what transpired next, if any?
they abducted you at the corner of Roces Avenue and Scout Reyes
St., Quezon City? A: Lakhvir gave the P20,000.00, sir.

A: It was a deserted street somewhere in St. Joseph College, Quezon ATTY. CRUZ:
City, sir.

Q: To whom did Lakhvir handed the P20,000.00?

Q: After you reached that deserted place, what happened next, if any?

A: To him sir.
A: They asked me for P100,000,00 and I told them that I have only
P5,000.00 and they told me that if I give P100,000.00 they will let me
go, sir. INTERPRETER:

Q: Who demanded the amount of P100,000.00 from you? Witness pointed to the accused Pavillare earlier identified.

WITNESS: ATTY. CRUZ:

A: He is the one, sir.

Q: Why do you know that only P20,000.00 was handed over by WITNESS:
accused Pavillare?
A: They were behind me, sir.
A: Because they counted the money and they complained about it, sir.
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Who counted the money?
Q: What was the distance if you can tell us?
A: He was the one who counted the money, sir.
A: Almost together and then when they asked me my name I replied
INTERPRETER: and they hold my arms, sir.

Witness pointing to accused Pavillare earlier identified. Q: Who hold your arms?

ATTY. CRUZ: A: He was the first, sir.

Q: Were you present when Pavillare counted the money? INTERPRETER:

A: Yes, sir. Witness pointed to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was identified
earlier.
Q: After Pavillare got the P20,000.00, what happened next, if any?
xxx xxx xxx
A: They left immediately and they left me too, and we went to get my
motorcycle, sir. 15 ATTY. MALLABO:

On cross-examination the complainant stood firm on his identification
of the accused-appellant as one of the abductors. He testified:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: You said that at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon of February 12,
1996 while you are going back to your motorcycle you were blocked
by four persons, is that correct?
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: You said that there were 5 persons who abducted you?
A: Yes, sir. 4 male and one female.
Q: On March 11, 1996 your cousin informed you or your friend
informed you that there were persons apprehended because also of
kidnapping incident?
A: Yes, sir. There were 4 of them arrested and when I went to see
them I only recognized one of them, sir.

Misleading, he said 3 persons, your Honor. ATTY. MALLABO:

COURT: Q: Who was that person?

Reform. A: He is the one, sir.

ATTY. MALLABO: INTERPRETER:

Q: You were blocked by 3 persons, is that correct? Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare.

A: Yes, sir. ATTY. MALLABO:

Q: Who was the person immediately in front of you when you were That would be all for the witness, your Honor.
blocked?
COURT:
A: He was the one, sir.
Any redirect?
INTERPRETER:
ATTY. CRUZ:
Witness pointing to accused Eduardo Pavillare which was earlier
identified. Few redirect, your Honor.

ATTY. MALLABO: ATTY. CRUZ:

Q: What about the two (2) other persons?

Q: Mr. Witness, before you went to the police station on March 11, Witness pointing at a man sitting inside the courtroom and when asked
1996 you were aware of how many suspects were in custody of to identify himself, he gave his name as EDUARDO PAVILLARE.
kidnapping of Gormel, is it not?
ATTY. CRUZ:
A: Yes, sir they were 4 of them.
Q: After Pavillare demanded to you whether you brought with you the
Q: You were aware that 4 persons were arrested for the kidnapping of money, what did you do next, if any?
your friend Gormel?
A: I told them "I have the money with me but I would not hand the
A: Yes, sir. money to you until I see Sukhjinder Singh."

Q: These 4 people were shown to you, were they not? Q: What was the response of the accused Pavillare after you told him
that Sukhjinder Singh be first shown to you before you turn over the
A: Yes, sir. money?

ATTY. CRUZ: A: One of them told us to follow him and they would bring Sukhjinder
Singh, sir.

Q: But when you were asked to identify who among them were
Q: From that place, where did you go if you can still recall?
involved in your kidnapping you only pointed one of them?

A: Yes, sir. A: We proceeded to a small grocery store near Land Bank, sir.

Q: You did not point to the other accused? Q: After going inside this grocery store near Land Bank, tell us what
happened next, if any?

A: No, sir.
A: After a few minutes, one of the kidnappers arrived together with
Sukhjinder Singh, sir.
Q: The only one whom you pointed as being involved in your
kidnapping was none other than the person of the accused Pavillare?
ATTY. CRUZ:

A: Yes, sir. 16
Q: After you saw Sukhjinder Singh together with one of his kidnappers,
what did you do next, if any?
Moreover, the complainant's cousin Lakhvir Singh who met the
kidnappers to pay the ransom money corroborated the complainant's
A: I immediately approached Sukhjinder Singh and I asked him if he
identification of the accused-appellant Pavillare. Lakhvir Singh
testified as follows: was hurt by the kidnappers and he said "yes but I am now okey."

Q: After reaching the designated area somewhere along Aurora Q: After Sukhjinder confirmed to you that he was previously beaten
Boulevard, what happened next, if any? and that he was already okey at that time, what did you do next, if
any?

A: As we parked our motorcycle near Land Bank, the kidnappers

immediately approached us, sir. WITNESS:

Q: How many kidnappers approached you? A: After that, one of the kidnappers said: "Andiyan na ang tao ninyo
ibinigay mo sa akin ang pera".

A: Three (3) of them, sir.

ATTY. CRUZ:

ATTY. CRUZ:
Q: Who among the kidnappers who said that?

Q: How were you able to know that they are the kidnappers?
A: That person, sir.

A: Because when they approached us one of them said: "Ano dala mo

and pera?" INTERPRETER:

Q: Tell us, were you able to recognize the faces of these three persons Witness pointing to the accused earlier identified as Eduardo
who approached you and demanded to you whether you brought the Pavillare.
money?
ATTY. CRUZ:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After Pavillare demanded that you turn-over to him the money, what
did you do next, if any?
Q: If you see anyone inside the courtroom, please point to him.

A: I gave him the money, sir.

INTERPRETER:
Q: When you said "him", to whom are you referring to?
A: To him, sir.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to accused earlier identified as Eduardo Pavillare.
ATTY. CRUZ:
If you recall, how many money all in all did you give to Eduardo
Pavillare that afternoon of February 12, 1996?
A: P20,000.00, sir. 17
xxx xxx xxx
We find that the trial court did not err in giving due weight and
credence to the identification in open court of the accused-appellant
by the private complainant and his cousin as one of the kidnappers.
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and
to remember their faces. The complainant had close contact with the
kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the
kidnappers haggled on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin
met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when he paid
the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in
close contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a
recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in
court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them again and
upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the
malefactors as he remembers him as the one who blocked his way,
beat him up, haggled with the complainant's cousin and received the
ransom money. As an indicium of candor the private complainant
admitted that he does not recognize the co-accused, Sotero Santos
for which reason the case was dismissed against him. It bears
repeating that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses is given utmost respect and as a rule will not be disturbed
on appeal because it had the opportunity to closely observe the
demeanor of the witness in court.
As regards the alibi forwarded by the appellant, we find that the
positive identification made by two eyewitnesses for the prosecution
pointing to the appellant as one of the kidnappers prevails over it. The
appellant's employee who testified to corroborate his alibi only stated
that in the month of February 1996 the accused-appellant was at the
Novaliches job site everyday. 18 The trial court properly took judicial
notice that it will take only a few hours drive from Novaliches, where
the accused-appellant claimed to be on the day of the incident, to
Roces Ave., in Quezon City, where the complainant was
kidnapped. 19 Absent any competent proof that Pavillare could not
have been at the scene of the crime at the time and day it was
committed, the trial court correctly denied weight and credence to the
appellant's alibi.
Pavillare's argument that the complainant could not have identified his
abductors were it not for the improper suggestion made by the police
investigator is based on the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the
accused-appellant himself. The police investigator was not confronted
with this accusation 20 and the defense did not present any evidence
to support it. It is on record that when Pavillare's counsel made an
attempt to question the police investigator, SPO1 Frias, on a matter
not covered by the direct examination, i.e., where SPO1 Frias
recorded the physical description given by the complainant of his
abductors, the trial court suggested that the defense may later call
SPO1 Frias to the stand as a defense witness apparently to give the
defense a chance to prove its allegation that the complainant did not
give any physical description of his abductors and that the
identification at the police line-up is tainted with an improper
suggestion. 21 The defense counsel never called SPO1 Frias to the
stand. The appellant must prove the veracity of his own
defense 22 and the prosecution could not controvert what was not
presented in evidence. In the same vein, the defense did not present
any competent proof that Pavillare was identified by the complainant
only as a scapegoat for the four other kidnapping cases committed
against other Indian nationals.
The cited variance between the complainant's testimony in court and
his affidavit on whether or not the complainant gave a physical
description of his abductors before the police investigator pertains to
a minor detail. Both the complainant and police investigator SPO1
Frias testified that the former gave a physical description of the
abductors to the police. The complainant testified that he gave the
physical description of the kidnappers while the police typed his
affidavit but no such physical description of the kidnappers is stated in
the affidavit. On the other hand, the police investigator testified that
the said description was entered in the police logbook. The defense
never required SPO1 Frias to produce the logbook in court to
ascertain whether such a description was given during the
investigation. As a rule, variance between the private complainant's
affidavit and his testimony in court, as long as it does not deviate from
the nature of the crime as stated in the Information, does not weaken
the credibility of the testimony in court. 23
Finally, the accused-appellant's argument that he should have been
convicted of simple robbery and not kidnapping with ransom because
the evidence proves that the prime motive of the accused-appellant
and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was
detained only for two hours, are both unmeritorious. Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three
days.
2 If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when
the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned
were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or
is raped, or is the subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. 24
The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are
replete with positive declarations that the accused-appellant and his
companions demanded money for the complainant's release. The
pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the dropping
of the charges for rape is not supported by the evidence. The
complainant's cousin testified that at the agreed drop-off point
Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated, "Andiyan na ang
tao ninyo ibigay mo sa akin ang pera". The accused-appellant
released the complainant when the money was handed over to him
and after counting the money Pavillare and his companions
immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of
the ransom money is in exchange for the liberty of the private
complainant. The death penalty was properly imposed by the trial
court. 25
The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not
alter the nature of the crime committed.1a\^/phi1 The crime of
kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty whether he
is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. 26 As
squarely expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death
is imposable where the detention is committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not material.
Four Members of the court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nonetheless they submit to the ruling of the majority of this
Court i.e., that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should
be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q96-65214 finding the accused-appellant
Eduardo Pavillare y Varona guilty of kidnapping for ransom and
imposing the DEATH penalty and the awards for actual and moral
damages is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
4. CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INVESTIGATION
G.R. No. 146277 June 20, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated October 17, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant
Albert Casimiro guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, §4, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1999, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and/or deliver to SPO2 DOROTHEO SUPA of the 14th
Regional Field Office, Narcotics Unit, posing as buyer, about nine
hundred fifty (950) grams of marijuana dried leaves in brick form,
without any authority of law to do so and knowing fully well that the
article is a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited provision of
law.2
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged, whereupon the trial of the case followed. 3
Three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution: PO2 Dorotheo
Supa,4 Alma Margarita D. Villaseñor, and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr.
Their testimonies established the following:
On August 16, 1999, a civilian informer, named Rose, walked into the
office of Police Chief Inspector Benson Dagiw-a Leleng at the 14th
Regional Narcotics Office, DPS Compound in Baguio City. She
informed Chief Inspector Leleng and PO3 Juan Piggangay that a
certain Albert Casimiro, accused-appellant herein, was engaged in the
distribution or sale of marijuana. As proof, Rose told the police officers
to wait and accused-appellant would call them up on that day.
Accused-appellant, however, did not call up. Nonetheless, Police
Chief Inspector Leleng formed a buy-bust team composed of P/Insp.
Edgar Afalla as team leader, PO2 Dorotheo Supa as poseur-buyer,
and SPO2 Marquez Madlon and PO3 Juan Piggangay, Jr. as back-up
men.5
The following day, August 17, 1999, Rose again told the Narcotics
agents to wait for a call from accused-appellant. True enough, at
around 4:00 p.m., the telephone rang. When PO2 Supa answered the
telephone, he found that it was accused-appellant who was calling.
Rose introduced on the telephone PO2 Supa to accused-appellant as
someone who wanted to buy marijuana. Accused-appellant allegedly
agreed to meet PO2 Supa at around 1:00 p.m. the following day
outside Anthony’s Wine and Grocery at the YMCA Building, Post
Office Loop, Upper Session Road. PO2 Supa said he wanted to buy
one kilogram of marijuana and accused-appellant said it would
cost P1,500.00. Accused-appellant said he would wear white pants
and a black leather jacket to their meeting the following day. 6
On August 18, 1999, at around 1:00 p.m., PO2 Supa and Rose went
to the grocery store. SPO2 Madlon and PO3 Piggangay waited
secretly inside the Post Office building, around 12 meters across the
street, where they could see PO2 Supa and Rose. At around 1:30
p.m., accused-appellant arrived. Rose greeted him, "O Bert, heto na
yung sinasabi ko sa iyong buyer. Bahala na kayong mag-usap. Aalis
na ako." (Bert, here is the buyer I told you about. I’ll leave you two
alone to talk.) Rose then left the two men alone. 7
PO2 Supa said he had P1,500.00 with him and asked for the
marijuana. Accused-appellant gave the poseur-buyer a paper bag,
which contained an object wrapped in plastic and newspaper. After
determining from its appearance and smell that the object inside was
marijuana, PO2 Supa gave a signal for the back-up team to make an
arrest by combing his hair. He testified that he no longer gave the
marked money to accused-appellant because he placed the latter
under arrest, reciting to him his rights, while the back-up team ran from
across the street.8
After arresting accused-appellant, the policemen took him to the 14th
Narcom Office, where PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay
wrote their initials on the brick of marijuana before giving it to the
evidence custodian. The policemen prepared a booking sheet and
arrest report, affidavits, and a request for the laboratory examination
of the confiscated marijuana.9 They also prepared a "receipt of
property seized," dated August 18, 1999, (Exh. L) which states:
18 August 1999
RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEIZED
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon PNP, the
undersigned seizing Officer have seized and taken possession of the
property described hereunder from the
a. Suspect: ALBERT CASIMIRO Y SERILLO, 24 yrs.-old, single,
waiter, native of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and resident of #2 Happy
Homes, Old Lucban, Baguio City.
b. Facts of the case: Suspect was arrested by elements of this office
on or about 181330H August 1999, in front of Anthony’s Grocery along
the vicinity of Post Office Loop, Baguio City.
c. Nature of the Case: Violation of Section 4 Art. II of RA 6425 as
amended by RA 7659.
 On October 17, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding
EXHIBI QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION REMARKS accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
T of its decision states:
"A" One (1) Bricks Marijuana Dried Leaves Delivered by the
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Albert Casimiro guilty
wrapped in a newspaper page placed suspect to a poseur
inside a black plastic bag with markings buyer. beyond doubt of Violation of Section 4 of Article II of Republic Act 6425
Prime wear shirt haus place[d] inside a as amended by Sections 13 and 17 of RA 7659 (Sale or delivery of
dark gray paper bag with markings 904.6 grams of marijuana brick) as charged in the Information and
Spencer & SM City hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and
to pay a Fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
WITNESSES:
The marijuana brick weighing 904.6 grams (Exhs. J to J-4) being the
subject of the crime and a prohibited drug is hereby declared
(signed) (signed)
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed
immediately in accordance with law.
1. PO3 Juan A. Piggangay ALBERT CASIMIRO Y CERILLO
PNP (Suspect/ Owner)
The accused Albert Casimiro, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to
be credited in the service of his sentence 4/5 of his preventive
(signed) (signed) imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. PO2 Dorotheo T. Supa SPO2 Marquez K. Madlon
PNP PNP (Seizing Officer) SO ORDERED.20

Accused-appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of
counsel.10 The dried leaves were then examined by the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Cordillera Administrative Region. 11 Police officer
and forensic chemist Alma Margarita Villaseñor found the specimen
to weigh 904.6 grams. The chemistry report dated August 20, 1999,
signed by Villaseñor, stated that the leaves were positive for
marijuana.12
The defense then presented evidence showing the following:
Accused-appellant, then 25 years old, residing at No. 1 Old Lucban
Street, Happy Homes, Baguio City,13 said that at around 8:00 a.m. of
August 16, 1999, he took the child of his neighbor to the Christian
Mission Center School near the Baguio General Hospital. He then
went home and stayed there during the day, as he usually did, except
when he needed to fetch the boy from school. At around 5:00 or 5:30
p.m., he reported for work at the Perutz Bar14 on Magsaysay Avenue,
where he worked as a waiter, until 3:00 a.m. of the next day.15
On August 17, 1999, accused-appellant said he received a call from
Rose, an acquaintance who worked as a guest relations officer at a
club on Magsaysay Avenue. Rose offered to help him find a better job
and asked that they meet at Anthony’s Wine and Grocery. In the past,
Rose had offered to sell him shabu or marijuana, but he refused to
buy from her as he had no money.16 At around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m.,
accused-appellant met Rose in front of the grocery store. While she
talked to him about a job opening in a club in Dagupan City, PO3
Piggangay grabbed his hands from behind even as he shouted "I-
handcuff, i-handcuff!" (Handcuff him, handcuff him!) Accused-
appellant was then taken to the Regional Narcotics Office by the
policemen, accompanied by Rose.17
At the Narcotics Office, PO3 Piggangay confronted accused-appellant
about the marijuana allegedly seized from him. Accused-appellant
said he denied having carried the bag of marijuana which he had seen
Rose carrying earlier.18 After taking pictures of him pointing at the bag,
the policemen threatened to shoot him in a secluded place if he did
not admit owning the marijuana. After failing to make him admit
ownership of the marijuana, PO3 Piggangay offered to release
accused-appellant if he gave them money. When accused-appellant
replied that he had no money, PO3 Piggangay said, "If you have no
money, then we will work on your papers so that you will go to
Muntinlupa." The policemen then took accused-appellant to a hospital
for a physical examination and afterwards asked him to sign a receipt
of property, a booking sheet, and an arrest report without explaining
their contents or allowing him to read them. 19
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that the evidence
against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.21
We find the appeal meritorious. Although the trial court’s evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, the rule does not apply
where it is shown that any fact of weight and substance has been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.22 In this
case, several such circumstances stand out as having been
overlooked or misapprehended by the lower court which entitle
accused-appellant to an acquittal.
First. With respect to the receipt of property seized from accused-
appellant, the lower court declared:
The fact that there was a receipt of property seized issued by the
police which was signed by the accused does not affect the liability of
the accused. The receipt of property seized was issued by the police
in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy bust
operation to show what property was seized. The receipt should not
be treated as an admission or confession.23
Indeed, the receipt (Exh. L) could not be considered evidence against
accused-appellant because it was signed by him without the
assistance of counsel.24 Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
The receipt states that a brick of dried marijuana leaves was delivered
by the suspect to a poseur buyer and signed by accused-appellant
Albert Casimiro as "suspect/ owner." In effect, accused-appellant
admitted that he delivered a prohibited drug to another, which is an
offense under the law. Having been made without the assistance of
counsel, it cannot be accepted as proof that marijuana was seized
from him. It is inadmissible in evidence.25
In People v. Obrero,26 this Court held that an uncounseled statement
is presumed by the Constitution to be psychologically coerced. Swept
into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures
typical of the atmosphere of a police interrogation, the suspect needs
the guiding hand of counsel.
PO2 Supa testified that he informed accused-appellant of his Miranda
rights while he was being arrested outside the grocery:
Q: What happened after you brought out your comb and started
combing your hair?
A: Sir, my two companions went to our place and effected the
arrest of the suspect.
Q: What else happened after the two members of the team rushed
to your place?
A: We apprised the suspect of his constitutional rights and
brought him to our Narcotics office.
Q: How did you apprise the suspect of his rights as you said?
A: Sir, we informed him of his constitutional rights by saying, "You
are under arrest for violation of 6425. You have the right to remain
silent. You have the rights to call for a lawyer of your own choice.
Anything you say may be used as evidence in favor or against you."
And we brought him to the office, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: Sir, we investigated him and the suspect identified himself as
Albert Casimiro.27
The warning was incomplete. It did not include a statement that, if
accused-appellant could not afford counsel, one would be assigned to
him. The warning was perfunctory, made without any effort to find out
if he understood it. It was merely ceremonial and inadequate in
transmitting meaningful information to the suspect.28 We cannot say
that, in signing the receipt without a lawyer, accused-appellant acted
willingly, intelligently, and freely. What is more, the police investigators
did not pause long enough and wait for accused-appellant to say
whether he was willing to answer their questions even without the
assistance of counsel or whether he was waiving his right to remain
silent at all.
Second. Nor is there other credible evidence against accused-
appellant. As he points out, he could not have been so careless as to
call the telephone number of the 14th Regional Narcotics Office and
offer marijuana to the policemen there. Nor can we believe that when
accused-appellant finally showed up at the appointed place, Rose
could simply introduce PO2 Supa as the one who wanted to buy
marijuana as if the latter were buying something not prohibited or
illegal. While drugs may indeed be sold to police officers, 29 these
transactions are usually done face-to face. It is improbable that a drug
dealer would discuss the details of an illegal sale over the telephone
with someone he has never seen before.
Third. The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited
drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense, an essential
requirement in a drug-related case.30
31
In People v. Mapa, accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after
the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the
NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from
the accused. In People v. Dismuke,32 this Court ruled that the failure
to prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic
chemist was that seized from the accused was fatal to the
prosecution’s case. In People v. Laxa,33 the policemen composing the
buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the alleged apprehension of accused-appellant. One policeman
admitted that he marked the seized items only after seeing them for
the first time in the police headquarters. It was held:
This deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics
operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Were
the bags which the policemen allegedly recovered from the scene of
the buy-bust operation the same ones which PO2 Espadera marked
in the police headquarters? This question gives rise only to surmises
and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of accused-appellant.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the
chain of custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2
Madlon, and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials
on the brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it from
accused-appellant outside the grocery store but only did so in their
headquarters.34 The narcotics field test, which initially identified the
seized item as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of
the crime, but only at the narcotics office.35 There is thus reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant
is the same brick of marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory for
examination.
According to PO3 Piggangay, the bag that he saw accused-appellant
give PO2 Supa was colored gray or blue, the same color as that of the
bag sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for laboratory
examination.36 PO2 Supa stated, however, that the bag of marijuana
which accused-appellant was carrying in the grocery was colored
brown.37 The discrepancy in the testimony of these two police officers
casts additional doubt on the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti.
Indeed, there is failure in this case to observe standard operating
procedure for a buy-bust operation. The government’s drive against
illegal drugs deserves everybody’s support. But it is precisely when
the government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most on
our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long
ago, "the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment
by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." 38 Our desire
to stamp out criminality cannot be achieved at the expense of
constitutional rights. For these reasons, we cannot uphold the
conviction of accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Baguio City is REVERSED and accused-appellant Albert Casimiro is
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is
ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully
held for another crime. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y
VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case
No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty
as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso
guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin
Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje
with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping each other, and who
were then armed with a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing
at the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given any
provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.1
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio
Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje pleaded not guilty to the charge of
murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July 1997,
also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel
Ramos was at a vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid screaming from across
the road: "Enough, enough, enough!" In front of her were Marlon
Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a fisticuff. By the
time Pawid was able to subdue the two men by standing between
them and embracing Galam, Buenviaje’s face was already bloodied
and Galam’s shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to
face Galam and, with his right index finger making a slicing motion
across his throat, shouted: "Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin,
papatayin kita." Galam retorted, "Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika."
Buenviaje did not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.2
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam
was shot to death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop,
for short) owned by him, which was located at Barangay Quezon,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez
Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of that fateful day, a man whom she
later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the Rooftop
and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in.
She answered in the negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc
asked another question, "What time does your bosing arrive?" She
replied that she did not know. She then went to the second floor of the
establishment.3
Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between
5:30 and 5:45 p.m. Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside
the information counter with his hands tucked in the pocket of his
jacket, ordered a bottle of beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but
was delayed in delivering the beer because she gave some
instructions to the dishwasher. When she gave the beer to Benjamin,
the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to bring the
beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and
some other waitresses. Then the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived. 4
Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the
ground floor of the building. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw
Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the ground face
up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and
disappeared into the darkness.5
Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito
Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod of BarangayQuezon, Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant located
along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The three were aboard a
tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and Diego Theater.
The younger Buenviaje was on the driver’s seat, while the older
Buenviaje and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao
ordered pancit bihon. While he was waiting outside of the restaurant,
he noticed that the tricycle was still parked in the vacant lot, and the
three occupants thereof were talking with each other. After getting his
order and while he was getting out of the restaurant, Parungao heard
four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop building. He thereafter
saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc,
walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon
Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off towards the center of the
town.6
The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a
hospital, where he was declared dead on arrival. 7 Dr. Antonio R.
Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver, found four
gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were inflicted
from behind and the last two were frontal. 8
That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the
Solano Police Station, assigned some investigators to go to the scene
of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., he and
Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon
City. Pilar and Jaramillo were interviewed by the cartographic artist,
who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing the face of the
assailant.9
On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at
the PNP Provincial Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who
shot Joseph Galam to death.10
On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the
Provincial Command Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to
take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters
he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the
investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the
room. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter
of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted to
have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name
one, Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour
later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO,
who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard
Sayaboc say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which
Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao
would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave
to go to the comfort room.11 That night Sayaboc executed an
extrajudicial confession12 in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to
killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of
P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and
attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case,
1counsel for accused Mike Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days to file a motion for
leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.13 The trial court acceded. But
instead of filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on
12 July 1999.14 The motion for leave to file the pleading was filed the
next day only.15
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order 16 issued
on 16 August 1999. Further, it ruled that because of they did not seek
nor were granted express leave of court prior to their filing of the
demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to
have submitted their case for judgment in accordance with Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to
proceed with the presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the
defense of alibi. He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or
having been informed of his rights. He testified to having been beaten
by six or seven police officers in the investigating room, who then
coerced him to confess to having killed Galam.17 Apart from his
testimony, he submitted a handwritten statement dated 20 March
199518 and an affidavit dated 10 April 199519to support his claim of
police brutality and retraction of his confession.
In its decision dated 9 November 2000, 20 the trial court found
Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating
circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of
death. As for Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio
Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery employed by Sayaboc
could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty
of the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two
others as accomplices. Each was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the amounts
of P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the
costs of the suit in favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT
SAYABOC GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY,
HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN
IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT
AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE AND
VIGILANT COUNSEL.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON
BUENVIAJE AND ACCUSED ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY
WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER THEY FILED
THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT FIRST
SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.
In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that
the crime committed by Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no
proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses did not see the
commencement of the shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as
evident premeditation, was not specifically designated as a qualifying
circumstance in the information. Neither can the aggravating
circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated because
they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial.
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which require aggravating and qualifying circumstances to be alleged
in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore,
be applied retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the
extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence
against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his
counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent,
independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective
because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not
independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police
Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio
Escorpiso claim that they were denied due process because they
were not able to present evidence in their defense. They ask this Court
to relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their
constitutional right to be heard by themselves and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the
back is adequate proof of treachery. Invoking People v. Aquino, 21 the
OSG contends that for treachery to be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, it needs only to be specifically alleged in the information
and does not have to be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified
by. As to the proven circumstances of craft and price or reward, the
same cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which are applicable to actions that are pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence against him, since it was made after he was
informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights, particularly the
right to an independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was
adduced during the trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo
used to be connected with the NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was
made for the first time in this appeal, and was based merely on an
information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now
deceased) to Sayaboc’s counsel in this appeal, which makes the said
information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional
circumstance exists in this case that may warrant the relaxation of the
rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to evidence carries with it
a waiver of the accused’s right to present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession,
we hold that such cannot be used in evidence in this case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
…
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed
to be voluntary.22 The condition for this presumption, however, is that
the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements
safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial
confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is
to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to
coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession
may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did
not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, 23 the
failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.24
In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungao’s claim that he conferred
with Sayaboc for half an hour informing him about his constitutional
rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only the following:
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions
will be asked to you regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at
the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection
with the shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House as
a result of his death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I would
like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the
Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or
refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you;
That you have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own
choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you
willing to give your true statement regarding the death of Joseph
Galam?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo
Cornejo.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to
assist you in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 25
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the
confession contains the passing of information of the kind held to be
in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution. In People v. Jara,26 the Court explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a
"legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it
together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign
it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness
or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle."27 It should allow the suspect to
consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make
of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who
has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva
Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers
for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right
to a competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the
unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still,
the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution
witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent
throughout the duration of the custodial investigation. The trial court
attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and
intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It
was in his character for him to want to be a central figure in a drama,
albeit tragic – for others. He would do what he wanted to do regardless
of the advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could only advise him of
his constitutional rights, which was apparently done. The said counsel
could not stop him from making his confession even if he did try. 28
We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a
"garrulous" man who would "do what he wanted to do regardless of
the advice of others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within the
rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to the satisfaction of
this Court, of a faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to
make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions. If anything,
it appears that Sayaboc’s counsel was ineffectual for having been
cowed by his client’s enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent
to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the
counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation,
that the suspect understands the import and consequences of
answering the questions propounded. In People v. Deniega, 29 we
said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice
as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person
undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from
making a confession. Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an
attorney’s duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth. However, counsel
should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of
the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation
should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the
suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an
accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in
obtaining evidence to bring criminals to justice. But even the hardest
of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with. Those tasked
with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it
carry the burden of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the
course of the performance of their duties are untainted with
constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of
the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak,
against possible indiscriminate use of the powers of the government.
Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any fruit of such deviation shall
be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be
used in evidence against him. We hold, however, that the prosecution
has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc
shot and killed Galam in the early evening of 2 December 1994. He
was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of that day,
shooting Galam shortly after the latter’s arrival, and fleeing from the
scene of the crime to a waiting tricycle. Credible witnesses described
Sayaboc’s appearance to the police soon after the shooting incident
and prepared affidavits about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at
the police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary
investigation, and, again, in open court. Such positive identification
constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold the finding
that Sayaboc was Galam’s killer. It cannot just be rebutted by
Sayaboc’s bare denial and weak alibi.
Appellants’ claim that the information against them is insufficient for
failure to specifically state that treachery and evident premeditation
were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In People v.
Aquino,30 we held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be
preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to
properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the case,
we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery has been
sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. Thus, two conditions must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself;
and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be
appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the
inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how the
killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be
supposed. 31
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses
did not hear any shout or conversation between the assailant and the
victim immediately before the attack could only mean that Sayaboc
had approached his victim through stealth. 32 While not improbable,
that conclusion is merely an inference. The fact remains that none of
the witnesses testified as to how the aggression began. The witnesses
testified having heard four shots, the last two of which were seen as
having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy
conducted by Dr. Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and
the shoulder, and two wounds on the right side of Galam’s back.
Although it is plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind,
such inference is insufficient to establish treachery. 33
Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying
circumstance. Evident premeditation exists when it is shown that the
execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of
evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between
such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act.34
Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was
hired to kill Galam, the testimony that the former inquired about the
latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of that
fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill
Galam. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before that plan was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.35
The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if
proved, can neither be considered because they were not specifically
alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for
it to be considered in the imposition of penalty. This requirement is
beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given retroactive
effect.36
Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of
homicide only, which is punishable by reclusion temporal. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances appreciated for or against
him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
meted a penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor
and whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon
Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso that the case
should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied the
right to be heard by the trial court. It must be remembered that their
demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior leave of
court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was filed only the
next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court.
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to
evidence found in Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to
present evidence on their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an
unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the
accused.37 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves
for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is
insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any
evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the
outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints
whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the rule is
also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a
demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would
then claim the right to present its evidence. 38
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it
disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present evidence on
their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right
to be heard by themselves and counsel.
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence
of conspiracy between Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy. 39 But
the same was not established by competent proof in this case. The
extrajudicial confession40 and the newspaper reports41 adduced by
the prosecution, which both contained Sayaboc’s statement pointing
to Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam,
are inadmissible in evidence. The first, as earlier stated, was executed
in violation of Sayaboc’s constitutional rights. The second are
hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as
witnesses to affirm the veracity thereof.42
Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may
be shown by circumstantial evidence.43 As correctly found by the trial
court and concurred with by the OSG, the concatenation of
circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with
Sayaboc, thus:
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph
Galam, causing him injuries on his face and prompting him to make a
threat to kill the latter;44
2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who
had no discernible motive to do so;45
3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and
the other appellants in the tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot
near the crime scene;46
4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and
disappeared;47
5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or
until 10 July 1997; and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje
offered prosecution eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad,
allowances, and two motorcycles in consideration of her retraction of
her testimony against Sayaboc.48
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is
more than one circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proved; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. All these requisites are present in the case at bar.
Being a conspirator equally guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must
be meted the same penalty as that of Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is
paucity of evidence linking them to the killing. They might have been
with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is nothing to show that
they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active
participation in furtherance of the common design or purpose to kill
Galam, their mere presence near the crime scene or in the tricycle
driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make them
conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act –
without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate – is not
enough to establish conspiracy.49
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial
court’s award of actual damages, representing the wake and burial
expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the amount supported
by receipts. The award of moral damages is, however, increased to
P50,000 conformably with current jurisprudence. 50 In addition, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 is
MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and
are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as
actual damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants Miguel Buenviaje and
Patricio Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133685-86 May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay,
finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and of Rape with Homicide in
Criminal Case No. T-2875, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
Death in each case.
The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874 reads
as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 o’clock in the
morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
while armed with a bolo, with nocturnity, treachery, superior strength,
and with disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of age
and sex, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and hack with said bolo one AURIA BROÑA, 1 a 70-year old
blind woman, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which
caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
ACTS CONTARY TO LAW.2
The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 o’clock in the
morning, more or less, at Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by
means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with ROSALIE
RAYALA, against her will and consent, and on the occasion thereof,
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and while
armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts
of her body, which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of
her heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded "not guilty"
to both charges against him,4 and joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to SPO2
Junwel Ambion for custodial investigation. Without asking the name
of appellant, SPO2 Ambion informed him in the Bicol dialect of his
right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says
may be used against or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or
molested. Asked if he is willing to cooperate, the accused assented
and gave his name as Amado Magnate. SPO2 Ambion later learned
that appellant’s real name is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told
SPO2 Ambion that he is willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again
informed appellant of his rights, and asked him further if he wants to
be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in
Manila. SPO2 Ambion offered the services of Atty. Paterno
Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. SPO2 Ambion then left to
fetch Atty. Brotamonte whose office was located several meters away
from the police station. However, Atty. Brotamonte told SPO2 Ambion
that he will just follow as he was having his office blessing at that time.
After some time, Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police station. Before
proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the
policemen to leave the investigation room and conferred with
appellant. He introduced himself to appellant and informed him of his
rights. He also asked and examined appellant to see if he was
physically harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty.
Brotamonte noticed that appellant’s left hand was handcuffed to the
table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a
statement. The investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect,
with SPO2 Ambion asking the questions. It was translated thereafter
into English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of
putting it into writing. After typing the first page of the confession, Atty.
Brotamonte translated and explained the contents thereof to
appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. While
all this was going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales was taking
pictures.5 The first page of the confession reads:
PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this office being
investigated for your involvement in the crimes imputed against you
particularly the killing of Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala and at the
same time having carnal knowledge of the two in Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay. But before we proceed in this investigation, may I inform you
that under our New Constitution, you have the right to remain silent,
and that anything you may say may be used in your favor or against
you in any court proceedings in the entire Philippines; that you have
the right to be assisted by a counsel of your own choice or if you
cannot afford to have one, the state represented by our office will
provide you a competent counsel; that you are free from torture or any
form of physical violence which will tend vitiate your statements. Do
you clearly understand your constitutional rights which were related to
you in Bicol dialect?
ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my Constitutional Rights
because it was related to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your Constitutional rights?
ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent counsel.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your own choice?
ANSWER : I have none sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own counsel, our office
will provide you one, is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the services of Atty.
Paterno Brotamonte, who is a competent lawyer is this acceptable to
you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that anything you say in
this investigation may be used in favor or against you in any court
proceedings in the entire Philippines. Do you still wish to give your free
and voluntary statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions that were asked
from you?
ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.6
SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages of the
confession, following the same procedure of propounding the
questions in the Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter into English
for each page.7 Atty. Brotamonte again read and explained the
contents thereof to appellant8 after which they again separately
signed on pages two and three thereof. The second and third pages
are quoted in verbatim, to wit:
03. Q- Please state your name and other personal circumstances?
A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single, duck
caretaker presently working in Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan and a native
of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?
A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the said
incident?
A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with Faustino
Bufi9 and Carlito Begil drink a bottle of gin at the store of Yolanda
Buban at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay and while we were drinking said
Carlito Begil told us that he will have sex with a woman on that night,
however he did not elaborate who the woman is and at about 8:00
P.M. of same date we already consumed the bottle of gin and we
decided to go home.
06. Q- Please continue
A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto Angeles
to spend the night at the said house however at on or about 12:30
A.M. August 7, 1997 I go out of the house and proceeded to my
grandparents house which is about five arms length from the house of
Roberto Angeles leaving the bolo on the ground and entered my
grandparents Aurea Bronia’s house and go directly on the room where
Rosalie Rayala is sleeping and once inside the room I embraced the
sleeping Rosalie Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie
Rayala spank and boxed me but still I continued on kissing her but still
he spank me, so I go out of the room and sits on the door but Rosalie
Rayala followed me so I kissed her again but she spank me again so
I got hold of the bolo and hack Rosalie Rayala hitting her on her neck
which caused her to fall on the ground and I pulled Rosalie Rayala
and have carnal knowledge of her while she is still alive, while Carlito
Begil and Roberto Angeles were standing and viewing what I am doing
and after satisfying my lust said Carlito Begil goes on to of Rosalie
Rayala and started on pumping her and after satisfying his lust, my
grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and thinks
that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her
on her neck and when she fall I pulled her away from the house
towards the grassy portion of the yard wherein Carlito Begil and
Roberto Angeles followed me wherein I was unable to determine who
from the two had carnal knowledge of my grandparent because I
already left them and I proceeded to the main road to Tabaco, Albay.
07. Q- Please continue further.
A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the house
of Jose which I had forgotten his family name and Armando Bosque
both Barangay Tanods of our place and told the two that is being
wanted by my godfather Julian Baloloy that there was something that
happened in the house of my grandparents house, and the two goes
with me and because I was already then frightened I just go with them
and hurriedly left the place and proceeded to Roberto Angeles house
and called my sister and I was allowed to enter and I prepared a cup
of coffee and after drinking same I hurriedly left the house and finally
proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep bound for the town
proper and spend the rest of the night at the town plaza and at about
6:00 A.M. August 7, 1997 I proceeded to the church to hear mass and
after that I went to my sister’s house at Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay and I eat
my breakfast and after eating I left my sister’s house named Avelina
Calla and it came to my mind that I will evade arrest and decided to
proceed to Metro Manila then to my place of work in Pulilan, Bulacan.
08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?
A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay for
accordingly an alarm to apprehend me was set by elements of the
Tabaco Police wherein one of them was able to trace me but luckily I
was able to evade them but finally I was apprehended at Bankilingan,
Tabaco, Albay and later on was brought to the Tabaco Police.
09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie Rayala
and Aurea Bronia?
A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she is my
grandparent.
10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you, do
you have anything more to add in this statement of yours?
A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the need arises.
11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?
A- Yes sir.10
After appellant’s confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte
left the police station and went back to his office. As far as he could
recall, the entire process took more than an hour. 11
The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before Judge
Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge
Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently
examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as
the authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte.
He also explained to appellant the consequences of his confession to
the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting
them. Judge Base inspected appellant’s body and asked him if he was
forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still
willing to sign it again and appellant answered in the affirmative saying
that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the
confession again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which
appellant affixed his signature.12
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial
confession of appellant showed how the crimes were committed by
him.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court
and assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation
of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully
apprised of the consequences of his confession. He testified that the
real perpetrators of the crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto
Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and that he was only forced into
owning up to the crimes because Angeles threatened to harm him or
his sister, Angeles’s wife, if he did not do so.
Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of
August 6, 1997, he was having a drink with Carlito Begil and Faustino
Bufe at the store of Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. While
they were drinking, Begil mentioned that he is planning to have sex
with someone he did not identify. They finished drinking at around 8:00
in the evening and started walking home. While he and Begil were
walking, Begil asked him to accompany him to Rosalie Rayala’s house
but he declined because he was already hungry and he wanted to eat
first. He then went to the house of Roberto Angeles who is married to
his sister Maria Nellie Bagnate. While he was on the porch having a
smoke, Angeles arrived very drunk. Begil arrived later. Begil and
Angeles drank "kalampunay". He took only one glass of the drink and
went inside the house to get a cigarette. When he went back to the
porch, Angeles and Begil were already gone. At around 12:30 in the
morning, he went inside and slept. The shout of his ninong, Julian
Baloloy, telling him to fetch a barangay tanod, awakened him. He
fetched Jose Rodriquez and Armando Bosque and they went to the
house of Rosalie, located thirty meters away. He was told to build a
fire while the rest searched for "something." After idling in the yard for
some time, he went back to Angeles’s house to have coffee. Angeles
and Begil then arrived and Angeles told him to flee or he (Angeles)
will kill his (appellant’s) sister. Angeles gave him P10.00. He took a
jeep to Tabaco and reached the Tabaco plaza at 2:00 in the morning.
He proceeded to his sister’s house, Avelina Bagnate, in Tayhi,
Tabaco, Albay, and passed the time there. Then he went to the
Tabaco town proper. He was finally arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco
and brought to the police headquarters at 5:00 in the morning of
August 7, 1997.13
The trial court found appellant’s extra-judicial confession admissible
in evidence on which basis, it convicted appellant of the crimes
charged against him. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the
heirs of Auria Broña the amount of P50,000.00 as damages; and,
2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape with Homicide as charged in Criminal Case No.
T-2875 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and
to indemnify the heirs of Rosalie Rayala in the amount of P50,000.00
as damages.
SO ORDERED.14
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF MURDER
AND RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.15
The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellant’s
confession. Appellant claims that Atty. Brotamonte was not a
competent and independent counsel as he failed to advise him of the
penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of committing;
hence, he was not aware of the consequences of his admissions.
To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be
express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel, and a person under custodial
investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very
start thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the
voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and the assistance
given must be independent and competent, that is, providing full
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused. 16
The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into
an unfamiliar atmosphere running through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical or psychological is forcefully apparent. 17 It is not intended as
a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and
intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from being coerced
to admit any that is untrue.18 To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need
not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The
presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should
never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 19
In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is
more than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty.
Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the
voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or
duress was employed by the police authorities on the latter to make
him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions
propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The testimony of Atty. Brotamonte
during cross-examination leaves no room for doubt that he adequately
assisted appellant during the investigation, viz:
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?
A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused to
stand and examined the body of the accused, if there were injury or
what and I asked the accused, if these policemen inflicted injury to
him, if he was harmed and according to accused, none.
Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine the body
of the accused of it bare some signs of injury?
A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the accused. If
the accused has body injury definitely I will be requiring the policemen
to submit the accused for medical examination before the
investigation will be conducted.
Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?
A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the policemen
harmed inflicted bodily injury to him and he told me no one of the
policemen.
Q: Any of the policemen present?
A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out because
I have to talk to the accused when I propound question and examine
the body of the accused and the accused was inside the room.
...
Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you did
not even bother to search the body of the accused?
A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth. Otherwise, he
will inform this representation because I already informed him that I
am a lawyer and I will protect him if somebody harmed him.
...
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that before I
introduced myself, I told him that the policemen informs this
representation that you are going to give your sworn statement before
the police and I told him that I am a lawyer and I will assist him until
the policemen finished the investigation and I told him to tell the truth
to the policemen and told him that if you want to give your sworn
statement to the police, you can do it because that is your right under
the constitution, to remain silent.
Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the right to
remain silent, and whatever you said will be used against in you, did
you not explain these one by one?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the sworn
statement you are going to make now might be used against you by
the police but the accused is willing to give his sworn statement.
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the sworn
statement in the Bicol dialect. Meaning that the questions were
propounded in English and you helped the police investigator to
translate it in Bicol dialect?
A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of the
answer, what the policemen were asking the witness in Bicol and they
translated in English and I even helped the policemen in the
translation of the question and the answer of the witness in Bicol
dialect.20
Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was
also sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the
consequences of his confession. Judge Base testified, thus:
Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the circumstances
how this sworn statement, how the affiant was able to come into your
house and the sworn statement was sworn to?
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.
A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me that they
were investigating a rape and murder case that happened somewhere
in the mountain of Tabaco, Albay and informed me that the suspect
has been apprehended and that the suspect is willing to sign an
affidavit of confession so I advised the police investigator to comply
strictly with respect to investigation custodial legis and I informed him
that that case should be assisted by a lawyer and the investigator told
me that he contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the
investigation and I said It’s better. So, after that the suspect was
brought to me together with Atty. Brotamonte because I requested
Atty. Brotamonte to be present also and the suspect. I investigated
the suspect and he admitted to me that what he stated in this affidavit
which is actually a confession that he killed the two women and
actually raped one of them is correct and true. So, after explaining to
him the consequence of his having confession to the crime being
charged against him and he was still willing to sign the confession I let
him sign the confession in my presence and in the presence of Atty.
Brotamonte and after which I subscribed the affidavit.
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)
Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the accused
was in your presence if there was any pressure or compulsion upon
the accused to sign this document?
A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not to use
any force and when the suspect was presented to me, actually I
inspected his body if there was any sign of abrasion and I actually
asked the suspect if he was forced or coerced into signing the crime
charged and he said, no. And I asked him if this confession is
voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is being bothered by his
conscience.21
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable
penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike
down appellant’s extrajudicial confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article
III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
1722 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is
confession given by an accused without having been informed of his
right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and
independent
counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services
of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights
was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was
tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other
means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution
that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty
for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that
the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed
to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he
was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally
immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the
commission of a crime.
To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of
assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only
required for a lawyer to be:
"….willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,
as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine,
peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional
rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed
that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and
to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle."23
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during
the entire procedure – from the time appellant signified his intention to
give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he signed the same.
Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the
consequences of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to
appellant when he appeared before the latter to swear to the veracity
of his confession.
The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked
appellant to sign anew the extrajudicial confession in his presence,
the copy thereof marked as Exhibits "A", "B", and "C" attached to the
records of the case do not show any subsequent signature made by
appellant. Nevertheless, appellant did not refute Judge Base’s
testimony, and it does not detract the fact that appellant executed the
extrajudicial confession voluntarily with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel, and that he subsequently
acknowledged having executed the same voluntarily and swore to its
veracity before Judge Base.
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was
brought to the Tabaco police station, the police officers boxed and
kicked him, telling him to confess to the crimes. 24 As the records show,
like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him if he was forced to
confess but Bagnate said that he was not. If it were true that he was
forced to confess to the crime, then appellant should have complained
of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the
opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate
occasions.
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to
the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute
any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a
reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.25
To consider appellant’s allegation of maltreatment as true is to
facilitate the retraction of solemnly made statements at the mere
allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever. 26
The taking of appellant’s confession has conformed to the safeguards
of the Constitution. It constitutes evidence of a high order, because of
the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and conscience.27
Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial
confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The
Rule specifically requires that there should be some other evidence
"tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession."28 Appellant’s confession is corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary
sense, that a crime has actually been committed.29
The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the victims’
deaths, as evidenced by the death certificates of Aurea Broña 30 and
Rosalie Rayala,31 and the findings of the autopsies conducted on the
victims’ cadavers by Tabaco Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba
showing that both were hacked to death and Rosalie was raped.
The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:
Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length
affecting skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscle and the cervical bone.
Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches in
length.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked
wound, neck.32
While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:
Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 ½ inches in length, 2 inches
depth reaching the cervical bone.
Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 ½ inches length superficial
slanting direction.
Hacked wound - right neck about 4 ½ inches length affecting skin
subcutaneous muscle & Blood vessels, right earlobe cut.
Hacked wound below the chin about 3 ½ inches length affecting skin
and subcutaneous tissue.
Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin
subcutaneous tissue, muscle, Blood vessels and the cervical bone.
Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length, left
occipital region about 1 inch in length.
Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.
Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple
hacked wound, neck.33
The foregoing findings coincide with appellant’s extrajudicial
confession. As he stated therein, he hacked both victims on the neck
with a bolo and he dragged Aurea towards the grassy portion of the
yard. Appellant also admitted that he raped Rosalie. The autopsy
report shows that Rayala had contusions on the floor of her vaginal
wall, thus confirming that Rosalie had been raped. The autopsy report
likewise confirmed that the victims suffered hack wounds on their
necks. The recovery of the bolo after appellant had left the place
likewise jibes with appellant’s declaration in his confession that he
hacked both victims with a bolo.34 These are details that appellant
could not have known if he did not commit the crimes.
It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours from
the occurrence of the crimes. It is not possible that within such short
span of time, appellant would be able to know the details of the crimes
as he described them when he gave his confession if it were true that
he really did not commit them. The voluntariness of a confession may
be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession
exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details – which could only be supplied
by the accused – reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be
considered voluntary.35
Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellant’s
extrajudicial confession is the defense evidence itself, establishing
that: Around 12:00 midnight of August 7, 1997, defense witness Julian
Baloloy heard cries for help coming from the house of Aurea. Together
with his son, Rodel, who brought a flashlight, they went to the house
and called out to Aurea and Rosalie but there was no response. When
they went inside the house, they saw blood and strands of hair on the
floor but there was no sign of the two. They shouted for help and
Roberto Angeles, whose house is located in front of the victims’ house
about thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant arrived next, saying that
he just came from work and was not able to clean his hands. When
Rodel Baloloy shone his flashlight on appellant, they saw that his
hands were sticky and covered in red. Julian Baloloy then ordered
appellant to fetch a barangay tanod. When Armando Bosque and Jose
Rodriguez arrived, they started to look for Aurea and Rosalie while
appellant was told to build a fire. At the back of the house, they saw
impressions on the yard indicating that an object had been dragged,
after which, they found the dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty
meters away.36
Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the search
and therefore, the latter could not have known or seen the injuries
suffered by the victims when they were found. It has been noted that
appellant, in his confession, had accurately specified the injuries he
inflicted on both victims. Julian Baloloy’s testimony that they saw
marks on the yard indicating that something has been dragged
corroborated appellant’s statement that he dragged Aurea. Moreover,
that Julian Baloloy saw appellant’s hand sticky and covered in red,
which Baloloy described "as if you have just slaughtered a pig and you
(sic) hands smudge with blood and when you washed your hands, it
could still (sic) red," bolsters the conclusion that appellant indeed had
participated in the gruesome crimes.37
Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, the trial court correctly
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Murder and Rape with Homicide.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-
2874, the trial court considered the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity, treachery, superior strength, and disregard of the respect
due to the victim on account of age and sex, as alleged in the
Information, thus qualifying the killing of Aurea to murder.
However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of treachery. The evidence on record does
not sufficiently prove that it attended the commission of the crime as
no one actually saw the incident. The fact that Aurea was blind does
not necessarily qualify her killing as treacherous. Treachery exists
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.38 Appellant’s confession merely stated: "after satisfying his lust,
my grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and
thinks (sic) that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing
I hacked her on her neck and when she fall (sic) I pulled her away
from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard . . .". There is
nothing in appellant’s confession that demonstrates that he
deliberately employed a particular means, method or form of attack in
the execution of the crime.
Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating
circumstance considering that it was not shown that the darkness of
the night was purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the
commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution. 39
It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aurea’s house.
However, dwelling may not be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the consideration of his criminal liability as it is not
alleged in the Information.40
Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by the
prosecution that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659,41 any person who shall kill another
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by death if committed
with abuse of superior strength. Hence, the trial court correctly
imposed the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874.42
As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broña in the
amount of P50,000.00, the Court considers the same as representing
civil indemnity. In murder cases, civil indemnity requires no further
proof other than death.43
The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of
moral damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.44 Considering that the prosecution failed to show any proof
that the heirs of Aurea Broña are entitled to moral damages, the same
may not be awarded.45
In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.46 Considering the generic aggravating circumstances
of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the award of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages is in order.47
In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly imposed
the death penalty. Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes the penalty of death when
by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor
of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount
of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00.48 The
heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages without need of proof,49 in view of the rape suffered by victim
Rosalie. The fact that the heirs suffered the trauma of mental or
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for
moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require
recital thereof at trial.50
Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling
of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should
likewise be awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be
awarded the amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the
admission made by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie
incurred expenses in said amount.51
Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records of this
case, that appellant could not have been the only perpetrator of the
crimes. As appellant revealed in his confession, he hacked each of
the victims on the neck with his bolo only once. The autopsy report,
however, shows that Aurea Broña suffered two neck wounds while
Rosalie Rayala suffered five hack wounds and one stab wound, all on
the neck. Appellant confessed that he dragged Aurea towards the
grassy portion of the yard and immediately
left the scene. Yet, Rosalie was also found on the grassy portion of
the yard. The autopsy report further showed that Rosalie likewise
suffered multiple linear abrasions on both scapular regions, thus
giving the impression that she was also dragged towards the yard.
Somebody else must have brought Rosalie to the place where she
was found. Indeed, there are clear indications that there are other
perpetrators of the crimes of murder and rape with homicide.
Appellant alone could not have inflicted all the injuries sustained by
the victims.
In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well as the
prosecutor’s office of Tabaco, Albay, should be required to apprise the
Court whether or not further investigation of this case was conducted
for the identification and arrest of the other perpetrators of the crimes
to completely bring justice to their victims.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15)
of Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-2874 finding appellant
Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty
of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea Broña the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity;
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and Twenty-
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875, finding
Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
with Homicide and imposing on him the penalty of death
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATIONS. The appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of the deceased victim Rosalie Rayala civil indemnity in the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); moral
damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00); and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broña and Rosalie
Rayala the amount of Fifty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine
Pesos (P54,259.00) as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let
the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco Prosecutor’s
Office are hereby ORDERED, with ten (10) days from receipt of copy
of herein resolution, to apprise the Court whether or not subsequent
investigations were conducted to determine the other perpetrator(s) of
the crimes involved herein.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a
robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously
for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence.
There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So
the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him
physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to
be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to
maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed
his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not
take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on
him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he
signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed
for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's
Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case
before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners
as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage
caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or
detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments
in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain
some information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being
the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has consistently and strongly
condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions
from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human rights. But
the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the
exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed
upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs.
Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her
house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of
seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt
instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary
construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the
murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case
was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban
police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI
where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos
Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the
suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. 4 But
the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily
executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the
crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his
companions in the crime.5 As a result, he was charged with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of
Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true
Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and
by means of force, intimidation and violence upon the person of one
Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person
of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount,
belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that by reason or
on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them
(accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the
success of their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a
dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head and extremities, which
directly caused her death, and the total amount of the loss is
P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused
had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge
dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the accused
guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay
the costs. Hence, the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are
as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the
early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named
Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and
then hacked to death by the accused and two others in her (victim's)
own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard
accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in
connection with the robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad
Fernando. It appears that on August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two
others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met
each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three
agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed among
them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by
climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises, they will search
every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole
aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two
companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous
agreement, met at the place where they formerly saw each other in
Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for
Montalban and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they
stopped and they waited at the side of the road until the hour of
midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired to
the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the
said premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering
the premises of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the
piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the back
portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first
entered the house through the hole that they made, followed by the
accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling", that it was already early
dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able to gain entrance
into the house of the victim; as the three could not find anything
valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed
the screen of the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon
entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first
the victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for
valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began
hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard
a moaning sound from the victim; that after the victim was killed, the
three accused began searching the room for valuables; that they
helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the
victim, where they found some money; that when the three accused
left the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and
pictures which they threw outside; that after killing and robbing the
victim, the three accused went out of the premises of the house, using
the same way by which they gained entrance, which was through the
back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards the
river bank where they divided the loot that they got from the room of
the victim; that their respective shares amount to P70.00 for each of
them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the three
accused left and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was
adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit
and his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave
their residence immediately; that he further stated that he overheard
accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions robbed
and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no
less than seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral
hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and
hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Necropsy Report
(Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim
(Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the
commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in his house in
Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal.
He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession
extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described
earlier, and without the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented
by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings
of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not
supported by competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness,
Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were
living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977,
because the mother of his wife is the wife of the accused; that when
he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police
station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling
(nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house
because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner
of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the
accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was insistent;
that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls
(dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon
learning of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban
police the next day and reported to the police chief about what he had
heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house
and arrested the accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down
the correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an
arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We
reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter
or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the
accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused
at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is
his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a close
scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:
I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilali
inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na h
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sa
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o
na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung sakal
manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na a
ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused
was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a
friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two
weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were
allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver
of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not
assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of
his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-
enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained
in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the
prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there
is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for
whatever action he may deem proper to take against the investigating
officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered ACQUITTING the
accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released
from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de
oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71523-25 December 8, 2000
ROLANDO SANTOS y RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72420-22 December 8, 2000
JESUS E. ESTACIO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72384-86 December 8, 2000
ALFREDO R. FAJARDO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72387-89 December 8, 2000
MARCELO S. DESIDERIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Challenged in these four separate petitions for review on certiorari is
the Decision dated July 19, 19851 of the Sandiganbayan disposing of
Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused
Alfredo Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y Silvestre,
Jesus Estacio y Estrella and Rolando Santos y Ramirez alias Mickey
Mouse, GUILTY as co-principals in the three (3) separate complex
crimes of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Documents and hereby
sentences them as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying circumstance
in attendance, each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY ofprision correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the
amount of P1 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate costs of said action;
"2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying circumstance
in attendance, sentences each of said accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the
maximum, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and/or the Central Bank
of the Philippines, in the amount of P3 million representing the amount
defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said
action;
"3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying circumstance
in attendance, sentences each of them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands in the amount of P5 million representing the amount
defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said
action.
"Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to have
been detained at the NBI as of February 16, 1982 by virtue of a
Presidential Commitment Order, although all of them were later
bonded and released on different dates, except Santos who has
remained in custody up to the present. Accordingly, they should be
granted the benefits of such preventive imprisonment under Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows: Santos from
February 16, 1982 up to the date of the promulgation of this decision;
Estacio up to April 29, 1985; Fajardo, Jr. up to April 26, 1982 and
Desiderio up to April 19, 1982.
"Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor, Central
Bank; the Citibank; the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Bankers
Association of the Philippines for their information and guidance.
"SO ORDERED."
On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan three
(3) informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents
against Felipe Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante, Basilio Tan, Alfredo
Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San Pedro, Manuel Valentino,
Rolando Santos, Marcelo Desiderio, Jaime Tan and Emilio
Reyes.2 The informations filed were similarly worded except for the
dates of commission of the crime charged, the number of the checks
involved, and the amounts allegedly misappropriated. Thus:
"That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in
Crim. Case No. 5951), in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Manuel Valentino, employed as
Bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank of the
Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio y Estrella, employed as
Janitor-Messenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and as such
are public employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage
of their official position, in order to implement a plan or scheme to
defraud the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch, which
plan or scheme was previously formulated and agreed upon by all the
herein accused immediately prior to (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case
No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and October
30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), accused Manuel Valentino
pursuant to said plan or scheme, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and taking advantage of his official position and with
intent to gain and to defraud, falsify the Clearing Statement prepared
by the Central Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and
submitted to the Clearing Section of the Central Bank of the
Philippines as well as the Manifest prepared by the Central Bank
Clearing Office in connection thereto by crossing out the entry in the
duplicate copies of the aforesaid Clearing Statement and Manifest
which entries refer to Check No. (27101 in Crim. Case No. 5949,
27111 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and 27108 in Crim. Case No. 5951)
and Check No. (27105 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27118 in Crim. Case
No. 5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case No. 5951) issued by accused
Bustamante against his checking account at the Bank of Philippine
Islands, Laoag City Branch, which has only an outstanding balance
of P1,000.00 and which checks were deposited in the current account
of Magna Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills
Branch by accused Rolando San Pedro and as a result of the
aforesaid falsification which made it appear that no such checks were
submitted by the Bank of Philippine Islands to the Central Bank of the
Philippines for clearing, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City
Branch has not issued any notice of dishonor or stop payment to the
Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a consequence thereof accused
Rolando San Pedro was able to withdraw from the Citibank the full
amount of the two checks amounting to (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case
No. 5949, P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and P5,000,000.00
in Crim. Case No. 5951) and thereafter all the accused appropriated
among themselves the proceeds thereof to their own personal use
and benefit and to the damage and prejudice of the Central Bank of
the Philippines or the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City
Branch in the aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in Crim.
Case No. 5949,P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951)."
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo, Desiderio,
Estacio, Valentino and Santos, assisted by their respective counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. 3 Salamanca, Basilio Tan,
Jaime Tan, Reyes and Bustamante have remained at-large while San
Pedro died. Upon agreement of the prosecution and the defense, a
joint trial of the three cases was ordered conducted. 4
Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state
witness.5 Later, he filed a motion for his re-inclusion in the information
as an accused allegedly for the sake of the safety of his family. The
Sandiganbayan granted his motion and thus he was re-included as an
accused in Crim. Case Nos. 5949-5951.6 The prosecution also moved
for the discharge of Valentino as an accused but the Sandiganbayan
denied that motion. Exercising its discretion, the Sandiganbayan
eventually discharged Valentino from the three informations to be a
state witness.7
The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are as
follows:
Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe Salamanca
infiltrated the Clearing Center of the Central Bank of the Philippines
(Central Bank, for brevity). In its operation, the syndicate employed
two schemes: the switching scheme, and the pilferage scheme.
In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current account
with such banks as the Bank of America (BA) and the Philippine
Veterans Bank (PVB) in Iloilo. As a matter of procedure, checks drawn
on the BA were forwarded to the Central Bank for clearing. Upon
receipt of those checks by the clearing clerk of the Central Bank, who
was a member of the syndicate, he would substitute those checks with
ones bearing the stamp of another bank. Thus, instead of forwarding
the checks to the BA, these were misrouted to cause delay in the
clearing procedure. Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the
depositor would withdraw the amount of the checks. However, the
scheme faltered as the huge amounts covered by the checks caused
suspicion on the part of the PVB. It called up the BA to inquire about
those checks and hence, the former bank discovered that the checks
were insufficiently funded.
In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with a
provincial bank, such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI),
Laoag branch, and a city bank such as the Citibank-Greenhills,
Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would then be forwarded
to the Central Bank clearing house where members of the syndicate,
who were employed there, would pilfer the check and alter the Central
Bank manifest and the entries in the clearing bank statements. The
pilferage was intended to provide opportunity for the syndicate to blot
out entries referring to the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag
would not know that a check drawn on it had been deposited with
Citibank. After the lapse of the five-day clearing period, the syndicate
would withdraw the amount deposited from Citibank simply because
said bank would have considered the check cleared and funded, as
no protest or notice of dishonor could be received from BPI-Laoag. In
utilizing this scheme in the commission of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951, the syndicate netted Nine Million
Pesos (P9,000,000.00).
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16)
witnesses,8 and documentary evidence marked Exhibits "A" to "DD",
and Annexes "B" to "QQ", with sub-markings, to prove the following:
9
On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante opened a savings
account with BPI-Laoag with an initial deposit
of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in check, and P1,000.00 in
cash.10 That same day, he opened a current account with P1,000.00
as initial deposit in the same bank. Upon his request, a checkbook
was issued to him.11
That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative of
Magna Management Consultant, approached Maria Nieves Garrido,
personal banker of Citibank-Greenhills, and requested signature
cards and other requirements for the purpose of opening a current
account. Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the bank, submitted the
required documents and duly accomplished forms, and made an initial
deposit of P10,000.00. Thus, a checking account in the name of
Magna Management Consultant was opened in Citibank-Greenhills
with Rolando San Pedro as its representative. A checkbook was given
to Desiderio.12
On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca
informed Manuel Valentino that two (2) checks were to be deposited
with Citibank the following day. Salamanca instructed Valentino to
watch out for those checks in the clearing house at the Central Bank.
On October 16, 1981, two (2) checks in the amounts of Four Hundred
Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Nineteen Pesos
(P498,719.00), and Five Hundred One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty
Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P501,260.30) were indeed deposited with
the Citibank-Greenhills under the current account of Magna
Management Consultant, represented by Rolando San Pedro. On
October 30, 1981, two (2) more checks were deposited at the same
bank in the total amount of P3,000,000.00. Another deposit of checks
was made on November 20, 1981 in the total amount
of P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central Bank
Clearing Center.
The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the Central
Bank on that day, which was a Friday, but on Monday, October 19,
1981. Manuel Valentino, a bookkeeper at the Clearing Operations
Division of the Central Bank, received from Jesus Estacio, a Central
Bank janitor-messenger, the demand envelope containing the two (2)
BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount of P1,000,000.00 in the comfort
room on the fourth floor of the Central Bank administration building.
Therein Valentino altered the amount of P1,076,416.95 by crossing
out the amount of One Million Pesos. Thus, under the column "Total
amount received", only the amount of P76,416.95 was reflected in
order that BPI-Laoag would not look for the P1 million
check.13 Valentino then brought the altered clearing statement back to
the Clearing Center and prepared a Central Bank Manifest where he
changed the figure in the original copy to tally with those in the altered
clearing statement.
On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same scheme. As
soon as the demand envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks
arrived, Valentino took it and gave it to Jesus Estacio who then
brought the same to the comfort room at the fourth floor. Valentino
followed him there and took the two BPI checks amounting
toP3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in the BPI Clearing
Statement. Valentino thereafter brought said envelopes to the clearing
house, and prepared the Central Bank Manifest, likewise altering the
figures in the original to tally with the figures in the altered clearing
statement.
At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed the
same procedure – Valentino asked Estacio to give him the demand
envelope and the former then went to the comfort room. Valentino took
the two BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount of P5,000,000.00 which
he later gave to Salamanca. Again, he altered the figures in the
clearing statement and those in the Central Bank Manifest so that
these would conform with each other.14
As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the
checks intended for BPI-Laoag, the altered Central Bank Manifests,
and the clearing statements were forwarded to the Regional Clearing
Center. The pilfered checks deposited in the account of Magna
Management Consultant were not included in those envelopes.
Because BPI-Laoag did not receive the checks with a total value
of P9,000,000.00, these were not processed. Consequently, as no
objection or protest regarding the checks were registered and no
notice of dishonor of the checks for insufficient funds was made by the
BPI-Laoag, and since the reglementary period for making such protest
or notice of dishonor had elapsed, Citibank-Greenhills considered the
checks as good and funded.
Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to
December 6, 1981, Citibank-Greenhills allowed withdrawals in the
aggregate amount of P9,000,000.00 from the account of Magna
Management Consultant. Withdrawals were made through checks
endorsed by Rolando San Pedro and encashed by Jaime R.
Tan.15 The proceeds of the anomalous transactions were divided
among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca gave
Estacio P10,000.00 after the October 19, 1981 operation, P4,900.00
after the October 30, 1981 operation andP5,000.00 after the
November 20, 1981 operation. Valentino
received P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 after the October
16 and 30, and November 20, 1981 operations.
On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative
Assistant for Transit Center (Clearing Center of BPI), was informed
through a long distance telephone call by the manager of BPI-Laoag
that their clearing transactions on October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981
and November 20, 1981 registered an outstanding discrepancy
of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their inter-office reconciliation
statement. The manager of BPI-Laoag and the BPI Regional Manager
for Northern Luzon who went to the office at BPI-Ayala showed the
clearing statements to Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox copies of
the BPI Clearing Statements (Laoag copies) and xerox copies of the
clearing envelope sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the
alterations. Thus, he went to the Accounting Department of BPI-Ayala
and found out that the Central Bank debited their bank in the amount
ofP9,000,000.00.16
Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake Ocampo, its
assistant manager, about the clearing items. After checking their
outgoing clearing checks for October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981 and
November 20, 1981, Ocampo told Gonzaga that they did not recall
said clearing checks. He gave Gonzaga reproduced microfilm copies
of those checks. Gonzaga submitted the checks to his superiors with
an accompanying report.17 The BPI and the Central Bank jointly
referred the matter for investigation to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assigned the case to Head Agent Salvador
Ranin of the Special Investigation Division.18
On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of the
Central Bank, Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the bank’s Chief Security Officer,
and the BPI Vice-President and Comptroller brought Manuel Valentino
to the NBI. The following day, Agent Ranin took Valentino’s statement.
Valentino waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. He signed
the waiver on the first page of his statement. On March 22, 1982,
Agent Ranin took Valentino’s supplementary sworn statement. The
same NBI agent took Jesus Estacio’s statement on February 17, 1982
and supplementary statement on March 22, 1982. Like Valentino,
Estacio waived his right to counsel. In their respective statements,
Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in the commission
of the crime, narrated how they carried out the plan to defraud the
banks, and identified those who participated in the criminal acts. After
the investigation, Agent Ranin came out with a Memorandum Report
dated April 26, 1982.19
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines employed
Jesus Estacio as janitor-messenger. In 1978, a certain Rico Javier
introduced Estacio to Felipe Salamanca. When Salamanca learned
that Estacio was connected with the Central Bank, he asked Estacio
if he knew any bookkeeper thereat as his compadre needed one.
Estacio replied that he would look for one. A week later, Salamanca
called up Estacio and asked him if he had found a bookkeeper.
Estacio mentioned Manuel Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio
to bring Valentino to Jack’s Restaurant in Quezon City after office
hours. In that restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to Salamanca.
Valentino was in turn introduced to Basilio Tan. During their
conversation, Valentino told Salamanca about his work as a
bookkeeper at the Central Bank.20
Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to
accompany him to the EDCOR office. There they met Salamanca,
Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando Santos and Basilio Tan. Salamanca told
Estacio to stay outside the office because the group was going to
discuss something. Half an hour later, the group dispersed. That same
month, Estacio saw Romeo Villasanta, another accused, at the
clearing office of the Central Bank. When Estacio asked why
Villasanta was there, the latter answered that he was "just expediting
something." Estacio saw Villasanta for the second time that same
month talking with Valentino at the clearing office. Valentino asked
Estacio to point out the office of the Department of Economic
Research to Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some
research. Estacio went with Villasanta to the fourth floor and showed
him the said office. Villasanta then inquired where the comfort room in
that floor was. Estacio thereafter went back to his work and did not
see Villasanta anymore.21 1
On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an envelope
to the fourth floor and to wait for him at its lobby. Estacio acceded and
later, Valentino arrived. Valentino took the envelope from Estacio and
went to the comfort room. Thereafter, Estacio went to the Clearing
Office.22
Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from the
NBI was looking for him, Estacio went to the NBI. There he told Agent
Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer but Agent Ranin did not allow
him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30
p.m. on February 17, 1982. This continued the following day and
lasted a week. In the course of the investigation, Agent Ranin
promised Estacio that he would not be harmed should he cooperate
and admit the charges against him, and that he would be freed once
he becomes a state witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a
newspaper and poked his gun at him. Estacio was allowed to read the
statement before he signed it.23
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at the NBI
for about two months, his wife and children would visit him every week
and he could talk to them freely.24 He was transferred to Muntinlupa
and detained at the Death Row for two years. On March 22, 1982,
Agent Ranin took his second statement that was a continuation of his
first statement. He was unable to read his supplementary statement
because of fear of Agent Ranin, who was scaring him. He stressed
that the statements he made before the NBI were not true and that he
only signed those documents25 because he was afraid of Agent
Ranin.26
Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold his
car to him (Salamanca) on installment withP15,000.00 as down
payment with the balance of P20,000.00 to be paid in two or three
months. He accepted partial payment for the car. After a time,
Salamanca fully paid the balance. In July 1981, Salamanca gave
himP3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to convince him to join
a scheme to defraud a bank. After Salamanca had paid him the full
price of the car, Salamanca asked him again to join his group. All he
had to do was to open a checking account. He could have easily
facilitated this, being the Vice-President for Finance of American
Steamship Agencies. In those meetings with Salamanca where he
was persuaded to open a checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan,
the son of a general and his classmate at San Beda College,
Valentino, and Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that
he was not interested in the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was
busy with his job, Salamanca got mad. On October 20, 1981, an
unidentified assailant shot him in his house. He sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds and was confined at the Parañaque Medical
Center.27
Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime in July
1981 when Salamanca went to his office28because he wanted to open
an account with Citibank-Greenhills. Desiderio went to Citibank-New
York to inquire about the requirements for opening an account. Two
days later, he gave Salamanca the bank forms and signature cards to
be accomplished. He learned from Salamanca that the forms would
be filled up by Rolando San Pedro. For the initial deposit, Salamanca
gave him P10,000.00 in cash and check. He also receivedP2,500.00
as consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-Greenhills to make the
deposit and the bank issued him a checkbook. 29
Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where
Salamanca and his group discussed a plan to defraud a bank. He
acceded in opening the bank account at Citibank-Greenhills because
Salamanca assured him that the account would be opened in
connection with a loan application with the Citibank of New York. He
denied that Salamanca’s group tasked him and Rolando Santos with
opening accounts in Metro Manila banks, particularly with Citibank-
Greenhills. He denied knowing Santos and Estacio personally
although he admitted that Estacio, with Manuel Valentino, came to his
office to deliver a tailored suit for a certain Atty. Martin. He further
denied knowing Jaime Tan but admitted knowing Alfredo Fajardo, who
was his client when he was still connected with BPI. 30
Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that he has
no documentary evidence to present before the
Sandiganbayan.31 Another accused, Emilio Reyes, voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was detained at the Security
and Sheriff Services office.32 He filed a motion for reinvestigation on
June 16, 1987 but it was resolved against him. 33 He pleaded not guilty
to the charges against him.34 However, since July 17, 1989, Reyes
failed to appear for trial. On February 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan
acquitted him in these cases on account of the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 35 Because the cases against
Reyes were tried in absentia, the Sandiganbayan ordered that these
be archived without prejudice to revival "for purposes of contempt
citation in the event that he shall have been apprehended and brought
within the jurisdiction" of the court.36
Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the vicinity
of the Sandiganbayan.37 He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges
against him.38 On June 11, 1989, he died.39 Thus, the Sandiganbayan
dismissed the cases against him. In the Resolution of February 23,
1990, which was promulgated on March 12, 1990, the Sandiganbayan
resolved that the cases against Felipe Salamanca, Basilio
Tan, Jaime Tan and Mariano Bustamante be archived.40
As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio, Desiderio,
Santos, and Fajardo of the complex crimes of estafa thru falsification
of public documents. Estacio, Desiderio and Fajardo filed separate
motions for reconsideration,41 while Santos filed with the Supreme
Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition forcertiorari.42 On
September 26, 1985, the Sandiganbayan denied those motions for
reconsideration.43 Hence, the instant petitions for review
on certiorari that they individually filed with this Court, but which were
consolidated in the Resolution of December 10, 1985. 44
In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) questions the propriety of raising factual issues in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of a Decision of the
Sandiganbayan.45The OSG asserts that in such a petition, this Court’s
jurisdiction is "confined to questions of law" and hence, this Court "is
not supposed to reweigh evidence but only to determine its
substantiality." On this matter, in Filoteo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,46 this Court, after citing Jariol, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,47 said:
"As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606
expressly provides that `(d)ecisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.’ However, in exceptional cases,
this Court has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to resolve
legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated
by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the
same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In
all criminal cases, a person’s life and liberty are at stake."
While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these
cases, as the three others are private individuals, it is in the light of
this pronouncement that the instant petitions shall be considered and
resolved. Moreover, in the recent case of Armed Forces of the
Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,48the Court, citing Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 dated
March 9, 1990, held that a petition for review on certiorariquestioning
the final judgment, order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Courts or other courts, may raise
factual issues. In the exercise of its sound discretion, taking into
account the attendant circumstances, this Court retains the option of
either taking cognizance of, and deciding such issues, or referring the
case to the proper court for determination. In these criminal cases, this
Court chooses to take cognizance of factual questions raised in the
interest of proper administration of justice.
In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no proof
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crimes charged
principally because:
(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino
are inadmissible in evidence as their right to counsel was violated
when said confessions were executed;
(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state
witness was improper; and
(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not
adequately proven.
Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be
convicted as charged, they should be held individually liable only as
an accomplice.49
Relevant to petitioners’ contention on the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino is Article
IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the rights of an
accused during custodial investigation. It reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution states:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel."
A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the 1973
Constitution does not specify the right against uncounselled waiver of
the right to counsel, which is found in paragraph 1, Section 12, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the latter constitutional provision
cannot be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior to its date of
effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that:
"x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a
waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession
was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly,
waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without
the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of
cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the
assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on
April 26, 1983 when this Court, throughMorales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued
the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial
investigation. The Court specifically ruled that `(t)he right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.’ Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, the Court
through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:
`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel
is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was
first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated
on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
‘While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section
12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to
appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach
waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation
ofMorales.’"50
Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these cases
as the extrajudicial confessions in question here, were taken on
February 13, February 17 and March 22, 1982, long before the date
of promulgation of theMorales Decision on April 26, 1983. Prior to this
date, the guidelines requiring that waiver of the right to counsel by an
accused can be properly made only with the presence and assistance
of counsel, had yet to be formulated and pronounced by this Court. 51
The rule on prospective application of "judge-made laws" was
stressed in Co vs. Court of Appeals.52 In that case, the Court,
through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that "(j)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," and Article 4 of the
same Code stating that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of statutes,
original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which,
although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of
what the law means.
As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino and
petitioner Estacio of their right to counsel during custodial
investigation, the intelligent and voluntary execution thereof should be
determined. The pre-interrogation advisories to the extrajudicial
confessants uniformly state:
"01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing you
that you are under investigation in connection with the alleged Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial/Official Documents committed at the
Central Bank of the Philippines. But before we ask you any question,
you must understand your legal rights. You have the right to remain
silent. You have the right not to give any statement if you do not wish
to. Anything you say may be used as evidence against you in any
proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel of your own
choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will
be appointed for you before we ask you any question. Now, after
having been so informed, are you still willing to give a free and
voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth and nothing but the
truth in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?
"A: Yes, sir.
"WAIVER
"I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything that I
say may be used as evidence against me and that I have the right to
a lawyer to be present with me while I am being questioned.
"I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and
answer questions. I do not want the assistance of counsel and I
understand and know whag (sic) I am doing. No promises or threats
have been made to me and no force or pressure of any kind has been
used against me.
(Sgd. with thumbmark)
MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN
13 February 1982, NBI, Manila"53
It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is
involuntary and untrue.54 The defense attempted to prove that
Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to threats and
intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions. Other than their
bare assertions, Valentino and petitioner Estacio miserably failed to
present any convincing evidence to prove the NBI’s use of force or
intimidation on their persons. Before signing their statements, they
never protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of
maltreatment that they could have relayed to relatives visiting them at
the NBI. In People vs. Pia,55 the Court said:
"x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where
they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action
against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they
did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions."
That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by the
fact that both confessants have reached the tertiary level of education:
Valentino holds the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Commerce56 while petitioner Estacio reached the first year of college
education in banking and finance.57 Possessed with sufficient
education and not proven to be mentally unfit, they could have
protested the forced extraction of culpability from themselves if indeed
that was true.
Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete with
details on the manner in which the crimes were committed, thereby
ruling out the probability that these were involuntarily
made.58 Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
language such that, if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it
being replete with details – which could possibly be supplied only by
the accused – reflecting spontaneity and coherence which,
psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind to which violence
and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary.59 InU.S. vs. De los Santos,60 the Court said:
"If a confession be free and voluntary – the deliberate act of the
accused with a full comprehension of its significance, there is no
impediment to its admission as evidence, and it then becomes
evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption – a
very strong one – that no person of normal mind will deliberately and
knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, especially
if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience."
In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the
members of the syndicate and the sophisticated manner by which the
crimes in question were perpetrated if Valentino and Estacio, who
were directly involved therein, did not reveal these.
With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of
Valentino and petitioner Estacio against their co-accused, once again,
this Court declares that although an extrajudicial confession is
admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it
admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.61 In People vs. Alvarez,62 this
Court ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator,
that confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. The
Court elucidated further in People vs. Encipido63 as follows:
"It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions
were independently made without collusion, are identical with each
other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They
are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against
their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the
latter’s actual participation in the commission of the crime. They are
also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being
clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other
than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the
crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as
interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule
that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence
only against the declarants thereof."
Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found Valentino at
the NBI. They talked for a while and Valentino told him to say whatever
he (Valentino) would say.64 That allegation alone cannot be
considered as indicative of collusion between them as their sworn
statements both contain facts showing their deep involvement in the
scheme to defraud a bank. Human experience dictates that no one
would volunteer to demonstrate one’s culpability unless it was the
truth. It may thus be safely presumed that in telling petitioner Estacio
to say whatever he would say, Valentino was merely cautioning
petitioner Estacio to tell the truth. Nevertheless, even without the
extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence
on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability. 65
On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information to be
a state witness, the determination of who should be used as a state
witness to bolster the successful prosecution of criminal offenses is
part of prosecutorial discretion.66 However, it is the courts that finally
determine whether the requirements of the Rules of Court 67 have
been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a state
witness.
It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally discharged
to be a state witness. Upon his manifestation that he would rather
remain an accused in these cases for the protection of his family, the
court re-included him in the information. Apparently considering the
nature of the crimes and the secrecy by which these were perpetrated,
the prosecution was left with no recourse but to side with Valentino’s
motion for his discharge to be a state witness. The absolute necessity
for the testimony of someone who was a participant in the criminal
scheme is buttressed by the ruling that where a crime is contrived in
secret then the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so he
can testify against the other conspirators.68 In a conspiracy which was
done in secret, there is a necessity to discharge one of the accused
to provide direct evidence of the commission of the crime. 69
Worth noting, however, is that Valentino’s testimony and his sworn
statements differ with regard to petitioner Estacio’s participation in the
commission of the October 19, 1981 criminal act, and the participation
of petitioner Fajardo in the three crimes. Valentino stated in his sworn
statement that on October 19, 1981, when he noticed that the BPI
representative had placed the demand envelope containing the BPI-
Laoag checks for clearing at the Laoag counter behind him, petitioner
Estacio, who was the syndicate’s messenger, immediately came with
a push cart. Petitioner Estacio placed the demand envelope in the
pushcart and proceeded to the comfort room in the fourth floor where
Valentino followed him to alter the documents to suit the syndicate’s
purposes. On the other hand, when he testified, Valentino asserted
that he did not see petitioner Estacio at the meeting when they
hatched the first operation on October 16, 1981. When the alterations
were made on October 19, 1981, Valentino claimed that petitioner
Estacio was not with them70 for it was he himself who brought the
bundle of checks to the fourth floor comfort room where Villasanta took
the checks and altered the bank statements.
With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his
supplementary sworn statement that petitioner Fajardo was present in
three or four conferences where he participated in the discussion to
defraud a bank.71 However, on the witness stand, Valentino swore
that petitioner Fajardo had "no participation in these cases" 72 or in the
three operations subjects of these cases.
These discrepancies in Valentino’s sworn statements and testimony
are material ones as far as petitioners Estacio and Fajardo are
concerned. On this issue, the Court has consistently held that:
"x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his affidavit
and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete.
Affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court
declarations because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired in his affidavit and those made by him. This is so because
affidavits are frequently prepared by the administering officer and cast
in the latter’s language or the latter’s understanding of what the affiant
had said, while the affiant frequently simply signs the affidavit after the
same has been read to him." 73
In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and recantation
of confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the
Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable.74 However,
that ruling may not find application under the circumstances of these
cases. In Fabro, it was the accused himself who recanted his
confession when, on the witness stand, he denied he committed the
crime. No other witness testified for the defense. On the other hand,
in these cases, Valentino, a co-conspirator who appeared as a state
witness before the court, adhered to his confession as regards the
participation of the accused, except that he testified that petitioner
Estacio was absent when the first crime was planned and committed,
and that petitioner Fajardo was not involved in the three cases. It has
been held that where a witness who testified for the prosecution
subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting his previous
testimony, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a
comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence.75 Although these cases do not involve the conflicting
testimonies of a witness, that rule may be applied in a conflict between
a sworn statement and the testimony while recognizing the inferiority
of a sworn statement to a testimony. In these cases, the narration of
facts in Valentino’s sworn statements were in substance reproduced
in his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial
evidence and the voluminous documentary evidence.
In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of Valentino
and that of his testimony, that portion of his testimony on the
nonparticipation of petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case No. 5949 and
petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be controlling. We deem the
variance in Valentino’s testimony as endeavors to rectify his sworn
statements to conform to the truth. To reiterate, such variance, does
not make him a less credible witness or affect the merit of his
testimony, as the other pieces of prosecution evidence support it and
do not prove that it is untruthful or contrived.
The value of Valentino’s testimony in the prosecution of these cases
cannot be underestimated. It fills in the gaps in the prosecution
evidence that the other prosecution witnesses failed to cover. Without
it, conspiracy to defraud the BPI-Laoag of P9,000,000.00 through
falsification of the clearing statement and manifest would not have
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 76 As
creditably shown by the prosecution, the crimes were committed not
solely by the person who altered the clearing statement and manifest.
That all-important act, the conception of which could have been
hatched only by one familiar with banking procedures, would not have
been possible if not for the indispensable cooperation of others. Thus,
Valentino testified:
"Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon during the
meeting?
A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open an
account at Laoag Branch of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and
Desiderio also and Santos are also in charge in opening accounts in
Metro Manila, particularly Citibank, Greenhills. Basilio Tan, he is
stationary in the office. Jaime Tan and Rolando San Pedro are the
ones in charge in withdrawals at the Citibank." 77
However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be considered
within the purview of the following pronouncement in the celebrated
case of People vs. Berroya78 where the Court said that:
"x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving
them to execute or implement the conspiracy. Hence, the mere
presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even
approval of it without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction. Thus, assuming Vienes was a
participant in the planning to abduct a Taiwanese national, in the
absence of eyewitnesses to the actual abduction, there is a paucity of
evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried out his part of the plan."
(emphasis supplied)
In these cases, even if Valentino’s supplementary sworn statement
stating that petitioner Fajardo participated in the discussion of the
scheme to milk money from a bank should be given evidentiary
weight, still, that evidence is not enough to convict him. There is no
evidence showing that he participated in opening a bank account in
the procedure to alter the clearing manifests and statements, or in the
withdrawal of substantial amounts resulting from such alteration of
documents. There is thus insufficient evidence against
petitioner Fajardo to find him culpable for the crimes charged in these
cases and hence, he should be acquitted.
Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His
admission to having attended several meetings of Salamanca’s group
did not satisfactorily define his liability as a conspirator considering the
absence of any proof that he committed an overt act in pursuance of
the syndicate’s scheme. His pretext of having entered into a "car sale"
with Salamanca may ring hollow in truth but the weakness of his
defense cannot be taken against him considering the insufficiency of
prosecution evidence on his participation in the actual commission of
the crime. His acquittal is, therefore, likewise in order.
With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentino’s testimony on the first
syndicate operation on October 16, 1981 should be counted in his
favor. There is insufficient evidence that he participated in the
alteration of documents at the Central Bank Clearing Office on
October 19, 1981 much more in the prior discussion to perpetrate the
crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal Case No. 5949 should follow.
However, as regards the syndicate operations on October 30, 1981
and November 20, 1981, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
his role in carrying the demand envelopes to the Central Bank’s fourth
floor comfort room where alterations were made. By the nature of his
work, he had access to these demand envelopes containing BPI
checks. His participation in the conspiracy was therefore vital to the
realization of the syndicate’s objectives.
Parenthetically, the Court notes with dismay the Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement that petitioner Estacio’s "wishy-washy" attitude in
offering himself as a state witness "confirmed his knowledge of the
intimate details of the conspiracy and the mode or manner by which
its operations and schemes would be initiated and
consummated."79 Such conclusion is in consonance with the
presumption of guilt, not with that of innocence. An accused may have
some reasons for his irresolute action as far as testifying for the
prosecution is concerned. Petitioner Estacio had such reason – he
feared for the safety of his family considering that he would be up
against a syndicate that, because of the success of its evil scheme,
had the money to harm their perceived "enemies." That petitioner
Estacio was deeply enmeshed in the syndicate’s activities to bleed
money from banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case No. 6603
involving the syndicate’s operation in the Solidbank, his conviction for
the crime of estafa thru falsification of public/commercial documents
was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 75362.80But such conviction for
another crime must not be the basis for a conclusion that the accused
is guilty of another crime charged, although basically, the same
criminal acts were committed. We therefore find the Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement totally unexpected of a court that must determine the
culpability of an accused based on the prosecution evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense or the reputation of an accused.
Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for having participated both in the
discussion and mapping out of the malevolent scheme and in its actual
execution. Desiderio’s knowledge of banking procedures provided the
rationale for his giving "birth", or having "authored" the scheme along
with Salamanca and Villasanta.81 He had served as branch manager
in the BPI where he was employed for twenty-seven years, or until he
was charged with estafa for accommodating a client’s loan against an
uncollected deposit.82 Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at Citibank-
Greenhills, who entertained him when he made queries about opening
a current account, confirmed his having opened said account for
Magna Management Consultant, thereby lending credence to and
corroborating Valentino’s testimony on his role in the implementation
of the criminal scheme.
Petitioner Desiderio’s claim that he opened that account in
accordance with his legitimate role as consultant in Mardes
Management Consultant is a lame excuse. Anyone, especially a
businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca, could have opened
a current account without hiring the services of a management
consultant. That lame excuse sounds even lamer considering the
evidence showing that his alleged client was also engaged in
management consultancy. Desiderio thus relied on denial as a mode
of defense. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the
strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently
assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly
connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is
negligible.83 Desiderio’s denial of complicity in the scheme cannot,
therefore, prevail over the positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and
Valentino that he played the important role of opening the current
account that paved the way to the "inside jobs" of petitioner Estacio,
Valentino and, probably, Villasanta. His sole overt act under the
syndicate’s scheme facilitated the commission of all three counts of
estafa thru falsification of public documents.
Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none of
the accused refuted the documentary exhibits offered in evidence by
the prosecution.84 The pieces of documentary evidence consist of
bank records including deposit slips, ledger cards, specimen cards,
checks for deposit and withdrawal, clearing statements and clearing
manifests. All of these clearly and positively buttress the prosecution’s
theory as to how the pilferage scheme was successfully implemented.
The defense obviously could not demolish the evidentiary weight of
the prosecution’s documentary evidence and hence, it focused on the
prosecution evidence on the membership of the accused in the
syndicate, and on the probative value of the interlocking confessions
of Valentino and petitioner Estacio. There is thus no alternative to
giving full credence and merit to the prosecution’s documentary
evidence, and to declaring them to be in complete accord with the
prosecution theory on the commission of the offenses and the nature
and extent of participation of the accused.
The informations filed in these cases individually charge an offense
"defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in relation to
Article 171, par. 2" of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa
are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third
party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation.85 It is indubitable that estafa was committed by abuse of
confidence in these cases. The conspirators that enlisted and utilized
the assistance of Central Bank employees abused the confidence that
the banking system reposed upon such employees. As a result of such
abuse of confidence, the BPI sustained damage in the aggregate of
Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00). Verily, the perpetrators of the
crimes breached even the confidence that people reposed on the
Central Bank and the whole banking system.
By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Under
Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, any public officer or
employee who, taking advantage of his official position, makes
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, commits the crime of
falsification of public documents. This kind of falsification requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. 86
The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino occupies
a public position as bookkeeper at the Clearing Office of the Central
Bank. He intercepted and pilfered BPI-Laoag checks with the
assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitor-messenger at the Central
Bank. In the comfort room, Valentino and/or Villasanta, who has so far
avoided the clutches of the law, tampered with the clearing statements
and clearing manifests which Estacio had taken from Valentino’s
desk. The tampered documents, along with the pilfered demand
envelopes, were then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing
Center in Laoag. These "inside jobs" were perpetrated as part of the
decadent scheme that private individuals had hatched to gain
monetary gratification.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were charged
in these cases, states that any person who shall defraud another by
means of "using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits"shall be
held liable for the crime of swindling (estafa). Under the peculiar
circumstances proven in these cases, the crime actually committed by
the offenders is that defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
on other deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that "(t)he
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the
damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another
by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter." Although the information charged the accused with violation
of paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defining the
crime of falsification by public officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan
correctly found that the accused violated paragraph 4 of the same
Article which states as follows:
"The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
"4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts."
Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents and Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code states that when an offense is a necessary
means for committing another offense, "the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed" in its maximum period, the penalty for
the crimes committed in these cases is that imposed for falsification
of public documents or prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine
of P5,000.00.
While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the basis
for imposition of penalty should be that imposed by law for falsification
of public documents, it erred in imposing the maximum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence it meted upon the accused. Finding no
modifying circumstances, the Sandiganbayan imposed for each
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document, the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.
Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for complex
crimes enunciated in Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan,87 the first step
in determining the proper penalty is to consider whether or not
aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances attended the
commission of the crimes.
Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily
surrendered.1âwphi1 For said mitigating circumstance to be
appreciated, surrender must be made spontaneously or in such a
manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of
finding and capturing him.88 According to NBI Agent Ranin, petitioner
Estacio went to the NBI bearing a referral note from Atty. Agapito
Fajardo, Chief of Anti-Fraud Unit of the Central Bank.89 However, it
was proven by the prosecution beyond peradventure of doubt that
petitioner Estacio’s alleged surrender was anything but spontaneous.
He went to the NBI on February 17, 1982, 90 five days after Atty.
Fajardo had brought Valentino to that office for questioning, and a day
after a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) had been issued
against him and Valentino.91 Moreover, the booking sheet and arrest
report states that petitioner Estacio was "arrested" on February 16,
1982.92 Voluntary surrender having been insufficiently proven, as far
as penalty is concerned, petitioner Estacio in Crim. Cases Nos. 5950-
51 shall suffer the same penalty as petitioner Desiderio who did not
present proof that could mitigate the penalty that he should suffer for
the crimes.
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the penalty
prescribed by law is a single divisible penalty, the accused shall be
imposed the medium period of such penalty when there are neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. The propriety of imposing
the medium period of the more serious penalty for a complex crime
after considering the modifying circumstances notwithstanding that
Article 48 requires the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period
has been settled.93 It is supported by the doctrine that penal provisions
shall be interpreted in favor of the accused.
The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one (1) day
to ten (10) years. In the absence of impediments to the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for each crime committed, the
penalty that should be imposed upon petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case
Nos. 5950 and 5951, and upon petitioner Desiderio in Crim. Case Nos.
5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the indeterminate sentence comprising
of the minimum penalty within the range of prision correccional, to the
maximum penalty of prision mayor medium plus a fine of P5,000.00.
It will be observed that the maximum penalty erroneously imposed by
the Sandiganbayan is ten (10) years and one (1) day which is already
within the period of prision mayor maximum.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Rolando
Santos y Ramirez in G.R. Nos. 71523-25, petitioner Alfredo R.
Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No. 72384-86 and petitioner Jesus E. Estacio in
G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to Criminal Case No. 5949 are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes charged for lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan as far as
petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G. R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner
Jesus E. Estacio, with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 5950 and 5951
are concerned, is herby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that,
for each crime, they shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143702 September 13, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZALDY MENDOZA Y SEVILLA, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated March 12, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City, finding accused-appellant
Zaldy Mendoza guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Hernandez Abatay, in the amounts
of P75,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The information against accused-appellant charged —
That on or about the 7th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused,
armed with a knife, conspiring and confederating with Marco Aguirre
who is still at large, working together and helping one another, with
deliberate intent and with violence employed upon the person of
Hernandez Abatay, that is by stabbing him with the said knife, with
which the accused was armed at the time, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally take and carry away with intent to gain one
(1) Seiko Divers wristwatch valued at P300.00 and cash of P15.00
owned by Hernandez Abatay and as a consequence of the stab
wounds suffered by Hernandez Abatay at the hands of the accused,
the said Hernandez Abatay died a few days thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The information was subsequently amended to include Marco Aguirre,
accused-appellant Mendoza's co-accused.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following:
On July 7, 1994, at around 1:30 a.m., the victim Hernandez Abatay
and his companion Jose Neri Tajanlangit were at the corner of Quezon
and Ledesma Streets in Iloilo City waiting for a jeepney to take them
home. They had just come from work at a supermarket. Tajanlangit
left Abatay to urinate nearby. He was about 15 feet away from Abatay
when he saw accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza and a companion
approach Abatay. The two men robbed Abatay. Accused-appellant's
companion held Abatay's hands behind his back while accused-
appellant took Abatay's wrist watch and money. Accused appellant
then stabbed Abatay in the abdomen. Abatay ran away but accused-
appellant pursued him.3
At that time, PO3 Danilo Tan of the PNP was going home on board a
tricycle. He saw a man running on the street, going in his direction.
Tan asked the tricycle driver to stop. He alighted and asked the person
why he was running. He turned out to be Abatay. He said that he had
been held up by two persons. Tan asked him why he was clutching
his stomach. Abatay replied that he had been stabbed by the robbers.
Tan found that the victim had a wound in the lower right portion of his
stomach, about one inch above his belt. Abatay told Tan that one of
the robbers was wearing a white t-shirt while the other was wearing a
sleeveless basketball shirt and undershirt uniform. 4
PO3 Tan asked the tricycle driver to take Abatay to St. Paul's Hospital,
while he went after the suspects. He spotted one of the suspects, who
was wearing a sleeveless basketball shirt, along Quezon St. on the
way to Rizal St. The suspect, who was later identified as accused-
appellant Zaldy Mendoza, was panting for breath because he had
been running. Tan identified himself and searched the suspect. Tan
was able to recover a table knife from accused-appellant.5
PO3 Tan then took accused-appellant to the St. Paul's Hospital where
Abatay was confined. In the presence of Tan and some nurses and
the attending physician in the emergency room, Abatay pointed to
accused-appellant as one of those who had held him up and then
stabbed him. At that time, Abatay was in good condition and even
spoke with Tan. Tan then placed accused-appellant under arrest and
took him to the police station for investigation. Accused-appellant
allegedly pointed to Marco Aguirre as his companion when they held
up Abatay. Tan tried to look for Aguirre but was unsuccessful. 6
Melly De Rojo testified that on July 7, 1994, from around 11:30 p.m.
to 12:30 a.m., she was washing clothes outside her house at the
Roxas Village in Mabini St., Iloilo. She was a neighbor of accused-
appellant Zaldy Mendoza and Marco Aguirre in the said
village.7 According to this witness, Marco Aguirre asked her to hide
him inside her house because he had just stabbed someone. De Rojo
said Aguirre was wearing a white t-shirt with bloodstains on it and was
holding a knife. Aguirre told her that he could not get inside his own
house because it was closed. She said she refused Aguirre's request
because her husband and children were sleeping inside the house.
Then Aguirre allegedly took off his clothes and hung them on her
clothes line. She told Aguirre not to hang his clothes on her clothes
line as it might place her in trouble. Aguirre left and De Rojo did not
see him again. Neither did she see accused-appellant. De Rojo did
not report the incident to the police because she was afraid and,
anyway, she found out later that the crime had already been reported
to the police.8
Accused-appellant went to see De Rojo twice after the event that took
place on the night of July 7, 1994. Accused-appellant's wife asked her
if it was true that Aguirre showed up at her house on the night in
question. De Rojo replied in the affirmative and told her that she would
testify in favor of accused-appellant because it was Aguirre and not
accused-appellant whom she saw that night outside her house. 9
The kitchen knife which had been recovered from accused-appellant
was turned over on July 8, 1994 at 8:00 a.m. to PO3 Manuel Artuz,
the exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I. The blade of the knife was
discolored but he could not say if it was blood that caused the stain. 10
Violeta Abatay, the victim's mother, testified that she saw her son at
the St. Paul's Hospital in the early morning of July 7, 1994. Her son
died on July 10, 1994, after three days' confinement. 11
Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City Police Station,
performed an autopsy on the body of Hernandez Abatay on July 11,
1994.12 As reflected in a medico-legal autopsy report (Exh. A)
prepared by him, Dr. Doromal found that the cause of death of the
victim was a single stab wound located under the subleeding and
thoraco-abdominal region or near the right lower abdomen. The
direction and entrance of the wound was horizontal inside the
abdominal cavity and ended at the outer portion of the right kidney.
The wound, which was 18 cms. deep and 3.5 x 1.2 cms. wide, was
inflicted using a single-bladed sharp instrument, such as a knife. The
bladed instrument penetrated the back and hit the posterior portion of
the lungs, causing the same to harden and acquire a liver-like
consistency. The victim developed hypostatic pneumonia causing his
death. Hemorrhaging secondary to the stab wound also contributed to
the victim's death.13
Dr. Doromal also found that based on the location of the wound in the
victim's body, it was possible that the victim and his assailant were
facing each other when the former was stabbed. The assailant's thrust
originated from below the victim's abdomen and moved upwards to
the inner portion of the body.
The defense of the accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza was alibi. He
claimed that on July 7, 1994, at around 11:30 p.m., he was at the
Rochelle Carinderia resting after a day's work, driving a "trisicad."
Afterwards, he walked along Mabini St. towards the corner of
Ledesma St. On the way, he saw his neighbor Marco Aguirre with a
certain person he did not know. Accused-appellant, who was about
five meters away, saw Aguirre pointing a knife at the person. Accused-
appellant said he approached the two and asked Aguirre what the
matter was, but he was told to leave. Then, he said, he saw Aguirre
stab the person. Accused-appellant claimed he fled towards the
direction of the Rochelle Carinderia. Accused-appellant said he
wanted to report the incident to the police, but before he could do so
a police patrol car arrived. PO3 Danilo Tan alighted from the car and,
while pointing a gun at him, asked accused-appellant who his
companions were. Accused-appellant said he had no companions. He
was then made to get inside the patrol car and taken to the Gen. Luna
Police Station for investigation.14
Accused-appellant said he was handcuffed and taken to St. Paul's
Hospital. At the emergency room of the hospital, he said PO3 Tan
asked Abatay if accused-appellant was the one who stabbed him, but
Abatay answered that it was accused-appellant's companion who
stabbed him.
On March 12, 1998, the lower court rendered a decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and is hereby punished with imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua to
Death, to pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as actual damages
and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.15
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration dated November
25, 1994. In its order dated October 26, 1998, the trial court denied
the motion after finding no compelling reason to reconsider its
decision.16 But the trial court amended the dispositive portion by
specifying the provision of the Revised Penal Code violated and the
penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Zaldy Mendoza y Sevilla is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659, is punished with imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua, to pay the heirs of the victim Seventy-Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and to pay civil indemnity of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.17
On November 25, 1998, accused-appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration and new adjudication on the ground that the trial
court's order, dated October 26, 1998, was rendered after Judge
Florentino P. Pedronio had vacated his position as RTC Judge of
Iloilo.18 But the trial court denied accused-appellant's motion in an
order on March 16, 2000.19
Hence, this appeal. In his lone assignment of error, accused-appellant
contends:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED ZALDY
MENDOZA Y SEVILLA FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE ON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.20
We find the appeal to be without merit.
First. The issue in this case turns on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. We have repeatedly ruled that in the absence of any fact
or circumstance of weight which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misconstrued, appellate courts will not
interfere with the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses or
set aside its judgment considering that it is in a better position to
decide these questions as it heard the witnesses during trial. 21 The
matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most completely performed and carried out by a trial judge who,
unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in the light
of the defendant's behavior, demeanor, conduct, and attitude during
the trial.22
In this case, accused-appellant questions the testimony of the lone
eyewitness, Jose Tajanlangit, claiming that the latter's testimony is not
worthy of credence because it is incredible and is based largely on
hearsay. To bolster his claim, accused-appellant cites three examples
from the latter's testimony. First, Tajanlangit did not testify that he
heard any sound come from the deceased Abatay when the latter was
stabbed by his holduppers. Accused-appellant says it is highly
improbable that the deceased did not make any outcry when he was
stabbed and equally improbable that Tajanlangit did not hear the
same. Second, Tajanlangit testified that he ran away in the direction
opposite that to which Abatay ran after being stabbed. Yet Tajanlangit
also testified that Abatay met PO3 Tan; that Tan sent Abatay to his
employer; and that Tan pursued and caught up with accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant asserts that Tajanlangit could not have
possibly testified as to facts which took place after he ran away and
that he only gathered such facts from the victim himself when the latter
was still alive in the hospital. Third, Tajanlangit testified that he and
the victim were waiting for a jeep instead of a taxi on the night in
question because the victim only had P15.00 in his pocket. Accused-
appellant claims that this is unbelievable since Tajanlangit had P50.00
in his own pocket. Why, accused-appellant asks, did Tajanlangit not
disclose this fact to the victim so that they could have taken a taxi? 23
The questions raised by accused-appellant concerning Tajanlangit's
testimony as to what he saw, heard, and did on that fateful night are
too incidental to merit any serious consideration. They concern only
minor details that do not touch upon the basic elements of the crime
itself and therefore cannot detract from the credibility of the
witness.24 No glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of Tajanlangit
were shown by the defense. What is crucial is that Tajanlangit testified
clearly that he saw accused-appellant and a companion being held up
Abatay on that night; that the two managed to take Abatay's money
and wrist watch; and that accused-appellant stabbed the victim. There
is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Tajanlangit's observation since
the place where the crime occurred was well-lighted, there being a
street lamp on a nearby corner.25
Witness Tajanlangit testified that he saw the actual stabbing of Abatay
and was even able to demonstrate that the direction of the stabbing
motion made by accused-appellant was downward going
upward.26 This coincides with the finding of the medico-legal expert,
Dr. Tito Doromal, that the entry of the weapon into the victim's
abdomen was "backward upward," that is, that the entrance of the
weapon was horizontal inside the abdominal cavity and ended at the
outer portion of the right kidney.27 Thus, the evidence confirms that
the wound sustained by the victim was inflicted in the manner seen
and testified to by Tajanlangit.28 Accused-appellant failed to show that
Tajanlangit had any motive to testify falsely against him and his
companion concerning so serious a crime as robbery with homicide.
Further bolstering the credibility of Tajanlangit are the testimonies of
the other witnesses presented by the prosecution which sufficiently
establish accused-appellant's guilt of the crime charged.
PO3 Danilo Tan testified that he encountered the victim on Ledesma
Street who told him that he had been robbed and then stabbed by two
persons; that the victim suffered a wound in the abdominal area; that
the victim described the appearance of his attackers; that he sent the
victim to his employer in the supermarket; that he caught accused-
appellant, who matched the description of one of the victim's robbers,
while the latter was running along Quezon St.; that he recovered a
table knife from accused-appellant; that he took accused-appellant to
the hospital where the victim was; and that the victim pointed to
accused-appellant as the person who had stabbed him.
PO3 Manuel Artuz, exhibit custodian of Police Precinct I in Iloilo City,
testified that a discolored table knife was turned over to him in the
early morning of July 8, 1994. The knife was identified by PO3 Tan in
open court as the same one he recovered from accused-appellant on
July 7, 1994.29
Violeta Abatay testified that she saw her son lying wounded in the
emergency room of the St. Paul's Hospital in the early morning of July
7, 1994 and that her son died on July 10, 1994.
Finally, Dr. Tito Doromal, who performed the autopsy on the body of
victim Abatay, testified that the latter died as a result of a stab wound
inflicted on the lower right portion of the abdomen and that the weapon
used to inflict the wound was a sharp-bladed instrument, such as a
knife.30
While it is true that none of the other witnesses, aside from
Tajanlangit, actually saw the accused-appellant rob and stab the
victim, their testimonies nonetheless provide sufficient corroborative
evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused-appellant. The
testimonies of Tan, Artuz, Violeta Abatay, and Dr. Doromal together
render a complete account of the events surrounding the death of
Abatay which lead to but one fair and reasonable conclusion — that
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Accused-appellant admitted that he was on Ledesma Street and saw
the crime committed, but claimed that he immediately left because
Marco Aguirre told him to leave. According to him, the next thing he
knew was that he was accosted by PO3 Tan, who searched his
person, and later took him to the St. Paul's Hospital, where he was
pointed to by the same man whom he had seen being robbed by
Aguirre.
Accused-appellant's denial that it was not he, but Marco Aguirre, who
committed the deed is, to say the least, self-serving. Accused-
appellant's denial does not credibly support his claim of
innocence.31 For in weighing contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. 32
Nor can accused-appellant's defense of alibi prosper. Accused-
appellant was positively identified as the person who committed the
crime. It is basic and well-entrenched that the defense of alibi cannot
stand against the positive identification of a credible eyewitness. 33 Nor
did accused-appellant show that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime. It has been repeatedly held that to
establish alibi, accused-appellant must not only show that he was at
some other place at or about the time of the commission of the crime
but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
place where the crime was committed.34 But, as earlier stated,
accused-appellant in fact admitted that he was actually on Ledesma
Street at the time the crime was being committed.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that the decision of the trial court,
dated March 12, 1998, is a nullity since it was promulgated twelve
months, or more than ninety (90) days, after the case was submitted
for decision on March 23, 1997. He cites the ruling of this Court
in Lazaret v. Bantuas,35 in support of his contention. 36 He further
contends that the amended decision dated October 26, 1998 is
likewise a nullity since it was issued motu proprio, contrary to Rule
120, §7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows the
modification of a judgment of conviction only upon motion of the
accused. Finally, accused-appellant maintains that the amended
decision, consisting of a new dispositive portion contained in a two-
paragraph order, was never promulgated and is, therefore, a nullity. 37
Accused-appellant's contention is without merit. The failure to decide
cases within the ninety-day period required by law constitutes a
ground for administrative liability against the defaulting judge, 38 which
may take the form of dismissal, forfeiture of benefits and
privileges,39 or a fine.40 But it does not make the judgment a nullity.
The judgment is valid.41
Accused-appellant also complains that the decision in this case was
amended without any of the parties asking for it. This is not so. The
original decision in this case was issued on March 12, 1998 and was
promulgated on July 15, 1998.42 The decision was written by Acting
Presiding Judge Florentino P. Pedronio of the Bacolod City RTC,
Branch 43. On July 24, 1998, accused-appellant, through counsel,
filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the decision be set
aside and accused-appellant acquitted on the ground that the decision
did not state the law violated nor refer to the specific provision of the
Revised Penal Code.43
Acting on the motion, the trial court denied accused-appellant's motion
for reconsideration, but amended the dispositive portion of its decision
for indeed the same failed to fix the specific penalty within the range
provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the crime
committed.44 Hence, the Court amended the dispositive portion of its
decision by citing the provision of the Revised Penal Code violated
and imposing on accused-appellant the appropriate penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
As the Solicitor General well observed, it is misleading for accused-
appellant to claim that the trial court motu proprio modified its ruling
as the trial court in fact resolved the motion for reconsideration filed
by accused-appellant resulting in the modification of the imposed
penalty. The trial court has the residual jurisdiction to correct the error
in imposing the penalty.
Accused-appellant further claims that the amended decision is a
nullity since the same consisted of only one paragraph and does not
contain the requisites of a decision.
The order, dated October 26, 1998, of the trial court is an integral part
of the original decision rendered on March 12, 1998 for the purpose
of determining compliance with the constitutional requirement of Art.
VIII, §14 that "No decision shall be rendered by any Court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based."
Rule 120, §2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the
judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts proved and admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification
of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission
thereof, if there be any; (b) the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the facts; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there be any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived.
In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall
make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in favor of the
offended party. (Emphasis added)
A perusal of the March 12, 1998 decision of the trial court shows that
it conforms substantially with these requirements. The dispositive
portion, however, is defective as it did not mention the law pursuant to
which accused-appellant was convicted and the two indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua and death was imposed upon him.
Hence, there was a need to amend the same, which the trial court did
upon motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant based on the
same ground.
Third. Accused-appellant argues that the confession he made to PO3
Daniel Tan at the St. Paul's Hospital that he and Marco Aguirre had
robbed Abatay is inadmissible in evidence because it was given
without the assistance of counsel while he (accused-appellant) was in
custody.
Indeed, the confession is inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under
custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of
counsel.45 However, the defense failed to object to its presentation
during the trial with the result that the defense is deemed to have
waived objection to its admissibility. No error was, therefore, incurred
by the trial court in admitting evidence of the confession.
Nor did the trial court err in sentencing accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua.46
The penalty for robbery with homicide under Art. 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion
perpetua to death. In the absence of any aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty should be imposed, i.e., reclusion perpetua.47
With respect to the amount of damages, the following expenses were
duly supported by receipts presented in evidence: P1,695.00 as
medical expenses; P51,302.00 as hospital expenses; and P6,500.00
as funeral expenses, or the total amount of P59,497.00. The trial
court's award of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity as a result of the
death of the victim is in accordance with the current case law 48 and
therefore is sustained. In addition, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages must likewise be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim
pursuant to recent rulings.49
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33, Iloilo City, finding accused-appellant Zaldy Mendoza guilty
of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P59,497.00
as actual damages and P50,00.00 as moral damages in addition to
the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as indemnity by the trial court.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142932 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO
BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated February 10, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao
Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and
Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery
with homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor
Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were
charged with Joseph Bernaldez with robbery with homicide under Art.
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which alleged -
That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro,
Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away "Seiko" diver's watch valued at P1,000.00, one
"Sanyo" cassette valued at P600.00 and cash amounting
to P2,725.00, with a total value of FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency,
belonging to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs,
represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum;
and on the occasion thereof, the said accused, armed with an
unlicensed handgun and a knife, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said
firearm one NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
wounds which caused his death.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not
guilty, whereupon they were tried.3
On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court
for Reinvestigation, which the court granted. As a result of the
reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss with respect to accused Joseph
Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the court issued an order
stating -
On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by
OIC 1st Asst. Prov'l. Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the
grounds stated therein to be well-taken and in order, said motion is
granted.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is
hereby ordered dismissed. The Provincial Warden is hereby directed
to release immediately from custody the person of Joseph Bernaldez,
if there is no other case that will warrant his further confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.4
Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales
and Romeo Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses
Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had visitors at their house in Bagsac,
Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks with
Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and Nicasio Lamanilao when
two armed men, one carrying a gun and the other a knife, suddenly
entered the house through the kitchen door. The one carrying a gun
had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other
one carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a
handkerchief. The knife-wielder held Chona, the third child of the
Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house
were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from
the sala. There, the man with a gun demanded a gun and money from
Nicanor. Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but asked his wife to
give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was
intended to be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed
it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder ransacked the cabinet and took
the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the school
expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the family's
Sanyo cassette recorder and some clothes. The holduppers also
divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko diver's
wristwatch and then left.5
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita
thought that the first one was a mere warning shot, but later Nicanor
was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after seeing her
husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor was immediately
brought to the Lupon Emergency Hospital where he was given first
aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum Regional Hospital
but he eventually died.6 The death certificate (Exh. B) states the cause
of his death as -
Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS]
PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH MASSIVE
CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL
TRANSECTION MESENTERIC VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM &
SIGMOID
Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA. 7
The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night.
Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales gave descriptions of the
holduppers and told the responding police investigators that they
would be able to recognize the suspects if they saw them again. 8
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger
bus compound in the neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team sent to investigate the
incident was able to pick up suspects, 9 one of whom was accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and
had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items, consisting of watches, a
cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were
recovered from his house, some of which were claimed by passengers
of the ACF bus line.10
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the
team investigating the robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed
Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro, about the
apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the recovery of the
items from him. Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita
Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to the Governor Generoso
Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel
Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales
was identified as the man armed with a gun who wore a bonnet to
cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as the knife-
wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his
face.11
Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her
nephew. Carolita and Arsenio said that they were able to recognize
the suspects despite their disguises because they were only one to
two meters away from each other during the holdup, and the rooms of
the house were well-lighted.12 In addition, Carolita was able to identify
the Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh. D) as the one taken from their
house because of the broken antennae and the name "Nick Suralta"
written inside the battery compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio
likewise identified the Seiko diver's watch (Exh. A) as his. 13
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang
Sora, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5,
1992 working in his mother-in-law's farm, piling coconut palm leaves
together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he had supper in his
house and slept there together with his family.14
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was
sleeping, he was awakened by Policeman Danny Cabanilas,
Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took him to the
Governor Generoso police station in connection with a robbery in the
ACF bus compound. At the police station, he was investigated by
Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside the jail,
people came to see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman
companion if he was one of the persons who committed the robbery
in San Isidro. The woman answered, "I do not know them." For this
reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return,
the woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and
accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez as those who were involved in
the robbery.15
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by
Policemen Ernesto Bahan and Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching
Mati, somewhere in Bañas, they alighted from the jeep and he was
made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro with the use
of an armalite and hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought
to the Mati Cemetery and there forced to confess. Thereafter, he was
placed inside an open tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to
the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days, he was taken to Governor
Generoso. He denied participation in the crime and stated that the
cassette recorder and other items were not confiscated from him.16
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at
around 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in
his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together with his father,
mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998, he went to the Municipal
Jail of Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police that
he was concealing a firearm. At the police station, he was investigated
by Inspector Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept, which he
denied. He was later placed in jail. 17 Inspector Malintad, however,
testified that Bernaldez was actually arrested in his house in
Tibanban.18
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita
Suralta, accompanied by Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went to
the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which they went to
Malintad's office. Then, the two returned to the jail cell after a few
minutes and Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in the
robbery.19
Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25
kilometers from Manikling, San Isidro, where the robbery with
homicide took place, and could be reached by several means of land
transportation.20
Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the
defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales's testimony. According to Bahan, at around 5
o'clock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he left for Governor Generoso
on official mission together with SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3
Jaljis, and PO3 Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel
Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant Provincial Director Supt.
Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo
Castro of Municipal Trial Court of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the
Chief of Police of Governor Generoso, to turn over Joel Gonzales. The
party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11 o'clock in the
morning and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
July 21, 1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the
court page 362 of the police blotter for July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:
SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan
arrived [at the] Police Station from Governor Generoso and brought in
the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of Chief Inspector
Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial Command, Mati Dvo
Or to Mun. Trial Court of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or
duly signed by [Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn over the custody of
accused to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC No.
7183 for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun.
Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of Police of Governor Generoso
granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided that maximum
security must be implemented and to be returned said to Governor
Generoso Police Station within three (3) days same said Joel
Gonzales also involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No. 7183 as
pinpointed by two witnesses subject is hereby placed under police
custody as per verbal order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer guard
"BJMP" SPO3 Cabillada.21
SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
to the Mati Cemetery. He said that when they arrived in Mati, he
immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to the Chief of Police, who
then turned him over to the investigating section.22
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken
to Mati in connection with Criminal Case No. 7183. Although SPO4
Bahan admitted he had been administratively charged with
maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case was later dismissed
and he was exonerated.23
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime
of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of the
victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum of P50,000.00, to indemnify also
jointly and severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of
the proceedings.
The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit "D") is ordered returned to the Suralta
family, while the wristwatch (Exhibit "A") to Arsenio Abonales.
SO ORDERED.24
Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following
errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING
THAT THE ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION
DURING THE TRIAL ARE INADMISSIBLE IN LAW.25
On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office, on behalf of both
accused-appellants, assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITIES OF THE
ASSAILANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.26
We find accused-appellants' contentions to be without merit.
After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution
evidence establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires
proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with
violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b)
the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done
with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense is
committed. The offense becomes the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the
victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the
Public Attorney's Office concedes that the prosecution was successful
in proving the commission of the crime, questioning only the
identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.27
First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving
credence to the identification made by the two prosecution witnesses,
Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales. They argue that the manner
by which accused-appellants were identified was suggestive and
showed partiality. They argue further that, most often, the bereaved
families of victims are not concerned with the accuracy of identification
because they are overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless
of whether or not the suspect is the real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside
the lower court's conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the
witnesses' identification of the accused-appellants as the persons who
robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples' guest Arsenio Abonales
and killed Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed.
Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a
lasting impression on the victims' minds which cannot be easily erased
from their memory.28 There is no evidence to show that the
eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they mistook accused-
appellants for the men who robbed and killed the victims. On the
contrary, fear for one's life may even cause the witness to be more
observant of his surroundings.29 Experience shows that precisely
because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree
of reliability in identifying criminals.30 The desire to see that justice is
done will not be served should the witness abandon his conscience
and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime. 31
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified
accused-appellants as the armed men who held them up on July 5,
1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility of mistaken
identification because prosecution witnesses were able to observe
their movements and their body built and height despite the fact that
accused-appellants covered their faces.32 As Carolita Suralta
testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that
right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not
able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his
actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?
A When they got inside, Your Honor.
....
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements
that he is the accused Joel Gonzales, considering that he was wearing
a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?
A Because at the time he said, "silence", I recognized his voice,
Your Honor.33
Accused-appellants' counsels attempted to confuse prosecution
witnesses during the trial by using the word "recognize" to
simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the
name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree
with private prosecutor that a mistake is likely when one equates
knowing the person by his movements and by his voice with knowing
a person by his name. Although the names of accused-appellants
were supplied by the police, the witnesses nevertheless recognized
accused-appellants when they visited them in the Governor Generoso
jail.34 What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the
true and correct names of the accused, but rather his ability to identify
the persons actually seen committing the offense. 35
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper
motive, it is presumed that he was not so moved and, therefore, his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 36 That presumption has not
been overcome in this case. Consequently, the identification of
accused-appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is
motive for the killing important when there is no doubt as to the identity
of the perpetrators of the crime.37 But here the motive is plain: the
victim was killed to rob him of his possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail
over the positive identification of accused-appellants. The defense of
denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
positive testimonies of credible witnesses.38
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the
interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant Romeo
Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to
secure the services of counsel, in violation of §§2 and 12, Art. III of
the Constitution. Hence, their admission of the commission of the
crime is inadmissible in evidence against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales was picked up at around 8:00 a.m. near his
residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Accused-appellant
Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline and was wearing a
wristwatch. According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant
Gonzales admitted participation in the crime upon interrogation and
voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
....
Q In his residence?
A In the vicinity of his residence.
Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?
A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.
Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
....
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I
brought him to the police station and interrogated him and after the
interrogation, he accepted the commission of the crime and he told
me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
....
Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that
that you said he voluntarily turned over the loot?
A On that date.
Q The time when you went to the house?
A Yes.
....
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A I did not go inside the house.
Q How many of you went to the house?
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?
A Yes.
Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?
A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender
the items.39
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial
investigation when they made their admissions to the police. At that
point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and
for this reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of freedom in a substantial way.40 Hence, the admissions made by
accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, §
2(1) and (3) of the Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise
its objections to the admissibility of these statements immediately, as
required by Rule 132, §36, when Inspector Malintad was presented
as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions
concerning the confession were asked of him. Consequently,
accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right to object to
the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's testimony. 41 Indeed, it was
even the defense counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector
Malintad to elaborate on the circumstances of accused-appellant
Gonzales' admission in the course of his cross-examination of the said
witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
told him that one of his companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
....
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A He was picked up later.
Q Where did you pick him up?
A At Tibanban.
Q Why did you pick him up?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo
Bernaldez is one of his companions?
A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we
picked him up.42
On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the
Municipal Jail at the Police Station of Governor Generoso in order to
identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the victim and
accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it was accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim,
and the other one answered - I was not responsible in the killing - and
he said, "Joel Gonzales killed the victim".
Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim
was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.43
Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as
evidence against his co-appellant Joel Gonzales. For the
constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused
orally admitted having committed the crime.44
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector
Malintad had no warrant when the latter conducted a search of his
residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the
robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and
wristwatch are inadmissible in evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector
Malintad, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales voluntarily surrendered
the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of accused-
appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder, chainsaw,
and spare parts were given to him. What thus happened was a
consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the constitutional
requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be
secure from an unreasonable search may be waived either expressly
or impliedly.45 And when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the exclusionary
rule (Art. III, §3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods
had been taken from him. Inspector Malintad testified that he
recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and spare parts
from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the latter in
his house. There is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintad's claim that
the stolen items were indeed recovered from accused-appellant
Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners as
those taken from them. Between the testimonies of the police officers,
who enjoy the presumption of regularity in their duties, and the bare
denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to believe the
police officers. This is true especially considering that the police
officers have not been shown to have any motive to testify falsely
against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, §3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides "that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that
things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him." Since the subject items were found in the
possession of accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, he is then presumed
to be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales was
unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty
for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. In
view of the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court on accused-
appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same being
in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 46 An additional amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be awarded in favor of
the heirs of the victim. Such damages require no further proof other
than the death of the victim.47 The restitution of the cash and of the
stolen items to their respective owners ordered by the trial court is
affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao
Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellants
Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor Suralta
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs
of the proceedings. The cassette recorder is ordered returned to the
heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the wristwatch to Arsenio
Abonales.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALFREDO
ENANORIA, (DETAINED), one alias Totong and one alias Boy, and
alias Eboy whose true name is RODRIGO FEROLINO,Accused.
ALFREDO ENANORIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by Alfredo Enanoria, from the October
31, 1989 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch II, in Criminal Case No. 16302-88, which
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping
with Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P110,000.00 for death and burial expenses, and P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and to pay the costs (Rollo, p. 22).
At around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of May 7, 1988, while he was at
the Davao Medical Center where he was brought after his arrest.
Enanoria executed an "ante-mortem" statement before P/Cpl. Cerilo
S. Solana, Jr. in the presence of Mayor Duterte and Lt. Col. Calida.
Although he claimed that he would still survive inspite of his wound,
he admitted having been shot because he was involved in the
kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He informed the police that one alias
Amil shot Mrs. Dakudao and that they were not able to get the
P50,000.00 ransom they had demanded (Original Record, p. 6).
Four days later or on May 11, 1988, Enanoria executed a sworn
statement before P/Cpl. Solana at the Talomo Patrol Station of the
Davao City Metrodiscom. After he had been apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel of his own choice,
he admitted involvement in the kidnapping of Mrs. Dakudao. He
claimed, however, that he did not know that he was participating in a
kidnapping as he was merely picked up in Tunggol, Pagalungan,
Maguindanao by Amil and one alias Totong. According to Enanoria,
Amil and Totong each carried a .38 caliber revolver and it was Amil
who shot Mrs. Dakudao only once at around 1:30 a.m. of May 7, 1988
(Exh. "1" ; Original Record, p. 7).
Hence, Enanoria, one alias Totong, one alias Boy and Rodrigo
Ferolino alias Eboy were charged in an Information filed on May 12,
1988 by 4th Assistant City Fiscal Barbara C. Pioquinto, which reads
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of
KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER under Article 267 and 248 in relation
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about May 7, 1988 and sometime prior thereto, in the city
of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for the purpose of extorting money from
one Lea Dakudao and her family in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) or of killing the said Lea Dakudao if the amount
demanded could not be given, kidnapped, carried away, brought to
Maguindanao and deprived said Lea Dakudao of her liberty without
authority of law, against her will and consent; that on the occasion of
said kidnapping and to enable them to carry out their purpose, the said
accused in pursuance of their conspiracy brought back aforesaid Lea
Dakudao to Davao City and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation shot her (Lea
Dakudao) with the use of firearm thereby inflicting upon her (Lea
Dakudao) a mortal wound which caused her death." (Original Record,
p. 1).
On June 27, 1988, Enanoria executed a supplementary sworn
statement before T/Sgt. Florante M. Rotor of the PC-CIS. Assisted by
Atty. Jonathan M. Jocom of the CLAO XI, Enanoria was once again
apprised of his constitutional rights before he executed the statement
which was sworn before 4th Assistant City Fiscal Antonina B.
Escovilla.
In said statement, Enanoria related that he joined the group of Rodrigo
Ferolino alias Eboy, his first degree cousin, in November 1987. The
other leaders of the group were Sgt. Bibit of the Philippine Army
assigned with the 27th IB stationed at Bansalan, Davao del Sur and
one alias Lugum. The group lured Enanoria with "instant money" as
they had kidnapped a certain Leong and one Angel who respectively
paid P50,000.00 and P200,000.00 ransom money.
According to Enanoria, Sgt. Bibit hatched the kidnapping plan as he
had financial problems. It was also Sgt. Bibit who gave Eboy a hand
grenade but Sgt. Bibit did not participate in the kidnapping of Mrs.
Dakudao. In the afternoon of May 6, 1988, when they posted
themselves at the Park and Shop in Bajada, Davao City, they were
armed not only with a hand grenade because Amil and Totong were
each armed with a .38 caliber revolver.
Enanoria claimed that Eboy instructed Amil and Totong to look for a
new car which Enanoria would drive. Hence, when they saw Mrs.
Dakudao boarding the Ford Laser car, Amil and Totong also boarded
it and Enanoria drove the car up to the corner of J.P. Laurel and
Cabaguio Avenue where Eboy was waiting. Eboy then drove the car
to Tunggol, Maguindanao.
Enanoria narrated that on the way, Eboy introduced himself as
Commander Bobby to Mrs. Dakudao and they discussed the ransom
to be paid. Upon reaching Tunggol, Mrs. Dakudao told Eboy that she
had P50,000.00 in cash at home. Having agreed on the ransom, the
group headed back to Davao City after staying in Tunggol for around
twenty minutes only.
Upon reaching Davao City, they stopped at the gasoline station in front
of the Tourist Lodge along MacArthur Avenue. Totong called up the
Dakudao residence and when they learned that Mr. Dakudao was not
around, Mrs. Dakudao volunteered to get the money herself. The
group then proceeded to Bajada but Eboy just parked the car along
the highway because Mrs. Dakudao told them that there was a
checkpoint manned by a security guard before reaching their
residence. Eboy then decided to return to Tunggol but upon reaching
Matina, they saw a roadblock which had been put up by the police.
Eboy did not heed the warning of the police. Instead, he stepped on
the accelerator of the car thereby prompting the police to open fire at
them. The car stopped upon reaching a bridge because its tires were
flat. As they were going out of the car, Amil gave Enanoria a .38 caliber
revolver and they all escaped in different directions. Enanoria,
however, was arrested by the police a few hours thereafter (Exh. "A" ;
Record of Exhibits, pp. 1-4).
When arraigned, Enanoria, who was the only one apprehended by the
authorities, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged (Original
Record, p. 21).
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sgt. Florante M. Rotor, then assigned as the Chief Investigator at the
11th CIS District. He testified that he personally investigated Enanoria
on June 27, 1988 and that before proceeding with the said
investigation, he first apprised Enanoria of his constitutional rights
particularly his right to counsel of his own choice. When Enanoria said
that he could not afford to hire one, Sgt. Rotor offered to contact the
Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), which, in turn, designated
Atty. Jocom to assist Enanoria. Upon Atty. Jocom’s arrival at the CIS
Office, Sgt. Rotor introduced him to Enanoria and allowed them to
confer with each other for about five minutes. After Enanoria had
agreed to have Atty. Jocom as his counsel, the investigation
commenced. Sgt. Rotor asked questions and Enanoria answered in
the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. The sworn statement, however, which
was typed by Sgt. Rotor simultaneously, was in the English language,
having been translated by Sgt. Rotor during the investigation.
Enanoria and Atty. Jocom thereafter signed the statement in one
another’s presence. Sgt. Rotor then brought Enanoria to the Office of
the City Fiscal for the administering of the oath.
On cross-examination, Sgt. Rotor said that Enanoria was brought to
the CIS Office after he was discharged from the hospital where he was
treated for his gunshot wounds. As Enanoria appeared to be strong
enough by then, Sgt. Rotor did not ask about the former’s injuries. Sgt.
Rotos also disclosed that Enanoria had previously executed a sworn
statement before the Talomo Police Station and that he was able to
read a copy of the same which was furnished to their office. Although
he could not recall its contents, he remembered that since the sworn
statement appeared to be inadequate, he took Enanoria’s
supplemental statement during his reinvestigation.
Sgt. Rotor affirmed that he informed Enanoria of his constitutional
rights, namely, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel of his own
choice, that if he could not afford to have one, the government could
provide him a lawyer to assist him in the investigation, and that
whatever he would say could be used as evidence against him. Sgt.
Rotor likewise confirmed that Enanoria voluntarily gave his statement
and that he (Sgt. Rotor) did not require Enanoria to sign a waiver
considering that he was already assisted by counsel. The
investigation lasted for approximately two hours. Four days later. Sgt.
Rotor took Enanoria, then detained at their office, to the Fiscal’s
Office. Then he waited outside and after the oath had been
administered, he brought Enanoria back to the CIS Office for
detention. (Hearing of August 15, 1988: TSN, pp. 4-33).
Pfc. Aquino Serenio, assigned at the Talomo Police Station. He
testified that he was on duty at around 1:30 o’clock in the morning of
May 7, 1988 when he received a flash alarm relayed by the
Metrodiscom Operation Center (MOC) stating that four unidentified
armed men were spotted on board a red car with plate number LAG-
312. Acting on the said alarm, Station Commander P/Lt. Reynaldo
Obrero immediately dispatched him together with several other police
officers to put up a road block to intercept the vehicle.
As the car was allegedly coming from the poblacion and heading
south, Pfc. Serenio’s team set up a road block in front of Matina Mini
Market in Davao City. Not long thereafter, they saw a red car fast
approaching so they signalled the driver to stop the vehicle. The driver,
however, ignored the signal and the car went through the road block
almost hitting one of the police officers. Several gunshots were fired
at them from the red car when they pursued it with their mobile unit.
Their team successfully fired at the tires of the car thus forcing it to
stop near the Balusong Bridge. A lone gunshot was then heard from
inside the car and then the passengers scampered in different
directions. The team quickly approached the car and there they saw
a seriously wounded lady on the front seat. The driver of the mobile
unit, Pat. Jickain, rushed the lady to the Davao Doctors Hospital for
treatment while he (Pfc. Serenio) and the others stayed behind to
search for the remaining passengers.
Eventually, they found Enanoria in the house of a certain Dado at
Muslim Village, Central Park Subdivision in Bangkal, Davao City. They
recovered a .38 caliber snubnose revolver, i.e., a small-barreled gun,
from Enanoria who was subsequently brought to the Davao Medical
Center due to a gunshot wound at the back. Pfc. Serenio later learned
that the lady, then identified as Mrs. Lea Dakudao, expired at the
hospital while Enanoria was investigated by P/Cpl. Cerilo Solana at
the Talomo Police Station. In court, Pfc. Serenio positively identified
Enanoria as one of the alleged kidnappers.
When cross-examined, Pfc. Serenio said that he did not know whether
there were other persons on board the red car aside from the reported
four armed men. He also admitted that he and the rest of his team
were all armed with M16 armalite rifles and that they all fired their
weapons when the passengers of the car first opened fire at them.
Pfc. Serenio stressed that their team directed their gunfire at the tires
of the car to forcibly stop it but the car did stop when it reached the
Balusong Bridge, about 200 meters from the roadblock. When they
inspected the car, Pfc. Serenio saw that both rear tires of the car were
flat. Thereafter, the car was brought to the police station for
safekeeping and investigation.
Pfc. Serenio added that he saw the lady whose back was bleeding,
apparently alive but unconscious. One male passenger jumped to the
river at the right side while the two others, one of whom was Enanoria,
proceeded to the left side of the bridge leading to a grassy area.
Nobody fired their guns while Pfc. Serenio’s team chased the said
passengers. Finally, Pfc. Serenio admitted that their team was not
subjected to paraffin tests nor their rifles to ballistic examination
(Hearing of August 15, 1989; TSN, pp. 34-58).
Atty. Jonathan Jocom, a lawyer assigned at the CLAO, declared that
on June 27, 1988 at around 8:30 o’clock in the morning, their office
received a call from the Criminal Investigation Unit of the CIS,
requesting for a lawyer to assist a person who was about to give a
statement during custodial investigation. In response thereto, Atty.
Jocom proceeded to the CIS Camp Leonor in Davao City. After he was
introduced by Sgt. Rotor, Atty. Jocom conferred with Enanoria. The
latter told him that he had already made a previous statement and that
he was willing to give a supplemental one to the police authorities.
Atty. Jocom, in turn apprised Enanoria of his constitutional rights and
advised him not to make any statement or to sign the same if he was
unsure of what he wanted to say. Despite such advice, Enanoria
willingly underwent investigation, in the presence of Atty. Jocom, for
about two hours. The investigation sheet was in English so Sgt. Rotor
translated the same into the Cebuano-Visayan dialect which not only
Enanoria but also Atty. Jocom knew since he grew up in Davao City.
After the investigation, he and Enanoria signed the sworn statement.
On cross-examination, Atty. Jocom stated that he did not know
Enanoria prior to the investigation yet the latter welcomed his
assistance. He informed Enanoria of the seriousness of the charge
but he observed that Enanoria was ‘overwhelming (sic) to tell the truth’
and that he (Enanoria) was ‘really positive’ about his statements. In
fact, Enanoria did not consult him at all about his answers to the
investigator’s questions as he made them all voluntarily. Lastly, Atty.
Jocom stated that the translation which Sgt. Rotor made relating to
the investigation was substantially correct (Hearing of August 16,
1989; TSN, pp. 5-18).
Cpl. Cerilo Solana, Jr., assigned at the Talomo Police Station. He
testified that he was also on duty on May 7, 1988 when he was
instructed by their Station Commander, Police Lt. Reynaldo Obrero,
to investigate the shooting incident which occurred in the early dawn
of that day. He was informed that a certain Alfredo Enanoria, one of
the suspects in the kidnapping of one Lea Dakudao, was
apprehended and then confined at the Davao Regional Hospital due
to gunshot wounds. He immediately proceeded to the said hospital
and he saw Enanoria being treated at the emergency ward.
Cpl. Solana, believing then that Enanoria was in a serious condition
and could die anytime, asked questions and prepared what he
considered as Enanoria’s ante-mortem statement. Enanoria,
however, survived and was subsequently discharged from the hospital
after which he (Enanoria) was brought to the Talomo Police Station.
Again, the Station Commander directed Cpl. Solana to take down
Enanoria’s statement. When interviewed, Enanoria disclosed to Cpl.
Solana the names of his companions as one alias Totong and the
other as Amil, who died after having been apprehended in Digos,
Davao City.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Upon cross-examination, Cpl. Solana said that based on his
investigation, he learned that Lea Dakudao died while on board the
car which sustained several bullet holes mostly at its rear portion. He
said, however, that he did not know the cause of the victim’s death nor
did he try to find out the same inasmuch as his purpose then was only
to investigate the suspect in the said incident. He did interview
Enanoria twice — first at the hospital after Solano’s arrest, and
second, when Enanoria had been brought to the police station. On the
second occasion, Enanoria readily admitted that he was with a group
on that fateful day. Enanoria specified Alias Totong and Alias Amil, who
allegedly shot the victim once. Enanoria claimed, however, that he
was not involved in the kidnapping of the victim. Since the referral of
the case to the Criminal Investigation Service, Cpl. Solana no longer
coordinated with the said office (Hearing of August 16, 1989: TSN, pp.
24-37).
Dr. Jose T. Pagsaligan, a medico-legal officer assigned at the
Regional Health Office in Davao City. He testified that on May 7, 1988,
he examined the body of Lea Dakudao, then already lifeless, at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes. According to his findings, the victim
died of shock secondary to severe hemorrhage due to gunshot
wounds. More particularly, Dr. Pagsaligan stated in his Autopsy Report
No. 004-88 (Exhibit "B", Record of Exhibits, p. 5) that Lea Dakudao
sustained two gunshot wounds, both of which were caused by bullets
presumably fired from a .38 caliber revolver. The bullet which caused
the first wound entered through the right side of the back just above
the waistline and its slug was recovered in the omentum, a part of the
abdominal cavity. That which caused the second wound, which was
more fatal, entered through the right side of the buttock and was
retrieved from the ascending colon of the large intestines. Dr.
Pagsaligan opined that the assailant could have been in a higher
position than the victim when he fired the first shot because of the
bullet’s downward trajectory. Aside from the gunshot wounds, Dr.
Pagsaligan noted the presence of multiple pelvic bone fragments and
1000 cc. of blood in the abdominal cavity, indicating internal
hemorrhage caused by the severance of the iliac artery. There was
also a laceration at the left eyebrow as well as gunpowder burns at
the right scapular area extending to the right side of the neck. Dr.
Pagsaligan issued the corresponding death certificate.
When cross-examined, Dr. Pagsaligan said that the two slugs he
recovered from the body of the victim and which were endorsed to
Sgt. Saradon for safekeeping, were of two kinds, one was of bronze
or lead material while the other was more of copper. Thus, it was
possible that two different firearms of the same caliber were used
(Hearing of August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 4-57).
Ma. Elenita Jimenez, a supervising clerk working at the local civil
registrar’s office in Davao City, merely confirmed as authentic the
signatures of Remedios Salingay and Teresita Fuentes who both had
certified to the correctness of the death certificate presented as
evidence before the court (Hearing of August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 58-
60).
Mr. Roberto Dakudao, Jr., a businessman and the surviving spouse of
the victim narrated that on May 6, 1988, at around 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, he arrived home from the golf course. He saw his 32-year
old wife, Lea, preparing to attend the 5:30 o’clock mass at the Davao
Redemptorist Church. Lea then left for the said church aboard one of
their family cars, a red Ford Laser with plate no. LBT312 which she
herself drove. Mr. Dakudao thereafter took a nap and woke up at
almost 9:00 o’clock in the evening.
As he normally expected his wife to come home within an hour after
the mass, he was surprised to know that she was not yet around by
then. This prompted him to call up their relatives and friends hoping
that he would be informed of Lea’s whereabouts. Nobody knew where
she was. So, he decided to take the other family car with their driver
in order to trace back the possible route that Lea could have taken
and to see if she had met an accident or had had a car breakdown.
He still failed to locate her.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In desperation, he called up his sister-in-law, Catalina `Teling’ Santos-
Dakudao who, being the daughter of Luis Santos, had `good
connections’ with the military. Teling then requested for police
assistance and a few minutes after, Lt. Pintak met with Mr. Dakudao.
Finally, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of the next day, May 7,
1988. Mr. Dakudao left for home with his driver. When they were near
the DASI Motors, they realized that the missing Ford Laser car had
just passed by on the other lane. Thus, they immediately turned
around and trailed the said car which subsequently parked at about
150 meters away from the Shell Gasoline Station. Mr. Dakudao
instructed his driver to likewise park their car at the Tourist Lodge
which was also near the said station and there he called Teling to
inform her what had happened.
As he was getting out of the lodge, he saw hi wife with one or two male
companions about to board the Ford Laser car again. Mr. Dakudao
presumed that they, too, made a phone call at the station. The car then
sped off again heading for the south. Mr. Dakudao and his driver would
have followed suit once more but at that moment, a Ford Fiera with
military men on board passed by. Thus, Mr. Dakudao signalled to them
to pursue the Ford Laser car.
The Ford Fiera did trail the said car for some time with Mr. Dakudao
and his driver close behind. Somewhere along the way, the Fiera
overtook the Laser which quickly made a U-turn at the Harana area in
Matina, Davao City. Mr. Dakudao cautioned his driver not to appear
obvious in following the Laser so it took them a while before they also
made a U-turn. By then, they already lost track of the Laser. Mr.
Dakudao asked to be brought to the Tourist Lodge to make another
phone call to Teling but Lt. Pintak, who also went there, instructed him
to call up a certain number instead and request the police to look out
for the Laser car with four armed men and a hostage. Thereafter, Mr.
Dakudao and his driver tried to locate the Laser once again. When
they failed to see it, they returned to the Tourist Lodge at almost 3:30
o’clock in the morning.
As soon as Mr. Dakudao arrived there, he was informed that his wife
had been shot and was rushed to the Davao Doctors Hospital for
treatment. He proceeded to the said hospital and there he learned that
his wife had passed away leaving him and their three children. On
further questions, Mr. Dakudao said that he transported her wife’s
remains and had her interred in Bacolod, her place of birth. He spent
around P80,000.00 for the purpose. In court, he pointed to Enanoria
whom he said was apprehended and then detained by the CIS agents
as one of those responsible for the kidnapping of his wife.
When cross-examined, Mr. Dakudao revealed that before 12:30
o’clock in the morning, while he was still at Teling’s house, he called
home. He was told by their helper that there were two strange callers
who asked if it was his (Mr. Dakudao’s) house and when it was so
confirmed, the callers abruptly hanged the phone. Mr. Dakudao
supposed that the callers could have been the kidnappers trying to
contact him so he decided to go home. He and his driver were on their
way home when they saw the Ford Laser and subsequently tailed it.
As the rear windshield was slightly tinted, Mr. Dakudao admitted that
all he could see then was a woman whom he presumed to be his wife
sitting at the front seat and at least two male passengers sitting at the
back seat of the Laser. When it stopped at the Shell station, he did not
approach the said car for fear that the male passengers could be
armed. Mr. Dakudao said that the police authorities informed him of
Enanoria’s arrest (Hearing of August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 61-78).
Romeo Borja, the family driver of the Dakudaos, simply corroborated
the testimony of Mr. Dakudao in its material points adding that the Ford
Laser which had several bullet holes was subsequently brought to the
DAMOSA for repair (Hearing of August 21, 1989; TSN, pp. 81-
88).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
4th Assistant City Fiscal Antonina Escovilla of Davao City, declared
that Enanoria was brought to her office on June 1, 1988. When
Enanoria was left alone with her in the room, she asked him under
oath to tell the truth. Utilizing the Cebuano-Visayan dialect which
Enanoria speaks, Fiscal Escovilla apprised him of his rights to remain
silent and to engage the services of counsel of his own choice. She
also informed him that anything he would give or say in the
investigation could be used in evidence against him. After such
precautions, Fiscal Escovilla proceeded to translate the sworn
statement to Enanoria who confirmed the truth of its contents. When
she asked if he was intimidated or forced into executing the statement,
Enanoria said he did it voluntarily and with the active assistance of a
CLAO lawyer of his choice. There was not even a hint from Enanoria
that he had been maltreated before or during the investigation.
When cross-examined, Fiscal Escovilla said that Enanoria, who was
physically well at that time, stayed in her office for about 15 to 20
minutes, during which time she substantially translated his sworn
statement. Enanoria’s answers then were coherent and when Fiscal
Escovilla asked if the signatures in the statement were his, Enanoria
answered affirmatively. After Fiscal Escovilla was through with him,
the escorts were called in to take Enanoria again into their custody
(Hearing of August 31, 1989; TSN, pp. 22-25).
Mrs. Fortune Castillo, a resident of Davao City, claimed that she was
acquainted with the late Mrs. Lea Dakudao, whom she last saw alive
on May 6, 1988 at the Davao Redemptorist Church located at Bajada,
Davao City, Mrs. Castillo said that like her, Mrs. Dakudao regularly
attended the daily mass scheduled at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon
held at the said church. On that fateful day, as Mrs. Castillo usually
sat at the last pew, she saw Mrs. Dakudao enter the church alone at
about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon. They heard the First Friday mass
together with the other mass-goers until it was over at 6:20 o’clock in
the evening. Apparently, that was the last time she would see Mrs.
Dakudao, for the following day, Mrs. Castillo attended her wake at the
Dakudao residence (Hearing of August 31, 1989; TSN, pp. 27-33).
The defense, on the other hand, interposed denial and presented only
two witnesses — the accused himself and his common-law wife.
Alfredo Enanoria, Accused herein, jobless and a resident of Tungol,
Pagalungan, Maguindanao, testified that at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening of May 6, 1988, he was at the purok near their house in
Tunggol when a car stopped in front of him. Logum who was on board
the said car, invited Enanoria to go with him to Davao for a
‘happening’. Enanoria thereafter changed his clothes and boarded the
car with five other passengers already inside, four of whom were male
and one was a female seated in front. Enanoria claimed that except
from Logum, the driver and the other passengers were not known to
him. They then proceeded to Davao City and arrived there at around
12:45 o’clock in the morning of May 7, 1988. They stopped
momentarily at a gasoline station near the Tourist Lodge to buy motor
oil, after which Logum remarked "Pa-Bajada tayo, Mrs." referring to
the lady who said yes.
They did reach Bajada and then the car stopped again for about fifteen
minutes at a crossing. At that point, Logum instructed the driver to turn
back towards Cotabato. When they were near the Talomo Market,
Enanoria saw several police officers some twenty meters away but he
did not notice if there was a road block. Logum ordered the driver to
proceed past the lawmen who eventually strafed the car. Enanoria
immediately ducked on the car floor to take cover. He said he did not
know whether Logum had a gun then and he himself did not have one
at any time. The car was hit at its front and rear mirrors and then he
heard the lady cry out in Tagalog, "Natamaan ako!." Enanoria said he
was also hit at his right knee and at the right side of his back. Logum
and another companion were also hit.
The car was pursued by and fired upon by the lawmen on board a
mobile unit. When the car finally stopped at the Balusong Bridge due
to its flat tires, Enanoria and his companions scampered to different
directions. Enanoria said he went to the left side and found a well. He
was taking a bath at the well when the muzzle of an armalite rifle hit
his wound at the back. Upon turning around, he saw several police
officers who later mauled him. They were about to ‘finish’ him but he
pleaded for his life and assured them that he would tell the truth.
Enanoria was then brought to the police station and subsequently to
the regional hospital for treatment. He stayed there until the next day,
May 8, 1988. After his discharge in the afternoon, he was brought
again to the police station. A police officer who investigated him asked
him to admit that he was one of the kidnappers. Enanoria said he was
not apprised at all of his constitutional rights and that he did not
understand the contents of the written statement which was presented
to him as it was in English and was not translated into a dialect which
he knew.
Enanoria also said that he collapsed before the statement was
completed. When he regained consciousness, Cpl. Solana asked him
to sign the statement. Afterwards, Enanoria was transferred to the CIS
office. He could not recall if he was also investigated by Sgt. Rotor at
the said office but when the supplementary statement prepared by the
latter was shown to him, Enanoria affirmed that the signatures thereon
were his. He said, however, that he was forced to sign the statement
by Sgt. Rotor upon the order of Lt. Macao. He could not remember if
that was the same document which he signed before Atty. Jocom at
the CLAO. Enanoria added that he met Atty. Jocom for the first time
at the CIS office and the latter simply left as soon as he told him
(Enanoria) that it was up to him to give a statement to the police
authorities. The second time was at the CLAO where he was asked to
sign a document.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
When cross-examined, Enanoria said that he used to work for the
MINTRANCO Bus Line as a conductor. One of their practices then
was to accommodate persons asking for free rides for fear that they
could be NPA or MNLF members. Logum was one such person whom
Enanoria obliged and then came to know later. During Logum’s
subsequent rides, Enanoria admittedly conversed with him, briefly
though, as he was always busy with his job. Enanoria thereafter
resigned from the said company.
On the night of that fateful day, Logum invited him to a ‘happening’,
i.e., to a disco and he acquiesced after changing his clothes. Enanoria
claimed that he never knew the names of Logum’s companions as
during the course of their trip to Davao City, they addressed each other
only as "bro.." He was not introduced to Logum’s companions either
and he did not ask Logum to do so for he was shy. Enanoria inquired
though why they had a female companion and Logum merely told him
that she was also invited to the disco. The lady appeared unafraid and
happy although the light inside the car was off. Then they proceeded
to Davao City and reached the place at past midnight. They stopped,
however, at Kinuskusan and then at Digos, when the driver and
another male companion answered the call of nature.
Upon further questions, Enanoria admitted that he knew how to drive
a car or any vehicle but he denied that he knew about the kidnapping.
He said that he could not remember if a .38 caliber pistol was
recovered from him while he was taking a bath at the well and he could
not remember, too, if there was a house near the same well. He also
denied having been arrested at the house of a Muslim. Likewise,
Enanoria could not recall the name of the fiscal before whom he took
his oath, what he told the fiscal and whether the said fiscal was a man
or a woman.
On redirect examination, Enanoria claimed that the reason why he
could not remember having appeared before the administering
officers was that he was not yet feeling well at that time (Hearing of
August 29, and 30, 1989; TSN, pp. 5-44 and 2-34).
For its second and last witness, the defense presented Madelon
Taborada, Enanoria’s common-law wife. She testified that on May 5,
1988, she went to Tunggol with Enanoria to get some food provisions.
The following day, Taborada left him behind as she headed back for
Davao City. On May 7, 1988, a woman informed her that Enanoria
was brought to the regional hospital. So, on that very night, she
proceeded there but the police guards did not allow her to see him. It
was only on the following morning that she saw Enanoria. He spoke
inaudibly, obviously in pain because of his wounds. Taborada said that
she did not know what caused his wounds and that Enanoria was
discharged from the hospital on May 9, 1988 (Hearing of August 30,
1992; TSN, pp. 37-41).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
On October 31, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision finding
Alfredo Enanoria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with
murder under Arts. 267 and 248 in relation to Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code and imposing on him the aforementioned penalty.
Hence, the present appeal.
The brief for appellant was filed on May 22, 1991 (Rollo, p. 38) while
that of appellee was filed on July 23, 1991 (Ibid., p. 104).
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I
The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant as co-
principal in a conspiracy to commit kidnapping with murder in the
absence of evidence and without proving the existence of a
conspiracy.
II
The trial court erred in admitting, the extrajudicial confession of the
accused-appellant in evidence and which coerced confession was
made the sole basis for the conviction of the Accused-Appellant.(p.
57, Rollo).
Enanoria’s counsel asserts that the extrajudicial statement which was
allegedly the only piece of evidence against his client, was obtained
under duress and in violation of the latter’s right to counsel and
therefore, it should have been disregarded. Appellant’s counsel insists
that had the court properly disregarded his extrajudicial confession,
the cause of the prosecution would have been reduced to nothing as
the prosecution had miserably failed to prove that Lea Dakudao had
indeed been kidnapped and that Enanoria participated therein. As
conspiracy was not established, Enanoria could not be held liable for
the crime charged.
A careful evaluation of the evidence on record reveals, however, that
such contentions are baseless and utterly devoid of merit.
Firstly, the rule is well-settled that a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and that the confessant, who bears the burden of proving
otherwise (People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-32661, July 20, 1982, 115
SCRA 184; People v. Estevan, G.R. No. 69676, June 4, 1990, 186
SCRA 34), must duly substantiate his claim that the admissions in his
affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will
certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. Considering
however, that voluntariness is largely determined by external
manifestations, the Court has laid down several factors indicative
thereof. Thus, "where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed
to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks
of violence on their bodies; and when they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim" (People v.
Mada-I Santalani, G.R. No. L-29979, September 28, 1979, 93 SCRA
3317), the defendants are deemed to have voluntarily confessed. Still
another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the
confession which could have been known only to the declarant
(People v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-31900, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 465;
Estacio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 75363, March 6, 1990, 183 SCRA
12). Significantly, all these are present in the case at bar.
It is worthy to note as well that the extrajudicial statement was
subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City Fiscal Escovilla who herself
extensively testified that she translated the contents of the statement
and inquired into the spontaneity of its execution. There is no showing
whatsoever that she was actuated by any reason other than her desire
to perform the solemn task of having affiant voluntarily and intelligently
swear to the truth of his statement (People v. Del Pilar, G.R. No.
86360, July 28, 1990, 188 SCRA 37).
Enanoria’s claim that his right to counsel was violated does not hold
water either. It is already beyond dispute that he was actively assisted
by a lawyer in the person of Atty. Jocom. The latter’s presence
adequately fulfilled the constitutional requirement. It must be
reiterated at this point that the right to counsel is intended to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Verily, whether it is an
extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is
always the ascertainment of truth (People v. Layuso, G.R. No. 69210,
July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 52).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Based on the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that
Enanoria’s extrajudicial statement is admissible as evidence. As it sets
out in detail his participation in the kidnapping and the eventual murder
of Mrs. Dakudao, Enanoria’s responsibility has been pinpointed.
However, Enanoria’s extrajudicial confession is not the sole basis for
his conviction. He has been positively identified by Pfc. Aquino
Serenio as one of those who scampered out of the Ford Laser car
when it stopped due to flat tires. Enanoria could have disproved this
testimony but he failed to do so. Neither did he present proof that Pfc.
Serenio had a motive or reason for his inculpation. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, his flight from the scene
of the crime strongly indicated his guilt (People v. Rey, G.R. No.
80089, April 13, 1989, 172 SCRA 149).
Conspiracy has also been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
concerted action of Enanoria and his companions (People v. Cruz,
G.R. No. 86217, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 127). As Enanoria
admitted in his supplemental sworn statement, in kidnapping Mrs.
Dakudao, his group adopted the same modus operandi they had used
in other kidnappings: they would wait for the owner to board his or her
car, get in the car with him or her and bring the owner to either Tunggol
or Kabacan, North Cotabato where Eboy had a house (Exh. "A-2").
The crime committed is kidnapping for ransom for which the death
penalty is imposable under the last paragraph of Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty has been
constitutionally abolished, the penalty imposable on the appellant
is reclusion perpetua.
There is no proof that Mrs. Lea Dakudao was kidnapped for the
purpose of killing her so as to make the offenses one of kidnapping
for ransom and murder a complex crime. What is evident is the fact
that the killing was perpetrated, apparently as an afterthought after the
Ford Laser car had been rendered immobile, while Mrs. Dakudao was
in the custody of armed men which included Enanoria. Hence, the
killing is qualified by abuse of superiority and with the aid of armed
men. That it was committed while the Ford Laser car was being shot
at by then pursuing police does not erase the crime there being proof
that the bullets which killed Mrs. Dakudao came from a .38 caliber
revolver like the gun retrieved from appellant during his arrest. There
being conspiracy, appellant is also liable for murder notwithstanding
his claim that it was Amil who shot Mrs. Dakudao. For murder,
Enanoria should suffer the separate penalty of reclusion perpetua, the
medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to
death, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
(Arts. 248 & 64(1), Revised Penal Code).cralawnad
PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellant Alfredo Enanoria is hereby
convicted of the separate crimes of kidnapping for ransom under Art.
267 and murder under Art. 248 for which crimes he shall suffer two
penalties of reclusion perpetua which he shall serve successively in
accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code. He shall also
indemnify the heirs of Leah Nora Rita Puentevella-Dakudao not only
the amount of P80,000.00 for burial expenses but also the amount of
P50,000 00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICTOR
BACOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision, [1] dated April 13, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Oroquieta City, finding accused-
appellant Victor Bacor guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In
addition, the court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs
of the victim, Dionesio Albores, in the amount of P50,000.00, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed with modification of the
penalty. The Court of Appeals sentenced accused-appellant
to reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, 13, par. 2 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, certified the case to this Court for
review.
Upon receipt of the case, the Court gave accused-appellant the
opportunity to file an additional brief if he desired. He did not do
so, however. Hence, the case was considered submitted for
resolution.
The full text of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:[2]
Accused-appellant assails the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14 dated April 13, 1993 convicting him of the
crime of MURDER. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that the guilt of
the accused, Victor Bacor, has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, and pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any
aggravating circumstance to effect the [same], the said accused,
Victor Bacor, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Dionisio Albores in the amount of
P50,000.00; to suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by
law and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The case with respect to the other accused, John Doe is hereby
ordered sent to the archive, to be revived as soon as said accused is
identified and arrested.
SO ORDERED.
(Records, p. 102)
The indictment against accused-appellant and one John Doe reads:
That on or about March 17, 1991, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening,
more or less, in barangay Seor, municipality of Sinacaban, province
of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the aforementioned accused with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously attack, assault and
shoot one DIONISIO ALBORES with the use of a shotgun while the
latter was inside his dwelling, unaware, unarmed and defenseless,
thereby inflicting multiple gun shot wounds on different vital parts of
his body causing his [instantaneous] death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with qualifying circumstance of treachery and
ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
(Records, p. 1)
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1991, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty. Trial then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, the
defense demurred to the evidence on the ground that accuseds
extrajudicial confession which is the only piece of evidence connecting
him to the commission of the murder, is inadmissible for any
purpose. The Omnibus Motion To Demur and Objection To The
Admissibility Of Exhibit B For The Prosecution was denied by the trial
court in an order dated June 4, 1992 after which the defense offered
the testimonies of the accused himself and the latters father, Cesar
Bacor. Their main line of defense was that at the time the crime was
being perpetrated, accused Victor Bacor was at home grating
coconuts. It was however also established in the course of their
testimony that Barangay Seor was only about one kilometer from
Barangay SK Avancea where accused Victor lived with his parents
and was accessible by means of transportation. (TSN, October 27,
1992, p. 49-67)
The facts as established by the prosecutions evidence are
summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
At about 9:00 oclock in the evening of March 17, 1991, Julian Albores
was resting at the living room of his house at Barangay Seor,
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp. 2-5). His
companions in the house were his son Dionisio and the latters
common-law wife Delia, who were then eating in the kitchen
(TSN, ibid., pp. 5-6). Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire followed by
Delias exclamation that Dionisio had fallen down on the floor
(ibid). Consequently, Julian rushed to the kitchen and found Dionisio
lying face down on the kitchen floor made of bamboo slats (TSN, Oct.
10, 1991, pp. 4-8). As Julian tried to move Dionisio, blood oozed from
his right armpit (ibid.). Julian shouted for his neighbors help but no one
helped him (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp. 6-7). Immediately, thereafter,
Julian brought his wounded son to the hospital for treatment but just
a few minutes after arrival there, his son died (TSN, Oct. 10, 1991, pp.
7-8; Exh. A).
On March 18, 1991, Dr. Marlene Awayan, Municipal Health Officer of
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, conducted a post-mortem
examination of the remains of Dionisio Albores (TSN, Nov. 19, 1991,
pp. 2-5; Exh. C). Based on her examination, Dr. Awayan found that
Dionisio Albores sustained multiple gunshot wounds, entrance at the
right anterior chest, 3 inches (in) depth and multiple protrusions hard
object at the left posterior chest and that the cause of his death was
internal hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C,
C-1, C-2).
On June 6, 1991, appellant approached Jesus Bernido, Chief of the
Intelligence Section of the Sinacaban Police Station and told the latter
that he was the one responsible for the killing of Dionisio Albores
(TSN, Nov. 19, 1991; p. 6). In view thereof, Bernido asked appellant
what prompted him to surrender and appellant told him that it was due
to his guilty conscience (ibid.).Consequently, Bernido, accompanied
by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, Chief Investigator of the Sinacaban
Police Station, and two (2) other police escorts brought appellant to
the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Oroquieta City (TSN, Oct. 22,
1991, pp. 3-4). Upon arrival at the PAO premises, SPO3 Ydulzura
informed PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot that appellant wanted to make a
confession of a crime he had committed (TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp. 3-
4). Thereafter, in her presence, appellant was asked by the policemen
if he had a lawyer and appellant replied that he had none (TSN, Nov.
12, 1991, pp. 3-4). Appellant was also asked if he wanted to avail of
the services of the PAO and he answered in the affirmative (TSN, Nov.
12, 1991, pp. 3-4).Consequently, Atty. Anggot requested the
policemen to leave her and appellant alone inside the office and the
policemen readily agreed and stayed outside (ibid.). She then inquired
if appellant was not intimidated, coerced or forced and whether
appellant was promised any reward (ibid.). She also informed
appellant that he had the right to remain silent and not to answer
questions which may incriminate him and that any statement he will
make may be used against him in the future (ibid.). After being
informed of such facts, appellant still declared that he was going to
confess because he had committed a crime (TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp.
3-4).
During the taking of appellants confession, in the presence and with
the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot, SPO3 Ydulzura likewise reminded
appellant in the Visayan dialect, which he knew and spoke, that he
had the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination
and to secure the services of a lawyer of his own choice to assist him
in the taking of his confession (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 6-8). Despite
such reminder, appellant still agreed and accepted the appointment of
PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot as his lawyer to assist him during the taking
of his affidavit of confession (Exhs. B, B-3, B-4; TSN, Oct. 22, 1991,
pp. 3-7; TSN, Nov. 12, 1991, pp. 4-7). In his affidavit which was taken
in the typewriter by SPO3 Ydulzura, appellant acknowledged and
admitted that he was the one who shot Dionisio Albores at 9:00 oclock
in the evening of March 17, 1991 at Barangay Seor, Sinacaban,
Misamis Occidental (Exhs. B, B-11, B-12; TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 8-
15). He declared therein that he shot Dionisio Albores because the
latter threatened to kill him and because he knew that Dionisio was an
ex-convict who had killed somebody with treachery in the past (TSN,
Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 13-15; Exhs. B, B-15).
Afterwards, SPO3 Ydulzura read the contents of appellants affidavit
to him, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot
(TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, p. 15; Exh. B). Subsequently, appellant, after
correcting the date, signed his name on the affidavit (TSN, Oct. 22,
1991, pp. 15-17). Thereafter, appellant subscribed and swore to the
veracity of his affidavit before Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Oroquieta City (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991,
pp. 24-26). Before signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to
appellant the contents thereof and informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and to counsel of his
own choice. She also informed appellant about the consequences of
his affidavit and that it may be used as evidence against him. She also
asked him whether he understood the contents of the affidavit
(ibid.). Subsequently, appellant was asked if the statements in the
affidavit are true and correct and he declared that the statements
therein are true and correct and that he was willing to sign the affidavit
on his own free will (TSN, Oct. 22, 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhs. B, B-1 to B-
2).
(Rollo, pp. 45-51)
Accused-appellant now assigns the following errors:
I got the weapon which was then in the possession of the Rosales
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT IS INADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCES FOR APPELLANT.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY.
The main thrust of these assignment of errors is the inadmissibility of
appellants extrajudicial confession on the ground that his waiver of his
right to remain silent was obtained sans observance of the procedural
safeguards embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, to wit:
Section 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx.
(Underlining supplied).
There is no merit in the contention.
Atty. Miriam D. Angot, the PAO lawyer who assisted the appellant
testified that before the in-custody interrogation started, she even
asked the police escorts then present to leave the room.She then
ascertained from accused-appellant Victor Bacor himself that the
latter was not cajoled nor coerced into making the intended confession
and apprised him further of his right to remain silent and not to answer
any question propounded to him. He was warned that statements
made by him might be used against him in the future. Bacor then
intimated that he was confessing to the crime for the simple reason
that he had done it (TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 70-71). He was
again informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Maharlika
Ydulzura before the actual taking of his extrajudicial confession (Ibid,
Exhibit B-3). Despite all these, the appellant proceeded into
confessing that he was the one who killed the victim Dionesio Albores.
The pertinent portions of said extrajudicial confession as translated
from the Visayan dialect to the English language are as follows:
PRELIMINARY: Mr. Victor W. Bacor, you are presently under
investigation regarding the MURDER of Ignacio Ampo and Dionisio
Albores. Before proceeding with the investigation, we will inform you
of your constitutional rights. You have the legal right to remain silent
and not to answer questions which you think might incriminate
you. Anything you say may be used in evidence against you in any
court of the Philippines. You have the right to counsel of your own
choice to assist you in todays investigation. If you cannot afford to pay
the services of a lawyer but you want to have one, a lawyer will be
provided by the government to assist you free of charge. Do you
understand?
ANSWER: Yes, I understand. I desire to have a lawyer but I cannot
afford to pay one as of now.
QUESTION: In front of you now is a lawyer of the Public Attorneys
Office. Do you accept her as your counsel to assist you in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, Sir. I accept. (Atty. Miriam O. Angot is officially
appointed as lawyer of Mr. Victor W. Bacor during this Interrogation)
xxx xxx xxx
14 Question: Regarding the death of Dionisio Albores, do you have
any knowledge of the facts surrounding that?
Answer: Yes, Sir. I was the one who shot Dionesio Albores.
15 Question: When and where was this killing?
Answer: Last March 17, 1991, at 9:00 oclock in the evening, in
Barangay Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental.
16 Question: Was there someone with you during the killing?
Answer: There was, Sir. Berwin Rosales was with me during the
killing.
17. Question: Please tell us what happened.
Answer: I had been drinking a little that night. Berwin Rosales
mentioned something about my adversary, Dionesio Albores. So, we
family, the same weapon used in killing Ignacio Ampo. When we got
to Dionesio Albores house, I was not able to shoot him at first because
he was lying down with his wife. Then at nine oclock in the evening,
Dionesio Albores got up and approached his wife who was then eating
in the kitchen. I shot him. He was hit near his armpit. That caused his
death.
QUESTION: What was the reason why you killed Dionesio Albores?
ANSWER: Before that, Dionesio Albores and I had a quarrel, and he
threatened to kill me. I heard that Dionesio Albores had previously
killed someone by means of treachery and that he had been
imprisoned in Muntinglupa. So on March 17, 1991, I thought of killing
him first.
QUESTION: Where now is the weapon which you used in killing
Dionesio Albores, the same weapon used by Charlie Manliquez in
killing Ignacio Ampo?
ANSWER: According to Laloy Rosales, the weapon was redeemed by
the person who pledged it to him.
QUESTION: Why are you now here before us and telling us what had
happened?
ANSWER: I voluntarily surrendered myself to Pfc. Jesus Bernido of
the Sinacaban Police Station because I could no longer bear a guilty
conscience.
QUESTION: Were you coerced, manhandled or given money in order
to make this confession?
ANSWER: No, Sir. Everything is out of my own free will.
QUESTION: Do you have anything more to say?
ANSWER: No more, Sir.
QUESTION: Are you willing to sign this statement you have made
under oath in accordance with law?
ANSWER: Yes, I am ready to do so, Sir.
(Records, pp. 4-6)
All throughout the custodial investigation, Atty. Miriam Angot of the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO) took pains to explain meaningfully to the
accused each and every query posed by SPO3 Maharlika
Ydulzura. Accused then stamped his approval to the extrajudicial
confession by affixing his signature on each and every page thereof
in the presence of counsel Miriam Angot. (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2, B-8,
B-19, B-20). Consequently, there was an effective waiver of the right
to remain silent. (People vs. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650).
Here is therefore a clear case of a criminal who had hearkened to the
proddings of conscience. And by so doing, he had wittingly furnished
the missing link necessary for his conviction.
Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the evidentiary rule that an
extrajudicial confession corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti
is sufficient to support a conviction. (Rule 133, Section 3, Rules of
Court).
The fact of death and the criminal agency, elements which are
constitutive of the corpus delicti, had been amply established by the
death certificate (Exhibit A) and the medical certificate (Exhibit C) the
veracity of which had been affirmed on the witness stand by the
examining physician. Details of the findings therein are as follows:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS:
BODY: MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS, ENTRANCE AT THE
RIGHT ANTERIOR CHEST, 3 INCHES DEPTH.
MULTIPLE PROTRUSIONS HARD OBJECT AT THE LEFT
POSTERIOR CHEST.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY TO MULTIPLE
GUNSHOT WOUNDS.
(Records, p. 118)
In sum: Bacor informed the police that he shot Dionesio Albores; that
the latter was hit near the armpit; and that the latter died as a
consequence thereof. The evidence of the corpus delicti shows
conformance of the extrajudicial statement with reality. The facts
dove-tail with the confession of the accused. There is no reason to
reject the same.
On the other hand, what can not be believed is Victor Bacors
subsequent denials and alibi. Alibi is an inherently weak and
unreliable defense because it is easily contrived and fabricated
(People vs. Amiguin, 229 SCRA 166; People vs. Calope, 229 SCRA
413; People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289). More so when it is
established mainly by accused himself or his relatives. (People vs.
Torres, 232 SCRA 32; People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124). For alibi
to prosper, the accused must show that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
felony (People vs. Servillon, 236 SCRA 385; People vs. Apa-ap, 235
SCRA 468; People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401). And, as already stated,
the place where the accused-appellant claimed to be was only one
kilometer away from the scene of the crime and easily accessible.
In cases involving crimes [committed] prior to the effectivity date of
R.A. 7659 (An Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous
Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Code, As
Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes), it is
mandatory for the courts to reduce the capital punishment to reclusion
perpetua in view of the constitutional proscription embodied in Article
[III], Section 19 (1) of the organic act. This rule however applies only
when the death penalty should be imposed after giving proper
consideration to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances (People vs. Muoz, 170 SCRA 1071; People vs. de la
Cruz, 216 SCRA 476). In People vs. Muoz, the Supreme Court
sitting en banc had the occasion to rule:
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the
death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal
hermeneutics that if the language under construction is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to
abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its
imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is
whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding
modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against
the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at
all expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or
indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It
would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it
categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One
searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The
writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might
be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not
say enough.
xxx xxx xxx
" x x x (W)e return to our original interpretation and hold that Art. III,
Sec. 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains
unchanged.
xxx xxx xxx
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the
applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 248, which conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and
announced, it is still reclusion perpetua.
In the light of the aforecited Supreme Court ruling we are therefore
bound to consider in fixing the appropriate penalty to be imposed
herein the whole range of the penalty prescribed under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code for the crime of murder, i.e., reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death.
Conformably with Article 77 in relation to Article 64 (no. 4) of the
Revised Penal Code, each of the three distinct penalties given under
Article 248 shall form a period and the penalty to be imposed shall be
determined after reasonably offsetting the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. In this light, we impose the medium period which is
reclusion perpetua considering that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender of the accused was offset by the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence imposed on
accused-appellant Victor Bacor is RECLUSION PERPETUA together
with its accessory penalties and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50,000.00.
Furthermore, in view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to be
imposed on appellant Bacor, this case is hereby CERTIFIED and the
entire record thereof is elevated to the honorable Supreme Court in
accordance with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court
(People vs. Cruz, 203 SCRA 683 [1991]).
SO ORDERED.
We have examined the evidence in this case and considered the
arguments of the parties. We now find that the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant.The findings
and conclusions of the appellate court as contained in the aforequoted
decision are accordingly adopted by the Court.
The main question in this case is whether accused-appellant validly
waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether his confession
is admissible in evidence against him. The question turns on the
application of Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
This is a corollary of the right against self-incrimination found in Art.
III, 17. It has been noted that the Constitution has separated the right
of persons under custodial investigation from the traditional right
against self-incrimination not only to emphasize but also to guarantee
the right to proper treatment of those under investigation. [3]
To implement the right of persons under custodial interrogation, R.A.
No. 7438, 2(d)[4] requires that any confession must be in writing and
signed by the confessant in the presence of his counsel.
Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be
admissible in evidence, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel preferably of the
confessants choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.[5] The Court finds that accused-appellants confession satisfies
the said requirements.
First. Accused-appellants confession, as quoted in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness and
spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to
the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months after the fatal
shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the crime because he
could no longer bear a guilty conscience. In his testimony before the
trial court, he admitted that the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his
sworn confession (Exh. B) was his without any claim that he was
forced, coerced, or threatened to make the confession. [6] Indeed, the
details contained in his confession could have been known to
accused-appellant alone.
Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession
without being warned of his constitutional rights. This is not true. The
record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to
remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty.
Meriam Anggot of Public Attorneys Office (PAO); second, by SPO3
Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accused-appellants
confession; and lastly, by the branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom
accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time,
he was asked whether he was willing to give a statement and he said
he was. This is sufficient.[7] Contrary to accused-appellants
contention, there is no need for a separate and express written waiver
of his constitutional rights.[8] Accused-appellant was not arrested. He
presented himself to the authorities to confess to the crime because,
he said, he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily
executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of
and with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of
his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively waived his right
to remain silent.[9]
Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the
assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointed counsel de
officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted
her appointment as his counsel before giving his confession. [10] As this
Court has held, a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent
counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering that
he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to
that of the accused-appellant.[11] Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer
in the present case satisfies the constitutional requirement of a
competent and independent counsel for the accused.
Judging from Atty. Anggots testimony before the trial court, there is no
reason not to consider her a competent and independent counsel. She
testified that before the taking of accused-appellants confession, she
requested SPO3 Ydulzura and the other policemen to step out of the
room so that she could privately confer with the accused-appellant,
free from pressure or intimidation. She also testified on the
circumstances surrounding her appointment as counsel for accused-
appellant. She said:[12]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. MERIAM ANGGOT
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what public office if any
were you holding in June, 1991?
A I am connected with the Public Attorneys Office based in Oroquieta
City with the designation as Public Attorney II.
Q On June 6, 1991, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon were you in
your office?
A Yes.
Q Do you know who came to your office at that time on that date?
A There were more or less four (4) or five (5) persons one of them is
Victor Bacor, the accused in this case, the other one is Policeman
Ydulzura and the two escorts whom I believe [were] policeman and I
could not longer mention their names.
Q What was their purpose in coming to your office?
A They told me that subject Victor Bacor who is the accused in this
case is going to make his confession of a certain crime that he has
committed.
Q Since he was going to make a confession regarding his commission
of a crime, you mean he was there to ask you to represent him as his
lawyer during that time?
A Well, I was told that the subject person is going to make a
confession and he was asked whether he wanted to have his lawyer
or whether he has a lawyer but he said that he has none and he was
again asked by the policeman whether he will avail [of] the services of
the Public Attorneys Office and he said that he will.
Q Before the witness was to make a detailed confession/statements
of the crime that he had committed, what if any did you inform him
regarding his rights?
A Before the interrogation started, I requested the policemen who
escorted the subject person to leave us and after they left the office
and stayed outside, I asked the subject person whether he was not
intimidated, coerce[d] or forced and informed him of the
consequences of his making the confession, and whether he was not
promised of any reward in order to make such confession and I further
told him that he has the right to remain silent and not to answer any
question propounded to him and that his statement might be used
against him in the future.
Q And what if any was his reply?
A Well, he said that he is going to confess because he has done the
crime.
Q Was that confession reduced to writing?
A Yes, it was typewritten.
....
Q As the affidavit was formed, what was done to its contents if there
was?
A I was present all the time when the interrogation was conducted and
in fact, I explain[ed] to him the question or every question propounded
and I let him understand and explained to him that his answers to the
questions are very crucial to his person.
Q Do you still recall before whom this affidavit was subscribe[d] and
sworn to?
A It was subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag.
SPO3 Ydulzura, on the other hand, testified, thus: [13]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. MAHARLIKA YDULZURA
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court what position if any were
you holding in June 1991?
A I am the chief investigator of the Sinacaban Police Station.
Q On June 6, 1991 in the afternoon of that date, where were you?
A I, together with Victor Bacor and some of my co-members of the
PNP, were in the Office of the PAO.
Q What was your purpose in going to the Office of the PAO on that
date?
A I was going to take the confession of Victor Bacor in the presence
of a lawyer.
....
Q What was done while you were in the office of the PAO?
A I began to extract the confession of Victor Bacor.
Q Before you extract his confession, was he represented by a lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Who was the lawyer representing him at that time?
A Atty. Meriam Anggot.
Q Will you kindly inform this Honorable Court how . . . you [took] the
confession of Victor Bacor?
A I did the writing in the presence of Atty. Meriam Anggot and put it
directly in the typewriter.
Q Who [typed] the contents in that affidavit?
A I was the one.
Q In what dialect or language used?
A That was in Visayan dialect, sir.
Q Was it taken in the language or dialect known to Victor Bacor?
A Yes, sir.
....
Q You said that you are the one who [typed] this affidavit, kindly inform
this Honorable Court what was your first question that was
propounded upon Victor Bacor?
A Yes, I inform[ed] him that he has the right to remain silent that he
has the right not to answer any question propounded on him that may
incriminate him and that he has the right to secure a lawyer of his
choice to assist him during the taking of the confession.
Q When that question was propounded upon Victor Bacor, was Atty.
Meriam Anggot present?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was that question placed in the affidavit of Victor Bacor?
A Yes, that is under the preliminary question your Honor.
Q You said that accused was represented by Atty. Meriam Angot
during the taking of his affidavit did the accused confirm or agree that
he should be represented by Atty. Anggot during the taking of his
affidavit?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was that also shown in the affidavit?
A Yes, sir, I made him place his name.
Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with the
assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before the branch
clerk of court who, before administering the oath to accused-appellant,
read the affidavit of confession to him and informed him of his rights
and the consequences of his confession. Accused-appellant stood pat
on his decision to tell it all. As Branch Clerk of Court Montejo-Lumasag
testified:[14]
ATTY. ACOSTA ON DIRECT
WIT. NORA MONTEJO-LUMASAG
Q What position if any were you holding in June, 1991 Atty. Nora
Montejo Lumasag?
A I am the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City.
Q Did you report for duty on June 6, 1991?
A Yes.
Q Do you recall on that date a certain person by the name of Victor
Bacor who was sworn to your office??
A Yes.
Q Would you kindly inform this Honorable Court who accompan[ied]
him in going to your office?
A It was SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura.
Q Who else?
A Also Atty. Meriam Anggot.
Q What was their purpose [for going] to your office?
A Their purpose was to swear before me [accused-appellants]
extrajudicial confession.
Q I am showing to you an affidavit which is found on pages 4 to 6 of
the record which [are] now marked as Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2,
respectively, kindly examine the same and inform this Honorable
Court what relation this affidavit has with that affidavit that you have
mentioned which was sworn to before you?
A This is the very affidavit that was sworn before me by Victor Bacor.
....
Q Before Victor Bacor affix[ed] his signature on this Exhibits B, B-1
and B-2, what if any was done as to the content of this affidavit?
A I read to him the contents of the affidavit and inform[ed] him of his
constitutional rights, that he has the right to remain silent, that he has
the right to have a counsel of his own choice and about the
consequence of his act, that it might be used as evidence against him
in the future and further ask[ed] him whether he understood the
contents of the affidavit and, after that he sign[ed] the confession.
Q Did you read the contents of the affidavit word for word?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you read to him the contents of the affidavit what if any did he
tell you?
A He said that the statements in the affidavit are true and correct and
that he is willing to sign the same in his own free will.
Q After signing this affidavit what if any did you say to him?
A I requested him to swear under oath as to the truthfulness of the
same.
Q And did he do so?
A Yes, sir.
Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily
and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden of
proof is upon the party who claims the contrary.[15] In this case, this
presumption has not been overcome. Not only is accused-appellants
confession replete with details that only he could have supplied, but
the circumstances surrounding its execution also belie his claim that
he did not validly waive his right to remain silent. Hence, both the trial
and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-appellant on the
basis of the confession since, as they noted, it was corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti which dove-tails with the confession.[16]
Against this evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants alibi
cannot prevail. He claimed that he was at his parents house at SK
Avancena, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental at the time of the killing of
Dionesio Albores. His father, Cesar Bacor, admitted, however, that
their house in Barangay Avancena is just one (1) kilometer from the
house of the victim in Barangay Seor where the crime was committed
and that transportation was easily available. [17] It was thus not
impossible for accused-appellant to have gone to Barangay Seor to
commit the crime.
Even if we consider accused-appellants defense of alibi a retraction
of his confession, the same is of no moment. In this jurisdiction,
retractions of confessions are generally considered unreliable and are
looked upon with disfavor. The asserted motives for the repudiation of
a confession are commonly held suspect and subject to serious
doubt.[18]
Finally, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced
accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua. When the crime of murder
was committed on March 17, 1991, the same was punishable under
Art. 248 of the Penal Code by reclusion temporal, in its maximum
period, to death. Each of the three (3) distinct penalties covered
thereby forms a period[19] and the penalty to be imposed is determined
after reasonably offsetting the attending mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.[20] In the instant case, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling considering that the latter
circumstance is not absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY,accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was
accused of the crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality
of xxx, province of xxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by
means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA against
her will and without her consent; and the above-named accused in
order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of
the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill the said AAA, attack, assault and hit said victim with
concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her
death.
Contrary to Law."[1]
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00
P.M., in xxx, AAA, twenty years of age and a second-year student at
the xxx, left her home for her school dormitory in xxx. She was to
prepare for her final examinations on February 21, 1994. AAA wore a
striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more
than P2,000.00 in cash.
AAA was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her
inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his
wife's grandmother should be taken. AAA agreed to take her blood
pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know
that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated,
appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of
the house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant
pulled AAA, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard
had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence.
On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside
the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to
transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with
a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the
face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the
fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned
it.[2]
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of AAA
was discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her
brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a
panty with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. xxx revealed that AAA died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
"1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique
from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3
inches in width, from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4
inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd
incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes,
right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus
and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity
showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital,
February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral
Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face."[3]
AAA's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor xxx
of xxx to form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal.
Searching the place where AAA's body was found, the policemen
recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what
appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a
pair of shoes which were identified as AAA's. [4]
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They
interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano
Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant
also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma
surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic
pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a
towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in
the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
appellant.[5]
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
xxx. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor xxx
traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol
jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of AAA's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the
victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant
relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo
Dizon, killed AAA and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that
he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
AAA.[6] Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and
Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by
the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house,
leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two
bags which were later identified as belonging to AAA. Thereafter,
photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects
holding the bags.[7]
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police
headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical examination
was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
xxx.[8] Appellant was found to sustain:
"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back:
with abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed
wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt."[9]
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered
at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.
Mayor xxx arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request
that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the
Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed AAA."
The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media
representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a
lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.[10] In the
presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and
appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He
disclosed how he killed AAA and volunteered to show them the place
where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon
whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them.[11] He also said that the devil entered his mind because
of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday.[12] After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son
and asked the mayor to help him.[13] His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide.[14]
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days,
February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters
came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession
to the mayor and reenacted the crime.[15]
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He
testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his
parent's house in xxx attending the birthday party of his nephew. He,
his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner
while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M.
and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to
Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents'
house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His
wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February
24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. [16]
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at xxx. In one of the
rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked
him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed
AAA. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and
injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed
to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he
saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the
police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags
from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was
told.[17]
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant
and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The
trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00
as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez
alias "Bobby" is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the
crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized
in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par.
8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family
of AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of AAA and P71,000.00
as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision
becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED."[18]
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section
22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Appellant contends that:
"I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS
BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR
ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO
SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF
CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS
THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED."[19]
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the
testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the
mayor of xxx and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his
extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and
video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the
commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the
policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were
made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
"SECTION 12.(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) x x x
(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) x x x"
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. [20] Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence
against him.[21] The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption
that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent.[22] The incommunicadocharacter of custodial interrogation
or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what
really transpired.[23]
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to
"[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense."
An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect,
i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense.[24] As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this
covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will
include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and
the NBI and such other police agencies in our government."[25]
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in
a general inquiry about the death of AAA. Indeed, appellant was
already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his
parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 xxx, the
police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused
who did this act?
WITNESS First, the place where AAA was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood
stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who
were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito
Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were
unknown, sir.
Q So you had a possible suspect?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then, what else did you do?
A We tried to find out where we can find him and from
information we learned that his parents live in xxx. We went there,
found him there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit."[26]
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he
confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform
appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated.[27] His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2
xxx, a member of the investigating team testified:
"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these
bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them,
where did he point these bags?
A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags
beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2)
bags were located?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located
what did you do?
A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we
would know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused
pointed to the place where the bags were located?
A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the
canal, he really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the
canal, sir."[28]
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled
confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also
inadmissible.[29]
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following
day, Mayor xxx visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor
and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and
appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded
for forgiveness. Mayor xxx testified, viz:
"Mayor xxx: x x x. During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that,
I brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office
of the Chief of Police, mayor?
A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor
patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
AAA." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while,
then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was going
to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he
admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera." [30]
xxx xxx
xxx
Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will
tell you something and then you responded by bringing him inside the
office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he
killed AAA . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin
mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay AAA," was that the only admission that
he told you?
A The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were
alone and the second one was before the media people, sir.
Q What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the
Chief of Police?
A These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from
making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear
what he was going to say, sir."[31]
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that
appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the
local police[32] and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer
for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not
made in response to any interrogation by the latter.[33] In fact, the
mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered
appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who
spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant
and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to
him did not violate his constitutional rights. [34] Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant
orally admitted having committed the crime. [35] What the Constitution
bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused
to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth.[36] Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the
mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.
The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have
held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.[37]
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to
Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The
interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife,
child and other relatives.[38] Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the
People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25,
1994. He testified that:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach
the place where the body of AAA was found, where did you start your
interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview
inside the police station of xxx and I identified myself to the accused
as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was
the one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him
that the victim was his cousin.
Q And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was
responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him
whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat,
intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I
knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that
he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether
he was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom
lang," sir.
Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present,
was the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name
I cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know
if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place where AAA resides
but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station
Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature
of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was
able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me
that he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage
of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment
and everything that transpired during the killing of AAA.
Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission
from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of
the xxx PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who accompanied you?
A I was accompanied by some xxx policemen including Mayor xxx
and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of AAA was
recovered.
Q How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more
or less?
A There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping
and crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep
of the xxx police, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in xxx,
what transpired?
A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the
crime was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen
of that old house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked
him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out the rape and
killing of AAA, sir.
Q Did he voluntarily comply?
A Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the
PNP xxx up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped
by you?
A Yes, sir.[39]
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise
covered the proceedings for three successive days. [40] His testimony
is as follows:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own
investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q Were there people?
A The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the
deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday
Badiday and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the
mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that
he was the one who killed AAA. I reiterated the question to the
suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape
with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death
of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the
one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a
while ago?
A Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to
take some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and
several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same
questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused
answered you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba
talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay AAA? Ang sagot
nya, "Oo." "Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay
AAA?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx
Q Did you ask him, why did you kill AAA?
A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because
a devil gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your
Honor, were the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids
which he, according to him, reads almost everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell
the court and the public what was the physical condition of accused
Pablito Andan?
A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he
was really down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there
was no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
x x x"[41]
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant
on February 26, 1994.[42] He also testified that:
"Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give
you the permission that you asked from him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A The first person that I saw there was Mayor xxx, policemen from
xxx, the chief investigator, SPO4 xxx, and since xxx, the chief of police
was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q Were they the only persons who were present when you
interviewed the accused?
A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with
people. There were people from the PNP and people from xxx, sir.
Q How about the other representatives from the media?
A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there
were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q How about Channel 7?
A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his
wife also present?
A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she
was really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was
crying and from the questions that I asked from the people there they
told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q How about the other members of the family of the accused, were
they around?
A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there,
sir.
Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview.
May we know what question did you ask and the answer.
A My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was
"Yes."
Q What was the next question?
A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the
victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and
he boxed her on the stomach.
Q What was the next question that you asked him?
A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why
he killed the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might
be discovered, sir.
Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a
news item on that?
A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q Were there other questions propounded by you?
A Yes, sir.
Q "Ano iyon?"
A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence,
sir.
Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of AAA to the other side
of the fence?
A I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A I have a xerox copy here, sir.
x x x"[43]
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free
from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news
reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant.[44] They were not acting under the direction and control of
the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the
mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and
reenact the commission of the crime.[45] In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate
days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details
in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All
his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family
and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The
Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. [46] It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that
certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect.[47] Governmental power is not
unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect
the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. [48]
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the
medical evidence against him. Dr. xxx, a Medical Specialist with the
Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no
spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the
hymen.[49] Allegedly, the minimal blood found in her vagina could have
been caused by her menstruation.[50]
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1,
1994 by Dr. xxx, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but
revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
"Hymen -- contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood
at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock." [51]
Dr. xxx testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have
been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when the
victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. [52] His
testimony is as follows:
"Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3
o'clock and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock.
x x x.
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges
of the lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as
fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on
the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body
was autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina
could have been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous
autopsy?
A Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy
on the victim which was already dead, no amount of injury or no
amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no
more circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed
that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of forceps or
retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already
dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were
caused by those instruments because the victim was already dead
and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations
with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the
walls of the clock could have been inflicted or could have been
sustained while the victim was alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the
lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have
just drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you
found the clotted blood?
A This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated
wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted
blood are found on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q What could have caused those lacerations?
A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly
inserted into that small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on
the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those
lacerations?
A It is possible, sir.[53]
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina does not negate the commission rape[54] nor does the lack of
complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. [55] What is essential is
that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how
slight.[56] Dr. xxx testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the
lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. xxx's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by
appellant are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial,
obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime
scene, viz:
(1) The victim, AAA, was last seen walking along the subdivision road
near appellant's house;[57]
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother
were not in their house;[58]
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of
appellant's house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also
found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's
house;[59]
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body
had been dragged over a flat rough surface. [60] This supports the
thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her
body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the
laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were
found positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood
type of the victim.[61] AAA's exact blood type was not determined but
her parents had type "A" and type "AB."[62] The victim's pants had
bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type;[63]
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he
failed to explain;[64]
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the
incident and were later found at his parents' house in xxx; [65]
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution
evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical improbability
at the time of the commission of the crime. Xxx is only a few kilometers
away from xxx and can be traversed in less than half an hour. [66]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and
accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members
of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, AAA, the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as
actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let
the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
LITO C. MARCELO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(First Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a
decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) [1] convicting him and
two others of qualified theft. The information against them alleges
That on or about February 17, 1989, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, ARNOLD PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then
an Emergency Laborer assigned as bag opener at the printed matters
section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking advantage of his
official position by having access to the mail matters in conspiracy with
accused RONNIE S. ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private
individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
grave abuse of confidence, and with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owners thereof, take, steal and carry away from the
Central Post office of Makati one bag containing assorted mail matters
some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate amount of
$500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the different addressee (sic)
or the government in the aforesaid mentioned (sic) amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts established during the trial show the following:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati
Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the
existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the
post office.[2] Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the
Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the
Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the modus operandi of
the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for mail
pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI
agents to Legaspi Village following a report that the group would stage
a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of
NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other
agents in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00
p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa Streets,
while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near
the Esguerra Building.[3]
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was
parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado
Street.[4] Esguerra Building is located between Adelantado and
Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel to
each other. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold
Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry Orindai. [5] Pasicolan
alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed
inside the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between
Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards Amorsolo
St.[6] Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra Building. The two are
separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave
the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie
Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the
contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag.
The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle. [7]
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan
going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards
Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the
mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.[8] At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and
Arles Vela arrested the two accused.
Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back
to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The
NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested
Pasicolan.[9]
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their
headquarters. They also brought along with them the motorcycle of
Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their
possession.[10] On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by
the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect,
Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there. [11]
The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622
letters.[12] The names of the addressees were listed. They were
subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their
letters.Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim
their letters. Some letters contained money.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures
on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the
members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the
people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to
Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify
the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them. [13]
NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various
denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars. [14] Vela and the other NBI
agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in the letters
which, if converted to Philippine pesos, at the then exchange rate of
P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00.[15] The addressees agreed to
leave the envelopes of the letters with the NBI. Those letters which
were not claimed were opened in court in the presence of the counsel
for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar
bills, one (1) five dollar bill, one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for
twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian riyals. [16]
Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo
were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case
was later withdrawn and another information for qualified theft was
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified
theft. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused, Arnold Pasicolan y
Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Mercado [should be
Marcelo] y Cruz, guilty, as principals, beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft defined in Article 310, in conjunction with
Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the
aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public position, the
Court imposes upon Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza the penalty ranging
from EIGHT (8) years, EIGHT (8) months, and ONE (1) day of Prision
mayor, as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) month, and
ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Applying
again the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the Court imposes upon
Ronnie Romero y Santos and Lito Marcelo y Cruz, the penalty ranging
from SEVEN (7) YEARS, four (4) months, and ONE (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, SIX (6) months, and
TWENTY-ONE (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the
following assignment of errors:
(1) Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the crucial finding
against petitioner that he has committed the act charged in conspiracy
with each other.
(2) Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of
petitioners guilt the letters signed by the accused during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of
his constitutional right.
First. Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged pilferage
was mail matter, only a government employee may be held guilty of
qualified theft unless a private individual was shown to have been in
conspiracy with him. He contends that since he is not a government
employee, then he cannot be charged or held guilty of the crime as
there is no proof that he conspired with a postal employee. The
petitioner argues that there is no evidence to prove that he was at any
time in conspiracy with the members of the syndicate inside the post
office. In fact, petitioner points out, Jacinto Merete, Projecto Tumagan,
and his co-accused Arnold Pasicolan were one in saying that it was
their first time to see him and Romero on February 17, 1989. Likewise,
in the meeting allegedly conducted by the members of the syndicate,
he and Romero were not around nor were their names
mentioned. Petitioner says that although he and Romero knew each
other, it was only on February 17, 1989 that they saw each other again
in order to see a movie.
We cannot understand petitioners theory that, as the subject of the
pilferage was mail matter, only a government employee, presumably
of the postal service, can be held liable of qualified theft. What makes
the theft of mail matter qualified is the fact that the subject thereof is
mail matter, regardless of whether the offender is a postal employee
or a private individual. This much is clear from Art. 310 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
Thus, as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art.
310, the crime is qualified theft. In this case, it is mail matter. Hence,
it is not necessary that petitioner be shown to have been inconspiracy
with a government employee in order to hold him liable for qualified
theft.
Be that as it may, conspiracy was proven in this case. NBI agent Arles
Vela testified that petitioner was instrumental in transferring the
contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan handed to them to their
travelling bag and that afterward petitioner and his co-accused
Romero tied the bag to their motorcycle.
Velas testimony was corroborated by Projecto Tumagan, who likewise
testified that Romero and Marcelo transferred the contents of the mail
bag to their bags. Although Tumagan said petitioner and Romero had
two bags, thus contradicting Velas testimony that petitioner and his
co-accused had only one bag, the inconsistency in the testimonies of
these two prosecution witnesses is not really of much importance.
What is important is that Tumagan corroborated Velas testimony that
petitioner helped in putting the letters in their bag. The discrepancy
could be due to the fact that these two witnesses were inside a car
and were at some distance from the persons they were observing. At
any rate, during the cross-examination, Tumagan said that the
contents of the mail bag were transferred to one other bagimplying
that there was really just one bag involved. [17] Moreover, the defense
should have confronted Tumagan with this inconsistency and asked
him to explain. For its failure to do so, the defense cannot for the first
time raise the point in this appeal.
Petitioner Marcelo showed no sign of surprise or hesitation when
Pasicolan handed the mail bag to him and Romero. It was apparent
he was acting pursuant to a prior agreement because when the mail
bag was given to him, he got the bag and he and Romero then
transferred its contents to their travelling bag. Petitioner acted in
concert with Pasicolan and Romero, thus indicating he was in
conspiracy with them. As the Sandiganbayan said:
The accused appear to have committed the acts charged in
conspiracy with each other pursuant to a pre-conceived plan known
to all of them to attain a common goal. Thus, when the postal delivery
jeep stopped near Esguerra Building along Adelantado Street,
Pasicolan alighted bringing with him a mail bag, passed through an
alley beside Esquerra Building, and upon reaching Amorsolo Street
handed over the mail bag to Romero and Marcelo who were waiting
for him. Upon receiving the mail bag they quickly opened it and
transferred its contents to a bag which Aguinaldo provided for the
purpose. No words were exchanged between Pasicolan, on the other
hand, and Romero and Marcelo, on the other, in effecting the
delivery. Pasicolan did not ask if Romero and/or Marcelo were the
person or persons sent to receive the mail bag. These facts indicate
that the three accused already knew each other and were fully aware
of what each had to do. And when Romero and Marcelo were arrested
for receiving the mail bag, they said nothing to the NBI. Not even a
whimper of protest was heard from them. They appear resigned to
their fate after having been caught red-handed.
Petitioner Marcelo claimed that he and Romero met on February 17,
1989 in order to see a movie; that when Pasicolan handed four
envelopes to Romero, he was across the street buying cigarettes; and
that when he joined Romero, a person identifying himself as an NBI
agent arrested them. Marcelo testified:[18]
ATTY. CRUZ
Q So you were asked by Ronnie Romero if you will be reporting for
work at that time?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA
Q What time was this when you were asked by Ronnie Romero?
A 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was the reason why you were asked by Ronnie Romero?
A He wanted me to go with him to see a movie.
Q Did he tell you at what place you will see a movie?
A No, sir.
Q What was your reply?
A I told him yes, I will go with you, anyway I have to go to my work at
10:00 oclock in the evening.
....
Q What happened next Mr. Marcelo?
A Then I rode at the back of his motorcycle and we went straight to
Makati. Suddenly we stopped near a building and I asked him what
we will do there and he told me he was going to wait for somebody
there.
....
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was told to you when you reached there?
WITNESS
A He told me he had to wait for somebody there and I told him to hurry
up, I thought you said we are going to see a movie, and he said, this
will not take long.
Q While at Taguig, were you informed by Ronnie Romero that you will
be waiting for somebody when you reached Makati?
A No, sir.
....
Q And what happened next?
A While we were there I told Ronnie Romero I had to buy cigarette
from across the street and after a while, about half an hour, Ronnie
called me I saw somebody handing him about four pieces of
envelopes.
Q How would you describe that envelope?
A It was like the Manila envelope that we see being used by the
elementary grades.
Q Was there any distinguishing mark in this envelope?
A No, sir.
Q Were you able to see what was the contents of these envelopes?
A No, sir.
Q That person who handed the envelope to Ronnie, do you know him?
A I do not know him.
Q While that envelope was being handed to Ronnie, you mean to say
you were across the street?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so you crossed the street to reach Ronnie?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you crossed the street was the envelope still being handed
or already handed to Ronnie?
A It was already handed to him.
Q What happened next?
A After I crossed the street somebody shouted at us identifying
himself as NBI, WE are from the NBI, do not move.
The foregoing testimony is contrary to the testimony of Ronnie
Romero. Romero said that Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter, had
asked him to meet a person in Makati who would give him an envelope
to be delivered to an unidentified person at the BF Homes Subdivision
in Paraaque. Romeros version is as follows:[19]
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q And do you know a certain person by the name of Redentor
Aguinaldo?
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q The accusation against you is that you conspired with your co-
accused Arnold Pasicolan and Lito Marcelo in stealing the articles and
things stated in the Information. Why do you say that you are not part
of the conspiracy, what do you mean by that statement?
A Because, sir, I do not know what was the contents of the envelope.
You can proceed now.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q You mentioned of an envelope which you claim not to have known
the contents of the same. Who gave you the envelope?
A Arnold Pasicolan.
Q Do you know Arnold Pasicolan prior to and/or before February 17,
1989?
....
A No, sir.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q When for the first time did you come to know Arnold Pasicolan?
A On February 17, sir.
Q When, where specifically did you come to know him?
A At the NBI office, sir.
Q Now...
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q February 17, 1989?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Proceed.
....
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Do you know a certain Redentor Aguinaldo?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q Tell us the circumstances under which you received this envelope?
A I received that envelope given to me by Arnold Pasicolan.
Q If you answer in monosyllable we will not understand. Alright, you
tell your story?
A Redentor Aguinaldo on February 17 told me that he is going to give
me a job. What I will do is get the envelope and bring it to a certain
subdivision in Las Pias and somebody will pick it up and pay me
P100.00 for it.
Proceed.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Now, do you know the person to whom you are to deliver the
envelope?
A No, sir.
Q Now, if you do now know the person to whom you will deliver the
envelope. JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
You may not cross-examine, tell him to tell us facts.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Where specifically in the subdivision in Paraaque where you will
deliver the envelope?
A BF Homes.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q To what particular person will you supposed to deliver it?
A I was just asked to go to that place and somebody will approach me.
Q To make your story more believable, BF Homes in Paraaque is a
very big subdivision. You enter that subdivision and there will be
several persons whom you can see there. How will the person know
that you are carrying an envelope for him. Where were you supposed
to deliver it. If you cannot explain that, we will not believe you?
A In that subdivision, there is a vacant place where there are no
houses. It is where I often go.
Q BF Homes subdivision in Paraaque has several vacant lots, how
will you know what vacant lot to proceed to?
A It was pointed to me by Aguinaldo.
Q So, Aguinaldo went with you in the morning of that same day and
pointed to you the place?
A In the morning of that same day and he pointed to me the place.
Second. The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was asked
to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by
petitioner:
Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
....
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-
accuseds names was not a mere mechanical act but one
which required the use of intelligence and therefore constitutes self-
incrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind the ruling
in Beltran v. Samson[20] to the effect that the prohibition against
compelling a man to be a witness against himself extends to any
attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a
document in a prosecution for falsification. Writing is something more
than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention,[21] so it was held.
To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from
the use of petitioners signature in this case. In that case, the purpose
was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the handwriting
in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show that
the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this
case the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the
envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones
seized from him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and
petitioners signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the
testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from
petitioner were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help
establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually
evidence of admission obtained from petitioner and his co-accused
under circumstances contemplated in Art. III, 12(1) and 17 of the
Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his
co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time
under custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way.[22] Under the Constitution, among the rights of a person under
custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The
letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident
of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioners admission that the letters in
question were those seized from him and his companion on February
17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion
from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their
own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest.
That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner
and his companion and seized from them was shown by the
testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-
accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found
on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI
agents and other prosecution witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL JANSON and
RICKY PINANTAO alias OGCO, appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVII,
Kidapawan, Cotabato promulgated on September 15, 1995, declaring
appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with rape, and sentencing
each of them to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and ordering them
to pay P30,000.00 and P10,000.00 in favor of Marites Alcantara and
Cesario Alcantara, respectively.
The information filed on August 31, 1987 alleged:
That on or about the 24th day of March 1986, at about 10:00 oclock
in the evening at Barangay Mateo, Municipality of Kidapawan,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused JOEL JANSON, RICKY
PINANTAO alias OGCO in company with alias ABDUL, alias PUTO,
JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, who are still at large and whose names
are still unknown, constituting a band and armed with long and short
firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away, at gun point,
cash money in the amount of P1,400.00, three (3) pieces of wrist
watches, one (1) can coffee beans and one (1) chicken and if
converted into cash it amounted to P1,845.00 or a total amount of
Three Thousand Two Hundred Fourty (sic) Five Pesos (P3,245.00),
Philippine Currency, owned by Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA;
and on the same occasion, the above-named accused, with the use
of force, violence and intimidation and armed with firearms, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take turns in having
carnal knowledge with one MARITESS ALCANTARA, a girl about 13
years old, daughter of Mr. & Mrs. CESARIO ALCANTARA, against her
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
persons in the aforesaid amount.
All contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
nighttime and the use of unlicensed firearms.
Kidapawan, Cotabato, August 31, 1987.[2]
On December 9, 1987, both accused pleaded not guilty. [3] Trial then
ensued.
For the prosecution, the following witnesses were presented: Teresa
Alcantara, Marites Alcantara, Dante Alcantara, Cesario Alcantara, Dr.
Cesar Manuel, Atty. Jorge Zerrudo, and police officers Pedro Idpan,
Jr. and Ortello Achas.
TERESA ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986 at about 10:00
in the evening, the accused with six (6) other companions asked for
food. She asked them to come back the following day but they
threatened to strafe and burn the house if they are not let in. The
accused then entered the house and once inside, made all occupants
lie down before covering them with a blanket. The accused demanded
money from Teresa and she gave them P1,000. She was brought to
the kitchen and someone guarded her. For a while, there was
complete silence.Then she went inside the room of her daughter
Marites, and saw her totally naked. Her daughter told her that she was
raped. She gave an additional P1,000 to the accused who also got
two (2) wristwatches worth P690.00, two (2) Seiko watches
worth P443.00, a chicken worth approximately P20.00, and one can
of coffee beans. The appellants were speaking among themselves in
the Manobo dialect.
Teresa identified appellants Janson and Pinantao as two of the men
who robbed their house and raped her daughter that night. She
testified that she knew appellants since they were their neighbors at
Mateo. She also claimed that while Janson and Pinantao were
masked during the incident, she recognized them through their body
built, physical appearance, and their voices while speaking in
Manobo.[4]
MARITES[5] ALCANTARA testified that she was thirteen (13) years old
at the time of the incident. She corroborated the testimony of her
mother and added that after the group entered their house and hogtied
her father, the appellants entered her room and turned off the lights
inside. Someone poked a gun at her. Then Ricky Pinantao, who had
an amputated right hand; Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona raped her. In
open court she identified appellants Pinantao and Janson as two of
her abusers, claiming that they were previously known to her. She
claimed that she knew Ricky because he was their neighbor and that
he often went to their house to buy bananas, while she knew Joel
because he often went to their barangay to visit his relatives.She
likewise claimed that while the appellants turned off the lights in their
house, there was a full moon that night which gave her enough light
to see her abusers. She immediately told her parents that she was
raped, and she underwent medical examination the following day. [6]
DANTE ALCANTARA testified that on the day of the robbery he was
only nine (9) years old. He said he recognized appellants Janson and
Pinantao because they were their neighbors.On cross-examination,
he admitted that the four robbers were masked, but the witness
insisted that he was able to recognize Pinantao with his cut wrist and
mustache, and also Janson because of his built. [7]
CESARIO ALCANTARA testified that on March 24, 1986, their house
was robbed and his daughter was raped. He admitted that during the
incident, he was not able to identify the perpetrators since he was
hogtied face downwards, and he was covered with a blanket. [8]
The prosecution also presented DR. CESAR MANUEL. He testified
that the physical examination he conducted on Marites Alcantara a
day after the incident revealed that there were lacerations between
the labia majora, labia minora, and the prepuce caused by a sharp
instrument. There was also the presence of seminal fluid in the vagina
of the victim indicating that there was actual sexual contact. [9]
ATTY. JORGE ZERRUDO testified that he only assisted appellant
Janson in waiving his right to counsel, and that the sworn statement
was already prepared when he signed it.Nevertheless, he asked
appellant Janson if the contents of the statement were true, and
whether he wished to be assisted by counsel. [10]
P/SGT. PEDRO IDPAN, JR. testified that he was a member of the
Integrated National Police (INP), Kidapawan, Cotabato, assigned in
the investigation of the crime of robbery with rape involving appellant
Joel Janson. He identified Jansons sworn statement saying it was
signed by him without being forced. He admitted that during the
investigation, there was no lawyer present and that Atty. Zerrudo
signed the affidavit only after the investigation was conducted. He
claimed, however, that prior to the custodial investigation, he informed
Janson of his constitutional rights and that despite being a Manobo,
Janson fully understood Cebuano, [11] which was the language used
during the custodial investigation.
Finally, P/SGT. ORTELLO ACHAS testified that he was at the police
station when Teresa Alcantara appeared on June 24, 1986, and
requested that she be accompanied to the jail to identify the person
who was earlier apprehended and detained. She identified the person
as appellant Joel Janson. On cross-examination, P/Sgt. Achas
admitted that he was not the one who conducted the investigation on
the person of Joel Janson and that he could not remember whether
appellant Janson who was then sixteen (16) years old and a Manobo
was assisted by a lawyer. Neither could he remember whether a
mental or physical examination was made upon Janson. [12]
For the defense, the following witnesses were presented: Datu Amado
Pinantao, Atty. Francis Palmones, Jr., and the two appellants: Joel
Janson and Ricky Pinantao.
DATU AMADO PINANTAO testified that he is an uncle of Ricky
Pinantao, and that they belong to a cultural minority group, the
Manobos. He admitted that they lived near the house of Cesario
Alcantara. He said that on March 24, 1986, appellant Pinantao was in
their house and that it was impossible for him to be elsewhere
because earlier, in 1985, Pinantao was hacked by one Bernardo Agio
resulting in the amputation of Pinantaos hand. He averred that
Pinantao could not go out of their house because at the time of the
incident, the wound he sustained was not yet completely healed. [13]
ATTY. FRANCIS PALMONES, JR., testified that he notarized the
sworn statement[14] of the appellant Janson on April 3, 1987, marked
as Exh. 4 and that Janson affirmed and understood the contents of
said affidavit because it was translated to him in the Visayan
vernacular.[15]
Appellant JOEL JANSON, for his own defense, declared that he was
assisted by a lawyer when he was investigated and made to sign a
sworn statement before the police on June 26, 1986. But he denied
the accusation against him and claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he did not
know how to read or write, and that he was made to execute a sworn
statement before a certain policeman named Ulep. Only after the
investigation did Atty. Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-
examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime,
robbery.[16]
Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him,
saying that he did not know Marites and Cesario Alcantara. He
claimed that he was arrested in March 1987 because he was
implicated by appellant Janson as one of the perpetrators of the crime,
per instruction of one Cristina Agio. [17]
On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment
thus:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all of the foregoing considerations,
the Court hereby pronounces the accused Ricky Pinantao alias Ogco
and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond
reasonable doubt and accordingly, sentences Ricky Pinantao and Joel
Janson each to undergo a prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify Marites Alcantara the sum of P30,000.00; to indemnify
Cesario Alcantara the sum of P10,000.00. No award of other damages
in the absence of proof thereof.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Both appellants filed their notices of appeal and submitted separate
appellants briefs. Appellant Ricky Pinantao averred that:
I was apprehended for another crime, and after he confessed to the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-
JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT JOEL JANSON, SAID
EVIDENCE BEING INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN AGAINST HIS CO-
ACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO, UNDER THEINTER ALIOS
ACTA RULE AS AGAINST HIS CO-ACCUSED RICKY PINANTAO
EITHER FOR PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE RESULTANT
CONVICTION OF RICKY PINANTAO;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES OF THE ALCANTARA
FAMILY WHICH WERE SHOT THROUGH WITH MATERIAL
CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND UNNATURAL
TESTIMONIES; and
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THAT IN
FACT THERE WAS A REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE IDENTITIES
AND GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED.[19]
Appellant Joel Janson, for his part, averred that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT JOEL JANSON WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; and
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
JOEL JANSON GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[20]
Simply put, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) Was the guilt of
appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond reasonable doubt?
(2) Is the extrajudicial confession of Janson admissible as evidence
for the prosecution? and (3) May said confession be used against co-
accused Pinantao?
We find the appeal impressed with merit. Appellants should be
acquitted.
Generally, the findings of the trial court concerning credibility of
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had the
opportunity to observe closely in the first instance the demeanor of the
witnesses presented before it.[21] However, when the trial court
overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony
of witnesses which if considered would materially affect the result of
the conviction, such findings will not bind this Court. [22] Such is the
case at hand.
Consistent with the testimonies of Teresa, Marites, Cesario, and
Dante Alcantara, we can gather that what transpired that fateful night
is as follows:
In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of
Cesario Alcantara threatening to strafe and burn it should they not be
let in. Once inside, the masked group of men turned off the lights,
hogtied Cesario, pushed him facedown and covered him with
blankets. They asked for money and Teresa gave
them P400.[23] Teresa was then led to the kitchen.During this time, her
daughter Marites was raped[24] by four men. Then Marites was led to
the kitchen where the culprits threatened to abduct her if her mother
would not give them money.Teresa then gave them an
additional P1,000 while the group took three wristwatches, one can of
coffee, and one chicken. Then they left the house, all the while
speaking in the Manobo dialect.[25]
While the testimonies of the witnesses up to this point are credible and
undisputed, it is unfortunate that the certainty ends here.
Marites testified in open court that she was raped by Ricky alias Ogco
Pinantao, Joel Janson, and Abdul Jona. [26] She said that she came to
know Ricky Pinantao because he is a neighbor and that he often goes
to their house to buy bananas. She also said that she came to know
Joel Janson because he is always going to Mateo since he has a
relative there.[27]
Upon cross-examination, however, Marites admitted that she was not
certain of the identity of her perpetrators at the time of the incident or
immediately thereafter. According to her, it was only after Joel Janson
police, that she was able to confirm her suspicion. When asked in
open court, she was not able to satisfactorily explain the discrepancy
in her initial sworn statement before the police and her testimony later.
Pertinent portions of her testimony in court are instructive:
Q: Was this Ricky Pinantao armed when he entered your room?
A: No sir, he wasnt.
Q: Where (sic) you afraid of him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Knowing that, according to you, you know him, did you not question
him, Ricky, why are you doing this to me?
A: I did not because I was only suspecting.[28]
xxx
Q: Is it not Marites, to refresh your memory, is it not that when a sworn
statement was taken from your (sic), you stated in your affidavit that
you did not recognize anybody?
A: That was what I stated in my statement.[29]
xxx
Q: Miss Marites, in this sworn statement of yours, which was already
marked as Exhibit E for the prosecution and Exhibit 1 for the defense,
there is a question here: Can you recognized (sic) any of the four men
or any of the six men that robbed and raped you? [you answered, I do
not know anyone sir. Now] in your testimony here, you said that you
know the two accused, how will you reconcile this one?
A: It is like this, what I am telling now in Court is the one true, during
that time, when the statement was taken on me (sic), I have already
suspect in my mind and I could not tell their names but there were
some evidence that dovetailed in my mind, like, the cut wrist of the
one perpetrator, Ricky Pinantao and the mustache. And these are the
things that I recall.
Q: Now, how come that you did not tell the police of the perpetrators
during that time of investigation?
A: Sir, it is very hard to name names during that time when a statement
was taken on me. But when this Joel Janson was first apprehended,
it was confirmed by his statement to the policeman. (sic)[30]
xxx
Q: So, when Joel Janson was apprehended, that was the time you
confirmed that he was the perpetrator?
A: xxx Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: Therefore, you failed to recognize Joel Janson during said time of
the incident?
A: I knew him through his body built.
xxx
Q: So, you merely assumed that Joel Janson is one of those persons
who robbed you, because of the aforesaid statement, that his alleged
statement in the police?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: According to you, you have confirmed your suspicion of this Joel
Janson after he was apprehended?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the same manner you confirmed your suspicion of Ricky
Pinantao after he was apprehended?
A: He himself revealed. Aside from that I already suspected because
of his cut wrist and his mustache.[31] (emphasis ours)
While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions
between declarations of the affiant in her sworn statements and those
in court, the rule is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on
substantial and irreconcilable facts such as those omissions in the
affidavit concerning important details which the affiant would not have
failed to mention and which omission could well affect the credibility
of the affiant.[32] If indeed, the victim recognized one of her assailants
as Ricky Pinantao because of his amputated hand, she should have
mentioned such glaring trait the first time she gave her statement to
the investigating officers. But she never mentioned anything. On the
contrary, she admitted that she did not recognize any of her
assailants. She also admitted that it was only after Joel Janson was
apprehended and confessed to the crime, implicating Ricky Pinantao,
that she confirmed her suspicion.
The testimony of Teresa Alcantara is also riddled with uncertainties:
Q: How many day had lapsed (sic) before you reported the incident to
the police?
A: Three months after the incident.
xxx
Q: Will you please explain why you reported the incident after three
months?
A: It was only upon hearing through radio DXND the name of this
person Joel Janson who was reported to have robbed the corn of a
certain Atty. Jalipa, that I reported to the police.
Q: That was the only reason why you reported to the police after three
months already?
A: It is like this: After hearing that, I went to the police right then and
there. I saw this Joel Janson who was the person among those who
raped my daughter and entered our house.
Q: If you knew already that Joel Janson was among those persons
who robbed you, why did you not report to the police immediately?
A: The following morning, I immediately reported, sir.
Q: And you gave sworn statement before the police on the following
morning?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Of course, this Joel Janson was unmasked when those six men
came to your house?
A: This Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao were the one (sic) wearing
mask.
Q: In other words, during the incident you failed to recognize outright
who were those persons masked?
A: I identified them through their body built and voice because they
were speaking Manobo.
Q: But you identified them because of their voice?
A: Voice and bodybuilt.
Q: But of course, you did not actually see the face of Joel Janson?
A: How can I see when he is masked.
xxx
Q: You only mentioned his (Joel Jansons) name (to the police) after
you heard his name over the DXND?
A: Yes...[33] (emphasis ours)
What stands out in the testimonies of the victims is that they were
uncertain of the identities of the masked men who committed the
robbery and rape that night and anchored their suspicion on the
alleged confession of Joel Janson. This confession, however, is itself
inadmissible for failing to meet the constitutional requirements for
admissibility.
The lawyer who allegedly assisted Joel Janson in the waiver of his
right to counsel, Atty. Zerrudo, testified:
Q: In other words, this sworn statement marked Exhibit B was already
typewritten and prepared when it was brought to you by the police?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.[34]
xxx
Q: But before he was brought to your office allegedly to assist him in
his waiving of his right, he was already subjected to investigation as
this sworn statement was already prepared?
A: That is true, but not signed.
Q: Of course he was not assisted because he was already subjected
to police investigation in his waiving of his constitutional rights?
A: May be, I am not sure about that. That was may be, that was
already prepared when they came to my office but only unsigned.
Q: What was prepared, the whole investigation or this entire part or
that part of waiving his rights?
A: As far as I can remember, it was already prepared, Your Honor.[35]
xxx
Q: Atty. Zerrudo, we are clear to the fact that this document was
already prepared before when it was brought to your office?
A: Yes, sir.[36] (emphasis ours)
The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, also admitted in
open court that the sworn statement of appellant Joel Janson was
taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together
with the waiver of his right to counsel, was already prepared when it
was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.
As shown by the transcript:
Q: But the accused during the investigation was not assisted by
counsel, is that right?
A: At the time when I conducted the investigation, the counsel is not
yet present.
Q: In other words, during the conduct of the investigation there was
no counsel being present assisting the accused Joel Janson?
A: None, sir.
Q: So in all the sworn statement of the accused Joel Janson made
earlier was made without the assistance of counsel? (sic)
A: When I prepared the investigation I advised him to get a counsel of
his own choice but the counsel was not yet present.
Q: He was not assisted by counsel during the conduct of the
investigation?
A: Yes, sir.
Court : What do you mean, Sergeant, Atty. Zerrudo was not yet
present?
A: When I conducted the investigation, Atty. Zerrudo was not present.
xxx
Court: He signed it after the investigation?
A: The prepared testimony.
Court: After the investigation?
A: After the investigation.[37] (emphasis ours)
Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson
cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by which it was obtained
violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled
confession or admission and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the
confessant.[38]
As provided for in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.
In People v. Javar,[39] this Court was clear in pronouncing that any
statement obtained in violation of the Constitution, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was
made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.[40] In People v. Gomez,[41] citing People v.
Rodrigueza,[42] this Court held that Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to a person under
custody even when he waives the right to counsel.
Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.[43]
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession
by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit
something false. What is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting
from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute
and thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have
been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive
psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. [44]
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it
must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, made in the
presence and with the assistance of counsel, [45]and it must be in
writing. Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel without the
assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value. [46]
In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel
was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant Joel Janson was
illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense.
As held in the case of People v. Bonola,[47] where the accused was
unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is
difficult to believe that considering the circumstances, the accused
made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In such instances,
the need for counsel is more pronounced.
It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already
had a prepared statement when they went to the lawyer who is
supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.
This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato,
Jr.,[48] where the police officers already prepared the affidavits of the
accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, and
the latter explained the contents of the affidavits in Visayan to the
accused who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the
same, the court held that the affidavits are inadmissible in evidence
even if they were voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v.
Compil,[49] the belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day,
even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does
not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the investigators were already
able to extract incriminatory statements from the accused
therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus,[50] we said that admissions
obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel,
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of
counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution.
As pointed out in People v. Deniega,[51] if the lawyers role is reduced
to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a priorly prepared
document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accuseds
constitutional rights, the constitutional standard is not met.
Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be
used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial confession by an
accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in
open court or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-
examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is
considered hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter
alios acta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. [52]
For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court finding Janson and Pinantao guilty of the crime of robbery with
rape fails to persuade us that appellants have been adequately
identified as the perpetrators of the heinous offense. In our view, to
affirm that judgment of conviction on the basis of contradictory
testimony of prosecution witnesses and the flawed extrajudicial
confession of appellant Joel Janson is to sanction a possible
miscarriage of justice.
What befell the Alcantara family, particularly to Marites, is abhorrent
and should be condemned. But after due reflection and deliberation,
we still find difficulty in sustaining the trial courts conclusion regarding
appellants guilt because of inconclusive identification. Doubts persist
in our mind as to who are the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense
has been perpetrated, but who are the perpetrators? How we wish we
had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts! But we have
only uncertain testimonies to rely on. It is only when the conscience is
satisfied that the persons on trial are the ones who committed the
offense that the judgment should be for conviction. Only when there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt can we be certain that, after trial, only
those responsible should be made answerable. [53] The evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[54] In this exacting standard, the prosecution failed. It follows
that the judgment of the lower court convicting appellants ought to be
set aside for failure to meet the quantum of evidence constitutionally
required.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No. 2016 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants Joel Janson and Ricky
Pinantao are ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, and
ordered released from prison unless they are being held for some
other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
implement this Decision and to report to this Court immediately the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.