Lawyer and Society

Director of Religious Affairs VS Bayot

74 Phil 579 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing
marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes
marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that
everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and
so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the
same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be
published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public..” It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not
earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

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 Lawyer and Society

In Re: Luis Tagorda

53 Phil 37 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice – Solicitation of Legal Business –

Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Stirring Up of Litigation
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election,
he campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can
do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help
clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising
the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still
practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is
willing to receive works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.;
that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions
and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced
lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being
disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.

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 Lawyer and Society

Ledesma VS Climaco

FACTS:

Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte of one of the accused when he was appoint
ed as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections. He then filed a motion with
drawing as such, but Judge Climaco denied it and appointed him as counsel de offici
o for the two defendants. Again, Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw on the gro
und that his appointment requires full time, but the Judge still denied it. Consequentl
y, the defense obtained 8 postponements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio co

nsidering his appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:

No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the welfare of the accu
sed could be prejudiced as stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in t
hese words: ” Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the sci
ence of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be c
onvicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneduca
ted. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so importa
nt that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules o
f procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have a
n attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but i
t is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and h
e is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

It has to be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with co
nditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession
, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. However, the admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, a
nd this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the pr
omptings of self-interest.

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 Lawyer and Society

Tan Tek Beng VS David

126 SCRA 389 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice – Solicitation of Cases

In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby
Tan Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall
give Tan Tek Beng 50% of the attorney’s fees collected as the latter’s commission. Atty.
David also agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the
latter’s consent. The agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both
sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek
the enforcement of their agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it
was tantamount to malpractice which is “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers” Sec. 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
“malpractice”.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. “The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional”.
On the agreement to divide the attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of
fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility.
On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s
responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct
the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation
to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .”

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 Lawyer and Society

Ulep VS The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession
– Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal
Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems”
in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in
the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides,
the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic
offers.

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ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such
is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is
not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services
being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards
of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions
of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

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 Lawyer and Society

Antonio VS Court of Appeals

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
seeks to annul the Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on March 10, 1987 which denied the
admission of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 2 earlier rendered. Also, it prays that a writ of preliminary
injunction be immediately issued to restrain the respondent Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch CXX, from implementing its
Order dated March 6, 1987, which issued a writ of execution in accordance with the Court of Appeals decision on the case, thereby
asking that said court be directed to defer or stay the execution pending the resolution of this petition and an annulment case allegedly
appealed with the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th Avenue,
Caloocan City. This property was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.

After due notice to the petitioners and all others concerned, the property was sold to the private
respondent at a public bidding held on July 29, 1982. It appears, petitioners deliberately did not
participate in the said bidding because they believed that, as tenants therein, they have priority in
law to acquire the property. Their thinking was that their participation would be deemed a waiver
of their right to question the act of the GSIS in selling the property and would adversely affect
their offer to buy the same.

The award or sale of the property to the private respondent was duly approved by the GSIS
Board of Trustees in its Resolution No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was then certified
that the possession and administration of the property had been transferred to the private
respondent A conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondent by the GSIS
stating that for all intents and purposes, the private respondent is the owner of the property.

The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay their rent and arrearages to the
private respondent. But despite repeated written demands, the petitioners failed and refused to
settle their accounts.

After a barangay conciliation proceeding proved futile, the private respondent filed a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court in that locality. Said court
rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises occupied
by them and to pay certain amounts as damages.

Not satisfied therewith, the petitioners appealed to the respondent Regional Trial Court which, on
August 20, 1985, rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial
Court.

The petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals.
This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07828.

On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the
petitioner for review. Later an entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified
thereupon by the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became final and
executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case were consequently, remanded to the
respondent Regional Trial Court on February 11, 1987.

On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new counsel, filed an "Appearance And
Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For Reconsideration, together with the Motion For
Reconsideration With Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Order," with the
respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent Court of Appeals admit their
motion for reconsideration, which was obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing
the same, alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated to the United
States without at least informing them that a decision was rendered against them.

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The petitioners' motion was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated
March 10, 1987, now put in issue. It is hereunder reproduced, thus:

Now before this Court is an Appearance and Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration' filed by petitioners in the above-entitled case on February 23,
1987 on the ground that their former counsel Atty. Funelas had abandoned the
case and is now abroad, together with the corresponding Motion For
Reconsideration With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.

Considering that the decision sought to be reconsidered dated December 5, 1986

had become final, entry of judgment having been issued on February 3, 1987 and
the records remanded to the court a quo on February 11, 1987, for which reason
the said decision has become final and this Court has become bereft of
jurisdiction to act thereupon, the abovementioned Motions are
hereby noted.Parenthetically, and merely for purposes of record, it is observed
that counsel of record of petitioners is the law office Funelas, Perez and
Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has
abandoned the case and is now abroad is not a valid ground for the late filing of
the motion for reconsideration. 3

Earlier, on March 6, 1987, the respondent Regional Trial Court issued an order 4 for a writ of
execution to be issued against the petitioners for the enforcement of the decision in CA-G.R. No.
07828.

Henceforth, the petitioners, believing that they were deprived of their day in court when the
respondent Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration, instituted this petition.

As their initial argument in this petition and as contained in their "Appearance And Motion For
Leave To Admit Motion For Reconsideration," the petitioners maintain that they were deprived of
their day in court-equivalent to a denial of due process of law-when their motion for
reconsideration was refused due course by the respondent Court of Appeals. They alleged that
their counsel at that time, Atty. Pitty A. Funelas, virtually abandoned them by leaving abroad
without at least notifying them. So when the Court of Appeals decision was rendered and a copy
was sent to Atty. Funelas, no notice thereof was ever received by the petitioners. The petitioners
only had knowledge of the judgment against them after it was eventually entered in the Book of
Entries Of Judgments for being final and executory.

A certain Romeo S. Obligar, representing himself as the former messenger of Atty. Funelas,
executed an affidavit on February 19, 1987 stating among others that while getting the mails from
the Post Office last January 6, 1987, for his new employer, he received the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 07828; that since the records of that case was with Atty. Funelas, he was not able to
contact the petitioners herein; and that he forgot all about said decision until a secretary informed
him that the petitioners were verifying the said case when they happened to visit the office of his
new employer.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It is
well-settled that after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from notice of judgment, the same becomes
final and the Court of Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case. And the subsequent filing of a
motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction
which had already been lost. 5 The court a quo cannot decide the case anew. decision rendered
anew notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void. 6

In this case, the messenger, Mr. Obligar, received a copy of the decision on January 6, 1987.
This decision became final and executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not be acted upon on the
merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was properly denied.

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The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable.
Clear and as it can be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record is the
law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the
documents in his capacity as the representative of the said law firm. The respondent Court of
Appeals made this same observation in its questioned resolution.

In an attempt to belie the preceding observation, the petitioners submitted to this Court another
affidavit executed by Mr. Obligar dated March 17, 1987. This affidavit stated that the law firm of
Funelas, Perez and Associates was actually composed of only Atty. Funelas; that Atty. Perez
was only a partner in name, never handled any case of the law office, and did not actually report
in said office; that there were no associates of Atty. Funelas; and that said law firm was dissolved
in August, 1986. This affidavit has no evidentiary value. It was executed and submitted after the
questioned resolution was already promulgated. Hence, it could not have affected or influenced
the adjudication of the said resolution.

It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and represented itself as such, with at least
two named partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was
earlier dissolved, the winding up process is presumed to have been performed in a regular
manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence must be
presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted.

At most, the affidavit must be classified as a mere afterthought and a futile attempt to contradict
the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals.

Recently, this Court laid down a ruling that is applicable to this case. It reads:

When a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding all court, all notices
required to be given therein must be given to their attorney and not to the client.
Hence, a notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings
of counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably
adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices
during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange
matters that communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence,
may reach him promptly. ... 7

In the motion for reconsideration, the sole issue presented for reconsideration was a mere
amplification of one argument already passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
decision.

On January 18, 1983 before the ejectment case was instituted, the petitioners filed a complaint in
the then Court of First Instance to annul the award in a public auction of the leased premises by
the GSIS to the private respondent for they claimed that as tenants therein, they have the priority
in law over the same. The court, in a decision rendered on January 28, 1985, dismissed the case
for lack of a cause of action. Now, this case is allegedly pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

The issue, thus, advanced in the motion for reconsideration is whether the pendency of an
annulment case of an award in public auction is prejudicial to an ejectment suit as to warrant the
suspension of the latter proceeding.

We quote with approval the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals on this matter, thus:

The pendency of an action for title filed by the defendants (now petitioners) with
the Regional Trial Court does not have the effect of removing the ejectment case
from the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The rule is well- settled that

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an action for ownership or annulment of title is not a bar to an action for forcible
entry and detainer (Alviar, et al. vs. Pampolina, et al., 84 Phil. 45, at p. 47; Padilla
vs. de Jesus, et al., 95 Phil. 688, at p. 691; Aguilar vs. Cabrera, et al., 74 Phil.
658, at p. 868.) 8

In an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is
ownership. 9 Therefore, an ejectment case can very well proceed independently of an annulment
case. The only recognized exception to the preceding doctrine is the situation wherein the
question of possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that the
question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This
case at bar does not fall within the exception. Accordingly, the petitioners' position that this
ejectment proceeding should be suspended in deference to an annulment proceeding presently
pending in another forum must necessarily be rejected.

The order of the respondent Regional Trial Court for the issuance of a writ of execution was
because the decision in the ejectment case had already become final and executory. Its
implementation cannot be stayed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs against petitioners. This is immediately
executory.

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 Lawyer and Society

Dacanay VS Baker and Mckenzie

Legal Ethics – Use of Foreign Law Firm Name

In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented
by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’ client. The
letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability
and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a
foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay
filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law
firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities
all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that
they can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises
and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law
firm are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.

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QUANO ARRASTRE SERVICE VS ALEONAR

Private respondent International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City against Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc.
(Mercantile) and petitioner Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. (OASI) for replacement of certain
equipment imported by IPI which were insured by Mercantile but were lost on arrival in
Cebu City, allegendy because of mishandling by petitioner OASI.

Petitioner OASI’s answer was filed by the law firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates
(LSA) and signed by Atty. Manuel Trinidad of the Cebu office or branch of LSA. However,
Atty. Fidel Manalo, a partner from the Makati office of LSA filed to postpone the hearing
stating that the case had just been endorsed to him by petitioner OASI.

After trial which Atty. Manalo handled for OASI, the trial court rendered a decision holding
Mercantile and petitioner OASI jointly and severally liable for the cost of replacement of
the damaged equipment plust damages, totalling P435,000.00.

Only Mercantile appealed from the decision. When the IPI filed a motion for execution of
the decision against petitioner OASI which public respondent granted, the petitioner’s
cousel, through Atty. Catipay of the Cebu Branch of the LSA, filed a notice of appeal
claiming that the decision was “mistakenly sent” by the trial court to the law firm’s Head
Office in Makati.

Petitioner, through the same counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
granting the writ of execution alleging that the failure to file an appeal was due to
excusable neglect and slight “oversight” claiming that there was miscommunication
between LSA-Cebu and LSA main office as to who would file the notice of appeal. The
respondent judge denied OASI’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and ordered
that the writ of execution be enforced.

On appeal, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the grounds that there had been a
valid service of the decision and that it was final and executor upon OASI.

Hence, petition for review to the Court.

Issue

Whether or not LSA having represented itself to the public as a single firm, be allowed to
contend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms with
separate and distinct personalities and responsibilities.

Held

Petitioner’s counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any
particular member or associate of that firm) which firm happens to have a main office in
Makati and a branch office in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the main and branch
offices operate under one and the same name, Saludo Ledesma and Associates. Having
represented itself to the public as comprising a single firm, LSA should not be allowed at
this point to pretend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate
law firms with separate and distinct personalities.
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Dia-Añonuevo VS Bercasio

Facts: Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest

of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo,
Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo
Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged
before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary public,
on January 25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned
only one-third undivided portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers
owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or
repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the
judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property
and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay
Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00. Respondent
sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. Forthwith a
complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the
pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw
P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no action
was taken by respondent.

Issue: WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948

Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
which provides in part: All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the
holding of sessions applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal
judges, but the latter may, after office hours and with the permission of the district judge
concerned, engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law ...
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant,
Mrs. Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case. Respondent's claim is
belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested
as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and
her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs.
Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee,
plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs.
Añonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question. (d) When his
attempts at an out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 4591 for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees. (e)
He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although,
as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial
Judge nonetheless took note of respondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that
occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc.

The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to
avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome
of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie
behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner
as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.

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CRUZ VS SALVA

FACTS:
A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus,
Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo
sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned
people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new
confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the
results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and
confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed
Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits
and confessions. Cruz’ counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of
Salva to conduct preliminary investigation because the case was pending appeal in
the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him
to appear at the investigation. SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the
prelim investigation.

ISSUES
Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?
RULING:
No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such
publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of
respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and
good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is
being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said
publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on
appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and the Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained
and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

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MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits
then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor
incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity
in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to
imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's
fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the
petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and
background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial?
HELD: NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to
be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was
not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of
the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge
of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed, we cannot say that the trial of the
petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance
of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with
due process. Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since
the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly
influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that
the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose
sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner
until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the
publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the
trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

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CORDOVA VS LABAYEN

FACTS:
On March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered
judgment for petitioners with respect to four ordering the ejectment of private respondents and
ordering them to pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have
vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees.

On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor,
alleging that although private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had not filed
a supersedeas bond nor make a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.

Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots
from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of the
decision would render their appeal moot and academic.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a late filing of Supersedeas Bond.

HELD:
The petition is not meritorious. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in
an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising
from the loss of possession of the property in question. The motion for execution was filed
eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTC's decision, after the
appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had been filed within the
period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners
manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the afore cited rule.
Lawyers as officers of the court must assist in the administration of justice.

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People VS Gacott Jr.

Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of
respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was
annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand
and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made
by the Second Division of the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge

Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of
a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows
that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It
was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other
hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to

the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be
imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication
of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases
involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

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UY VS CAPULONG

JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court

of Valenzuela, Branch 172, Metro Manila, is charged[1] with gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint filed on 15
November 1991 with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose
P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for
settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.

The records show that on 21 November 1988, a certain Herminia R. Alvos,

claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C.
Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement
of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco. Two (2) days after, or on 23 November
1988, respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix
under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

On 27 March 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion
stating that sometime in February 1978 two (2) parcels of land belonging to the
late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had
been sold to complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale
with the Register of Deeds of Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel
requested the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any
transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the properties
covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T-
-39565, T-50276, T-52754, T-220168, TCT Nos. T-7537 and 75101. On 29
March 1989, respondent Judge granted the motion.

On 18 April 1989, upon order of respondent Judge, the Register of Deeds of

Valenzuela reported on the status of the titles to the properties subject of the
"freeze order," informing the Court that on 3 February 1989, a deed of absolute
sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9
December 1978 was filed with the Register of Deeds, describing therein fifteen
(15) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-
15359, and B-163276; that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new transfer
certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and
Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which could not be located in the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still
registered in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez; and, that the
status of TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which were with the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan, could not yet be determined.

On 5 May 1989, counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an
urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that
the latter was able to register the titles in his name in February 1989 through
fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.

On 7 June 1989, respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the
name of complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the

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spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in
their name.

On 3 July 1989, complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
to annul the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from
implementing the Order of 7 June 1989, and that respondent Judge be
restrained from further proceeding against him.

Meanwhile, acting on the questioned Order of respondent Judge, the Register of

Deeds of Valenzuela cancelled the certificates of title of complainants Jose P. Uy
and Rizalina C. Uy and reverted them to Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez.

On 28 September 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari
and prohibition of complainants and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of
respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose
P. Uy in the intestate proceedings thus -

"x x x a probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of

property, real or personal. The only purpose of the examination x x x is to elicit
information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having
possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If
after such examination there is good reason for believing that the person so
examined has property in possession belonging to the estate, it is the duty of
the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the same (Alafriz v. Mina, 28
Phil. 137 [1914]; Modesto v. Modesto, 109 Phil. 1066 [1959]; Chanco v.
Madrilejo, 12 Phil. 543 [1909])."

Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos sought a reconsideration of the ruling of

the Court of Appeals but the same was denied on 15 November 1989.

On 28 December 1989, Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 91092.

On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved a project of partition dated 18

August 1990 submitted by Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together
with Paz Ramirez (surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and Alicia
Alinsunurin. In the project of partition, TCT Nos. B-15345 to B-15352 and B-
15354 to B-15359 covering the parcels of land in Bulacan (which were reverted
in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco pursuant to the Order of 7 June 1989) were
adjudicated to the surviving spouse Paz Ramirez Pingco.

On 16 January 1991, on motion of counsel for the Special Administratrix,

respondent Judge ordered the Registers of Deeds of Valenzuela and Manila to
cancel the titles in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez and to issue
new ones in favor the persons mentioned in the approved project of partition.

On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge granted the ex-parte petition of the

Special Administratrix for approval of the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of
land covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B-15349, and stating
therein that as far as the intestate proceedings were concerned, complainant

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Jose P. Uy was not a participant either as heir or oppositor; that the property
covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351 and B-15348 and B-15349 were part of
the intestate estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco over which the trial court had
jurisdiction and in whose name said titles were registered when the proceedings
were instituted; that even as the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulled her
Order of 7 June 1989, it did not prevent her from proceeding with her actions on
the properties, neither did it direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to revert
the titles again from Ambrocio C. Pingco to complainant Jose P. Uy. As a result,
instead of complying with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, respondent
Judge directed the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own Order
of 16 January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and ordering the issuance
of new titles in accordance with the project of partition she obstinately approved.

On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which annulled and set aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent
Judge. Thus -

"We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply
provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession property
belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath
on the matter. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the
question of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of
the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent cancellation
of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained
through a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said
vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To recover the
property, an independent action against the vendee must be instituted in the
proper court" (citing Tagle, et al. v. Manalo et al., 105 Phil 1124).

On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter disregard of Our Resolution of 8

March 1991, granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for
approval of the deed of absolute sale of properties covered by TCT Nos. B-15345
and B-15346 of the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale
of her questioned Order of 4 February 1991.

On 29 April 1991, undaunted by her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this
Court, and in blatant disobedience to judicial authority, and established
precedents and jurisprudence, respondent Judge again granted an ex-parte
petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of another deed of absolute
sale covering three (3) more parcels of land originally titled in the name of
complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos. B-15347, B-15355 and B-15356 of the
Register of Deeds of Valenzuela, reiterating for the second time the reasons
stated in her Orders of 4 February and 2 April 1991.

In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy claim that despite
the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency of
the petition for review by way of certiorari before this Court, respondent Judge
continued issuing various orders resulting in the issuance of new titles to the
properties in the name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the
damage and prejudice of complainants.

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Complainants further contend that even after this Court had affirmed the ruling
of the Court of Appeals that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain
further proceedings concerning the ownership of the properties, respondent
Judge still, in an attempt to defeat the proscription imposed by higher judicial
authority, issued orders approving the sale of the properties to the further
prejudice of complainants.

In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the filing of the complaint
against her is merely to harass her. While she admits that her Order of 7 June
1989 was annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals, which annulment was
affirmed by this Court, she argues that no temporary restraining order was
issued and that before the Decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated her
Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied with by the Register of Deeds of
Valenzuela. She further contends that even as she was prohibited from
proceeding against complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not order the
reversion of the titles to them.

We are far from persuaded by respondent Judge. The charges against her are
clearly meritorious and supported by the records. Hence, there is no need in fact
for Us to conduct a formal investigation if only to determine her culpability[2] as
it is well documented. Her orders and those of the appellate courts display her
open defiance of higher judicial authority.

In Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 pending before her sala, respondent Judge
committed the following highly irregular and questionable acts indicative of gross
ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the public interest, to
wit: (a) respondent Judge cancelled on mere motion of a party the titles of
complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina Cortes, who were not parties to the case,
to the great prejudice of the latter; (b) respondent Judge issued two (2) orders
which disregarded the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her disputed
Order of 7 June 1989;[3] (c) respondent Judge issued another order authorizing
the sale of the other properties previously titled in the name of complainants
despite the directive of the Court of Appeals for her to desist from proceeding
against complainant Jose P. Uy;[4] (d) respondent Judge issued still two (2)
more orders approving deeds of sale even after this Court had already affirmed
the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7 June 1989.[5]

These actuations of respondent Judge clearly stress her blatant disobedience to

the lawful orders of superior courts and belie any claim that she rendered the
erroneous orders in good faith as would excuse her from administrative liability.

Time and again We emphasize that the judge is the visible representation of law
and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be
studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.[6] To fulfill
this mission, the judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines
of this Court.[7] If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not

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deliberately refrain from applying them; otherwise such omission can never be
excused.[8]

Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that when questions arise
as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.[9] The failure of respondent
judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known
legal rules.

Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that when title to land has
already been registered and the certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens
title cannot be collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the title
can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for the purpose. Corollary to
this is the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over
their properties on mere motion of a party and without affording them due
process, respondent Judge violated her sworn obligation to uphold the law and
promote the administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.[10]

The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge are further aggravated by her

refusal to abide by the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7
June 1989, which directed the cancellation of the titles of complainants. She was
in fact specifically enjoined from proceeding against them, yet, despite this
Decision, respondent Judge still authorized the subsequent transfer or alienation
to other persons of properties titled in the name of complainants to the
detriment of the latter. This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court
constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the public, the bench
and the bar. The absence of a temporary restraining order or an order from the
Court of Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient justification
for respondent Judge to issue subsequent orders contrary to the appellate
court's proscription. Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the
necessary consequence of the appellate court's decision is to put back the
complainants to their former status prior to the issuance of the annulled order.
Consequently, the Order of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the
ownership of the properties subject of the settlement proceedings remains
vested in complainants and will continue to be so until declared void in an
appropriate proceeding, not in the intestate proceedings before respondent
Judge. Thus, an order from the appellate court that will revert the titles to
complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from its decision annulling
the questioned cancellation.

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Moreover, the total disregard by respondent Judge of Our Resolution of 8 March

1991 cannot be condoned. Therein, We affirmed the Decision of the Court of
Appeals declaring her to have exceeded her jurisdiction in cancelling the titles of
complainants. Nonetheless, respondent Judge chose not to heed our
pronouncement. She issued two (2) more orders approving the sale to other
persons of the remaining properties which were titled in the name of
complainants.

We consider this willful disobedience and continued disregard of Our Resolution

as grave and serious misconduct.[11] Indeed, respondent Judge displayed open
defiance to Our authority and utterly failed to show proper respect for, and due
and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of this Court.[12]

By her acts and omissions, respondent Judge has failed to observe in the
performance of her duties that prudence and circumspection which the law
requires for public service. She has made a mockery of the judicial system of
which she is a part and which she is sworn to uphold. This Court cannot
countenance any act or omission which would diminish the faith of the people in
the administration of justice.[13] As Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos articulated,
"the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people and the integrity of
the courts. Take this faith away and the moral influence of the court is gone and
popular respect impaired."

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG

guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of the judicial service; consequently, she is hereby DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with prejudice to reinstatement
or reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations.

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TORRES VS ORDEN

Complainant Rosita S. Torres engaged the services of respondent Atty. Amado D. Orden to
represent her in Civil Case No. 1928-R for the recovery of possession of a market stall from
spouses Prudencio and Victorina Gayo before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Baguio
City. In time, a decision was rendered in favor of Torres. The Gayo spouses appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent lawyer failed to submit an appellee's brief before
the appellate court; hence, the resolution, dated 05 July 1994, of the Court of Appeals-
"No appellee's brief having been filed per JRD Report of June 16, 1994, the Court resolved
to submit the case for decision sans appellee's brief. Let the case be re-raffled for study and
report."[1]
On 25 September 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in favor of the spouses
Prudencio and Victorina Gayo.
On 12 October 1995, respondent lawyer filed with this Court a Notice of Petition for Review
on Certiorari. On 15 January 1996, no Petition for Review on Certiorari having theretofore
been filed, this Court issued a resolution declaring the case terminated and the judgment of
the Court of Appeals final and executory. Thus-
"It appearing that petitioner failed to file the intended petition for review on certiorari within
the reglementary period, the Court further resolved to DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED
AND DIRECT the Clerk of Court to INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be
reviewed has become final and executory, no appeal therefrom having been timely
perfected."[2]
Complainant thereupon filed the instant Administrative Complaint against respondent for the
latter's failure to properly discharge his duty as such counsel despite his having allegedly
received the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for court expenses and
attorney's fees.[3]
In a manifestation, dated 11 January 1997, to this Court, respondent explained that-
"x x x when undersigned filed his Notice for Review on Certiorari, he had then expected to
receive a notice for the payment of fees and thereupon the number of days within which to
file his brief"Scjj
"x x x x x x x x x
"x x x had undersigned been given notice to pay the fees and file the brief for the
complainant within such time as this Honorable Court may have directed, undersigned would
have paid such fees and filed the said brief."[4]
In its resolution of 17 February 1997, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Attorney Renato G. Cunanan, submitted in due time the results of his
investigation. The report dated 07 November 1998, adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its resolution of 19 June 1999, contained the salient findings of the
Investigating Commissioner.[5]
"We note that inspite of Atty. Orden's repeated declarations which would create the
unmistakable impression that he had in fact prepared and completed his client's brief, no

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such brief was ever submitted to the Supreme Court, either in connection with his Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 22, 1996, or his Manifestation of January 11, 1997.
"We are convinced that Atty. Amado Orden, despite his avowals has not prepared any such
brief. Worse, we are just as convinced that Atty. Orden has displayed a glaring ignorance of
procedures and a grossly negligent failure to keep abreast of the latest resolution and
circulars of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court in regard to appeals. To be sure as a
practitioner, Atty. Orden ought to have kept himself attuned to the Rules of Court and the
latest jurisprudence and rulings of the Supreme Court. Briefly stated, respondent Atty. Orden
has not been honest with the Supreme Court. Worse, he has not been honest with his client
and worst with himself.
"We recommend that Atty. Amado D. Orden be suspended from the practice of law for at
least one year."[6]
It does look apparent that Attorney Amado D. Orden has fallen far too short of the
circumspection required of every member of the Bar. Jjsc
A counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even malfeasance or
nonfeasance, would be binding on his client.[7] Verily, a lawyer owes to the client the
exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation.[8] Lawyers are expected
to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with
them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client's cause.[9]
Upon appeal, the appellate court, not being in a position to hear firsthand the testimony of
the parties, can only place great reliance on the briefs and memoranda of parties. The failure
to submit these pleadings could very well be fatal to the cause of a client. Respondent's
failure to submit the brief to the appellate court within the reglementary period entails
disciplinary action.[10] Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but also to the court as
well.[11] His shortcomings before the Court of Appeals is, in itself, already deplorable but to
repeat that same infraction before this Court constitutes negligence of contumacious
proportions. It is even worse that respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by
professing ignorance of appellate procedures, a matter that, too, is inexcusable.
Regrettably, the Court is constrained to affirm the aptly considered recommendation of the
IBP on the matter.[12]
WHEREFORE, this Court so finds respondent Atty. Amado Orden remiss in his sworn duty
to his client, and to the Bar and the Bench as well, and imposes upon him the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year immediately effective
upon his receipt of this judgment.

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REYES VS GAA

FACTS:

Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that
he had been the victim of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City
Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant’s
business rival. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent in an entrapment operation
set up by them.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of
lawyer’s oath.

RULING:

Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official,

which also constitutes as a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath is a source of
his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment, or other
disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67 [1983]).

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DINSAY VS CIOCO

Facts:

§ Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the

Bank) certain properties as security for the payment of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted in the
payment of the loan so the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At a foreclosure
sale conducted by the sheriff, the property was sold to the bank, who was the sole bidder. A
certificate of Sheriff’s sale was executed by Atty. Cioco, then clerk of Court and Ex-officio
Sheriff.
§ Records disclose that page four of the said Certificate was surreptitiously substituted.
The new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of P3, 263, 182.67 to only
P730,000. Cioco and the sheriff who conducted the sale had previously been
administratively charged and dismissed from service.
§ Now, Atty.Cioco is sought to be disbarred. He argues that there was res adjudicata due
to the administrative case, and that disbarment was deemed adjudicated therein, thus he
may now longer be charged.

Issue: W/N Cioco may be charged with disbarment (W/N res adjudicata appplies)

Held:
§ Cioco’s contention has no merit. Res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s administrative powers, as in this case.
§ Disbarment has not been adjudicated in the previous case. Therein, Cioco was
administratively proceeded against as an erring Court personnel under the supervisory
authority of the court. Herein, Cioco is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the court’s
plenary authority over members of the legal profession.
§ While Cioco is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, there is no double
jeopardy as both proceedings are administrative in nature.
§ The general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as
a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
The exception is , if that misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral
delinquency.
§ Cioco’s participation in changing the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriff’s Sale affects his
fitness as a member of the bar. He knows it is patently illegal to alter its contents after
notarization, since it is already a public document.
§ Cioco is disbarred.

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IGOY VS SORIANO

FACTS:
§ Igoy is one of the petitioners in the case of Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. vs. Mactan
Shangrila Hotel.
§ Eng. William Redoblado introduced Atty. Soriano to Igoy as a Justice of the CA.
§ According to Igoy’s friend, Atty. Soriano will be able to help him in his case which is
pending in the CA
§ Atty. Soriano demanded from Igoy P20,000 but the former reminded the latter the he will
only be able to help in the case as soon as the case was lifted to the SC
§ Igoy’s case received an unfavorable decision in the CA and Atty. Soriano offered to
prepare the Petition for Review to be filed in the SC.
§ Atty. Soriano asked for an additional P20,000
§ Igoy send the amount by courier to the address of Atty. Soriano which was received by
his son.
§ SC denied the petition for review of Igoy with finality
§ Igoy later found out that Atty. Soriano is not a CA Justice and filed this complaint against
Igoy in the SC
§ Arguments of Atty. Soriano:
o It is unnatural for a person to give money to someone whom he does not know well and
whom he met only for the first time
o The money was offered gratuitously by Igoy
o it is impossible the Igoy handed the money to him on the SC parking lot for many
employees were passing in that place
o it is not Eng. Redoblado who introduced him to Igoy but Mr. Taneo
o if the SC finds that he is guilty, he will retire from the service
§ Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under RA 1616

ISSUE:
§ W/N Atty. Soriano violated Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:
§ Yes! Atty. Soriano was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and is suspended from the practice of law.
§ Atty. Soriano’s offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may
be imposed on him. However, resignation will not extricate him form the consequences of
his acts

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§ Resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade
administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative sanctions
§ To accept the claim of Soriano that the money was offered gratuitously will open the
floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption.
§ Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service for
public service is a public trust. Government lawyers should be more sensitive to their
professional obligations as their reputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.
§ The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not
mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working standards
and attainable goals that should matched with actual deeds.

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PEOPLE VS ESQUIVEL

In 1946, a group of armed men robbed two jeepney drivers and divested them of the
jeepneys they were driving. They also killed the two drivers. Five of the malefactors were
arrested: Amado Dizon, Pablo Esquivel, Ben Pascual, Simplico Navarro and Gorgonio
Rivera. The last two later on became state witnesses. On the strength of these two’s
testimonies, Dizon, Esquivel, and Pascual were convicted. Only Dizon and Esquivel
appealed the conviction.

Their appeal is grounded on the fact that Navarro’s and Rivera’s testimonies were
conflicting.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction is correct.

HELD:
No, but only as to the conviction of Esquivel – the conviction of Dizon is sustained. It was
found by the Supreme Court that in both testimonies sworn by Navarro and Rivera, that
Esquivel played no active hand in the commission of the crime. The testimonies of the two
as to the participation of Esquivel is likewise conflicting as when Rivera testified that it was
Esquivel who suggested the killing of the drivers while on the other hand Navarro testified
that it was someone else. This was never clarified by the prosecution – therefore, Esquivel’s
conviction is based on shaky grounds.

The case for the prosecution was not presented with the care and thoroughness which the
gravity of the offense demanded. There is absolute necessity for a government prosecutor to
lay before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the
end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and
the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution’s prime duty to the
court, to the accused, and to the state.

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COLLANTES VS RENOMERON

FACTS:
• Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City
• This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
• Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which was that
V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
• Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio
(of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The
Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents.
• Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the registration
thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements
not adverted in his previous denial.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court
for his malfeasance as a public official.
• Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government
service in the discharge of official tasks.

HELD: Yes to both issues.

RATIO DECIDENDI:
On Issue No. 1
• A lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.
• The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice.
• The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

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On Issue No. 2
• The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6).
• The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any
corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).

RULING: Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

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