1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185717 After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La
Plaintiff-Appellee, Loma, Quezon City planned a buy-bust operation against a certain Garry who was in
Present: the BarangayWatch List. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA).
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the stations Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police Inspector
DEL CASTILLO, and Oliver Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel
PEREZ, JJ. Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1 Roderick Valencia (PO1 Valencia), PO1
Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2 Ronald Pascual were assigned as back-up operatives. Their informant
Promulgated: attended the briefing.
GARRY DE LA CRUZ y DELA CRUZ,
Accused-Appellant. June 8, 2011 Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban Streets, Quezon
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x City and arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. The informant introduced PO2 Ibasco to the accused, who
was standing in front of a shanty, as wanting to buy shabu. The accused asked for PhP 100, and when
DECISION PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the former handed over to him a white crystalline substance in a plastic
VELASCO, JR., J.: sachet. Upon PO2 Ibascos prearranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached
them. The accused, sensing what was happening, ran towards the shanty but was caught by PO1
The Case Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced himself as a police officer and frisked the accused, in the
process recovering the buy-bust money.
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. Q- The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused was turned over to
03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de the desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the sachet bought from him and the recovered
la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic buy-bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on June 3, 2003. Accused was then
Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. committed to the Quezon City Jail.[6]

The Facts Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and
examined by a Philippine National Police forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo).The
In an Information[3] filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime allegedly laboratory result confirmed that the substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
committed as follows: or shabu.

That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero
point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded not guilty to the above
charge.[4] Trial[5] on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the trial. The
testimony of Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense.
Version of the Defense
The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of
denial and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.
The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m. inside his
house at Barangay Manresa, Quezon City while he was alone drinking coffee. While two neighbors
were talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed men alighted from it, whereupon

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


his neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed men then returned, saying, Nakatakas,
nakatakbo. (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men saw the accused and entered his
house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his pocket.PO1 Valencia also entered
his house and came out with a shoe box, then said, Sige, isakay nyo na. (Take him in the car.) He asked
the armed men what his violation was but was told to merely explain at the precinct.
In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed him a
plastic sachet which they allegedly recovered from him. Then a man approached him and demanded
PhP 30,000 for his release, but he said he did not have the money. Thereafter, he was presented for
inquest.
A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May 29, 2003,
he called the police precinct to have a certain Taba, an alleged drug pusher in their area, arrested. PO2
Ibasco and other police officers responded immediately. When the police officers arrived, Buencamino
pointed to Taba, who, however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he was surprised to see the
accused inside the vehicle of the policemen. But he did not know why and where the accused was
arrested since he did not witness the actual arrest.
Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the terrace of
her house on 135 Manba St., Manresa, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, when she noticed the
accused talking to a certain Taba, a resident of the area. When a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in front
of the house of accused, Taba ran away and was pursued by two men who alighted from the
vehicle. The two men returned without Taba, who evidently escaped, and entered the house of the
accused. She did not know what happened inside the house but she eventually saw the men push the
accused outside into their vehicle.
The Ruling of the RTC
On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY DELA
CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
PESOS.
SO ORDERED.
In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing People v. Jubail,[7] which enumerated the elements
required to be established by the prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the trial court
found that the prosecution had established the elements of the crime.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
2
The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest a certain
Taba, an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not present when the accused was arrested. The trial
court likewise did not accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of Lepiten, who testified that she saw
the accused talking to Taba and that when the police officers entered the house of the accused, she
was unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony did not provide
clear and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid and straightforward testimonies of the
police officers.
Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing any ill
motive on the part of the police officers to testify against the accused, and the principle that the bare
denial of an accused is inherently weak, the RTC convicted the accused.
Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence[8] and was
subsequently committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.
Aggrieved, accused appealed[9] his conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly affirming the
findings of the RTC and the conviction of appellant. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED and
the assailed Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required for the
conviction of an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 were present in the instant case. The
appellate court brushed aside the irregularities raised by accused-appellant by putting premium
credence on the testimonies of the arresting police officers, who positively identified accused-
appellant in open court. One with the trial court, the CA found no improper motive on the part of the
police officers who, it said, were regularly performing their official duties. Besides, relying on People v.
Barlaan,[10] the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no coordination with the PDEA and
that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the seized drug, if true, did not invalidate the
legitimate buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus delicti, i.e., the
confiscated shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented as evidence of the commission of the offense.
The CA also ruled that accused-appellants mere denial, as corroborated by Buencamino and
Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis--vis the positive identification by the arresting officers who
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent the questioned chain of custody, the CA found it unbroken and
duly proven by the prosecution.
The Issues
Hence, We have this appeal.
Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief),[11] while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the Philippines,
submitted neither a Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on July 27, 2009, the Court dispensed
with the OSGs submission of a supplemental brief.[12] Since no new issues are raised nor supervening
events transpired, We scrutinize the Brief for the Accused-Appellant[13] and the Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee,[14] filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, in resolving the instant appeal.
Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:
I accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for their testimony against accused-appellant; (4) the
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.[15]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission of the
crime charged for the following irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did not coordinate with the
PDEA, as required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical inventory was conducted and photograph
taken of the alleged seized drug in the presence of public officials, as required by Sec. 21 of RA 9165;
and (3) the chain of custody was not duly proved by the prosecution. And second, his denial is worthy
of credence upon corroboration by the credible witnesses presented by the defense.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
3
After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-
appellant should be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt his
commission of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante
delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to
apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the
commission of the crime.[16] However, where there really was no buy-bust operation conducted, it
cannot be denied that the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the seeming straightforward
testimony in court by the arresting police officers. After all, the indictment for illegal sale of prohibited
drugs will not have a leg to stand on.
This is the situation in the instant case.
The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-appellants guilt
on: (1) the straightforward testimony of the arresting police officers; (2) their positive identification of
self-serving defense of denial by accused-appellant; (5) the seeming irregularities in the conduct of the
buy-bust operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not invalidating the operation; and (6) the
testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that the buy-bust operation was not conducted.
Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed
on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under appeal,[17] as here.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be
proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place,
coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.[18]
In People v. Doria,[19] the Court laid down the objective test in determining the credibility of
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations. It is the duty of the prosecution
to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until
the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale.[20] We said that [t]he
manner by which the initial contact was made, x x x the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x must be the subject of strict scrutiny by the
courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[21]
No Surveillance Conducted
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 4

The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged surveillance A: Its in the office, sir.
conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to the alleged buy-bust operation, the corresponding
intelligence report, and the written communiqu with the PDEA. The defense in cross-examination put ATTY. LOYOLA:
to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these matters, as attested to in the Joint May I make a reservation for continuance of the cross-examination considering
Affidavit of Apprehension[22] executed by the two police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2 Ibasco testified that there are documents that the witness has to present.
that his unit, specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance on accused-appellant for a
week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003 which, according to him, turned out positive, COURT:
i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed, selling shabu. What documents?

PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus: ATTY. LOYOLA:

The proof your Honor that there was indeed a coordination and the intelligence
ATTY. LOYOLA: report.
Being an operative, you are of course, trained in intelligence work?
COURT:
PO2 IBASCO: Will you be able to produce those documents?
Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir. Titingnan ko po.

Q: You said you conducted surveillance but you cannot show any proof that there is PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
an intelligence report, you have no proof? Titingnan?
A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.
COURT:
Q: Where is your proof now? You are not sure? You dont have any copy of those documents?
A: Its in our office.
A: You Honor, what we have in the office is the dispatch.[23]
Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance do you have any?
A: I dont have it now sir but its in the office.
PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination testified:
Q: You said that you conducted surveillance for one week, did I hear you right?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. LOYOLA:
xxxx Mr. Witness, tell me during the orientation, you will agree with me that there was
no coordination made to the PDEA regarding this intended buy bust
Q: So, you are saying you did not actually see him selling drugs at that time during operation?
the surveillance?
A: We saw him, sir. PO1 VALENCIA:
We have coordinated at the PDEA.
xxxx
Q: You say that but you have no proof to show us that there was coordination?
Q: None. You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA? A: We have, sir.
A: We coordinated it, sir.
Q: What is your proof?
Q: What is your proof that you indeed coordinated? A: We have files in our office for coordination.

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


Q: Are you sure about that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the information, you already planned to conduct a
buy bust operation against the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you will agree with me that there was no surveillance against the accused?
A: We have conducted a surveillance one week before the operation and we
conducted surveillance Pinakawalan namin ang informant.
Q: What do you mean pinakawalan ang informant?
A: So that we have a spy inside to verify whether Garry was really selling shabu.
xxxx
Q: In fact you dont have any information report?
A: We have, sir. Its in the office. Its with Insp. Villanueva.
Q: And because you claim that you have submitted an information and report, of
course, you should have come up with an intelligence report.
A: Yes, sir. Its also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.
xxxx
Q: And the alleged recovered item, the plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance was brought by whom to the PNP Crime
Laboratory?
A: I cannot remember who brought it sir because it was a long time ago.[24]
These documentsspecifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the alleged
surveillance, and the written communiqu from the PDEA for the conduct of the surveillance and buy-
bust operationwere not, however, presented in court. Evidently, these documents are non-existent,
tending to show that there really was no surveillance and, consequently, no intelligence report about
the surveillance or the averred written communiqu from PDEA attesting to coordination with said
agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to explain why it could not present these
documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-appellant allegedly sold shabu a week before he
was arrested.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
5
Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant in the
backdrop of the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten tend to show that there was
really no buy-bust operation conducted resulting in the valid arrest of accused-appellant.
Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust
operation against appellant ever took place.[25] The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of
RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal
and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[26]
No Buy-Bust Operation
But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, these irregularities take on more significance which are, well nigh, fatal to the prosecution.
Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted testimonies
of Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave credence to accused-appellants denial and frame-up
theory. The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of
planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians.[27] This Court has been issuing
cautionary warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[28]
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of
the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official
duties.[29] Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient evidence or
proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that accused-appellants defenses of
denial and frame-up are credible given the circumstances of the case. Indeed, jurisprudence has
established that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is
such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,[30] as in the instant case. At the very least,
there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-bust operation conducted and that accused-appellant
sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.[31]
Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking them
to apprehend a certain Taba, a notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2 Ibasco and company
responded to his call and Buencamino helped identify and direct the policemen but Taba unfortunately
escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mr. Witness, who asked you to testify today?
BUENCAMINO:
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 6

I volunteered myself to testify. presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [33] applies. In fact, the
prosecution did not even assail Buencaminos credibility as a witness but merely made the point in the
xxxx cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the arrest of accused-appellant. Thus,
Buencamino was cross-examined:
Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the accused was arrested?
A: I was the one who called-up the precinct to arrest a certain Taba and not PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
Garry. Taba was the target of the operation. You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?

Q: When was that? BUENCAMINO:

A: May 29, 2003. No, sir.

Q: Why did you call the police station? Q: You dont know where he was arrested at that time?
A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba. A: I dont know where Garry was, sir.

Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba? PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

A: Because he is a pusher in the area. That will be all, your Honor.[34]

Q: Why do you know Ibasco?

A: Because he was a previous resident of Barangay Manresa.
Q: You said you called police officer [sic] what was the topic. Mr. Witness?
A: That Taba is already there and he already showed up and they immediately
responded to arrest Taba.
Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your call?
A: Yes, sir.
More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was no
buy-bust operation. Her testimony corroborates the testimony of Buencamino that police enforcers
indeed responded to Buencaminos phone call but were not able to apprehend Taba. This destroys the
buy-bust operation angle testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Since the buy-bust operation
allegedly happened not inside the house of accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a shanty,
such cannot be sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but were not able
to arrest Taba; thereafter, the policemen went inside the house of accused-appellant, emerging later
with him who was led to the vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:

Q: When they arrived in your place what happened else, if any?

A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest him. ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29, 2003, if you could still remember?
Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?
A: No, sir. He was able to escape. COURT:
What time?
Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias Taba what happened, next Mr.
Witness? What happened to Garry Dela Cruz? ATTY. BARTOLOME:
A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela Cruz already inside the vehicle and I At around 9:00 in the morning.
dont know why Garry was inside the vehicle.[32]
LEPITEN:
Buencaminos assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not rebutted. Moreover, the I was at the terrace of the house we are renting while sipping coffee.
presentation of the police logbook on calls received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed
show if Buencamino or someone else made a call to the precinct about a certain Taba, but then, again, Q: Where is that house located?
the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay Manresa, Quezon City.

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 7

COURT: Q: After that what else happened, if any?

Where is this, Novaliches? A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside the FX.
A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del Monte.
xxxx
xxxx
COURT:
ATTY. BARTOLOME: Any cross?
While drinking coffee, what transpired next, Mrs. Witness or was there any unusual
thing that happened? PROSECUTOR ANTERO:
A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front of the house we are renting is No cross, your Honor.[35]
the house of Garry. Garry was talking to a certain Taba whom I know.
Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light of the
xxxx foregoing testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court cannot conclude that there was a buy-
bust operation conducted by the arresting police officers as they attested to and testified on. The
Q: While you saw them talking to each other, what happened next? prosecutions story is like a sieve full of holes.
A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.
Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody
Q: Where?
A: In front of the house of Garry. Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of the
seized specimen. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what happened next, if any? seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
A: Taba ran, sir. laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.[36] The CA found an unbroken chain
of custody of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the records belie such
Q: What happened next, if any? conclusion.
A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt alighted from the maroon FX and ran
after Taba. The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension, were bereft of any assertion on how the seized shabu in a heat-sealed sachet was duly
Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness? passed from PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received it from accused-appellant,
A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him. to forensic chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the forensic examination. While the testimony of
Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order
Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if any? dated March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft of any assertion substantially proving the custodial
A: They returned in front of the house and Garry and I saw them entered the house safeguards on the identity and integrity of the shabu allegedly received from accused-appellant. The
of Garry. stipulation merely asserts:
x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that
xxxx his office received a request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit A; that
together with said request is a brown envelope marked as Exhibit B; which
Q: What did they do, if any? contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit B-1; that he conducted a requested
A: I dont know what they did inside because I could not see them, sir. Then I saw laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a Chemistry
them went down and pushed Garry towards the FX. Report marked as Exhibit C. The findings thereon showing the specimen positive
for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit C-1, and the
xxxx signature of the said police officer was marked as Exhibit C-2. He likewise issued a

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


Certification marked as Exhibits D and D-1, and thereafter, turned over the
specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same for [sic] purposed
proceeding scheduled today.[37]
While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic sachet duly
marked with the initials EIGC, there was no sufficient proof of compliance with the chain of
custody. The records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-appellant, the specimen was
allegedly turned over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not revealed. Then it was the
stations OIC, P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from
the alleged receipt of the plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2 Ibasco from the alleged
buy-bust operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has not been substantially shown. The Court
cannot make an inference that PO2 Ibasco passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer on duty
until it made its way to the laboratory examination. There are no details on who kept custody of the
specimen, who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and who received and kept custody of it until Engr.
Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The stipulated facts merely made an allusion that the
specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had possession of the specimen and released it for the
proceedings before the trial court.
It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the
same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.[38] This, the prosecution
failed to do. The prosecution must offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently
complete chain of custody.[39]
As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:
x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody
of the seized drugs raises doubt as to its origins.
x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation
of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the
testimony of police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full
faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted with
irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[40]
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
8
In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of
custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The law
demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.[41] In all
criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.[42] As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might
probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.[43]
In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly involving a
buy-bust operation, thus:
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. While appellants defense
engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not
sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or
probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence
for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants
with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility
may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though
the appellants innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defense. Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in
favor of the accused.[44]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y Dela Cruz
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA Decision
dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully
held for another cause.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 128106-07 January 24, 2003
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO BALDOGO, accused-appellant.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias "Baguio" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in
Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death
in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 12903.
I. The Indictments
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas alias "Bunso" which read:
"That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio
Camacho of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused who were both convicted by final
judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving sentence, committed the
above name offense by conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with
a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack one
JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of
his body, which was the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,]
premeditation and recidivism. Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996."1
x x x Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored him. Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud sound,
"That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victim's
residence, Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while serving sentence at the Central
Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E.
CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age, and brought her to the mountains, where said Julie E.
Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than five days.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
9
CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.3 Edgardo Bermas died before he could be arraigned.4 The two cases were ordered
consolidated and a joint trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban
Mamites and Julio Camacho, Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-
chief.
II. The Antecedent Facts
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the
Palawan State University in Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge,
who was fourteen years old;5 Julie, who was 12 years old and a grade six elementary pupil at the
Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security
guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-
colony. Edgardo Bermas alias "Bunso," an inmate of the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic
helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant alias "Baguio," also an inmate of the colony, was
assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers resided in a hut
located about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge
and Julie in the house of the Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible
study at the dormitory in the Agronomy Section of the Penal Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper, were
in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house.
After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas
called Julie from the kitchen saying: "Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo." Julie ignored him. After five minutes,
akin to a yell, "Aahh! Ahh!" coming from the kitchen located ten meters from the house. This
prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the
ground near the kitchen, face down and bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp.
Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo.6 The shirt of Bermas
was bloodied.7 Julie was horrified and so petrified that although she wanted to shout, she could not.
She ran back to the sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook
Julie, tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent
her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas went to the room of Julie's brothers. Accused-
appellant dragged Julie outside the house and towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 10

With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards the GENERAL DATA:
direction of the mountain. About a kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-
appellant and Julie stopped under a big tamarind tree at the foot of the mountain. After about thirty JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal
minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag Farm, approximately 5'3 inches in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival
containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They untied Julie and at 12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of death 8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.
removed the gag from her mouth. The three then proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking
for six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the night. When the three woke up in
FINDINGS
the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of the mountain.
Seven hours thereafter, they started to follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told
Julie that they would later release her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. 1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of
However, accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The two survived on sugar and rice cooked by the xyphoid process, anteriorly.
accused-appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-appellant hid
Julie behind the tree. She wanted to shout but he covered her mouth. 2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line,
level of the 3rd rib.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving her as he
was going to Puerto Princesa City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next 3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5th rib.
day. After their breakfast, accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for herself. A few hours after
accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands. She found a river and followed its 4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5th rib, left
course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its occupant who introduced himself as midclavicular line.
Nicodemus. Julie sought help from him. When asked by Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police
authorities were looking for, she replied in the affirmative. Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham
where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie 5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6th rib.
over for custody to them.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He the 4th lumbar region.
noticed that the television set was switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children
but they were nowhere to be found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied by accused-appellant and 7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region,
Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr. then rushed to the house of his older brother, Augusto deep, penetrating involving the liver.
Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge and Julie were not there. Julio Sr.
then sought the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the 8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2nd lumbar region.
Camacho residence and proceeded to the kitchen where they noticed blood on the floor. The two
proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge dumped about three meters away
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the
from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he
neck and the trachea and esophagus.
was pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin examined
the cadaver and found that the victim was stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times. He
sustained a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and esophagus of Jorge had CAUSE OF DEATH
been cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an autopsy of the cadaver
and signed a medical certificate with his findings, thus: Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and
laceration of the neck."8
"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons
were used in stabbing Jorge and that two assailants stabbed the victim.9
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement to the
police investigators.10 Julio Sr. suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of
Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept in the
penal colony showing that he had been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and that he commenced serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of
his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997.11
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie
implicated him because she was coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper
in the house of Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial Section of the colony and the older
brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-appellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have accused-
appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However, accused-appellant balked because he had
heard from Edgardo Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel and had been maltreating
Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-appellant was transferred as a domestic helper of
Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because whenever the latter was
angry, he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur about two
times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the kitchen. At about
7:00 p.m., while he was already in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a
bloodied bolo measuring about 1½ feet long and told accused-appellant that he (Bermas) had just
killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-appellant
not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-appellant kept silent. Bermas then
brought accused-appellant to the kitchen in the house of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw
the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas called Julie three times, telling her that
her brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored Bermas. Julie later relented and went to the
kitchen where Bermas grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of
Julie with a piece of cloth and placed a piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought accused-
appellant and Julie outside the house. The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way,
Bermas picked a bag containing food provisions and his and accused-appellant's clothings. Accused-
appellant thought of escaping but could not because Bermas was watching him. With the help of a
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
11
flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with Julie walking ahead of
accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas tied
Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring for water, Bermas kicked
accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand and foot of accused-
appellant sustained bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant
and Julie after 1½ days.
In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie calling his
name. Julie later told accused-appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going
to kill accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time, accused-
appellant and Julie saw soldiers who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and
Julie's location to the soldiers because he was afraid that he might be killed. On February 25, 1996,
accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he will set her free as soon as his foot shall have
healed.
On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He ordered her to go
down the mountain and proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still
aching, accused-appellant went down from the mountain ahead of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham.
He then walked to Irawan where he took a tricycle to the public market in the poblacion in Puerto
Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at Brooke's Point where he was arrested
after one week for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He
averred that during the entire period that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him,
he tried to protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to
her parents after Bermas had left them and to surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr.
might kill him.
IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 – finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking advantage and
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 12

use of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.
Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in the manner prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of
the deceased Jorge Camacho; II

1. Actual and compensatory damages: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL.
For expenses incurred for funeral and other
expenses incident to his death --- P45,000.00 III
2. Moral damages ---------------------------- 100,000.00
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00 ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE SAME.
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00

B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 – finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, 'Baguio,'
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance appreciated
and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, and not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for
life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie Camacho for
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of
P100,000; and to pay the costs.
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of
criminal liability occasioned by his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against
him.
SO ORDERED."12
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
IN THE (SIC) CRIMINAL CASE #12900."13
VI. Resolution of this Court
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve the same
simultaneously.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed for, the
death of Jorge and the kidnapping and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting
under duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered
him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a credible
witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was merely coached into
implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.

V. Assignment of Error We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of accused-
appellant is the credibility of Julie, the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that: probative weight of her testimony.

"I This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of
the parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison d'etre of this principle is that this Court has to contend
itself with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by the parties:
"x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the
contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered
lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The
record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or
gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show
if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence.
Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at
an informed and reasoned verdict."14
In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the
attitude, conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said
court. Echoing a foreign court's observation, this Court declared:
"Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a
court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the
judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame,
the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting
a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the
truthful one, are alone seen by him."15
The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when
patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the
conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c) when the trial court ignored,
misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case.16 In this case, the trial court found the youthful Julie
credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Accused-appellant has not sufficiently
demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.
The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the felonies for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more
specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed and that accused-appellant precisely
committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the accused.17 The reasonable standard rule which was adopted by the
United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of Mr. Justice Felix
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
13
Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, "of due process of law in the historic, procedural
content of due process." The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship 18 that in a
criminal prosecution, the accused has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his life upon conviction and because of the certainty that
he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant
killed Jorge. However, the prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired
with Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during and
after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent.19 It is
not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of a felony;
rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the conspira`tors had the
same purpose and were united in its execution.20 In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.21 All
the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation.22 For a
conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually attacks or
kills the victim. As long as all the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design in bringing about the death of
the victim, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death of said victim.23
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired
with Bermas to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:
1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his pretext that
Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about
half a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all over.24
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-appellant and
Bermas ran after her. Accused-appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a
piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors.25
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie towards the
direction of the mountain while Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the
bedroom of her brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for a while for Bermas to join him.26
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and personal
belongings in a bag and buried the bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they excavated and retrieved the bag from under the
tree.27
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which
they cooked in the forest.28
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help, accused-
appellant covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help.29
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of February 23,
1991, accused-appellant continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he
abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-appellant,
thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and
on to Brooke's Point where he was arrested a week after said date.30
2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the
repeated maltreatment and physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie. 31
The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where
they found refuge after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie
in conjunto constitute potent evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge
and kidnapping and detention of Julie.32
The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently weak.
Accused-appellant's claims that he even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas
to kidnap Julie are of the same genre.33 The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive
testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crimes charged.34
Accused-appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to cooperate with
him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt
accused-appellant of the crimes charged, "the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual
damages of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-defense in equal
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
14
combat."35 Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense of
duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or
because of, a threat of a third person."36 As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler,37 "No man from
fear of circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on
mankind." In these cases, in light of the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of accused-
appellant no less, there is no doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas and is himself a
principal by direct participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of captivity does
not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge
and the kidnapping and detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to testify on.
Indeed, when asked to identify the person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to
mention any person:
"Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have
kidnapped her and participated in the killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say to that?
A That is not true.
Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed
you as one of the authors of the crime?
A Maybe somebody coached her.
Q Who do you think coached her?
A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her."38
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has repeatedly held
that the testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and
truthful than that of an older person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the
character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence and probative
weight.39 Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely testify against accused-appellant.
Hence, her testimony must be accorded full probative weight.40
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty
of. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659.41 The trial court is correct. There is no evidence that
Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he was killed. The last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is
committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900
(For Murder)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, based on the following findings and ratiocination:
"The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 22,
1996. It was carried out after the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the
dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in their early dinner
before 7:00 o'clock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made
preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other
personal belongings and food provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then
placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take to flight."42
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength with the following disquisition:
"The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain.
On the contrary, both accused are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them
would already be superior in strength and disposition to their hapless and innocent victim.
How much more with the combined strength and force of the two of them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking
advantage of their superior strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported
cruelty to them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the victim. They could have directed
their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in
strength and agility to any of them or even to the combined force of both of them. So, to
insure execution of their criminal intent without risk to them for the defense which the
offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against the deceased who is
very much inferior in physical combat even only to any one of them."43
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
15
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of
the trial court that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the
following requisites:
"x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. x x x"44
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying
circumstance, must be proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation
cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a
felony up to the time that he actually commits it.45 The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing
evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before it was effected. 46 The
prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to
his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time frame that must elapse from
the time the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it. Each case must be
resolved on the basis of the extant factual milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-
appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or
so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and
kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony.
There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The
prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor did
it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination to commit the said
crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they
took advantage of their numerical superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior
strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.47 Nighttime cannot likewise be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and
Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or accomplishment
or to evade their arrest.48 Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was
killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When
Jorge was killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously
held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put
up a defense is attended by treachery.49 Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by said circumstance.50
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the
commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.51 Conformably with current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the
heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the amount of P50,000.00 by way
of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he spent P45,000.00 during the wake and burial of
the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the same. Hence, the award of
P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903
(For Kidnapping)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which
reads:
"Art. 267—Detención ilegal grave.—Será castigado con la pena de reclusión temporal el
particular que secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad."
"Secuestrare" means sequestration.52 To sequester is to separate for a special purpose, remove or set
apart, withdraw from circulation.53 It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is a broader
concept than secuestrare.54 Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by
Groizard, "encerrar" es meter á una persona ó cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o
arrestar, poner en prisión, privar de la libertad á alguno." He continued that "la detención, la prisión, la
privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio ó por cualquier
tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad."55 On his commentary
on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos modalidades de privacion de
libertad, el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no
puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para
que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar
encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."56
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house
through force and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept
under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going back home for a
period of about six days. Patently then, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
16
Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was taken from their house by accused-
appellant and Bermas. However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an aggravating
circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which
reads:
"SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it."57
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance, the
same will not serve to aggravate the penalty.58
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code59 is alleged in both Informations.
Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the
penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance.60 The prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was
burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of
homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and executory. 61The raison d'etre is
that:
"x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was
a joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or
absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the
modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the
accused-appellant the aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to
object to the prosecution's omission as mentioned earlier."62
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen
years, eight months and one day as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced
on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16,
1997.63 The excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court64 to prove the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary
or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the judgment had
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The
barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact that final
judgment for homicide has been rendered against him.65 There being no modifying circumstances in
the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.66
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the felony of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright
when she was kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where she was detained for several days. The
trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral damages. 67 In light of the factual milieu in this case, the
amount is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.68
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the
felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral damages. The award of P45,000.00 as of
actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the
felony is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in
the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 116132-33 August 23, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO DELOVINO Y UDAL, accused-appellant.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
17
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
On 13 November 1992, 17-year old Antonette Modesto filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City two complaints for forcible abduction with rape against the accused. They were docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-1845 and Criminal Case No. 92-1846 and assigned to Branch 116 of the said court.
The accusatory portions of the complaints read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 92-1845
That on or about the 4th day of November, 1992, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, AURELIO
DELOVINO Y UDAL, by means of force, violence, intimidation, threats and will [sic] lewd
designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away
complainant Antonette Modesto, a minor 17 years of age and thereafter brought her at
Queens Land Motel, this city and again by means of force and intimidation and with the use
of deadly weapon, lie and have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant, against
her will and
consent.1
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 92-1846
That on or about the 20th day of October, 1992, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Aurelio Delovino Y
Udal, by means of force, violence, intimidation, threats and will [sic] lewd designs, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away complainant Antonette
Modesto, a minor 17 years of age and thereafter brought her to Cavite and again by means
of force and intimidation and with the use of deadly weapon, lie and have carnal knowledge
with the undersigned complainant, against her will and consent.2
Upon his arraignment on 21 January 1993, the accused pleaded not guilty and waived his right to a
pre-trial.3 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The prosecution presented complainant Antonette Modesto; her mother, Elsa Modesto, PO3 Fernando
Pascua; Dr. Ruperto J. Sombilon, Jr., a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI); and Alfredo Batario, Antonette's former teacher. The defense presented Lagrimas Delovino and
Ana Pacantara, the wife and the aunt of the accused, respectively; Reynaldo Improgo, a civilian
volunteer officer; Dr. Ruperto Sombilon, Jr.; Alicia Abañez; and the accused himself.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

The evidence for the prosecution established the following:
Antonette Modesto was a senior high school student of the Arellano University. She and the accused
were neighbors in the reclamation area in Pasay City. At about 12:00 noon of 20 October 1992, while
she was waiting for a ride to school at Libertad Street, Pasay City, the accused placed his hand on her
shoulder and poked a knife, which was covered with a handkerchief, at her side. He threatened to kill
her if she would shout for help or run away. He ordered her to walk towards the corner of F.B. Harrison
Street and Libertad Street and to board a passenger jeepney bound for Baclaran. He made her sit
between him and the driver in the front seat. The accused held on to his knife. Upon reaching Baclaran,
he alighted and ordered her to also disembark.
Thereafter, the accused brought Antonette to Dasmariñas, Cavite, on board another jeepney. Upon
reaching Cavite at around 1:00 p.m., he took her to a deserted house, where he started to kiss her. She
resisted, but he continued to threaten her with his knife. When she struggled and screamed for help,
he boxed her twice at her stomach, thereby weakening her. He then gagged her with a handkerchief
and tied her hands from behind. He undressed her and inserted his penis inside her vagina while she
remained helpless on the floor. Notwithstanding her struggles, the accused succeeded in his
ejaculation.
Not long after, the accused raped Antonette again, and after satisfying his bestial instinct, he allowed
her to dress up. He brought her back to Pasay City at around 5:00 p.m. Before leaving her, he warned
her not to tell anyone about the incident or he would kill her and her family. When she reached home,
she proceeded to her room and cried. She did not tell anyone of the shame inflicted on her. 4
Then, at about 10:00 a.m. of 4 November 1992, Antonette left home for school. While aboard a
pedicab, the accused joined her and seated himself beside her. He had a knife wrapped in a
newspaper, which he poked at her. She was forced to alight with him at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City,
where the accused flagged down a taxi which took them to Queensland Motel, Pasay City. Inside the
motel, the accused started kissing her. When she resisted, the accused boxed her twice at the
stomach. He undressed her and, with his knife, ripped off her bra. He inserted his penis into her vagina
until he reached his climax. Thereafter, he sexually assaulted her again. By late afternoon, they both
dressed up. Once more, the accused threatened her to keep quiet about the incident, otherwise he
would kill her and her family. They left the motel by taxi, and when they parted at the reclamation
area, he reiterated his warning. When she reached home, she went to her room and cried.5
It was on 10 November 1992 when her mother, Elsa Modesto, saw her crying in her room that
Antonette divulged what had happened to her. She and her parents then immediately proceeded to
the police substation to lodge her complaint.6 There, she narrated her ordeal to PO3 Fernando Pascua,
who then recorded her complaint in the police blotter7 and accompanied her to the house of the
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
18
accused. As might be expected, the accused denied the charges and was then turned over to the
Investigation Division.8
The next day, Antonette, accompanied by her mother, went to the NBI for a medical examination. 9 The
medico-legal officer who examined her,
Dr. Ruperto J. Sombilon, Jr., noticed no external injuries on her but found the presence of an "old-
healed hymenal laceration," 10 which could have been caused by sexual intercourse with a male. 11
Finally, through the testimony of Antonette, the prosecution proved that the accused offered, through
her parents, to pay P40,000.00 to amicably settle these cases, which offer she declined; 12 and that as a
consequence of the commission of these crimes, she had been experiencing sleepless nights and was
forced to quit her schooling.13
According to the contrariant version of the accused, who was 33 years old at the time of the
occurrence of the acts complained of and married with four children, Antonette had a special feeling
for him and eventually became his sweetheart; yet, he never took undue advantage of such
relationship by having sexual union with her.
He first noticed the special feeling of Antonette when he bought various items from her family's sari-
sari store and she handed him more than what he paid for. Taking the cue, he suggested a date with
her, which she welcomed.14
Their first date was on 2 September 1992 when they discreetly met at Harrison Plaza and watched a
movie. Then, they proceeded to Dasmariñas, Cavite, where they had a brief stay in the house of his
aunt, Ana Pacantara, to whom he introduced Antonette. Their second and third trips to Cavite were on
29 September and 20 October 1992.15 On the latter occasion, they slept together for an hour in the
house of his aunt. Antonette even borrowed a duster from his aunt, since she was still in her school
uniform. While alone together in the room, they kissed each other but did not have sexual intercourse.
Thereafter, they played bingo with his aunt before leaving for home. 16
On 4 November 1992, they went again to Cavite to join an excursion. Since the excursion did not push
through, they just stayed and had lunch at his aunt's house. They returned to Pasay in the afternoon.
That was the last time they saw each other.17
This alleged special relationship with the complainant was corroborated by Ana Pacantara, Lagrimas
Delovino, and Reynaldo Improgo.
Ana Pacantara declared that the accused and the complainant had their regular rendezvous in her
house in Cavite, particularly on 2 September, 29 September, 20 October, and 4 November 1992. They
acted like lovers and rested together in the bedroom, with Antonette even borrowing her duster.18
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Lagrimas Delovino testified that when she visited Antonette's sister at the San Juan de Dios Hospital on
7 November 1992, Elsa Modesto informed her (Lagrimas) that Antonette and the accused were having
an affair and that if the accused would not stop the relationship, "something bad" would happen to
him.19
Reynaldo Improgo claimed that he is a neighbor of Antonette and the accused in the reclamation area
and that he had seen them together on several occasions.20
As a witness for the defense, Dr. Sombilon opined that the "old-healed complete laceration"21 which
he had indicated in his report could be around three months old and, therefore, could not have been
sustained on 20 October or 4 November 1992. He concluded that Antonette was no longer a virgin at
the time of the alleged rapes.22
In her rebuttal testimony, Antonette denied having an affair with the accused and having gone to
Cavite on 2 September, 29 September, and
4 November 1992. On 2 September and 29 September 1992, she was actually attending her classes in
school.23Elsa likewise denied having confronted and threatened Lagrimas Delovino.24
Alfredo Batario, Antonette's professor at the Arellano University, corroborated Antonette's claim that
on 2 September and 29 September 1992, Antonette had attended his Social Studies class from 3:30 to
4:30 p.m., as shown in his school register.25 He declared, however, that from 20 October 1992
onwards, Antonette had been absent and considered dropped from the class.26
In its decision27 dated 25 October 1993 but promulgated on 24 November 1993, the trial court found
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape in each of the two cases and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-1845 and in Criminal Case No. 92-1846, accused Aurelio
Delovino y Udal is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape; and he is
sentenced, in each of the cases, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
complainant Antonette Modesto y Duque the sum of P25,000.00 as moral damages.
No pronouncement is made as to costs.
It gave full faith and credit to the testimony of the offended party because her declarations describing
how, through force and intimidation, the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with her were
positive, clear, and convincing and were made in a spontaneous and straight forward manner, leaving
no doubt in the mind of the court that she was telling the truth.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
19
According to the trial court, the force and intimidation in these cases consisted in the accused's boxing
the complainant and threatening her with a knife. And, since the knife used is a deadly weapon, the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua to death, but because the imposition of the death penalty had
been prohibited by the Constitution, the penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.28
It refused to believe the accused's claim that the complainant was in love with him and was his
sweetheart because, assuming this to be true, she would not have filed these cases. It further found no
improper motive on her part to falsely accuse him of the commission of the crimes in question.
The trial court did not, however, convict the accused of the complex crime of abduction with rape as
charged because, although he had forcibly abducted the complainant, the prosecution had failed to
prove lewd designs.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court gravely erred in (1) convicting him not on the
basis of the strength of the prosecution's evidence but rather on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense; (2) giving credence to the improbable and inconsistent testimony of the private complainant;
and (3) failing to appreciate the testimony of the NBI medico-legal officer in his favor.29
The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that we affirm the assailed decision with the modification
that the moral damages be increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.
We find no merit in this appeal. On the contrary, as hereinafter discussed, we find the accused guilty in
each of the two cases of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and not just of rape.
The first assigned error is baseless. The trial court convicted the accused on the basis of proof beyond
reasonable doubt which the evidence for the prosecution had established. Its reference to the weak
evidence for the accused was evidently made to demonstrate his failure to overcome the strength of
the prosecution's evidence.
The second assigned error involves the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It is doctrinally
entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal
with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
witness stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. 30 In People vs. De Guzman,31 this Court
aptly stated:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on
the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record
will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if
tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only
the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an
informed and reasoned verdict.
In the first decade of this century, a foreign court likewise observed:
Truth does not always stalk baldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a
court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the mind's eye of the
judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame,
the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the
carriage and mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting
a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the
truthful one, are alone seen by him.32
The recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily
or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could have affected the result of the case. 33
The accused has miserably failed to convince us that the exceptions apply to these cases. He has not
challenged the unequivocal pronouncement of the trial court that the complainant testified in a
"spontaneous and straightforward manner, leaving no doubt in the mind of the court that she was
telling the truth," and that her declarations were "positive, clear and convincing." The best that he
could do was to suggest the improbability of the commission of the abductions considering that they
occurred in a public place and in broad daylight and the complainant could have shouted for help or
called the attention of the people around her. The suggestion is not persuasive because it fails to
consider the unrebutted testimony of Antonette that he poked a knife on her side and threatened to
kill her if she would run away or shout for help. He even forgot to comment on the evidence for the
rapes. This studied silence on the rapes amounts to an admission of the sexual congresses.
Our own evaluation of the evidence not only fully supports the finding of the trial court that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant through force and intimidation on 20 October 1992
and 4 November 1992, but discloses, as well, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of
forcible abduction as a means for the commission of the rapes.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
20
The testimony of the complainant, although uncorroborated, is credible and convinces us with moral
certainty of the accused's guilt. No improper or ulterior motive was shown why she would falsely
testify against the accused, who was her neighbor. The latter categorically admitted on cross-
examination that he knew no reason why the complainant would charge him of rape and publicly make
known the fact.34 It is settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.35
The complainant's conduct in these cases further convinces us that she told the truth and filed these
cases solely to obtain justice. She reported the commission of the crime to the police authorities,
allowed an examination of her private parts, and thereafter suffered the ordeal of a public trial. It is
difficult to believe that an unmarried woman, like her, would tell a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless
she were motivated by an honest desire to seek justice. No young decent Filipina would publicly admit
that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth; it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor.36
The accused's denial of sexual intercourse does not deserve even a passing glance. Denial is an
inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
complainant.37
Moreover, the accused failed to deny the testimony of Antonette that he had offered to pay
P40,000.00 to amicably settle these cases. Such an offer was an implied admission of guilt 38 pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads in part as
follows:
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
In his third assigned error, the accused faults the trial court for its failure to consider the testimony of
Dr. Sombilon that the "old-healed complete laceration" in Antonette's hymen was already three
months old when he conducted the examination on 11 November 1992. He then asseverates that
inasmuch as the laceration was inflicted long before 20 October 1992 and 4 November 1992 when the
crimes in question were committed, he could not have caused it.
We disagree. That the laceration was three months old does not prove that the accused had no carnal
knowledge of Antonette on 20 October and
4 November 1992. Antonette established with moral certainty that the accused had raped her on those
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 21

dates. Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in the hymenal laceration is irrelevant in the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify complainant Antonette Modesto the sum of
these cases, for virginity is not an element of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.39 P40,000.00 as moral damages.

Moreover, the prosecution cannot be said to have relied on the old-healed hymenal laceration as Costs against the accused.
evidence of rape. It primarily relied on the testimony of the complainant which, standing alone and
even without the medical examination, was sufficient to convict. SO ORDERED.

A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Otherwise, grave and irreparable
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189301
injustice would be inflicted upon hapless victims if the crime were committed in remote areas where
Plaintiff-Appellee,
no doctor could conduct a medical examination. So too, if the victim would not submit to it because
Present:
what immediately pre-occupied her mind after the traumatic experience was not necessarily the filing
of a complaint but rather the fear of what the assailant would further inflict upon her should she reveal
- versus - CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
his criminal act, or the embarrassment and humiliation accompanying a public disclosure of the
VELASCO, JR.,
ignominy and dishonor she had suffered in the hands of her tormentor.40
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
JOSE PEPITO D. COMBATE a.k.a. PEPING, DEL CASTILLO, and
We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that although the complainant was brought against her PEREZ, JJ.
Accused-Appellant.
will to the Queensland Motel in the first case and to Cavite in the second case, the prosecution failed
to prove the element of lewd designs. Lewd design means unchaste design.41 We find that in both Promulgated:
cases the principal purpose of the accused was to rape the complainant and that her abduction was December 15, 2010
only a means to commit the rape. Rape, under any clime and civilization, will always be x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
unchaste.42 Thus, the abduction of the complainant was obviously with lewd designs.
DECISION
Accordingly, the accused should be held liable for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
defined and penalized under Article 342 (forcible abduction) and Article 335 (rape) of the Revised VELASCO, JR., J.:
Penal Code. Pursuant to Article 48 of the said Code, the penalty for the more serious crime, which is
rape, shall be imposed in its maximum period. Since the two rapes were committed with a deadly The Case
weapon, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 335, to
be imposed in its maximum period — death. But since these cases were committed when the
imposition of the death penalty was still prohibited under the Constitution, 43 only reclusion This is an appeal from the January 30, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
perpetua may be imposed. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepito D. Combante a.k.a.
Peping, which affirmed with modification the July 2, 2003 Decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 &
Also, pursuant to the current policy of this Court, moral damages should be awarded in each case and 95-17071 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50 in Bacolod City.
increased from P25,000.00 to P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate stands convicted of the crime of Murder and
Homicide, as defined and penalized under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
Court of Pasay City in Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-1845 end 92-1846 is modified as above indicated. As modified, accused AURELIO DELOVINO is respectively. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion temporal and reclusion perpetua.
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, as
defined and penalized under Article 342 and Article 335, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, in
each of the said cases, and pursuant to Article 48 thereof, he is in each case hereby sentenced to suffer The Facts

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from two Informations:
Criminal Case No. 95-17070
That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery,
with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on EDMUND PRAYCO y
OSABEL, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter which
caused the death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.[3]
Criminal Case No. 95-17071
That on or about 16th day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Murcia,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm, with treachery,
with intent to kill and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot on LEOPOLDO GUIRO, JR. y
PEREZ alias Nene thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the body of the latter
which caused the death of the said victim.
Contrary to law.[4]
On November 28, 2001, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the two cases. When
arraigned with assistance of counsel, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter,
a joint trial ensued.
During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Shenette Guiro, the wife of the
deceased victim Leopoldo Guiro; Jose Tomaro; Rebecca Montino Apdo; Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Rolando Salamisan; Inspector Jose Labuyo; Police Inspector William Senoron; PO1 Rommel Pregil; Dr.
Jimmy Nadal; and Dr. Emmanuel Bando. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses
Magno Montinola and accused-appellant.
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
22
On March 16, 1995, at around 9 oclock in the evening, Tomaro parked his passenger jeepney
at the garage of Leopoldos mother, Patria Guiro, located at Purok 2, Barangay Minoyan in Murcia,
Negros Occidental. He then proceeded to the house of Leopoldo where he usually sleeps after driving
the jeepney owned by Leopoldos parents.
Upon entering the gate, Tomaro met Leopoldo and Edmund Prayco, who were on their way
out. Leopoldo invited him to join them in drinking liquor but he declined saying he was already tired.
He continued on his way and was about to ascend the stairs when he heard a gunshot. He rushed back
to the road and there he saw accused-appellant pointing a gun at the fallen Leopoldo. When Edmund
was about to intervene, accused-appellant also shot Edmund at a very close range. After shooting
Edmund, accused-appellant turned his attention back to Leopoldo and shot him for a second time.
Tomaro then rushed to help Leopoldo and pleaded for his life. Instead of heeding his plea,
accused-appellant pointed his gun towards Tomaro and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. At
that instant, Tomaro jumped on accused-appellant and was able to grab the gun. Tomaro tried to
shoot accused-appellant but the gun still did not fire. Hastily, accused-appellant fled to the direction
of Bacolod City.
Leopoldo and Edmund were later brought to the Bacolod Sanitarium and Hospital. Edmund
was declared dead on arrival, while Leopoldo died the following day.
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellants defense, on the other hand, was confined to a denial, to wit:
In the evening of March 16, 1995, accused-appellant was in his house drinking liquor when
Montinola, a close friend, arrived to fetch him. He was told to report to the barangay hall and to
render duty as a tanod. Before leaving, Montinola also partook of a small quantity of liquor.
On their way to the barangay hall, they passed by the house of Leopoldo, who was drinking
liquor by the side of the street fronting his house, along with Tomaro, Edmund, and someone else who
accused-appellant could not identify. He and Montinola were walking on the left side of the street
going towards the direction of the Mambucal Resort, while Leopoldo and his group were on the right
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

side. Accused-appellant then extended a greeting to Leopoldo, who responded with a sarcastic remark.
Accused-appellant and Montinola ignored the rudeness thrown their way and just continued walking.
They, however, soon noticed Leopoldo crossing the street and started to follow them.
Edmund likewise also followed them but on the other side of the street. Suddenly, accused-appellant
saw Leopoldo pull something out from his waist. He then heard a gunshot and saw Leopoldo fall to the
ground. He pushed Montinola aside and they ran away.
After a few moments, he heard more gunshots coming from the direction of where Leopoldo
and his group were situated. He was stricken with fear so he went home. Later, he learned that he was
the suspect in the killing of Leopoldo and Edmundo. Thus, to avoid trouble, he fled to Victorias City,
Negros Occidental where he was arrested by the Murcia police on October 13, 2001.
The story of accused-appellant was corroborated by Montinola.
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of its July 2,
2003 Decision reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof.
There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the
late Leopoldo Guiro the following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
2. The sum of P932,712.00 as compensatory damages and;
3. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
23
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund
Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as Principal
thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned to pay the heirs of
the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the sum of
P30,000.00 as compensatory damages.[5]
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On January 30, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court and modified the
award of damages. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial
court, Branch 50 of Bacolod City dated 2 July 200[3] is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The award of compensatory damages in both cases is deleted,
and in lieu thereof, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of
Leopoldo Guiro and another P25,000.00 to the heirs of Edmund Prayco. In all other
respects, the assailed decision is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Issue
Hence, this appeal is before us, with accused-appellant maintaining that the trial court erred
in convicting him of the crimes of homicide and murder, despite the fact that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Factual findings of the trial court should be respected
In his Brief, accused-appellant says that the trial court failed to consider several
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. First, as to Tomaro, who directly
implicated accused-appellant, his testimony was unsubstantiated and did not conform to the physical
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

evidence. According to Tomaro, Edmund was shot at close range yet no powder burns were found
around the entry wound. Second, as to the testimony of Shenette Guiro, accused-appellant harps on
the fact that she never mentioned Tomaro being present at the scene of the crime and that she only
heard one gunshot while the other witnesses heard three or four. Lastly, as to the testimony of SPO1
Salamisan, accused-appellant points out that SPO1 Salamisan testified that he only saw one spot of
blood when there were two victims.
To accused-appellant, the inconsistencies thus described erode the credibility of the
witnesses when taken as a whole.
We do not agree.
Time-tested is the doctrine that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality.[7] The Supreme Court will not interfere with that
assessment, absent any indication that the lower court has overlooked some material facts or gravely
abused its discretion.[8]
Complementing the above doctrine is the equally established rule that minor and
insignificant inconsistencies in the testimony tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of
witnesses, for they show that the testimony is not contrived or rehearsed. [9] As the Court put it
in People v. Cristobal, Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the
witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming.[10]
A careful review of the records shows that the RTC, as well as the CA, committed no
reversible error when it gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as opposed to
accused-appellants bare denials.
Moreover, the testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety and not merely on
its truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts
and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by witnesses,
everything stated by them on direct, cross, and redirect examinations must be calibrated and
considered.[11] It must be stressed in this regard that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in an
answer to one question may be supplied or explained as qualified by the answer to other question. The
principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied to this jurisdiction.[12] As explained
in People v. Osias:
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
24
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been
aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in
some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy
of belief may be credited.
The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the
scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the accused] as one of the
perpetrators of the crime charged x x x.[13](Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, we agree with the trial court that the alleged inconsistencies merely refer to
minor details which do not affect the witnesses credibility. In disregarding the alleged inconsistent
statements, the trial court explained:
The inconsistencies are more imagined than real. The inconsistencies, like
the ownership of the passenger jeepney, whether said jeepney is owned by Guiro
or his mother, are so trivial and does not at all affect credibility.
The accused also makes much fuss about the fact that Shenette Guiro
heard only one (1) shot while the other prosecution witnesses as well as the
accused and his witness Magno Montinola, heard three (3) to four (4) shots. The
accused conveniently forgot that Shenette Guiro was asleep when the shooting
took place. She was awakened by the shot she heard and that shot might have
been the last shot.
The accused flays the testimony of Jose Tomaro as incredible and
unbelievable when the said witness testified that he ran and cradled Guiro in his
arms after the latter was shot. The accused asserts that it is unnatural for a person
to unnecessarily expose himself to danger.
The argument need not detain the Court. It is a settled rule on evidence
that witnesses to a crime react in different ways. (Pp. vs. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615).
There is no standard behavior when one is considered
with a strange, startling or frightening situation. (Pp. v.
De Leon, 262 SCRA 445)
Moreover, Jose Tomaro has no quarrel with the accused. He has every
reason to expect that he will not be assaulted as he was not making any aggressive
move against him.[14]
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Likewise, we are not persuaded as to the alleged inconsistency of Tamaros testimony that
Edmund was shot at close range but the physical evidence revealed that there were no powder burns
around the entry wounds. In his testimony, Tamaro described the incident as follows:
COURT:
Q: Now according to your testimony, the next time around, Combate was pointing
his gun at Prayco?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He pointed his gun to Prayco and fired his gun. At the time he fired his gun, how
far was he from Prayco?
COURT
Witness indicating a very short distance where the Court Interpreter is
situated which is less than (1) meter away.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
As aptly held by the CA, such testimony is in fact consistent with the lack of powder burns on
Edmunds body, viz:
The distance from which a shot is fired affects the nature and extent of
the injury caused on the victim. In close range fire, the injury is not only due to the
missile but also due to the pressure of the expanded gases, flame and other solid
products of combustion. In contrast, distant fire usually produces the characteristic
effect of the bullet alone. A shot fired from a distance of more than 60 cm or about
two (2) feet does not produce the burning, smudging or tattooing typically present
in loose contact or near fire, short range fire and medium range fire.
Powder burns is a term commonly used by physicians whenever there is
blackening of the margin at the entrance of the gunshot wound. The blackening is
due to smoke smudging, gunpowder tattooing and, to a certain extent, burning of
the wound margin.
In this case, the fact that there were no powder burns found in
EDMUNDs body indicates that the shots were fired at a distance of more than two
(2) feet which is consistent with Jose Tomaros testimony that Edmund was shot at
about less than 1 meter away from appellant.[16]
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
25
Defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification
For his defense, accused-appellant wants this Court to believe his innocence and offers his
version of the facts wherein he did not commit the crime. This Court is not persuaded.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. [17]Accused-
appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to perjure
and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their testimonies were
not moved by any ill will and bias stands, and, therefore, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit.[18]
Lest it be overlooked, accused-appellant fled to Victorias City, Negros Occidental right after
the incident, an act that is evidence of his guilt. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is
competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn.[19] Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as lion.[20]
Award of damages
This Court will now endeavor to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the proper award
of damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua or death.
As a rule, the Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal cases: civil indemnity and
moral and exemplary damages. We shall discuss all three.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven
actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[21] This
award stems from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Civil liability ex delicto may come in the form of restitution, reparation, and
indemnification.[22] Restitution is defined as the compensation for loss; it is full or partial compensation
paid by a criminal to a victim ordered as part of a criminal sentence or as a condition for
probation.[23] Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the compensation for
an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.[24] Clearly, all of these correspond to actual or
compensatory damages defined under the Civil Code.[25]
The other kinds of damages, i.e., moral and exemplary or corrective damages,[26] have
altogether different jural foundations.
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate
one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have
sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219[27] and Article 2220[28] of the
Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as compensatory damages
awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong. [29] They may also be
considered and allowed for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailants conduct, as well as the factors of provocation,
the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim,
[and] mental distress.[30]
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon:
[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[31]
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
26
And lastly, the Court awards exemplary damages as provided for in Arts. 2229 and 2230 of
the Civil Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party.
Clearly, as a general rule, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they generic or qualifying.
However, there have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded despite the lack of an
aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify this confusion in People v. Dalisay, where it
categorically stated that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, to wit:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts
generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended
the commission of the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information.
This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating
circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in
the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven,
but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may
still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if
the aggravating circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven,
in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which
remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of
the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private
offended party.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially
those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been
sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and
another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both
been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set
are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili.
And in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference
between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before
or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the
grant of exemplary damages taking into account simply the attendance of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of
the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on
this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings,
and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a
result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by
the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that intensifies
the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to
refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where
the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
27
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an
instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies
or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also,
in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the
moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines v. Cristino
Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the Philippines
v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to
protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article
2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed,
to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate opinion in People of the
Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying
public policy behind the award of exemplary damages to set a public example or
correction for the public good.[32]
Before awarding any of the above-mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under Republic Act No. (RA) 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the penalty of
death under certain circumstances.
For a full appreciation of the award on damages, it is imperative that a thorough discussion
of RA 7659 be undertaken. Each crime will be discussed as well as the proper amount of damages for
each crime.
Under RA 7659, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in
general,[33] mutiny on the high seas,[34] and simple rape.[35]
For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
qualified piracy;[36] qualified bribery under certain
circumstances;[37] parricide;[38] murder;[39] infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the
child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

purpose;[40] kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; [41] robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; [42] destructive arson, except
when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the
article;[43] attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion
thereof; plunder;[44] and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. [45]
RA 7659 imposes the penalty of death on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or
present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the
victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane
or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1)
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child
below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
Nevertheless, all these must be taken in relation to Art. 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
28
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to
the result of such compensation.
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the
court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can
impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present.
But with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in
lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.[46]
As a result, courts now cannot impose the penalty of death. Instead, they have to
impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages,
following the ruling in People v. Salome[47] and People v. Quiachon,[48] is the penalty provided by law or
imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender.[49]
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the penalty of
death were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor,[50] that
the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be PhP 75,000. We
reasoned that [t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.[51] Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found
in RA 7659.
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa,[52] PhP
50,000 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it
is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime
of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[53] Subsequently, the amount was increased to
PhP 75,000 in People v. Soriano.[54]
As to exemplary damages, existing jurisprudence has pegged its award at PhP
30,000,[55] despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The reason, as previously discussed, is to
deter similar conduct and to serve as an example for public good.
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346,
the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be
used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
On the other hand, when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, the Court has ruled that the proper amounts should be PhP 50,000 as civil
indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.[56]
Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 95-17070 and 95-17071, the exemplary damages awarded
by the CA in the amount of PhP 25,000 should be increased to PhP 30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
Moreover, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages for unearned income by the
CA in Criminal Case No. 95-17071 is proper. This Court pronounced in People v. Mallari:[57]
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
29
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages therefore may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence
is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.
In this case, neither of the exemption applies. The earnings of Leopoldo at the time of his
death were above minimum wage set by labor laws in his respective place at the time of his
death.[58] As testified to by his wife, Shenette Guiro, Leopoldo was earning between PhP 200 to PhP
300 per day. This is more than minimum wage. Hence, absent any documentary evidence, the award of
compensatory damages must be deleted.
Likewise, the deletion of the award of compensatory damages by the CA in Criminal Case No.
95-17070 is proper for lack of any basis. The trial court did not discuss why it awarded compensatory
damages to the heirs of Edmund.
Interest on damages
When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases.[59] In People v. Tubongbanua,[60] interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be
applied on the award of damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several
cases such as Mendoza v. People,[61] People v. Buban,[62] People v. Guevarra,[63] and People v.
Regalario.[64] Thus, we likewise adopt this rule in the instant case. Interest of six percent (6%) per
annum should be imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or
compensatory damages, moral damages and exemplary damages, from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00294
finding accused-appellant Jose Pepito D. Combate guilty of the crimes charged
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, the ruling of the trial court should read as follows:
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Jose Combate, Jr. y Dallarte alias Peping, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of HOMICIDE in Criminal Case NO. 95-17071 as Principal thereof.
There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall serve a prison term of Eight (8)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal.
By way of civil liability, the accused is condemned to pay the heirs of the
late Leopoldo Guiro the following:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
2. The sum of P56,319.59 as reimbursement for the burial expenses.
In addition, the accused is ordered to pay Shenette Guiro the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The accused is also declared GUILTY of MURDER for the death of Edmund
Prayco as charged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-17070 as Principal
thereof. There being no modifying circumstances, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is condemned to pay the heirs of
the late Edmund Prayco the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages
from the finality of judgment until fully paid in the two (2) aforementioned
criminal cases.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMY SAGUN @ POKPOK, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Accused-appellant Romy Sagun @ Pokpok assails the decision[1] dated April 23, 1993, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,[2] of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 891, finding him guilty
of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay private
complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as damages without subsidiary imprisonment.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
30
On September 25, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor, Anthony A. Fox, filed with the court a quo an
information,[3] charging accused-appellant of the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 12:00 oclock midnight on November 5, 1990, in Barangay Bonifacio, Municipality of
Diffun, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
ROMY SAGUN alias POKPOK, armed with a bolo, by means of force and intimidation and lewd design,
did then and there there (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
MARITESS A. MARZO against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During arraignment on June 25, 1992, accused-appellant assisted by his counsel,[4] entered a plea
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution, culled from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
succinctly synthesized in the Appellees Brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General,
established the following facts:
In the evening of November 5, 1990, Maritess Marzo, single and a third year high school student, was
asleep in the room of her boarding house located at Bonifacio St., Diffun, Quirino (p. 2, tsn, July 9,
1992). Fronting said boarding house and separated by a road is the house of Romy Sagun where he and
his family reside (p. 3, tsn, March 31, 1993).
At about midnight of November 5, 1990, Maritess was awakened by sounds of footsteps approaching
her. Maritess shouted but a man whom she recognized as Romy Sagun, her neighbor, poked his bolo at
her head (p. 4, tsn, Aug. 11, 1992) and uttered, Do not shout or else I will kill you and tomorrow you
will not be living any more (p. 5, supra). Then, Sagun shifted his bolo to the neck of Maritess, who was
lying on her side, and started removing her skirt and panty (pp. 7-8, supra). Sagun took off his pants
and laid on top of Maritess (p. 10, supra); opened her legs and inserted his organ into Maritess (p. 12,
supra) and started gyrating for about five minutes. Maritess struggled and pushed Sagun but to no
avail. Thereafter, Sagun stood up, put on his pants and left (p. 13, supra). Maritess felt that Saguns
male genital partly penetrated hers (p. 15, supra).
After Sagun left, Maritess woke up her boardmates and informed them that somebody entered the
boarding house but did not reveal that she was raped because of Saguns death threat (p. 15,
supra). The following morning, however, Maritess informed her landlord, Rudy Agsalud that Sagun
entered her room and sexually abused her. Rudy Agsalud immediately reported the incident to the
police authorities (p. 6, supra).
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

On November 6, 1990 (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 17, 1992), Maritess submitted herself to a medical
examination. Dr. Moises Lazaro, the examining physician, testifying on the results of his examination,
pertinently declared as follows:
Q - Doctor, you were saying that there was a partial penetration on the vagina. How many
centimeters was the deep of the penetration?
A - As I said from the opening to the hymen 1-1.5 cm. May be the tip of the penis penetrated the
hymen but it did not break the hymen. Because we have to consider the circumstance
whether there is resistance or force x x x(p. 11, supra)[5]
Accused-appellant denied having committed said crime. His counterstatement of the facts as
tersely summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
He knows Maritess Marzo, the complainant. She was boarding in the house of Mercedes Agsalud
sometime in November 1990. Student at the Quirino State College. Complainants boarding house is
about 45 meters from their house. In the evening of November 5, 1990, he was in their house with his
wife and children. Before 9:00 oclock of the same evening, he had a drinking spree with his
nephew. After consuming two bottles of beer grande, he went to buy cigarette. On his way home, he
noticed that the door of the boarding house of complainant was opened. She was reviewing. His
nephew at that time was already asleep. He entered the boarding house of the complainant, sat down
on the chair about four meters from her. Complainant inquired why he entered the house. Told
complainant that he just came for a visit because she is a neighbor. Because he was drunk,
complainant had to go upstairs. Complainant told him to leave the house or else she will report him to
Mrs. Agsalud. With that warning, he went home. He denied the testimony of the complainant to the
effect that he threatened her with a bolo, undressed her, removed her panty, mounted at her and had
sexual intercourse with her. That there is no truth about the testimony of the complainant because
nothing had happened to her. That he does not know why the complainant testified against him.
On cross examination, witness testified that he went to the boarding house of the complainant on the
alleged night of the incident after a drinking spree with his nephew. That it was only when he was
already drunk that gave him the idea of going to the boarding house of the complainant. At that time,
he entered the boarding house, complainant was reviewing, she was alone. He went near the
complainant to talk to her being a neighbor. That he used to go to the boarding house. He was asking
complainant why she was reviewing at that late hour of the night. He was seated near the door of the
house while Maritess Marzo was reviewing in the sala of the house. That in the first floor of the house,
there are no rooms while the second floor, it has rooms. That the drinking spree took place in his
house. That after buying cigarette he did not go home directly because he dropped by at the boarding
house of the complainant. He talked with the complainant. After he was warned that she is going to
report his coming in the house of Mrs. Agsalud, he left and that was the time he went home. He told
complainant that he was visiting her being a neighbor and sensing that she was mad, he left.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
31
On clarificatory question of the court, accused testified that he knows that complainant was alone at
that night, and that he entered the house to talk with her considering that she is a neighbor. He
entered the boarding house of the complainant because he could not get his sleep that night. He just
wanted to talk with the complainant. That he entered the boarding house of Maritess Marzo past 9:00
oclock that evening. That he does not know of any reason why the complainant filed the case against
him. Before November 5, 1990, he never visited Maritess Marzo because she used to go home in their
barangay except on November 5, 1990. That he did not have any misunderstanding between Maritess
Marzo and her parents before November 5, 1990 neither has he any misunderstanding before
November 5, 1990 with Mrs. Agsalud. That he left Quirino sometime on November 9, 1990 in order to
have a driving job in Tondo, Manila because his former employer Engr. Valido went abroad. That he
came to know for the first time that he was charged for rape when his wife went to Manila before
Christmas in 1990.[6]
In its decision dated May 10, 1993, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the guilt of the accused of the crime charged has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA plus
all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnity the complainant Maritess Marzo the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost. The detention of the accused shall be fully credited in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this appeal from the lower courts decision. Significantly, accused-appellant makes only
one assignment of error:
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST HIM AND IN AWARDING DAMAGES
AGAINST HIM.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to
the testimony of the complainant because it is tainted with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Drawing our attention to the medico-legal findings, he avers that the medical
certificate issued by the physician who conducted the physical examination negates complainants
claim of carnal knowledge as her hymen remains intact. He likewise bewails the fact that complainants
acts and deeds the day after the alleged rape was committed are simply incredulous, as no rape victim
could have easily recovered from the effects of such a traumatic experience.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Thus, at the outset, it may be noted that accused-appellant places at issue the credibility of
private complainant, upon whose testimony he was convicted. Once again, however, we have to stress
that the matter of assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses presented at the trial. The trial judge is thereby placed in a vantage position
to discriminate finely between what is true and what is false[8] in the versions given by the witnesses of
the opposing parties. Appellate courts will not disturb the findings on the credibility, or lack of it,
accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the trial court
had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily certain facts and circumstances of significance in the
case.[9] On this score, accused-appellants plea that it was error to rely on the testimony of the
complaining witness is less than persuasive.
The crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, hence it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. [10] As a result,
conviction may be based justifiably on the plausible testimony of the private complainant herself.
In the present case, we find the trial courts reliance on the testimony of the complainant based
on solid evidentiary grounds. She had no improper motive whatsoever, as admitted by accused-
appellant himself,[11] to impute such a very serious offense to him. It is accepted doctrine, that in the
absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused,
her testimony deserves credence.[12]
The spontaneity of complainants testimony could not be discredited by mere denials of accused-
appellant. For an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it
comes from the mouth of a credible witness.[13] Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability to merit credence. [14] Furthermore, in the light of the
complainants positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, the latters
defense of bare denial must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony overrides his negative
testimony.[15] Note that accused-appellants own version of a friendly visit he made to complainant in
her boarding house on November 5, 1990, puts him squarely at the place and time of the alleged
offense.
As pointed out by the lower court, complainant testified in a direct and straightforward
manner. She even demonstrated in court how she was raped by accused-appellant. Complainant cried
when she testified; her tears added poignancy to verity born out of human nature and
experience.[16] There was no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court considered the testimony of
complainant worthy of full faith and credit, thus:
"x x x Complainants detailed and straight forward narration and demonstration in court how she was
abused and raped bear the earmarks of truth. There is no showing that she was ill motivated in filing
the case against the accused.[17]
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
32
Moreover, it is simply inconceivable that complaining witness, a 17-year-old lass[18] from a
remote barrio in Rafael Palma, Diffun, Quirino, who was inexperienced with the ways of the world,
would fabricate a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter submit
herself to the indignity of a public trail or endure a lifetime of ridicule, if she had not, in fact, been a
victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished. As well said, when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed.
As borne out by the evidence, complainant was forced to submit to appellants bestial desires
through violence and intimidation.[19] When appellant pointed his bolo at complainants neck, while he
was removing her skirt and underwear, there was indeed force and intimidation directly against her
person. When he warned her not to shout unless she wanted to die, his evident intentions to harm her
could not be disputed. Even when appellant put down the bolo to remove his pants, the threat and
intimidation continued, since he could pick up the bolo anytime, to stab her. In any event, the
significant consideration is that, the violence and intimidation were continuous as to engender fear for
the safety of her life and limb.
Intimidation is said to be addressed to the mind of the victim. It is subjective and its presence
cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule, but must be viewed in the light of the victims perception
and judgment at the time of the crime.[20] It may be of the moral kind, such as the fear caused by
threatening a woman with a knife.[21] It is enough that it produces fear--fear that if the victim does not
yield to the bestial lust of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter,
as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident.[22] Intimidation would also explain
why sometimes there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off her
attacker.[23]
Based on the record with the testimony of the complainant in the light of experience and
common sense, we entertain no doubt that appellant employed such amount of intimidation and
violence sufficient to consummate rape. Appellant admittedly had been drinking and the influence of
alcohol on his conduct was undeniable. Moreover, according to the complainant, appellant is much
stronger than her. The physical superiority of appellant would show not only when his body violently
held down complainants but also when her mind was subdued by his intimidating words and weapon
at hand.
Moreover, though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet if by an array of physical forces, he so
overpowers her mind that she does not resist, or she ceases resistance through fear of greater harm,
the consummation of the sexual act is recognized in jurisprudence as rape. [24] Physical resistance need
not be established in rape, when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety.[25]
Undoubtedly, in the present case, complainant could not have safely resisted accused-appellants
unchaste urge as the latter poked the bolo he was holding first at her head, then at her neck. Threats,
intimidation, violence, fear and terror all combined to suppress the will to resist, kick, shout or struggle
against the rapist. Thus, despite her lack of strong resistance or failure to shout in order to attract the
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 33

attention of her boardmates, who were just sleeping a few meters away in another room, she could
not be considered as giving consent to his attackers bestial deed. Evidence shows that the appellant
had undressed the complainant and forcibly taken off her underwear while he was holding a bolo
aimed at her neck, before he took off his pants and had sex with her. The consummation of the offense
of rape could not be any clearer.
Moreover, settled is the rule that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as to be irresistible. It is only
necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused
had in mind.[26]
Appellant would want to capitalize on the fact that there was no full or deep penetration of
complainants vagina to negate the finding that rape had been committed. But penetration of a
womans sex organ is not an element of the crime of rape. Penile invasion of and contact with the labia
would suffice. Note that even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation, or
unconsciousness is already rape in our jurisdiction.[27] In order to sustain a conviction for rape,
penetration of the female genital organ by the male is not indispensable. Neither rupture nor
laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is required. Thus, the fact that the complainants hymen
is intact and there is no sign of laceration will not negate a finding that rape was committed. [28] In this
case, what counts is the fact of contact with and penetration of the sexual organ, no matter how
slight.[29] There was, therefore, on this point no error on the part of the trial court in concluding that
indeed rape has been committed.
Accused-appellant likewise contends that complainants acts and deeds after the assault was
unnatural and not in accord with the ordinary experience of mankind, for a rape victim usually suffers
trauma or even a nervous breakdown. But it has been repeatedly held by the Court, that different
people react differently to emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable.[30] As held in People v. Luzorata,[31] this Court indeed has not laid down any
rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has been abused.This experience is
relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending on the circumstances, but her
credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt.
Certain victims of rape might never be able to complain or file criminal charges against the
rapist. They might bear the ignominy and pain of the offense in private, rather than reveal their shame
to the world or risk the rapists making good the threat to kill or hurt the victims.[32] But the silence of
the victim of rape, or her failure to disclose her state without loss of time to persons close to her and
to report the matter promptly to the authorities, will not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was
not sexually molested or that her charges against the accused are baseless, untrue and
fabricated. Mere failure to report the incident immediately will not cast doubt on the credibility of the
charge. Even if delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation made and exercised by
the accused on the victim,[33] such failure in making a prompt report to the proper authorities does not
destroy the truth per se of the complaint.
Moreover, accused-appellant could not capitalize on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony
of the complainant, even if they do exist. Such minor inconsistencies tend to bolster, rather than
weaken, her credibility for they show that her testimony was not contrived nor rehearsed. Besides,
errorless testimony could not be expected when complainant is recounting details of a harrowing
experience. No matter how courageous she is, the act of filing a complaint and appearing in court
would exact a heavy psychological and social toll on the victim who is usually twice victimized: by the
rapist during the act of rape and by misguided elements of society which devalue the victims
worth. She would not be expected to possess total recall and complete composure on the witness
stand.
To conclude, we find the assigned error in this appeal utterly without basis. The conviction of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape is supported by the prosecutions
evidence which could not be overthrown by the accused-appellants self-serving denials. Consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence, we note that the award of moral damages is in order.[34] They are
awarded to victims of rape cases involving young girls between thirteen and nineteen years of age,
taking into account the immeasurable havoc wrought on their youthful feminine psyche.[35] Such award
is distinct from indemnity awarded to complainant for the injury that she suffers because of the
offense committed on her person. In this case, both indemnity and moral damages are justifiably called
for.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the court a quo imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the complainant indemnity in the amount of fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and moral damages also in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00). Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in
the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The
condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased
to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960
the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney
Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to
appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order
was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out,
the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend
to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the
criminal action.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
34
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this
criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REY GADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rey Gado seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch
276 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Muntinlupa City.
The Information dated July 14, 1992 charging accused-appellant and his co-accused Emma Gallos
with Murder pertinently alleged:
That on or about the 30th day of January, 1992, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
kill, with treachery, while armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab Melencio M. Manalang, Jr. in his abdomen as a result of which said victim sustained a
serious body injury which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in such amount as
may be proven at the trial.
(p. 1, Record.)
During trial, the prosecution adduced the inculpatory facts through Fernando Reyes, Melencio
Manalang, Sr. (the victim's father), and Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, then Acting Chief of the NBI Medico -
Legal Division, which may be summarized as follows:
On the evening of January 30, 1992, the victim and some of his friends were having a drinking
session at the house of Juanito Vicente. Shortly thereafter, the victim decided to leave and accused-
appellant Rey Gado and Juanito Vicente decided to bring him home. With them were a certain Emma
and her brother whose name the victim failed to mention. On their way, and while they were along
Fleur De Liz Street, the victim was held by his companions and he was stabbed in the abdomen by Rey
Gado. As the victim freed himself from his assailants, the latter fled. He immediately grabbed a stone
and hurled it at them.
While he was proceeding home, he was chanced upon by barangay tanod Fernando Reyes who
offered to help him home. At about 9 o'clock that evening, he reached their house. He immediately
slumped on the floor and asked his father to bring him to the hospital. Upon his father's query, the
victim identified Rey Gado as his assailant.
While aboard a jeep on their way to Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Pias, Metro Manila, the victim
once more related what happened to him, identifying the other companion of Rey Gado. He was given
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
35
medical attention at Perpetual Help Hospital but about four hours thereafter, at around 2 o'clock early
morning of January 31, 1992, he succumbed.
On September 15, 1992, an Information charging Rey Gado and Emma Gallos was filed in court.
An order for the arrest of the accused was accordingly issued on September 17, 1992, but the same
was left unserved. The trial court ordered the case to be archived on February 22, 1993. It was not
until May 30, 1994 when Rey Gado, one of the two accused, was served an alias writ of arrest by the
PNP Criminal Service Command of the Cavite Provincial Office while detained at Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna due to a charge of Robbery/ Hold Up before the Municipal Trial Court of Carmona
Cavite (p. 11, Record).
On November 21, 1994, both accused-appellant Rey Gado, and his co-accused Emma Gallos, who
voluntarily appeared in court upon notice, were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty. Emma
Gallos was then also ordered to be detained.
The two accused, on their part, sought refuge in their defense of alibi. Rey Gado claimed to
have been tending the store of his brother at Sucat, Cupang, Muntinlupa, about five kilometers away
from the place where the incident happened, while Emma Gallos averred that she was at home
tending to her sick daughter.
The trial court rendered judgment acquitting Emma Gallos. Rey Gado was, however, convicted of
the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer "the penalty of reclusion perpetua . . . and [to] indemnify
the heirs of his victim the sum of P50,00.00 and to pay P50,000.00 as reimbursement for the medical
and burial expenses . . ." Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS FERNANDO REYES.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING MELENCIO MANALANG'S TESTIMONY AS A DYING
DECLARATION.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT LENDING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ALIBI.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

After carefully going over accused-appellant's arguments as well as the evidentiary record, we
find his appeal wanting in merit.
On the issue of witness Fernando Reyes's retraction, the trial court, in its order denying the
motion for reconsideration of accused-appellant, explained thus:
After carefully evaluating the grounds relied upon in the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR
NEW TRIAL, this Court holds that the conviction of accused Rey Gado is not only based on the affidavit
of the eye witness which admittedly was recanted by the affiant, but also on the declaration of the
victim who told his father Melencio Manalang, Sr. that he was stabbed by accused; at a time when this
victim Melencio Manalang, Jr. felt he was weakening, and therefore conscious of an impending death
(p. 282, Record)
We find no further reason to entertain the argument of accused-appellant on this matter. We
shall instead look into whether or not sufficient evidence remains to sustain the conviction of accused-
appellant for the crime charged.
Accused-appellant vigorously takes exception to the trial court's admission of the testimony of
Melencio Manalang, Sr., who testified in regard to the statements and declarations of his son
concerning his assailants, claiming that the said declaration are not in the nature of a dying declaration
for the simple reason that they were not made under a clear consciousness of an impending death.
We are not persuaded.
Forthwith, we must stress that with regard to the credibility of Melencio Manalang, Sr. as
witness, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's finding. The settled and time-tested
jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy
the respect of appellate courts for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify (People vs. Cabiles, G.R. No. 112035, January 16, 1998; People
vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). In the absence of any
arbitrariness in the trial court's findings and evaluation of evidence which tends to show that it
overlooked certain material facts and circumstances, such findings and evaluation of evidence should
be respected on review (People vs. Dio, 226 SCRA 176 [1993]). The presiding judge of the trial court
had the opportunity to actually observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses on the witness
stand while being asked direct-examination questions by the prosecution, cross-examination questions
by the defense, as well as clarificatory questions by the trial judge himself. Between the trial judge and
this Court, the former is in a far better position to determine whether a witness is telling the truth or
not. From the records before us we find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment and to
discredit Melencio Manalang, Sr. as a witness.
The central issue to be resolved is whether the statements, uttered by the victim before he died
partake of the nature of a dying declaration or not.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
36
The Court finds in the affirmative.
Through the dying declarations of the victim as related by his father, Melencio Manalang, Sr.
before Atty. Pepito Tan at the National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region (Taft Avenue,
Manila), the identity of the killer was established in this case, to wit:
07. T: Maari bang isalaysay mo ang buong pangyayari ayon sa pagkakakuwento sa iyo ng biktima na
si MELECIO MANALANG, JR?
S: Ayon po sa aking anak, nag-inuman silang magbabarkada sa bahay ni JUANITO VICENTE at nang
siya ay malasing na inihatid siya ni REY GADO at JUANITO VICENTE na may kasamang isang
babae nagngangalang EMMA at isang lalaki na hindi ko alam ang pangalan na kapatid ni
EMMA. Noong nasa daan na sila ng Fleur de Luz St. sa ilalim ng puno ng aratiles ay doon na
raw siya sinaksak ni REY GADO sa may tiyan. Noong nakabitaw na si MELECIO MANALANG,
JR. ay nakadampot pa siya ng bato at pinukol ang grupo nina REY GADO na nakanya-kanya na
ng takbo. Noong pauwi na siya ay nasalubong daw niya si FERNANDO REYES, isang Barangay
Tanod na siyang naghatid sa kanya sa bahay. Pagdating sa bahay ay inihatid na namin siya sa
hospital ng Perpetual Help Medical Center, Las Pias, Metro Mla. na kung saan siya ay
nalagutan ng hininga ng bandang alas-dos ng madaling araw ng January 31, 1992.
(p.
1, Exhibit E)
The witness reiterated the material points of this sworn statement during his testimony before
the trial court. He also established the basis for the admissibility of the dying declaration, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, to wit:
COPY
Q You said that the victim when he arrived at your house he was holding his wounds?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Immediately when he arrived at your house, what did he do?
A He sat down, your honor.
Q He sat down, where?
A He sat down on the floor, your honor.
Q And, you talked at him?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And, he was just sitting on the floor, and was he was holding his wounds?
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 37

A Yes, your honor. Capitalizing on the fact that the victim was still able to stand and walk even after the first
declaration was made, accused-appellant contends that there could not have possibly been a belief of
Q And, did you see any blood coming from his wounds? a looming and impending death on the part of the victim.
A Yes, your honor. We cannot quite agree. From the established facts in the case at bar, the trial court correctly
Q Now, did you ask him how he felt? considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible. The declarant
was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right
A He told me to bring him to the hospital, your honor. after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was
becoming weaker by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds (People vs. Sarabia,
Q Did he tell you why he should be taken to the hospital? 127 SCRA 100 [1984] and the fact that the victim died shortly afterwards (People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA
A Because he is getting weak, your honor. 133 [1981]).

Q Now, did you ask him why he was getting weak? Even assuming that the victim's utterances were not made under a firm belief of an impending
death, the victim's statements may, at the very least, form part of the res gestae. For the admission of
A He told me that he was stabbed by Rey Gado, your honor. evidence as part of the res gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence, (b) the statements forming part thereof were made before the declarant had the
Q And, so he asked you to bring him to the hospital because he was getting weak?
opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending
A Yes, your honor. circumstances (People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316 ([1985]). We have ruled that while the statement of the
victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because it was not made under the consciousness of
Q He told you that he was only feeling weak. Did you tell him or did you ask him if he did impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil 601 [1926]), it may still be inadmissible as part of the res
something or if he wants to eat or anything? gestae if it was made immediately after the incident (People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or a few
hours thereafter (People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 [1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement in the
A I did not say anything, your honor.
case at hand was made immediately after the incident, before he could even have the opportunity to
Q Did he say, he did something? contrive or concoct a story.Of relevance, too, is the fact that on two occasions, first at their house, and
later while he was being brought to the hospital, he identified one and the same person as his
A No, your honor. assailant.
Q He just told you to bring him to hospital because he was getting weak? Where the elements of both a dying declaration and a statement as a part of the res gestae are
present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying declaration and at the same
A Yes, your honor.
time as part of the res gestae (People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859 [1983]).
Q Now, did you ask him where he was stabbed?
From a perusal of the decision of the trial court, one gets the impression that the supposed
A Yes, your honor, he said that he was stabbed in the stomach, your honor. eyewitness account was heavily relied upon. Thus, on motion for reconsideration, accused-appellant
pointed to the inevitable fact that because of retraction by the supposed eyewitness of the sworn
(pp. 17-20, tsn, April 10, statements executed by him before the investigating officer, full credence thereto may no longer be
1995) accorded. The trial court justified the conviction anyway, upon the strength of the dying declaration as
related by Melencio Manalang, Sr.
As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is inadmissible as evidence. In order that a dying
declaration may be admissible as evidence, four requisites must concur, namely: that the declaration The Court has re-assessed the evidence of the prosecution minus the supposed eyewitness
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; that at the time the account to determine whether it would be correct to convict accused-appellant of murder, and not
declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; that the simple homicide. This Court finds ample basis to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant for the
declarant is competent as a witness; and that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, killing of Melencio Manalang, Jr. qualified by treachery, as alleged in the Information.
murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim (People vs. Israel, 231 SCRA 155 [1994]; People
vs. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361 [1991]).

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 38

While the victim was being brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital at Las Pias, Metro Manila (pp. 8-9, Appellee's Brief.)
boarded on a jeep hired for the purpose, the victim related the following to his father.

FISCAL DE JOYA
Q What was your conversation, between you and your son?
A He told that he was stabbed by Rey Gado under the tree of alatires, ma'am.
Q And what else did your son tell you?
A He was able to free himself from the person who was holding him, he got a stone and he cast
stone to the person who stabbed him, ma'am.
Q You said that your son told you that one Rey Gado stabbed him?
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, both indivisible penalties. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellant to the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However,
we do not see how the award of actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of
the evidence tending to show that only the total amount of P23,217.65 was actually spent (see Exhibit
F-II, p. 9 Folder of Exhibits). It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages, unlike moral and
exemplary damages, cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. In del Mundo vs. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 3348 [1995] were stressed that:

A Yes, ma'am.
Q What else did your son tell you about the said stabbing incident?
A Besides the is being stabbed, he told me that this Rey Gado has companions in the name of
Emma Gallos, Juanito Vicente and a certain person who is a tall guy and one John Doe,
ma'am.
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he
has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We must emphasize that these damages
cannot be presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

(pp. 9-10 tsn, April 10, 1995) (p. 356)

It seems fairly established, therefor, that more than one person attacked the victim. While he
The award of actual and compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the
was being stabbed by accused-appellant, some of the companions of accused-appellant were holding
amount duly proved at the trial which is to P23,217.65.
the victim in a defenseless position. The manner in which the stabbing was done tended directly and
specially to ensure its execution, affording the victim no chance to put up any defense. The WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
constitutes alevosia. The killing, therefore, was qualified to murder. It is to be noted also that accused MODIFICATION as to actual damages as hereinabove indicated. No special pronouncement is made as
appellant and his companions were supposed to assist the victim home. However, instead of bringing to costs.
him safely home, accused-appellant and his companions ganged up on the victim, who had no inkling
of any impending attack, having placed himself in the safekeeping of persons who then turned vicious SO ORDERED
assailants.

The defense of alibi presents itself to be very weak vis--vis the evidence adduced by the G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996
prosecution pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, as correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General in the People's Brief, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he has been elsewhere when ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-appellant.
the crime was committed but he must further demonstrate that it would have been physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (People vs. Esquilona, DECISION
248 SCRA 139 [1995]).
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and
charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically
evil act,1 an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself.
The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn within
her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in the mystery of
life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a married woman. She
was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when tragedy struck. She was
sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.
She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.
Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has been
committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused should be
held for trial.3 Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest4 and fixed his bail bond at P17,000.00. 5 The
accused was arrested but was later released on bail. 6 Thereafter, the court increased the amount of
bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the accused.7 Unfortunately, by this time,
he was nowhere to be found.
On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is apprehended." 8 Almost a year after, or specifically
on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the Provincial
Fiscal for proper disposition. 9
On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information10 charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of rape
committed as follows:
That between the hours of 12:00 to 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of March 31, 1986 in
Barangay San Dionisio I, Municipality of Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, threat
and intimidation and with lewd design, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one CHERRY A. TAMAYO against the will of the latter.
That the aggravating circumstance of the accused having committed the crime in
uninhabited place attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
39
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 604 and assigned to Branch 32 of the said court.
A warrant of arrest was issued on 18 October 1987. Because it was returned unserved, an alias warrant
of arrest was issued on 1 February 1988, which was also returned unserved. The trial court then
ordered the archival of the case and the arrest of the accused. 11
It was only on 27 July 1993 when accused Rogelio Cristobal was arrested and detained at the provincial
jail. 12 On 21 October 1993, the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Manifestation for the revival of the
case,13 which the court favorably acted upon.14
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the offended party, Cherry Tamayo, and the physician who conducted a
medical examination on her, Dr. Mercedita S. Erni-Reta. The defense presented the accused Rogelio
Cristobal and his employer, Wilfredo Manzano, who is married to the accused's cousin, Emilia
Manzano. Being merely corroborative to the testimonies of the first two defense witnesses that at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime the accused was hired by the Manzano spouses to plow
their field,15 the testimony of Mrs. Emilia Manzano was admitted by the prosecution to expedite the
disposition of the case.16
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of 31 March 1986, Cherry Tamayo, a resident of Barangay San Dionisio I, Maddela,
Quirino, went to the nearby Bilala Creek to wash her family's clothes. She was alone. At around
midday, between the hours of 12:00 and 1:00 and after accomplishing her task, she decided to take a
bath in the creek. She was about to start when somebody held her neck from behind and thereafter
forcibly laid her down the ground. Only then did she recognize her attacker, the accused Rogelio
Cristobal. Cherry managed to stand up and run away, but Rogelio caught up with her and delivered two
fistblows to her stomach. Not content with this, Rogelio, while viciously holding her hair, pressed down
Cherry's face into the water. Rogelio then took her three meters away from the creek and forcibly laid
her down on the ground. Because of her weakened and pregnant state, Cherry could not struggle any
further. Rogelio removed her clothes and panties. He then went on top of her, inserted his private
organ into hers, and succeeded in satisfying his lust on her.17 Afterwhich, he slapped and threatened
Cherry with death if she would talk.18
The threat went unheeded as Cherry, upon reaching her home, immediately told her husband of what
had happened to her. Her husband accompanied her to the police station of Maddela, Quirino, to
report the incident and then to Dr. Mercedita Erni-Reta for medical examination.19
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

Dr. Erni-Reta found that Cherry's vaginal canal had a laceration at the erythematous border at 2:00 and
chemoses at 3:00 at the vaginal os.20 On the witness stand, Dr. Erni-Reta confirmed these
findings.21 She added that, upon internal examination, she found seminal fluid in the vaginal canal
which must have been there for no longer than twenty-four hours.22
The defense, on the other hand, established the following to refute the version of the prosecution:
On 31 March 1986, Rogelio Cristobal was plowing the land of the spouses Wilfredo and Emilia
Manzano located in Salay, San Agustin, Isabela. He started plowing at 7:00 a.m. and went with
Wilfredo to the latter's home for lunch at around 11:00 a.m.. Emilia was with them for lunch. The three
of them talked until 2:00 p.m.. He went home thereafter, attended to his children, and then brought
out his carabao to graze in Talaytay, Dagubog Grande, which is about 200 meters away from his
house.23 Then he went to the house of Melchor Cristobal. While he was at Melchor's house, a
policeman by the name of Jimmy Benedicto arrested him for the crime of rape and brought him to
Councilor Benjamin Dumlao. He was subsequently taken to the 166th PC Detachment in San Dionisio,
Maddela, Quirino, where he was interrogated and where he spent the night. In the morning, he was
brought to the municipal court to face the charges filed against him.24
In its decision25 dated 28 March 1994, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the complainant, Cherry Tamayo, in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trial court found clear and convincing the categorical testimony of Cherry Tamayo of having been
accosted from behind, knocked to the ground, boxed, submerged in water, taken three meters from
the creek, and raped.26 In view of her positive identification of the accused, it disregarded the defense
of alibi set up by the latter, which it found to be a weak one. It ruled that for the defense of alibi to
prosper the accused must show physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. The accused was within three kilometers only from Bilala Creek where the rape was
committed. Such distance is near enough to cover by walking in a matter of thirty minutes.27 It was not,
therefore, physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.
In this appeal, the accused contends that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him on the basis of the
private complainant's inconsistent testimony, and (2) not giving due weight to his defense of alibi.28
The Appellee disagrees with him and prays that the assailed decision be affirmed with modification of
the award for moral damages, which should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.29
Central to the accused's assigned errors is the issue of the credibility of the complainant. It has long
been settled that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
40
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.30 It has been aptly said:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation Of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on
the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and
prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record
will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record
will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if
tears were shed in anger, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge
trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed
and reasoned verdict.31
This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily, when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could affect the result of the case. 32 None of these exceptions exists in this case.
It is also settled that when a woman Says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.33
Moreover, the accused was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the complainant. In fact, in his
answer to the court's questions, he categorically stated that there was no grudge between him and the
complainant.34 Where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous
crime, the said testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 35
Additionally, no married woman in her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to public
scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being
alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo then resolved to face the ordeal and
relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so simply to obtain
justice.
To cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the testimony
of the complainant. He points out that at first, the complainant said that her panties were removed by
the accused while she was already lying down, but later she said that it was before she was laid down
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 41

on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The accused failed to elevate this BANTULO alias DOMING, Present:
inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of credibility. Being too
trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant's credibility rests. In EDUARDO PADAYAG alias
fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming. 36
EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG
As to the second assigned error, the accused submits that although as a general rule alibi is a weak
alias OYONG, and RODOLFO
defense, it gained strength in this case in the light of the aforementioned inconsistency in the
complainant's testimony. We are not persuaded. Since, as discussed above, such inconsistency does PADAYAG alias JUAN, PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
not pierce the complainant's credibility, the, second assigned error has therefore no leg to stand on.
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to prosper,
it must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
the time of its commission.37 The accused's testimony placing himself somewhere else was SR., and
corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to establish physical
impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the crime was - versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.
PEDRO LAWA, JENNIFER MOSO,
For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption, LINO MENDI, MAMER BAGON,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition then
of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for JOEL BAGON, LEA TACULOD,
correction for the public good38 is warranted. 39 We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.
LILIA BAGON, GLORIA ANDA,
Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be
increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00. ALICIA GILON, EDDIE BAGON,

PEDRO BAGON, ROMEO JARMIN,

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the decision of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cabarroguis, Quirino, in Criminal Case No. 604 convicting the accused ROGELIO CRISTOBAL of the and THE COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated:
crime of rape is AFFIRMED, subject to the foregoing modifications. As modified, the award of moral
damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, and the accused is further ordered to pay (Third Division),
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
Respondents. October 11, 2006
Costs against the accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
EDUARDO LEYSON, G.R. No. 150756

EDUARDO BANTULO alias CALLEJO, SR., J.:

BOY, DOMINADOR

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 42

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of 8. Lilia Bagon - 25,000.00
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos
City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 12205, except as to the penalty imposed on petitioners Eduardo 9. Gloria P. Anda - 7,000.00
Leyson, Sr., Eduardo Bantulo, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag, Eddie Padayag and Rodolfo
Padayag. 10. Alicia B. Gilon - 98,735.00

The Antecedents 11. Eddie Bagon - 27,140.00

On February 28, 1997, an Information charging petitioners with arson was filed before the 12. Pedro Bagon - 28,710.00
RTC of General Santos City:
13. Romeo Jarmin - 25,000.00

That on or about 10:00 oclock in the morning of September 7, 1996 at Nopol,

Conel, General Santos City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable with the total value of P468,490.00, more or less, and to their damage and
Court, the above-named accused Eduardo Leyson, as ranch owner, and the accused prejudice in such amount.
Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo alias Doming, Bernardo Bantulo alias Boy, Eduardo
Padayag alias Edring, Eddie Padayag alias Oyong and Rodolfo Padayag alias Juan,
who are the cowboys or farm-hands of accused Eduardo Leyson, conspiring,
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
confederating and mutually helping one another with malice aforethought, with
intent to destroy and cause damage and in order to drive away the different
complainants from the area of the ranch of Eduardo Leyson which they have been
cultivating for years, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire
on the thirteen (13) houses one after the other of the complainants causing
damage representing the value of the houses and their personal belongings which Petitioners, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September 25, 1997 and entered their
were reduced to ashes with their corresponding value as follows: respective pleas of not guilty.

1. Pedro Lawa - P67,795.00 The Case for the Prosecution

2. Jennifer Moso - 7,000.00 Sometime in October 1993, Eduardo Leyson allowed some members of the Blaan Tribe to till
portions of his 29-hectare landholding in Nopol, Conel, General Santos City which he called Nopol Hills
3. Lino Mendi - 37,500.00 Ranch. The following members of the Blaan Tribe were allowed to build their houses and till portions
of the land, provided that they would deliver to Leyson 50% of their produce: Romeo Jarmin, Judith
4. Mamer Bagon - 85,950.00
Jarmin, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Teresita Bagon, Lilia Bagon, Eddie Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Pedro Lawa,
Jennifer Moso, Lino Mendi, Leah Taculod, Gloria P. Anda, Alicia B. Gilon, and Bonifacio Batata.
5. Joel Bagon - 8,500.00
Romeo Jarmin built his house on the ranch sometime in December 1993. The roof was made
6. Teresita Bagon - 19,000.00
of cogon, the walls of split bamboo, and the side of a coconut tree was used for flooring. The portion of
7. Lea Taculod - 31,160.00 the ranch where he planted corn and palay was about 3 hectares. [3] Mamer Bagon, his brother-in-law,
lived about 50 meters away from him, also in a house made of wood.[4] Mamer Bagon planted palay,

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 43

coconut trees and other agricultural plants and gave 50% of his produce to Leyson. [5] Joel, Teresita,
Lilia, Eddie, Pedro, all surnamed Bagon, also built their respective huts in the ranch. Pedro Lawa, who
also built a house on the landholding, also delivered to Leyson his share of the produce from his c. Lino Mendi, for his house,
agricultural crops as agreed upon.
corn plants, and lost personal
However, on July 20, 1996, Leyson called all the farmers to a meeting and told them to
vacate his ranch. The farmers refused to leave the premises.[6] properties 37,500.00

At about 4:00 p.m. on September 1, 1996, Leyson and his son Winkie, together with his d. Mamer Bagon, for his house,
employees Ramon Soy, Dominador Bantulo, Juan Padayag and Eduardo Padayag and some policemen,
arrived in the ranch. They were armed, and Leyson himself had a long firearm. [7] They fired their guns 8 chickens, shoes, pants,
at the farmers in an effort to drive them away from the land. Although no one was hurt, the farmers
were petrified. They fled from the ranch and sought sanctuary at the barangay hall. The next day, 2 sacks rice, 2 sacks corn 85,000.00
Romeo Jarmin, Mamer Bagon, Bonifacio Batata and the other farmers returned to their houses to
e. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00
retrieve their farm animals.[8] Leyson and his men threatened to inflict bodily harm on them unless
they left the ranch. The farmers reported the incident to Barangay Captain Manuel Abadimas and to
f. Teresita Bagon, for her house 19,000.00
Benjamin Sumog-Oy, the Executive Assistant for Community Affairs of the City Mayor of General
Santos City.[9] g. Lea Taculod, for her house,

1/2 sack rice, a plow, and

At about 10:00 a.m. on September 7, 1996, Romeo Jarmin returned to his house in the ranch a guitar 31,000.00
with Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio Batata. Bonifacio Batata wanted to get his share of the agricultural
crops from Alicia Gilon.[10] Jarmin proceeded to the house of his brother-in-law, Mamer Bagon, and h. Delia Bagon, for her house
saw Leyson with his employees Rodolfo Padayag, Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo
Padayag, Eddie Padayag and Ramon Soy.[11] Two of the men were armed with M-16 carbine rifles, & personal belongings 30,000.00
another with an M-16 rifle, and yet another with an armalite. [12] When they saw the armed men,
Jarmin and Batata hid in a canal near the cogon area. The armed men fired their guns in the air. One of i. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00
them set fire on the houses of Mamer Bagon, Pedro Bagon, Alicia Gilon, Joel Bagon, Romeo Jarmin,
Pedro Lawa. The houses of the other farmers were also set aflame. He, along with Mamer Bagon and j. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,
Bonifacio Batata, watched as the houses burned down to mere rubble. The value of the structures and
personal belongings that were lost in the fire, as well as their respective owners, are as follows: corn planted in l/2 hectares

of land, 35 punos of banana

a. Pablo Lawa, for his house plants, 10 head chickens, and

& the items inside P67,000.00 carpentry tools 98,000.00

b. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00 k. Eddie Bagon, for his house &

other belongings 27,000.00

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


l. Pedro Bagon, for his house and
Other lost properties 28,700.00
m. Romeo Jarmin, for his house 25,000.00[13]
The farmers reported the matter to Sumog-Oy who then invited members of the media,
police and barangay personnel to the ranch on September 10, 1996. Leyson and the six employees
responsible for the burning of the farmers houses were pointed out to Sumog-Oy.[14] He examined the
debris and what remained of the farmers razed houses. Pictures of the site were also taken. [15] Sumog-
Oy also saw cattle owned by Leyson feasting on the crops of the farmers nearby. [16] When Sumog-Oy
asked Leyson what the latter planned to do about the incident, the latter replied that he wanted to be
furnished the list of the crops which had been eaten by his cattle, including the damages sustained by
the farmers and the amount thereof. He averred, however, that the cost of the wood used in
constructing the huts should not be included because the farmers had taken the same from his
ranch.[17] Leyson stated that he would pay for the damages sustained by the farmers.
The Case for the Accused
Petitioners denied having burned the huts of the complainants and interposed the defense of
alibi.
Leyson testified that his co-accused Dominador Bantulo, Eduardo Bantulo, Eduardo Padayag,
Jun Padayag and Eddie Padayag, were employees in his eight-hectare farm located at Lower Nopol,
Purok 7, Barangay Mabuhay, General Santos City.[18] Ramon Soy, however, was not his employee.
Leyson claimed that this property is different from his ranch. He had a contract with Pioneer Seeds
Production for the use of his property for the production of corn seeds. [19]
He narrated that during the period of September 1 to 11, 1996, he was supervising his men in
the harvesting and loading of corn in his farm which was about 6 kilometers from his ranch, one to two
hours away by horse ride.[20] They did not go to his ranch on September 1 to 7, 1996.[21] He admitted
that he allowed Pedro Lawa, Judith Jarmin, who was the wife of Romeo Jarmin, Leah Taculod, Romeo
Mozo, Eddie Bagon, Mamer Bagon, Joel Bagon, Lilia Bagon and her two sons, to farm portions of his
ranch and to construct their huts thereon.[22] He asked them to leave the place after two years, but
they refused to go, and even filed a complaint against him before the barangay captain, who endorsed
it to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. [23] Sometime in August 1996, he went to
his ranch to repair the perimeter fence and saw 47 heavily armed men who appeared to be
professional squatters and MILF elements.[24]
Dominador Bantulo testified that he and Bernardo Bantulo were brothers, employed by
Leyson as laborers in the farm. Rodolfo and Eduardo Padayag were also Leysons laborers. All of them
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
44
resided in Leysons house in Lower Nopol, Purok 7. Romeo Jarmin was also employed as Leysons
cowboy.[25] Dominador denied any involvement in the burning of the farmers houses. He claimed that
he and his co-accused were harvesting corn in Leysons farm in Lower Nopol from September 1 to 11,
1996. Leyson and his son later asked him to operate the trailer-tractor, while the others loaded the
corn.[26] They did not leave the place because they were prohibited from visiting their families. They
had to watch the seeds.[27]
The other accused likewise denied the charge. They insisted that they were in the farm of
Eduardo Leyson harvesting and loading corn from September 1 to 11, 1996.
Renilo Punay, a laborer of Pioneer Seeds Production, corroborated the testimony of the
accused. He narrated that he was the roving guard of the company and stayed with the men as they
harvested and loaded corn for Pioneer Seeds Production from September 1 to 11, 1996. His tour of
duty was from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the following day.[28] There were times that the accused left the
farm, but only one at a time to get food.[29] He further testified that at 4:30 p.m. on September 1, 1996,
the accused were in Leysons farm, which was about 5 to 6 kms away from the ranch. [30] They were also
in the farm on September 7, 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
On August 10, 1997, the court rendered judgment convicting all the accused of arson, except
Leyson who was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, all the accused were ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, the damages sustained by the private complainants. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused
DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO BANTULO alias BOY, EDUARDO
PADAYAG alias EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG, RODOLFO PADAYAG alias
JUAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ARSON, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, each of them is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two years four months and one day as minimum, to eight
years, as maximum. All of them, including Eduardo Leyson, are severally liable for
the actual damages of private complainants.
Accused EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. is hereby ACQUITTED. However, he is
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally with the other accused the following
amounts to the private complainants:
1. Pablo Lawa, for his house
& the items inside P62,000.00
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 45

2. Jennifer Moso, for her house 7,000.00 12. Pedro Bagon, for his house and

3. Lino Mendi, for his house, other lost properties 23,700.00

corn plants, and lost personal 13. Romeo Jarmin, for his house 20,000.00

properties 32,500.00 The accused found guilty should suffer all the accessory penalties
provided for by law. Also, they are ordered to pay the cost of suit.
4. Mamer Bagon, for his house,
SO ORDERED.[31]
8 chickens, shoes, pants,
The accused appealed the decision to the CA, alleging that
2 sacks rice, 2 sacks corn 80,000.00
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF
5. Joel Bagon, for his house 8,500.00 THE PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.
6. Teresita Bagon, for her house 14,000.00
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO
7. Lea Taculod, for her house, BANTULO ALIAS BOY, DOMINADOR BANTULO ALIAS DOMING, EDUARDO PADAYAG
ALIAS EDRING, EDDIE PADAYAG ALIAS OYONG, AND RODOLFO PADAYAG ALIAS
1/2 sack rice, a plow, and JUAN DESPITE REASONABLE DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO
ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE HOUSES.[32]
a guitar 26,000.00
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to
8. Delia Bagon, for her house the sentence of the appellants. The fallo of the decision reads:
& personal belongings 25,000.00 WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification
that accused DOMINADOR BANTULO, EDUARDO BANTULO, EDUARDO PADAYAG,
9. Gloria P. Anda, for her small hut 7,000.00
EDDIE PADAYAG and RODOLFO PADAYAG are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the appealed decision
10. Alicia B. Gilon, for her house,
is AFFIRMED.[33]
corn planted in l/2 hectares
According to the appellate court, the testimony of Batata and Jarmin, corroborated by Lino
of land, 35 punos of banana Mendi, were credible and entitled to full probative weight. It took into account Leysons admission that
he would pay for the damages sustained by the private complainants. The appellate court rejected as
plants, 10 chickens, and barren of factual basis the appellants defenses of denial and alibi.

carpentry tools 93,000.00 Leyson and his men filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied;
hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, where petitioners submit the following
11. Eddie Bagon, for his house & contentions:

other belongings 22,000.00 BOTH COURTS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE
PERSONS WHO BURNED THE HOUSES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE CLEARLY

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


ESTABLISHED. THIS FINDING IS PURE SPECULATION, SURMISE AND CONJECTURE,
BEING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD IN THIS CASE.
xxx
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED EDUARDO BANTULO alias
BOY DOMINADOR BANTULO alias DOMING, EDUARDO PADAYAG alias EDRING,
EDDIE PADAYAG alias OYONG and RODOLFO PADAYAG alias JUAN, DESPITE
DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITIES OF THE PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY BURNED THE
HOUSES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.THIS FINDING IS A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS.
xxx
BOTH COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING EDUARDO LEYSON, SR. CIVILLY LIABLE
TOGETHER WITH THE CONVICTED ACCUSED, THUS, THE TRIAL COURT AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS WRONGLY APPLIED THE LAW ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF AN
ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE.[34]
The issues to be resolved in the present case are: (1) whether the prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of petitioner, except petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) whether petitioner Leyson is civilly liable for alleged damages to the
private complainants.
Petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
arson. The testimonies of respondent Romeo Jarmin and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with the
affidavits given to the police investigators. While Jarmin pointed to and identified petitioner Eduardo
Leyson during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit, [35] Jarmin failed to
mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men were cowboys. Petitioners further point
out that Jarmin had admitted that he returned to the farm only on September 2, 1996; hence, it was
impossible for him to have seen the burning of the houses on September 11, 1996.
Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified that even before the burning of the houses on
September 7, 1996 he already knew petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the
perpetrators in the affidavit which he gave to the police investigators. [36] In fact, Batata, in his affidavit,
never identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin could not have
seen the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the culprits, considering that the surface of
the canal where they claim to have hidden was covered by three feet cogon grass, and Jarmin and
Batata were only 5 feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared that he saw petitioners burn the
houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and declared that he saw only one of
them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he did not see the face of the arsonist. And
contrary to the ruling of the CA, Lino Mendi did not see the burning of the houses.
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
46
Petitioners conclude that conformably with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the
testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have no probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the ruling of the CA is buttressed
by the testimonial and documentary evidence on record. The alleged inconsistencies between the
testimonies of Jarmin and Batata and their respective affidavits pertain to minor and peripheral
matters, and did not necessarily discredit them. The OSG asserts that Leyson, having been acquitted
merely on reasonable doubt, is nevertheless civilly liable to private respondents. It points out that he
even obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by private respondents.
We agree with the rulings of the RTC and the CA that petitioners conspired to burn the
houses of private respondents on September 7, 1996.
Well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA on appeal, are
accorded with high respect, if not conclusive effect by this Court. The assessment by the trial court of
the credibility of the
witnesses and its calibration of the probative weight thereof are even conclusive on this Court, absent
clear evidence that facts and circumstances of substance which if considered would alter or reverse
the outcome of the case were ignored, misinterpreted or misconstrued. [37]
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated
parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a
conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything
stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one question
may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to other question. The principle falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.[38] The doctrine deals only with the weight of
evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal
application.[39] The testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to
others:
Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not
give credit to Edwin and Linas testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it
should, pursuant to the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, likewise disregard
their testimonies as against the appellant and accordingly acquit him. In People vs.
Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but
rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In People vs.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 47

Pacada, we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts
and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs. Osias, we ruled that:
Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or peripheral matters
It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a and not to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused from the crime charged or
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with the elements of such crime are not grounds for the acquittal of the accused.
respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even
when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some
material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions It is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin[43] in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner
thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. Leyson for the burning of the houses. In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson conspired
with his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents because they refused to vacate the
ranch.[44] Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his co-petitioners, was present when the houses were
burned on September 7, 1996, as he was even armed with a long firearm. Petitioner Leyson even
The primordial consideration is that the witness was assured Sumog-oy later that he would pay for the damages sustained by private respondents. The
present at the scene of the crime and that he positively testimony of Sumog-Oy on the matter reads:
identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged x x x.

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary: Q And you talked to Mister Leyson?

It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself A Yes, sir, and in fact I asked him what things he will do considering that his cattle
worthless first, in point of validity, because in one form it were feasting on the crops of the Blaans and he told me that all these
merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one things will be listed and he will pay for them.[45]
needs to be told, and in the others, it is absolutely false as a
maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it
merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what
they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous
form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because
there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and Sumog-oy reiterated his testimony on cross examination:
secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel
a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly
unimportant in themselves.[40]

Q Because you of course asked Mister Leyson if he could assist those people?

A No sir, I just asked him what is he planning to do that his cattle were feasting on
the crops of the Blaans.
The general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in
contrast with what he stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him. Affidavits given to police
and barangay officers are made ex parte and often incomplete or incorrect for lack or absence of
sufficient inquiries by the investigating officer.[41] It is of judicial knowledge that sworn statements are Q And so you asked particularly on the crops that as you said were feasted by his
almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in cattle?
open court.[42]

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


A Yes sir including the houses and he said to list all the things that were damaged
and then including the crops amount and he also mentioned about the
houses and in fact he told me that they should not charge the cost of the
woods because the woods used for the construction of the houses were
just cut from his ranch, he said.
Q And that was the response of Mister Leyson when you asked him if he could
assist these people?
A I did not particularly ask him to assist, it was his own suggestion.
Q So he suggested that he would assist these people?
A Because I told him, what are you going to do now that the houses of these
people were destroyed and your cattle were feasting on the crops and he
told me that just tell them to list the things that were destroyed including
the amount and I will pay them.
Q Pay them as his assistance to these people?
A He just plainly said, I will pay.
Q In other words, his offer to pay was in response to your questioning him what he
would do to the destroyed houses and on the damaged crops, correct?
A That is the logical interpretation sir.
Q That is the correct interpretation?
A Probably the logical interpretation.[46]
On redirect examination, Jarmin declared that, in his affidavit he wanted to charge not only petitioner
Leysons employees but also the cowboys as well:
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
48
Q Mister Witness, do you understand the words or how do you understand the
words to file a complaint against the cowboys of Mr. Eduardo Leyson, as
far as against whom you are filing?
A All of them, Mister Leyson and his cowboys.[47]
Apparently, Jarmin did not know whether petitioners were farmhands or cowboys of petitioner
Leyson. But whether petitioners were the farmhands or cowboys of petitioner Leyson is of little
significance. The fact of the matter is that petitioner Leyson employed his co-petitioners, who were
given long firearms when they drove away the private respondents from the farm on September 1 to 2,
1996; and on September 7, 1996, they fired shots and burned private respondents houses.
Petitioner Leyson ordered his men to intimidate the private respondents with bodily harm if they did
not leave the ranch. Indeed, as testified by Jarmin, petitioner Leyson was with his co-petitioners on
September 7, 1996 when private respondents houses were burned:
Q Where are your houses now?
A Our houses were burned on September 7, 1996.
Q How many houses were burned on September 7, 1996?
A 13 houses were burned down.
Q Around what time were the houses burned?
A 10 oclock in the morning.
Q Who were those persons who burned the houses Mister Jarmin?
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 49

A Their companions were Ramon Soy, Doming Bantolo, Juan Padayag, Boy, Ebring A I returned there to get some vegetables and to get my carabao.
Padayag together with Mister Eduardo Leyson.

Q So that was the only time you returned?

Q Are they in court today Mister Jarmin?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A There are only four here in court now.

Q On September 2, 1996?

A The last time to go there was on September 7.

Q Will you please point at them.

A That is one (witness pointing to a person wearing a striped t-shirt who answered COURT
by the name of Rodolfo Padayag). That person Doming Bantolo (who
answered by the name of Dominador Bantolo) and that person (who Proceed.
answered by the name of Fernando Bantolo) and Mister Eduardo Leyson
(pointing to a person wearing red t-shirt who answered by the name of
Eduardo Leyson).
ATTY. MELLIZA:

Q And what was the reason why you returned there on September 2, 1996?
Q Will you tell us how they burned your houses?
A To get my carabao and to harvest some vegetables.
A They set on fire on the cogo[n] roofing with a match.[48]

Q As a matter of fact, you were not able to enter the area?

We agree with petitioners contention that during his direct examination on June 24, 1998, Jarmin
testified that after they were driven off with gun fire from their houses on September 2, 1996, they A I actually went inside the area because my carabao was inside the area.
were never able to return to their farmhouses until today. However, when queried by the trial court if
he returned to the farm after September 2, 1996, Jarmin declared that he came back on September 2
and on September 7, 1996:
Q And you were able to get your carabao?

A Yes, sir.
COURT:

Q Did you not return on September 2?

Q Who were your companions in returning to that place on September 2, 1996?

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 50

A Mamer Bagon and Bonifacio Batata. Thus, Batata testified that petitioners, who were in the company of petitioner Leyson, burned private
respondents houses. From the canal where he and Jarmin hid, they saw one of them burn the houses
after firing their guns:

Q And were they able to get their work animals?

A This Bonifacio Batata has no animal of his own there because he just went there Q Did you see the persons who fired their guns?
to harvest palay.
A Yes, sir.

Q What is the complete name of Batata?

Q Will you still be able to recognize them if you see them again?
A Bonifacio Batata.[49]
A I only knew them through their faces but not their names.
Evidently, when Jarmin was asked whether he returned to the farm after September 2, 1996
he understood the question to refer to him and to the other private respondents. Indeed, the only
persons who returned to the farm on September 7, 1996, were Jarmin himself, Mamer Bagon and
Batata. The other private respondents no longer returned to their farmhouses. Q Are they in court today?

We agree with petitioners contention that Lino Mendi did not witness the burning of his A Yes, sir, they are here.
house and the houses of the other private respondents on September 7, 1996 and that he learned of
the burning and all the perpetrators thereof only from Batata and Jarmin. [50] However, the thrust of
Mendis testimony was only for the purpose of proving the actual damages he sustained, consisting of
the value of his house and his other personal belongings which were burned. Likewise of minimal Q Please point at them.
significance is the seeming discrepancy between the testimony of Jarmin, that petitioners burned the
houses of private respondents, and the testimony of Batata, that only one of petitioners whose face he A These persons (pointing to all the persons seated at the accused bench).
did not actually see burned the houses.

Q So what did you do Mister Witness when you heard the persons firing their
Considering the entirety of the testimonies of Batata and Jarmin, they declared that all the petitioners guns?
were responsible for the burning because of their collective acts, including those that transpired on
A We jumped towards the canal near the cogonal place and hid ourselves.
September 1 and 2, 1996. By their collective acts, petitioners (except petitioner Leyson) conspired to
burn the houses of private respondents. It is elementary that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and a conspirator may be held as a principal even if he did not
participate in the actual commission of every act constituting the offense.In conspiracy, all those who in Q And then what happened thereafter?
one way or another helped and cooperated in the consummation of the crime are considered co-
principals since the degree or character of the individual participation of each conspirator in the A After firing their guns, they set the houses on fire.
commission of the crime becomes immaterial. Thus, liability exists notwithstanding appellants non-
participation in every detail in the execution of the crime.[51]

Q Whose house Mister Witness?

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 51

A The first house was the house of Mamer Bagon. Q Can you estimate how many houses were burned?

A About 14 houses.

Q And then?

A They again went upwards and set fire the house of Pedro Bagon and Alicia Gilon, Q Do you know the owners of the houses Mister Witness?
as well the house of Eddie Bagon.
A Mamer, Eddie, Pedro, Alicia, Romeo Jarmin, the house of Ronnie, Lawa while the
others I do not know the owners names but which were also burned.

Q Did you see the persons who set the fire on the houses?

A The same persons who burned the house of Mamer. Q Do you still remember at what time were the houses burned by the accused?

A About 10 oclock in the morning.[52]

Q Are they in court today?

A Yes, sir. xxxx

Q Will you please point to them. ATTY. MELLIZA:

A The same persons seated in the accused bench. Q You said the persons whom you saw set fire on the houses. Do you mean that all
those persons whom you saw actually set fire on the houses?

A Yes, sir, although only one person set fire on the houses.

Q And after witnessing the persons setting fire on the houses of the complaining Q Who was that person when you said only one person set fire on the houses, who
witnesses in this case, what happened next? was that person?

A They proceeded going towards the upper direction. A I did not see him when he set fire on the houses because his back was towards
me.

Q How many houses were burned?

Q So it is now clear Mister Batata that the person whom you actually saw setting
A From the house starting down going upward were burned. fire on the houses could not be one of the persons now sitting on the
accused bench?

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 52

A No, sir, because his back was towards me.

Q How many garand rifles did you see at that time?

Q But you are very much certain that only one of the six (6) armed men set fire on A If I am not wrong, two of them were carrying a garand.
the houses?

A Yes, sir.
Q And how many of them did you see carrying M-16 rifles?

A One.
Q What weapons if you could remember were used by the six (6) armed men who
fired the gunshots?

A Garand, carbine and M-16 armalite. Q So what else were the weapons you saw at that time?

A Carbine.

Q So you are very sure of that, that it is or the only weapons used?

A Yes, sir. Q How many carbine rifles did you see?

A Two.

Q What weapon was being held by that person who was setting fire on the houses?

A Garand. Q So one armalite, two garands and two carbines, is that what you mean?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q You have generally pointed to all the persons sitting now on the accused
bench. What weapon was being held by this man? Q Five?

A M-16 armalite. A Yes, Your Honor.[53]

Q What [w]as he doing with the M-16 armalite? xxxx

A While he was setting fire on the houses, the other accused were standing by as if
they are guarding.

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 53

Q Mister Batata, you said you were in Nopol Hills on September 7, 1996 when you ATTY. MELLIZA:
witnessed the burning by the accused in this case and you pointed to
these persons in the accused bench. Why, please tell us, did you point at May we request Your Honor that the statement I know him because he is an ex-
these persons in the accused bench? kagawad be included.

A Because they are the ones whom I saw setting fire on the houses and fire their
guns.
ATTY. GACAL:

Q About the second person in the person of Eduardo Padayag?

Q You saw them on September 7, 1996?
A I also saw him.
A Yes, sir.

Q And the third person by the name of Dominador Bantolo, you saw him also?
Q You see the first person?
A Yes, sir.

COURT:
Q What about the fourth person Bernardo Bantolo, you saw him?
Q At a distance of 40 meters?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, Your Honor, but only through their faces but not their names.

Q What about the fifth person Padayao?

COURT:
A Yes, sir, I saw him.[54]
Continue.

ATTY. GACAL:
It bears stressing that Batata saw petitioners before the latter burned the houses, when they
Q Did you see the first person and I am pointing to Mister Leyson? fired their guns to scare off anybody who could be in the houses:

A Yes and I know him.

COURT:

Q So actually you were only going there from time to time to harvest palay or corn
in the farm of your friends?

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 54

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Because you have no farm there of your own? While it is true that Jarmin and Batata fled, jumped into a canal and hid there while
petitioners burned private respondents houses, the foliage or the surface of the canal did not obstruct
A No, Your Honor. their view. Batata is five feet and four inches tall, and the canal was only three feet deep:

Q So during the gun firing or the burning you were only looking at these persons? ATTY. GACAL:

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Mister Batata, you mentioned that while you were in the canal or where cogon
grasses on the surface of the canal, will you tell us how tall are the cogon
grasses?

Q For how many minutes did you look at them? A The height of the cogon is that when you will stand up, your head will be
exposed.
A I can not estimate Your Honor.

COURT:
Q For a long time or a short time.
So that must be about two (2) feet tall from the ground?
A For quite a time.
A About this tall (demonstrating a height of about 2 to 3 feet).

Q About one hour?

Q How tall are you?
A No, Your Honor.
A 54.

Q About half an hour?

Q How tall is the canal?
A About 10 minutes only.[55]
A Up to my breast (about 3 feet deep).

COURT:

3 feet cogon above the canal about 6 feet.[56]

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


Jarmins view was likewise not obstructed by the cogon grass:
Q Were the cogons then thick Mister Witness?
A Not so thick.
Q Were there obstructions from your vision to the 40 meters distance where you
said you saw the accused?
A None, if you will look down, you can see the place.
Q Were you on a high plain or lower plain?
A We are on the higher plain.
Q So the cogon grass were never an obstruction to your vision?
A No, sir.[57]
Thus, petitioners denials and alibi cannot prevail over the collective positive testimonies of
Jarmin and Batata, who positively and spontaneously pointed to them as the perpetrators at the trial.
Denial and alibi are weak defenses in criminal prosecution: alibi is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, while denial is mere self-serving evidence which cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of witnesses who identified the perpetrators. To merit approbation, clear and convincing evidence
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
55
must be adduced to show that petitioners were in a place other than the situs of the crime when it was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the crime. [58] In this
case, it was not impossible for petitioners to rush to the ranch of petitioner Leyson from his farm which
was only 5 to 6 kms away on horseback, arrive there at 10:00 a.m., fire their guns and burn the houses
of private respondents.
The trial court acquitted petitioner Leyson of arson but ruled that he is civilly liable to private
respondents. The CA affirmed the ruling of the court a quo. We quote with approval the ruling of the
appellate court:
Finally, the rule is that a persons acquittal of a crime on the ground that
his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt does not bar a civil action
for damages founded on the same acts involved in the offense. Rule 111, Section
2(b) of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. It is also an established rule that the acquittal of an accused on
reasonable doubt is not generally an impediment to the imposition, in the same
criminal action, of civil liability for damages on said accused. In the case at bar,
there is no finding by the court a quo that the houses of the complainants were not
burned which is the basis of the civil liability of appellant Leyson. Leyson was
acquitted for lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[59]
Besides, petitioner Leyson obliged himself to pay for the damages sustained by private
respondents.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23756 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 56

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167955

Appellee, (Formerly G.R. No. 151275) September 30, 2009

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,*

- versus - CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

CASTILLO, and DECISION

ABAD, JJ.

ARMANDO PADILLA y NICOLAS,

PERALTA, J.:
Appellant. Promulgated:

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

 57

For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00571 which affirmed, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 166-M-96,[2] finding appellant Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of Death. The CA found appellant guilty of Qualified Rape and likewise imposed on him the penalty of
Death. It reduced the awards for civil indemnity from P100,000.00 to P75,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. In addition, the CA awarded moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00.
Consistent with the Court's decision in People v. Cabalquinto,[3]
the real name of the rape victim in this
case is withheld and, instead, fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal
circumstances of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her identity,
as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
AAA did not complain nor tell her brothers about her ordeal because she was afraid as she was
threatened by appellant that he will hurt them and burn their house if she relates the incident to
them.[25] It was only in October 1995 that she was able to tell her aunt about her experience in the
hands of appellant.[26] Subsequently, her aunt accompanied her to the office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) where they filed a complaint against appellant.[27]
On February 1, 1996, an Information[28] was filed against appellant charging him before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of statutory rape, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Marilao,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd designs have carnal knowledge of said AAA, a minor who is
11 years old, against her will.

The facts of the case, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

All contrary to law with an aggravating circumstance that the accused is the
legitimate father of AAA.[29]

Around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 22, 1994, AAA was inside their house located at Marilao,
Bulacan.[4] With her were her father, herein appellant, her two older brothers and her sister BBB. [5] She
was then staying in one of the rooms because she was suffering from asthma and was taking medicine On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.[30] Pre-trial conference followed.[31] Thereafter, trial
through the help of her sister, BBB.[6] On the other hand, her brothers were already asleep in another ensued.
room.[7] After AAA took her medicine, appellant told BBB to sleep outside the room where AAA was
staying.[8] When BBB went outside, appellant turned off the light and proceeded to their
kitchen.[9] Thereafter, appellant returned to the room where AAA was staying. [10] He then took off
On November 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision,[32] the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
AAA's clothes and also removed his. [11] He went on top of AAA and tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.[12] AAA resisted but appellant held her hands and boxed her left thigh twice. [13] She was then
rendered weak enabling appellant to successfully insert his organ inside her vagina. [14] AAA felt pain,
after which her vagina bled.[15] While appellant's penis was inside her vagina, he made push and pull WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Armando Padilla y Nicolas GUILTY beyond
movements.[16] She pleaded with appellant to stop but to no avail.[17] It was in the course of her reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape described and penalized under
struggle against appellant's advances that she called on her sister for help.[18] Thereafter, she felt Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 7659 otherwise referred to
something come out of his penis. [19]Appellant withdrew his penis from her vagina but remained on top as the Death Penalty Law, and hereby sentences him the capital penalty of DEATH.
of her and even began touching her breast.[20] It was during that compromising position that BBB
entered the room and saw them.[21] Appellant immediately gathered his clothes and went to the
comfort room.[22] Thereafter, AAA cried while BBB handed her clothes to her. [23] They then slept beside
each other.[24] The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party AAA damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 and to pay exemplary damages in the amount

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES


of P50,000.00 to deter other sex perverts from sexually assaulting hapless and
innocent girls especially their kin.
In passing, Justice Vicente Abad Santos once remarked there should be a special
place in hell for child molesters. The accused deserves a deeper pit because the
child he molested was his own daughter. More than anyone else, it was he
to whom the child would have looked up for
the protection of her chastity. He cynically betrayed that faith with his unnatural
lechery.
SO ORDERED.[33]
In an Order[34] dated November 6, 2001, the RTC directed the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to this Court and likewise ordered the commitment of the accused to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa.
Pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[35] which modified the provisions of the
Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the case was
referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.[36]
After a review of the case, the CA affirmed, with modification, the decision of the RTC convicting the
appellant. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment dated November 5,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15 in Criminal Case
No. 166-M-96 finding Armando Padilla y Nicolas guilty of Qualified Rape and
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
58
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004,
amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the
entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[37]
The case was then elevated to this Court for review.
In a Resolution[38] dated July 19, 2005, the parties were required to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both parties manifested that they are not
filing their supplemental briefs as their positions in the present case had been thoroughly expounded
in their respective appeal briefs which were forwarded to the CA. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for deliberation.
Appellant assigned the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
APPLYING THE PRUNA GUIDELINES, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY PROVE THE MINORITY OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ACCUSED.
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT FOR
QUALIFIED RAPE.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.[39]
As to the first assigned error, appellant avers that the death penalty may not be imposed because the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not properly alleged and proved by the
prosecution.
The Court agrees in part.
The first issue is whether or not the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly alleged by the prosecution.
It is clear from the Information that AAA was alleged to be a minor who was aged eleven (11) at the
time of the commission of the crime and that the accused is her father. Contrary to the prosecution's
asseveration, it does not matter that the private complainant's relationship with the accused was
denominated as an aggravating circumstance and not as a special qualifying circumstance.
The Court has repeatedly held, even after the amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure took
effect,[40] that qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying
or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.[41] The Court has repeatedly qualified cases of rape where
the twin circumstances of minority and relationship have been specifically alleged in the Information
even without the use of the descriptive words qualifying or qualified by.[42] In the instant case, the fact
that AAA's relationship with appellant was described as aggravating instead of qualifying does not take
the Information out of the purview of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC ), as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659),[43] which was the prevailing law at the time of the
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
59
commission of the offense. Article 335 does not use the words qualifying or aggravating in
enumerating the circumstances that qualify rape so as to make it a heinous crime punishable by death.
It merely refers to the enumerated circumstances as attendant circumstances. The specific allegation
of the attendant circumstances in the Information, coupled with the designation of the offense and a
statement of the acts constituting the offense as required in Sections 8 [44] and 9[45] of Rule 110, are
sufficient to warn appellant that the crime charged is qualified rape punishable by death.
In the present case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically alleged
in the Information. These allegations are sufficient to qualify the offense of rape.
The next question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove appellant's relationship
with AAA as well as the latter's minority.
As to AAAs relationship with appellant, the Court agrees that the prosecution was able to prove it
beyond reasonable doubt. The Information alleged that appellant is the father of AAA. Appellant, in
turn, admitted during trial that AAA is her daughter.[46] Under prevailing jurisprudence, admission in
open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove relationship
with the victim.[47]
However, with respect to AAA's minority, the settled rule is that there must be independent evidence
proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the absence
of denial by appellant.[48] The victim's original or duly certified birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
school records would suffice as competent evidence of her age. [49] In the instant case, aside from the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with appellant's absence of denial, no independent
substantial evidence was presented to prove the age of AAA. Neither was it shown by the prosecution
that the said documents had been lost, destroyed, unavailable or were otherwise totally absent.
Anent appellants failure to object to the testimony of AAA, regarding her age, the Court has held that
the failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding the rape victims age shall not
be taken against him.[50] Even the appellant's implied admission of the victim's age, in the absence of
any supporting independent evidence, may not be considered sufficient to prove her age. In People v.
Biong,[51] the appellant testified as to the exact date when her daughter, the complainant, was born.
However, the Court held that appellant's testimony falls short of the quantum of proof required to
establish her age. As the qualifying circumstance of minority alters the nature of the crime of rape and
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES

increases the penalty thereof, it must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself.[52] In the present case, the Court agrees with appellant that the prosecution failed to discharge
this burden.
Coming to the second assigned error, appellant questions the credibility of the victim, AAA, arguing
that his constitutional right to be presumed innocent should take precedence over the unfounded
claim of AAA that he raped her.
It is settled that to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided
by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape,
the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[53]
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's
testimony.[54] The settled rule is that the trial courts conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape
cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality, unless there appear
in the record certain facts or circumstances of weight and value which the lower court overlooked or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.[55]
Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position to decide the question of
credibility.[56]Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate
court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted.[57] No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA are in agreement that AAAs account of her ordeal in the hands of
her father was categorical and straightforward.
Appellant contends that AAA had a grudge against him and, aside from that, she was influenced and
even instigated by her aunt, Elena Manahan, to file the complaint against appellant because of the
bitterness that Elena feels towards him. According to the appellant, this bitterness was brought about
TRIAL TECHNIQUE
60
by a misunderstanding between him and Elena involving money entrusted to the latter by his wife
which was supposed to be used for the construction of apartments.[58] However, appellant's claim
deserves scant consideration. The Court finds it incredible for private complainant to trump up a
charge of rape against appellant on the simple reason that she has a grudge against the latter or that
she was influenced by her aunt who harbors resentment against him. No woman would cry rape, allow
an examination of her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go through the rigors of public trial
and taint her good name if her claim were not true.[59]
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motive on the part of the victim would not destroy the credibility
reposed upon her by the RTC and the CA because, as the Court has held, a rape victims testimony is
entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a
daughter against her father.[60]
Moreover, appellant's rape of private complainant was corroborated by no less than the latter's sister
who is also a daughter of appellant. The rule is that where there is no evidence that the witness for the
prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full credence.[61]
In addition, AAAs subsequent acts of disclosing and complaining about her molestation to her aunt and
the authorities and taking immediate steps to subject herself to medical examination represent
conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and probable testimony that she was in fact raped
by appellant. They represent strong and compelling factors that enhance complainants credibility as a
witness.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the defense of
denial. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill-motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. [62] In the present case,
there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify falsely against the
appellant or to implicate him falsely in the commission of the crime; hence, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
Accordingly, appellant's weak defense of denial cannot prosper.
The prevailing law at the time the crime was committed in 1994 was still Article 335 of the
RPC as amended by Section 11 of RA 7659, the first paragraph of which provides as follows:
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES
 61

reasonable doubt of the Crime of Simple Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the private
complainant AAA the reduced amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. and the increased amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.

xxxx SO ORDERED.
Paragraph 7(1) of the same Article further provides that:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

The elements of statutory rape, of which appellant was charged are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age.[63]

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the age of AAA, much less the allegation that she
was under the age of twelve when she was raped. Thus, the Court cannot hold appellant liable for
statutory rape. However, since the prosecution was able to establish, without any objection from the
defense, that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA with the use of force, he can be convicted of
simple rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua. Appellant may not be convicted of rape in its
qualified form, as to impose upon him the penalty of death, considering that, while the aggravating
circumstance of relationship was proven, the prosecution failed to establish AAA's minority by
independent proof.

With respect to the last assigned error, the Court agrees with the CA in awarding civil indemnity as well
as moral and exemplary damages to AAA. However, since the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the civil
indemnity must be reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[64] Moreover, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code.[65]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00571 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Armando Padilla is found GUILTY beyond

TRIAL TECHNIQUE LLB - 3 1ST SET OF CASES