Admin Law Jan 8

Vidal vs COMELEC, GR. 206666, Jan 21, 2015

Issue: Did the pardon extended to Estrada restore his right civil and political rights and to seek public
elective office?

Ruling: Yes. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. the statement
"[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear – the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was
unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to has a
settled meaning in law and jurisprudence. Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and
concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.

Pichay vs Ochoa gr 196425 july 24, 2012

Issue: Does the IAD-ODESLA encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman?

Ruling: No. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being
conducted by another investigatory agency. Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an
administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government,
extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies. While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable
cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-
ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations
remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's
constitutional duties.

CSC v. Guevarra, GR No 176162, Ocotber 9, 2012

Issue: Can CSC only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the complaint was made by a
private citizen?

Ruling: No. CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the
complaint.

A literal interpretation of E.O. 292 would mean that only private citizens can file a complaint directly
with the CSC. For administrative cases instituted by government employees against their fellow public
servants, the CSC would only have appellate jurisdiction over those. Such a plain reading of the subject
provision of E.O. 202 would effectively divest CSC of its original jurisdiction, albeit shared, provided by
law. Moreover, it is clearly unreasonable as it would be tantamount to disenfranchising government
employees by removing from them an alternative course of action against erring public officials.

There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private citizen and one filed by
a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal" without any qualification.***
***Additional info only, just in case.

Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Sept. 4, 2012

Being the appointing authority and under the doctrine of implication, can the president remove the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor?

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is implied from
his Power to Appoint. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him.
The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is
expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In giving the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express
terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Gonzales vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Jan. 28, 2014

The President’s power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced
with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing of an administrative case against the
Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their suspension and
can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution.
With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable
by the President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers
had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.

Ombudsman vs. Valencerina, G.R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014

Issue: Is an ombudsman order/decision in an administrative case imposing the penalty of removal on

a public official immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal?

Ruling: Yes. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Section 7, Rule
III), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the office’s
decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of course and
shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Based on the afore-quoted
provision, it is clear that the OMB’s June 8, 2005 Order imposing the penalty of removal on Valencerina
was immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of his appeal.

Issue: As between Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure and Sec. 12, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court—on the effect of appeal from the decision of the OMB in administrative cases, which
shall prevail?

Ruling: Sec. 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure shall prevail. The general rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial bodies stated under Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules – which provides that "[t]he
appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just" – would not apply in this
case for the following reasons:

First, Section 3 Rule V of the OMB Rules of Procedure provides that the Rules may apply suppletorily or
by analogy only when the procedural matter is not governed by any specific provision in the said rules.
Here, Section 7,Rule III categorically provides that an appeal shall not stop the office’s decision imposing
the penalty of removal, among others, from being executory. Second, it is a fundamental legal principle
that when two rules apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must
prevail over the other. Evidently, the aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to
administrative complaints cognizable by the OMB,51 while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies to
appeals from quasi-judicial bodies52 in general, including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules,
Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in appeals from
a decision of the OMB in an administrative case. Third, the OMB is constitutionally authorized to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions rendered
by the said office when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically and specifically warrant their
enforcement, else the OMB’s rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and
statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded.

Ombudsman v. Castro, G. R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014

Did respondent’s acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a SWAT
vehicle constitute misconduct or was it a case of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service?

The respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The SC hold that the
Ombudsman correctly ruled that the respondent's acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in
riding on board a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not
misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her official functions. As long as the
questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty
may be meted on the erring public officer or employee.

The Supreme Court point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or
be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The respondent
in the present case summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-
law. There was no link between the respondent's acts and her official functions as a city prosecutor. the
respondent's acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT in a matter purely personal to her and
riding on their vehicle in going to and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for: these were a
haughty and an excessive display of the influence that she could wield, ultimately aimed at helping
Mariven and Rosefil to compel Emily to accept the "depreciated" vehicle, and to return the bum checks
issued by Mariven. These send the wrong impression that public officials could use and exploit the police
force for their personal interests.

Carpio-Morales v. Binay, GR No 217126-27 Nov. 10, 2015

Issue: Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of RA No 6770, valid and constitutional?

Ruling: The first paragraph is declared ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
unconstitutional and invalid.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing,
took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted
by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly
promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of
judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions,
such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional
allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a
particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended
while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of
the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770-
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated
Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject
matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

(Sorry guys, taas jd siya na case)

CSC vs Plopinio, GR No. 197571 April 3, 2017

Issue: May a public officer or employee who is AWOL be separated from service or dropped from the
rolls of employees without prior notice?

Ruling: Yes. There is no question that a public officer or employee who is AWOL may be separated from
service or dropped from the rolls of employees without prior notice.

Rule VI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave in the Civil Service 26 provides:

Sec. 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. - An official or employee who is continuously absent
without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without
official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior
notice. However, when it is clear under the obtaining circumstances that the official or employee
concerned, has established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences though
less than thirty working (30) days 3x in a semester, such that a pattern is already apparent, dropping
from the rolls without notice may likewise be justified.

If the number of unauthorized absences incurred is less than thirty (30) working days, a written Return-
to-Work Order shall be served to him at his last known address on records. Failure on his part to report
for work within the period stated in the Order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the rolls.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Based on current rules, a public officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for AWOL without
prior notice, under any of the following circumstances: (1) the public officer or employee was
continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 working days; or (2) the public officer or
employee had established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences, though
less than 30 working days, three times in a semester, such that a pattern was readily apparent. Dropping
from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature. It shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefit of the public
official or employee concerned nor in said public official or employee's disqualification from
reemployment in the government. Thus, the concerned public official or employee need not be notified
or be heard.
Issue: Was there legal basis to drop the respondent form the rolls on account of being AWOL?

Ruling: No. In this case, there was no proof that respondent was actually absent or did not report for
work for 30 days or more. Respondent's AWOL was merely presumed from the fact that his DTRs for the
periods of January to April 2002 and January to July 2003 were not on file with the COMELEC Personnel
Department. There is reasonable ground to believe that respondent did submit his DTRs for January to
April 2002 and January to July 2003 to his immediate supervisor, PES Cariño, who did not sign and
forward the same to the COMELEC Personnel Department. Therefore, there is no more factual basis for
the presumption that respondent had been AWOL for the said time periods that would have, in turn,
justified his being dropped from the rolls. Without such presumption, the COMELEC could only insist on
the dropping of respondent from the rolls on the ground of AWOL if it could establish that respondent
had been actually absent without approved leave for 30 days or more - which the COMELEC en banc
utterly failed to do in this case.

Daplas vs DOF, G.R. 221153, April 17, 2017

Issue: For failure to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2003 is petitioner liable
for dishonesty, grave misconduct, etc. warranting dismissal from services?

Ruling: No. Daplas is only found guilty of simple negligence in accomplishing her SALN. Records reveal
that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.

Additional: Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any
material fact. Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifestx0060.

There is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal
the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997
SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or
any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.