People vs Soriano GR No.

152565, July 29, 2003

Facts:
There was a disagreement between Soriano and Rosario regarding their child. It stemmed from the
fact that Honeys brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child out without the consent of accused-appellant
who wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But Honey refused. As their
discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her, which he
vigorously pursued the night before with much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser
instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.
In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead. You are hurting me, she snapped
back, just like what you did to me in Manila.
Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It is better that I burn this house, and then took a match
from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of
Honeys room. He also set on fire the clothes. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally
burned together with five (5) neighboring houses. RTC ruled that the crime committed was destructive
arson.
Issue:

W/N the defendant has committed the crime of destructive arson

Ruling:

Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two
kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based
on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage
caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons. The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious
burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal
Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality
in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the
qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable
under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the
offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was
motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned cannot be
appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or
risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing
can be worse than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple
Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house
or dwelling.

People v Cedenio GR No. 93485, June 27, 1994

Facts:

On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five members of the family, then
occupying the house were burned to death. The five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio,
with wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost severed,
Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and
infant Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.

Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe
Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.

Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a bolo on the night of November 26,
and the following morning, the bolo was returned to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The accused
Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the court, I will answer (for)
everything”

The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and
penalized under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime of arson with murder.

Ruling:

No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard-

…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in the house and that the
objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that
killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a
means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In other words, if the main
object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the
burning of a building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.

From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death,
appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a separate
crime of four counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with murder.

Tan v People GR No. 134298 August 26, 1999 (Anti-Fencing Law)

Facts:

Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad
Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats.
Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito
Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods,
propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing.
She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or
less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss.
Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his
companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as
bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who
paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one
another.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against
petitioner

Ruling:

In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of
fencing as follows:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and

4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
 There was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance,
consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance
with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other
hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since
the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

Llamado v CA GR No. 99032 March 26, 1997 (BP 22)

Facts:

Private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused the amount of P180,000.00, with the assurance of
Aida Tan, the secretary of the accused in the corporation, that it will be repaid on 4 November 1983,
plus interests thereon at 12% plus a share in the profits of the corporation, if any.

Upon delivery of the money, accused Ricardo Llamado took it and placed it inside a deposit box. Accused
Jacinto Pascual and Ricardo Llamado signed Philippine Trust Company Check No. 047809, postdated 4
November 1983, in the amount of P186,500.00 in the presence of private complainant.

On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited the check in his current account with the Equitable
Banking Corporation which later informed the complainant that said check was dishonored by the
drawee bank because payment was stopped, and that the check was drawn against insufficient funds.
Private complainant was also notified by the Equitable Banking Corporation that his current account was
debited for the amount of P186,500.00 because of the dishonor of the said check.

Private complainant returned to Aida Tan to inform her of the dishonor of the check. Aida Tan received
the check from private complainant with the assurance that she will have said check changed with cash.
However, upon his return to Aida Tan, the latter informed him that she had nothing to do with the
check. TC ruled that Llamado is guilty of violation of BP 22.

Issue:

W/N petitioner, as treasurer of a corporation, can be held liable under BP 22 for checks issued on behalf
of the corporation?

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance of the check without sufficient funds and involvement
in the transaction with private complainant. However, knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to
establish. Thus, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption, i.e., that the drawer had knowledge
of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's
presentment for payment. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption by paying the amount of the
check within five (5) banking days from notice of the dishonor. His claim that he signed the check in
blank which allegedly is common business practice, is hardly a defense. If as he claims, he signed the
check in blank, he made himself prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent
upon him to prove his defenses. As Treasurer of the corporation who signed the check in his capacity as
an officer of the corporation, lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction is not a defense.

Petitioner's argument that he should not be held personally liable for the amount of the check because
it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of
the corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states:

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Allied Banking Corporation v Ordonez (Trust Receipts Law)

Facts:
On 23 January 1981, Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its duly authorized officer, private
respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of commercial letters of credit with petitioner's
Makati branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired
Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks.
Petitioner issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd. (Nikko) by virtue of
which the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by PBM and duly honored and paid by the
petitioner bank.:- nad
To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts, and in consideration of the transfer by
petitioner of the possession of the goods to PBM, the latter as entrustee, thru private respondent,
executed four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates on 19 May, 3 and 24 June 1981
acknowledging petitioner's ownership of the goods and its (PBM'S) obligation to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within the stated period.
Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated demands,
PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return the same.
Issue:

Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) apply when the goods covered by a Trust
Receipt do not form part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead,
utilized/used up in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the entrustee-manufacturer?

Ruling:
Yes. The trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. Their terms are to be
interpreted in accordance with the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all cases
to prevent fraud on the part of either party to the transaction. The entrustee binds himself
to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over to the
entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this
undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115.

The wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted
goods, or to return said goods if unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the
trust receipts. Private respondent claims that at the time of PBM's application for the
issuance of the LC's, it was not represented to the petitioner that the items were intended
for sale, hence, there was no deceit resulting in a violation of the trust receipts which would
constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot uphold this contention. The non-payment of
the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's obligation to pay.
There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust
receipts, except those expressly excluded.

The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by the
trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed),
reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
To uphold the Justice Department's ruling would contravene not only the letter but the spirit
of PD 115.