such a modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other authority.

"
( 5 2923.6, subd. (b).)7
As the trial court recognized, section 2923.6 "does not operate substantively," but
"merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan ~nodifications on certain terins."
(Mabry, supra, 185 Cal.AppAth at p. 222.) Appellants concede that any violation of
section 2923.6 does not support an independent cause of action.
The demurrers to the first and second causes of action were properly sustained.
11.
The trial court sustained the demurrers to the third through seventh causes of
action with leave to amend. Appellants. however, elected not to amend the complaint.
" 'It is the rule that when a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint and
elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be
presumed that the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he can.' (Gonzales v. State of
California (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 621,635; see also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great
Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 3 12 [the plaintiffs failure to amend
'constrained [us] to determine only whether appellants state a cause of action, not
whether they might have been able to do so'].)" (Reynolds v. Bement, supra, 36 Cal.4th
at p. 1091.) In this situation, " 'the judgment of dismissal must be affirmed if the
unlamented complaint is objectionable on any ground raised by the demurrer. ( G o m l e s

' Section 2923.6 was amended, effective January 1,2013, to make slight changes
to subdivisions (a) and (b) that do not alter the substance of the provisions, and to add
requirements including that a lender not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or
conduct a trustee's sale, until the mortgage servicer makes a written determination that
the borrower is not eligible for a first lien modification and a specified appeal period has
expired, the borrower does not accept an offered modification, or the borrower defaults
on a modification; and that the mortgage servicer provide the borrower with a written
notice identifying the reasons for denial. ($2923.6, subds. (c), (d), (e), (f); Stats. 2012,
ch. 86, § 7 (S.B. 900), eff. January 1, 20 13, repealed January l , 2 0 18.) These new
requirements are not applicable to the present case.
 The trial court granted the demurrer to this cause of action for three reasons. First,
assuming there was a separate statutory cause of action for violation of the statutes
appellants relied upon, the court found the allegations lacked the required degree of
particularity for statutory causes of action in that appellants failed to show "what specific
charges, in what specific amounts, were miscalculated or were otherwise excessive."
Second, the court found that appellants failed to allege facts showing how the claimed
violations could have caused them prejudice: Since they alleged the residence was worth
no more than $750,000, the court questioned how it could benefit appellants if the notice
of trustee's sale stated the delinquent loan balance as $956,000 (using the numbers
alleged in the complaint) instead of $999,000. as "no rational buyer would purchase the
residence at a trustee's sale for $206,000 more than the residence was worth." Third, the
court held appellants failed to allege that they tendered the amounts secured by the deed
of trust or to show an equitable basis for declining to apply the rule requiring such a
tender.
Appellants argue that the trial court utilized an incorrect standard for the
particularity required in a complaint-that the allegations need only give sufficient facts
to infonn the defendant of the basis upon which relief is sought, "modern discovery
procedures" make specificity in pleading unnecessary, and less particularity is needed
where the defendant can be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal to the
plaintiffs.
The trial court did not employ an improper standard. In general, " 'a plaintiff is
required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with
particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his
cause of action. [Citation.]' " (Ludgate ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608, quoting Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. ( 1 969) 70 Cal.2d
240,245.) But there are "certain suits in which pleading with particularity is required,
such as suits claiming fraud (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods
Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197,2 16) or, as a rule, asserting statutory causes of action
(Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 780,795)." (Bockruthv.
Aldricl~Chemical Co. (1999) 2 1 Cal.4th 7 1, 78, italics added.) The trial court applied
this rule to appellants' cause of action for statutory violations.*
Appellants cite three statutes in this cause of action: sections 2924d,
subdivision (a), 2924f, subdivision (b)(l), and 2924c, subdivision (b)(l). Section 2924d,
subdivision (a), enumerates the costs and expenses incurred in enforcing a mortgage
obligation. As indicated above, appellants specify certain fees they allege would be
permitted under section 2924d, subdivision (a) -a total of $10,185- then state that the
"grand total of arrears and fees should be no more than $55,935 ." Subtracting $10,185
from $5 5,935, it appears that appellants acknowledge arrears of $45,750. The allegations
of the complaint do not explain how this figure was determined or why this figure, rather
than that stated in the Notice of Trustee Sale, is correct.

Appellants attempt to avoid the rule requiring particularity in pleading stated in

Lopez, supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 785, by arguing that Lopez was decided before the
enactment of the Civil Discovery Act of 1986, subsequent enactment of a new Civil
Discovery Act in 2005, and "cases which now hold that there is no longer need to require
specificity in the pleadings because [ofJ modem discovery procedures." Ludgate
Insurance Co.,supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at page 608, the first of the cases appellant relies
upon, in stating that "[tlhere is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because
'modem discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be
required in a pleading,' " quoted Semole v. Sansoucie, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 7 14,7 19, a
case predating Lopez; Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins.
Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099, cited Ludgate Insurance Co. for this point.
The "fair-notice" pleading test (Ludgate Insurance Co.,supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 608)
and recognition of the role of discovery procedures in reducing the need for specificity in
pleading long predated the statutes appellants suggest altered the pleading requirements
for statutory causes of action. As stated in the text, certain causes of action simply
require greater particularity in pleading than others. (Bockrath .v Aldrich Chemical Co.,
supra, 2 1 Cal.4th at p. 78.)