Remedial Law

EN BANC
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked
for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother
of Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that
there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already
paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in
the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence
to the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from
February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and petitioner.4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,6 hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.
The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972,
and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created
and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination only.9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of
the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review
has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223,
as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from
receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties.
1
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It
held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no
right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the
substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously,
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code,
it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed
within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform
any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and
by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was
deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its
jurisdiction.
2
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary
clause therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impassè, both in point of purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial
review over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in
almost all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over
all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among
others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not
lie from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the
Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those
specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are
cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of
the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of
the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of
review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of
Congress, more particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the
same time expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only
final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of
review of factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and
by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495
seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of
the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the
Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically
reducing the workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an appellate
tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the
Supreme Court:
3
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of reviewing
these cases which present no important issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties
involved, so that the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the
discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the guarantor of the people's
basic rights and additional task expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five
years ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall
continue to mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following
proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues
arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in
the House of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452, having
theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20, 1995, 22 inclusive
of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use
of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on
Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals
as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably
and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the
advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
4
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are
factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been
constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted
and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts
in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered
to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
5
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 63737 as well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part,
located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their
father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[’] father’s co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs’ father without the
knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent
of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by
the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded
feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer.3
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully
turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting to ₱1,500.00 and for the subsequent
attendance to the hearing of this case at ₱1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and ₱500.00 for every court appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section
33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that –
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
6
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed
value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be
picked-up for determining the Court’s jurisdiction as provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value of the land in question
cannot exceed ₱20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed
before said Court rather than before the RTC. …6
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of
the market value of the property in question, which was ₱200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square
meters, more or less, the total value thereof is ₱3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and
"the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value."
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation,
and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim. 9 Traversing the material allegations of the
complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his
grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention10 making common cause with the private respondent. On her
own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.11
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of
₱5,950.00.12
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property; and
Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on
May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action,
conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant
petition, with the following assignment of errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
7
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER]
COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND
IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.17
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the
private respondent, who was the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according
to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land
in question in the amount of ₱3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for damages exceeding ₱20,000.00,
over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.18 The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the
waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion
reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the
real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real
property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is
one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 19
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-
owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house
thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private
respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property
and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment
level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled
to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
8
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of
the complaint.21 The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. 22 Absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners’ action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property
in 1991 was ₱5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of
the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or
1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property
with an assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA’s disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.
For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds ₱20,000, and the MTC, if the value is ₱20,000 or below.
An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax
declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose
remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant
in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of
value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is ₱5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.24
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been
issued by the proper government agency.25
Unavailing also is the petitioners’ argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding ₱20,000.00, then
the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the
determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2
thereof states that –
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or
the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the
assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and
void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
9
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147058 March 10, 2006
DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 8, ATTY. SERAFIN S. OSABEL, NEOCEDA NOVAL-OSABEL, MARIE
JOHANNA OSABEL- GARCIA, VICTORIA LUZ OSABEL-DACUYCUY, ANNA CHRISTIA OSABEL and SERAFIN OSABEL, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner, an electric utility with franchise to distribute electricity in Davao City and other areas, assails in the present petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the Decision dated October 6, 2000 and the Resolution dated February 6, 2001 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50234.1
Petitioner and private respondents are the contending parties in two separate civil cases before the lower courts. Civil Case No. 3452-F-96 is
for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney’s Fees pending before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City, Branch 6, where
petitioner is the plaintiff while private respondent Atty. Serafin Osabel (Atty. Osabel) and Alfredo Rubin (Rubin) are the defendants. On the
other hand, Civil Case No. 25,086-97 is for Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 8, with private respondents as plaintiffs and petitioner as defendant.
In Civil Case No. 3452-F-96, petitioner alleged in its Amended Complaint that: it entered into an electric service contract with Rubin; despite
notice, Rubin failed to pay his electric bills from September 1990 to May 1993 until it amounted to P35,154.17, prompting petitioner to cut off
electrical service on October 14, 1993; petitioner discovered that during said period, Rubin’s electricity service was extended beyond his
property line to a certain Ronald Donguila, who, in turn, sold his property to Atty. Osabel; petitioner also discovered that Atty. Osabel was
using the electrical service of a certain Maria Mercedes Villarosa (Villarosa); petitioner tried to collect from Atty. Osabel but the latter refused
and instead, informed petitioner that he is consigning the payment of his current consumption to the court; petitioner tried to collect the
amount consigned to the court but was informed by the Clerk of Court that he needed an order to do so; petitioner gave Atty. Osabel an
opportunity to settle his obligation under his present consumption but the latter ignored petitioner’s communications; because of private
respondents’ failure to pay the arrears, petitioner disconnected the service on February 6, 1997, and in view of the termination of the
contract, removed the meter from the premises.2 Thus, petitioner prayed for the payment of the sums sought to be collected, damages and
attorney’s fees.3
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 25,086-97, Atty. Osabel, together with his co-private respondents wife and children, presented three causes of
action for damages due to petitioner’s (1) failure to give notices of disconnection in two instances between February 1996 and December
1996; (2) disconnection of private respondents’ electric services on February 6, 1997; and (3) removal of the electric meter by petitioner in full
view of their neighbors and the public on February 21, 1997.4
Private respondents alleged in their complaint that: in 1994 and with petitioner’s knowledge, they leased a residential house owned by
Villarosa including the use of Electric Meter No. 86817 under Account No. 091-13848; some time in December 1995, they received from
petitioner a letter demanding payment of P18,900.17 for the electrical consumption made under the name of Rubin; Atty. Osabel replied and
informed petitioner that his obligation under Account No. 091-13848 has been settled, and the demand for payment for the consumption
made in Rubin’s name is illegal for which he cannot be held liable, and that he is tendering payment in the amount of P189.41 as full payment
for his March 1996 account; petitioner wrote back to Atty. Osabel, informing him that the unpaid account in Rubin’s name was transferred to
his name under Account No. 091-13848, and that a conference was scheduled on May 22, 1996 so that the matter may be settled; Atty. Osabel
declined to attend the conference, reiterated his objection to the transfer of Rubin’s account to his name, and requested for a statement of
account for May 1996 so that he could deposit the amount with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC; several communications were
exchanged between petitioner and Atty. Osabel until the electrical service to the Osabels was twice disconnected, in February and December
1996, without notice and warning; Atty. Osabel made deposits with the MTCC Office of the Clerk of Court for their account due from March
1996 to December 1996; on January 1997, petitioner wrote Villarosa claiming the amount of P9,633.32 as outstanding balance as of January
1997, without prejudice to its recovery of the amount of P18,900.17 against Atty. Osabel; Atty. Osabel then made another deposit
of P1,008.44 with the MTCC Office of the Clerk of Court for their January 1997 consumption, notifying petitioner of the same in a Notice of
Consignation dated February 3, 1997; petitioner refused to acknowledge the consignation and decided to terminate its service contract on
February 6, 1997, and removed its electric meter on February 21, 1997.5 In each of the three causes of action, the Osabels prayed for the
award of moral, nominal and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in their favor. They also prayed for the
deletion of the amount of P9,633.32 from Account No. 091-13848.6
Petitioner filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 25,086-97 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and that a
valid consignation needs a judicial action in the MTC for the complaint to prosper.7 With regard to lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argued that
the claim for moral damages is only for P80,000.00, and as such, it is below the jurisdictional amount cognizable by the RTC. Petitioner also
argued that since private respondents’ other causes of action pertain to their consignation of P7,912.62 before the MTCC, and the damages
prayed for are mere incidents to it, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. On the issue of the lack of cause of action, petitioner
10
contended that private respondents, who alleged that the case is one for damages and not consignation, failed to allege in their complaint that
there was a valid consignation made in order for them to validly claim the damages sought. Petitioner also contended that private respondents
are not even the real-party-in-interest inasmuch as they are mere lessees of Villarosa and the contract of service was with the latter. Finally,
petitioner claimed that the consignation made with the clerk of court is ineffective in the absence of a complaint or case made in court. 8
Private respondents filed their opposition to the amended motion to dismiss, refuting petitioner’s arguments. Respondents essentially claimed
that the case before the trial court is for damages and does not depend on the issue of consignation. 9
On June 19, 1997, the RTC issued its Order denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC ruled thus:
In this regard, this Court notes that the instant claim is for the recovery of damages for the alleged and oppressive act of defendant in cutting
of power in plaintiffs’ abode which this Court finds to be incapable of pecuniary estimation for as stated in Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 213 SCRA 457, "(I)n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether it is in the municipal court [now municipal trial courts] or in the
courts of first instance [now regional trial courts] would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such action as cases where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now regional trial courts]."
Anent the second, defendant asserts that the complaint fails to state a cause of action upon plaintiffs’ failure to allege a valid consignation,
which, it stresses, is a matter upon which their claim is hinged.
This Court appreciates the logic of defendant’s arguments. The argument, however, assumes that plaintiffs’ claim depend on a valid
consignation or that the consignation made by plaintiffs was ineffective. Suffice it to state that these are matters better ventilated at the trial
on the merits.10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s denial, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated November 10, 1998.11
Petitioner then brought the RTC orders to the CA via petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, but the CA denied this
in the assailed Decision dated October 6, 2000. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; and the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. 25,086-97 are AFFIRMED en toto. The petitioner is hereby ordered to file its Answer before the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA found that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the action before the RTC seeks to compel petitioner to accept payment
of the consigned amounts, and therefore one for specific performance, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 13
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the CA’s decision but this was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated February 6, 2001.14
Hence, the present petition, with petitioners setting forth basically the same arguments it raised before the RTC and the CA. 15 According to
petitioner, based on the allegations and the relief prayed for in the complaint, the action before the RTC is a consignation case or an action to
compel the creditor to accept payment; and following the ruling in Ascue v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 804, the amount consigned is below
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner also argues that the case before the RTC is not a proper consignation case as it is not lodged with the
proper forum where the consignation or deposit is at the disposal of judicial authority, the deposits having been made with the MTCC Office of
the Clerk of Court. Lastly, petitioner contends that since it is not the proper case, then it is dismissible for lack of jurisdiction, lack of or failure
to state a cause of action and litis pendentia.
It has long been settled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order. It neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,
as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits, and as such, the general rule is that the denial
of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari.16 In order to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.17 In this case, the Court finds none.
Both the RTC and the CA found that Civil Case No. 25,086-97 is within the RTC’s jurisdiction as the same is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
But that is the only aspect where the two courts shared the same view. The RTC and the CA differed in characterizing respondents’ case. It was
the opinion of the RTC that Civil Case No. 25,086-97 is one for damages, while the appellate court found that it was for specific performance.
Given this divergence of opinion, it now devolves upon the Court to ascertain the nature of the case before the RTC and ultimately determine
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the same.
11
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 18 In this case, the
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 25,086-97 sufficiently established a case for DAMAGES, and not specific performance. Neither is it an action for
consignation. This is evident from the reading of the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. The complaint principally sought an
award of moral, nominal and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged damages suffered by
respondents by reason of petitioner’s disconnection of their electrical service. The allegations regarding the consignation with the court of the
amounts due to petitioner are mere factual premises from which respondents are basing their theory that petitioner’s disconnection of the
electrical service and removal of the electric meter was unjustified. Also, the relief sought by respondents for the RTC to order petitioner to
delete the amount of P9,633.32 from their account is merely incidental to their claim for damages. It is not the main cause of their claim.
Given that Civil Case No. 25,086-97 is an action for damages, the next question to be resolved is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.
Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds P100,000.00,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with
the RTC.19 Where the amount of the demand in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.20 On March 20, 1999, by virtue of Administrative Circular No. 21-99, the jurisdictional amount was
increased to P200,000.00.
Guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691 were laid out in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994. Particularly, with
regard to damages, paragraph 2 provides:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause
of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.21 Jurisdiction should not be affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the
defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.22
The complaint in Civil Case No. 25,086-97 was filed on March 3, 1997,23 hence, R.A. No. 7691 and its implementing guidelines apply. In their
prayer, respondents sought, among others, the following awards:
xxxx
C. On the First Cause of Action: To condemn defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P80,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 nominal damages
and P20,000.00 exemplary or corrective damages with interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid.
D. On the Second Cause of Action: To condemn the defendant to pay damages to the following plaintiffs, viz.:
(1) To plaintiff Serafin S. Osabel:
P200,000.00 – moral damages
20,000.00 – nominal damages
20,000.00 – temperate damages
20,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages
with interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid.
(2) To plaintiffs Neoceda Osabel, Marie Johanna Osabel-Garcia, Victoria Luz-Dacuycuy, Anna Christia Osabel and Serafin Osabel, Jr.
25,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages
12
with interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid.
(3) P6,163.13 actual or compensatory damages with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully
paid.
E. On the Third Cause of Action: To condemn the defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P140,000.00 in damages itemized as follows:
20,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages 24
It is clear from the foregoing that respondents’ main action is for damages. Hence, all these claims must be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount, and obviously, it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioner’s argument of lack of cause of action likewise cannot stand.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.25 A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of
action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that
are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. 26
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This
hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint. Hence,
to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the
truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?27
A perusal of the complaint discloses sufficient allegations of a legal right or interest enjoyed by respondents, which was allegedly violated by
petitioner, thus causing damages and injury to the former. The issue of valid consignation raised by petitioner is a matter of defense that is
best left to be established by proof and determined during the trial on the merits of the case, as was correctly ruled by the RTC.
Lastly, with regard to the ground of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of the case, suffice it to say that petitioner never raised this issue
before the RTC or the CA. It is being alleged for the first time only before the Court. The rule is that questions not raised in the lower courts
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.28Consequently, the Court will not dwell on said issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 8, is ORDERED to proceed with Civil Case No. 25,086-
97 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
13
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989
LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner

vs.
HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.
Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio Perez.
Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. Perez.
REGALAD0, J.:
Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's
complaint, as well as the order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent
Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III.
Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas,
Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by
respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are
four of the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de Jesus did not answer either the original or the amended complaint, while
defendant Rosario Vargas could not be served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno is included herein as he was impleaded by
defendant Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein, in her cross-claim.
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written submission of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to
Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P
9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila,
defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck with
Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried
to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the
shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1
The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of
carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-
delict.
Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire
ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a
certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck
was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is
ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner
executed a release of claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
14
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto
Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva
already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and
Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called
counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured
to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied.
Hence, this appeal, petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of
respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
We find the present recourse devoid of merit.
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement
under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by
petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in
our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial
court found them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly
and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot
accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued in his favor.
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a procedure.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their
subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other
solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment made by the
other respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records
to show, either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as
agreement.
WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
15
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented
by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN,
JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA,
minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and
non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may
be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover
16
and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as
a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the
water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite,
(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric
power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53%
of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the
entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary
growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6
June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional
policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right
to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1)
the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and
the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
18
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply
in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage
of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement
or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing
would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before
the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced
by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter
of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation
of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
19
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or
a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill
of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates
on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and
noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of
the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.
20
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which
reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective
of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality
that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian
of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
21
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if
we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
22
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to
wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
23
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131719 May 25, 2004
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, OWWA PUNO, ADMINISTRATOR, and POEA ADMINISTRATOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER (ARCO-PHIL.), INC., representing its members:
Worldcare Services Internationale, Inc., Steadfast
International Recruitment Corporation, Dragon International Manpower Services Corporation, Verdant Manpower Mobilization
Corporation, Brent Overseas Personnel, Inc., ARL Manpower Services, Inc., Dahlzhen International Services, Inc., Interworld Placement
Center, Inc., Lakas Tao Contract Services, Ltd. Co., and SSC Multiservices, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the POEA Administrator and the OWWA Administrator, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, assail the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38815 affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401, granting the plea of the petitioners therein for a writ of preliminary injunction
and of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on August 24, 1995.
The Antecedents
Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. The Omnibus
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996
issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.)
filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to
declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections
9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law.
In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No. 8042 was self-executory and that no implementing rules were needed.
It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal
recruitment, Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments, viz:
Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussions, there appears to be urgent an imperative need for this Honorable Court to maintain
the status quo by enjoining the implementation or effectivity of the questioned provisions of RA 8042, by way of a restraining order
otherwise, the member recruitment agencies of the petitioner will suffer grave or irreparable damage or injury. With the effectivity
of RA 8042, a great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being
prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional. This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the
fact that processing of deployment papers of overseas workers for the past weeks have come to a standstill at the POEA and this has
affected thousands of workers everyday just because of the enactment of RA 8042. Indeed, this has far reaching effects not only to
survival of the overseas manpower supply industry and the active participating recruitment agencies, the country’s economy which
has survived mainly due to the dollar remittances of the overseas workers but more importantly, to the poor and the needy who are
in dire need of income-generating jobs which can only be obtained from abroad. The loss or injury that the recruitment agencies will
suffer will then be immeasurable and irreparable. As of now, even foreign employers have already reduced their manpower
requirements from the Philippines due to their knowledge that RA 8042 prejudiced and adversely affected the local recruitment
agencies.3
On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period of only twenty (20) days therefrom.
After the petitioners filed their comment on the petition, the ARCO-Phil. filed an amended petition, the amendments consisting in the
inclusion in the caption thereof eleven (11) other corporations which it alleged were its members and which it represented in the suit, and a
plea for a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing Section 6 subsection (i), Section 6 subsection (k) and
paragraphs 15 and 16 thereof, Section 8, Section 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, and Sections 11 and 40 of Rep. Act No. 8042.
The respondent ARCO-Phil. assailed Section 2(g) and (i), Section 6 subsection (a) to (m), Section 7(a) to (b), and Section 10 paragraphs (1) and
(2), quoted as follows:
(g) THE STATE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION TO ALL MIGRANT WORKERS IS THE POSSESSION OF SKILLS. PURSUANT
TO THIS AND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL DEPLOY AND/OR ALLOW THE DEPLOYMENT ONLY OF SKILLED
FILIPINO WORKERS.4
24
Sec. 2 subsection (i, 2nd par.)
Nonetheless, the deployment of Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service contractors and
manning agents employing them shall be encourages (sic). Appropriate incentives may be extended to them.
II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-
licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-
holder, licensee or holder of authority:
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of
securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless
the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for
employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to the dignity of
the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized
representative;
(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of foreign exchange earnings,
separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any
corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial
considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
25
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the
officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) nor more than one
million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of
age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
Sec. 8.
Prohibition on Officials and Employees. – It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of the Department of Labor and
Employment, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), or the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA), or the Department of Foreign Affairs, or other government agencies involved in the implementation of this Act, or their
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, to engage, directly or indirectly, in the business of recruiting
migrant workers as defined in this Act. The penalties provided in the immediate preceding paragraph shall be imposed upon them.
(underscoring supplied)
Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2.
Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint
and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its
approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
SEC. 11. Mandatory Periods for Resolution of Illegal Recruitment Cases. – The preliminary investigations of cases under this Act shall
be terminated within a period of thirty (30) calendar days from the date of their filing. Where the preliminary investigation is
conducted by a prosecution officer and a prima facie case is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within
twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima
facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecution officer within forty-eight (48)
hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.
The respondent averred that the aforequoted provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.5 According to the
respondent, Section 6(g) and (i) discriminated against unskilled workers and their families and, as such, violated the equal protection clause, as
well as Article II, Section 126 and Article XV, Sections 17 and 3(3) of the Constitution.8 As the law encouraged the deployment of skilled Filipino
workers, only overseas skilled workers are granted rights. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek
employment abroad. According to the respondent, the right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from
finding employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while
unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by
foreign employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only encourage fly-by-night illegal
recruiters.
According to the respondent, the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the exclusion of all other licensed and
authorized recruiters is an invalid classification. Licensed and authorized recruiters are thus deprived of their right to property and due process
26
and to the "equality of the person." It is understandable for the law to prohibit illegal recruiters, but to discriminate against licensed and
registered recruiters is unconstitutional.
The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment
agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are
holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in
Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive;
hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for
officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep.
Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment. Since recruitment agencies usually operate with a manpower of more than three persons, such agencies are
forced to shut down, lest their officers and/or employees be charged with large scale illegal recruitment or economic sabotage and sentenced
to life imprisonment. Thus, the penalty imposed by law, being disproportionate to the prohibited acts, discourages the business of licensed
and registered recruitment agencies.
The respondent also posited that Section 6(m) and paragraphs (15) and (16), Sections 8, 9 and 10, paragraph 2 of the law violate Section 22,
Article III of the Constitution10 prohibiting ex-post facto laws and bills of attainder. This is because the provisions presume that a licensed and
registered recruitment agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the
prohibited acts under the law. Furthermore, officials, employees and their relatives are presumed guilty of illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage upon such finding that they committed any of the said prohibited acts.
The respondent further argued that the 90-day period in Section 10, paragraph (1) within which a labor arbiter should decide a money claim is
relatively short, and could deprive licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process. The period within which the summons and
the complaint would be served on foreign employees and, thereafter, the filing of the answer to the complaint would take more than 90 days.
This would thereby shift on local licensed and authorized recruiters the burden of proving the defense of foreign employers. Furthermore, the
respondent asserted, Section 10, paragraph 2 of the law, which provides for the joint and several liability of the officers and employees, is a bill
of attainder and a violation of the right of the said corporate officers and employees to due process. Considering that such corporate officers
and employees act with prior approval of the board of directors of such corporation, they should not be liable, jointly and severally, for such
corporate acts.
The respondent asserted that the following provisions of the law are unconstitutional:
SEC. 9. Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at
the time of the effectivity of this Act.
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
Sec. 40.
The departments and agencies charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act shall, within ninety (90) days after the effectiviy of
this Act, formulate the necessary rules and regulations for its effective implementation.
According to the respondent, the said provisions violate Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution 11 because they impair the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that (a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief; (b) the
petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been released as yet; (c) the assailed provisions do not violate
any provisions of the Constitution; and, (d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State. In opposition to
the respondent’s plea for injunctive relief, the petitioners averred that:
As earlier shown, the amended petition for declaratory relief is devoid of merit for failure of petitioner to demonstrate convincingly that the
assailed law is unconstitutional, apart from the defect and impropriety of the petition. One who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond reasonable doubt (Caleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748). All reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This presumption of constitutionality is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers which enjoin upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments (Garcia vs. Executive
Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991]). Necessarily, the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
27
prayed for must fall. Besides, an act of legislature approved by the executive is presumed to be within constitutional bounds (National Press
Club v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 1).12
After the respective counsels of the parties were heard on oral arguments, the trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the
petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of ₱50,000. The petitioner posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995,
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 pending the
termination of the proceedings:
… Section 2, subsections (g) and (i, 2nd par.); Section 6, subsections (a) to (m), and pars. 15 & 16; Section 7, subsections (a) & (b);
Section 8; Section 9; Section 10; pars. 1 & 2; Section 11; and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. …13
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court on the following grounds:
1. Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive
relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042;
2. Respondent Judge fixed a ₱50,000 injunction bond which is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioner-officials
may sustain, should respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.14
The petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the trial court. It is inconceivable how the
respondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law. They argued that if,
at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled
Filipino migrant workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not the respondent. The respondent, as petitioner
in the trial court, was burdened to adduce preponderant evidence of such irreparable injury, but failed to do so. The petitioners further
insisted that the petition a quo was premature since the rules and regulations implementing the law had yet to be promulgated when such
petition was filed. Finally, the petitioners averred that the respondent failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the law and the rules and regulations issued implementing the same.
On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four-page decision dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
The petitioners now come to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Private respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its member-agencies to be protected by the
injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042;
2. The ₱50,000 injunction bond fixed by the court a quo and sustained by the Court of Appeals is grossly inadequate to answer for
the damage which petitioners-officials may sustain, should private respondent ARCO-PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled
thereto.15
On February 16, 1998, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the assailed order and writ of
preliminary injunction.
The Issues
The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed order and the writ of preliminary injunction on a bond of only ₱50,000 and whether or not the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court’s order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.
The petitioners contend that the respondent has no locus standi. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest
as petitioner in the action. Although the respondent filed the petition in the Regional Trial Court in behalf of licensed and registered
recruitment agencies, it failed to adduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolutions of the said members
authorizing it to represent the said agencies in the proceedings. Neither is the suit of the respondent a class suit so as to vest in it a personality
to assail Rep. Act No. 8042; the respondent is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented. The
petitioners assert that the law is presumed constitutional and, as such, the respondent was burdened to make a case strong enough to
overcome such presumption and establish a clear right to injunctive relief.
The petitioners bewail the ₱50,000 bond fixed by the trial court for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and affirmed by the
appellate court. They assert that the amount is grossly inadequate to answer for any damages that the general public may suffer by reason of
the non-enforcement of the assailed provisions of the law. The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in granting the
28
respondent’s plea for injunctive relief, and the appellate court erred in affirming the order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court.
The respondent, for its part, asserts that it has duly established its locus standi and its right to injunctive relief as gleaned from its pleadings
and the appendages thereto. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it was incumbent on the petitioners, as respondents in the RTC, to
show cause why no injunction should issue. It avers that the injunction bond posted by the respondent was more than adequate to answer for
any injury or damage the petitioners may suffer, if any, by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. In any event, the
assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 exposed its members to the immediate and irreparable damage of being deprived of their right to a
livelihood without due process, a property right protected under the Constitution.
The respondent contends that the commendable purpose of the law to eradicate illegal recruiters should not be done at the expense and to
the prejudice of licensed and authorized recruitment agencies. The writ of preliminary injunction was necessitated by the great number of duly
licensed recruitment agencies that had stopped or suspended their business operations for fear that their officers and employees would be
indicted and prosecuted under the assailed oppressive penal provisions of the law, and meted excessive penalties. The respondent, likewise,
urges that the Court should take judicial notice that the processing of deployment papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill
at the POEA.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The Respondent Has Locus Standi
To File the Petition in the RTC in Representation of the Eleven Licensed and Registered Recruitment Agencies Impleaded in the Amended
Petition
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association
with that of its members.16 An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected
by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.17
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,18 we held that standing jus tertii would be
recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the right of the third party
would be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claims.
In this case, the respondent filed the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for and in behalf of its eleven (11)
licensed and registered recruitment agencies which are its members, and which approved separate resolutions expressly authorizing the
respondent to file the said suit for and in their behalf. We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized for the
purposes inter alia of promoting and supporting the growth and development of the manpower recruitment industry, both in the local and
international levels; providing, creating and exploring employment opportunities for the exclusive benefit of its general membership;
enhancing and promoting the general welfare and protection of Filipino workers; and, to act as the representative of any individual, company,
entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to
accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and
its members are in every practical sense identical. The respondent asserts that the assailed provisions violate the constitutional rights of its
members and the officers and employees thereof. The respondent is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make
more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.19
However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead
any unskilled workers in its petition. Furthermore, in failing to implead, as parties-petitioners, the eleven licensed and registered recruitment
agencies it claimed to represent, the respondent failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 6320 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, since the
eleven licensed and registered recruitment agencies for which the respondent filed the suit are specifically named in the petition, the
amended petition is deemed amended to avoid multiplicity of suits.21
The Assailed Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction Is Mooted
By Case Law
The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed to the immediate
and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rights without due process, on its claim that a
great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear that (a) their officers and employees
would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive
penalties, including life imprisonment, for illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment without regard to whether the recruitment
29
agencies involved are licensed and/or authorized; and, (b) if the members of the respondent, which are licensed and authorized, decide to
continue with their businesses, they face the stigma and the curse of being labeled "illegal recruiters." In granting the respondent’s plea for a
writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court held, without stating the factual and legal basis therefor, that the enforcement of Rep. Act No.
8042, pendente lite, would cause grave and irreparable injury to the respondent until the case is decided on its merits.
We note, however, that since Rep. Act No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, the Court had, in a catena of cases, applied the penal provisions
in Section 6, including paragraph (m) thereof, and the last two paragraphs therein defining large scale illegal recruitment committed by officers
and/or employees of recruitment agencies by themselves and in connivance with private individuals, and imposed the penalties provided in
Section 7 thereof, including the penalty of life imprisonment.22 The Informations therein were filed after preliminary investigations as provided
for in Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 8042 and in venues as provided for in Section 9 of the said act. In People v. Chowdury,23 we held that illegal
recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage and must be enforced.
In People v. Diaz,24 we held that Rep. Act No. 8042 is but an amendment of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law
because it is not applied retroactively. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 the issue of the extent of the police
power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling vis-à-vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution were raised and we held, thus:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the
right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of
which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a
legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the
maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode
and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled
practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals
leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen
are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require
previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken
continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet
reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the Constitution to support their
argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract.
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution … must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law,
and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists under the assailed department orders
constitutes class legislation which violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require
absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long
as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present
and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 26
The validity of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal
recruitment has been upheld in People v. Chowdury:27
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been
held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human
agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business
30
naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its
purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. …28
By its rulings, the Court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed penal and procedural provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042, including the
imposable penalties therefor. Until the Court, by final judgment, declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of the
said provisions cannot be enjoined.
The RTC Committed Grave Abuse of Its Discretion Amounting to Excess or Lack of Jurisdiction in Issuing the Assailed Order and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
The matter of whether to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if the
court commits grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the said writ amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified via a
writ of certiorari and prohibition.
In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona,29 we ruled that a law is presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial
interpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the official acts not
only of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the highest magistrate of the land.
In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,30 the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions,
are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to
be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420, 85
L.Ed. 577.
And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this rule, that:
"It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every
criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith …" 319 U.S., at 164, 63 S.Ct., at 881.31
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it, unless
there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. 32 The "on its face"
invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
generally disfavored.33
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. 34 The higher standard reflects judicial
deference toward "legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover, an injunction will
alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone
even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.35 Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing
whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public interest.36 In
litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest
than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.37 Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future
enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship. 38
The fear or chilling-effect of the assailed penal provisions of the law on the members of the respondent does not by itself justify prohibiting
the State from enforcing them against those whom the State believes in good faith to be punishable under the laws:
… Just as the incidental "chilling effect" of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect
that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State
from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in
good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.39
It must be borne in mind that subject to constitutional limitations, Congress is empowered to define what acts or omissions shall constitute a
crime and to prescribe punishments therefor.40 The power is inherent in Congress and is part of the sovereign power of the State to maintain
peace and order. Whatever views may be entertained regarding the severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficiency or its futility,
these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.41 The comparative gravity of crimes and whether their consequences are more or less
injurious are matters for the State and Congress itself to determine.42 Specification of penalties involves questions of legislative policy.43
31
Due process prohibits criminal stability from shifting the burden of proof to the accused, punishing wholly passive conduct, defining crimes in
vague or overbroad language and failing to grant fair warning of illegal conduct.44 Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one
which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.45 Bills
of attainder are legislative acts which inflict punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a
bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the
lack of judicial trial.46
Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and their relatives employed in government
agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale
illegal recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment
only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime charged.47
The possibility that the officers and employees of the recruitment agencies, which are members of the respondent, and their relatives who are
employed in the government agencies charged in the enforcement of the law, would be indicted for illegal recruitment and, if convicted
sentenced to life imprisonment for large scale illegal recruitment, absent proof of irreparable injury, is not sufficient on which to base the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to suspend the enforcement of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 and avert any indictments
under the law.48The normal course of criminal prosecutions cannot be blocked on the basis of allegations which amount to speculations about
the future.49
There is no allegation in the amended petition or evidence adduced by the respondent that the officers and/or employees of its members had
been threatened with any indictments for violations of the penal provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. Neither is there any allegation therein that
any of its members and/or their officers and employees committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 6(a) to (m) of the law for which they
could be indicted. Neither did the respondent adduce any evidence in the RTC that any or all of its members or a great number of other duly
licensed and registered recruitment agencies had to stop their business operations because of fear of indictments under Sections 6 and 7 of
Rep. Act No. 8042. The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment agencies would close shop and
stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
penal laws cannot be based on such conjectures or speculations. The Court cannot take judicial notice that the processing of deployment
papers of overseas workers have come to a virtual standstill at the POEA because of the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042. The
respondent must adduce evidence to prove its allegation, and the petitioners accorded a chance to adduce controverting evidence.
The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No.
8042. Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend foreign employees in cases before the
Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.
The trial court even ignored the public interest involved in suspending the enforcement of Rep. Act No. 8042 vis-à-vis the eleven licensed and
registered recruitment agencies represented by the respondent. In People v. Gamboa, 50we emphasized the primary aim of Rep. Act No. 8042:
Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain employment
abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
Aimed at affording greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment
and placement of workers for overseas employment. Otherwise known as the Magna Carta of OFWs, it broadened the concept of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties thereto, especially those that constitute economic
sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.51
By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the
prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad
as overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies52 embedded in Rep. Act No. 8042. It bears stressing that overseas
workers, land-based and sea-based, had been remitting to the Philippines billions of dollars which over the years had propped the economy.
In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court considered paramount the interests of the eleven licensed and registered
recruitment agencies represented by the respondent, and capriciously overturned the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed
provisions on the barefaced claim of the respondent that the assailed provisions of Rep. Act No. 8042 are unconstitutional. The trial court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary
injunction. It is for this reason that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court dated August 21, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-24401 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by it in the
said case on August 24, 1995 are NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
32
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986
SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI, Cebu, Branch VIII], and PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents.
Jesus Yray for petitioner.
Teodoro Almase for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
petition for certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against respondent Judge Bernardo L. Salas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
antecedent facts are briefly as follows:
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint on December 6, 1972 against petitioner's father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and
partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro Sepulveda filed his Answer dated December 31, 1972 resisting the claim and raising the
special defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding. During the presentation of evidence for the
plaintiff, the defendant died on March 25, 1975. On May 21, 1975, counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were
enumerated the thirteen children and surviving spouse of the deceased.
On May 5, 1975, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her late
father in July, 1976.
At the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, Attys. Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela, former counsels for the deceased defendant,
manifested in open court that with the death of their client, their contract with him was also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor
the surviving spouse had renewed the contract, but instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings.
Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the respondent trial judge set the case for hearing on
January 13, 1976 and sent the notice of hearing to said counsels.
On January 13, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued three orders. The first order substituted the heirs of the deceased defendant, namely,
his thirteen children and surviving spouse, as defendants; the second order authorized Atty. Teodoro Almase, counsel for the plaintiff, to
present his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela and the third order treated the case submitted for decision, after the
plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and directed that said counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant be
furnished copies thereof.
On January 28, 1976, the respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the deceased defendant.
On February 19, 1976, ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know that a decision had already been rendered,
filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased defendant through their counsel Atty. Jesus Yray. This was denied admission by the respondent
trial judge for being already moot and academic because of the earlier decision.
On March 9, 1976, the widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their counsel Atty. Delfin Quijano, filed a motion for
substitution and for reconsideration of the decision dated January 28, 1976. On April 7, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued an order
setting aside his decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff, Pacifico Pelaez, with a proviso that said
order was applicable only to the three heirs who had filed the motion. On July 14, 1976, the respondent trial judge lifted the order setting
aside his decision, despite the verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the absence of
their counsel.
On July 9, 1976, petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased defendant and who was one of the
heirs who had filed an Answer on February 19, 1976, filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. On August 25,
1976, the respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had already become final.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the proceedings in the respondent trial court.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the present appeal.
33
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. — Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes
incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or
incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with this rule by filing a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They
also correctly manifested in open court at the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with
him was also terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the heirs had instead engaged the services of
other lawyers in the intestate proceedings.
Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels of the deceased defendant as counsels for
the heirs of the deceased. The statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the lawyers of their deceased father
in court on January 13, 1976 (Annex K) carries the presumption that they were authorized by the heirs of the deceased defendant" is
erroneous. As this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. 16), "the attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the
deceased upon the death of the latter, the principal. " Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the manifestation of said
lawyers in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs of the deceased defendant.
Consequently, when on the same date, November 27, 1975, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting the continuation of the trial of
the case on January 13, 1976, with notices sent to Atty. Almase for the plaintiff and Attys. Antigua and Branzuela for the deceased defendant,
he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
It was only at the hearing on January 13, 1976 that the respondent trial judge issued an order substituting the deceased defendant with his
fourteen heirs. This was followed with an order authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to present his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua
and Branzuela, and lastly, an order treating the case as submitted for decision.
In the order of the respondent trial judge dated November 10, 1976, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order denying her
motion for intervention (Annex 1 of the Comment), mention was made of the delayed arrival of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela at the hearing on
January 13, 1976 and of their being allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff himself.
The refusal of said former counsels of the deceased defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff was justified —
... in view of the intervening event of appellant's death and the interposition of the equally established principle that the relationship
of attorney and client is terminated by the death of the client, as acknowledged by respondent court itself as well as respondents. In
the absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his deceased defendant the attorney would have no further
power or authority to appear or take any further action in the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the
necessary steps to safeguard the decedent's rights in the case. (Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 534,
540)
Moreover, as above stated, petitioner had as early as May 5, 1975 filed a petition for letters of administration, and the same was granted in
July, 1975.
Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the de ceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
As this Court has held:
... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the claim is not thereby extinguished, to order
upon proper notice the legal representative of the deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since
no administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same was still pending determination in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of the deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within
which to file appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have set a period for the substitution of the deceased
party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the court is called upon to order the opposing party to procure the
34
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative shall then
'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the legal representative of the deceased
and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who yet had to be substituted in the pending appeal Thus, it has been held that
when a party dies in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of
the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the
trial held by the court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void
because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding. (Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil 275 [1936]; Obut vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546) (Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 541.
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate. It is only in
cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased.
In the case at bar, in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF Intestate Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application of
petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix of the estate, the respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner
and granted her motion to substitute the deceased defendant.
While the lower courts correctly held that the death of Pedro Sepulveda did not obliterate his verified Answer to the Complaint filed by private
respondent and that the Answer filed by the ten heirs and the Answer filed by the Administratrix were both unnecessary, the said heirs or the
administratrix could, with leave of court, file an Amended Answer.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial judge after the death of the deceased
defendant are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the petition for certiorari is granted; petitioner is ordered substituted for the
deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda; and the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial judge after the death of the deceased
defendant, including the decision rendered by him on January 28, 1976, are set aside; with costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
35
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967
AGUSTIN O. CASEÑAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE ROSALES (Substituted by her heirs), ROMEO S. ROSALES, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.
Juan L. Pastrana for plaintiff-appellant.

Francisco Ro. Cupin and Wenceslao B. Resales for defendants-appellees.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of dismissal entered by the Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 780, entitled Agustin Caseñas vs.
Concepcion Sanchez Vda. de Rosales, et al.
On August 21, 1952, Rodolfo Arañas and Agustin O. Caseñas filed with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, under Civil Case No. 261, a
complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses Jose
A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez. They alleged that sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseñas acquired from Rodolfo Arañas under a deed of
assignment, the latter's rights and interest over a parcel of land covering an area of more or less than 2,273 square meters and designated as
Lot No. 445-A of the Butuan Cadastre No. 84 (Psd. 4943); that Rodolfo Arañas in turn, acquired the said property from the spouses Jose A.
Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of sale executed on March 18, 1939 under the terms of which, however, the actual transfer of
the aforesaid land unto the vendee would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that despite the above documented transactions,
and despite the arrival of the stipulated period for the execution of the final deed of transfer, the vendors spouses refused to fulfill their
obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to the vendee, Rodolfo Arañas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O. Caseñas. Thus,
the principal relief prayed for in the above complaint was for an order directing the defendants-spouses to "execute a deed of absolute sale of
the property described in the complaint in favor of the assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseñas.
After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint, but before trial, the counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the
trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Arañas and defendant Jose A. Rosales had both died. In view of the said manifestation, the lower court, in an
order dated April 27, 1956, directed, the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseñas, to amend the complaint to effect the necessary substitution of
parties thereon. The said surviving plaintiff, however, failed altogether to comply with the aforementioned order of April 27, 1956 to the end
that on July 18, 1957, the lower court issued the following order:
Until this date no amended complaint was filed by the attorney for the plaintiffs. This shows abandonment and lack of interest on
the part of the plaintiffs. This being an old case, for failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs to comply with the order of
this Court the same is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.
As no appeal was taken from the above order of dismissal, the same, in due time, became final.
On April 18, 1960, Agustin O. Caseñas, the same plaintiff Caseñas in civil Case No. 261, filed with the same Court of First Instance of Agusan,
under Civil Case No. 780, another complaint against the widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to
real property, with damages." This suit referred itself to the very same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261 and asserted exactly the
same allegations as those made in the former complaint, to wit: "that the plaintiff (Agustin O. Caseñas) has acquired the above-described
property by purchase from its previous owner, Rodolfo Arañas now deceased, ...; and said Rodolfo Aranas had in turn acquired the same
property by virtue of another deed of sale executed by Jose A. Rosales, now also deceased;" (Par. 3, Complaint) "that under the terms and
stipulations of paragraph 2 of the deed of sale (between Rosales and Arañas) ... Jose A. Rosales was to hold title to the land in question in favor
of Rodolfo Arañas or the latter's signs and successors in interest for a period of (5) years from February 19, 1936, at the expiration of which
said Jose A. Rosales was to execute a document conveying absolutely the title to the land in question in favor of the aforementioned Rodolfo
Arañas or his assigns and successors in interest" (Par. 9, Complaint) ; "despite which obligation the defendants refused, even after the
expiration of the stipulated period to "convey title to the land in question and to execute the corresponding document covering the same."
(Par. 12, Complaint) In the premises, the plaintiff prayed for judgment "quieting the title of the plaintiff to the land in question and ordering
the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the same in favor of the said plaintiff" plus costs and damages.
To the above complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action,
failure to include indispensable parties, and that the contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had filed his
opposition to the above motion, the lower court issued the order under appeal dismissing the complaint. Of the above grounds, though, the
lower court relied alone on the defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and prescription. The material portion of this order of
dismissal reads:
The Court, however, believes that this action is barred by prior judgment. The order of dismissal in Civil Case No. 261 was already
final and has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. The parties in Civil Case No. 261 and in this case are substantially the
same; the subject matter is the same and there is identity of cause of action. All the elements of res judicata are therefore
present.1äwphï1.ñët
36
Moreover, the complaint states no cause of action if its purpose is to quiet title, because the plaintiff has as yet no title to the land in
question. Precisely, this action is brought in order to acquire or secure title by compelling the defendants to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the plaintiff. However, this action for specific performance cannot also prosper because being based upon an agreement in
writing it is already barred by prescription as the period of ten years has long expired when the present complaint was filed.
The appeal at bar assails the above determination that Civil Case No. 780 is barred by a prior judgment and by prescription and that the same
states no cause of action. It is on these issues, therefore, that this Court shall dispose of this appeal.
We find for the appellant.
When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof was given to the trial court, it devolved on the said court to
order, not the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased in accordance with the
procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 17. Death of Party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, this court held that an order to amend the complaint, before the proper substitution of
parties as directed by the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end
that an order dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent case, Ferriera et al. vs.
Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a similar conclusion on the determination that the continuance of a
proceedings during the pendency of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the
rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction."
The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited, save for the minor variance that in the former two of the litigants
died while only one predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during the pendency of civil case, notice was given to the trial
court of the deaths of one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the substitution of the deceased's legal
representatives in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving plaintiff to amend the
complaint and when the latter failed to comply therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance. We must hold,
therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his
complaint in Civil Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such an order did not justify the dismissal of his
complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void.
Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No. 261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar the subsequent prosecution of the same or
identical claim.
Finally, We find ourselves unable to share the appellees' view that the appellant's complaint under Civil Case No. 780 failed to state a sufficient
cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs.
Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and both these elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, this Court is of the view that it should defer resolution on it until after Civil Case No. 780 shall
have been tried on the merits, considering that one of the defenses set up by the appellant against the said issue is the existence of a trust
relationship over the property in dispute.
In view of all the foregoing, the order dated January 20, 1961 dismissing Civil Case No. 780 is hereby set aside and the said case is ordered
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. Costs against the appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
37
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160426 January 31, 2008
CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,

vs.
AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Capitolina Vivero Napere interposes this petition for review to assail the Court of Appeals’ Decision1 dated October 9, 2003, which
upheld the validity of the Regional Trial Court’s decision despite failure to formally order the substitution of the heirs of the deceased
defendant, petitioner’s husband.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
Respondent Amando Barbarona is the registered owner of Lot No. 3177, situated in Barangay San Sotero (formerly Tambis), Javier, Leyte and
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7350. Lot No. 3176, covered by OCT No. 1110 in the name of Anacleto Napere, adjoins said
lot on the northeastern side. After Anacleto died, his son, Juan Napere, and the latter’s wife, herein petitioner, planted coconut trees on
certain portions of the property with the consent of his co-heirs.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that in April 1980, the spouses Napere, their relatives and hired laborers, by means of stealth and
strategy, encroached upon and occupied the northeastern portion of Lot No. 3177; that the Naperes harvested the coconut fruits thereon,
appropriated the proceeds thereof, and, despite demands, refused to turn over possession of the area; that in April 1992, a relocation survey
was conducted which confirmed that the respondents’ property was encroached upon by the Naperes; that on the basis of the relocation
survey, the respondents took possession of this encroached portion of the lot and harvested the fruits thereon from April 1993 to December
1993; but that in January 1994, the Naperes repeated their acts by encroaching again on the respondents’ property, harvesting the coconuts
and appropriating the proceeds thereof, and refusing to vacate the property on demand.
On November 10, 1995, while the case was pending, Juan Napere died. Their counsel informed the court of Juan Napere’s death, and
submitted the names and addresses of Napere’s heirs.
At the pre-trial, the RTC noted that the Naperes were not contesting the respondents’ right of possession over the disputed portion of the
property but were demanding the rights of a planter in good faith under Articles 445 and 455 of the Civil Code.
On October 17, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision against the estate of Juan Napere, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, hereby declaring the following:
a) The estate of Juan Napere is liable to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (P179,200.00)
PESOS in actual damages;
b) The estate of Juan Napere shall be liable to pay FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS in litigation expenses, and the
c) Cost[s] of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing, inter alia, that the judgment of the trial court was void for lack of
jurisdiction over the heirs who were not ordered substituted as party-defendants for the deceased.
On October 9, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC Decision.3 The appellate court held that failure to substitute the heirs for the
deceased defendant will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment in a case which survives the death of such party.
Thus, this petition for review where the only issue is whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan
Napere. Petitioner alleges that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs because of its failure to order their
substitution pursuant to Section 17,4 Rule 3 of the Rule of Court; hence, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the trial
court are null and void.
The petition must fail.

38
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party
by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address
of the latter’s legal representative.
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the defendant. Notably, the
counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The trial
court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, we hold that the proceedings conducted and
the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no
substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such
party.5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that
there was an undeniable violation of due process.6
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. 7The rule on substitution
was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process.8 It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. 9 Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules
results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected
by the decision rendered therein.10 Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.11
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in
defense of the deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due process. The essence of due process is the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is not violated, as when the
right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
validity of a promulgated decision.14
In light of these pronouncements, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court and the judgment rendered therein because the
petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan
Napere and petitioner continued to represent them even after Juan’s death. Hence, through counsel, petitioner was able to adequately defend
herself and the deceased in the proceedings below. Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not
denied petitioner.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process as would nullify the proceedings and the judgment thereon can be invoked only by the heirs whose
rights have been violated. Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have been
allegedly violated.15 Petitioner, who had every opportunity and who took advantage of such opportunity, through counsel, to participate in the
trial court proceedings, cannot claim denial of due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 9, 2003, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 56457, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
39
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33949 October 28, 1973
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH II, HONORABLE TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, and ILIGAN
INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-33986 October 23, 1973
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TEOLULO C. TANDAYAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iligan City, Branch II; SHERIFF OF ILIGAN
CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-34188 October 23, 1973
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Lanao del Norte and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS,
INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin for petitioners Republic and Board of
Investments.
Filoteo Evangelista and Angara, Abello, Regala and Cruz for petitioner Central Bank of the Philippines.
Jesus A. Avanceña, Federico G. Cabling and Hilario G. Orsolino for petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines.
Dominador R. Aytona, Manuel O. Chan, Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jose P. Santillan, Manuel San Jose and Roberto San Jose for respondent Iligan
Integrated Steel Mills, Inc.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Petition of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short) and the Board of Investments (BOI) for certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. L-33949, against the order of respondent court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint
against them in said court's Civil Case No. 1701, notwithstanding their having invoked therein the grounds of improper venue and non-suability
of the State, because the said complaint of private respondent Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. (IISMI) seeks specific performance by the
Republic of certain contracts it has with said respondent and the Export Import Bank of Washington, D.C. as well as the approval of the BOI of
said respondent's applications for registration of its blast furnace and B.O.F. for hot metal making facilities and also the giving by the BOI to
said respondent of protective tariff privileges; petition also for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction docketed as G.R. No. L-
33986, of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank) against the order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same respondent
court ordering the removal of private respondent IISMI from said petitioner's watchlist of debtors of government financial institutions and
further enjoining petitioner Central Bank to allow said respondent to import raw materials by utilizing its (respondent's) own resources,
without additional DBP or other government financing institution exposure, and also to approve the no-dollar processing agreement between
said respondent and Atlas Worldwide Corporation; and another petition, likewise for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. L-34188,
of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) against the order and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same respondent court
enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by said petitioner of various mortgages in its favor of private respondent IISMI.
On August 25, 1971, shortly after the petition in G.R. No. L-33949 was filed, the Court required respondents to answer the petition, and after
respondent IISMI filed its answer, the case was set for hearing on October 15, 1971. Before this last date, however, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
L-33986 and L-34188 were filed, and as these last two petitions were also given due course, and respondents were required to answer them,
and inasmuch as all three petitions deal practically with the same subject-matter, the Court ordered the consolidation of the three cases and
set them all for a joint hearing.
40
After several postponements, the first joint hearing was held on January 27, 1972, after which the parties were given time to file their
respective memoranda. On February 14, 1972, however, acting on the "Manifestation with Petition for Preliminary Injunction" filed by the
Republic and BOI on February 11, 1972, the Court resolved to issue in G.R. No. L-33949 a restraining order enjoining the respondent court not
to hold any further proceeding in its aforementioned Civil Case No. 1701 insofar as said petitioners Republic and BOI are concerned until
further orders.
In the meanwhile, under date of September 20, 1971, respondent IISMI filed a motion alleging that:
5. IISMI's importation of raw materials is urgently required. With it, approximately 2,000 employees will be gainfully
employed instead of lost to other employments after great expense incurred in their technical training. A shortage of steel
products in the local market will be avoided. The other industrial and steel companies who buy IISMI's steel products as
their own raw materials for manufacture will not have to import the same from abroad, incurring greater dollar outlay.
IISMI will not be in a position to fulfill its existing orders to export products worth $3.6 million and to sell finished products
in the domestic market totalling P2 million plus P146 million until December of this year (Exhs. U and V). Productive use
will be made of a steel mill complex with total assets amounting to approximately P820 million, which otherwise will be
idle. (Par. 5, p. 2, Motion of Sept. 20/71 in Vol. III, G.R. No. L-33986.)
and praying, inter alia:
(1) that an order be issued directing the petitioner Central Bank to obey the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
lower court and therefore give due course to IISMI's applications for letters of credit to cover its importation of raw
materials; (Pp. 2-3, id.)
By the resolution of October 8, 1971, petitioner Central Bank was required to comment on the above motion, which it did on October 14,
1971. On October 29, 1971, IISMI filed a reply to said comment, to which Central Bank made a rejoinder on November 12, 1971, followed by a
sur-rejoinder of IISMI on December 9, 1971. Under date of April 6, 1972, petitioner DBP asked for earliest resolution of its petition. After
careful consideration of all these pleadings and upon mature deliberation, the Court issued on April 25, 1972, following resolution:
Acting on the motion dated September 20, 1971 of private respondents Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. (IISMI, for short)
in G.R. Nos. L-33949, Republic v. Court etc., et al., and L-33986, Central Bank v. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al.,
praying that Court direct the petitioner Central Bank "to obey the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court
and therefore give due course to Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc.'s applications for letters of credit to cover its importation
of raw materials," and without in any way intending to pass definitely on any of the issues raised by the parties, the Court
considered: (1) that respondent court appears, prima facie, to have acted within its jurisdiction in acting on IISMI's petition
for injunction against petitioner Central Bank considering that in effect, the enforcement of Monetary Board Resolution
No. 466 of January 19, 1971 and the Memoranda, Exhibits 0 and 0-2, both dated March 23, 1971, and other memoranda
watchlisting IISMI can result in preventing it from importing the raw materials it needs for the operation of its mills, before
it is finally decided by the court whether or not the issuance of such resolution, memoranda and watchlisting constitutes a
breach of the terms and conditions of the tripartite agreement of January 22, 1964 among the herein petitioner, Republic
of the Philippines, respondent Iligan Integrated Mills, Inc. and the Export and Import Bank of Washington, D.C., and it is
admitted by the Central Bank that such "importations are ... continuing acts up to Iligan City"; hence, although the
actuations of the Central Bank complained of are being mainly performed in Manila, they in fact constitute negative acts
impeding importations of said respondent which are continuing up to Iligan City" within the jurisdictional territory of
respondent judge (applying in principle the rulings of this Court in Director v. Algaen, 33 SCRA 868 as well as Gonzales v.
Secretary, 18 SCRA 296 cited therein); albeit, to be sure, this question of jurisdiction in the sense that the Central Bank has
its office in Manila and, therefore, outside of Lanao del Norte, the seat of respondent court, is not raised in Central Bank's
Comment of October 14, 1971, but the Court has to rule on it preliminarily and without prejudice to finally passing on it
later, since it is obvious that if the respondent court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in
question, there is no legal basis for its enforcement either by order of this Court or of the respondent judge; (2) that going
over the allegations of the parties in all their pertinent pleadings filed so far with this Court, it appears that there seems to
be sufficient basis for the contention of respondent-movant IISMI that the actions taken by the Central Bank in regard to
the requests of respondent-movant for authority to import raw material without Development Bank of the Philippines'
guaranty and for the Central Bank to give due course to the application of respondent-movant for approval of its
processing agreement with Atlas Worldwide Corporation S.A. cannot be deemed compliance with but, on the contrary, fall
short of the apparent intent and purpose of the impugned writ of preliminary injunction, inasmuch as the increase in the
arrearages of IISMI in both its obligations to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Exim Bank and/or to the
guarantor Republic of the Philippines can hardly be considered as "additional exposure on the part of the defendant
Development Bank of the Philippines and other government lending institutions" within the contemplation of the
respondent court's order of August 11, 1971 directing the issuance of the said writ, and, on the other hand, the risk of any
foreign exchange remittance abroad by way of damages arising from the feared contingency that IISMI might fail to comply
with its processing agreement with Atlas Worldwide, is merely speculative and contrary to the normal presumptions in the
ordinary course of business, involving as it does the assumption that IISMI will likely incur in breach; as, indeed, nowhere in
the extant communications of the petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (in G.R. No. L-34188) does said Bank
state that there will be "additional exposure" on its part, if the importations in question are allowed; (3) that, without
advancing, despite the above prima facie observations, that IISMI is definitely entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its action
41
in the court below, a matter which the Court will resolve when it presently decides the herein three related cases G.R. Nos.
L-33949, Republic v. Court, L-33986, Central Bank v. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, and L-34188, and Development Bank v. Hon.
Teodulo C. Tandayag, on their merits, the Court is impressed that the enforcement of the impugned writ is in the best
interest of all concerned since it can serve as an interim arrangement whereby great losses to all the parties may be
avoided, not to speak of the relief it can produce upon the continued unemployment of the over a thousand workers of
IISMI and the adverse over-all effect upon the steel industry and the national economy of the complete stoppage of the
operations of IISMI, whereas, on the other hand, the ways to make IISMI ultimately liable, should such be the final
judgment in these cases, and to the enforcement of such liability, do not appear to be impossible, specially if IISMI is
allowed to operate in the meanwhile; accordingly, it is to be expected that the Central Bank will no longer allege excuses
not actually founded on the conditions thereof: and (4) that, even if it appears to the Court, as already discussed, that the
actions of the Central Bank are not in conformity with the writ issued by the trial court, there is, however, the procedural
point that its enforcement is within the ambit of the authority of the trial court rather than that of this Court, precisely
because no restraining order has been issued by this Court against it, and, therefore, it is best that said enforcement be left
in the first instance with the said court; in view whereof, the Court RESOLVED to REFER respondent-movant's motion of
September 20, 1971 to respondent judge for his appropriate action in the light of the above considerations of this
resolution. Fernando, and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
On May 19, 1972, Central Bank moved for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution followed by another motion of Solicitor General, who
had just entered his appearance for said petitioner, requesting that a hearing be held on said motion for reconsideration. On June 6, 1972, the
Court denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the motion for hearing in the following resolution:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Central Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-33986, Central
Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al. (consolidated with G.R. Nos. L-33949 and L-34188), and it
being the sense of the Court's resolution of April 25, 1972, subject of the said motion for reconsideration, merely to lay
down the proper procedure for the consideration and resolution of the motion of respondent Iligan Integrated Steel Mills,
Inc. dated September 20, 1971, without actually resolving any of the issues involved in the three consolidated cases, G.R.
Nos. L-33986, 33949, and 34188, except some of them in a prima facie manner, in order to enable the respondent court to
act on said motion after a full hearing of all evidence and arguments of the parties, reserving to this Court ultimately, in the
appropriate case, the final resolution of all issues that the parties may wish to raise after respondent court had acted,
including but not limited to those on which the Court has made prima facie observations in its resolution of April 25, 1972,
the Court Resolved to DENY, the instant motion for reconsideration, without prejudice that in the meanwhile, pending
action by respondent court on the motion of IISMI already referred to, to said respondent IISMI submitting, as it is hereby
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT to this Court, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, a simplified statement of the sales and
exportations it has made after using the raw materials it has purchased with the proceeds of all the advances made by
petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines, including but not limited to the sales made to its sister companies and/or
subsidiaries, indicating how payments have been made or are going to be made thereon by the corresponding purchasers,
both local and foreign, considering that in referring to an interim arrangement in the resolution now sought to be
considered, the Court did not have in mind to suggest that respondent may be allowed to import raw materials under the
terms of the respondent court's writ of preliminary injunction without being assured that (1) all proceeds from the sales
and exportations to be made possible by the importations of raw materials contemplated in said writ, shall be used, after
proper deduction of operating expenses, for the servicing of the outstanding accounts of said respondent with the
petitioners Development Bank and Republic of the Philippines and (2) the proceeds of the processing agreement with Atlas
Worldwide Corporation S.A., should such agreement ever materialize by virtue of the impugned writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, shall likewise be duly accounted for to this Court and used for the same purposes hereinabove set
forth; and in consequence, to DENY also the motion of the Solicitor General asking that the Central Bank's motion for
reconsideration be set for hearing.
Now, it appears that without awaiting the Court's action on Central Bank's above motion for reconsideration of May 19, 1972, on June 3, 1972,
respondent court acted on IISMI's motion of September 20, 1971, which the Court had referred to it by the resolution of April 25, 1972, by
issuing an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the motion dated September 20, 1971 of plaintiff filed with the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-
33986 and referred by the latter to this Court for appropriate action in the light of the considerations stated in its
resolution of April 25, 1972, and orders defendant Central Bank, thru the Monetary Board, as implementing order, to obey
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on August 14, 1971, by desisting from continuing to enforce
Monetary Board Resolution No. 466 and Memoranda to Authorized Agent Banks, Exhs. 0 to 0-2, and other memoranda and
resolutions watchlisting IISMI, to approve all pending applications of plaintiff for letters of credit to cover its importations
of raw materials without Development Bank of the Philippines guaranty, and allowing the implementation of the
processing agreement between plaintiff and Atlas Worldwide Corporation S.A. (Exh. W), without the conditions and
limitations stated in Central Bank Deputy Governor Amado Brinas' letter of September 16, 1971 to the Security Bank and
Trust Company, Central Bank Deputy Governor's letter dated September 20, 1971 to the Bank of America, the Central Bank
Deputy Governor's letter to Security Bank and Trust Company of September 30, 1971, the Monetary Board Resolution No.
1729 dated October 12, 1971, mentioned in the Central Bank Comment (on IISMI's motion dated September 20, 1971)
dated October 14, 1971 and Central Bank Rejoinder dated November 11, 1971 filed in the Supreme Court and offered in
this Court as Exhs. C and E, Manifestation, within (10) days from receipt hereof. (Annex A of Central Bank's Motion of July
11, 1972 in Vol. VI, G. R. No. L-33986.)
42
Central Bank moved on June 21, 1972 for clarification of this order and for further extension of the time to comply with the writ of preliminary
injunction dated August 14, 1971, and on June 27, 1972, the Solicitor General filed a supplemental motion to the same effect. On July 1, 1972,
respondent Court denied said motions in an order, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing clarifications and considerations, the Court, in enforcing the writ of preliminary
injunction of August 14, 1971, and in clarifying and amplifying its implementing order of June 3, 1972, hereby orders
defendant, Central Bank, thru its Governor and Members of the Monetary Board to obey the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by this Court on August 14, 1971, by desisting from continuing to enforce Monetary Board Resolution No. 466 and
Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks, Exhs. 0 to 0-2, and other memoranda and resolutions watchlisting IISMI
including the Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks issued by the Governor of the Central Bank dated July 16, 1971,
Exh. 1, and not to limit the amount of the importation of plaintiff for the purchase of raw materials and spare parts and
manufacturing supplies necessary for the continuous operation of its mills at Iligan City and, accordingly, to inform agent
banks thru circulars and other means of the lifting of the watchlisting of IISMI and the revocation or non-enforcement of
Monetary Board Resolution No. 466, Memoranda to Authorized Agent Banks, Exhs. 0 to 0-2 and other memoranda and
resolutions watchlisting IISMI including the Memorandum Circular to Authorized Agent Banks dated July 16, 1971 issued by
the Governor of the Central Bank, Exh 1. within two days from receipt of this order; to approve all pending applications of
plaintiff for letters of credit to cover its importation of raw materials and spare parts without Development Bank of the
Philippines guaranty and guaranty from other government lending institutions filed and pending approval before the
defendant, Central Bank, thru the Governor and Members of the Monetary Board before the lifting of the watchlisting of
IISMI within two days from receipt of this order; to order defendant, Central Bank, thru its Governor and Members of the
Monetary Board, to inform agent banks by means of circulars or thru other means that plaintiff is hereby allowed to open
letters of credit for the importation of raw materials and spare parts and manufacturing supplies in accordance with
Memorandum Circular No. 289 issued by the Central Bank of the Philippines dated February 21, 1970, particularly in
accordance with Section 5 of said circular, Exhs. H and H-1, without necessity of reference to or prior approval by the
Central Bank and ordering defendant Central Bank, thru the Members of the Monetary Board, to approve and implement
the processing agreement between plaintiff and Atlas Worldwide Corporation S.A., Exh. W, without the conditions and
limitations stated in Central Bank Deputy Governor's letter of September 16, 1971, to the Security Bank and Trust
Company, Central Bank Deputy Governor's letter dated September 20, 1971, to the Bank of America, the Central Bank
Deputy Governor's letter to the Security Bank and Trust Company of September 30, 1971 and Monetary Board Resolution
No. 1729 dated October 12, 1971, as amended by the resolution of the Monetary Board dated June 23, 1972, Exhs. 2, 2-A,
mentioned in the Central Bank Comment (on IISMI's motion dated September 20, 1971) dated October 14, 1971 and
Central Bank rejoinder dated November 11, 1971, filed in the Supreme Court and offered in this Court as Exhs. C and E, and
in the Central Bank's Supplemental Motion, within two days from receipt of this order." (Annex B, pp. 11-13 of the same
motion of July 11, 1972.)
As to be expected, on July 11, 1972, Central Bank assailed the above orders of respondent court in a motion filed with this Court praying:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner prays that this Honorable Court:
1) Issue ex parte the writ of preliminary injunction originally prayed for in the above-entitled case, including restraining the
enforcement of the Order of respondent court dated July 1, 1972; and
2) Urgently decide the above-entitled petition for certiorari and prohibition on the merits and set aside and declare null
and void all the proceedings heretofore taken before respondent court, including the Order dated July 1, 1972.
Petitioner further prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the premises.
Upon being required by the Court, IISMI answered this motion on July 17, 1972. Hearing on this motion, of Central Bank was originally set for
July 17, 1972 but it was postponed to July 20, 1972. After the hearing, the following resolution was promulgated:
L-33986 (Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al.); L-34188 (The Development Bank of
Philippines vs. The Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al.); and L-33949 (The Republic of the Philippines and, the Board of
Investment vs. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, etc., et al.). — At the hearing on the motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction in these cases this morning, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza assisted by Asst. Solicitor
General Jaime M. Lantin, Attys. Filoteo Evangelista and Manuel G. Abello, appeared and argued for and in behalf of the
petitioner in these joint cases. Attys. Dominador Aytona and Manuel O. Chan, assisted by Attys. Roberto V. San Jose, Jose
P. Santillan and Norberto J. Quisumbing appeared and argued for and in behalf of the respondents. Both parties were
GRANTED twenty (20) days from today to submit, simultaneously, their respective memoranda in amplification of oral
argument. The Court further Resolved to require: (a) DBP Chairman Leonides Virata, Governor Gregorio Licaros of the
Central Bank and Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata, who were personally present, at the hearing to SUBMIT within twenty
(20) days from today, a joint memorandum; and (b) respondent Iligan Integrated Steels Mills. Inc. to SUBMIT within ten
(10) days from today additional data and information indicated in item No. 1 of letter (c) of the resolution of this Court of
July 18, 1972, such as: (1) statement of cost of goods manufactured and sold for the period of July 1, 1969 to May 31, 1972,
segregating and showing details on quantity and value of raw materials guaranteed by DBP and of those purchased by
IISMI out of its own funds; (2) statement of income and expenses for the same period above; (3) Cash Flow for the same
43
period; (4) Balance Sheet as of May 31, 1972; (5) Statement of Inventories existing as of May 31, 1972, showing detailed
composition, quantity and value of raw materials inventory, goods in process and finished goods; (6) copy of agreement, if
any, between Ferro and IISMI regarding the sale of IISMI products and/or a summary statement of the terms and
conditions of sale, including terms of payment, pricing and other relevant conditions; (7) summary list of other purchasers
of IISMI products, the statement of terms of sale including term and method of payment and pricing; and (8) a sworn
statement as to whether or not IISMI, or any of its shareholders, or their relatives by consanguinity or affinity, have any
interest in any of the companies which have purchased or imported products of IISMI.
The Court further Resolved to require the IISMI to SUBMIT within the period above stated a list of all the stockholders and
directors of the IISMI and the FERRO from 1969 to the present with their corresponding holdings.
The Court hereby CLARIFIES, also, the resolution of July 18, 1972, item No. 1 of letter (c) as requiring the Iligan Integrated
Steel Mills, Inc. to submit to this Court in these cases the foregoing additional data and information herein required, in
addition to furnishing the petitioner therewith.
And so, on August 17, 1972, the motion was deemed submitted for resolution, as may be gleaned from the following resolution:
L-33986 (Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al.); L-33949 (Republic of the Philippines, et
al. vs. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, et al.); and L-34188 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs.
Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, etc., et al.). — Considering the pleadings filed in these cases, The court Resolved to NOTE: (a)
the memorandum of the petitioner in L-33986, dated August 8, 1972, in support of its urgent motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, dated July 11, 1972, (b) the memorandum of the Solicitor General, dated August 8, 1972 for
petitioners in these cases; (c) the compliance of the Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata, Chairman Leonides Virata of the
Development Bank of the Philippines and Governor Gregorio Licaros of the Central Bank, with the resolution of July 20,
1972, by submitting their respective memoranda; (d) the memorandum of respondent Iligan Integrated Steel Mills,
Incorporated, dated August 9, 1972, filed in connection with the urgent motion of the Central Bank, dated July 11, 1972;
and (e) the manifesto of the Concerned Citizens' Movement in Iligan City headed by President Angelo M. Manalo,
requesting this Court to decide these cases at the earliest possible time or to allow Iligan Integrated Steel Mills,
Incorporated, to continue its operation pending the promulgation of the decision of this Court.
Before the Court could act, however, under date of December 4, 1972, all the petitioners in all these three cases filed the following self-
explanatory motion:
COME NOW petitioners Republic of the Philippines, Board of Investments, Central Bank of the Philippines and
Development Bank of the Philippines, by the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully state:
1. That pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 11 of September 29, 1972, of the President of the Philippines, Judges of
the Court of First Instance tendered their resignations as Judges of their respective districts. Judge Teodulo Tandayag
submitted his resignation as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao Norte, Branch II;
2. That on October 27, 1972, the President of the Philippines accepted the resignation of Judge Teodulo Tandayag as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II. True copy of the letter of the President to Judge Tandayag is
attached hereto as Annex "A";
3. That on October 31, 1972, the Honorable Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 381, authorizing the
Honorable Judge Eduardo Tutaan of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte Branch IV, in addition to his regular
duties, to take cognizance of all kinds of cases pertaining to Branch II of the same court, vacated by former Judge Teodulo
Tandayag. True copy of the Administrative Order No. 381 is attached hereto as Annex "B";
4. That on November 20, 1972, November 21, 1972 an November 22, 1972, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the
Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Republic of the Philippines and the Board of Investments, respectively, wrote the
Honorable Judge Eduardo Tutaan of the Court of First Instance of Lanao de Norte, calling his attention to the fact that
among the cases assigned to Branch II is Civil Case No. 1701, Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc., plaintiff, versus,
Development Bank of the Philippines, Central Bank of the Philippines, and Republic of the Philippines and Board of
Investments, defendants, and requesting information whether or not his Honor is adopting or maintaining the following
orders and writs issued by former Judge Teodulo Tandayag of Branch II against the said defendants for their guidance in G.
R. Nos. L-34188, 33986 and 33949 of this Honorable Supreme Court:
Development Bank of the Philippines
(a) Order of August 11, 1971
(b) Writ of Preliminary Injunction of August 14, 1971
44
Central Bank of the Philippines
(c) Order dated June 3, 1972
(d) Order dated July 1, 1972.
Republic of the Philippines and Board of Investments
(a) Order of July 23, 1971
(b) Writ of Restraining Order of January 15, 1972
(c) Order of February 12, 1972
True copies of the letters of November 20, 1972, November 21, 1972 and November 22, 1972 are attached hereto as
Annexes "C", "D" and "E";
5. That in the letters of November 24, 1972, the Honorable Judge Eduardo Tutaan of the Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Norte replied, informing that presently he is not in a position to state whether or not he is adopting and/or maintaining
the orders of July 23, 1971, August 11, 1971, September 20, 1971, February 12, 1972, June 3, 1972 and July 1, 1972, and
the writs of August 14, 1971 and January 15, 1972 issued in Civil Case No. 1701 by former Judge Tandayag against the
defendants, but that he is ready to study, re-examine and review the said orders and writs. The Honorable Judge Tutaan
further informed that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 381, dated October 31, 1972, of the Secretary of Justice, he
took cognizance of the cases pertaining to Branch II of the Court last November 13, 1972. True copies of the letters of
November 24, 1972 are attached hereto as Annexes "F", "G" and "H";
6. That in the appeals of the Development Bank of the Philippines in G.R. L-34188, the Central Bank of the Philippines in
G.R. L-33986, and the Republic of the Philippines and Board of Investments in G.R. L-33949, to this Honorable Supreme
Court, former Judge Teodulo Tandayag of Lanao del Norte has been impleaded as one of the party respondents;
7. That under Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, when an officer is a party to an action and during its pendency
resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained against his successor if within
thirty (30) days after the successor takes office it is shown to the Court that the latter adopts or maintains the action of his
predecessor;
8. That in view of the foregoing considerations, the Honorable Judge Eduardo Tutaan of the Court of First Instance of Lanao
del Norte should perhaps be accorded the opportunity to re-examine and review the questioned orders and writs issued by
former Judge Teodulo Tandayag in Civil Case No. 1701, to wit:
Development Bank of the Philippines — G.R. L-34188
(c) Order of September 20, 1971
Central Bank of the Philippines — G.R. L-33986
(c) Order of June 3, 1972
(d) Order of July 1, 1972
45
Republic of the Philippines and Board of Investments — G.R. L-33949
(a) Order of July 23, 1971
(b) Writ of Restraining Order of January 15, 1972
(c) Order of February 12, 1972 (The Order of February 12, 1972 in Civil Case No. 1701 required Republic to answer IISMI's
Supplemental Complaint. However in view of the Temporary Restraining Order of the Supreme Court of February 1972 in
G.R. L-33949 restraining Judge Tandayag from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 1701, said Order was not enforced.
The Order of February 12, 1972 was not included in Republic's Manifestation with Petition for Preliminary Injunction filed
with the Supreme Court on February 11, 1972 since copy thereof was only served on February 29, 1972.)
9. That in this motion the Development Bank of Philippines, the Central Bank of the Philippines, and the Republic the
Philippines and Board of Investments seek the leave of this Honorable Supreme Court considering that G.R. Nos. L-34188,
33986 and 33949 are still pending before it.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the petitioners be given leave to raise anew before the
Honorable Judge Eduardo Tutaan of Branch II and Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte the
questioned orders and writs of former Judge Teodulo Tandayag in Civil Case No. 1701, Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, versus,
Development Bank of the Philippines, Central Bank of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines and Board of
Investments.
IISMI filed its comment on the foregoing motion on January 26, 1973, contending that section 18 of Rule 3 does not apply to the situation
obtaining in these cases arising from the resignation of Judge Tandayag and his replacement by Judge Tutaan.
Without resolving petitioners' motion, and acting sua sponte, on April 10, 1973, the Court resolved:
G.R. No. L-33949 (Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte); L-33986 (Central Bank of
the Philippines vs. Hon. Teodulo C. Tandayag, et al.); and L-34188 (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Teodulo C.
Tandayag, etc., et al.) — More or less reliable information having come to the Court that private respondent Iligan
Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. has been taken over by the Government, the Court resolved, before acting further in these
cases, to REQUIRE the parties to state to the Court, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, such details and circumstances
related to the said takeover as would enable the Court to determine whether or not these cases have already become
moot and academic.
In their compliance with this resolution, petitioners limit themselves to a recital of the contents of the Letter of Instruction No. 27, ordering the
takeover by the Secretary of National Defense of "the management, control and operation of respondent IISMI for the duration of the present
national emergency or until otherwise ordered by the President or by his duly designated representative" and also the taking by said Secretary
of "all steps, means and measures necessary and essential for the resumption of operations of (its) entire steel plant", plus the two
memoranda of October 14, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the same Secretary pursuant to said Letter of Instruction No. 27 and the
following pertinent statements:
5. That functioning as the Board of Directors of the Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc., the Presidential Steel Committee has
appointed the following officers:
Eduardo J. Rodriguez — President
Rafael Zagala — Treasurer
Francisco Tamondong — Asst. Treasurer
Lilia R. Bautista — Corporate Secretary
Danilo L. Protacio — Asst. Corporate Secretary
6. That on April 12, 1973, Mr. Eduardo J. Rodriguez, submitted to the Presidential Steel Committee a "Report on IISMI's
Operation from October 15, 1972 to April 14, 1973". In the Report, he underscored significant progress made under the
new management during the first six months of government take-over. Some of the salient features of the report are the
following:
a. Production cost of IISMI's steel mills have been reduced by about P33 million, per annum and the
production rates for all facilities have been increased substantially;
46
b. IISMI has been selling most of its products directly to end users thus reducing marketing and interest
expenses by around P40 million yearly;
c. Expenses for moving and storing raw materials and finished products have been reduced by P6
million per year;
d. IISMI has been able to finance its current operating requirements and to generate some funds to pay
for a portion of the old management's past due obligations;
e. With the assistance of DBP, a P100 million Syndicate Credit Agreement has been signed with a
consortium of local banks to finance importations of raw materials.
True copy of said Report of President Rodriguez is attached hereto as Annex "D".
while IISMI's compliance states:
Case not moot

and academic
6 As shown by the underscored portions of the Letters of Instructions of the President of the Philippines and corresponding
memoranda on the purported authorities by which the government effected its take-over of IISMI on October 14, 1972,
the take-over is limited in duration and in scope.
(a) The take-over is limited in duration — it is merely temporary to last only "for the duration of the
present national emergency or until otherwise ordered by (the President) or by my duly designated
representative.
(b) The take-over is also limited in scope — its stated express purpose being "the resumption of the
operation of the entire plant" of IISMI to the end that "the much needed supply of steel products" will
not gravely be disrupted, steel sheets and tinplates (being) critically essential for infra-structure
projects, housing and many other activities, and the manufacture of foods and other products which
are necessary for the daily existence of our people.
7. Being limited in duration or merely temporary to last only for the duration of the present national emergency, the issues
of these cases in court therefore remain unaffected by the take-over in the manner that provisional remedies such as
attachment, preliminary injunction and receivership do not affect the merits of the controversy. The merits of the
controversy principally arising from the specific performance of the tripartite agreements entered into by and among the
Export-Import Bank of Washington, an agency of the United States of America, the Republic of the Philippines and the
Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. and the review on certiorari and prohibition of incidental orders issued by the lower court
in connection with that main controversy, are unresolved by the instant government take-over nor even by the Letters of
Instructions of the President of the Philippines and corresponding memoranda under whose purported authorities said
take-over was effected.
The justiciable controversy not being affected or resolved, the cases have not become moot and academic. Thus, upon the
termination of the present national emergency or earlier termination of the takeover by the President or his duly
authorized representative, —
(a) The Supreme Court will still have to decide whether or not the lower court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the
complaint for improper venue and non-suability of the state (G.R. No. L-33949); whether or not the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunctive writ of August 14, 1971, enjoining DBP foreclosure, ouster of private
investors of IISMI from control or management, and takeover of IISMI or any of its properties, plants and mills (G.R. No. L-
34188); and whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said injunctive writ of
August 14, 1971, enjoining the CB from continuing to enforce its resolutions and circulars watchlisting IISMI and ordering it
to allow IISMI to import raw materials through letters of credit or through other means without additional exposure on the
part of the DBP and other government lending institutions and to give due course to IISMI 's application for approval of its
processing agreement with Atlas Worldwide Corporation, S.A. (G.R. No. L-33986); and
(b) The lower court in Civil Case No. 1701 will still have to decide on the merits whether or not to enjoin "the defendants,
their officers, representatives, agents and assigns, perpetually and permanently from proceeding with the foreclosure of
the mortgages referred to in the DBP's notice of foreclosure dated May 17, 1971, and enjoin(ing) perpetually and
permanently the defendant Government and all its officers, agents and instrumentalities from taking any step with the
view of ousting the private investors in IISMI from control or management of IISMI , or to take over IISMI or any of its
properties, plants and mills, with costs"; whether or not "the defendant Government and its instrumentalities, including
the DBP, Central Bank, and the BOI be ordered to comply with their commitments and incentives promised to IISMI under
47
the aforesaid agreements, laws, and circulars, declaring Central Bank Circular No. 466 and all memoranda issued pursuant
thereto (specifically Annexes 0, 0-1, and 0-2) as null, void, and without legal effect; and whether or not "the defendants be
sentenced to pay the plaintiff such damages as may be proven during the trial.
8. Being limited in scope and purpose, i.e., the resumption of the operations of the steel mills to avoid disruption of supply
of steel products critically essential for the infra-structure projects of the government, the takeover leaves to respondent
IISMI the residual power, thru its board of directors and officers duly constituted in accordance with its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws, at least to protect its rights and those of its stockholders and to prosecute actions in court to
protect said rights which in this particular case includes the right to defend against a foreclosure commenced by the
Development Bank of the Philippines and a take-over by the government for allege violations of the tripartite agreements,
under which the government and/or its instrumentalities sought to acquire majority and control of IISMI.
For this added reason, the cases have not become moot and academic. The judgments that the courts will render in such
suits can still be enforced as they are not in any way directed against the martial law take-over for the purpose of resuming
operations of the steel mills to avoid disruption of the supply of steel products essential for the infra-structure projects of
the government, under which the government and/or its instrumentalities do not acquire majority ownership and control
of IISMI.
Suspension of
proceedings
The essence of the tripartite agreement among the Government, EXIMBANK and IISMI and other agreements between the
Government and private investors (Exhibits B, C, D, E, G, H, I, J, N, & R) is that the project would be privately managed with
full government support and assistance. The private sector would never have invested in the integrated steel mill project
without this assurance.
IISMI and the private investors therein resorted to judicial remedies for the enforcement of their rights under these
agreements with the Government. To hold that the court cases have become moot and academic simply because of IISMI'
s martial law take-over by the Government, which is temporary, would necessarily result in depriving IISMI and its
stockholders of their day in court. This would be the most unimaginable injustice in the history of Philippine jurisprudence.
However, private respondent IISMI will yield to suspension of the proceedings of the above-entitled cases if the Supreme
Court should believe that said cases are no longer urgent in view of the martial law take-over of the steel mills.
Indeed, the Development Bank of the Philippines may not proceed with the foreclosure of mortgages in view of the martial
law take-over and of the injunctive writ of August 14, 1971.
Since the government has taken over the operation of the steel mills and imports raw materials — it seems — without encountering difficulties
at the Central Bank, then private respondent IISMI has no urgent need of the enforcement of the writ of preliminary injunction against the
watch-list circulars of the Central Bank until the steel mills are returned to it upon the termination of the present national emergency or earlier
termination of the take-over by the President or his duly authorized representative, and if the Central Bank should then still insist on its
watchlisting circulars and memoranda. Until then, private respondent IISMI will not really require a writ of injunction against the same.
Reservation:
The agreement of Private respondent IISMI to a suspension proceedings should however not be construed as an
acceptance of the validity of the instant government martial law take-over.
Just to mention one ground, the United States Supreme Court in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company case on June 2,
1952 overruled the contention that the President's seizure order of some steel mills was within his power and duty as
commander-in-chief.
However, private respondent IISMI elects to meanwhile exhaust administrative remedies against the instant martial law
take-over of its mills.
On May 30, 1973, petitioners filed their" Manifestation and Reply to Comment" of IISMI, pertinent portions of which read thus:
IISMI Misrepresentation of Facts and

Other Inappropriate Acts
1. After the Government took over management and control of IISMI and other Jacinto companies pursuant to Letters of
Instruction Nos. 27 and 35, a study was undertaken of the actual financial condition of IISMI. In this context, the U.P.
Business Research Foundation, Inc. which was retained for this purpose, was requested to evaluate and consider the
48
representations previously made by IISMI before this Court as to its financial condition, its receivables, the causes of the
huge losses it had incurred, its relation to FERRO Products, Inc., etc. A report on this matter has been submitted which
shows, among other things, that IISMI had misrepresented material facts before this Court. A copy of the report is herewith
enclosed as Annex "A";
2. Some of the salient points demonstrated in the report are the following:
a. IISMI could have lost at most P38,027,000.00 due to the floating rate because importations before
February 1970 were sold at pre-devaluation prices even after devaluation, but no such loss can, or
should be claimed after June 1970. After this date, IISMI had, or should have adjusted its prices to post-
devaluation levels. Besides, even considering the total amount of P51,999,000.00 allegedly lost by IISMI
from 1970 up to 1972, still this amount is insignificant compared to the more than P407 million due
from IISMI to the DBP and the National Government;
b. IISMI's trade policies were intended to shift profits otherwise due IISMI to the Jacinto-controlled
corporations particularly FERRO Products, Inc. (FPI), its marketing arm and biggest single buyer, by:
1) Adopting a self-defeating pricing scheme whereby it increased its post-

devaluation selling price of goods to FERRO by only 25%, despite the 50% increase
in the cost of raw materials caused by the floating rate. On the other hand, FERRO
resold the same goods at a mark-up of 30%, enough to cover the 25% increase in
the cost of goods, leaving a 5% additional gross profit for itself;
2) Extending extraordinarily long credit terms of 90-180 days to FERRO without

considering its own obligations and accumulating deliquencies;
3) Failing to collect trade receivables from FERRO which amounted to more than
P85 million as of June 30, 1972, accumulated during a 4-year period;
4) Failing to collect from other Jacinto-controlled corporations, which, together

with the FERRO account, totalled P89,220,147.00 as of June 30, 1972;
5) Allocating and disbursing during a 3-year period more than P8 million for
domestic selling expenses alone as compared to FERRO's P3,022,000.00
representing total selling expenses. IISMI's huge selling expenses were unwarranted
because it sold the bulk of its produce, or a total of 80% thereof, to only one
customer, namely FERRO.
c. IISMI resources were actually diverted to Jacinto-controlled corporations and to members of the
Jacinto family, amounting to P95,913,668.72 as of June 30, 1972 by various means, namely:
1) Interest-free loans or direct advances to Jacinto-controlled corporations

amounting to P5,957,636.11, as of June 11, 1972;
2) Unliquidated travel and representation allowances to employees and officers,

including members of the Jacinto family amounting to P1.236 million as of June 30,
1972;
3) Payments by IISMI of obligations of some Jacinto-controlled corporations,

including interests on loans obtained by them to pay for subscription IISMI shares,
all totalling P9,129,189.68;
4) IISMI borrowings at 12% interest per annum from some Jacinto-controlled

corporations, instead of collecting the receivables (trade and non-trade) long
overdue from its own creditors, particularly FERRO to whom the lender IISMI-
affiliates are heavily indebted;
5) Uncollected sales to Jacinto-controlled corporations which as of June 30, 1972,

amounted to P89,220,147.00, representing 99% of IISMI's total trade receivables.
d. Payments were charged to IISMI but actually received, not by IISMI but by Jacinto-controlled
corporations and members of the Jacinto family, totalling P25,961,191.67;
49
e. IISMI actually imported for two Jacinto-controlled corporations raw materials by availing of DBP
guarantees in the amount of P4,272,842.76, knowing that these guarantees were for IISMI's exclusive
use and benefit;
f. The massive misuse and diversion of funds by IISMI shown above where camouflage by outrageous
"window-dressing" of the financial statements and records of IISMI and those of the Jacinto-controlled
corporations including the financial statements submitted to this Honorable Court which were not
spared, thus:
1) To underplay profits of both companies, by understating sales of IISMI to FERRO

and correspondingly understating purchases of FERRO from IISMI. This wise, losses
would not be attributed to operations but rather to outside forces such as the
floating rate;
2) To show a favorable cash position, by including the amount of P15 million as part
of its cash balance as of May 31, 1972 allegedly as payment from FERRO Products.
However, it appears that P2 million was supposedly paid out of "Cash on Hand" of
FERRO, and P13 million in checks drawn on the Security Bank and Trust Company
and the Pacific Banking Corporation. The Check Register revealed that the SBTC
checks were actually issued after June 27, 1972, while the PBC checks were issued
after June 22, 1972. (The Balance Sheet (tentative) embodying this data was
submitted to this Court by IISMI on June 23, 1972. IISMI was later required to
submit additional information, which it did on July 31, 1972.) The intent to deceive
this Court is made more apparent when considered in the light of the other facts:
(1) that the checks were not deposited by IISMI; (2) that the checks were voided by
tearing off their lower righthand portions bearing the signatures; (3) that the checks
were later on replaced, but with checks which were undated. SBTC Check No.
381487 for P2 million was returned and still unreplaced, as of this date, for
insufficient funds;
3) To show a favorable asset position, by including goods allegedly returned by

FERRO in the amount of P21,035,075.86, which appear however to have already
been mortgaged by the latter to the Security Bank and Trust Co. Also, the
Inventories account of IISMI revealed an overstatement of P9.8 million;
4) To show a low accounts receivable-trade from FERRO Products, a Jacinto-

controlled corporation, and of other Jacinto-controlled corporations, by recognizing
"offsets" against legitimate payable to IISMI. To prove the lack of basis for such
"offsets", the independent auditors of IISMI later reversed and cancelled such
entries in the financial statements, thereby reinstating the obligations due tb IISMI
from FERRO and other Jacinto-controlled corporations, or corrections were never
relayed to this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioners now bring the facts and findings in the aforementioned report before this Court: (a) To rebut and controvert
representations previously made by respondent IISMI; (b) To show that if this Court must go into the substantive merits of
all the issues, it would have to evaluate and consider a mass of facts which if disputed is perhaps better done by a trial
court;
4. The facts could not have been brought before the Court by the petitioners when these cases were heard. Not having
access to respondent IISMI's records which apparently were on occasions adjusted, petitioners had to argue on the basis
largely of respondents' own representations;
On arguments raised in IISMI counsel's Comment
5. Contrary to the comment of respondent IISMI, remand of the cases at bar to the lower court will serve a useful purpose.
Among others, the procedure will allow a ventilation in the lower court of all facts relevant to the issue raised, such as
those pertaining to causes of the huge financial loss incurred by IISMI. As a trial court, the lower court is best suited to
receive the parties' evidence on this matter. It cannot be gainsaid that further clarification of this all important matter will
help in the just and speedy disposition of the cases at bar;
xxx xxx xxx
50
11. Lastly, it cannot be denied that this Honorable Court has complete control over its proceedings. There is no
insurmountable legal obstacle which would prevent the remand of these cases to the court a quo if the said procedure
would serve the higher interest of justice.
This Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C.
Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275, to lay down, for recognition in this jurisdiction, the
sound rule in the administration of justice holding that "it is always in the power of the court (Supreme
Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purpose
of justice require it." Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, ...
(Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933)
As above stated, remand of these cases will give the new judge an opportunity to re-examine the questioned orders and
writs of his predecessor. The procedure will likewise shed light on the validity of IISMI's claim that the huge losses it had
incurred were unavoidable. This fact is important in viewing the intricate issues involved herein in their proper perspective.
On the other hand, after filing on June 15, 1973 a motion for leave to file a rejoinder to the foregoing "Manifestation and Reply to Comment",
which was granted, IISMI subsequently filed on July 30, 1973, the following "Manifestation and Omnibus Motion":
Respondent Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. (IISMI), through its counsel of record, respectfully alleges:
1. As reply to respondent IISMI's comment on petitioners' motion to remand the above-entitled certiorari cases back to the
lower court, petitioners alleged that they have further evidence to offer on the causes of the alleged huge financial loss
incurred by respondent IISMI. (pp. 8-9, petitioners' manifestation and reply to comment) Petitioners further alleged that
they could not have brought to the attention of the Court their new and further facts when the cases were heard, "not
having access to respondent IISMI's records" (p. 8, manifestation and reply to comment). Petitioners came by their further
or new evidence after the government took over management and control of IISMI and other Jacinto companies pursuant
to Letters of Instruction Nos. 27 and 35' (p. 2, manifestation and reply to comment). The report of the UP-IISMI Study
Group submitted as Annex A of petitioners' Manifestation and Reply to Comment in its preliminary statement said that an
examination was made of "the available records of IISMI, and to the extent relevant, those of other Jacinto owned and/or
controlled companies" which were seized by the government after declaration of martial law.
The new and further evidence are inadmissible. First, they were seized without judicial warrant. Second, the takeover of
the mills during the emergency under the Presidential Letters of Instructions assuming them valid did not authorize seizure
and use of evidence. (Please see study on admissibility of illegally obtained evidence annexed hereto)
2. Martial law and the situation brought about by it render the defense of respondent IISMI in these certiorari cases, and
the proper prosecution of the case for specific performance in the lower court, impossible. The parties with knowledge of
the facts of the case are out of the country and dare not return. Their employees in the country have been dispersed. The
records of respondent IISMI and the Jacinto Corporations have been seized. In view thereof, it has now become impossible
for private respondent to make a Reply to the Petitioners' Manifestation and Reply dated May 17, 1973, leave to file which
on or before July 27, 1973, had been granted by this Honorable Court in its resolution of June 20, 1973.
3. The government having taken over the mills ostensibly "for the duration of the emergency", all legal proceedings should
meanwhile be abated.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned counsel respectfully pray for leave to withdraw from representation in these cases; and, as
their last acts of representation, reiterate their prayer for the suspension of proceedings of the cases until after martial law
is lifted, the IISMI mills restored to it, and all seized records returned; and, pray for the striking out of petitioners
'Manifestation and Reply to Comment dated May 17, 1973, with its annexed UP-IISMI study report.
as to which, the "Cross Manifestation" of petitioners of August 7, 1973, reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners Republic of the Philippines, Board of Investments, Central Bank of the Philippines and
Development Bank of the Philippines, by the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully state:
1. Respondent IISMI's assertion that the Government is precluded from proving mismanagement on the basis of its own
records now in the latter custody is without any merit. The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot support this stance. The Government took over the management of IISMI pursuant to Letter of Instruction
No. 27 in lawful exercise of martial law powers by the President. As an indispensable incident of this take over, the
Government has to take custody of IISMI's records. It is to be underscored that IISMI has not squarely assailed the legality
of its Government take over.
51
Moreover, the Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable and seizure cannot apply to the cases at bar which
are certiorari petitions and do not involve criminal proceedings. The records in question are not being utilized as evidence
to secure the criminal conviction of any person. If they are to be used at all, it is only to establish the defense of
mismanagement to defeat IISMI's claim. In other words, said records are not being wielded as a sword but only a shield.
2. Respondent IISMI also states that it is not in a position to contest the Government's claim of fraud and mismanagement
in its corporate affairs because its records are presently not in its possession. This is not a meritorious claim. The subject
records can always be made available to IISMI subject to the usual security measures to safeguard their integrity. IISMI has
never requested from the government that it be allowed to use said records so that it may properly respond to the
representations of the government to this Court in connection with these cases. It cannot therefore claim lack of access to
its records.
3. Respondent IISMI cannot also contend that disposition of these cases should be deferred because its officials with
knowledge of the case are out of the country and dare not return. IISMI cannot seek sanctuary behind general claims. It
does not specify who are its officials out of the country without whom it could not prosecute its case. More important, it is
not claimed that there is a legal impediment to the return of these officials to the Philippines. If they dare not return here,
it can only be because they are unwilling to defend themselves. Certainly, our wheels of justice should not stop running to
await the return of persons who have voluntarily left the country and have refused to return here perhaps to precisely
avoid the processes of our courts.
4. Respondent IISMI cannot also claim that it can not go to trial in the lower court because its employees have already
scattered as a result of martial law and the government take over of its mills. Again the claim is all too conveniently
nebulous. IISMI does not state who are these seemingly indispensable employees. Nor is there any clarification as to
whether or not these employees cannot really be located. Somehow, these employees are still in the Philippines and hence
their availability cannot be an impossibility.
Indeed, these excuses only underscore the immediate need in disposing of the cases at bar, whether in this forum or in the
lower court. The longer these cases tarry, the greater the danger that witnesses may no longer be available, records have
to be reconstructed, etc.
5. Petitioners submit to the Court the propriety of whether or not the present counsel of IISMI should be allowed to
withdraw. It is interesting to note however that the reasons relied upon by IISMI counsel have long existed. It is only after
petitioners have confronted IISMI with concrete assertions of misrepresentations that counsel for respondent IISMI seek
withdrawal from these cases. Be that as it may, their withdrawal should not provide IISMI with another lame excuse to
seek delay in the disposition of the cases at bar. The stability of the economy itself is at stake in these cases. We cannot
temporize with the fate of our economy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that IISMI's prayer of deferment of the cases at bar as
well as to strike out petitioners' Manifestation and Reply to Comment dated May 17, 1973 be denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners also reiterate their prayer in their Manifestation and Motion dated July 10, 1973 to resolve these cases and/or
the pending incidents at the earliest time possible.
In view of all the foregoing and after a comprehensive review of the records of all these three cases, (made up of seven (7) volumes in G.R. No.
L-33986, four (4) volumes in G.R. No. L-33949 and three (3) volumes in G.R. No. L-34188, each volume averaging about ten (10) inches in
thickness and containing a total of over one hundred annexes) the Court finds no other alternative but to terminate the present proceedings in
this Court, so as to give way to further proceedings in the court below, wherein all pertinent issues arising from the developments which have
taken place since August 17, 1972 may be appropriately and fully threshed out, considering that the factual matters involved therein would
require the formal and proper presentation of varied and voluminous evidence which the Court is not adequately equipped to receive.
Needless to say, the Court's resolutions of April 25, 1972 and June 6, 1972, aforementioned, were predicated on the facts and circumstances,
as the same appeared then to the Court, viewed in the light of the issues lengthily discussed by all the parties in their pleadings, with
corresponding annexes, and at the hearings, and, of course, on the Court's overall view of the public interest, together with the apparent
equities to all the parties, herein involved. Withal, the parties have yet to be heard by the trial court regarding the merits of their respective
claims, and as matters stood in the record before Us at the time of said resolutions, the allegations of petitioners charging private investors
with shady or questionable manipulations were more or less generalized and in concrete, and in some ways seemingly untenable, what with
the presence of government representatives in the board of directors of IISMI and the Budget Commissioner being the Comptroller thereof,
and there is no intimation whatsoever that these officials were either negligent or in connivance with them. We therefore held that until a full-
blown inquiry could be undertaken, it was best to provide for the continued operation of the project in question, while We took what We
considered appropriate measures to insure maximum feasible protection against any possible dissipation of respondent's income or the
diversion thereof in a manner prejudicial to the government and for the benefit of said private investors. Thus, in the resolution of June 6,
1972, We did not only require IISMI to submit "a simplified statement of the sales and exportations it has made after using the raw materials it
has purchased with the proceeds of all the advances made by petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines, including but not limited to the
sales made to its sister companies and/or subsidiaries, indicating how payments have been made or are going to be made thereon by the
corresponding purchasers, both local and foreign," but also made sure that "(1) all proceeds from the sales and exportations to be made
possible by the importations of raw materials contemplated in said writ (in question), shall be used, after proper deduction of operating
52
expenses, for the servicing of the outstanding accounts of said respondent with the petitioners Development Bank and Republic of the
Philippines and (2) the proceeds of the processing agreement with Atlas Worldwide Corporation S.A., should such agreement ever materialize
by virtue of the impugned writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, shall likewise be duly accounted for to this Court and used for the same
purposes hereinabove set forth". Actually, We had in mind then "that the enforcement of the impugned writ is in the best interest of all
concerned since it can serve as an interim arrangement whereby great losses to all the parties may be avoided, not to speak of the relief it can
produce upon the continued unemployment of the over a thousand workers of IISMI and the adverse over-all effect upon the steel industry
and the national economic of the complete stoppage of the operations of IISMI, whereas, on the other hand, the ways to make IISMI
ultimately liable, should such be the final judgment in these cases, and to the enforcement of such liability , do not appear to be impossible,
specially if IISMI is allowed to operate in the meanwhile."
From the latest pleadings of petitioners, however, supported, as they are, by official reports which are more specific and factual, the situation
relative to the equities in these cases appears to Us to have changed considerably. And in the face of this circumstance, counsel for IISMI have
not been able to present sufficiently documented denials and rebuttals of the new allegations of petitioners, albeit they excuse themselves by
alleging that they have lost contact with their clients, the principal private investors who used to be in control of respondent corporation. It is
claimed that said private investors have gone abroad to places unknown to said counsel, for which reason, precisely, the latter are even asking
for leave to be allowed to withdraw their representation. Under the circumstances, and considering that to await the uncertain return of the
private investors would jeopardize the efforts of the government to make the national project herein involved as conceived in the triangular
agreement among the Republic, the EximBank and IISMI itself, namely, the establishment of an integrated steel complex to meet the
requirements of the industry and economy of the whole country, totally operative without further loss of time, the Court is of the considered
opinion that all the matters here in dispute should be referred to the respondent court for further proceedings and appropriate resolution.
Indeed, having in view the nature and volume of the evidence which the parties would have to present in connection with the factual issues
raised by petitioners regarding what they claim to have discovered or unearthed after the Secretary of National Defense took over the
"management, control and operation" of IISMI, may be justly and comprehensively resolved only after such evidence have been received by
the trial court, rather than this Court, since it has the ready adequate machinery for the purpose. And with such additional evidence, the trial
court would naturally be in a better position than before to rule on the injunctions which have given rise to these proceedings.
It should be plainly understood, however, that the action We are taking is not premised on Section 18 of Rule 3, cited by petitioners. In fact, in
Our view, it is of no moment whether or not Judge Tandayag is still in the lower court. In other words, it is the change of circumstances of the
cases themselves rather than the replacement of the presiding judge of the court a quo that warrants further proceedings therein.
Accordingly, We do not consider it opportune at this time to rule on the issue joined in by the parties regarding the applicability hereto of the
cited provision of the rules. Suffice it to state here, in that respect, that the "officer of the Philippines" contemplated in said provision does not
include a judge who is sued in connection with his actuation in the exercise of his judicial functions, if only because the nature of such act is
such that any action impugning it is not abated by his cessation from office. A judicial act is unlike the adoption and implementation or
enforcement by an administrative officer of a policy dictated by discretion given him by law. (See authorities cited in I Moran, Rules of Court, p.
212, 1970 ed.) Besides, a judge who is thus sued, although named as a defendant or respondent in the pleadings, is no more than a nominal
party therein. (Pinza vs. Aldovino, G.R. No.
L-25226, Sept. 27, 1968, 25 SCRA 220) Under Section 5 of Rule 65, he is not a real party in interest, whereas what Section 18 of Rule 3 refers to
is an officer whose official interest in the action is such that the suit cannot be maintained against his successor. Special civil actions against
judges do not have that character, for, in essence, these remedies do not differ from ordinary appeals, which obviously are not dismissed
merely because the trial judge has died, resigned, retired or has been transferred or removed from office. Indeed, to apply the rule to judges
of inferior courts would make the determination by the superior courts of the cases questioning their actuations largely dependent, not on the
correctness or incorrectness of the rulings of the judge concerned but on whether or not they would continue in office, thereby throwing
overboard the whole system of procedure designed to insure that all courts and judges must act in accordance with law.
Anent the prayer of all the counsel of IISMI to be given leave to withdraw their representation of said respondent, it is important to note that
said request is not accompanied by proof of their client's consent to such withdrawal.1Ordinarily, under Section 26 of Rule 138, such consent is
required. And even in the instances where the same section dispenses with the client's consent, it is generally the rule that the client should be
notified of the petition of counsel. But it is not inconceivable that under peculiar circumstances, the court may be justified in relieving a lawyer
from continuing his appearance in an action or proceeding, without hearing the client, as, for instance, when a situation develops, like in the
cases at bar where the client stops having any contact with the lawyer, who is thereby left without the usual means which are indispensable in
the successful or, at least, proper defense of the client's cause, such as, actual knowledge of relevant facts, the identity of usable witnesses,
pertinent documents and other evidence, not to speak of the money needed for even the minimum of litigation expenses and the possible
advances of attorney's fees. Understandably, no responsible lawyer can be expected to do justice to any cause under such conditions, and, it
would be an unjust imposition to compel him to continue his services in relation thereto. While perhaps the absence of legal counsel may
create an apparent denial of the party's inherent right to legal assistance, in these particular cases it can rightly be said that in a large sense
and for obvious reasons, movant counsel's clients have it in their power to remedy the situation.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to terminate by this resolution, the proceedings in this Court in all these three cases, and the trial court is
hereby ordered to resume proceedings in its Civil Case No. 1701, by receiving further evidence which the parties may desire to present relative
to all the issues they have so far raised either here or in that court in connection with the causes of action alleged in respondent IISMI's
complaint, and, thereafter, to resolve all the incidents related to the writ of preliminary injunction said court has issued and every other
incident in the said case and/or render final judgment in the main case on the merits.
The Court further resolved to grant the prayer of Attorneys Dominador Aytona, Manuel O. Chan, Jose P. Santillan, Norberto J. Quisumbing,
Manuel V. San Jose and Roberto V. San Jose for leave to withdraw their appearance for respondent IISMI. Said attorneys are directed to notify
53
their clients of this resolution by registered mail to be sent to them at their addresses last known to counsel and to furnish the Court proof of
such notice within ten (10) days from receipt by said counsel of the corresponding registry return cards.
54
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79403 December 19, 1988
EMETERIO M. MOZAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERNESTO MADAMBA, (or the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVII), CITY
SHERIFF OF MANILA and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO GUBALLA, SR., respondents.
G.R. No. 78223. December 19, 1988
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO GUBALLA, SR. and GUBALLA MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioners

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RUFINO B. RISMA and TECLA GOTICO-RISMA respondents.
PARAS, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal in: (1) G.R. No. 78223, the resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 04090, Risma et al. vs. Bulaklak Publications, et al." (a) dismissing the appeal for failure to comply with a lawful order of the Court; and (b)
denying the motion for reconsideration of said resolution and (2) G.R. No. 79403, the decision 2 of the same Appellate Court in C.A. G.R. SP No.
07983, "Mozar vs. Madamba, et al." affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 82- 12102 which
denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against Judge Ernesto A. Madamba, of the City Court of Manila, the City Sheriff and
Francisco Guballa, Sr.
As gathered from the records, the undisputed facts of these cases are as follows:
I. In G.R. No. 78223-Writ of Possession Case
The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. (Guballa Sr. for short) was the registered owner of a parcel of land, located at 1002-1004 R.
Hidalgo St., Quiapo, Manila under TCT No. 15638 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, together with improvements existing
thereon, consisting of a building known as the Bulaklak Building (Exh. "3", Folder of Exhibits, p. 27, G.R. No. 78223).
Guballa Sr. used to own and operate Bulaklak Publications housed in the ground and mezzanine floors of said building. After cessation of
Guballa Sr.'s business operations BUSCOPE LABOR UNION (BUSCOPE for short), instituted a complaint for non-payment of separation pay
against BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS and/or Francisco Guballa, Sr., docketed as NLRC Case No. 014 and entitled "BUSCOPE LABOR UNION and
Amado S. Pagsanjan, as its President, et al. vs. BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS and/or Francisco Guballa, Sr." (Exhibit "J", Folder of Exhibits, p. 39,
G.R. No. 78223). After hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of BUSCOPE and against BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS, et al., ordering the latter to
pay the sum of P139,123.75 as collective Separation Pay of the complainants' union. The NLRC issued a writ of execution and levied upon
Guballa's property covered by TCT No. 15638 and subsequently sold the same at public auction on July 8, 1975 in favor of BUSCOPE as highest
bidder, the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to it by the Sheriff of Manila and annotated on the back of said title on July 11, 1975
(Rollo, pp. 35-36, G.R. No. 78223; Exhibit "3", Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 78223, p. 51). Rentals of said building were delivered to BUSCOPE
starting November 1975 and the succeeding months.
On July 7, 1976, and within the period of redemption, a motion for the annulment of the certificate of sale issued in favor of BUSCOPE was
filed in NLRC Case No. 014 and in connection therewith, a Notice of Lis Pendens was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 15638 under Entry
No. 6666. However, despite the pendency of said motion, a Final Deed of Sale was issued by the Sheriff of Manila on November 4, 1976 in
favor of BUSCOPE over subject property (Exhibit "B", Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 78223, p. 2).
On March 10, 1978, BUSCOPE's President Amado Pagsanjan sold the said property to Atty. Rufino Risma (Exhibit "C", Folder of Exhibits, G.R.
No. 78223, p. 3) but without annotating his acquired rights thereon, in TCT No. 15638.
Three days later, on March 31, 1978, Mozar and Atty. Risma entered into a lease agreement over the premises in question in the amount of
P3,000.00 monthly beginning April 1978 (Exhibit "E", Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403).
However, on April 10, 1979, a decision was rendered by Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong in NLRC Case No. 014, setting aside the deed of sale
in favor of BUSCOPE, the dispositive portion of which decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the sale of the property covered by TCT No. 15638 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Manila on July 8,
1975 is hereby set aside, the judgment claims of the complainants having been fully satisfied.
The Register of Deeds of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel the sale of the property covered by TCT No. 15635
in favor of BUSCOPE Labor Union on 8 July 1975, restoring ownership thereof to the respondent Francisco Guballa, Senior."
(Rollo, p. 37, G.R. No. 78223)
55
No appeal was interposed from the said order. Cancellation of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 15638
(Exhibit "3-G", Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 78223, p. 52).
On June 26, 1979, an action for the issuance of a writ of possession of property covered by TCT No. 15638 was filed by the Risma spouses
against Guballa Sr. at the CFI of Manila, Branch XXXIV docketed as Civil Case No. 12427, "Rufino B. Risma, et al. vs. Bulaklak Publications and
Francisco Guballa, Sr.'. In his answer Guballa Sr. prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of.- (a) lack of cause of action, the
claimants having been paid and the decision having been fully satisfied and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance on the subject
matter thereof, the NLRC having the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same (RA G.R. No. 78223, pp. 8-9). The prayer for dismissal was
denied in the Order of the lower court dated December 11, 1979 (Original Record, G.R. 14o. 78223, pp. 81-82) and the motion for
reconsideration said Order was denied in the Order of March 20, 1980 (Ibid., p. 104). On June 19, 1982, subject property was sold by Guballa
Sr. to Guballa Marketing Corporation by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage (Original Record, G.R. No. 79403, pp. 547-548)
and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 153154 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp. 545-546).
On July 26, 1982, a decision was rendered granting the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject property in favor of the private
respondents spouses Risma (Original Records, pp. 241- 250).
But on appeal to the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. CV No. 04090 and after filing of the appellant's brief (CA Rollo, p. 148), several
motions to dismiss were filed by private respondents Risma in view of the sale of the property by appellant Guballa Sr. to Guballa Marketing
Corporation which allegedly implied that appellants Guballa Sr., et al. are no longer the real party in interest (CA Rollo, pp. 154, 183). Said
motions were all denied by the Second Civil Cases Division and instead party-appellant Guballa Sr., et al. was ordered to be substituted by the
present owner upon "the initiative of the adverse party if it so desires" in a resolution dated October 28, 1985 and November 12,1985 (CA
Rollo, pp. 179 and 181).
Petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. did not comply with the aforesaid resolutions. No notice of resolution was sent to Guballa Marketing Corporation.
A motion for reconsideration of the latter resolution was filed by private respondents Risma and on December 9, 1986, the appeal was
dismissed for failure of appellant to comply with the resolution dated November 12, 1985 (CA Rollo, pp. 209-210).
From said dismissal, petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 2, 1987 and Guballa Marketing
Corporation's notice of voluntary appearance dated February 10, 1987 (CA Rollo, pp. 211, 221). On April 13,1987, the motion was denied and
the appearance of petitioner corporation merely noted (CA Rollo, p. 227).
II. In G.R. No. 79403--Ejectment Case
On the other hand, the records show that there was an existing contract of lease between Guballa Sr. as lessor and Emeterio M. Mozar as
lessee, over subject property, for a term of five (5) years beginning January 1, 1973 and expiring on January 1, 1978 (Rollo, p. 8, G.R. No.
79403).
On March 16,1979, Guballa Sr. filed an ejectment suit at the City Court of Manila (now MTC, Branch 17) docketed as Civil Case No. 042984-CV,
against petitioner Mozar for unlawfully detaining the subject premises since the expiry date of the lease contract between them or from
January 1, 1978 and for non-payment of rentals.
On January 22, 1980, a decision 3 was rendered by the said City Court, Branch XVII on said ejectment case, ordering Mozar to vacate subject
premises and to pay the corresponding rentals thereon (Exhibits "1 - "1" - H pp. 30-38, Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403).
On appeal, the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXVII, in Civil Case No. 130088, affirmed aforesaid judgment 4 on July 3, 1980 (Folder of
Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403, Exhibit "2", pp. 3944). On review, the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 11149- R 5 affirmed on March 27, 1981 the
decision of the Court of First Instance with the modification that petitioner shall not be liable for the payment of rentals from November 1,
1975 to April 10, 1979 (Exhibit "3-A", Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403, pp. 46-50). Still further, on appeal by certiorari, in G.R. No. L-57953,
this Court finally denied the petition of Mozar on June 2, 1982 and entry of judgment was made (Exhibits "2", "7" and "8", Folder of Exhibits,
G.R. No. 79403, pp. 55-57).
On July 12, 1982, Guballa Sr. filed a motion for execution of the decision in the ejectment case as modified by the Court of Appeals, which was
opposed by Mozar.
After hearing, the City Court (now MTC) Branch XVII, issued a writ of execution on July 16, 1982 to enforce its decision as modified, and said
writ was subsequently served on petitioner Mozar who partially complied by paying the money portion of the execution judgment (Exhibits
"A" -"A-1", pp- 1 2, Folder of Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403, pp. 1-2).
On July 23, 1982, Mozar undertook to leave the premises in question on or before August 31, 1982, otherwise, the ejectment execution shall
be enforced against him (Exhibit "4", p. 51, Folder of Exhibits). Mozar, however, did not comply with his undertaking.
Meanwhile, on August 30,1982, in violation of his undertaking to leave subject premises and to obviate further execution of the judgment in
the ejectment case, Mozar filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayers for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
56
order before the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 54, docketed as Civil Case No. 82-12102 against the Presiding Judge, City Court of Manila
(now MTC, Branch 17) and the City Sheriff of Manila, for the following purposes: (a) to quash the writ of execution issued on July 16, 1982
because of the grant of the writ of possession to the Risma spouses which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in C.A-G.R. R. C.V. No. 04090
(The Writ of Possession Case) and (b) to enjoin respondent court from issuing another writ of execution in connection with the decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-1 11 49-R (The Ejectment Case).
Said Regional Trial Court issued on August 30,1982 a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo (G.R. No. 79403, Original Records,
p. 80).
On November 25, 1982, Mozar acquired the premises in question from Atty. Risma by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "F", Folder of
Exhibits, G.R. No. 79403, pp. 18-20) which was also not annotated in TCT No. 15638.
On March 29, 1985, said Regional Trial Court, Branch 54 6 finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, denied the petition in
Civil Case No. 82-12102 as well as the injunctive relief prayed for (G.R. No. 79403, Original Records, pp. 372-382).
Guballa moved for the withdrawal of rental deposits on April 9, 1985 (Original Records, p. 384), while the Mozars appealed the above
mentioned decision and opposed withdrawal of the deposits with a counter-motion to preserve the status quo of the parties in this case
(Ibid. p. 387).
Considering the motion for the withdrawal of the deposits and the opposition of the Mozar's primarily based on the fact that the decision of
said Regional Trial Court is on appeal with the Court of Appeals, the former issued an Order 7 dated April 16,1985, granting the prayer for the
maintenance of the status quo of the rights of the parties and enjoining the Municipal Trial Court from issuing a writ of execution (G.R. No.
79403, Original Records, pp. 398-399). Noting however, the finality of the decision in the ejectment case, Judge Cabanos reconsidered his
status quo order on June 17, 1985 (Ibid., pp. 417-418).
On certiorari and prohibition, filed with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-06516, Mozar sought the annulment of
the June 17, 1985, Order of Judge Cabanos A temporary restraining order was issued on March 23, 1983 to maintain the status quo (G.R. No.
79403i CA Rollo, p. 177), but on November 25, 1986, a decision 8 was finally rendered declaring that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by Judge Cabanos in issuing the Order of June 1 7, 1985 (Ibid., p. 170-174).
Earlier, however, before the promulgation of said decision, Mozar moved for the transmittal of the records of the earlier certiorari case, Civil
Case No. 82-12102 which was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, to the Court of Appeals, the case being now docketed as C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 07983.
On February 19,1987, a motion to consolidate C.A.-G.R. No. 06516, the terminated case and C.A.-G.R. No. 07983-R was filed by Guballa Sr. but
this was denied on April 22,1987 (G.R. No. 79403; Court of Appeals Rollo, pp. 175-176).
Based on said denial of the motion for consolidation, MTC Judge Caesar Sangco, Branch 17, granted the motion to issue an alias writ of
execution on June 29, 1987 to enforce the decision in the ejectment case (p. 321, Court of Appeals Rollo, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 07983-R). An alias
writ of execution was issued on June 30, 1987 (Ibid., p. 203). The Deputy Sheriff of Manila filed his return on July 2, 1987, informing the court
that the judgment as regards the ejectment of Mozar was satisfied but not as regards the money claim (Ibid., p. 203). Notice of levy on Mozar's
personal properties was likewise made on the same date (Ibid., p. 207). Respondent Court of Appeals restrained MTC, Branch 17 and the City
Sheriff from implementing the said alias writ of execution dated June 30, 1987 on the ground that Mozar filed a bond of P150,000.00 to
answer for the back rentals of the premises from 1982-1987 (Ibid., p. 220). On July 10, 1987, MTC, Branch 17 issued an Order to defer the
implementation of the said writ and instructed the Sheriff to remove the lock which he had installed in the premises (Ibid., p. 234). But this
Order was subsequently set aside by the MTC of Manila, Branch 17, on July 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 313-315) for having been inadvertently issued,
as the alias writ of execution had already been fully implemented four days before the Court of Appeals issued its restraining order. On July 31,
1987, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 07983-R, considered as an appeal from the decision of the RTC,
Branch 54 in Civil Case No. 82-12102, affirming the judgment of the latter court, which in effect denied the prayer to recall the writ of
execution dated July 16, 1982.
Unsatisfied with the decisions of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 06515 and C.A.- G.R. SP No. 07983-R, which involve the same issues,
parties, subject matters and facts, Mozar now comes to this Court by way of petition for review to raise once again the same legal questions
already ruled upon.
Hence this petition in G.R. No. 79403.
In G.R. No. 78223, private respondents filed their comment on the petition for review on certiorari on September 2, 1987 (Rollo, G.R. No.
78223, p. 61) in compliance with the resolution of the Second Division of this Court dated July 15, 1987 (Ibid., p. 49-a), while the petitioners
filed their reply on October 3, 1987 (Ibid., p. 90). A rejoinder to the reply was filed by private respondents on December 8, 1987 (Ibid., p. 101)
in compliance with the resolution of October 21, 1987 (Ibid., p. 100).
In G.R. No. 79403, pending action on the petition, petitioner Mozar filed an urgent motion on August 22, 1987 with the Court of Appeals, for
protection and preservation of his rights, directing the Deputy Sheriff Alfredo Distor to hold in abeyance the execution sale of his personal
57
properties levied upon earlier until such time as this Court shall have acted on the petition (G.R. No. 79403, CA Rollo, pp. 302-305). The Court
of Appeals denied aforesaid motion on August 3l, 1987 for having lost jurisdiction over the case (Ibid., p. 307).
Respondents filed their comment on the petition for review on certiorari on September 19, 1987 (Ibid., p. 109) in compliance with the
resolution of the Second Division of this Court of August 26, 1987 (Ibid., p. 67) ', while petitioner filed his reply on September 29, 1987 (Ibid., p.
152) in compliance with the resolution of October 14, 1987 (Ibid., p. 151). Petitioner's urgent ex- parte and supplemental motions filed on
August 21, 1987 and September 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 59 and 142) for issuance of a temporary restraining order were noted and G.R. No. 78223
and 79403 were consolidated. The Court gave due course to the petitions and considered the cases submitted for deliberation on December 9,
1987 (Ibid., p. 107). Considering the urgent motion and amended urgent motion of the petitioner in G.R. Nos. 79403 to resolve supplemental
motion for issuance of order of restitution/restoration, the Court Resolved to require the adverse parties to comment thereon in the
resolution dated February 17,1988 (Ibid., p. 183). Petitioners in G.R. No. 78223 and private respondents in G.R. No. 79403 filed the required
comment on March 23,1988 (Ibid., p. 184).
On May 26, 1988, counsel for Emeterio Mozar manifested to the Court as to the recent death of his client Emeterio Mozar, and submitted a
copy of the latter's death certificate (G.R. No. 79403, Rollo, pp. 200, 202). A motion for substitution of the heirs of Emeterio Mozar as co-
petitioners in G.R. No. 79403 was filed on May 30,1988 (Ibid., p. 206), while on June 9,1988 (Ibid., p. 215) the heirs of deceased Emeterio M.
Mozar filed a motion to allow them to retrieve personal records and properties not levied upon.
In G.R. No. 78223, petitioners raised the following assignments of errors:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE OUTRIGHT SUBSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL APPELLANTS BY THE PRESENT
OWNER, GUBALLA MARKETING CORPORATION, WHO, AS TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE, SHOULD AT MOST BE JOINED AS PARTY APPELLANT.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HEIRS OF FRANCISCO GUBALLA SR. FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
AMENDED RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 12,1986.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL ON A GROUND NOT PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES OF COURT, EVEN
DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT THE APPELLANTS' BRIEF HAD LONG BEEN FILED.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 9,1986, MERELY NOTICING THE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OF GUBALLA MARKETING CORPORATION. (Rollo, p. 13)
In G.R. No. 79403, petitioner Mozar raised the following assigned errors:
FIRST
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION BY RESPONDENT THEN CITY COURT OF MANILA ON JULY 16,1982 WAS PREMATURE FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF THE RULE STATED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1, RULE 39 THAT "[I] IF THE JUDGMENT HAS BEEN DULY APPEALED,
EXECUTION MAY ISSUE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT FROM THE DATE OF THE SERVICE OF THE NOTICE PROVIDED IN SECTION 11 OF RULE 51."
SECOND
THE SETTLED RULE THAT AN EXECUTORY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE EXECUTED IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAVE CHANGED
MATERIALLY AS TO MAKE ANY EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE MAKES NO DISTINCTION WHETHER THE RIGHT OF THE PARTY AFFECTED
BY THE EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT IS ALREADY SETTLED OR IS MERELY INCHOATE OR CONTINGENT. THE RULE IS A RULE OF EQUITY
ANCHORED ON "SIMPLE JUSTICE" AND CONSEQUENTLY WHAT IS CRUCIAL IS THAT THE MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN
THE PARTIES RENDERS EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE. (Rollo, p. 19)
At the outset, it is significant to note that the decisions in question in both cases have already become final and executory.
In G.R. No. 78223, it is beyond dispute that the decision of Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong in NLRC Case No. 014 on April 10, 1979: (a) has
been fully satisfied by the payment by Gubalia Sr. of the judgment claims of the complainants as stated in the decision itself and as evidenced
by the "Deed of Conveyance and Reversion" dated May 26,1977 and "Satisfaction of Judgment and/or Release and Quitclaim" dated May 26,
1977 signed by the members of the Union as claimants in NLRC Case No. 014 (Exhibits "6" to "6-B", G.R. No. 78223, Record on Appeal, p. 74);
58
(b) has become final and executory there being no appeal from either party as certified to by the Executive Director NLRC, dated June 14, 1979
(Ibid., p. 47); and (c) has in fact been executed by the cancellation of the Sheriffs sale of the property in favor of BUSCOPE Labor Union in the
Registry of Deeds and the restoration of ownership thereof to its original owner, Guballa Sr. (Rollo, p. 37, G.R. No. 78223). Said property had
remained titled under the name of Guballa Sr. until it was transferred to Guballa Marketing Corporation (G.R. No. 78223, Record on Appeal, p.
87).
However, the bone of contention in this case, arose in the issuance of the Final Deed of Sale by the Sheriff of Manila despite the pendency of
the motion for annulment of the Sheriff s sale filed with the NLRC and the subsequent sale of said property to Atty. Rufino Risma, all of which
transpired despite a Notice of Lis Pendens duly annotated on the back of TCT No. 15638. In contrast, such subsequent sale in favor of Risma
was not annotated in subject title.
As previously stated, an action for the issuance of a writ of possession of subject property was filed by the Risma spouses, which was granted
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXIV, but on appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case was not decided on the merits. Instead
the appeal was dismissed in the resolution of December 9, 1986 of the Court of Appeals for failure of the Guballa Marketing Corporation to
comply with a lawful order of the Court (Resolution of Second Civil Cases Division dated November 12,1985 amending Resolution dated
October 28, 1985; G.R. No. 78223, CA Rollo, p. 181).
As an aftermath, Mozar who subsequently bought subject property from Risma, again without the corresponding annotation on the title, filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of First Instance, Branch XXXVII seeking to quash the execution of the decision of the City
Court, Branch XVII in the ejectment case in favor of Guballa Sr. That said decision had already become final and executory is likewise beyond
question. The same was affirmed by the aforesaid Court of First Instance, then by the Court of Appeals with modification and finally by the
Supreme Court and the corresponding entry of judgment had already been made, as earlier stated. In fact said judgment had also been
partially executed by the payment of the money judgment by Mozar with a promise to leave the premises. Mozar, however, reneged on his
undertaking.
In G.R. No. 78223, the main thrust of the petition is that failure of party-appellant to be substituted by a transferee pendente lite in the case at
bar is not a proper ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners argue that substitution or joinder of parties under Section 20 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is not mandatory, it being permissible
to continue the action by or against the original party in cases of transfer of interest pendente lite. As the original party stands to be bound by
the final outcome of the case, non-joinder or substitution as party-appellant of Guballa Sr., et al. by Guballa Marketing Corporation as buyer of
subject property is not deemed necessary and does not warrant dismissal of the appeal (Rollo, pp. 18, 24, G.R. No. 78223).
Dismissal of the appeal in the writ of possession case is primarily anchored on non-compliance by petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. of respondent
Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 12, 1975, which reads:
After a mature deliberation on the Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by counsel for the petitioners- appellees on August 15,
1985, the Comment filed thereto, and the Manifestation filed by the appellee on September 5,1985, the Court RESOLVED
to deny the said motion and to order the substitution of the party appellant on record by the present owner within ten (10)
days from notice, and the substitution should be set at the initiative of the adverse party if it so desires. (Rollo, p. 16)
It has been held that a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment
because the action or suit may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee
(Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 462 [1979]). More specifically, this Court has ruled
that a transferee pendente lite is a proper party in the case but it is not an indispensable party (Fetalino vs. Sanz, 44 Phil, 691 [1923]; Jose vs.
Blue, 42 SCRA 361 [1971]; Tanchoco vs. Quiño, 154 SCRA 18 [1987]).
There is likewise no argument on the fact that the courts are authorized to order the outright substitution of the transferee pendente lite, as
the Court of Appeals has done in the instant case in its resolution of November 12, 1985. But the ambiguity of the aforesaid resolution is
readily apparent.
The appellate court speaks of an adverse party at whose initiative the substitution should be made.
If the adverse party alluded to is Guballa Marketing Corporation, as could be gleaned from the use of the pronoun IT, the same could not be
bound by said resolution, notice thereof not having been given to said corporation, much less was it a participant in said proceedings. Under
the circumstances, respondent Court of Appeals has no basis for its charge that there has been a patent and deliberate failure to comply with a
lawful order of the court.
More than that, the tenor of the resolution in question: "if it so desires" is clearly indicative of an option given to the adverse party as to
whether or not it desires to be substituted. Having opted as it did, said corporation can hardly be held liable for disobedience to a court order.
59
Accordingly, failure of substitution in the case at bar, could at most be a mere technical defect which may be cured without much ado.
Respondent Court of Appeals could have reconsidered its resolution dismissing the appeal upon the voluntary appearance of Guballa
Marketing Corporation, but it did not, and on the contrary ruled that if such appearance is intended for compliance, it came too late in the day
(Resolution, CA-G.R. CV No. 04090 dated April 13, 1987; Rollo, p. 227, G.R. No. 78223).
It is an oft-repeated axiom that dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon, where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim
would be defeated (Gregorio vs. C.A., 72 SCRA 120 [1976]; De las Alas vs. C.A., et al, 83 SCRA 216 [1978]; Galdo vs. Rosete, 84 SCRA 243
[1978]). The trend of rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant amplest opportunity for determination of their cause, freed from
constraints or technicalities (Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 416 [1985]).
In fine, the appeal interposed by petitioners from the decision of the Court of First Instance granting the writ of possession should be given
due course or reinstated as prayed for. However, instead of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals which would only be productive of
further delays in the final adjudication of the litigation, it is deemed expedient as held by this Court in a long line of decisions, that the appeal
be now resolved on the merits, where the same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on record (Pagdonsalan vs. NLRC, L-
63701, 127 SCRA 468 [1984]; Diferia vs. Paras, et al., 141 SCRA 519 [1986]; Board of Transportation vs. Castro, L-53431, 125 SCRA 418 [1983];
Quisumbing vs. C.A., L- 60364, 122 SCRA 709 [1983]; Board of Liquidators vs. Zulueta, L-30738, 115 SCRA 557 [1982]; Velasco vs. C.A. L47544,
95 SCRA 621-622 [1980]; Sacdalan vs. Bautista, L38014, 56 SCRA 179 [1974]; Quimaon vs. PNB, L-24920, 36 SCRA 37 [1970]).
It is unquestioned that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter in the labor dispute which is a claim for separation pay of the
complainants' union whereby the amount of P139,123.75 was adjudged in their favor. Counsel for Guballa Sr., therefore, correctly argued that
the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the res, the same having been already acquired by the NLRC (Rollo, p. 39, G.R. No. 78223).
When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the
appellate authority until the matter is finally and completely disposed of (Lee vs. Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 1, 145 SCRA 408
[1986]).
That the Commission has authority to execute its decisions, orders or awards, is specifically provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code.
The Commission gained authority over the res upon the issuance of a writ of execution in pursuance of the judgment in NLRC Case No. 014
when the property in question was levied upon and subsequently sold at public auction (Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 927-928
[1918]).
The power of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution carries with it the right to look into the correctness of the execution of the decision in this
case and to consider the supervening events that may affect such execution (Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 145 SCRA 210
[1986]). The NLRC has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters and incidents prior to and after a decision has been rendered and arising out of
and in connection with a labor dispute (Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. Sarmiento, 133 SCRA 234 [1984]).
The Commission had jurisdiction to entertain motions to quash its writs of execution or set aside a sheriff 's sale on the ground of satisfaction
of judgment or by reason of the full payment of the judgment debt because every court has the inherent power for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes (Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, 76 Phil. 146 [1946]; Cobb-Perez
vs. Lantin, 23 SCRA 642-643 [1968]).
The Court which rendered the judgment has general supervisory control over its process of execution, being merely adjunct to the main case,
with right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. Any irregularities in the execution of judgment
brought about by the enforcement of a dead writ of execution must be litigated in the court which issued the controversial writ of execution
(Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 168 [1987]).
From the foregoing discussion, it can be readily seen that the issuing Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to grant the writ of possession
in question, ergo, the writ is null and void.
More importantly, it is evident that respondent Union acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale. Under such
circumstances, as ruled by this Court (Cometa vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 568 [1987]), it is not entitled to the claimed possession and so are its
successors in interest Risma and Mozar who bought the property despite a Notice of Lis Pendens annotated in the title. They cannot claim a
better right than their predecessor.
In G.R. No. 79403, petitioner Mozar presents the issue of whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case which has
gone all the way to the Supreme Court may be stayed by a trial court on the ground of a supervening event, namely, a decision in the Regional
Trial Court granting the writ of possession in favor of private respondent Risma.
By and large, this Court has ruled that the pendency of a writ of possession case where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the
Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue
involved is the material possession or possession de facto of the land under litigation. Such action which involves the title over the premises is
entirely independent from unlawful detainer. The judgment of the MTC is res judicata as to the issue of possession de facto but is not
60
conclusive as to the title ownership. Possession and ownership of a parcel of land may be held by different persons. The winning party is
entitled to the execution of the municipal court's final judgment as to possession. The enforcement of that judgment would not cause "chaos
and confusion" (Ramirez vs. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]; Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]; Ang Ping vs. Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Br. 40,154 SCRA 84 [1987]).
The rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right of possession of the property involved. It does not admit of delay in the determination thereof.
Procedural technicality is therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be tolerated and cannot
override substantial justice. So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent
further damages arising from loss of possession (And Ping vs. RTC, supra.).
Moreover, the assailed writ of execution dated July 16, 1982 issued by MTC, Branch 17 to implement the long final decision in the ejectment
case has been superseded by an alias writ of decision dated June 30, 1987.
As an alias writ sought to be enjoined is now functus oficio as petitioner has already been ejected from the subject premises and possession
thereof having already been delivered to the owner, while the instant case was still pending in the Court of Appeals, resolution of the propriety
of the writ of execution dated July 16, 1982 or of the alias writ dated June 30, 1 987 can no longer be restrained, attacked nor relief be granted
thereon (Santiago vs. Castro, 128 SCRA 545 [1984]; Tinio vs. Castro, 136 SCRA 658 ([1985]).
It may be mentioned that the filing of multiple petitions by Mozar and counsel constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade and administration of justice. To state the unnecessary, the lawyer who files such multiple
or repetitious petitions delays the execution of a final and executory judgment and may be held liable for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth
and honor (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 275 [1976]).
Petitioner Mozar and his lawyer have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
The conduct of one particular counsel of his who made the inaccurate statements regarding the feigned non-enforcement of the questioned
writ and alias writ of execution in the ejectment case which are belied by his pleadings: (1) dated July 8, 1987 before the Court of Appeals,
whereby they moved for the immediate restoration of possession of the premises in question (Rollo, pp. 89- 91); (2) a motion to breakdown
padlock before the MTC, Branch 17 (Order dated July 20, 1987, CA Rollo, pp. 313-315); and (3) urgent motion for protection and preservation
of rights dated August 22, 1987 with the Court of Appeals (CA Rollo, pp. 302-305), falls short of the exacting standard of candor and fairness
required of lawyers (Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics) and the same is censurable. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other
than candidly with the facts in the presentation of the causes (Monzon vs. Reyes, 67 SCRA 402 [1975]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition in (1) G.R. No. 78223 is GRANTED, the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04090 is REINSTATED, and Civil Case No.
124627 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) G.R. No. 79403 is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic, and treble costs are
assessed against petitioner Mozar to be paid by his counsel in accordance with the ruling laid down in Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, (23 SCRA 646
[1968]).
SO ORDERED.
61
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13602 April 6, 1918
LEUNG BEN, plaintiff,

vs.
P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY, judges of First Instance of city of Manila,defendants.
Thos. D. Aitken and W. A. Armstrong for plaintiff.

Kincaid & Perkins for defendants.
STREET, J.:
This is an application for a writ of certiorari, the purpose of which is to quash an attachment issued from the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila under circumstances hereinbelow stated.
Upon December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover of Leung Ben
the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games
conducted ruing the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the plaintiff asked for an attachment,
under section 424, and 412 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about
to depart from the Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued; and acting under the authority thereof,
the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the defendant with the International Banking Corporation.
The defendant thereupon appeared by his attorney and moved the court to quash the attachment. Said motion having dismissed in the Court
of First Instance, the petitioner, Leung Ben, the defendant in that action, presented to this court, upon January 8, 1918 his petition for the writ
of certiorari directed against P. J. O'Brien and the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila whose names are mentioned in the
caption hereof. The prayer is that the Honorable James A. Ostrand, as the judge having cognizance of the action in said court be required to
certify the record to this court for review and that the order of attachment which had been issued should be revoked and discharged. with
costs. Upon the filing of said petition in this court the usual order was entered requiring the defendants to show cause why the writ should not
issue. The response of the defendants, in the nature of a demurrer, was filed upon January 21, 1918; and the matter is now heard upon the
pleadings thus presented.
The provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be accuse of action arising upon contract, express or
implied. The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is that the statutory action to recover
money lost at gaming is no such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and he therefore insists that the original complaint shows on its
face that the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in granting
the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ
of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for his relief.
The case presents the two following questions of law, either of which, if decided unfavorably to the petitioner, will be fatal to his application:
(1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which there is no statutory authority, can this court entertain the
present petition and grant the desired relief?
(2) Is the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an obligation arising from "contract, express or implied?"
We are of the opinion that the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative. Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the writ of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First Instance, wherever said courts have
exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the same section, it is further declared that the
proceedings in the Supreme Court in such cases hall be as prescribed for Courts of First Instance in section 217-221, inclusive, of said Code.
This Supreme Court, so far as applicable, the provisions contained in those section to the same extent as if they had been reproduced verbatim
immediately after section 514. Turning to section 217, we find that, in defining the conditions under which certiorari can be maintained in a
Court of First Instance substantially the same language is used as is the same remedy can be maintained in the Supreme Court of First Instance,
substantially the same language is used as is found in section 514 relative to the conditions under which the same remedy can be maintained
in the Supreme Court, namely, when the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. In using these expressions the author of the Code of Civil Procedure merely adopted the language which, in American
jurisdictions at least, had long ago reached the stage of stereotyped formula.
In section 220 of the same Code, we have a provision relative to the final proceedings in certiorari, and herein it is stated that the court shall
determine whether the inferior tribunal has regularly pursued its authority it shall give judgment either affirming annulling, or modifying the
proceedings below, as the law requires. The expression, has not regularly pursued its authority as here used, is suggestive, and we think it
should be construed in connection with the other expressions have exceeded their jurisdiction, as used in section 514, and has exceeded their
jurisdiction as used in section 217. Taking the three together, it results in our opinion that any irregular exercise of juridical power by a Court of
First Instance, in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, is remediable by the writ of certiorari, provided there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
62
remedy; and in order to make out a case for the granting of the writ it is not necessary that the court should have acted in the matter without
any jurisdiction whatever. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation
where a court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful
power.
It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used in attachment cases, has reference not only to the authority of the
court to entertain the principal action but also to its authority to issue the attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the statutory
ground. (6 C. J., 89.) This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an ancillary remedy incident to the principal litigation is of
importance; as a court's jurisdiction over the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to grant an attachment as ancillary to
such action. This distinction between jurisdiction over the ancillary has been recognized by this court in connection with actions involving the
appointment of a receiver. Thus in Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), a receiver had been appointed without legal
justification. It was held that the order making the appointment was beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and though the court admittedly had
jurisdiction of the main cause, the order was vacated by this court upon application a writ of certiorari. (See Blanco vs. Ambler, 3 Phil. Rep.,
358, Blanco vs. Ambler and McMicking 3 Phil. Rep., 735, Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil. Rep., 404.)
By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court issues a writ of attachment for which there is no statutory authority, it is acting
irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction, in the sense necessary to justify the Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. In
applying this proposition it is of course necessary to take account of the difference between a ground of attachment based on the nature of
the action and a ground of attachment based on the acts or the conditions of the defendant. Every complaint must show a cause of action
some sort; and when the statue declares that the attachment may issue in an action arising upon contract, the express or implied, it
announces a criterion which may be determined from an inspection of the language of the complaint. The determination of this question is
purely a matter of law. On the other hand, when the stature declares that an attachment may be issued when the defendant is about to
depart from the Islands, a criterion is announced which is wholly foreign to the cause of action; and the determination of it may involve a
disputed question of fact which must be decided by the court. In making this determination, the court obviously acts within its powers; and it
would be idle to suppose that the writ of certiorari would be available to reverse the action of a Court of First Instance in determining the
sufficiency of the proof on such a disputed point, and in granting or refusing the attachment accordingly.
We should not be understood, in anything that has been said, as intending to infringe the doctrine enunciated by this court in
Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (25 Phil. Rep., 245), when properly applied. It was there held that we would not, upon application for a writ
of certiorari, dissolve an interlocutory mandatory injunction that had been issued in a Court of First Instance as an incident in an action
of mandamus. The issuance of an interlocutory injunction depends upon conditions essentially different from those involved in the issuance of
an attachment. The injunction is designed primarily for the prevention of irreparable injury and the use of the remedy is in a great measure
dependent upon the exercise of discretion. Generally, it may be said that the exercise of the injunctive powers is inherent in judicial authority;
and ordinarily it would be impossible to distinguish between the jurisdiction of the court in the main litigation and its jurisdiction to grant an
interlocutory injunction, for the latter is involved in the former. That the writ of certiorari can not be used to reverse an order denying a
motion for a preliminary injunction is of course not to cavil. (Somes vs. Crossfield and Molina, 8 Phil. Rep., 284.)
But it will be said that the writ of certiorari is not available in this cae, because the petitioner is protected by the attachment bond, and that he
has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy appeal. This suggestion seems to be sufficiently answered in the case of Rocha & Co vs. Crossfield
and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), already referred to, and the earlier case there cited. The remedy by appeal is not sufficiently speedy to meet
the exigencies of the case. An attachment is extremely violent, and its abuse may often result in infliction of damage which could never be
repaired by any pecuniary award at the final hearing. To postpone the granting of the writ in such a case until the final hearing and to compel
the petitioner to bring the case here upon appeal merely in order to correct the action of the trial court in the matter of allowing the
attachment would seem both unjust and unnecessary.
Passing to the problem propounded in the second question it may be observed that, upon general principles,. recognize both the civil and
common law, money lost in gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner can not in the absence of statue, be recovered in a civil
action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions
recognizing the right to recover money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain games (secs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11). The original complaint in the
action in the Court of First Instance is not clear as to the particular section of Act No. 1757 under which the action is brought, but it is alleged
that the money was lost at gambling, banking, and percentage game in which the defendant was banker. It must therefore be assumed that
the action is based upon the right of recovery given in Section 7 of said Act, which declares that an action may be brought against the banker
by any person losing money at a banking or percentage game.
Is this a cause arising upon contract, express or implied, as this term is used in section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure? To begin the
discussion, the English version of the Code of Civil Procedure is controlling (sec. 15, Admin. Code, ed. of 1917). Furthermore it is universally
admitted to be proper in the interpretation of any statute, to consider its historical antecedents and its juris prudential sources. The Code of
Civil Procedure, as is well known, is an American contribution to Philippine legislation. It therefore speaks the language of the common-law
and for the most part reflects its ideas. When the draftsman of this Code used the expression contract, express or implied, he used a phrase
that has been long current among writers on American and English law; and it is therefore appropriate to resort to that system of law to
discover the appropriate to resort to that system of law to discover the meaning which the legislator intended to convey by those meaning
which the legislator intended to convey by those terms. We remark in passing that the expression contrato tracito, used in the official
translation of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Spanish equivalent of implied contract, does not appear to render the full sense of the English
expression.
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The English contract law, so far as relates to simple contracts is planted upon two foundations, which are supplied by two very different
conceptions of legal liability. These two conceptions are revealed in the ideas respectively underlying (1) the common- law debt and (2) the
assumptual promise. In the early and formative stages of the common-law the only simple contract of which the courts took account was
the real contract or contract re, in which the contractual duty imposed by law arises upon the delivery of a chattle, as in
the mutuum, commodatum, depositum, and the like; and the purely consensual agreements of the Roman Law found no congenial place in the
early common law system.
In course of time the idea underlying the contract re was extended so as to include from one person to another under such circumstances as to
constitute a justa cuas debendi. The obligation thereby created was a debt. The constitutive element in this litigation is found in the fact that
the debtor has received something from the creditor, which he is bound by the obligation of law to return or pay for. From an early day this
element was denominated the quid pro quo, an ungainly phrase coined by Mediaeval Latinity. The quid pro quo was primarily a materials or
physical object, and its constituted the recompense or equivalent acquired by the debtor. Upon the passage of the quid pro quo from one
party to the other, the law imposed that real contractual duty peculiar to the debt. No one conversant with the early history of English law
would ever conceive of the debt as an obligation created by promise. It is the legal duty to pay or deliver a sum certain of money or an
ascertainable quantity of ponderable or measurable chattles.
The ordinary debt, as already stated, originates in a contract in which a quid pro quo passes to the debtor at the time of the creation of the
debt, but the term is equally applicable to duties imposed by custom or statute, or by judgment of a court.
The existence of a debt supposes one person to have possession of thing (res) which he owes and hence ought to turn over the owner. This
obligation is the oldest conception of contract with which the common law is familiar; and notwithstanding the centuries that have rolled over
Westminster Hall that conception remains as one of the fundamental bases of the common-law contract.
Near the end of the fifteenth century there was evolved in England a new conception of contractual liability, which embodied the idea of
obligation resulting from promise and which found expression in the common law assumpsit, or parol promise supported by a consideration.
The application of this novel conception had the effect of greatly extending the filed of contractual liability and by this means rights of action
came to be recognized which had been unknown before. The action of assumpsit which was the instrument for giving effect to this obligation
was found to be a useful remedy; and presently this action came to be used for the enforcement of common-law debts. The result was to give
to our contract law the superficial appearance of being based more or less exclusively upon the notion of the obligation of promise.
An idea is widely entertained to the effect that all simple contracts recognized in the common-law system are referable to a singly category.
They all have their roots, so many of us imagine, in one general notion of obligation; and of course the obligation of promise is supposed to
supply this general notion, being considered a sort of menstruum in which all other forms of contractual obligation have been dissolved. This a
mistake. The idea of contractual duty embodied in the debt which was the first conception of contract liability revealed in the common law,
has remained, although it was detained to be in a measure obscured by the more modern conception of obligation resulting from promise.
What has been said is intended to exhibit the fact that the duty to pay or deliver a sum certain of money or an ascertainable quantity of
ponderable or measurable chattles — which is indicated by them debt — has ever been recognized, in the common-law system, as a true
contract, regardless, of the source of the duty or the manner in which it is create — whether derived from custom, statue or some consensual
transaction depending upon the voluntary acts of the parties. the form of contract known as the debt is of the most ancient lineage; and when
reference is had to historical antecedents, the right of the debt to be classed as a contract cannot be questioned. Indeed when the new form
of engagement consisting of the parol promise supported by a consideration first appeared, it was looked upon as an upstart and its right to be
considered a true contract was questioned. It was long customary to refer to it exclusively as an assumpsit, agreement, undertaking, or parol
promise, in fact anything but a contract. Only in time did the new form of engagement attain the dignity of being classed among true contract.
The term implied takers us into shadowy domain of those obligations the theoretical classification of which has engaged the attention of
scholars from the time of Gaius until our own day and has been a source of as much difficulty to the civilian as to the common-law jurist. There
we are concerned with those acts which make one person debtor to another without there having intervened between them any true
agreement tending to produce a legal bond (vinculum juris). Of late years some American and English writers have adopted the term quasi-
contract as descriptive of these obligations or some of them; but the expression more commonly used is implied contract.
Upon examination of these obligations, from the view point of the common-law jurisprudence, it will be found that they fall readily into two
divisions according as they bear an analogy to the common-law debt or to the common law assumpsit. To exhibit the scope of these different
classes of obligations is here impracticable. It is only necessary in this connection to observe that the most conspicuous division is that which
comprises duties in the nature of debt. The characteristic feature of these obligations is that upon certain states of fact the law imposes an
obligation to pay a sum certain of money; and it is characteristic of this obligation that the money in respect to which the duty is raised is
conceived as being equivalent of something taken or detained under circumstances giving rise to the duty to return or compensate therefore.
The proposition that no one shall be allowed to enrich himself unduly at the expense of another embodies the general principle here lying at
the basis of obligation. The right to recover money improperly paid (repeticion de lo indebido) is also recognized as belong to this class of
duties.
It will observed that according to the Civil Code obligations are supposed to be derived either from (1) the law, (2) contracts and quasi-
contracts, (3) illicit acts and omission, or (4) acts in which some sort ob lame or negligence is present. This enumeration of sources of
obligations and the obligation imposed by law are different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi, criticises this assumption and says
that the classification embodied in the code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one or the other of these categories should have
64
been suppressed and merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish ed., vol. 5 arts. 5, 7, 9.) The validity of this criticism is,
we thin, self-evident; and it is of interest to note that the common law makes no distinction between the two sources of liability. The
obligations which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those arising ex lege, are in the common la system, merged into the
category of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated implied contracts.
Many refinements, more or less illusory, have been attempted by various writers in distinguishing different sorts of implied contracts, as for
example, the contract implied as of fact and the contract implied as of law. No explanation of these distinctions will be here attempted. Suffice
it to say that the term contract, express or implied, is used to by common-law jurists to include all purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict, or tort. As to these it may be said that, generally speaking, the law does not impose a contractual duty upon
a wrongdoer to compensate for injury done. It is true that in certain situations where a wrongdoer unjustly acquired something at the expense
of another, the law imposes on him a duty to surrender his unjust acquisitions, and the injured party may here elect to sue upon this
contractual duty instead of suing upon the tort; but even here the distinction between the two liabilities, in contract and in tort, is never lost to
sight; and it is always recognized that the liability arising out of the tort is delictual and not of a contractual or quasi-contractual nature.
In the case now under consideration the duty of the defendant to refund the money which he won from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty
imposed by statute. It therefore arises ex lege. Furthermore, it is a duty to return a certain sum which had passed from the plaintiff to the
defendant. By all the criteria which the common law supplies, this a duty in the nature of debt and is properly classified as an implied contract.
It is well- settled by the English authorities that money lost in gambling or by lottery, if recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser in an
action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. (Clarke vs. Johnson. Lofft, 759; Mason vs. Waite, 17 Mass., 560; Burnham vs.
Fisher, 25 Vt., 514.) This means that in the common law the duty to return money won in this way is an implied contract, or quasi-contract.
It is no argument to say in reply to this that the obligation here recognized is called an implied contract merely because the remedy commonly
used in suing upon ordinary contract can be here used, or that the law adopted the fiction of promise in order to bring the obligation within
the scope of the action of assumpsit. Such statements fail to express the true import of the phenomenon. Before the remedy was the idea; and
the use of the remedy could not have been approved if it had not been for historical antecedents which made the recognition of this remedy
at one logical and proper. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the question is not how this duty but what sort of obligation did the
author of the Code of Civil Procedure intend to describe when he sued the term implied contract in section 412.
In what has been said we have assumed that the obligation which is at the foundation of the original action in the court below is not a quasi-
contract, when judge by the principles of the civil law. A few observations will show that this assumption is not by any means free from doubt.
The obligation in question certainly does not fall under the definition of either of the two-quasi- contracts which are made the subject of
special treatment in the Civil Code, for its does not arise from a licit act as contemplated in article 1895. The obligation is clearly a creation of
the positive law — a circumstance which brings it within the purview of article 1090, in relation with article, 1089; and it is also derived from
an illicit act, namely, the playing of a prohibited game. It is thus seen that the provisions of the Civil Code which might be consulted with a view
to the correct theoretical classification of this obligation are unsatisfactory and confusing.
The two obligations treated in the chapter devoted to quasi-contracts in the Civil Code are (1) the obligation incident to the officious
management of the affairs of other person (gestion de negocios ajenos) and (2) the recovery of what has been improperly paid (cabro de lo
indebido). That the authors of the Civil Code selected these two obligations for special treatment does not signify an intention to deny the
possibility of the existence of other quasi-contractual obligations. As is well said by the commentator Manresa.
The number of the quasi-contracts may be indefinite as may be the number of lawful facts, the generations of the said obligations;
but the Code, just as we shall see further on, in the impracticableness of enumerating or including them all in a methodical and
orderly classification, has concerned itself with two only — namely, the management of the affairs of other person and the recovery
of things improperly paid — without attempting by this to exclude the others. (Manresa, 2d ed., vol. 12, p. 549.)
It would indeed have been surprising if the authors of the Code, in the light of the jurisprudence of more than a thousand years, should have
arbitrarily assumed to limit the quasi-contract to two obligations. The author from whom we have just quoted further observes that the two
obligations in question were selected for special treatment in the Code not only because they were the most conspicuous of the quasi-
contracts, but because they had not been the subject of consideration in other parts of the Code. (Opus citat., 550.)
It is well recognized among civilian jurists that the quasi- contractual obligations cover a wide range. The Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi, to whom
we have already referred, considers under this head, among other obligations, the following: payments made upon a future consideration
which is not realized or upon an existing consideration which fails; payments wrongfully made upon a consideration which is contrary to law,
or opposed to public policy; and payments made upon a vicious consideration or obtained by illicit means (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones,
vol. 5, art. 130.)
Im permitting the recovery of money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced modifications in the application of articles 1798, 180`, and 1305
of the Civil Code. The first two of these articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of the nullity of contracts proceeding
from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these provisions together, it must be apparent that the obligation to return money lost at play
has a decided affinity to contractual obligations; and we believe that it could, without violence to the doctrines of the civil law, be held that
such obligations is an innominate quasi-contract. It is, however, unnecessary to place the decision on this ground.
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From what has been said it follows that in our opinion the cause of action stated in the complaints in the court below is based on a contract,
express or implied and is therefore of such nature that the court had authority to issue writ of attachment. The application for the writ
of certiorari must therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
As I finished reading the learned and interesting decision of the majority, the impression which remained was that the court was enticed by
the nice and unusual points presented to make a hard case out of an easy one and unfortunately t do violence to the principles of certiorari.
The simple questions are : Di the Court of First Instance of city of Manila exceed its jurisdiction in granting an attachments against the property
of the defendant, now plaintiff? Has this defendant, now become the plaintiff, any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy? The answer are
found in the decision of thinks court, in Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin ([1913], 25 Phil., 245), from which I quote the following:
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it
is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure errors in the proceedings or to correct
erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure errors in the proceedings to correct
jurisdiction of the subject matter and f the person, decisions upon all question pertaining to the cause are decisions within its
jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The Code of Civil Procedure giving
Courts of First Instance general jurisdiction in actions for mandamus, it goes without saying that the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and t decide every question presented to it which
pertained to the cause. It has already been held by this court, that while it is a power to be exercised only in extreme case, a Court of
First Instance has power to issue a mandatory injunction t stand until the final determination of the action in which it is issued. While
the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and erroneous, a question concerning which
we express no opinion, nevertheless its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reveiwable on certiorari.
It is not sufficient to say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds and in the absence of the other party. The
question is, Did the court act with jurisdiction?
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president t issue the license, for the reason that
he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise a discretion as to whom
the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of these questions goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the
fundamental question in a mandamusagainst a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the
performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determinations of the cause. To claim that
the resolution of that question may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel proposition. It is equivalent to the contention
that a court has jurisdiction if he decides right but no jurisdiction if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never
necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to determine whether the court has jurisdiction. The question of
jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the merits of the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of a cause are
merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded. In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority or jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action for mandamus and to decide very question which arises in that cause and
pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those question, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident
contradiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it
does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction
should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all, and not the decision
rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before,
the decision of all other questions arising in the case an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Then follows an elaborate citation and discussion of American authorities, including a decision of the United States Supreme Court and of the
applicable Philippine cases. The decision continues"
The reasons givens in these cases last cited for the allowance of the writ of prohibition are applicable only to the class of cases with
which the decision deal and do not in any way militate against the general proposition herein asserted. Those which relate to
election contest are based upon the principle that those proceedings, are special in their nature and must be strictly followed, a
material departure from the statute resulting a loss, or in an excess of jurisdiction. The cases relating to receivers are based, in a
measure, upon the principle the appointment of a receiver being governed by the statute; and in part upon the theory that the
appointment of a receiver in an improper case is in substance a bankruptcy proceeding, the taking of which is expressly prohibited by
law. The case relative to the allowance of alimony pendente lite when the answer denies the marriage is more difficult to distinguish.
66
The reasons in support of the doctrine laid down in that case are given the opinion in full and they seem to place the particular case
to which they refer in a class by itself.
It is not alight things that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error and with them certiorari and prohibition, in so far as they were
methods by which the mere errors of an inferior curt could be corrected. As instruments to that end they no longer exist. Their place
is no taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior court retains jurisdiction its errors can be corrected only by that method. The office
of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other
purpose. It is truly an extra ordinary remedy and in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in which
the action of the inferior court is wholly void, where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and
would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree
would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a juridical pretension, a recorded falsehood, a
standing menace. It is only to avoid such result as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here an appeal will lie if the
aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully supports
the proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its
decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however, erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by
appeal.
I see no reason to override the decision in Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (supra). Accordingly, I can do no better than to make the language
of Justice Moreland my own. applying these principles, it is self-evident that this court should no entertain the present petition and should not
grant the desired relief.
FISHER, J., dissenting:
I am in full accord with the view that the remedy of certiorari may be invoked in such cases as this, but I am constrained to dissent from the
opinion of the majority as regards the meaning of the term implied contract.
Section 412 of the code of Civil Procedure in connection with section 424, authorizes the preliminary attachment of the property of the
defendant: "(1) In an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising upon contract, express or implied, when the
defendant is about to depart from the Philippine Islands, with intent to defraud his creditors; (2) . . .; (3) . . .; (4) . . .; (5) When the defendant
has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors."
It is evident that the terms of paragraph five of the article cited are much broader than those of the first paragraph. The fifth paragraph is not
limited to action arising from contract, but is by its terms applicable to actions brought for the purpose of enforcing extra-contractual rights as
well as contract rights. The limitation upon cases falling under paragraph five is to be found, not in the character of the obligation for the
enforcement for which the action is brought, but in the terms of article 4265, which requires that the affidavit show that the amount due the
plaintiff . . . is as much as the sum for which the order is granted.
That is to say, when application is made for a preliminary attachment upon the ground that the plaintiff is about to dispose of his property
with intent to defraud his creditors — thus bringing the case within the terms of paragraph five of the section — it is not necessary to show
that the obligation in suit is contractual in its origin, but is sufficient to show that the breach of the obligation, as shown by the facts stated in
the complaint and affidavit, imposes upon the defendant the obligation to pay a specific and definite sum. For example, if it is alleged in the
complaint that the defendant by negligence, has caused the destruction by fire of a building belonging to plaintiff, and that such building was
worth a certain sum of money, these facts would show a definite basis upon which to authorize the granting of the writ. But if it were averred
that the defendant has published a libel concerning the plaintiff, to the injury of his feeling and reputation, there is no definite basis upon
which to grant an attachment, because the amount of the damage suffered, being necessarily uncertain and indeterminate, cannot be
ascertained definitely until the trail has been completed.
But it appears that the legislature although it has seen fit to authorize a preliminary attachment in aid of action of all kinds when the
defendant is concealing his property with intent to defraud his creditors, has provided is about to depart from the country with intent to
defraud his creditos, the writ will issue only when the action in aid of which it is sought arises from a contract express or implied. If an
attachment were permitted upon facts bringing the application with the first paragraph of the section in support of action of any kind,
whether the obligation sued upon is contractual or not, then paragraph five would by construction be made absolutely identical with
paragraph one, and this would be in effect equivalent to the complete eliminated of the last two lines of the first paragraph. It is a rule of
statutory construction that effect should be given to all parts of the statue, if possible. I can see no reason why the legislature should have
limited cases falling within the firs paragraph to action arising from contract and have refrained from imposing this limitation with respect to
cases falling within the terms of the fifth paragraph, but this should have no effect upon us in applying the law. Whether there be a good
reason for it or not the distinction exists.
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Had the phrase express or implied not been used to qualify contract, there would be no doubt whatever with regard to the meaning of the
word. In the Spanish Civil law contract are always consensual, and it would be impossible to define as a contract the judicial relation existing
between a person who has lost money at gaming and the winner of such money, simple because the law imposes upon the winner the
obligation of making restitution. An obligation of this kind, far from being consensual in its origin, arises against the will of the debtor. To call
such a relation a contract is, from the standpoint of the civil law, a contradiction in terms.
But is said that as the phase express or implied has been used to qualify the word contract and these words are found in statue which speaks
the language of the common law, this implies the introduction into our law of the concept of the implied contract of the English common-law,
a concept which embraces a certain class of obligation originating ex lege, which have been arbitrarily classified as contracts, so that they
might be enforced by one of the formal actions of the common law which legal tradition and practice has reserved for the enforcement of
contract. I cannot concur in this reasoning. I believe that when a technical juridical term of substantive law is used in the adjective law of these
islands, we should seek its meaning in our own substantive law rather than in the law of America or of England. The code of Civil Procedure
was not enacted to establish rules of substantive law, but upon the assumption of the existence of these rules.
In the case of Cayce vs. Curtis (Dallam's Decisions Texas Reports, 403), it appears that the legislature, at a time when that State still retained to
a large extent the Spanish substantive civil law, enacted a statue in which the word bonds is used. In litigation involving the construction of
that statute, one of the parties contended that the work bond should be given the technical meaning which it had in the English Common Law.
The court rejected this contention saying —
On the first point it is urged by counsel for the appellant that the word bond used in the statute being a common law term, we must refer to
the common law for its legal signification; and that by that law no instrument is a bond which is not under seal. The truth of the proposition
that sealing is an absolute requisite to the validity of a bond at common law is readily admitted; but the applicability of that rule of the case
under consideration is not perceived. This bond was taken at a time when the common law afforded no rule of decision or practice in this
country, and consequently that law cannot be legitimately resorted to, even for the purpose for which it is invoked by the counsel for the
appellant, unless it be shown that the civil law had not term of similar import for we regard it as a correct rule of construction, that where
technical terms are used in a statute they are to be referred for their signification to terms f similar import in the system of laws which prevails
in the country where the statues is passed, and not to another system which is entirely foreign t the whole system of municipal regulations by
which that country is governed. (Martin's Reports, vol. 3, 185; 7 Martin [N. S.], 162.)"
Consequently, I believe that in the interpretation of phase "contract, express or implied," we should apply the rules of our own substantive
law. The phrase in itself offers no difficulty. The concept of the contract, under the Civil Code, as a legal relation of exclusively consensual
origin, offers no difficulty. Nor is any difficulty encountered in the gramatical sense of the words express and "implied". Express according to
the New International Dictionary is that which is directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely implied or left to interference. Therefore,
a contract entered into by means of letters, in which the offer and the acceptance have been manifested by appropriate words, would be an
"express contract." The word "imply" according to the same dictionary, is to involve in substance or essence, or by fair inference, or by
construction of law, when not expressly stated in words or signs; to contain by implication to include virtually.
Therefore, if I enter a tailor shop and order a suit of clothes, although nothing is said regarding payment, it is an inference, both logical and
legal, from my act that is my intention to pay the reasonable value of the garments. The contract is implied, therefore, is that in which
the consent of the parties is implied.
Manresa, commenting upon article 1262 of the Civil Code, says:
The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties concerning that which is to constitute the contract . . . . The forms of this
agreement may vary according to whether it is expressed verbally or in writing, by words or by acts. Leaving the other differences for
consideration hereafter, we will only refer now to those which exist between express consent and implied consent . . . . It is
unquestionable that implied consent manifested by act or conduct, produces a contract. . . .
If it were necessary to have recourse to the English common law for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the phrase under
consideration, we could find many decisions which gave it the same meaning as that for which I contend.
An implied contract is where one party receives benefits from another party, under such circumstances that the law presume a
promise on the part of the party benefited to pay a reasonable price for the same. (Jones vs. Tucker [Del.], 84 Atlantic, 1012.)
It is true that English courts have extended the concept of the term contract to include certain obligations arising ex lege without consent,
express or implied. True contracts created by implied consent are designated in the English common law as contracts implied in the fact, while
the so-called contracts in which the consent is a fiction of law are called contracts implied by law. But is evident that the latter are not real
contracts. They have been called contract arbitrarily by the courts of England, and those of the Untied States in which the English common law
is in force, in order that certain actions arising ex lege may be enforced by the action of assumpsit. In the rigid formulism of the English
common law the substantive right had to be accommodated to the form of action. As is stated in the monograph on the action of assumpsit in
Ruling Case Law. (volume 2, 743) —
In theory it wan action to recover for the nonperformance f simple contracts, and the formula and proceedings were constructed
and carried on accordingly. . . . From the reign of Elizabeth this action has been extended to almost every case where an obligation
68
arises from natural reason, . . . and it is now maintained in many cases which its principles do not comprehend and
where fictions and intendments are resorted to, to fit the actual cause of action to the theory of the remedy. It is thus sanctioned
where there has been no . . . real contract, but where some duty is deemed sufficient to justify the court in imputing the promise to
perform its, and hence in bending the transaction to the form of action.
In the ancient English common law procedure the form of the action was regarded as being much more important than the substantive right to
be enforced. If no form of action was found in which the facts would fit, so much the worse for the facts! to avoid the injustices to which this
condition of affairs gave rise, the judges invented those fictions which permitted them to preserve the appearance of conservatism and change
the law without expressly admitting that they were doing so. The indispensable averment, that they were doing so. The indispensable
avernment without which the action of assumpsit would not lie, was that the defendant promised to pay plaintiff the amount demanded.
(Sector vs. Holmes, 17 Vs., 566.) In true contracts, whether express or implied, this promise in fact exists. In obligations arising ex lege there is
no such promise, and therefore the action of assumpsit could not be maintained, and therefore the action of assumpsit could not be
maintained, although by reason of its relative simplicity it was one of the most favored forms of action. In order to permit the litigant to make
use of this form of action for the enforcement of ascertain classes of obligations arising ex lege, the judges invented the fiction of the promise
of the defendant to pay the amount of the obligation, and as this fictitious promise give the appearance of consensuality to the legal relations
of the parties, the name of implied contract is given to that class of extra-contractual obligations enforcible by the action of assumpsit.
Now, it is not be supposed that it was the intention of the Legislature in making use in the first paragraph of article 412 of the phrase contract,
express or implied to corrupt the logical simplicity of our concept of obligations by importing into our law the antiquated fictions of the
mediaeval English common law. If one of the concepts of the term "implied contract" in the English common law, namely, that in
which consent is presume from the conduct of the debtor, harmonizes with the concept of the contract in our law, why should we reject that
meaning and hold that the Legislature intended to use this phrase in the foreign and illogical sense of a contract arising without consent? This
is a civil law country. why should we be compelled to study the fictions of the ancient English common law, in order to be informed as to the
meaning of the word contract in the law of the Philippine Islands? Much more reasonable to my mind was the conclusion of the Texas court,
under similar circumstances, to the effect to be referred for their signification to terms of similar import in the system of laws which prevails in
the country where the statue is passed." (Cayce vs. Curtis, supra.)
My conclusion is that the phase contract, express or implied should be interpreted in the grammatical sense of the words and limited to true
contracts, consensual obligations arising from consent, whether expressed in words, writing or signs, or presumed from conduct. As it is
evident that the defendant in the present case never promised, him in the gambling game in question, his obligation to restor the amounts
won, imposed by the law, is no contractual, but purely extra-contractual and therefore the action brought not being one arising upon contract
express or implied, the plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary attachment upon the averment that the defendant is about to depart from the
Philippine Islands with with intent t defraud his creditors, no averment being made in the compliant or in the affidavit that the defendant has
removed or disposed of his property, or is about to depart with intent to defraud his creditors, so as to bring the case within the terms of the
fifth paragraph of section 412.
I am unable to agree with the contention of the application (Brief, p. 39) here that the phase in question should be interpreted in such a way as
to include all obligations, whether arising from consent or ex lege, because that is equivalent to eliminating all distinction between the first
and the fifth paragraphs by practically striking out the first two lines of paragraph one. The Legislature has deliberately established this
distinction, and while we may be unable to see any reason why it should have been made, it is our duty to apply and interpret the law, and we
are not authorized under the guise of interpretation to virtually repeal part of the statute.
Nor can it be said that the relations between the parties litigant constitute a quasi-contract. In the first place, quasi- contracts are "lawful and
purely voluntary acts by which the authors thereof become obligated in favor of a third person. . . ." The act which gave rise to the
obligation ex lege relied upon by the plaintiff in the court below is illicit — an unlawful gambling game. In the second place, the first paragraph
of section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize an attachment in actions arising out of quasi contracts, but only in actions
arising out of contract, express or implied.
I am therefore of the opinion that the court below was without jurisdiction to issue that writ of attachment and that the writ should be
declared null and void.
Avanceña, J., concurs.
69
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119657 February 7, 1997
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
The appellate proceeding at bar turns upon the interpretation of a stipulation in a contract governing venue of actions thereunder arising.
On October 8, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, simply KUBOTA) and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (hereafter,
simply UNIMASTERS) entered into a "Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's products in Samar and Leyte
Provinces.1 The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: ". . . All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the
amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Some five years later, or more precisely on December 24, 1993, UNIMASTERS filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City against
KUBOTA, a certain Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch (hereafter, simply METROBANK) for damages for
breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-12-241 and
assigned to Branch 6.
On the same day the Trial Court issued a restraining order enjoining METROBANK from "authorizing or effecting payment of any alleged
obligation of . . (UNIMASTERS) to defendant . . KUBOTA arising out of or in connection with purchases made by defendant Go against the credit
line caused to be established by . . (UNIMASTERS) for and in the amount of P2 million covered by defendant METROBANK . . or by way of
charging . . (UNIMASTERS) for any amount paid and released to defendant . . (KUBOTA) by the Head Office of METROBANK in Makati, Metro-
Manila . . ." The Court also set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing on January 10, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA filed-two motions. One prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue (said motion being set
for hearing on January 11, 1994). The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing to January 11, 1994 because its counsel was not
available on January 10 due to a prior commitment before another court.
KUBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had been granted, the Trial Court went ahead with the hearing on the
injunction incident on January 10, 1994 during which it received the direct testimony of UNIMASTERS' general manager, Wilford Chan; that
KUBOTA's counsel was "shocked" when he learned of this on the morning of the 11th, but was nonetheless instructed to proceed to cross-
examine the witness; that when said counsel remonstrated that this was unfair, the Court reset the hearing to the afternoon of that same day,
at which time Wilford Chan was recalled to the stand to repeat his direct testimony. It appears that cross-examination of Chan was then
undertaken by KUBOTA's lawyer with the "express reservation that . . (KUBOTA was) not (thereby) waiving and/or abandoning its motion to
dismiss;" and that in the course of the cross-examination, exhibits (numbered from 1 to 20) were presented by said attorney who afterwards
submitted a memorandum in lieu of testimonial evidence. 2
On January 13, 1994, the Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a bond of
P2,000,000.00.3 And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an Order denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Said the Court:
The plaintiff UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place of business in the City of Tacloban while the
defendant . . (KUBOTA) is holding its principal place of business in Quezon City. The proper venue therefore pursuant to
Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila (sic), as
agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership Agreement, are additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of
Court. The filing, therefore, of this complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban City is proper.
Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33234. It contended, more particularly, that (1) the RTC had "no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of . . (UNIMASTERS') action considering that venue was improperly laid," (2) UNIMASTERS had in truth "failed to
prove that it is entitled to the . . writ of preliminary injunction;" and (3) the RTC gravely erred "in denying the motion to dismiss."4
70
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA that — in line with the Rules of Court5 and this Court's relevant rulings6 — the stipulation respecting
venue in its Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and exclusively to "the
proper courts of Quezon City."7 The Court also held that the participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the hearing on the injunction incident did not
in the premises operate as a waiver or abandonment of its objection to venue; that assuming that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices
provided that the venue of actions thereunder should be laid at the Court of the City of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision
would govern "suits or legal actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the Dealership Agreement between KUBOTA and
UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof; and that no impediment precludes issuance of a TRO or
injunctive writ by the Quezon City RTC against METROBANK-Tacloban since the same "may be served on the principal office of METROBANK in
Makati and would be binding on and enforceable against, METROBANK branch in Tacloban."
After its motion for reconsideration of that decision was turned down by the Court of Appeals, UNIMASTERS appealed to this Court. Here, it
ascribes to the Court of Appeals several errors which it believes warrant reversal of the verdict, namely:8
1) "in concluding, contrary to decisions of this . . Court, that the agreement on venue between petitioner (UNIMASTERS) and private
respondent (KUBOTA) limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the venue of any complaint filed arising from the dealership agreement
between . . (them);"
2) "in ignoring the rule settled in Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Tensuan,9 that 'in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue
stipulations in a contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place;" and in
concluding, contrariwise, that the agreement in the case at bar "was the same as the agreement on venue in the Gesmundo case," and
therefore, the Gesmundo case was controlling; and
3) "in concluding, based solely on the self-serving narration of . . (KUBOTA that its) participation in the hearing for the issuance of a . .
preliminary injunction did not constitute waiver of its objection to venue."
The issue last mentioned, of whether or not the participation by the lawyer of KUBOTA at the injunction hearing operated as a waiver of its
objection to venue, need not occupy the Court too long. The record shows that when KUBOTA's counsel appeared before the Trial Court in the
morning of January 11, 1994 and was then informed that he should cross-examine UNIMASTERS' witness, who had testified the day before,
said counsel drew attention to the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and insistently attempted to argue the matter and have
it ruled upon at the time; and when the Court made known its intention (a) "to (resolve first the) issue (of) the injunction then rule on the
motion to dismiss," and (b) consequently its desire to forthwith conclude the examination of the witness on the injunction incident, and for
that purpose reset the hearing in the afternoon of that day, the 11th, so that the matter might be resolved before the lapse of the temporary
restraining order on the 13th, KUBOTA's lawyer told the Court: "Your Honor, we are not waiving our right to submit the Motion to
Dismiss." 10 It is plain that under these circumstances, no waiver or abandonment can be imputed to KUBOTA.
The essential question really is that posed in the first and second assigned errors, i.e., what construction should be placed on the stipulation in
the Dealership Agreement that" (a)ll suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City."
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons
who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another." 11 Parties may by stipulation waive the legal
venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third
persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public
policy. 12
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive
in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other
agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, 13 it is easy to accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be
deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other words,
stipulations designating venues other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the
parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated
in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and
categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their
actions. This is easier said than done, however, as an examination of precedents involving venue covenants will immediately disclose.
In at least thirteen (13) cases, this Court construed the venue stipulations involved as merely permissive. These are:
1. Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, decided in 1969. 14 In this case, the venue stipulation was as follows:
The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.

71
This Court ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning
is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is
the venue are totally absent therefrom. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they
may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4."
The Polytrade doctrine was reiterated expressly or implicitly in subsequent cases, numbering at least ten (10).
2. Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, decided in 1975. 15 In this case, the stipulation on venue read:
. . . (A)ll legal actions arising out of this contract . . may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts
in the City of Manila.
This Court declared that the stipulation does not clearly show the intention of the parties to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila
only. "It must be noted that the venue in personal actions is fixed for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the
ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the interest of justice may be served by confining the situs of the action to Manila, considering that
the residences or offices of all the parties, including the situs of the acts sought to be restrained or required to be done, are all within the
territorial jurisdiction of Rizal. . . Such agreements should be construed reasonably and should not be applied in such a manner that it would
work more to the inconvenience of the parties without promoting the ends of justice.
3. Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon, decided in 1981. 16 Here, the stipulation in the promissory note and the chattel mortgage specified Davao City as
the venue.
The Court, again citing Polytrade, stated that the provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under
Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place
named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties. The stipulation did not deprive . . (the affected party) of his right to pursue remedy in the
court specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court. Renuntiato non praesumitur."
4. Capati v. Ocampo, decided in 1982 17 In this case, the provision of the contract relative to venue was as follows:
. . . (A)ll actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
The Court ruled that the parties "did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga;" they "merely
agreed to submit their disputes to the said court without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b),
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court."
5. Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1988. 18 Here, the provision governing venue read:
The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in Section 12.01 shall be in the City of Manila.
The court restated the doctrine that a stipulation in a contract fixing a definite place for the institution of an action arising in connection
therewith, does not ordinarily supersede the general rules set out in Rule 4, and should be construed merely as an agreement on an additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
6. Moles v. Intermediate Appellate Court, decided in 1989. 19 In this proceeding, the Sales Invoice of a linotype machine stated that the proper
venue should be Iloilo.
This Court held that such an invoice was not the contract of sale of the linotype machine in question; consequently the printed provisions of
the invoice could not have been intended by the parties to govern the sale of the machine, especially since said invoice was used for other
types of transactions. This Court said: "It is obvious that a venue stipulation, in order to bind the parties, must have been intelligently and
deliberately intended by them to exclude their case from the reglementary rules on venue. Yet, even such intended variance may not
necessarily be given judicial approval, as, for instance, where there are no restrictive or qualifying words in the agreement indicating that
venue cannot be laid in any place other than that agreed upon by the parties, and in contracts of adhesion."
7. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, decided in 1989. 20 Here the stipulation on venue read:
. . (T)his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined under and
may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore
shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. . .
This Court held that due process dictates that the stipulation be liberally construed. The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts
of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the others, had jurisdiction. The clause in question did not operate to divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction.
72
8. Nasser v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1990, 21 in which the venue stipulation in the promissory notes in question read:
. . (A)ny action involving the enforcement of this contract shall be brought within the City of Manila, Philippines.
The Court's verdict was that such a provision does not as a rule supersede the general rule set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and should
be construed merely as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
9. Surigao Century Sawmill Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1993: 22 In this case, the provision concerning venue was contained in a
contract of lease of a barge, and read as follows:
. . . (A)ny disagreement or dispute arising out of the lease shall be settled by the parties in the proper court in the province
of Surigao del Norte.
The venue provision was invoked in an action filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila to recover damages arising out of marine subrogation
based on a bill of lading. This Court declared that since the action did not refer to any disagreement or dispute arising out of the contract of
lease of the barge, the venue stipulation in the latter did not apply; but that even assuming the contract of lease to be applicable, a statement
in a contract as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits at the election of the plaintiff where no qualifying or restrictive words indicate
that the agreed place alone was the chosen venue.
10. Philippine Banking Corporation, v. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, etc., Circle Financial Corporation, at al., decided in 1993. 23 Here, the stipulation
on venue was contained in promissory notes and read as follows:
I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this
promissory note.
This Court held the stipulation to be merely permissive since it did not lay the venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or
ordinary import of the stipulation is the grant of authority or permission to bring suit in Valenzuela; but there is not the slightest indication of
an intent to bar suit in other competent courts. The Court stated that there is no necessary or customary connection between the words "any
legal action" and an intent strictly to limit permissible venue to the Valenzuela courts. Moreover, since the venue stipulations include no
qualifying or exclusionary terms, express reservation of the right to elect venue under the ordinary rules was unnecessary in the case at bar.
The Court made clear that "to the extent Bautista and Hoechst Philippines are inconsistent with Polytrade (an en banc decision later in time
than Bautista) and subsequent cases reiterating Polytrade, Bautista and Hoechst Philippines have been rendered obsolete by the Polytrade line
of cases."
11. Philippine Banking Corporation v. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, etc., Brinell Metal Works Corp., et al., decided in 1994: 24 In this case the subject
promissory notes commonly contained a stipulation reading:
I/we expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Manila, any legal action which may arise out of this promissory
note.
the Court restated the rule in Polytrade that venue stipulations in a contract, absent any qualifying or restrictive words, should be
considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive, but rather,
permissive. For to restrict venue only to that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely based on technicality; on the
contrary, the stipulation should be liberally construed. The Court stated: "The later cases of Lamis Ents v. Lagamon [108 SCRA
1981], Capati v. Ocampo [113 SCRA 794 [1982], Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals [167 SCRA 592 [1988], Moles v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [169 SCRA 777 [1989], Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Sherman [176 SCRA 331], Nasser v. Court of
Appeals [191 SCRA 783 [1990] and just recently, Surigao Century Sawmill Co. v. Court of Appeals [218 SCRA 619 [1993], all treaded
the path blazed by Polytrade. The conclusion to be drawn from all these is that the more recent jurisprudence shall properly be
deemed modificatory of the old ones."
The lone dissent observed: "There is hardly any question that a stipulation of contracts of adhesion, fixing venue to a specified place only, is
void for, in such cases, there would appear to be no valid and free waiver of the venue fixed by the Rules of Courts. However, in cases where
both parties freely and voluntarily agree on a specified place to be the venue of actions, if any, between them, then the only considerations
should be whether the waiver (of the venue fixed by the Rules of Court) is against public policy and whether the parties would suffer, by
reason of such waiver, undue hardship and inconvenience; otherwise, such waiver of venue should be upheld as binding on the parties. The
waiver of venue in such cases is sanctioned by the rules on jurisdiction."
Still other precedents adhered to the same principle.
12. Tantoco v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1977. 25 Here, the parties agreed in their sales contracts that the courts of Manila shall have
jurisdiction over any legal action arising out of their transaction. This Court held that the parties agreed merely to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort in the event of suit, to those indicated by the law: the courts either of Rizal, of which private respondent
was a resident, or of Bulacan, where petitioner resided.
73
13. Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, promulgated in 1987. 26 In this case, a similar stipulation on venue, contained in the shipping ticket issued
by Sweet Lines, Inc. (as Condition 14) —
. . that any and all actions arising out or the condition and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall
be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu
— was declared unenforceable, being subversive of public policy. The Court explained that the philosophy on transfer of venue of
actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice; and considering the expense
and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably
decide not to file the action at all.
On the other hand, in the cases hereunder mentioned, stipulations on venue were held to be restrictive, or mandatory.
1. Bautista vs. De Borja, decided in 1966. 27 In this case, the contract provided that in case of any litigation arising therefrom or in connection
therewith, the venue of the action shall be in the City of Manila. This Court held that without either party reserving the right to choose the
venue of action as fixed by law, it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of the action, in connection
with the contract sued upon in the proper courts of the City of Manila only, notwithstanding that neither party is a resident of Manila.
2. Gesmundo v. JRB Realty Corporation, decided in 1994. 28 Here the lease contract declared that
. . (V)enue for all suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or any cause between the LESSOR and LESSEE, and persons
claiming under each, . . (shall be) the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City. . .
This Court held that: "(t)he language used leaves no room for interpretation. It clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit to the 'courts of
appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City' the venue for all suits between the lessor and the lessee and those between parties claiming under
them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b)."
3. Hoechst Philippines, Inc. v. Torres, 29 decided much earlier, in 1978, involved a strikingly similar stipulation, which read:
. . (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action shall be in the competent courts of the
Province of Rizal.
This Court held: "No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that both parties agreed that any action by either of them would be
filed only in the competent courts of Rizal province exclusively."
4. Villanueva v. Mosqueda, decided in 1982. 30 In this case, it was stipulated that if the lessor violated the contract of lease he could be sued in
Manila, while if it was the lessee who violated the contract, the lessee could be sued in Masantol, Pampanga. This Court held that there was an
agreement concerning venue of action and the parties were bound by their agreement. "The agreement as to venue was not permissive but
mandatory."
5. Arquero v. Flojo, decided in 1988. 31 The condition respecting venue — that any action against RCPI relative to the transmittal of a telegram
must be brought in the courts of Quezon City alone — was printed clearly in the upper front portion of the form to be filled in by the sender.
This Court held that since neither party reserved the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by Section 2 [b], Rule 4, as is usually done if
the parties mean to retain the right of election so granted by Rule 4, it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the
venue of action, in connection with the written contract sued upon, in the courts of Quezon City only.
An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and emphasizes the soundness of the Polytrade principle. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the
parties' intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that
convenience is the foundation of venue regulations, and that construction should be adopted which most conduces thereto. Hence, the
invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4
of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they
wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4,
agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that
in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified
by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by
them, 32 regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved against giving
their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable
standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City.
Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
74
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." 33 In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue
KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that " . . All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of Quezon
City," without mention of Tacloban City. The question is whether this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an
optional venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive a negative answer. Absent
additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be
ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City — or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention —
the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either
in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
One last word, respecting KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of . . (UNIMASTERS') action
considering that venue was improperly laid." This is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue
has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is fundamental. 34 The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an
amount considerably in excess of P20,000,00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. 35 Assuming that venue were
improperly laid in the Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment — precluding ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong venue notwitstanding that the subject matter is within its
jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, 36 the RTC would proceed in perfectly
regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.
This is true also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property" 37 were commenced in a province or city other than that "where the property or any part thereof
lies," 38 if no objection is seasonably made in a motion to dismiss, the objection is deemed waived, and the Regional Trial Court would be acting
entirely within its competence and authority in proceeding to try and decide the suit. 39
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6,
dated February 3, 1994, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and said Court is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Civil Case No. 93-12-241 in due
course.
SO ORDERED.
75
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13846 August 30, 1919
APOLINARIA LOPEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TRANQUILINO GLORIA and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LEYTE, defendants-appellees.
Del Rosario and Del Rosario and Ciriaco K. Kangleon for appellant.
Francisco Zialcita for appellee Gloria.
No appearance for the other appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On June 18, 1907, an action (case No. 604) was brought in the Court of First Instance of Leyte against Tranquilino Gloria by Apolinaria Lopez,
who alleged that she is the owner of two parcels of land situated in the districts of Tabunan and Magkasa of the municipality of Cabalian,
Leyte; that three individuals, among whom was the defendant Tranquilino Gloria, took action to disturb her possession and property right over
the said lands; that they entered upon and forcibly gathered the fruits thereof against her consent; and that, therefore, she prays the court
toenjoin the said defendants from exercising any act repugnant to her rights or tending to deprive her of the possession and enjoyment of the
said lands, and in conclusion to issue a perpetual mandatory injunction. (Record No. 604, pp. 1-2.)
In his amended answer, filed December 6, 1909, denying all of the aforesaid allegations, the defendant Tranquilino Gloria alleged in cross-
complaint that he is the absolute owner of the lands described in the action; that in the year 1907 the plaintiff took possession of them and
has continued in said possession up to the date of the said answer; that she has refused to return same to the defendant; that consequently he
has suffered damages in the amount of one thousand pesos (1,000), and that therefore he prays the court to absolve him from the action of
the plaintiff, to declare him the owner of said lands, to order the plaintiff to deliver same to him and to pay him one thousand pesos (1,000) as
damages (record No. 604, pp. 27, 28).
In the evidence presented at the trial of the case were several documents wherein, according to the opinion of the court, it appears that the
lands in question were sold in the years 1892 and 1894 by the brothers Gerardo, Francisco, Benigno and Dionisio, of the surname Balugu, to
Tranquilino Gloria and, in 1906, by Dionisio Balugu to the plaintiff Apolinaria Lopez (record No. 604, pp. 41, 42); whereas in view of the merits
of the same the court declared the defendant, Tranquilino Gloria, owner of the lands in question and ordered the plaintiff to recognize,
respect and return to him the property and its possession, but the court refused to uphold his counterclaim for damages for the reason that
"as possessor in good faith, the fruits gathered belong to the plaintiff . . ." (record No. 604, p. 42).
From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court; but the appeal was declared abandoned for failure to prosecute, and, on October
16, 1911,1 the record was returned to the court of origin for execution (record No. 604, pp. 88, 89).
On November 22, 1911, the same plaintiff Apolinaria Lopez presented a new action in the same Court of First Instance of Leyte against the said
defendant Tranquilino Gloria and the provincial sheriff of Leyte, alleging that there had been a former suit between them; that therein the
ownership of the lands in controversy had been adjudicated to the defendant; that nevertheless the plaintiff was declared possessor in good
faith; that the judgment rendered in that case was already final had been executed at the request, of the defendant final and had been
executed at the request of the defendant who took possession of the lands in question, without paying the plaintiff the necessary and lawful
expenses — a total sum of two thousand six hundred and seventy two pesos (P2,672) incurred by the construction on the land of a building
(camarin) for a sugar mill, of the planting and care of two hundred and thirty-five (235) fruit-bearing coconuts and for the planting of sugar
cane on an area equivalent to nineteen (19) "gantas" of seed of corn (maiz) — said building, plantings and seedlings existing on said lands at
the time of the executions and the taking possession of the defendants; that before and after the execution of the judgment by the sheriff the
plaintiff requested the defendant to refund the said expenses; that the latter refused to do so and insisted upon taking, as in fact he did take
possession of the lands and their improvements, making use of the same to her damage; and that therefore the plaintiff prayed the court to
render judgment sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of two thousand six hundred and seventy two pesos(2,672), to return to
the plaintiff the lands together with the right of retaining same until the complete reimbursement of said sum, with the costs against the
defendant.
Defendant's demurrer to the action having been overruled, without it appearing that he may have taken any exception to the order overruling
the said demurrer, the defendant filed his answer admitting all the facts alleged in the action except those concerning the improvements and
their value, and prayed the court to dismiss it, with the costs against the plaintiff.
After trial and consideration of the evidence of both parties the court on April 25, 1917, rendered judgment absolving the defendant from
plaintiff's action.
To this judgment the plaintiff excepted, and at the sametime moved for new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the weight
of evidence and to law. This motion together with its exception being denied, the plaintiff filed on time the corresponding bill of exceptions
which was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, together with all of the evidence.
76
For the determination of the questions of facts involved in this decision it is in conformity with the law that it should appear that, at the time
the plaintiff filed her answer to the defendant's cross-complaint in the said case No. 604, which answer was received in the office of the clerk
of the lower court in July, 1910 (record No. 604, p. 38), the coconuts, the sugar cane and the warehouse (camarin) taken by the defendant
were already in existence inasmuch as they were already found there in 1907, and June of 1910 and 1909, respectively (according to the
testimony of the only witness presented by the plaintiff, record No. 604, pp. 12, 22 and 27), the defendant presenting no other evidence than
that mentioned in case No. 604 by which he claims that this action for the recovery of the improvements in the present case should have been
presented as a counterclaim at the time when he filed his cross-complaint in said case No. 604, and that by not having presented it then,
plaintiff is not now permitted to maintain such a claim, according to section 97 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure.
The English text of section 97 of the said Code employs the word "counterclaim" which was translated as "reconvencion" in the Spanish text,
and inasmuch as the said Code of Procedure is an Act of the Commission and is based on American legal principles, in order to interpret
correctly the provisions of the said section 97, it is necessary to inquire what the word "counterclaim" means in American law.
In the Encyclopedia of law and procedure the word "counterclaim" is defined as follows:.
Counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) is a claim presented by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of plaintiff. A
species of set-off or recoupment introduced by the codes of civil procedure in several of the states, of a broad and liberal character,
and embraces, as a general rule, both recoupment and set-off although broader and more comprehensive than either, and secures
to defendant the full relief which a separate action at law, or a bill in chancery, or a cross bill, would have secured him on the same
state of facts, being substantially a cross action by defendant against plaintiff. (34 Cyc., 629-631.).
Recoupment (reconvencion) is the act of rebating or recouping a part of a claim upon which one is sued by means of a legal or
equitable right resulting from a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction. (34 Cyc., 623.)
Set-off (compensacion) is a counter-demand which a defendant holds against a plaintiff, arising out of a transaction extrinsic of
plaintiff's cause of action, the object of which is to liquidate the whole or a part of plaintiff's demand, according to the amount of the
set-off, and like the modern recoupment is in the nature of a cross action. (34 Cyc., 625.).
According to the Code of New York a counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) should tend in some way to lessen or neutralize that the plaintiff is
trying to recover (Bliss' New York Annotated Codes, vol. 1, p. 715), and, according to the doctrine laid down in California, the facts upon which
it is based should be such as to give to the defendant the right to bring a separate action against the plaintiff, otherwise, if it only constitutes a
good defense, it would not be "counterclaim" (contrarreclamacion). (Kerr Cyc. Codes of California, vol. 3, part I, p. 612, notes 30 and 31.).
From the foregoing it is inferred that both recoupment (reconvencion) and set-off (compensacion) are counterclaims (contrarreclamaciones),
the first differing from the second in that the former arises out of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is based, and the
latter of a transaction disctinct from that on which said action is based.
From the said doctrines it is also inferred that both recoupment (reconvencion) and set-off (compensacion) have the character of a genuine
action in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff in such a manner that, independent of any other consideration, a genuine action is
constituted for the defendant which could be employed separately against the plaintiff; wherefore if they only tend to oppose or to destroy
the action of the plaintiff, they would constitute a good defense but not a counterclaim (contrarreclamacion.).
Furthermore, an essential condition of a counterclaim is that it tends to lessen or neutralize what the plaintiff is trying to recover, that is to
say, neither denies the facts upon which the action of the plaintiff is based nor bases it on facts which directly destroy the action or cause of
action of the plaintiff (because in such a case it would be only a special defence), but, taking for granted the allegation of the plaintiff the effect
of said counterclaim may be to neutralize, wholly or partially, that which the plaintiff wishes to obtain. Nor does it need to have for its object
to obtain a positive remedy distinct from the payment of money, like a writ of injunction or the specific performance of a contract, because it
would not then be a counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) but a cross-complaint (contrademanda) which is governed by section 98 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
In synthesis, we are able to say that the essential requisites of a counterclaim (contrarreclamacion) which comprehends recoupment
(reconvencion) and set-off (compensacion) are: (1) That the same be essentially a genuine action of the defendant against the plaintiff; (2) that
the same should have as its object to neutralize, wholly or partially, that which the plaintiff is trying to obtain; (3) that the same does not have
for its object to destroy directly the action of the plaintiff; and (4) that same ought not to pray for a positive remedy distinct from the payment
of money.
It is unquestionable that recoupment (reconvencion) is a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction upon which the plaintiff's cause of
action is based, and that paragraph 1 of section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure treats of a counterclaim of this kind existing at the time of
the presentation of the action of the plaintiff, while paragraph 2 of the said section 97 treats of a counterclaim based upon a transaction
distinct from the plaintiff's cause of action; therefore, it follows that paragraph 1 of the said section refers to recoupment (reconvencion) and
paragraph 2, to set-off (compensacion).
1. When the plaintiff asked for a writ of injunction, in the former suit, case No. 604, against the defendant who was disturbing her titular rights
to the lands in question, was the (plaintiff) obliged to present, together with the same, her claim against the said defendant for the
77
improvements which she had put on the lands or for payment of their value? 2. When defendant in the said case No. 604 presented a cross-
complaint for damages, did the obligation then fall upon plaintiff to demand her right over the improvements in question or the payment of
their value?.
Before clearing up these two points in accordance with the provision of the law of Civil Procedure by the application of the legal principles the
value of which has be in given the court will proceed to determine whether the plaintiff, who has acquired those lands by means of a
conveyance and holds as owner in good faith, has or has not a right to the improvements which she has put on the lands, in accordance with
the provision of the civil law, whereby property right is controlled and governed by substantive civil law, the source of the power which the
owner exercises over the things that lawfully belong to him. Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure
in order that courts applying correctly laws of all kind are able to administer justice. Therefore, what is necessary and essential is if the
interested party, has or has not in equity any right (which may be recognized in law) to obtain in the suit and then on obtaining some before
the courts, if his claim has or has not been settled according to the established rules of procedure for the initiation, prosecution and judgment
of suit.
Article 361 of the Civil Code says:
Any owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith, shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so
built, sown, or planted upon paying the compensation mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has built or
planted to pay him the value of the land, or to require the person who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor.
The two articles herein before cited are of the following tenor:
Art. 453. Necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until
they are repaid to him.
Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in
his possession having the option of refunding the amount of such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing
has acquired by reason thereof.
Art. 454. Expenditures purely for ostentation or mere pleasure shall not be repaid the possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it does not suffer injury thereby and if the successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
By a final judgment Tranquilino Gloria is now the owner of the two parcels of land wherein in good faith, the plaintiff had put improvements —
sowing plants of great use, erecting a warehouse (camarin), placing therein implements for the manufacture of sugar. The same judge who
rendered the said decision in the former case No. 604, declared and upheld that the plaintiff, on introducing such improvements on the lands
in question, did so in good faith; that inasmuch as the defendant, who, on winning the case, was declared owner of the said two parcels of
land, upon taking possession of them, took over the improvements made by the plaintiff, it is no more than just that said defendant should
indemnity the plaintiff for the value of price of the aforesaid improvements the sugar cane and coconut trees planted on the lands, the
warehouse (camarin) erected thereon, and the implements and machinery placed therein for the manufacture of sugar — entailing necessary
and useful expenditures which have increased the price of the lands which the defendant now possesses. It is not just nor is it permitted by
any law that the defendant, Gloria, should enrich himself t the expense, and to the prejudice, of Apolinaria Lopez, who has expended much
work and money in order that such improvements might be put on the said two parcels of land. It should be observed that article 453 above
cited authorizes the one who had incurred the expense of the improvements to retain said lands until the owner shall have paid in full the
value of said improvements.
When the final judgment rendered in the former case, 604, was executed the plaintiff was ejected from the said parcels of land and completely
deprived of the possession of the improvements which she had made thereon in good faith, without having been able to exercise the right of
retention granted by the said article 453. As the said expenses of the plaintiff were not purely for luxury or mere ostentation, the obligation on
the part of the defendant, who now enjoys with positive benefits the said improvements, to refund the value of the same to the plaintiff
Apolinaria Lopez, is deemed unavoidable.
Under these assumptions, this opinion being now concerned with the decision of the two questions above set forth, and examining them
under the legal principles of American law, we can, thereupon, affirm that the counterclaim to which section 97 of Act No. 190 refers is
expressly for, and is an obligation imposed upon, the defendant. It is an unjustifiable anomaly to oblige the plaintiff, who is in possession of the
land as owner and asking for a writ of injunction, to demand the improvements thereon, or their value, from the defendant who declares
himself to be the owner of the land and disturb the possession of the former, precisely at the moment of exercising the remedy of injunction
to the end that her right may be protected against the defendant-intruder. Furthermore, if the said plaintiff is convinced, in goof faith, that she
is the owner and lawfully possesses the disputed lands by title to such, it is absurd to oblige her to claim, as an act of foresight, the
improvements which she had put on the lands, or their value, because such a procedure would give a reason for suspecting her good faith and
because by taking advantage of such a strange claim for improvements not the object of the suit, the defendant could allege that this
anomalous and unusual pretention confirms his defense that he is the owner of the lands in question.
78
If the plaintiff Apolinaria Lopez were the defendant, the present defendant Tranquilino Gloria being plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of
the possession of a piece of land, there is no doubt that the defendant Lopez would set up a counterclaim for the improvements of their value.
But Gloria did not file any complaint in the former case for the recovery of the lands but, instead, in order to defend himself against the writ of
injunction, elected by the plaintiff Lopez, demanding protection for her rights disturbed by him, he filed a demurrer alleging himself to be the
owner of the lands in question, and exercising in the form, of a demurrer, so to speak, the action for the recovery of the possession of a piece
of land (reivindicatoria). Moreover if when exercising said remedy of injunction, the plaintiff had asked, for the reimbursement of the value of
the improvements, this conduct might have given a reason to presume a tacit confession that in truth she was not the owner of the lands upon
which the said improvements exists, in case that the litigation should be decided in the manner that it has been.
Concerning the second point or question above mentioned, the plaintiff is also not obliged to set up recoupment for the improvements upon
answering the cross-complaint for damages, for the reason that the said plaintiff was in the possession of the lands and their improvements as
owner, and the defendant, upon alleging in his defense that he was the owner of the said lands, was not claiming any right over the
improvements but was only asking for damages. Against a claim of this kind there is no obligation imposed upon the defendant in the cross-
complaint and plaintiff in the remedy for the writ of injunction to set up recoupment for the improvements which were not claimed by the
defendant who was only suing for the ownership of the lands.
The fact that the plaintiff was defeated in an action in which she was only praying for remedy of the writ of injunction to protect her right by a
judgment rendered by virtue of defense based on the right of property, cannot, under any concept, serve to compel her to present, together
with the said action for the remedy of injunction, a recoupment against the defendant who was not in the possession of the lands nor of the
improvements and who, in the judgment in that case, was not declared owner of the latter.
In the judgment appealed from taking into consideration its origin, there is no ground to infer the presumption of res adjudicata in connection
with the final judgment rendered in the said case. No. 604, inasmuch as, according to article 1252 of the Civil Code, in order that the said
presumption may be admissible in this suit, it is necessary that the most perfect identity exist between the case decided by the judgment
appealed from and that in which presumption is invoked with respect to the subject matter, cause of action, the parties thereto, and the
capacity in which they litigated.
No extensive arguments nor great intellectual efforts are necessary to comprehend that, even the litigants interested in this case and the
aforesaid No. 604 are the same, in no way will that fact be able to establish on a reasonable basis the existence of perfect identity between
these respective cases, objects, causes and rights of action. In as much as by the former judgment Tranquilino Gloria was declared owner of
the disputed lands it is not possible legally to infer, that in neither of said decision are included the ownership and right of possession of the
said improvements made, and paid for by Apolinaria Lopez. It is natural that they should not be included in said decision since the right to the
improvements has not been the object of the dispute and no one of the parties has claimed them as his exclusive belonging. Since, under no
concept of said decision can there be included the right to the improvements; nor ground to contend that the said former decision produced
the effect and consequences of a writ of inscription of property, ordered by the Court of Land Registration, for the reason that, by the express
provision of law in land registration cases, when in an order of adjudication of ownership to realty in favor of a petitioner and its inscription in
the property registry there is not stated in writing the encumbrances and charges which directly affect and burden the realty registered, no
one can afterwards claim the existence of such encumbrances inasmuch as, in case the registration of the realty was ordered unconditionally,
the petitioner obtained from that moment, by an act of law, the state of being the absolute owner of the realty so registered and of its
improvements — special conditions expressly established by the Land Registration Act, which cannot be applied in favor of a party who has
only obtained a recognition and declaration of ownership by virtue of a final judgment in an ordinary case.
In other respects, granting that the action instituted in this suit by the plaintiff is proper and lawful, for the failure of the defendant to submit
evidence to the contrary, the following amounts are deemed invested by the plaintiff for the cultivation and clearing of the land, according to
her own evidence: for the planting of the sugar cane, five hundred and sixty nine pesos (P569), (record, p. 9); for the construction of the
warehouse (camarin) together with the costs of the implements for the cultivation of sugar, seven hundred and eleven pesos and fifty
centavos (P711.50) (record, pp. 14 and 15); and for the planting of the coconuts, four hundred and seventy two pesos (P472) (record, pp. 16
and 17); which added to two hundred fifty pesos and fifty centavos (P250.50), the amount of the expenses incurred for the cultivation of the
bamboo tress and coconuts planted on the land, give the total sum of two thousand and three pesos (P2,003).
The result of this evidence adduced by the plaintiff was not contradicted with justifiable reason by the defendant, nor was the credibility of the
witness who has furnished the details of the expenses incurred by the former impugned, so that the value of the improvements in question as
it was found is accepted as true, it being not unlawful nor unjust or without foundation.
The defendant, upon taking possession of the lands adjudicated to him, decided to appropriate the improvements introduced by the plaintiff
thereon, for the said defendant refused to return them. The said article 361 of the Civil Code confers the right, to any owner of land, to take as
his own what has been built, to any owner of land, to take as his own what has been built, sown, or planted on it in good faith by another upon
paying the expenses incurred by the latter. Therefore, the defendant is obliged to pay to the plaintiff the value of the improvements which he
preferred to retain for his benefit and use. It is not lawful that he should enrich himself at the expense, and to the prejudice, of the legitimate
owner of the said improvements.
For these considerations it follows that, with the reversal of the judgment appealed from, it is hereby declared that the plaintiff, Apolinaria
Lopez, is the owner of the improvements existing on the lands now in the possession of the defendant, Tranquilino Gloria, and therefore we
should condemned, as we hereby do, the latter to pay the said plaintiff the sum of two thousand and three pesos (P2,003) together with its
79
legal interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date when the defendant took possession of the land and the said improvements up
to the date of its payment in full, without special finding as to the costs of both instances. So ordered.
80
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120958 December 16, 1996
FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. STELLA CABUCO-ANDRES, Presiding Judge of Branch 31, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, San Pedro,
Laguna, SPOUSES FELIPE and VICTORIA LAYOS, EDUARDO R. LOYOLA, NENITA ZARRIS, MANUEL R. TUASON and BENILDA
AMBIOJA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with application for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 March 1995 dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner. Impugned likewise is the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 13 July 1995
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
Petitioner Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential
subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Binan, Laguna. Its partner in the joint venture, La Pat Housing and
Development Corporation (La Paz), provided the aforementioned properties which are registered in its name. The project involves
the "construction and development of, among others, a highway interchange linking nearby communities to the South Expressway
and world class tourism-generating cultural theme and water parks." 1
On 29 December 1992, a certain Felipe Layos filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Application for Preliminary
Injunction2 against Fil-Estate Realty Corporation, (FERC) et al. with the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna and docketed as Civil
Case No. B-3973.
It was alleged in the said complaint that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and possessor of two (2) parcels of land having a total area of
837,695 square meters located at Barrio Tubigan, Binan, Laguna, known as Lots 1 & 2 of Plan Psu-201 of the Bureau of Lands having
acquired the same from his father, Mauricio Layos, who in turn inherited said properties from his own father, Natalio Layos, allegedly
the original owner thereof. Layos claimed that the Southwoods project encroached upon the aforecited lands and thus contended
that his rights of ownership and possession were violated when FERC brought in men and equipment to begin development of the
said properties.
On 2 February 1993, FERC filed an Opposition to Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction3 and explicitly stated therein that the
developer of the Southwoods project is its sister company, FEGDI.
On 5 March 1993, FEGDI filed an Answer4 to the abovementioned complaint and reiterated that it is the developer of the
Southwoods project and not FERC and that the land covered by the project is covered by Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of
La Paz, copies of which were attached to said answer as annexes.
On 29 March 1993, Presiding Judge Justo M. Sultan of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna issued an order denying the prayer
for preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. B-3973 in view of the inability of Layos to substantiate his right. Neither he nor his counsel
appeared on the scheduled hearings. The order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
When this case was called for hearing on the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, only the defendant
Fil-Estate Realty Corp. and its counsel are present. On the other hand, the plaintiff and counsels did not appear in Court.
Records will show that on January 18, 1993, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court and was served on the
defendant on February 1, 1993. On the February 2, 1993 hearing, the plaintiff moved that the hearing be reset on February
22, 1993. This is with the full knowledge that a temporary restraining order would become moot and academic by the next
hearing.
On the date of the hearing (February 27, 1993), the plaintiff moved for postponement on the ground that he will submit a
report on the relocation survey within Ten (10) days; hence, the hearing was again reset to March 23, 1993. That, on said
date (March 23, 1993), no hearing took place inasmuch as the plaintiff just filed a written Motion for Postponement. The
Court then set the hearing to March 30, 1993. Again, the hearing was reset to April 29, 1993. LRC Case No. B-452 (sic) being
related to Civil Case No. B-3973, its hearing was likewise made to coincide with the hearing on the issuance of the writ of
81
preliminary injunction. On the date set for hearing, the plaintiff who is also the applicant in LRC Case No. B-542 including
his two counsels did not appear in Court despite due notice to them.
WHEREFORE, in view of the plaintiff's inability to substantiate his right, the prayer for preliminary injunction is denied due
course.
SO ORDERED.5
On 25 June 1993, Felipe Layos along with his wife and other individuals filed another case for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna docketed as Civil Case No. B-4133, this time against the
correct party, FEGDI.
The complaint in the San Pedro case (Civil Case No. B-4133) is basically identical to that filed in the Binan case (Civil Case No. B-3973),
except for changes in the number of party-plaintiffs and party-defendants and in the area size of the claimed landholdings. Further,
in the San Pedro case there is reference to a title (OCT No. 239), a specific date of intrusion and an increase in the damages prayed
for.6
On 1 July 1993, FEGDI moved to dismiss the San Pedro case on grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping, lack of cause of action and
lack of jurisdiction.7 FEGDI argued that a similar complaint was previously filed with the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna and is
currently pending therein. It, likewise, accused the private respondents of forum-shopping, stating that the latter instituted the San
Pedro case after their application for preliminary injunction was denied by the Binan court. Anent the third and fourth grounds,
FEGDI averred that the documents relied upon by the private respondents are of doubtful veracity and that they failed to pay the
correct filing fees considering that the San Pedro case is a real action as allegedly revealed in the body of the complaint. The Layoses
filed their opposition on 5 July 1993 arguing in the main that there is no litis pendentia because there is no identity of parties. Felipe
Layos claimed that he never authorized the filing of the Binan case and that the defendant therein is the Fil-Estate Realty Corporation
not the Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. Consequently, the two cases being dissimilar, there can be no forum-shopping.8 Private
respondents contended, likewise, that they have satisfied all the requirements of a valid cause of action and insisted that the suit is
not for recovery of possession but is a personal action for injunction and damages. On 12 July 1993, Judge Stella Cabuco-Andres of
the San Pedro Regional Trial Court issued an order denying FEGDI's motion to dismiss.9 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
FEGDI on 13 July 1993 was similarly denied by the aforesaid court in an order dated 14 July 1993.10
On 15 July 1993, FEGDI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction with the Court of
Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31507)11 assailing the denial of its motion to dismiss the San Pedro case. The arguments and
issues raised by petitioner to support its motion to dismiss were the same issues raised in the aforestated petition.
On 20 July 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Andres from proceeding with the San
Pedro case.12
Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, in an order dated 25 January 1994, dismissed the Binan case without prejudice
on grounds of forum-shopping.13 FEGDI moved for a partial reconsideration of the said order praying that the dismissal be with
prejudice. Hence, on 25 April 1994, the aforestated court dismissed the Binan case with prejudice to forestall the plaintiffs therein
from forum-shopping. The said order states, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court in its Order dated January 25, 1994 dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. The defendant
corporation later on filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration insisting that the dismissal should be permanent as a
penalty for forum shopping. For indeed, the reiteration of the same would result in contempt, summary dismissal of all the
actions or proceedings as well as administrative sanctions. (MP[sic] Finance Corp. vs. Abesamis, 195 SCRA 592; (Benguel
[sic] Electric Corp., Inc. vs. AEA, Jan. 23, 1991; see also Aqualyn Corp. vs. CA, 214 SCRA 307 (1992); Ruiz vs. Drilon, 209 SCRA
695 (1992).
This Court is in full agreement with the defendant corporation, otherwise, if the dismissal is without prejudice, what would
prevent the plaintiff from raising the same thing in another tribunal as it has raised in Branch 31 of this Court? It would
result in absurdity. The rule prohibiting as well as penalizing forum-shopping has not been intended to allow absurdity to
happen. It was intended to prevent repetitious filing of suits by one party in case he cannot succeed in a claim lodged
before a court of justice. There must be an end to litigation and this is one thing the penalty for forum shopping has
intended to be.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing premises, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. This case is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.14
82
On 10 March 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed FEGDI's petition for lack of merit. It ruled that:
1. There is no litis pendentia because there is no identity of parties, specifically the main party-defendants, FERC (the
defendant in the Binan case) and FEGDI (the defendant in the San Pedro case) which have separate and distinct
personalities;
2. Private respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping for the same reason as above-stated;
3. The essential elements of a valid cause of action are present in private respondents' complaint and the main allegations
therein are sufficient for the court to render a valid judgment; and
4. Private respondents paid the correct filing fees. Not being a real action, there was no need for private respondents to
state in their complaint the assessed value of the properties in question as basis for the assessment and collection of the
docket and filing fees.15
FEGDI's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals' resolution dated 13 July 1995. 16 Hence, this
petition for review.
Petitioner makes the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (AND RESPONDENT JUDGE) ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT CIVIL CASE NO. B-
3973 (THE "BINAN CASE") WAS AUTHORIZED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT FELIPE LAYOS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (AND RESPONDENT JUDGE) ERRED IN FAILING TO UPHOLD LITIS PENDENTIA AS A
GROUND FOR DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. B-4133 (THE "SAN PEDRO CASE"), PARTICULARLY BY HOLDING THAT THE
REQUISITE IDENTITY OF PARTIES IS NOT PRESENT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (AND RESPONDENT JUDGE) ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE A FORUM SHOPPING
SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE FILING OF THE BINAN AND THE SAN PEDRO CASES, AND TO INVOKE THE SAME AS A GROUND
FOR DISMISSING THE LATTER CASE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (AND RESPONDENT JUDGE) ERRED IN FAILING TO UPHOLD LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION
AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSING THE SAN PEDRO CASE.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (AND RESPONDENT JUDGE) ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE SAN PEDRO
CASE IS A REAL ACTION, HENCE FAILING TO UPHOLD THE DISMISSAL OF SAID CASE ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION FOR FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO PAY THE PROPER
FILING FEES.17
The petition is granted.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is predicated on four grounds: litis pendentia, forum-shopping, lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction for failure to pay the proper filing fees. However, in resolving the same, we shall focus our discussion on the second and
third grounds only.
Private respondents have indeed resorted to forum-shopping in order to obtain a favorable decision. The familiar pattern (of one
party's practice of deliberately seeking out a "sympathetic" court) is undisputedly revealed by the fact that after Felipe Layos
instituted in 1992 a case for injunction and damages with application for preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Binan,
Laguna and after his prayer for a preliminary injunction was denied in March 1993, he and his wife, together with four (4) alleged
buyers of portions of the land claimed by him, filed an identical complaint for injunction and damages with preliminary injunction a
few months later, or in June 1993, this time with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
83
Having been denied their temporary restraining order in one court, private respondents immediately instituted the same action in
another tribunal — a deliberate tactic to seek out a different court which may grant their application for preliminary injunction, or at
least give them another chance to obtain one.
Private respondents parry petitioner's allegation of forum-shopping by adamantly contending that Felipe Layos did not, in any
manner, authorize the filing of the Binan case. Moreover, they insist that Felipe Layos' signature in the Binan complaint is a forgery
and that he neither appeared nor participated in the proceedings before the Binan court.
We find no merit in private respondents' assertions. The almost word-for-word similarity of the complaints in both the Binan and San
Pedro cases totally refutes such a theory, as can readily be observed from a comparative view of the two aforementioned
complaints:
Binan Case San Pedro Case
Plaintiff is a Filipino, of legal age, with Plaintiffs Sps. Felipe and Victoria Layos
residence at Our Lady of Monserrat St., are Filipinos, of legal age, with residence Lot 21, Block 18, Rosario Village, San at our Lady of
Monserrat Street, Lot 21,
Pedro, Laguna; whereas defendant FIL- Block 18, Rosario Village, San Pedro,
ESTATE REALTY CORPORATION, Laguna; plaintiffs Eduardo R. Loyola,
is a corporation duly organized and Nenita Zarris and Benilda Ambojia are
existing under Philippine laws, defendant Filipinos, of legal age and all residing at
ARNEL NULOT is a Filipino, of legal Silang, Cavite, while plaintiff Manuel R.
age, and is the Project Engineer and Tuason, Filipino, of legal age and a resi-
Personnel Manager of defendant cor- dent of Lagro Subdivision, Valenzuela,
poration, BOY ESCANO is Filipino, Metro Manila; whereas defendant FIL-
of legal age, and is consultant of said ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT
corporation, and JOHN DOES are INC., is a corporation duly organized and
Filipinos, of legal age, whose identities existing under Philippine laws, and JOHN
may be made later on, and who are and PETER DOES are Filipinos, of legal
acting for or under instruction of said age, whose identities may be established
corporation, all with address at Fil- later on, and who are acting jointly with
Estate Realty Corporation Office, SEC and/or for or under instruction of said Building, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, corporation, all
with address at Fil-Estate
where they may be served with summons Golf and Development, Inc. office, SEC
and other court processes. (Par. 1). Building, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
where they may be served with summons
and other court processes. (par. 1).
Plaintiff is the owner and lawful possessor Plaintiffs are the co-owners and lawful
of two (2) parcels of land situated at Barrio possessors of two (2) parcels of land
Tubigan, Binan, Laguna, known as Lots 1 situated at Barrio Tubigan, Binan, Laguna,
and 2 of the Plan Psu-201 of the Bureau known as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201 of
of Lands, copy of which Plan is attached the Bureau of Lands, copy of which Plan
as Annex "A" hereof. (par. 2). is attached as Annex "A" hereof. (par. 1,
first sentence).
Said lots have a total area of 837,695 Said lots have a total area of 1,068,725
square meters as shown in said plan. square meters as shown in said plan. The
The original owner and lawful possessor original owner and lawful possessor of
of said land is NATALIO LAYOS, said land is NATALIO LAYOS,
grandfather of herein plaintiff (par. 3). grandfather of plaintiff Felipe Layos (par.
2, last sentence; paragraph 3, first
sentence).
When his said grandfather died, said When plaintiff Felipe Layos' grandfather
properties were acquired by inheritance died, said properties were acquired by
by his sole heir MAURICIO LAYOS, inheritance by his only son and sole heir
who is the father of herein plaintiff. MAURICIO LAYOS, who is the father
(par. 4). of herein plaintiff Felipe Layos. (par. 4).
On April 15, 1992, said MAURICIO On April 15, 1992, said MAURICIO
LAYOS executed an "Affidavit of Self- LAYOS executed an "Affidavit of Self-
-Adjudication with Sale," copy of Adjudication with Sale," a copy of which
which is attached as Annex "B" is attached as Annex "C" hereof. Under
hereof, whereby said Mauricio Layos said Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with
84
after having adjudicated the subject Sale, Mauricio Layos . . . sold the same
properties to himself as sole heir of the properties to herein plaintiff Felipe Layos.
deceased Natalio Layos, sold the same (par. 5, first 2 sentences).
properties to herein plaintiff Felipe
Layos. (par. 5).
Plaintiff herein is now the owner and . . . . who is one of the owners and lawful
lawful possessor of the subject properties, possessors of the subject properties. His
his possession thereof, tucking (sic) the open, continuous and peaceful possession
possession of his said father and grand- thereof, tacking the possession of his said
father, in the concept of an owner, is father and grandfather, in the concept of
for more than thirty (30) years, way back an owner, is more than thirty (30) years
in 1909 when the said plan was approved now, commencing even before December
by the Bureau of Lands. (par. 6). 14, 1909 when the said plan was approved
by the Bureau of Lands. (par. 5, second
part of second sentence and third sentence).
The subject parcels of land is (sic) The subject parcels of land are declared
declared for taxation purposes as for taxation purposes and real estate
evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. therefor had been paid by plaintiff Felipe
55007 and 55008, copy of each Layos. (par. 7).
attached as Annexes "C" and "D"
hereof, respectively (par. 7).
Recently, said defendants, in conspiracy On or about June 16, 1993, the

and in confederation with one another, defendants, in conspirary and in
have brought men, materials, and confederation with one another, have
equipments (sic) near the subject brought men, materials, and equipments
properties and are threatening, procuring, (sic) at or near the subject properties and
suffering, or about to, enter, occupy, are threatening, procuring, suffering, or
use and/or develop the subject properties about to, enter, occupy, use and/or
in gross violation of the plaintiff's rights develop as they have in fact entered,
of ownership and possession over said occupied, use (sic) and started to develop
properties (par. 8). the subject properties without the consent
of plaintiffs thereby violation (sic) their
rights of ownership as well as the
erstwhile peaceful and undisturbed
possession over said properties for
which plaintiffs suffered actual damages
of at least P50,000,00. (par. 8).
Such acts of defendants are in violation The unlawful and highly irregular acts
of plaintiff's rights as lawful owner and of defendants are in violation of plaintiffs'
possessor of subject properties, and the rights as lawful owners and possessors of
same would work great and irreparable subject properties, and said acts
damage and injustice to plaintiff. (par. complained of herein would work great
9). and irreparable damage and injury to
plaintiffs. (par. 13).
Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs
and the whole or part of such relief demanded and the whole or part of such
consists in restraining defendants from reliefs consists in restraining defendants
entering, occupying, and developing from entering, occupying, using and
the abovesaid properties of plaintiff, or developing the abovesaid properties of
any portion thereof, and from violating plaintiffs, or any portion thereof, or to
the latter's rights of ownership and desist from continuing with said unlawful
possession thereon. (par. 10) acts and from violating their rights of
ownership and possession of the subject
properties. (par. 10).
The commission or continuance of the The commission or continuance of the

acts complained of during the litigation acts complained of during the litigation of
would definitely work great and the instant case would definitely work
irreparable injustice and damage to great and irreparable injury and damage
plaintiff, and may render the judgment to plaintiffs, and may make the judgment
85
that his Honorable Court may render that this Honorable Court may render
(sic) ineffective. (par. 11). (sic) herein ineffectual. (par. 15).
Unless immediately restrained, defendants Unless immediately restrained, defendants

and persons working under them will as well as any and all persons acting and
persist and continue entering, occupying working for and in its (sic) behalf, will
use (sic) and/or developing the subject persist and continue entering, occupying,
properties of plaintiff in violation of the using and/or developing the subject
latter's right and to his great damage properties of plaintiffs in violation of the
and irreparable injuries. (sic; par. 12). latter's right and to their great damage
and irreparable injuries. (sic; par. 16).
Plaintiff has no other plain, speedy, or Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy or
other sufficient remedy in the ordinary other sufficient remedy in the ordinary
course of law, and he is willing to file course of law, and they are willing and
an injunction bond in such amount that able to file an injunction bond in such
the Honorable Court may reasonably amount that this Honorable Court may
fix. (par. 13). fix. The affidavit of plaintiff Felipe Layos
in support of their prayer for preliminary
injunction is hereto attached as Annex "D"
and made part hereof. (par. 17).
Due to the abovesaid unlawful acts of By reason of defendant's unlawful acts

defendants, plaintiff has suffered fear, complained of herein, plaintiffs have
anxiety, worry, embarrassment, nervous suffered fear, anxiety, worry,
tension, and other similar injuries for embarrassment, moral anguish, nervous
which he is entitled to an award of tension, sleepless nights and other similar
moral damages in the amount of not injuries for which they are entitled to an
less than P100,000.00. (par. 14). award of moral damages in the amount
of at least P200,000.00. (par. 10).
For the same reason, and to serve as an In order to serve as an example for the
example for the public good, plaintiff is public good, plaintiffs are also entitled to
entitled to an award of moral (sic) an award of exemplary damages which
damages which can be reasonably can be reasonably estimated at not less
estimated at not less than P100,000.00 than P100,000.00. (par. 11).
(par. 15).
For the same reason, and to protect the For the same reason, and to protect their
rights and interest (sic), plaintiff is rights and interests (sic), plaintiffs were
constrained to engage the services of constrained to engage the services of
counsel for which it has committed to counsel for which they agreed to pay the
pay the sum of P100,000.00 plus sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's
P1,000.00 per court appearance of fees and other litigation expenses, plus
counsel. (par. 16) P1,000.00 per court appearance of counsel
(par. 12).
At the outset, a restraining order be At the outset, a temporary restraining
issued directing defendants, their order be issued directing defendants, their
officers, workers, attorneys, agents, officers, workers, attorneys, agents,
representatives, subordinates, personnel representatives, subordinates, personnel
and other persons assisting them or and other persons assisting them or acting
acting under them, to desist and refrain under them, to desist and refrain from
from entering, occupying, using or entering, occupying, using or developing
developing the properties subject of the properties subject of this case,
this case, particularly Lots 1 and 2 of particularly Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201,
Plan Psu-201, copy attached as Annex Annex "A" hereof, and covered by
"A" hereof. (Prayer 1). Original Certificate of Title No. 239 of
the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Laguna, copy of which is attached
as Annex "B" hereof, (Prayer 1).
Thereafter, a preliminary injunction be After due hearing, a preliminary
issued after plaintiff's filing of an injunction injunction be issued upon plaintiff's filing
bond in such amount as this Honorable of an injunction bond in such amount as
Court may reasonably fix. (Prayer 2). this Honorable Court may fix. (Prayer
2).
86
After due trial and hearing, a decision After trial and hearing, judgment be
be rendered making said preliminary rendered in favor of plaintiffs making
injunction permanent, and directing said preliminary injunction permanent,
defendants to jointly and severally pay and directing defendants to jointly and
plaintiff the sums of: P50,000.00 — as severally pay plaintiffs the sums of at
and for moral damages; P50,000.00 — least: P50,000.00 — for actual damages;
as and for exemplary damages; P200,000.00 — as and for moral damages';
P100,000.00 plus P1,000.00 court P100,000.00 — as and for attorney's fees
appearance of counsel as and for and other litigation expenses. (Prayer 3). 18
attorney's fees. (Prayer 3).
Even the affidavits attached to the two complaints are virtually identical:
Binan Case San Pedro Case
I, FELLPE LAYOS, a Filipino, of legal I, FELIPE LAYOS, a Filipino, of legal

age, and with residence at our Lady of age, and with residence at our Lady of
Monserrat St., Lot 21, Block 18, Monserrat St., Lot 21, Block 18,
Rosario Village, San Pedro, Laguna, Rosario Village, San Pedro, Laguna,
after having been duly sworn, depose after first being duly sworn, depose and
and say, that: (prefatory statement; say that: (prefatory statement;
Affidavit). Affidavit).
I am the owner and lawful possessor of I am the owner and lawful possessor of
two (2) parcels of land situated at Barrio two (2) parcels of land situated at Barrio
Tubigan, Binan, Laguna, known as Lots Tubigan, Binan, Laguna, known as Lots
1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201 of the Bureau 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201 of the Bureau
of Lands, copy of which Plan is attached of Lands and covered by OCT No.
as Annex "A" hereof. (par. 1, Affidavit). 239 copies of which are marked as
Annexes "A" and "B" of the Complaint,
respectively. (par. 1, Affidavit).
Said Lots have a total area of 837,695 Said Lots have a total area of 1,068,725
square meters as shown in said plan. square meters as shown in said plan and
The original owner and lawful possessor OCT. The original owner and lawful
of said land is NATALIO RAMOS (sic), possessor of said land is NATALIO
my grandfather. (par. 3, Affidavit, N.B. LAYOS, my grandfather. (par. 2,
there is no par. 2). Affidavit).
When my said grandfather died, said When my said grandfather died, said
properties were acquired by inheritance properties were acquired by inheritance
by his sole heir MAURICIO LAYOS by his sole heir MAURICIO LAYOS
who is my father. (par. 4, Affidavit). who is my father. (par. 3, Affidavit).
On April 15, 1992, my said father, On April 15, 1992, my said father,
MAURICIO LAYOS, executed an MAURICIO LAYOS, executed an
"Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with "Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with
Sale", copy of which is attached as Sale", copy of which is attached as
Annex "B" hereof, whereby said Annex "C" of the Complaint, whereby
Mauricio Layos, after having said Mauricio Layos, after having adjudicated
adjudicated the subject properties to the subject properties to himself as sole
himself as sole heir of the deceased heir of the deceased Natalio Layos, sold
Natalio Layos, sold the same properties the same properties to me. (par. 4,
to me. (par. 5, Affidavit). Affidavit).
By virtue thereof, I am now the owner By virtue thereof, I am now the owner
and lawful possessor of the said and lawful possessor of the said
properties. My possession thereof, properties. My possession thereof,
tucking (sic) the possession of my said tucking [sic] the possession of my said
father and grandfather, in the concept of father and grandfather, in the concept of
an owner, is for more than thirty (30) an owner, is for more than thirty (30)
years, way back in 1909 when the said years, even before December 14, 1909
plan was approved by the Bureau of when the said plan was approved by the
Lands. (par. 6, Affidavit). Bureau of Lands. (par. 5, Affidavit).
87
The subject parcels of land is [sic] The subject parcels of land are declared
declared for taxation purposes as for taxation purposes. (par. 6, Affidavit).
evidenced by Tax Declaration Nos.
55007 and 55008, copy of each is
attached as Annexes "C" and "D"
hereof, respectively. (par. 7, Affidavit).
Recently, defendants in this case, in On or about June 16, 1993, the defendants
conspiracy and in confederation with in conspiracy and in confederation with one
one another, brought men, materials another, have brought men, materials and
and equipments [sic] near the subject equipment at or near the subject properties
properties and are threatening, procuring and are threatening, procuring, suffering or
about to, or are suffering to, enter, about to, enter, occupy, use and/or develop
occupy, use and/or develop the said as they have in fact entered, occupied, use
properties in gross violation of my [sic] and started to develop the subject
rights of ownership and possession properties without the consent of plaintiffs
thereby violation (sic) their rights of
ownership as well as the erstwhile
peaceful and undisturbed possessions over
said properties for which plaintiffs suffered
actual damages of at least P50,000.00.
(par. 7, Affidavit).
Such acts of defendants are in violation The unlawful and highly irregular
of my rights as lawful owner and possessor acts of defendants are in violation of
of subject properties, and the same plaintiffs' rights as lawful owners and
would work great and irreparable possessors of subject properties, and
damage and injustice to me. (par. 9, said acts complained of herein would
Affidavit). work great and irreparable damage and
injury to plaintiffs.
I am entitled to the relief demanded Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs

and the whole or part of such relief demanded and the whole or part of such
consists in restraining said defendants reliefs consists in restraining defendant
from entering occupying, and developing from entering, occupying, using and
the above-said properties of plaintiff developing the abovesaid properties of
or any portion thereof, and from plaintiffs, or any portion thereof, or to
violating the latter's rights of ownership desist from continuing with said unlawful
and possession thereon. (par. 10, acts and from violating their rights of
Affidavit). ownership and possession of the subject
properties. (par. 10, Affidavit).
The commission or continuance of the The commission or continuance of the

acts complained of during the litigation acts complained of during the litigation
would definitely work great and of the instant case would definitely
irreparable injustice and damage to me, work great and irreparable injury and
and may render the judgment that this damage to plaintiffs, and may make the
Honorable Court may render [sic] judgment that this Honorable Court may
ineffectual. (par. 11, Affidavit). render herein ineffectual. (par. 11
Affidavit).
Unless immediately restrained, defendants, Unless immediately restrained,

their subordinates, workers, and persons defendants, as well as any and all
working under them will persist and persons acting and working for and in
continue entering, occupying, using and/or its [sic] behalf will persist and continue
developing the subject properties of entering, occupying, using and developing
plaintiff in violation of the my [sic] right the abovesaid properties of plaintiffs
and to my great damage and irreparable in violation of the latter's right and to their
injuries [sic]. (par. 12, Affidavit). great damage and irreparable injuries
[sic]. (par. 12, Affidavit).
I have no other plain, speedy, or other Plaintiffs have no other plain, speedy,
sufficient remedy in the ordinary course or other sufficient remedy in the
of law, and I am willing to file an ordinary course of law, and they are
injunction bond in such amount that the willing and able to file an injunction
88
Honorable Court may reasonably fix. bond in such amount that this Honorable
(par. 13, Affidavit). Court may reasonably fix. (par. 13,
Affidavit.19
Examining the two complaints one can easily discern that the San Pedro complaint is simply an "improved" version of the Binan
complaint and the similarity does not end there. The residence certificates (of Felipe Layos) used in the verification of both
complaints are practically identical — same number, date of issue and place of issue.20
If indeed there is a "ghost Mr. Layos," as claimed by the private respondents, the genuine Felipe Layos and the rest of the private
respondents should have, on their own volition, denounced the allegedly bogus case filed with the Binan court or at the very least,
informed the San Pedro court about it. It cannot be denied that private respondents were aware of the Binan case considering that
Annex C (Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale) of the San Pedro complaint was a mere photocopy of Annex B of the Binan
complaint.
Private respondents likewise aver that there is no identity of party-defendants in view of the fact that the defendant in the Binan
case is the Fil-Estate Realty Corporation (FERC) and in the San Pedro case the Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI), two
completely separate and distinct entities.
Private respondents' contention is unmeritorious.
In the Binan case, FEGDI voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing its answer and expressly stating therein that it is the
developer of Southwoods, and not its sister company, FERC. Moreover, the Binan court in its orders dated 25 January 1994 21 and 20
October 199422 expressly recognized FEGDI as the defendant in the said case. There can be no question then that in both cases FEGDI
is the true party-defendant.23
As clearly demonstrated above, the willful attempt by private respondents to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it
failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process. Such disrespect is penalized by the
summary dismissal of both actions as mandated by paragraph 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on 11
January 1983 and Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.24 In Bugnay Construction & Development Corporation v. Laron,25 we declared:
Forum-shopping, an act of malpractice, is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It is improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Paragraph 17
of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, in connection with the implementation of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act. Thus, Said Paragraph 17 provides that no petition may be filed in the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals "if another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme
Court" and vice-versa. The Rule ordains that "(a) violation of the rule shall constitute a contempt of court and shall be a
cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel or party concerned."
This rule has been equally applied in the recent case of Limpin, Jr., et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where the
party having filed an action in one branch of the regional trial court shops for the same remedies of a restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction in another branch of the same court. We ruled therein that:
So, too, what has thus far been said more than amply demonstrates Sarmiento's and Basa's act of
forum-shopping. Having failed to obtain the reliefs to which they were not entitled in the first place
from the "Solano Court," the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, they subsequently instituted
two (2) actions in the "Beltran Court" for the same purpose, violating in the process the ruling against
splitting causes of action. The sanction is inescapable: dismissal of both actions, for gross abuse of
judicial processes.
The rule against forum-shopping is further strengthened by the issuance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Said
circular formally established the rule that the deliberate filing of multiple complaints to obtain favorable action constitutes forum-
shopping and shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof:
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION
SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR CIVIL COMPLAINTS, PETITIONS AND OTHER

INITIATORY PLEADINGS FILED IN ALL COURTS AND AGENCIES, OTHER THAN THE
89
SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, TO PREVENT FORUM SHOPPING OR
MULTIPLE FILING OF SUCH PLEADINGS.
Revised Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in
other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping.
Complementary thereto and for the same purpose, the following requirements, in addition to those in pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the filing of the complaints, petitions,
applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
and shall be subject to the sanctions provided hereunder.
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced
any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have
been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes
to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application
wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading, upon motion and after hearing. However, any clearly willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his
counsel through the filing of multiple complaints or other initiatory pleadings to obtain favorable action shall be a ground
for summary dismissal thereof and shall constitute direct contempt of court. Furthermore, the submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with the undertakings therein, as provided in Paragraph 1 hereof, shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to disciplinary proceedings against the counsel and the filing of a criminal action
against the guilty party. (Emphasize ours.)
This Circular shall take effect on April 1, 1994.
February 8, 1994.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice
We, likewise, find that the complaint in the San Pedro case did not state a cause of action; consequently, the Court of Appeals erred
in upholding the trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint on this ground.
In determining whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the allegations in the complaint must be considered. Thus,
in the recent case of Navoa v. Court of Appeals,26 we held as follows:
A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf. The
requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created, (b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and (c) an act or
omission on the part of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff's right or breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff. Briefly stated, it is the reason why the litigation has come about; it is the act or omission of
defendant resulting in the violation of someone's right.
In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. Lack of
cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint and its existence may be determined only by the allegations of
the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being
allowed.
If a defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action, such as what petitioners did in the
case at bar, he is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts
found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant
90
and material facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless
of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants.
However, the Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, limited itself to the allegations in the complaint proper of the San Pedro
case in concluding that said complaint stated a cause of action. This is erroneous. In the determination of whether or not the
complaint states a cause of action, the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered, they being parts of the complaint:
The fact that there is "no cause of action" must be evident on the face of the complaint itself (namely, the allegations,
including attached annexes and statements, mentioned in the complaint (Acuna v. Batac Producers Cooperative, L-20333,
June 30, 1967; Deleplanque v. Tervel, et al., 95 Phil. 959). In other words, the test is — assuming the allegations and
statements to be true, does the plaintiff have a valid cause of action? If the answer is NO, dismissal on this ground will be
proper (See World Wide Insurance and Surety Co. v. Manuel, 18 Phil. 46).27
Particularly, in Deleplanque v. Teruel,28 we ruled that:
. . . . It is contended for the appellant that the lower court erred in taking into account civil case No. Q-232 of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, already above referred to, because it is a foreign matter and the rule is that a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action must be based only on the allegations appearing in the complaint. The rule
invoked by counsel for the appellant is correct, but it has no application to the case at bar. It appears that, aside from the
fact that in paragraph VII of the complaint the sale of the land belonging to the defendant J.B. Teruel was expressly
mentioned as having been made at a "public auction", the said complaint contains, as Annex "B", a copy of the sheriff's
certificate of sale in civil case No. Q-232, whereby the land in question was conveyed to the herein defendant Manuela C.
Perez cor (sic) P22,656.00, pursuant to a writ of execution dated February 12, 1952, issued by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch III. . . . .
In the case at bar, Annex C of the complaint, which is the "Affidavit of Self-Adjudication" glaringly negates the existence of a cause of
action as will be discussed hereinafter.
Moreover, the rule that the court's scrutiny is limited to the four corners of the complaint is subject to exceptions as laid down
in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia:29
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the rule on a motion to dismiss cited by the petitioner, while correct as a general rule is not without exceptions.
In the present case, before the trial court issued the questioned order dismissing petitioner's complaint, it had the
opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the
counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. It was but logical for said court to consider all of these pleadings
in determining whether or not there was a sufficient cause of action in the petitioner's complaint. The order of dismissal
was in the nature of a summary judgment.
Again, the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry, (supra), we ruled:
In Llanto v. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V.
Sanchez, held that the trial court can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of
cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into consideration the discussion in said motion and
the opposition thereto. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, "even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for insufficiency
of cause of action will be granted if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts
sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure in the complaint" (LOCALS No.
1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoreman's Association v. Southern Pacific Co.,
6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d. 605). . . .
Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is
that the complaint states no cause of action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the
allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary
in importance are made to override the ends of justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the
91
prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be countenanced." (Vol. 1,
Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases.)
The trial court, therefore, did not err in considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted by the parties
in deciding whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of a cause of action.
Commenting on the exception as expounded in the above-cited case, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Remedial
Law has this to say:
. . . . The exception is provided in Sec. 2, Rule 9, i.e., where the motion to dismiss on this ground in (sic) filed during the trial
in which case the evidence presented is considered. Also, it has been held that under this ground the trial court can
consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record (Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
Garcia, G.R. No. 55935, July 30, 1986).30
In the San Pedro complaint, private respondents anchored their claim of ownership on an OCT No. 239 and on a survey plan PSU-201
in the name of Natalio Layos, copies of which were attached to the complaint. His son and sole heir Mauricio Layos inherited the
properties covered by the said plan. In turn, Felipe Layos became the owner thereof through an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with
Sale executed by Mauricio Layos, his father. This is where the inconsistency materializes. In the said Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
with Sale which was also attached to the San Pedro complaint as Annex "C," Mauricio Layos categorically stated that the subject
properties (Lots No. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201) were not registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Property Registration
Decree.31 If the properties in question were not registered, where did the OCT No. 239 come from? Mauricio Layos' express
admission not only contradicts but indubitably strikes down the purported OCT No. 239 and exposes private respondents' claim as a
sham. This inconsistency is patent in the documents attached to the complaint which form part and parcel of the complaint. The
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale attached to the complaint is the crucial and indispensable basis for private respondents' claim
of ownership and interest in the subject properties, without which they have no right of action or personality in the case.
Necessarily, the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is a vital part of the complaint that should be considered in the determination of
whether or not a cause of action exists.
Private respondents' inconsistency is further manifested by the 1992 application for original registration filed by Mauricio Layos with
the Regional Trial court of Binan, Laguna (docketed as Civil Case No. B-542) for the lots under Plan Psu-201.32 Why would Mauricio
Layos file an application for the registration of the land claimed by him if it is already covered by OCT No. 239? The conclusion is
inescapable that the document is fake or a forgery.
Finally, private respondents' cause of action against petitioner is defeated by the findings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Bureau of lands, contained in his letters to the Regional Technical Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15 December 1992, respectively:
12 November 1992
The Regional Technical Director of Lands

DENR, Region IV, 1515 L & S Building
Roxas Boulevard, Manila
ATTN.: Engr. ROBERT C. PANGYARIHAN

OIC, Surveys Division
Sir:
In connection with your request to validate the white print copy of an alleged plan Psu-201 which you had issued and
certified that it is a copy of the tracing cloth of Psu-201 which is on file in that Office, please forward to us the tracing cloth
plan to be examined instead of the white print copy that you have issued in accordance with the procedure stated in DENR
Administrative Order regarding validation of plans other than the original copies being sent to the region office.
It may be worthwhile to state for your information that the plan Psu-201 is not among those officially enrolled into the file
of this Bureau. What is more confusing is that the inventory book of all plans that were recovered after the war shows that
Psu-210 is a survey for J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila but the plan that was salvaged was heavily
damaged and therefore it was not also microfilmed. This would require therefore a more exhaustive research regarding the
authenticity of the tracing cloth that is in your file. (Emphasis ours.)
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
92
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division 33
xxx xxx xxx
MEMORANDUM:
15 December 1992
FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands

The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard
Manila
FROM: L M B
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certified by Engr. Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared
from a tracing cloth plan on file in the NCR" for validation. We returned the white print plan prepared by Engr. Pangyarihan
because we should examine the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the tracing cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies
sent by the Central Records Division to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated 27 November 1992, Engr. Pangyarihan explained that he prepared the copy which he certified from a
white print plan on file in the region as the applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth. While the explanation may be
considered, yet the preparation of the plan is not yet in accordance with Section 1.3 and 4.3 of DENR Administrative Order
No. 49, s-1991 which requires that the white prints or photographic print of the plan other than the original plan which
have been decentralized must first be authenticated by this Bureau before a certified true copy is issued by the region. It is
evident therefore that the issuance of a certified true copy of Psu-201 from a white print is premature, and considered
void ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print copy is subjected to field ocular inspection of the
land and on the basis of the findings, the region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as usual. Certified copies may
now be issued based on the reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201 should therefore be subjected to
ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila.
That plan was heavily damaged and its reconstruction was not finalized. This should be included in the investigation.
(Emphasis ours.)
For the Director of Lands:

(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division.34
Consequently, Mr. Sidicious F. Panoy, the Regional Technical Director of DENR, Region IV, issued an order dated 5 May 1994
cancelling all copies of plans pertaining to Psu-201. The order states that:
IN RE: CANCELLATION ORDER:

Plan Si-14769
True copy of Plan Claimant-Sofronio Olano
Si-14779 and Psu-201 Brgy. Bukal ng Tala & Hasaan
Municipality of Ternate, Cavite
Area: 13,321, 977 sq. m.
Plan Psu-201
Claimant - Natalio Layos
Brgy. Tubigan, Binan, Laguna
Area: 837,695 sq. m.
ORDER
93
By way of reaction to a number of inquiries as to the status of plans Si-14769 and Psu-201, verification was made at the
Technical Reference Section of the Land Management Bureau, Escolta, Manila as to the authenticity thereof on the basis of
still recoverable records and the following facts were established, to wit:
1. That Psu-201 is an original survey for J. Reed located in Malate, Manila; and
2. That Si-14769 is a survey number for the plan of a land parcel situated in Bo.
Bessang, Municipality of Allacapang, Province of Cagayan in the name of Gregorio
Blanco.
The purported blue print plan of Psu-201 indicating the land covered thereby to be situated in Bo. Tubigan, Binan, Laguna
and claimed by Natalio Layos and comprising 837,695 sq. meters is, therefore, a spurious plan and, probably the result of a
manipulative act by scheming individuals who surreptitiously got it inserted in the records. The same can be said as to the
blue print of Si--14769 which is a plan purportedly covering a parcel of land situated in Bo. Bukal ng Tala and Hasaan,
Ternate, Cavite comprising 13,321, 977 sq. meters. (Emphasis ours.)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, all plans pertaining to the above and indicated as true copies and bearing the
signature of Engr. Robert C. Pangyarihan are as hereby IT IS CANCELLED including any document attached thereto and, as
such, declared null and void and of no force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
94
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 151900 August 30, 2005
CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.
JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
The Court settles an issue, heretofore undecided, on whether the absence of the signature in the required verification and certification against
forum-shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complaint. We rule in the negative.
The relevant facts in this Petition for Review are culled from the records.
On 24 October 2001, a complaint for damages was lodged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126. 1 The complaint
was filed by Christine Chua, herein petitioner, impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants in the
suit were herein respondents Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran. Torres was the owner of the 9th Avenue Caltex Service Center (Caltex Service
Center), while Beltran was an employee of the said establishment as the head of its Sales and Collection Division. 2
The complaint alleged that on 3 April 2000, Jonathan Chua issued in favor of the Caltex Service Center his personal Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) Check No. 0412802 in the amount of Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (₱9,849.20) in
payment for purchases of diesel oil. However, the check was dishonored by the drawee bank when presented for payment on the ground that
the account was closed. Beltran then sent petitioner a demand letter informing her of the dishonor of the check and demanding the payment
thereof. Petitioner ignored the demand letter on the ground that she was not the one who issued the said check.
Without bothering to ascertain who had actually issued the check, Beltran instituted against petitioner a criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22). Subsequently, a criminal information was filed against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 50.3 The MTC then issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner. The police officers tasked with serving the warrant
looked for her in her residence, in the auto repair shop of her brother, and even at the Manila Central University were she was enrolled as a
medical student, all to the alleged embarrassment and "social humiliation" of petitioner.4
Beltran’s purported negligence amounted to either malicious prosecution or serious defamation in prosecuting petitioner resulting from the
issuance of a check she herself did not draw, and served cause for a claim of moral damages. On the other hand, Torres, as employer of
Beltran, was alleged to have failed to observe the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage suffered by petitioner.
Exemplary damages and attorney’s fees were likewise sought, thus bringing the
aggregate total of damages claimed to Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00), plus costs of suit. 5
Significantly, while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the second paragraph of the complaint that
he was being "impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff".6 There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by
Jonathan, and the prayer therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense. 7 Neither did
Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified
herself as "the principal plaintiff".8
Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint9 on the ground that Jonathan Chua had not executed a
certification against forum-shopping. The RTC stressed that Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule requiring the
certification, makes no distinction whether the plaintiff required to execute the certification is a principal party, a nominal party or a necessary
party. Instead, the provision requires that a plaintiff or principal party who files a complaint or initiatory pleading execute such certification.
Jonathan Chua, being a plaintiff in this case, was obliged to execute or sign such certification.10 Hence, his failure to do so in violation of the
mandatory rule requiring the certification against forum-shopping constituted valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.11
After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration12 lodged by petitioner, the matter was elevated directly to this Court by way of petition
for review under Rule 45, raising a purely legal question,13 cast, if somewhat unwieldily, as "whether or not a co-plaintiff impleaded only as a
necessary party, who however has no claim for relief or is not asserting any claim for relief in the complaint, should also make a certification
against forum shopping."14
Preliminarily, it bears noting that Jonathan Chua did not sign as well any verification to the complaint, ostensibly in violation of Section 7, Rule
4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The RTC failed to mention such fact, as does petitioner in her present petition. In their arguments before this
Court, respondents do refer in passing to the verification requirement15 , but do not place any particular focus thereto. The verification
requirement is separate from the certification requirement.16 It is noted that as a matter of practice, the verification is usually accomplished at
95
the same time as the certification against forum-shopping; hence the customary nomenclature, "Verification and Certification of Non Forum-
Shopping" or its variants. For this reason, it is quite possible that the RTC meant to assail as well the failure of Jonathan Chua to verify the
complaint.
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. 17 The absence of a proper verification
is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.18 It would be as well that the Court discuss whether under the circumstances,
Jonathan Chua is also required to execute a verification in respect to petitioner’s complaint.
Having established the proper parameters of the petition, we proceed to the core issues. We find the petition has merit, although we
appreciate the situation differently from petitioner. Our decision proceeds from the fundamental premise that Jonathan Chua was misjoined
as a party plaintiff in this case.
It is elementary that it is only in the name of a real party in interest that a civil suit may be prosecuted.19 Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 20 One having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action.21 To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. 22
The subject complaint does not allege any rights of Jonathan Chua violated by respondents, present any rights of his to be enforced, or seek in
his behalf any rights to the avails of suit. In short, Jonathan claims nothing, and for nothing, in the subject complaint. If he alone filed the
complaint, it would have been dismissed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, instituted as it was by a person who was
not a real party in interest.
But was it proper for petitioner to have even impleaded Jonathan as a co-plaintiff in the first place? Petitioner alleged in her complaint that
Jonathan was a necessary party, and remains consistent to that claim even before this Court. She however fails to demonstrate how Jonathan
can be considered as a necessary party, other than by noting that he was "the one who really
issued the check in controversy."23 Such fact, if proven, may establish the malice of respondents in filing the criminal case against petitioner for
violation of B.P. 22, but does not create the need to require Jonathan’s participation as a necessary party.
Section 8, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as "one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a
party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
action."24 Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.25
An example of a necessary party may be found in Seno v. Mangubat.26 Petitioner therein sold her property through a deed of sale to three
vendees. Two of the vendees then sold their shares to the third buyer, who then sold the property to another set of persons. Thereafter,
petitioner, who claimed that the true intent of the first sale was an equitable mortgage, filed a complaint seeking the reformation of the deed
of sale and the annulment of the second sale. The question arose whether the two vendees who had since disposed of their shares should be
considered as indispensable parties or necessary parties. In concluding that they were only necessary parties, the Court reasoned:
In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be
held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be an equitable mortgage. Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute
owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants no
longer have any interest in the subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is
necessary in order to settle all the possible issues of the controversy. Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an equitable
mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights
against defendant Marcos Mangubat.27
In Seno, the persons deemed by the Court as necessary parties may have had already disposed of their interests in the property. However,
should the lower court therein grant the prayer for the reformation of the deed of sale, the ruling will undoubtedly have an effect on such
parties, on matters such as the purchase price which they may have received, and on whatever transmission of rights that may have occurred
between them and the vendor.
In contrast, Jonathan Chua does not stand to be affected should the RTC rule either favorably or unfavorably of the complaint. This is due to
the nature of the cause of action of the complaint, which alleges an injury personal to petitioner, and the relief prayed for, which is to be
adjudicated solely to petitioner. There is no allegation in the complaint alleging any violation or omission of any right of Jonathan, either
arising from contract or from law.
It may be so that Jonathan may be called to testify by his sister, in order to prove the essential allegation that she did not issue the check in
question, and perhaps such testimony would be vital to petitioner’s cause of action. But this does not mean that Jonathan should be deemed a
necessary party, as such circumstance would merely place him in the same class as those witnesses whose testimony would be necessary to
prove the allegations of the complaint. But the fact remains that Jonathan would stand unaffected by the final ruling on the complaint. The
96
judicial confirmation or rejection of the allegations therein, or grant or denial of the reliefs prayed for will not infringe on or augment any of his
rights under the law. If there would be any effect to Jonathan of the RTC’s ultimate decision on the complaint, it would be merely emotional,
arising from whatever ties of kinship he may retain towards his sister, and no different from whatever effects that may be similarly sustained
on petitioner’s immediate family.
Since we are unconvinced by petitioner’s basic premise that Jonathan was a necessary party, it is unnecessary to directly settle the issue as
couched by petitioner of "whether or not a co-plaintiff impleaded only as a necessary party, who however has no claim for relief or is not
asserting any claim for relief in the complaint, should also make a certification against forum shopping."28 We can note, as the RTC did, that
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes no distinctions that would expressly exempt a necessary party from executing the
certification against forum shopping. Nonetheless, there are dimensions to the matter, heretofore unraised, that may unsettle a strict
application of the rule, such as if the necessary party is impleaded as a plaintiff or counterclaimant without his knowledge or against his
will.29 But these circumstances relevant to a necessary party are not present in this case, and thus require no further comment upon for now.
Instead, what the Court may rule upon is whether the absence of the signature of the person misjoined as a party-plaintiff in either the
verification page or certification against forum-shopping is ground for the dismissal of the action. We rule that it is not so, and that the RTC
erred in dismissing the instant complaint. There is no judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view, but we are comfortable with making
such a pronouncement. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the first place, and it would make
little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the requirements expected of plaintiffs.
At the same time, Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately.30
Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of
parties.31 Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need
for a motion to such effect from the adverse party.32 Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while erroneous, may be
corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the prosecution of the suit.
It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be cause for impediment to the prosecution
of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all, such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should
be accorded to whatever act or omission of
the party.33 Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it
then follows that whatever action or inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is
inconsequential. Hence, it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign the certification against forum-shopping,
since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place. The fact that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face of the complaint itself, and the
error of the RTC in dismissing the complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise this point. After all, the RTC could
have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which should have been evident to it upon examination of the
complaint.
There may be a school of thought that would nonetheless find some satisfaction in petitioner’s woes before the RTC, as it was her error in the
first place of wrongfully impleading her brother as a party plaintiff which ultimately served as cause for the dismissal of the complaint. The
blame may in the final analysis lie with petitioner, yet we should not construe the rules of procedure to quench an unnecessary thirst to punish
at the expense of the intellectual integrity of the rules. For our Rules of Court do not regard the misjoinder of parties as an error of fatal
consequence, and the logical extension of this principle is to consider those procedural acts or omissions of misjoined parties as of similar
import.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 3 December 2001 and 15 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 126, in Civil Case No. C-19863 are SET ASIDE, and the Complaint in the aforementioned case is REINSTATED. The lower court is enjoined
to hear and decide the case with deliberate dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
97
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179878 December 24, 2008
NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August
2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters
Association, Inc. (NOPA) against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos (Campos).
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate
contracts denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but
was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of
Campos to file the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of actual damages
by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket fees.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. NOPA received this Order on 17 July 2006.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June 2006 Order. On 5 January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying
NOPA’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5
January 2007.
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations in the petition are "based on authentic records", in violation
of Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which provides:
" – x x x - A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading."
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings and documents, which would aid in the resolution of the
instant petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such as:
a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial dated July 27, 1999;
b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint;
d. Orders dated July 31, 2000, March 20 2001, November 17, 2004, and May 17, 2005, respectively;
e. Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated August 10, 2003;
f. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
98
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated May 12, 2005.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the paragraph of section 3, Rule 46."
3. Failure of petitioner’s counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter No.
1132 and/or A.M. No. 287, which reads as follows:
"The Court resolved, upon recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte to require all lawyers
to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all papers or pleadings submitted to the various judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies in addition to the requirement of indicating the current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt
or Lifetime Member Number."2
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in
compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said
Motion in the second assailed Resolution dated 16 August 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where NOPA raises the following issue and arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND
FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.3
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal and not jurisdictional. The court may give due course to an unverified
pleading where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for
certiorari.4
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition for Certiorari clearly legible and duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order or resolution of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof and such material portions of the record
as would support the petition.5
3. Substantial compliance of the rules, which was further supplied by the petitioner’s subsequent full compliance demonstrates its
good faith to abide by the procedural requirements.6
4. The resolution of the important jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioner before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would justify a
relaxation of the rules.7
The original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Negros Oriental Planters’ Association, Inc. (NOPA), the
petitioner in this case, a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine Laws, with principal place of business at Central Bais,
Bais City, Philippines; that I am duly authorized by the Board of NOPA (Secretary’s Certificate attached as Annex "A") to cause the
preparation of the foregoing petition; and that I hereby affirm and confirm that all the allegations contained herein are true and
correct to my own knowledge and belief;8
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NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a Verification that contains the allegation "to the best of my
knowledge" and the allegation "are true and correct," without the words "of his own knowledge," citing Decano v. Edu,9 and Quimpo v. De la
Victoria.10 NOPA claims that the allegations in these cases constitute substantial compliance with the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply
to the case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the
amendment, said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.–Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification.–Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state
under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on
authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in Section 5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is
not curable by amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading,11 Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure
to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. – x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it
shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned
pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to
the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party’s knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to
the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion,
refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA’s Motion for Reconsideration with attached Amended
Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court? The old case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas12states that it can, but only in
exceptional cases when there is grave abuse of this discretion or adverse effect on the substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the
expedition of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one tribunal could not easily prescribe
to another the appropriate rule of procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental principles of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court
which "lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal at law or in equity.
We have seen that where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the
prohibition of review in appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the statute; but it would be a monstrous
100
travesty on justice to declare that where the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the substantial
legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and affirmative showing is made of an
abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper
exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence
of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion
conferred upon the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which
should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice. As was said in the
case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U. S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion,
and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355),
it was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or
by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule"
to guide a court of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not therefore attempt to control the exercise
of discretion by the court below unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise of mere "arbitrary
will," or in other words that his action in the premises amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to
review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of
abuse of power to the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an erroneous principle of law not vested in
discretion.13
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial rights of a litigant. NOPA’s Petition for Certiorari is
seeking the reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPA’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The
alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals’ exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the
payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this Court on
the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of contract from being
decided on the merits. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical
rules of procedure while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting this Court’s reversal of the exercise of
discretion by the former. However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of NOPA in its Petition
for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that such Petition would still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Court’s ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,14 wherein we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment
of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amount sought in the amended pleading.
In denying15 NOPA’s Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 16 wherein we modified our ruling in
Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid
ruling was made on the justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the case at bar, since
Campos deliberately concealed his claim for damages in the prayer.
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros,17 we discussed how Manchester was not applicable to said case in view of the lack
of deliberate intent to defraud manifested in the latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent
intent in omitting the amount of damages claimed in its Second Amended Complaint, thus placing itself on the same footing as the
complainant in Manchester, when it is clear that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the amount of P410.00, notwithstanding its claim for damages in
the amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the private respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the
original complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body of the complaint, damages in the amount of P78,750.00 but
omitted the same in its prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees. Such fraud-defining circumstance is absent in the
instant petition.
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Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-payment of docket fees in Manchester, the complainant therein filed
an amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and
when directed by the court to specify the amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced the same
from P78,750,000.00 to P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent
scheme is wanting in the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of our rulings in Manchester andSun Insurance. Its attempt
to strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to bolster its arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential
blessing must be struck down by this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of
docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the
liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insuranceand not the strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of
unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. The total amount considered in computing the docket fee was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately
omitted a claim for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and,
hence, the amount that should have been considered in the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly deliberately
omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Campos’s pleadings furthermore evince
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the
case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. against private respondent Aniceto Manojo
Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
102
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139337 August 15, 2001
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated April 21, 1999 and Resolution2 dated July 20, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
nullifying the Orders3 dated May 13, 1998, May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260,
which found private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas liable to pay support pendente lite and subsequently in contempt of court after failing
to tender the required amount of support pendente lite.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 4, 1997, petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Civil Case No. 97-0523, which is
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas,
private respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children. The case was raffled to Branch 257 of
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City presided by Judge Rolando C. How. But the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch
257 a Notice of Dismissal dated November 20, 1997, to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the provision of Section 1, Rule
17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been served and no responsive pleading has yet been filed.
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on November 25, 1997. It was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of
the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City presided by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
On May 13, 1998, when the case was called for a pre-trial conference, the matter of plaintiff’s (petitioner’s) application for support pendente
lite of their four (4) minor children was taken up. Judge Bautista-Ricafort received evidence on the application for support pendente lite. The
private respondent and her counsel, Atty. Alberto Diaz, participated in that proceedings by conducting an extensive cross-examination of the
petitioner. The trial court then issued its Order dated May 13, 1998 declaring the proceedings on the application for support pendente
liteterminated and deemed submitted for resolution; and as prayed for by the parties, also set the case for pre-trial on June 15, 1998 at 8:30
a.m.1âwphi1.nêt
On May 19, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort, issued an Order4 granting the application for support pendente lite, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The plaintiff, testifying under oath, submitted Exhibit "A" itemizing the expenses incurred for the support of the children over a
period of time during their stay at Ayala-Alabang; and showed that their total monthly average expense is P84,585.00, or P42,292.50
per month, per spouse. Interestingly, the defendant did not adduce any evidence to dispute the figures presented to the Court by
the plaintiff, nor did he present proof of his financial incapacity to contribute more than 50% of the children’s school tuition fees.
The court has painstakingly reviewed the item included in Exhibit "A", and found the same reasonable, xxx.
Under Art. 49 of the Family Code, there being no written agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for the adequate
support of their minor children xxx, this Court finds the prayer for support pendente lite to be in order. Accordingly, the defendant is
hereby ordered to contribute to the support of the above-named minors, (aside from 50% of their school tuition fees which the
defendant has agreed to defray, plus expenses for books and other supplies), the sum of P42,292.50 per month, effective May 1,
1998, as his share in the monthly support of the children until further orders from this Court. xxx. All expenses for books and other
school supplies shall be shouldered by the plaintiff and the defendant, share and share alike. Finally, it is understood that any claim
for support-in-arrears prior to May 1, 1998, may be taken up later in the course of the proceedings proper.
On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite private respondent in contempt of court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 61 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, after the latter failed to comply with the said Order dated May 19,
1998 of the trial court. Private respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Alberto Diaz, filed a counter-manifestation and motion admitting that
"xxx there is really no genuine issue as to his obligation and willingness to contribute to the expenses for the support of his minor children xxx.
He simply wants to make sure that whatever funds he provides for the purpose will go to the expenses for which they are intended."5Thus, he
prayed that the manner and mode of payment of his contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified such that he will pay
directly to the entities or persons to which the payment for such expenses are intended. On September 23, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort
issued an Order6 directing the private respondent "to comply fully with the Order of this Court dated May 19, 1998 by updating payment of his
103
share in the support of the minor children, pendente lite, covering the period May 1998 to September 1998, within five (5) days from his
receipt hereof xxx under pain of legal sanctions if he still fails to do so. xxx."
On September 28, 1998, or about four (4) months later, private respondent, through his new counsel, Atty. Francisco Ma. Guerrerro, filed an
Omnibus Motion (1) applying to be authorized to discharge Atty. Alberto Diaz as his counsel and to substitute him with the new counsel; (2) to
re-open hearing on the Motion for Support Pendente Lite; and (3) to temporarily stay execution of the Orders dated May 19, 1998 and
September 23, 1998. The omnibus motion was set for hearing on October 2, 1998. Private respondent requested that before the omnibus
motion is heard the May 19, 1998 Order be temporarily suspended. When the presiding judge did not grant that request of private
respondent, the latter’s new counsel refused to proceed with the hearing of his omnibus motion.
On October 8, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order giving private respondent ten (10) days to comply with the May 19, 1998 Order,
otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of court.
On October 23, 1998, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the Orders of the trial court dated
May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998 and October 8, 1998.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued another Order,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, and on the strength of the provisions of Sec. 5 Rule 61 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant (herein
private respondent) is hereby pronounced guilty of Contempt of Court, and is hereby ordered arrested and confined at the City Jail of
Parañaque City, Metro Manila, without bail, and as long as he has not complied with and obeyed in full the Order of this Court dated
May 19, 1998 by updating his monthly contribution of P42,292.50 for the period of May 1998 to the date, giving the said amount
directly to the plaintiff, or depositing it with the Clerk of Court, who shall therefor (issue) the corresponding receipts.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent was arrested by the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on December 14, 1998 but he was released on the
following day after the appellate court temporarily enjoined Judge Bautista-Ricafort from enforcing her November 27, 1998 Order as well as
her Orders dated May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998, and October 8, 1998. When the temporary restraining order lapsed on March 11, 1998,
the respondent was again arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort. After depositing with the clerk of court of
the trial court the amount of support in arrears stated in the Orders of the trial court, private respondent was released from custody.
On April 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the instant petition is GRANTED. Consequently, all the proceedings/actions taken by respondent
Judge on the matter of support pendente lite in Civil Case No. 97-0608 (formerly Civil Case No. 97-0523) are hereby declared NULL
and VOID, and said CASE is ordered RETURNED to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, for appropriate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.8
The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the
petitioner did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice.
The decision of the appellate court elaborated the reasons for the granting of the petition, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
While a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer (Sec. 1,
Rule 17), there is however a need to state the fact of prior filing and dismissal thereof in the certification on non-forum shopping, in
the event the complaint is refiled, as in this case. This must be so in order to prevent the plaintiff or principal party from invoking
Section 1 of Rule 17 in the hope that, if and when refiled, the complaint will be raffled to a more sympathetic judge.
To the mind of the Court, private respondent availed of Section 1 of Rule 17 not for any other reason or purpose than to take the
case out of the sala of Judge How and to have it assigned to another. This belief finds support from the fact that private respondent’s
lawyer and respondent Judge were classmates at the UP College of Law.
Not only that. While private respondent actually resides in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City, it was made to appear in the complaint
that she is a resident of Parañaque City, where respondent Judge is one of the RTC Judges. While the question of venue was not
properly raised on time, this circumstance is being cited to support petitioner’s charge of forum-shopping.
104
xxx xxx xxx
Needless to say, forum-shopping merits such serious sanctions as those prescribed in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Considering, however, that when the complaint was withdrawn, no substantial proceedings had as yet been taken by the
court to which it was first raffled, and that the dismissal thereof was then a matter or (sic) right, the Court is not inclined to impose
any of the said sanctions. Instead, for the peace of mind of petitioner who entertains some doubts on the impartiality of respondent
Judge, the annulment case should be returned to Branch 257 of the RTC of Parañaque City, to which it was originally raffled. And, to
enable the Presiding Judge of said Branch to act on the matter of support pendente lite, which gave rise to this petition for certiorari
and disqualification, the proceedings/actions taken by respondent Judge relative thereto should be set aside, the same having been
attended with grave abuse of discretion.9
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant petition the petitioner poses the following statement of issues, to wit:
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING?
II
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NULLIFYING JUDGE RICAFORT’S ORDER OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE AND HER
RELATED IMPLEMENTING ORDERS WHICH IT WAS HER JUDICIAL DUTY TO ISSUE UNDER ART. 49 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND OTHER
RELATED PROVISIONS OF LAW?
III
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN NULLIFYING THE PROCEEDINGS ALREADY HELD BEFORE JUDGE RICAFORT
AFFECTING HER QUESTIONED ORDERS, AT THE SAME TIME IMPLIEDLY UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE REST OF THE PROCEEDINGS
INCLUDING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE?
IV
DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN ORDERING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 97-0523 RAFFLED TO JUDGE RICAFORT BE
"RETURNED" TO JUDGE HOW OF BRANCH 257 OF THE RTC OF PARANAQUE CITY?
In other words, if a case is dismissed without prejudice upon the filing by the plaintiff of a notice of dismissal pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 17,
before the service of the answer or responsive pleading, would the subsequent re-filing of the case by the same party require that the
certificate of non-forum shopping state that a case involving the same issues and parties was filed and dismissed without prejudice
beforehand? Would the omission of such a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping render null and void the proceedings and
orders issued by the trial court in the re-filed case?
It is our considered view and we hold that the proceedings and orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort in the application for
support pendente lite (and the main complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not
rendered null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal without
prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties and issues.
Section 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
105
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The language of
the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it is primarily
intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.10 The most important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to
rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs."11
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held that a
party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever
been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts.12 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.13 For the principle of res judicata to
apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the
two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of action.14
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523 which was the first case filed and raffled to
the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The dismissal without prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner
was pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure15 considering that it was done before service of answer or any
responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case before
Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge How’s order is one merely "confirming the
dismissal" of the complaint by the plaintiff (herein petitioner). Neither is there res judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a
decision on the merits but a dismissal "without prejudice".
Thus, private respondent’s apprehension that the case was dismissed in order to be transferred to the sala of a judge who is allegedly more
sympathetic to the petitioner’s cause is baseless and not a valid reason to declare the petitioner guilty of forum shopping. First, the petitioner
is not assured that the case would be raffled to a more sympathetic judge. There are five (5) RTC branches in Parañaque, namely, branch nos.
257, 258, 259, 260 and 274. Second, Judge Bautista-Ricafort of RTC of Parañaque, Branch 260, is presumed to be fair and impartial despite
private respondent’s claim that she is an alleged law school classmate of the petitioner’s counsel. In any event, at the slightest doubt of the
impartiality of the said trial judge, private respondent could have filed before the same judge a motion for her inhibition on that ground. But
private respondent did not.
Private respondent is also estopped in questioning the proceedings and orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort. He tacitly acknowledged the validity
of the proceedings and the orders issued by the said trial judge by participating actively in the hearing on the application for support pendente
lite and by praying for the modification of the Order of May 19, 1998 in that he should be allowed to directly pay to the persons or entities to
which payments of such expenses are intended in connection with the required support pendente lite of their minor children. Private
respondent cannot validly claim that he was not ably and sufficiently represented by his first counsel, Atty. Diaz, especially during the hearing
on that incident on May 13, 1998 when he himself was present thereat.
It is also too late for the private respondent to claim wrong venue in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City as a alleged proof of forum
shopping. He should have raised that ground in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. But he did not, so it is deemed waived. Besides, petitioner
is also a resident of Parañaque where the family of her parents reside.
Considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 was dismissed without prejudice by virtue of the plaintiff’s (herein petitioner’s) Notice
of Dismissal dated November 20, 1997 filed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in the
certificate non-forum shopping in Civil Case No. 97-0608 about the prior filing and dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-0523. In Gabionza v. Court of
Appeals,16 we ruled that it is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 (now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) must
be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-
91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules or procedure – which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.17
Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicataand litis pendencia as in the
case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by
the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission 18 that a
liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural
rules which is to "secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
For a party to be adjudged guilty of forum shopping in the trial courts, a motion to dismiss on the ground of either litis pendencia or res
judicata must be filed before the proper trial court and a hearing conducted thereon in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The same ground cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court while the main action in the trial court
is still pending for the reason that such ground for a motion to dismiss can be raised before the trial court any time during the proceedings and
is not barred by the filing of the answer to the complaint.19
106
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of alleged forum shopping in the trial court is premature for the reason that there is
an adequate and speedy remedy available in the ordinary course of law to private respondent, i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia or res judicata before the trial court. But private respondent did not file such a motion
based on either of said grounds. And where the ground is short of res judicata or litis pendencia, as in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for certiorari filed by herein private
respondent. The trial court should have been given an opportunity to rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in consonance with the
hierarchy of courts.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution dated April 21, 1999 and July 20, 1999 respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED,
and the Orders dated May 13, 1998, May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260,
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
107
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135042 September 23, 1999
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Br. 15; and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous
doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive
pleading to a complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the
property owner.
The Case
Before us is a Petition under Rule 45, challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated February 27, 1998 and its Resolution
promulgated July 23, 1998 in CA-GR SP-46002, which (1) dismissed the action for certiorari and preliminary injunction filed by Robern
Development Corporation ("Robern" for brevity); and (2) effectively affirmed the Orders (dated August 13, 1997; September 11, 1997; and
November 5, 1997) and the Writ of Possession (dated September 19, 1997), all issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Civil Case No.
25356-97.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows: 2
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in this manner: 3
There being no compelling reason to modify, reverse or reconsider the Decision rendered in the case dated February 27,
1998[;] the Motion for Reconsideration posted by petitioner on March 23, 1998 is DENIED, it appearing further that the
arguments raised therein were already considered and passed upon in the aforesaid Decision.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed.
1. Robern is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of about 17,746.50 square meters, which the National Power Corporation
("NPC" for brevity) is seeking to expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost housing project in Inawayan, Binugao, Toril,
Davao City.
2. On June 6, 1997, NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against Robern. 4 Instead of filing an answer, petitioner countered with a
Motion to Dismiss,5 alleging (a) that the Complaint suffered a jurisdictional defect for not showing that the action bore the approval of the NPC
board of directors; (b) that Nemesio S. Cañete, who signed the verification and certification in the Complaint, was not the president, the
general manager or an officer specifically authorized under the NPC charter (RA 6395); (c) that the choice of property to be expropriated was
improper, as it had already been intended for use in a low-cost housing project, a public purpose within the contemplation of law; and the
choice was also arbitrary, as there were similar properties available within the area.1âwphi1.nêt
3. Before this Motion could be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession based on Presidential Decree No. 42. On July
9, 1997, NPC deposited P6,121.20 at the Philippine National Bank, Davao Branch, as evidenced by PNB Savings Account No. 385-560728-9. 6
4. In its Order of August 13, 1997, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
This refers to the motion to dismiss. The issues raised are matters that should be dealt with during the trial proper. Suffice
it to say that [NPC] has the privilege as a utility to use the power of eminent domain.
108
The motion is denied for lack of merit. The pre-trial conference shall be on August 27, 1997 at 2:30 P.M. 7
5. On September 2, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that (a) the issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss could
be resolved without trial, as they could be readily appreciated on the face of the Complaint itself vis-à-vis the applicable provisions of law on
the matter; and (b) the grounds relied upon for dismissing the Complaint did not require evidence aliunde.
6. On September 11, 1997, the trial court denied the Motion. as follows:
The . . . motion [of the petitioner] for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. Finding the . . . motion
[of NPC] to be meritorious[,] let a writ of possession issue. 8
7. On September 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of September 11, 1997, arguing among others that
Section 15-A of RA 6395 was virtually "amended" when Cañete was allowed to verify and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in regard
to the Complaint for expropriation filed by NPC.
8. Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of Possession.
9. On September 19, 1997, in spite of petitioner's opposition, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession as follows:
WHEREAS, the applicant National Power Corporation in the above-titled case has presented to this Court a petition praying
for the issuance of a Writ of Possession of the affected property of the . . . Robern Development Corporation, described
hereinbelow, as follows:
TCT No. Total Area in Area Affected in
Square Meter Square Meter
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50
—————— —————
TOTAL — 97,371.00 17,746.50 — Total
affected area
WHEREAS, on September 11, 1997 the court issued an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of the . .
. National Power Corporation for the immediate possession and control of the parcels of land owned by the [petitioner] as
aforestated for the construction Mantanao-New-Loon 138 KV Transmission Line Project to be undertaken by the petitioner
affecting 17,746.50 sq. m. of the 97,371.00 sq. meters as shown above.
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to place [NPC] in possession and control of the affected property consisting
17,746.50 [s]quare [m]eters of the total area of 97,371.00 square meters described above and to eject therefrom all
adverse occupants, Robern Development Corporation and [all other] persons . . . claiming under it. 9
10. On November 5, 1997, before counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court directing the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, NPC occupied the disputed property.
11. In a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), Robern assailed the Writ on the following grounds: (a) patent on the face of
the complaint were its jurisdictional defect, prematurity and noncompliance with RA 6395; and (b) the issuance of the Writ of Possession was
109
irregular, arbitrary and unconstitutional, as the trial court had yet to fix the "appropriate value for purposes of taking or entering upon the
property to be expropriated."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following grounds.
First, the verification and certification of the Complaint by someone other than the president or the general manager of NPC was not a fatal
jurisdictional defect. It was enough to allege that the expropriating body had the right of eminent domain. The issues of whether the
expropriation was properly authorized by the board of directors and whether Cañete's verification and certification of the Complaint was
likewise authorized were evidentiary and could be ruled upon only after the reception of evidence.
Second, whether the disputed property could still be expropriated even if it had already been intended to be used in a low-cost housing project
and whether the choice of that lot was arbitrary and erroneous, given the availability of similar properties in the area, were factual issues that
would entail presentation of evidence by both parties.
Third, the allegation in the Complaint that NPC sought to acquire an easement of right-of-way through the disputed property did not preclude
its expropriation. Section 3-A of the NPC charter allowed the power company to acquire an easement of right-of-way or even the land itself if
the servitude would injure the land.
Fourth, the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPC's compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine National Bank an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the disputed property.
Fifth, certiorari was not the proper remedy, as the Order sustaining the right to expropriate the property was not final and could still be
appealed by the aggrieved party. The availability of appeal ruled out certiorari.
Hence, this Petition. 10
The Issues
In their Memorandum, 11 petitioner raises the following issues: 12
I WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 1997 DIRECTING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HIGHLY IRREGULAR, ARBITRARY, AND DESPOTIC.
II WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DISMISSIBLE ON ITS FACE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION,
BEING FLAWED WITH PREMATURITY, AND VIOLATIVE OF RA 6395.
III WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A FINDING NOT BORNE OUT BY THE COMPLAINT, THUS IT EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
IV WHETHER OR NOT THE CHOICE OF THE PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS ARBITRARY.
Simply stated, the petition raises the following issues:
1. Were there valid grounds to dismiss the Complaint?
2. Was the Writ of Possession validly issued, considering that the trial court had not conducted any hearing on the amount to be deposited?
This Court's Ruling
The Court of Appeals was correct in its rulings, but in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to file its
answer.
First Issue:
Grounds for Dismissal
Jurisdiction
110
Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because, first, Atty. Cañete who signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was neither the president nor the general manager of NPC; and second, under Section 15-A of RA 6395,
only the NPC chief legal counsel, under the supervision of the Office of the Solicitor General is authorized to handle legal matters affecting the
government power corporation. On the other hand, NPC argues that Cañete, as its regional legal counsel in Mindanao, is authorized to prepare
the Complaint on its behalf.
We find the disputed verification and certification to be sufficient in form. Verification is intended to assure that the allegations therein have
been prepared in good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. 13 Generally, lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is
neither jurisdictional nor fatal. Its absence does not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction. 14 The trial court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
The certificate of non-forum shopping directs the "plaintiff or principal party" to attest under oath that (1) no action or claim involving the
same issues have been filed or commenced in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and that, to the best of the plaintiff's knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of its present status shall be
made; and (3) if it should be learned that the same or a similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, the plaintiff shall report this fact to
the court where the complaint or initiatory pleading was filed. 15 This rule is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. 16Administrative Circular No.
04-94, which came before the 1997 Rules of Court, is deemed mandatory but not jurisdictional, as jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the
action is conferred by law. 17
In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Cañete was the acting regional legal counsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center
in Iligan City. He was not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal
pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in the
best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal
counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to certify if an action for expropriation had already been filed and pending with the
courts.
Besides, Atty. Cañete was not the only signatory to the Complaint; he was joined by Comie P. Doromal, OIC-assistant general counsel; and
Catherine J. Pablo — both of the NPC Litigation & Land and Land Rights Department. They all signed on behalf of the solicitor general in
accordance with the NPC charter. 18 Their signatures prove that the NPC general counsel and the solicitor general approved the filing of the
Complaint for expropriation. Clearly then, the CA did not err in holding that the Complaint was not dismissible on its face, simply because the
person who had signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not the president or the general manager of NPC.
Legal Standing and
Condition Precedent
Next, petitioner asserts that NPC had no legal standing to file the expropriation case, because the Complaint did not allege that its board of
directors had authorized its filing. It added that under Section 6, RA 6395, only the board was vested with the corporate power to sue and be
sued.
The National Power Corporation explains that, like other corporate officers and employees whose functions are defined by the board, Atty.
Cañete is authorized to file the expropriation case. Even if he is not the general counsel, he has residual authority to prepare, verify and certify
the Complaint for expropriation.
We rule for the private respondent. Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 1. The complaint. — The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall
state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be
expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest
therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. . . . . .
The foregoing Rule does not require that the Complaint be expressly approved by the board of directors of a corporation. In any event, such
authorization is a factual issue that can be threshed out during the trial. As held by the appellate court, "the issue of whether or not the
expropriation proceedings [were] authorized by the Board of Directors or that those who signed the complaint [were] authorized
representatives are evidentiary in character determinable only in [the] trial proper."
Prematurity of the Complaint
The same ruling applies to the argument alleging prematurity of the Complaint. Petitioner's insistence that NPC must secure the approval of
the provincial board and the municipal council is unfounded. Section 3(j), RA 6395, merely requires that the Complaint be filed in the same
manner as an expropriation case of the national, the provincial or the municipal government. At bottom, all that is needed is compliance with
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and the prevailing jurisprudence on expropriation.
111
Defenses and Objections
Petitioner avers that the Complaint should be dismissed, because the subject property was already committed to be used in a low-cost housing
project. Besides, there were other available properties in the area. Finally, the Complaint allegedly sought only an easement of a right-of-way,
not essentially an expropriation.
We disagree. Petitioner's argument in this case is premised on the old rule. Before the 1997 amendment, Section 3 of Rule 67 allowed a
defendant "in lieu of an answer, [to] present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all of his objections and defenses to
the right of the plaintiff to take his property . . . ." A motion to dismiss was not governed by Rule 15 which covered ordinary motions. Such
motion was the required responsive pleading that took the place of an answer and put in issue the plaintiffs right to expropriate the
defendant's property. 19 Any relevant and material fact could be raised as a defense in a condemnation proceeding, such as that which tended
to show that (1) the exercise of the power to condemn was unauthorized, or (2) there was cause for not taking defendant's property for the
purpose alleged in the petition, or (3) the purpose for the taking was not public in character. 20
This old rule found basis in the constitutional provisions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain, which were deemed to be for the
protection of the individual property owner against the aggressions of the government. 21 Under the old rule, the hearing of the motion and
the presentation of evidence followed.
However, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer requires such extraordinary motion to dismiss. Instead it provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. — . . . .
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the
taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically
designate or identify the property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest
claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. . . . . .
In his book on remedial law, Justice Florenz D. Regalado writes that the old Rule was a "bit confusing as the previous holdings under that
former provision also allowed the filing of another motion to dismiss, as that is understood in Rule 16, to raise additionally the preliminary
objections authorized by that Rule." Further, an answer, which is now required, gives more leeway. First, even if it still applies the omnibus
motion rule, it allows amendments to be made within ten days from its filing. 22 Second, the failure to file an answer does not produce all the
disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because the defendant may still present evidence as to just compensation. 23
When petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had already taken effect. Statutes regulating procedure in the
courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time those statutes were passed. 24 New court rules apply to proceedings
that take place after the date of their effectivity. 25 On April 8, 1997, the Court en bancissued a Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803, declaring that
the revisions in the Rules of Court were to become effective on July 1, 1997.
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as grounds for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the disputed land
for another public purpose or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal
are exclusive to those specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground
authorized by this provision. 26
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative defenses that should be alleged in an answer, since they require presentation of
evidence aliunde. 27 Section 3 of Rule 67 provides that "if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property," he should include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully
ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the petitioner.
Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears that
there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the
merits. 28
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case arose, we believe that in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner
should be given an opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Order of Condemnation
The Court will now tackle the validity of the trial court's assailed Order of August 13, 1997, which Respondent Court affirmed in this wise:
. . . . The denial of Robern's Motion to Dismiss [is tantamount] to a confirmation or a determination of the authority of NPC
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the case.
Under Section 4 of the present Rule 67, 1997 Rules, supra, an order sustaining the right to expropriate the property is a
final one and may be appealed by any aggrieved party (Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 [1989]). . . . . . 29
112
We clarify. Founded on common necessity and interest, eminent domain is the inherent right of the stare (and of those entities to which the
power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. It may appear to be harsh
and encompassing, but judicial review limits the exercise of eminent domain to the following areas of concern: (1) the adequacy of the
compensation, (2) the necessity of the taking, and (3) the public-use character of the purpose of the taking. 30
If there are objections and defenses that require the presentation of evidence and the hearing of arguments, the trial court should not
immediately issue an order of expropriation. This is clearly implied in Section 4 of Rule 67, which mandates that "[i]f the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. . . . ."
The Court of Appeals ruled that there were issues that required presentation of evidence during the trial proper; namely, whether the
expropriation proceeding was authorized by the NPC board of directors, whether the property to be expropriated was already devoted to
public use, and whether the choice of the property was arbitrary and erroneous in view of the other properties available in the area. The
necessity of the taking and the public character of the purpose of the expropriation were still in issue and pending resolution by the trial court.
To these we add the issue of whether the "taking" of the disputed property would require only an easement of right-of-way or would
perpetually deprive Robern of its proprietary rights. Therefore, the trial court should not have issued the assailed Order of Expropriation which
foreclosed any further objection to the NPC's right to expropriate and to the public purpose of the expropriation, leaving the matter of just
compensation as the only remaining substantial issue.
The nullity of the Order was glaring. While the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss, as the issues raised by the petitioner should
be dealt with during the trial proper, it nonetheless ruled that NPC had "the privilege as a [public] utility to use the power of eminent domain."
Second Issue
Requisite of a Writ of Possession
Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ of Possession for being "highly irregular, arbitrary and despotic," because the Motion to Dismiss
was yet to be resolved. It stresses that there was no hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for the taking of the disputed
property, as required in Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture. 31 We cannot uphold this contention.
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken,
provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. 32 However,
the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.
To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, 33 the Court held that the railway corporation had the right to enter and possess the land
involved in condemnation proceedings under Section 1, Act No. 1592, 34 immediately upon the filing of a deposit fixed by order of the court.
The Rules of Court of 1964 35 sanctioned this procedure as follows:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or Provincial Treasurer. — Upon the filing of the complaint or
at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property
involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and
fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final
disposition of the court. . . . . . (emphasis ours.)
Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree No. 42 and its companion decrees, which removed
the court's discretion in determining the amount of the provisional value of the land to be expropriated and fixed the provisional deposit at its
assessed value for taxation purposes. Hearings was not required; only notice to the owner of the property sought to be
condemned.1âwphi1.nêt
On the issue of the immediate possession, PD 42 (Authorizing The Plaintiff In Eminent Domain Proceedings To Take Possession Of The Property
Involved Upon Depositing The Assessed Value, For Purposes of Taxation) provided:
WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is not expeditious enough to enable the
plaintiff to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved as soon as possible, when needed for public
purposes;
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent domain proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and
after due notice to the defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
113
involved if he deposits with the Philippine National Bank, . . . an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation, to be held by said bank subject to the orders and final disposition of the court.
The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed.
Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property for Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation) also authorized immediate takeover of the property in this manner:
3. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of just compensation as provided for
herein, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of
the real property and the improvements thereon even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before
the Court of First Instance or the higher courts.
Where the "taking" was for "socialized housing," Section 3, PD 1259 (Amending Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD No. 1224 Further Defining The
Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending the above-quoted
paragraph, provided:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of the just compensation provided for in
Section 2 hereof, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and
disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised
whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations or the higher courts.
Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further Amending Paragraph 3 Of Presidential Decree No. 1224 As Amended By Presidential Decree No.
1259, Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending
paragraph 3 of PD 1224, decreed:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of
its branches of the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the just compensation provided for in Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1259, the government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession,
control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon with the power of demolition, if necessary,
even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian
Relations, or the higher Courts.
In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of PD No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban Land Reform In The Philippines And Providing For The
Implementing Machinery Thereof), which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of
its branches of the amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the declared assessment value in 1975, the Government, or
its authorized agency or entity shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon with the power of demolition, if necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be
raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher Courts.
Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform Basis For Determining Just Compensation And The Amount Of Deposit For Immediate Possession Of
The Property Involved In Eminent Domain Proceedings) mandated the deposit of only ten percent (10%) of the assessed value of the private
property being sought to be expropriated, after fixing the just compensation for it at a value not exceeding that declared by the owner or
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Section 2 thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or
any of its branches of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of compensation provided in Section 1
hereof, the government or its authorized instrumentality agency or entity shall be entitled to immediate possession,
control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon, including the power of demolition if necessary,
notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the courts.
Accordingly, in San Diego v. Valdellon, 36 Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 37 and Haguisan v. Emilia, 38 the Court reversed itself and
ruled that Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules, was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 42. The judicial duty of ascertaining and fixing the
provisional value of the property was done away with, because the hearing on the matter had not been "expeditious enough to enable the
plaintiff to take possession of the property involved as soon as possible, when needed for public purpose." 39
114
In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional value of the land did not necessarily represent the true and correct one but only tentatively
served as the basis for immediate occupancy by the condemnor. The just compensation for the property continued to be based on its current
and fair market value, not on its assessed value which constituted only a percentage of its current fair market value.
However, these rulings were abandoned in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 40 because "[t]he method of ascertaining just
compensation under the aforecited decrees constitute[d] impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tend[ed] to render this Court
inutile in a matter which under the Constitution [was] reserved to it for final determination." The Court added:
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
In Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of the presidential decrees that fixed the just
compensation in an expropriation case at the value given to the condemned property either by the owners or by the assessor, whichever was
lower.
More precisely, Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture 42 ruled that the judicial determination of just compensation included the
determination of the provisional deposit. In that case, the Court invalidated the Writ of Possession because of lack of hearing on the
provisional deposit, as required under then Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76,
1533 and 42, insofar as they sanctioned executive determination of just compensation, any right to immediate possession of the property
must be firmly grounded on valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules; that is, the value of the subject property, as
provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings, must be deposited with the national
or the provincial treasurer. 43
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and clearly reverted to the San Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings.
Section 2 now reads:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.
[Emphasis ours.]
In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession
was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate
effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take
place after the date of their effectivity. 44Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law
in this case. 45
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation
mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
NPC's Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.
The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD 1533 is not being revived.
Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the
property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional deposit of NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to expropriate
portions, not the whole, of four parcels of land owned by Robern, the provisional deposit should be computed on the basis of the Tax
Declarations of the property: 46
TCT No. Total Area Area Affected Assessed Provisional
in Sq. M. in Sq. M. Value Deposit
115
T-251558
(T-141754) 11,469.00 3,393.00 P4,250.00 P1,257.32
T-251559
(T-141755) 10,000.00 2,124.00 8,960.00 1,903.10
T-251556
(T-14152) 30,000.00 3,402.00 18,910.00 2,144.39
T-251555 45,000.00 8,827.50 18,450.00 3,619.28
————— ————— —————
TOTAL 97,371.00 17,746.50 P8,924.09
Hence, the amount of the provisional deposit should be increased in order to conform to the requirement that it should be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property. In the interest of justice, NPC should in the meantime pay Robern reasonable rental, to be fixed by the trial
court in its final decision, for the use and occupation of the disputed property from the date of entry until the deposit of the full assessed value
of the property, as mandated by Rule 67.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP-46002 are AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) petitioner is granted a period of ten days from the finality of this Decision within which to file its answer, in accordance
with Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Court; (2) NPC shall deposit, also within ten days from the finality if this Decision, the full amount required
under the aforecited Rule; and (3) the trial court shall, in its final decision, fix the rental for the use and the occupation of the disputed
property, from the date of NPC's entry until its deposit of the full amount required under the 1997 Rules. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
116
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149660 January 20, 2009
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a resolution issued by the Court of Appeals. The resolution denied the petition
for review filed by petitioner Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.
The present proceedings emanate from a complaint for regularization, subsequently converted into one for illegal dismissal, filed before Labor
Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan by private respondent Sheryl Oabel.
It appears that private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. This lasted until
February 7, 1997.1 Respondent worked in Century Park Hotel, an establishment owned by the petitioner.
On September 16, 1996,2 petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development Corporation.3 Subsequently, private respondent Oabel was
transferred to MANRED, with the latter deporting itself as her employer.4 MANRED has intervened at all stages of these proceedings and has
consistently claimed to be the employer of private respondent Oabel. For the duration of her employment, private respondent Oabel
performed the following functions:
Secretary, Public Relations Department: February 10, 1997 - March 6, 1997
Gift Shop Attendant: April 7, 1997 - April 21, 1997
Waitress: April 22, 1997 - May 20, 1997
Shop Attendant: May 21, 1997 - July 30, 19985
On July 20, 1998, private respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a petition for regularization of employment against the petitioner. On
August 1, 1998, however, private respondent Oabel was dismissed from employment.6Respondent converted her petition for regularization
into a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision on July 13, 1999, dismissing the complaint against the petitioner. The decision held:
While complainant alleged that she has been working with the respondent hotel in different department (sic) of the latter on (sic) various
capacities (although not all departments are part and parcel of the hotels), complainant never disputed the fact that her work with the same
were on a per function basis or on a "need basis" – co-terminus with the function she was hired for….Considering that complainant job (sic)
with the respondent hotel was on a per function basis or on a "need basis", complainant could not even be considered as casual employee or
provisional employee. Respondent hotel consider (sic) complainant, at most, a project employee which does not ripened (sic) into regular
employee (sic).7
Private respondent appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
held that: (1) MANRED is a labor-only contractor, and (2) private respondent was illegally dismissed.
Of the first holding, the NLRC observed that under the very terms of the service contract, MANRED shall provide the petitioner not specific jobs
or services but personnel and that MANRED had insufficient capitalization and was not sufficiently equipped to provide specific jobs.8 The
NLRC likewise observed that the activities performed by the private respondent were directly related to and usually necessary or desirable in
the business of the petitioner.9
With respect to the termination of private respondent’s employment, the NLRC held that it was not effected for a valid or just cause and was
therefore illegal. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. xxxx Respondents Century Park Hotel and Manila Resource Development
Corporation are hereby declared jointly and severally liable for the following awards in favor of complainant: 1) her full backwages and
benefits from August 1, 1998 up to the date of her actual reinstatement; 2) her salary differentials, share in the service charges, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from July 20, 1995 to July 31, 1998.
117
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a resolution, the appellate court dismissed the petition on account of the
failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held:
After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We resolve to DISMISS the present petition on the ground of non-compliance with the rule
on certification against forum shopping taking into account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel
Director of petitioner corporation without attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of petitioner corporation per board
resolution or special power of attorney executed by the latter. 11
Petitioner duly filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 30, 2001.12
In the present petition for review, the petitioner invokes substantial justice as justification for a reversal of the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.13 Petitioner likewise contends that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum shopping attached
constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement.14
There is no merit to the petition.
Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance applies only with
respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its presence in the pleading wherein it is required.
Petitioner’s contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the
defect in the pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to
inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The
requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.
Petitioner relies upon this Court’s ruling in Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals15 to show that its Personnel Director has been duly
authorized to sign pleadings for and in behalf of the petitioner. Petitioner, however, has taken the ruling in Digital Microwave out of context.
The portion of the ruling in Digital Microwave upon which petitioner relies was in response to the issue of impossibility of compliance by
juridical persons with the requirements of Circular 28-91.16 The Court’s identification of duly authorized officers or directors as the proper
signatories of a certificate of non forum-shopping was in response to that issue. The ruling does not, however, ipso facto clothe a corporate
officer or director with authority to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping by virtue of the former’s position alone.
Any doubt on the matter has been resolved by the Court’s ruling in BPI Leasing Corp. v. Court of Appeals17where this Court emphasized that
the lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.18 Specific authorization, the Court
held, could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the
petition and execute the certification, to make his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.19
This Court has not wavered in stressing the need for strict adherence to procedural requirements. The rules of procedure exist to ensure the
orderly administration of justice. They are not to be trifled with lightly.
For this reason alone, the petition must already be dismissed. However, even if this grave procedural infirmity is set aside, the petition must
still fail. In the interest of averting further litigation arising from the present controversy, and in light of the respective positions asserted by
the parties in the pleadings and other memoranda filed before this Court, the Court now proceeds to resolve the case on the merits.
Petitioner posits that it has entered into a service agreement with intervenor MANRED. The latter, in turn, maintains that private respondent
Oabel is its employee and subsequently holds itself out as the employer and offers the reinstatement of private respondent.
Notably, private respondent’s purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996, way after she was hired by the petitioner as
extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. There is thus much credence in the private respondent’s claim that the service agreement
executed between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to circumvent the law on employment, in particular that which pertains on
regularization.
In this regard, it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself do not cease with the end of each event or
function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioner’s business. Thus, although
the tasks themselves may vary, the need for sufficient manpower to carry them out does not. In any event, as borne out by the findings of the
NLRC, the petitioner determines the nature of the tasks to be performed by the private respondent, in the process exercising control.
This being so, the Court finds no difficulty in sustaining the finding of the NLRC that MANRED is a labor-only contractor.20 Concordantly, the
real employer of private respondent Oabel is the petitioner.
118
It appears further that private respondent has already rendered more than one year of service to the petitioner, for the period 1995-1998, for
which she must already be considered a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where
the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the present petition is DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 2001 is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
119
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143088 January 24, 2006
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., MANOLO AQUINO, JORGE MA. CUI, JR. and PATRICIA CHIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) and LEONARDO BHAGWANI, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court presents a recurring question regarding the Court’s requirement of a
certification of non-forum shopping.
Petitioners Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and Manolo Aquino, Jorge Ma. Cui, Jr. and Patricia Chiong, in their capacity as Executive Vice-
President Administration and Services, Manager International Cabin Crew and Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services, respectively, are before
the Court seeking the reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP-56850, dated January 31, 2000, dismissing their
appeal and the resolution of May 11, 2000, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts on the conflict between PAL and respondents Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) and Leonardo
Bhagwani are not necessary for the Court’s resolution of the petition. It is enough to state that on May 14, 1997 FASAP and Leonardo
Bhagwani filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against petitioners before the Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that PAL committed unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal of Bhagwani and, consequently, ordered the payment of damages. The NLRC later modified the decision by setting aside the
finding that PAL was guilty of unfair labor practice, but affirming the rest of the decision.
What is relevant to the case is the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals. When petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against the
decision with the Court of Appeals, it was accompanied by a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan
Del Carmen, Vice-President Human Resources and Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services of PAL, respectively, who are not parties to the case.
The certification, however, was without proof that the two affiants had authority to sign in behalf of petitioners. As a result, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the case for failure to show the authority of affiants to sign for PAL and for failure of the other petitioners to join in the
execution of the certification. A motion for reconsideration was filed with a Secretary’s Certificate attached evidencing that affiants Cesar R.
Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen have been authorized by Board Resolution No. 00-02-03 to initiate and/or cause to be filed on behalf of PAL
petitions and pleadings in all labor-related cases. As to the other petitioners, it was argued that they are mere nominal parties so that their
failure to execute the certification does not justify dismissal of the petition. Despite this submission, the Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the case is now before this Court.
The petition is without merit.
The necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing petitions for certiorari is found in Rule 65, Section 1, in relation to Rule 46,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. These provisions require it to be executed by the corresponding petitioner or petitioners. As no distinction is
made as to which party must execute the certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both natural and juridical entities.1 When the
petitioner is a corporation, the certification should be executed by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be called upon to
execute the certification, although such a person may have personal knowledge of the facts to be attested to. 2
This Court has explained that a corporation has no power except those conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or
incidental to its existence. The exercise of these powers is done through the board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents.
Given these corporate features, the power of a corporation to sue in any court is generally lodged with the board of directors. The board, in
turn, can delegate the physical acts needed to sue, which may be performed only by natural persons, to its attorneys-in-fact by a board
resolution, if not already authorized under the corporate by-laws.3
Thus, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a
corporation. In addition, the Court has required that proof of said authority must be attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum
shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority.4
The petition filed with the Court of Appeals had a certification of non-forum shopping executed by Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen.
The certification, however, was without proof of authority to sign. When a motion for reconsideration was filed, a Secretary’s Certificate was
submitted as proof that the board of directors of PAL had authorized the two to execute the certificate. Nonetheless, the Court finds that this
belated submission is an insufficient compliance with the certification requirement.
120
This Court has allowed the reinstatement of petitions that were dismissed due to lack of proof of authority to sign the certification upon its
subsequent submission, saying that this amounted to
substantial compliance. The rationale was that the signatories, at the time of execution of the certification, were in fact authorized to sign,
although proof of their authority was lacking.5
This is not what happened in this case. A perusal of the Secretary’s Certificate submitted reveals that the authority to cause the filing of the
petition was granted on February 15, 2000.6 The petition, on the other hand, was filed on January 24, 2000 and was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals on January 31, 2000. This means that at the time the certification was signed, Cesar R. Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen were not duly
authorized by the Board of Directors of PAL and, consequently, their signing and attestations were not in representation of PAL. This
effectively translates to a petition that was filed without a certification at all as none was issued by PAL, the principal party to the case.
The required certification of non-forum shopping must be valid at the time of filing of the petition. An invalid certificate cannot be remedied by
the subsequent submission of a Secretary’s Certificate that vests authority only after the petition had been filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
121
G.R. No. 157195. April 22, 2005
VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARMELITA V. LIM, Petitioners,

vs.
FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (now BPI LEASING CORPORATION), Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once more, the Court stresses that procedural rules must be used to promote, not obstruct, substantial justice. The failure to attach the
Resolution authorizing herein individual petitioner to represent herein corporate petitioner is, under the circumstances, excusable. The
immediate correction of the defect should have been deemed sufficient compliance with the rules.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside two Resolutions2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 23, 20023 and February 7, 2003,4 in CA-GR SP No. 73117. The earlier Resolution reads:
"The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of proper verification and certification against forum shopping as the same was
executed by Carmelita V. Lim, one of the petitioners, without showing any authority from petitioner corporation to sign for and on its behalf."5
The second assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s
Certificate."
The Facts
This controversy originated from a Complaint6 for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein
petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing
Corporation) and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a Complaint 7 against Vicar,
Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.
These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged in the construction business, for the purchase of
certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans, Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back" provision were executed by the parties. In those
Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them back.8 For the
total loan of ₱30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid FEB an aggregate amount of ₱19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.
Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about ₱22,000,000, despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-
three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an aggregate area of 20,300 square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the
corporation as additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced ₱17,000,000 which, Vicar claims, should have been applied
to its loans.
In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to the possession/custody of eight (8) units of the
subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002, the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and
denied the latter’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order dated September 30, 2002, the RTC
denied the corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.
On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued
against the subject equipment.
The Petition was, however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2002, because the Verification and
the Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to
sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation.
On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Admission of the Attached Secretary’s Certificate." Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion in this wise:
"The belated filing by the petitioners of the Certification of their Corporate Secretary, to the effect that petitioner Carmelita Lim has been duly
authorized by petitioner corporation to file the subject petition for certiorari, did not cure the defect of said petition. Absent any compelling
122
reason for petitioners’ failure to comply at the first instance with the required certification, we cannot, therefore, accept their subsequent
compliance."9
Hence, this Petition.10
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"A.
Whether compelling reasons exist which warrant the liberal construction of the Petition for Certiorari.
"B.
Whether petitioners’ subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.
"C.
Whether the policy of the law is to afford a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his case." 11
In short, the principal issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition for Certiorari.
The present Petition for Review is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Summary Dismissal
Petitioners assert that Carmelita V. Lim was duly authorized to execute, for and on behalf of Vicar, the Verification and Certification against
forum shopping. Attached to the Petition and signed by Petitioner Lim was the Verification/Certification, in which was explicitly stated the
authorization and affirmation, as follows:
"x x x. I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc. x x x."
This statement was supported by Vicar’s board of directors, who unanimously approved a Resolution dated October 2, 2002, which reads thus:
"NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Corporation be authorized to file a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals for the purpose of annulling or setting aside the Orders dated 2 August 2002 and 30 September 2002 rendered by Branch 150
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in connection with Civil Case No. 02-357 entitled ‘FEB Leasing & Finance Corporation, Plaintiff vs. Vicar
International Construction, Inc. et al., Defendants.’
"RESOLVED further, that the President/General Manager Carmelita V. Lim is hereby authorized to execute and sign any and all documents
necessary for filing of the Petition for Certiorari, including the verification and certification against forum shopping.’"12
Petitioners candidly admit that they inadvertently failed to attach the above Resolution to their CA Petition. In preparing the Petition, their
counsel supposedly worked overnight without sleep. She wanted to file it immediately to avoid the trial court’s quashal of their counterbond
and, thus, the immediate seizure of their equipment -- their only means of livelihood.
Their counsel allegedly believed in good faith that the secretary’s Certificate was attached to the Petition. When they received a copy of the
October 23, 2002 CA Resolution on November 11, 2002, they lost no time in filing the following day their "Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s Certificate."
Petitioners submit that the foregoing circumstances constitute compelling reasons to justify setting aside the procedural defect, pursuant
to Ramos v. Court of Appeals.13
Further, citing Yap v. Baldado,14 they contend that their posthaste submission of the secretary’s Certificate, albeit after the filing of their
Petition, constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Finally, they aver that pursuant to the policy of the law to afford
parties the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, the CA should have given due course to their Petition.
123
On the other hand, Respondent FEB asserts that the CA’s dismissal of the Petition -- arising from petitioners’ failure to attach a duly executed
verification and certification against forum shopping -- is well within the appellate court’s authority, pursuant to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 46 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Respondent also claims that petitioners’ present action before this Court seeks to correct a perceived
erroneous application by the CA of a procedural rule that is not correctible by certiorari.
Finally, respondent alleges that the instant Petition, being based on the ground of excusable negligence, is actually a motion for new trial. As
such, the Petition must allegedly fail, because petitioners did not execute and attach an affidavit of merits.
The issue before us is not novel; neither are the factual circumstances that gave rise to it.
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,16 the petitioner had not attached any proof that its resident manager was authorized to sign the
Verification and the non-forum shopping Certification, as a consequence of which the Petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Subsequent to the dismissal, however, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, to which was already attached a Certificate issued by
its board secretary who stated that, prior to the filing of the Petition, the resident manager had been authorized by the board of directors to
file the Petition.
Citing several cases17 excusing noncompliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping, the Court held that "with more
reason should x x x the instant petition [be allowed,] since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to
show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so." The Court further said that the subsequent submission of the Secretary’s Certificate,
attesting that the signatory to the certification was authorized to file the action on behalf of petitioner, mitigated the oversight.
Similarly, in General Milling Corporation v. NLRC,18 the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition, which was not accompanied by any board
resolution or certification by the corporate secretary showing that the person who had signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was
duly authorized to represent the petitioner-corporation in the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the petitioner attached a
board Resolution stating that the signatory of the Certification had been duly authorized to do so.
Under those circumstances, the Court held that "there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the
prescribed procedural requirements," except that the petition "was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretary’s certificate that the
person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case." 19
Also, in BA Savings Bank v. Sia,20 the Court of Appeals denied due course to a Petition for certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank. The CA’s action
was grounded on the fact that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the Petition had been signed merely by the bank’s
counsel, not by a duly authorized representative, as required under Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. Subsequently filed by the petitioner
was a Motion for Reconsideration, to which was attached a Certificate issued by the corporate secretary. The Certificate showed that the
Resolution promulgated by the board of directors had authorized the lawyers of petitioner "to represent it in any action or proceeding before
any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the certificate of non-forum shopping," among others. Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals denied the Motion on the ground that Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 "requires that it is the petitioner, not the counsel,
who must certify under oath to all of the facts and undertakings required therein."
The Court again reversed the appellate court and ruled thus:
"Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. We see no circumvention of this
rationale if the certificate was signed by the corporation’s specifically authorized counsel, who had personal knowledge of the matters
required in the Circular. In Bernardo v. NLRC,21 we explained that a literal interpretation of the Circular should be avoided if doing so would
subvert its very rationale. Said the Court:
‘x x x. Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be
interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping.’"22
Guided by the above pronouncements, the Court deems it proper and justifiable to grant the present Petition. Clearly, petitioners did not
deliberately ignore SC Circular 28-91. In fact, a "Verification/Certification," stating the information required under the Circular, was attached to
the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. In that Verification/Certification signed by Petitioner Lim, she attested as follows:
"1. x x x I am likewise duly authorized to execute this Verification/Certification in behalf of petitioner Vicar International Construction, Inc.
"2. In my personal capacity and as a duly authorized representative of Vicar International Construction, Inc., I caused the preparation of the
foregoing Petition for Certiorari."
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lim’s authority from Vicar to execute the said
Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretary’s Certificate attesting to the fact
124
that, indeed, Petitioner Vicar’s board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president and
general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and "to execute and sign x x x the verification and certification against forum shopping."
The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution
-- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of
Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due
to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretary’s Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.
In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. 23 Rules of procedure are
but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 73117 with deliberate speed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
125
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 73039 October 9, 1987
PERFECTA CAVILI, PRIMITIVO CAVILI and QUIRINO CAVILI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. TEODORO N. FLORENDO, Presiding Judge, Branch XXXVI, Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, 7th Judicial Region, CLARITA CAVILI,
ULPIANO CAVILI, ESTRELLA CAVILI, PLACIDA CAVILI, ET AL., respondents.
No. L-68680 October 9, 1987
PERFECTA CAVILI, PRIMITIVO CAVILI and QUIRINO CAVILI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. TEODORO N. FLORENDO, Presiding Judge, Branch XXXVI, Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, CLARITA CAVILI, ULPIANO CAVILI,
ESTRELLA CAVILI, PLACIDA CAVILI, GREGORIA CAVILI, FORTUNATA CAVILI, AMILITA CAVILI, APAD CAVILI, AQUILINA CAVILI, CRESENCIO
CAVILI, ALMA CAVILI, ET AL., respondents.
No. L-57771 October 9, 1987
QUIRINO CAVILI, PRIMITIVO, CAVILI, and PERFECTA CAVILI, petitioners,

vs.
HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental; ULPIANO CAVILI, CLARITA CAVILI,
ESTRELLA CAVILI, RAMONA TAKANG COSME TAKANG FABIAN TAKANG, LEODEGARIO TAKANG ET AL., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review and set aside two orders of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, namely: (1) the order dated October
11, 1985, disqualifying Perfects Cavili dela Cruz as a witness in Civil Case No. 6880 entitled "Clarita Cavili, et al. v. Perfecta Cavili, Quirino Cavili,
and Primitivo Cavili" and (2) the order dated November 26, 1985, refusing to reconsider the previous orders of disqualification and resetting
the reception of evidence for the defendants to December 19 and 20, 1985 with a warning that should defendants' witnesses fail to appear in
court on said date, they will be deemed to have waived their right to be witnesses in this case.
The private respondents filed Civil Case No. 6880 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against herein petitioners for Partition,
Accounting, and Damages. After the case was raffled to Branch I presided over by Judge Augusto S. Villarin, summons was issued to the three
petitioners, all at Bayawan Negros Oriental which was the address indicated in the complaint.
After trying to effect service, the process server went back to the court with the following return of service to Quirino and Primitivo Cavili not
contacted, according to Perfecta Cavili, subject persons is (sic) staying in Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental."
Meanwhile, Atty. Jose P. Alamino filed a motion for extension to answer in behalf of the defendants, manifesting the representation of his
client Perfecta Cavili that she will inform her brothers Primitivo and Quirino about the case.
The defendants, however, failed to file their answer within the request period and upon motion of the plaintiffs, the defendants were declared
in default, and on October 5, 1979, a judgment by default was promulgated by Judge Augusto S. Villarin.
The records of the case, however, show that a Manifestation was filed by Atty. Jose P. Alamino informing the court that since he never met
Primitivo and Quirino Cavili, who are residents of another province, he desisted from further appearing in the case in their behalf.
On November 7, 1979, Atty. Jose P. Alamillo received a copy of the decision. On December 7, 1979, he filed a motion for new trial in behalf of
the defendants on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and, with a meritorious defense that the properties sought to be partitioned have already
been the subject of a written partition agreement between the direct heirs of the late Bernardo Cavili who are the predecessors of the parties
in this case. In/an order dated April 23, 1980, the court granted said motion.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting new trial and at the same time prayed that a writ of execution be issued
but only in so far as defendant Perfecta Cavili was concerned.
In an order dated July 21, 1981, Judge Cipriano Vamenta of Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental to whom the case had
been assigned after a re-raffle, set aside the order of April 23, 1980 and directed the execution of the October 5, 1979 decision without
qualification ruling that the petitioners' remedy should have been appeal rather than new trial.
126
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on August 11, 1981, the defendants, now petitioners, brought the case to this Court
through a petition for certiorari, G.R. No. 57771, entitled "Quirino Cavili, et al., Petitioners vs. Hon. Cipriano Vamenta, et al., Respondents "
On May 31, 1982, this Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Our resolution dismissing the petition is hereby reconsidered; the petition is granted; and the order dated
July 21, 1981, is set aside while that of April 23, 1980, is revived. (No special pronouncement as to costs. Rollo p. 21)
Thereafter, the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 6880 was scheduled on October 9, 10, and 11, 1985 before Branch XXXVI of the Regional
Trial Court, presided by respondent Judge Teodoro N. Florendo. The defendants, (now petitioners), presented Perfects Cavili dela Cruz as their
first witness. The respondents, through counsel moved for her disqualification as a witness on the ground that having been declared in default,
Perfects Cavili has lost her standing in court and she cannot be allowed to participate in all premise the even as a witness. The court, through
the respondent judge, sustained the respondents' contention and disqualified her from testifying.
The petitioners, through counsel, moved for a reconsideration of the ruling.
On November 26, 1985, the lower court issued an order denying reconsideration of its Order dated October 11, 1985 disqualifying Perfecta
Cavili dela Cruz as a witness in Civil Case No. 6880.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Perfecta Cavili's competence as a witness is put in issue by the private respondents.
Section 18, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states who are qualified to be witnesses. It provides:
Section 18. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who, having organs of sense, can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons interested in the
outcome of a case shall be excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor any person on account of his opinion on matters of
religious belief.
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualifications based on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a
rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law
does not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception,
exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. (In Re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167) As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. (Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 90) The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.
The respondents, however, cite Section 2, Rule 18 on Defaults, to wit:
Section 2. Effect of order of default. — Except as provided in section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings nor to take part in the trial.
They advance the argument that to allow Perfecta Cavili to stand as witness would be to permit a party in default "to take part in the trial."
An explanation of the Rule is in order.
Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an order of default. Thus, a party declared in default is considered out of court and cannot
appear therein, adduce evidence, and be heard and for that reason he is not entitled to notice. (Rule 18, Rules of Court; Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 80
Phil. 166) However, "loss of pending" must be understood to mean only the forfeiture of one's rights as a party litigant, contestant or legal
adversary. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses. He has
no right to expect that his pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor may he object to or refute evidence or motions filed against him.
There is nothing in the rule, however, which contemplates a disqualification to be a witness or a opponent in a case. Default does not make
him an incompetent.
127
As opposed to a party litigant, a witness is merely a beholder, a spectator or onlooker, called upon to testify to what he has seen, heard, or
observed. As such, he takes no active part in the contest of rights between the parties. Cast in the cited role of witness, a party in default
cannot be considered as " a part in the trial." He remains suffering the effects of an order of default.
A party in default may thus be cited as a witness by his co-defendants who have the standing and the right to present evidence which the
former may provide. The incidental benefit giving the party in default the opportunity to present evidence which may eventually redound to
his advantage or bring about a desired result, through his co-defendants, is of minor consequence.
Of greater concern or importance in allowing the presence of Perfecta Cavili as a witness in the case at bar, is the preservation of the right of
petitioners Quirino and Primitivo Cavili to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in their behalf. To reject Perfects
Cavili's presentation of testimonial evidence would be to treat Primitivo and Quirino, as if they too were in default. There is no reason why the
latter should also be made to bear the consequences of Perfecta's omission. Moreover, we cannot deprive Quirino and Primitivo of the only
instrument of proof available to them, as Perfecta alone has been in possession and administration of the claim.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order of the respondent court disqualifying. Perfects Cavili dela
Cruz as a witness in Civil Case No. 6880 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the court a quo for Wither proceedings. The temporary
restraining order issued on January 6, 1986 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
128
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to
and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the
motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi
vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages.2While the present case is an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's
fees arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe
rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is
not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint
was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as
merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only
of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled
out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an
investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on
October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12,
1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of
damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
129
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages
alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the
damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it
was held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the
court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended
complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show
clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages
as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is
no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in
this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body
of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the
anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment
of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
130
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law
Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee
has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL,
and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in
the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said
objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records
of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial
court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to
reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates
of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of
Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the
same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by
private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,
issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact
amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein
a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint
however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same
constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the
reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
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On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total
claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment
of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private
respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional
docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private
respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be
recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising
therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation
vs. CA, 4 as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time
said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the
ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket
fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of
P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the
additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the
Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to
the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition
for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be
filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's
declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting
the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period
after the proclamation as provided therefor by law.10However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the
date when it was mailed.
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Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint.
However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending
before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name
of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should
be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to
plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the
amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the
plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the
amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended
complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may
determine, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The
opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the
additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the
amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was
not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the
action is also one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended
complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million
paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale
of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to
pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during
the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and
sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the
complaint as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be
assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the
prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of
another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint
was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On
November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for.
This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount
of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original complaint duly
filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken
by the trial court were declared null and void.13
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The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court
together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total
amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for
the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the
docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less
than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00
based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his
total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for
the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70,
petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the
docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in
Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the
respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a
matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter,
if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine
the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint
and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989
NG SOON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
Braulio R. G. Tansinsin for petitioner.
Augusto Gatmaytan for private respondent Billie T. Gan.
Del Rosario, Lim, Telan, De Vera & Vigilia for China Banking Corp.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (L-75919, May 7, 1987,
149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11 August 1988, ordered (1) that petitioner's Complaint below (in Civil Case No. Q-52489), for
reconstitution of a savings account, and payment of damages and attorney's fees, be expunged; and (2) that the case be dismissed. He also
denied, on 21 October 1988, the reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order.
The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are
respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon, claims to be the latter's widow.
The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as follows:
2. During his lifetime, Mr. Gan Bun Yaw opened Savings Account No. 17591-2 with CBC wherein he deposited P900,000.00
more or less.
3. Before his death on January 3, 1987 he lapsed into a coma until he finally took his last breath. But his passbook still
showed a deposit of P900,000.00 more or less.
xxx xxx xxx
5. For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit passbook with the help of her children to no avail.
xxx xxx xxx
7. She discovered further that aforesaid savings account was closed by defendant CBC on December 8, 1988. x x x.
8. She discovered finally that defendant Billie T. Gan connived and colluded with the officers and officials of CBC to
withdraw all of the aforesaid savings account of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw by forging his signature. This has to be done because Mr.
Gan Bun Yaw slipped into a comatose condition in the hospital and could not sign any withdrawal slip.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she
suffered actual damages in the form of missing money in aforesaid savings account and expenses of litigation.
12. Due also to the unfounded and malicious refusal of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she suffered moral
damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.
13. Due likewise to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she
suffered exemplary damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.
14. Due finally to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to heed her just and valid demands, she was
constrained to hire the services of counsel, binding herself to pay the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her,
thereby suffering to the tune thereof.
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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court render judgment:
1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to reconstitute Savings Account No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr. Gan
Bun Yaw in the amount of P900,000.00 with interest from December 8,1977 or ordering them both to pay her the principal
and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and severally.
2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00.
3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorney's fees equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or
payable to her, but not less than P50,000.00.
She prays for such other and further relief to which she may be entitled in law and equity under the premises. [Emphasis
supplied] (pp. 11-13, Rollo)
For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees.
Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the
Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees.
On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint." He explained:
It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as impliedly specifying the amount (namely, P900,000.00, more
or less) of what is referred to in its par. 11 as 'missing money 'which apparently is the main part of the alleged actual
damages), the body of the complaint does not specify the following, to wit: the amount of the rest of the alleged actual
damages; the amount of the alleged moral damages; the amount of the alleged exemplary damages; and, the amount of
the alleged attorney's fees. As regards the alleged attorney's fees, in particular, the clause 'the amount equivalent to
twenty percent payable to her' is vague and indefinite. It leaves to guesswork the determination of the exact amount
relative to which the 'twenty percent' shall be reckoned. Is it the amount of P900,000.00, more or less? Or is it the total
amount of all the actual damages? Or is it the grand total amount of all the damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable
to her'?
As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be regarded as specific enough as to the principal sum of P900,000.00
as actual damages, it cannot be so regarded with respect to the amount of moral and exemplary damages (No. 2 of the
prayer) and attorney's fees (No. 3 of the prayer); for, evidently, the phrase 'not less than P50,000.00' in each of Nos. 2 and
3 of the prayer merely fixes the minimum amount, but it does not mean that plaintiff is not praying for an unspecified sum
much higher than said minimum. And, again, the clause 'equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or
payable to her' in No. 3 of the prayer is as vague and indefinite as the similar clause found in the complaint's body referred
to earlier. What exactly is the amount relative to which the 'twenty percent' shall be determined? Is it the amount of
P900,000.00, more or less? Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages? Or is it the grand total amount of all the
damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable to her'? Certainly, the great difference between any of these amounts, on
the one hand, and the amount of P50,000.00 in the phrase 'not less than P50,000.00' in No. 3 of the prayer, on the other
hand, is quite too obvious to need underscoring.
Needless to state, implicit in the obligation to specify is the duty to be clear and definite. A purported specification which is
vague and indefinite obviously is no specification at all; indeed, it will serve no purpose other than to evade the payment of
the correct filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fees.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants defendants' aforesaid 'MOTION TO EXPUNGE COMPLAINT and hereby denies
plaintiffs aforesaid 'URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION (ETC.)' and 'OPPOSITION (ETC.)' inclusive of all the prayers contained
therein and, accordingly, plaintiff's complaint herein is hereby deemed EXPUNGED from the record. Further, being
rendered moot and academic as a result hereof, defendant Billie T. Gan's 'MOTION TO DISMISS' dated April 25,1988 and
defendant China Banking Corporations' 'MOTION TO DISMISS' dated May 25,1988 are hereby dismissed. (pp. 16-18, Rollo)
Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order having been denied, she asks for its review, more properly for a Writ of Certiorari.
The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:
1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by respondent Judge; and
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2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the Complaint expunged from the record
although petitioner had paid the necessary filing fees.
During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others, that petitioner is an impostor and not the real
Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs. Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as shown by a Certificate issued on 27 April
1989 by, and bearing the seal of, the An Hai Municipal Government.
This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner in her "Sur-rejoinder to Manifestation" filed on 12 August 1989, to which respondent Gan
has countered with a Reply on 9 September 1989.
We resolved to give due course to the Petition and dispensed with the submittal of Memoranda, the issues having been thoroughly threshed
out by the parties.
Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition.
It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the
complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any pleading
that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record.
While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00
as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees
payable.
Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of interest
demanded was not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly implies that the specification of the interest rate
is not that indispensable.
Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The sums claimed were ascertainable, sufficient
enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141, section 5(a).
Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not be initially stated with mathematical
precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal "more or less." Thus:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court,
the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.
In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally
paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial payment of the filing fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved.
.... there is merit in petitioner's claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 5(a) clearly contemplates a situation
where an amount is alleged or claimed in the complaint but is less or more than what is later proved. If what is proved is
less than what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is
subject to adjustment is the differencein the fee and not the whole amount (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., et als., vs.
Court of Appeals, et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).
Significantly, too, the pattern in Manchester to defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the intent not to pay the same having been
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent in this case.
Petitioner demonstrated her willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P 3,600.00. She had also asked the lower
Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said Court did not heed her plea.
Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion et al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this
Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule when it held, inter alia,:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (Italics ours).
In respect of the questioned Identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter falling within the competence of the Court a quo, this Court not
being a trier of facts.
137
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge, dated 11 August 1988 and 21 October 1988, are SET ASIDE, and he is hereby directed to
reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for determination and proper disposition of the respective claims and rights of the parties, including the
controversy as to the real identity of petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
138
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas,
respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, 1 three
(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 ) were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants,
docketed as follows:
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209
2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial Court, presided over by Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was
assigned to Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus Matas.
The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership
being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3)
having himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals
therefor, but these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit.
The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped by them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:
1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;
2 ) Actual damages, as proven;
3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix ;
4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;" 4
and
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.
The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for,"
immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire phrase read, "
P5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven. 5
Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common counsel .6 Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not
acquired jurisdiction of the case —
139
. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ... Supreme
Court dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;"
and
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in
dispute.
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but ordered the expunction of the "allegations in paragraph 11 of the ...
complaint regarding moral as well as nominal damages . 7 On motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered the striking out, too, of
the "handwritten amount of 'P5,000. 00 as and for.' including the typewritten words 'actual damages as proven' ... in sub-paragraph b of
paragraph 4 in the conclusion and prayer of the complaint ..." 8
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209 were also denied in separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial
Fernandez. 9 His Order in Case No. 2209 dated March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the "action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and
Attorney's fees ... (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b) that the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages "are only one
aspect of the cause of action," and (c) because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they
should be "expunged from the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in the rendition of the Orders above described, the defendants in all
three (3) actions have filed with this Court a "Joint Petition" for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be annulled and respondent judges directed to
dismiss all the complaints "without prejudice to private respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7."
The joint petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral
and nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in question-indeed, the respondent Clerk
of Court should not have accepted the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to expunge the claims for
damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for "reivindicatoria" remain for trial" by itself. 10
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 1-88 (effective January 1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders
thereto attached 11 were not certified by the proper Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative. Certification was made by the
petitioners' counsel, which is not allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important reason. It fails to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent Judges in rendering the Orders complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any proper cause for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus. On the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the law to the admitted facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the
actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an
accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages
allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action
for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, 12 or for partition or condemnation of,
or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property 13 - in other words, a real action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts." 14 The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The
rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be
immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of
personal property, 15 or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the amount claimed, 17 or the value of the personal property,
is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions
at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562
(May 7, 1987), has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since
been clarified and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38,
February 13, 1989.
140
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount of
damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the
docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee." The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court,
the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule
that subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing
awards of claims not specified in the pleading - i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading-as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the
property in litigation or the value of the estate," on the other. 18 There are, in other words, as already above intimated, actions or proceedings
involving real property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, account thereof being taken merely for
assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in
which the value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside from being the basis for fixing
the corresponding docket fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise
statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are
unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the
fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim,
but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed
fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in
the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as
of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain
of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably
141
has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying
claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which
no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints
so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
142
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and
THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente for petitioners.

Camilo L. Sabio for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific performance with damages is presented by this petition for
prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the
prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental
complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise
denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of
P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that
private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and
supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 1 a similar case involving an action for specific performance with damages, this
Court held that the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in
computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific
performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket
fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount of exemplary damages being sought, the
complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of
the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the
private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs.
Judge Asuncion 2 in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor
shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for
exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being
sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
143
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims
not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of
the complaint or any pleading, should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective
damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to
the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of
exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or
on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise
amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period. 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the claim for exemplary damages in the
amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to
private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
144
G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and JOSE N.
QUEDDING, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32472 entitled "Eden
Ballatan., et. al., plaintiffs-appellees v. Gonzalo Go and Winston Go, appellants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants v. Li Ching Yao, et. al., third-
party defendants."1
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42) square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. The parties herein are
owners of adjacent lots located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square
meters in area, is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. 2 Lots Nos. 25 and 26,
with an area of 415 and 313 square meters respectively, are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. 3 On Lot No. 25, respondent
Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters in area, and is registered in
the name of respondent Li Ching Yao. 4
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence and side
pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. 5 Her building
contractor formed her that the area of her lot was actually less than that described in the title. Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of
this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house, including its fence and pathway,
were built within the parameters of his father's lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the
Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the IAI to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area received from them.
The AIA authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few meters and that of
respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away, increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared that he made a verification
survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been in their proper position. He,
however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary
walls. 6
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot No. 24 lost approximately
25 square meters on its eastern boundary that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area;
that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western boundary. 7 In short, Lots Nos. 25,
26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and dismantle their
improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties including Li Ching Yao, however, met several times to reach an agreement
one matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on April 1, 1986,
petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court,
Malabon, Branch 169. The Go' s filed their "Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li Ching
Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners. It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No. 24, demolish
their improvements and pay petitioner Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. It dismissed the third-party
complaint against: (1) AIA after finding that the lots sold to the parties were in accordance with the technical description a verification plan
covered by their respective titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding, there being no privity of relation between him and respondents Go and his erroneous
survey having been made at the instance of AIA, not the parties; and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any wrong in the
subject encroachment. 8 The court made the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter:
145
1. To demolish and remove all improvements existing and encroaching on plaintiff's lot;
2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of the encroached area to the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the following:
a) P7,800.00 for the expenses paid to the surveyors;
b) P5,000.00 for plaintiffs' transportation;
4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the current market value of the subject
matter in litigation at the time of execution; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
The third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go against third-party defendants Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the
third-party complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go
to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao
to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It
also ordered Jose Quedding to pay respondents Go attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the dismissal of the third-
party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is concerned but modified in all other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the reasonable value of the forty-two (42) square
meters of their lot at the time of its taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is hereby ordered to pay defendants-appellants the reasonable value of the thirty-
seven (37) square meters of the latter's lot at the time of its taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding is hereby ordered to pay to defendants-appellants the amount of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for further proceedings and reception of
evidence for the determination of the reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:
1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN UTTER DISREGARD AND IN VIOLATION OR
GROSS IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY RIGHTS TO HEREIN PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO APPLY/USE EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY BUT IN EFFECT A VERY APPARENT PARTIALITY AND FAVOR TO RESPONDENTS
GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE
AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE IN
VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED UNDER THE LAW AS THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH TORRENS
TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ANY FILING OR DOCKET FEE.
146
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY EXPENSES IN PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS
CASE. 10
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose
Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaint should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack
of jurisdiction due to third-party plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint filed was
for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession of real property which is a real action. The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is
filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. 11 In real actions, the docket and filing
fees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any 12 If the complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at
the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription. 13 Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not, the court,
although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompnying claim for damages. 14 Accordingly,
the court may expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege the
precise amount of damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fee. 15 If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. 16 The
same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings. 17
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to the complaint. The third-party
complaint sought the same remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's fees and costs without specifying their
amounts, thus:
ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against Third-Party Defendants Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching
Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for whatever is adjudged against the latter
in favor of the Plaintiffs;
3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees as may be proved during trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered to pay the costs.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for. 18
The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the trial court without the requisite payment of filing fees, particularly on the Go's
prayer for damages. 19 The trial court did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the third-party complaint. The Court of Appeals,
however, granted the third-party complaint in part by ordering third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum of P5,000.00
as attorney's fees.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeal did not err in awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for
and pay the corresponding additional filing fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award. 20
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five (45), as initially found by the
trial court; that this forty-two (42) square meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24 belonging to petitioners; that this said
portion is found the concrete fence and pathway that extends from respondent Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of
the subject portion, respondents Go did not gain nor lose any portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No. 27, on which respondent Li
Ching Yao built his house, encroached on the land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven (37) square meters of the latter's
land.21
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA.. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas
was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that
triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He
built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they
encroached petitioners' lot. They are deemed builders in good faith 22 until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of their encroachment
on her property.23
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the other parties did. 24 He constructed his house in 1982, respondents Go in
1983, and petitioners in 1985. 25 There is no evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching Yao was aware that when he built his
147
house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's adjoining land. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. 26
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the appropriate
provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and
548, 27 or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building
or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.
The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the building, planting or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in the
proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to
purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land,
otherwise the owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the
land if its value considerably more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to
the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The
right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement stands to the builder, planter
or sower, is given to the owner of the land. 28
Art. 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the adjoining
owner. 29 The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Cabral v. Ibanez, 30 to wit:
[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their house in the belief that it was entirely
within the area of their own land without knowing at that time that part of their house was occupying a 14-square meter
portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the defendants, and that the defendants Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M.
Cabral were likewise unaware of the fact that a portion of plaintiff's house was extending and occupying a portion of their
lot with an area of 14 square meters. The parties came to know of the fact that part of the plaintiff's house was occupying
part of defendant's land when the construction of plaintiff's house was about to be finished, after a relocation of the
monuments of the two properties had been made by the U.S. Army through the Bureau of Lands, according to their
"Stipulation of Facts," dated August 17, 1951.
On the basis of these facts, we held that:
The court, therefore, concludes that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the relative rights of the defendant
Mamerta Cabral as owner of the land and of the plaintiffs as owners of the building is governed by Article 361 of the Civil
Code (Co Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off. Gaz.5514). Article 361 of the old Civil Code has been reproduced with an
additional provision in Article 448 of the new Civil Code, approved June 18, 1949. 31
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that:
Although without any legal and valid claim over the land in question, petitioners, however, were found by the Court of
Appeals to have constructed a portion of their house thereon in good faith. Under Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article
448 of the new), the owner of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the building, after payment to the builder of necessary or useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for
pure luxury or mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Respondents, as owners of the land,
have therefore the choice of either appropriating the portion of petitioners' house which is on their land upon payment of
the proper indemnity to petitioners, or selling to petitioners that part of their land on which stands the improvement. It
may here be pointed out that it would be impractical for respondents to choose to exercise the first alternative, i.e., buy
that portion of the house standing on their land, for in that event the whole building might be rendered useless. The more
workable solution, it would seem, is for respondents to sell to petitioners that part of their land on which was constructed
a portion of the latter's house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable to buy, then they must vacate the land and must pay
rentals until they do so. Of course, respondents cannot oblige petitioners to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the aforementioned portion of the house. If such be the case, then petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The
parties must come to an agreement as to the conditions of the lease, and should they fail to do so, then the court shall fix
the same. 33
148
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by respondents Go on their land,
or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then
petitioners may sell to respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy
the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel
respondents Go to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the value of the land is
much more than the Go's improvement, the respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then
they may go to court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market
value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the improvements were
built on the land. The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. The instant case is not for
expropriation. It is not a taking by the state of private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an
owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but fair and
just to fix compensation at the time of payment.34
Art. 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and respondent Li Ching
Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents Go's land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is modified as follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision their option to either buy the portion of respondents
Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which the improvement stands. If petitioners
elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the
improvement will render respondents Go's house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go.
If petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and
pay reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree
upon the terms, the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option, respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the time the parties
agree on the terms of the lease or until the court fixes such terms.
(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26, vis-a-visrespondent Li Ching Yao as builder
of the improvement that encroached on thirty seven (37) square meters of respondents Go 's land in accordance with paragraph one
abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to
respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.
(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing third-party complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
149
EN BANC
G.R. No. 166547 September 12, 2007
UMBRA M. TOMAWIS, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. NORA M. TABAO-CAUDANG, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84424, and
its Resolution2 dated December 20, 2004. The assailed Decision annulled and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao
del Sur, Branch 8, Marawi City, dated September 15, 2003 in Special Civil Action No. 820-02, as well as its Order4 and Writ of Execution5 dated
April 23, 2004.
Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On September 1, 1987, then Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) Executive Director Jiamil I.M. Dianalan (Dianalan) appointed6 Atty. Nora M. Tabao-
Caudang (Caudang) as Regional Director of Region XII-B, pursuant to Section 8 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 122-A, as amended by E.O. No.
295. At that time, the OMA staff and Regional Directors were not yet classified as Career Executive Service (CES) positions. Hence, the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) approved Caudang's appointment as permanent.
On February 18, 1991, the directorship positions in the OMA, including those of Regional Directors, were classified as CES positions thereby
requiring CES eligibility for permanent appointments. Said reclassification was embodied in CSC Resolution No. 94-2925 and CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 21, both dated May 13, 1994.
On February 4, 1993, Caudang received a notice7 that she had been replaced by Mr. Umbra Tomawis (Tomawis), the latter having been
appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos. Aggrieved, Caudang requested a ruling from the CSC on her status (of appointment) as Regional
Director. Before the CSC could resolve the matter, on April 29, 1993, Caudang filed a petition for quo warranto against Tomawis before this
Court, but the same was dismissed for lack of certification of non-forum shopping and verified statement of material dates, as required by
Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91.8
On January 4, 1994, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 94-00149 declaring Caudang's appointment as permanent. She was declared as the
lawful incumbent, giving her the right to recover the position through a petition for quo warranto before the appropriate court.
On the basis of the above resolution, on February 4, 1994, Caudang filed a petition for quo warranto docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33246. On
June 30, 1994, the CA granted Caudang's petition reinstating her to the position and ordering Tomawis to vacate and relinquish the
same.10 However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General, the CA reversed itself in an Amended Decision11 dated October
17, 1994, ruling that the petition should not have been entertained in the first place for being violative of the procedural rules on non-forum
shopping, given the identical petition Caudang earlier filed with this Court. On appeal before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari,
we denied the petition for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. The said denial had become final
and executory and the same was subsequently entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments. 12
Left with no other recourse, Caudang went to the CSC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution No. 94-0014. In
Resolution No. 96623113 dated September 23, 1996, the CSC denied Caudang's motion. The CSC noted that Caudang's petition for quo
warranto was dismissed by the CA, thus, the motion for execution must necessarily fail. The CSC likewise held that the services of Caudang
were terminated by the Chief Executive prior to the filing of the petition for quo warranto, thus, preventing the Commission from an inquiry
into the said separation from service effected by the President as the issue is reviewable only by the High Court.14 The CSC later denied
Caudang's motion for reconsideration.
On July 3, 1998, then OMA Executive Director Acmad Tomawis removed Tomawis from the contested position and appointed Engr. Dardagan
Maruhom in his stead. Tomawis did not challenge his removal and, instead, claimed terminal pay equivalent to his earned leave credits. He
was re-appointed to the same position on July 31, 2000 by then OMA Executive Director Ismael Naga, Jr. but his appointment was
characterized as temporary, because he did not possess the appropriate CES eligibility.
On December 18, 2001, then OMA Executive Director Habib Mujahab A. Hashim (Hashim) issued a Memorandum15 to Tomawis clarifying that
his appointment was merely temporary and that a new appointment may be issued either in his favor or to another qualified individual. He
was directed to start clearing himself of money, property and all other office accountabilities. On March 8, 2002, Hashim issued Office Order
No. 0079, series of 200216 reinstating Caudang to the contested position. Consequently, Tomawis was directed to vacate and formally
relinquish the position and turn over the office, along with its funds and properties, to Caudang.
150
Caudang then requested the CSC to issue an order affirming the continuity of her service from the time she was separated from service on
February 8, 1993 until her reinstatement in 2002. On July 29, 2002, the CSC denied Caudang's request in Resolution No. 021000.17 The CSC
held that Caudang's request had no legal basis because CSC Resolution No. 94-0014 (which was ostensibly the basis of Hashim's Office Order)
was, in effect, reversed by the Court of Appeals in its October 17, 1994 Amended Decision.18
Aggrieved by Hashim's order requiring him to vacate his position, Tomawis instituted an action for injunction and prohibition19 against
Caudang and Hashim before the RTC. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 820-02.
Tomawis likewise filed a verified complaint against Hashim for alleged violation of the "Anti-Graft Law" for issuing Office Order No. 0079. The
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission conducted a fact-finding inquiry and, acting on its recommendation, the Office of the President (OP)
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the reinstatement of Caudang was just and lawful pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 94-0014.20
Meanwhile, on September 15, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Tomawis, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant petition for Injunction and Prohibition is hereby granted for being highly
meritorious. Respondent OMA Executive Director Hon. HABIB MUJAHAB A. HASHIM or any person acting in his behalf is hereby
directed to cease, desist and refrain from enforcing office Order No. 0079, Series of 2002 dated March 8, 2002. Respondent Atty.
Nora T. Caudang is likewise ordered to cease, desist and refrain from further assuming the powers and functions of OMA Regional
Director, Region XII-B, Marawi City.
SO ORDERED.21
A copy of the decision was served on Caudang on September 24, 2003. The following day, Caudang filed a motion for reconsideration22 which
was denied23 on December 15, 2003. However, it appears from the records that Caudang never received a copy of the December 15 Order.24
On December 18, 2003, Caudang filed a Manifestation25 praying for the immediate dismissal of the case, attaching thereto a copy of the
Decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 2-J-523 and a Certification issued by the OMA Director for Administrative Services that
Caudang is the incumbent Regional Director of Region XII.26However, this Manifestation (which was really a motion for the dismissal of the
pending case) was not set for hearing. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order27 dated January 7, 2004 setting aside its September 15 and
December 15, decision and resolution, respectively, on the ground that the legal authority of Caudang as Regional Director was
administratively upheld by the OMA and the OP.
On January 16, 2004, Tomawis filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of the September 15 decision and December 15 order of the RTC
averring that they had become final and executory for failure of Caudang to appeal the same within the reglementary period. Caudang,
however, opposed the motion claiming that she had not been served a copy of the order denying her motion for reconsideration.
On April 23, 2004, the court granted28 the motion and the corresponding writ of execution29 was accordingly issued. On May 7, 2004, Caudang
moved30 to quash the writ which the court denied in an Order31 dated May 19, 2004.
Pursuant to the above writ of execution, then Undersecretary/OMA Executive Director Datu Zamzamin L. Ampatuan issued Office Order No.
04-27032 dated June 3, 2004 re-installing Tomawis to the contested position until the issuance of a new appointment either in his favor or to
other qualified applicant.
On June 9, 2004, Caudang elevated the matter to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity of the writ
of execution issued by the RTC on the ground that the decision sought to be executed did not attain finality. Caudang claimed that it was the
January 733 Order of the RTC that had, instead, become final and executory.
On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision in favor of Caudang, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City in Spl.
Cvl. Action No. 820-02 dated 15 September 2003, the Order dated 23 April 2004 and the Writ of Execution dated 23 April 2004 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Office Order No. 04-270, Series of 2004, issued by OMA Executive Director Zamzamin Ampatuan
directing the re-installation of respondent Umbra Tomawis as OMA Regional Director, Region XII-B, Marawi City is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Director Ampatuan is further directed to recognize petitioner ATTY. NORA TABAO-CAUDANG as the
legitimate holder/occupant of the office. Land Bank of the Philippines, Marawi Branch, through its bank officials, is directed to desist
from honoring checks and withdrawals signed/issued by respondent Tomawis. Respondent Umbra Tomawis is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from performing the functions of OMA Regional Director, Region XII-B, Marawi City and to surrender said office to
petitioner Caudang. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.34
The appellate court held that in both procedural and substantive aspects of the case, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion: first, the
September 15 Decision of the RTC never attained finality because Caudang had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for
151
reconsideration; the rule on constructive receipt of mails is not applicable because the envelope containing said resolution was marked "return
to sender"; second, the January 7 Order of the RTC is null and void for failure to comply with the procedural requirement of a valid hearing;
and third, the petition for injunction commenced by Tomawis is a disguised petition for quo warranto which should never have been
entertained because Tomawis had no legal standing to file the same since he held the contested position merely in a temporary capacity.
Tomawis' motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution35 dated December 20, 2004. Tomawis, now the petitioner, filed the instant
petition, and in his Memorandum,36 he raises the following issues:
(1).
DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF JUDGE ADIONG DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 2003.
(2).
DID NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD NO LEGAL RIG[H]T TO FILE SPL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 802-
02.
(3).
DID NOT THE RESPONDENT COMMIT MULTIPLE FORUM SHOPPING.37
In his memorandum, Tomawis claims that the CA erred in reviewing the merits of the RTC decision, as it was never raised as an issue before
the appellate court. He claims that the only issue elevated to the appellate court was whether or not the decision sought to be executed
attained finality in order to warrant the issuance of a writ of execution.38 Tomawis also insists that he has the legal personality to commence
the injunction case being the occupant of the contested position, albeit in a temporary capacity. 39 He further avers that the CA should not have
relied on the decision of the OP in OP Case No. 2-J-523 because it was in the nature of a forgotten evidence since the respondent failed to
present the same in her evidence-in-chief.40 Lastly, the petitioner argues that respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping in litigating her
claim before the CSC, the CA and this Court.41
The petition is without merit.
The first and second issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed together.
It must be understood that there are two RTC decisions involved in the present case, the second (January 7) entirely incompatible with the first
(September 15). From the factual circumstances surrounding this case, and as correctly held by the CA, the January 7 Order is null and void
because of an incurable procedural defect,42 i.e., it was never set for hearing. Thus, the only decision material to our consideration is the
September 15 Decision. Did the aforesaid decision attain finality to justify the issuance of a writ of execution? We answer in the negative.
Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. – Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by
registered mail. x x x.
Section 10 of the same Rule provides:
Completeness of service. – Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt
by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service, which is deemed complete upon expiration of five (5) days from the date
the addressee received the first notice from the postmaster. 43
Thus, there is constructive service by registered mail only if there is conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the
addressee and that such first notice had been delivered to and received by the addressee. The best evidence to prove that notice was sent
would be a certification from the postmaster to the effect that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how, when and to whom the
delivery was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered.44
In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the December 15 resolution. Neither was
there proof that a first notice was indeed received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice cannot apply. Accordingly, since the
152
respondent was not served a copy of the resolution, the decision could never attain finality. Consequently, there can be no valid basis for the
issuance of the writ of execution.
Before a writ of execution may issue, there must necessarily be a final judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding. The writ of
execution is the means by which a party can enforce a final judgment or order of the court. Absent a final judgment or order, there is nothing
to enforce or execute; thus, there can be no valid writ of execution.45
Aside from nullifying the questioned writ of execution, the CA also delved into the intrinsic validity of the September 15 decision of the RTC,
and Tomawis challenges the procedural propriety of such review by the appellate court.
It is true that in her petition before the CA, Caudang merely sought the nullification of the writ of execution for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. She did not raise as an issue the propriety of the RTC's decision granting the writ of injunction. But the procedural lapse, if
any, is of no great moment.
Be it remembered that in the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest
injustice. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Substantive rights must not be prejudiced by a
rigid and technical application of the rules. Indeed, when a case is impressed with public interest, we should relax the application of the rules.
The controversy between Tomawis and Caudang started in 1993. Several cases had been brought before both judicial and administrative
tribunals, and no final resolution had been reached. In the meantime, the legitimacy of the public officer who should occupy the position of
OMA Regional Director, Region XII-B, remains in question. Public service is compromised.
The RTC judge, who should have been resolute, proved to be indecisive. First, he ordered Hashim and Caudang to cease and desist from
enforcing Office Order No. 0079 and from occupying the position of Regional Director, respectively; then, in his clarificatory order, he declared
that his decision did not include the reinstatement of Tomawis to the position. This vacillating attitude only served to create a hiatus in public
service, totally repugnant to the basic rule that title to public office should not be subjected to continued uncertainty. In addition, as observed
by the CA, the RTC judge remained deafeningly silent on the alleged January 7 Order, neither confirming nor denying issuance of the same.
Moreover, the appellate court could not have simply turned a blind eye to the obvious blunder committed by the trial court in issuing the
injunctive writ. To overlook such a manifest mistake would have been inconsistent with substantial justice, and would have allowed a party to
unjustly benefit from a mistake or inadvertence of the trial court. Thus, the Rules reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public
duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, especially such as clearly demonstrate that the suitor has
no cause of action. The rule does not intend for the (appellate) court to sift the record and deal with questions which are of small importance,
but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and are of a controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in
the rule is to prevent the miscarriage of justice resulting from oversight.
On the merit of the RTC decision, we agree with the CA that Tomawis had no clear legal right to institute his petition for injunction. Indeed, the
Tomawis suit before the RTC was a thinly disguised petition for quo warranto, and not having any legal title to the position of Regional Director
(his temporary appointment having been terminated), he did not possess proper personality to file the action. 46
Even if the initiatory pleading filed by Tomawis before the RTC is truly a special civil action for injunction and prohibition, our conclusion
remains – he still had no clear legal right to institute the same.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.47 As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the
movant must show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) that the act against which injunction
is to be directed is a violation of such right.48A "clear legal right" means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter
of law.49 The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the acts sought to
be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage.50
The facts clearly show that Tomawis was appointed Regional Director. However, because he did not possess the requisite CES eligibility,
pursuant to established rules and jurisprudence, his appointment was characterized merely as temporary. His appointment papers dated July
31, 2000, specifically provided that his appointment was merely temporary. As such, he had no security of tenure.51 Upon the issuance of
Office Order No. 0079 appointing Caudang to the position, Tomawis' right to the position ceased to exist. Thus, he should have vacated and
relinquished the position and turned over the duties, funds and properties of the office to Caudang.
Accordingly, his petition for injunction should have been denied outright by the court. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the
injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.52
Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioner's claim that respondent is guilty of multiple forum shopping. There is forum shopping where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.53 True, respondent had previously
153
instituted quo warranto proceedings involving the same contested position, and her petitions had been dismissed with finality by this Court.
We, however, find that the issue in the instant case is based on a different set of facts.
This case was initiated by no less than the petitioner himself through a petition for injunction before the RTC in order to enjoin the
enforcement of Office Order No. 0079 which recognized the new appointment of the respondent thereby terminating his (petitioner's)
temporary appointment. The previous quo warranto actions instituted by the respondent were based on her appointment on September 1,
1987. On the other hand, the present action is based on her appointment on March 8, 2002. Although the issues in all of the cases brought to
this Court involve the rightful occupant of the contested position, the fact remains that the "appointments" are distinct from one another.
In view of all the foregoing, we hereby affirm the nullity of the writ of injunction issued by the RTC for failure of the petitioner to show clear
legal right to enjoin the enforcement of the office order. We likewise affirm the findings of the appellate court that the September 15 Decision
of the RTC never attained finality. Consequently, the corresponding writ of execution is null and void. Office Order No. 04-270 (installing
petitioner to the contested position) issued pursuant to the writ of execution is, likewise, annulled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 8, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its December 20, 2004 Resolution
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
154
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 89070 May 18, 1992
BENGUET ELECTRlC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
* respondents.
Raymundo W. Celino for respondent Peter Cosalan.
Reenan Orate for respondent Board of Directors of BENECO.
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of Petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Beneco"), having been elected as
such by the Board of Directors of Beneco, with the approval of the National Electrification Administrator, Mr. Pedro Dumol, effective 16
October 1982.
On 3 November 1982, respondent Cosalan received Audit Memorandum No. 1 issued by the Commission on Audit ("COA"). This Memorandum
noted that cash advances received by officers and employees of petitioner Beneco in the amount of P129,618.48 had been virtually written off
in the books of Beneco. In the Audit Memorandum, the COA directed petitioner Beneco to secure the approval of the National Electrification
Administration ("NEA") before writing off or condoning those cash advances, and recommended the adoption of remedial measures.
On 12 November 1982, COA issued another Memorandum — Audit Memorandum No. 2 –– addressed to respondent Peter Cosalan, inviting
attention to the fact that the audit of per diems and allowances received by officials and members of the Board of Directors of Beneco showed
substantial inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The Audit Memorandum once again directed the taking of immediate action in
conformity with existing NEA regulations.
On 19 May 1983, petitioner Beneco received the COA Audit Report on the financial status and operations of Beneco for the eight (8) month
period ended 30 September 1982. This Audit Report noted and enumerated irregularities in the utilization of funds amounting to P37 Million
released by NEA to Beneco, and recommended that appropriate remedial action be taken.
Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of Beneco and what appeared to be mismanagement, respondent Cosalan initiated
implementation of the remedial measures recommended by the COA. The respondent members of the Board of Beneco reacted by adopting a
series of resolutions during the period from 23 June to 24 July 1984. These Board Resolutions abolished the housing allowance of respondent
Cosalan; reduced his salary and his representation and commutable allowances; directed him to hold in abeyance all pending personnel
disciplinary actions; and struck his name out as a principal signatory to transactions of petitioner Beneco.
During the period from 28 July to 25 September 1984, the respondent Beneco Board members adopted another series of resolutions which
resulted in the ouster of respondent Cosalan as General Manager of Beneco and his exclusion from performance of his regular duties as such,
as well as the withholding of his salary and allowances. These resolutions were as follows:
1. Resolution No. 91-4 dated 28 July 1984:
. . . that the services of Peter M. Cosalan as General Manager of BENECO is terminated upon approval
of the National Electrification Administration;
2. Resolution No. 151-84 dated September 15, 1984;
. . . that Peter M. Cosalan is hereby suspended from his position as General Manager of the Benguet
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) effective as of the start of the office hours on September 24, 1984,
until a final decision has been reached by the NEA on his dismissal;
. . . that GM Cosalan's suspension from office shall remain in full force and effect until such suspension
is sooner lifted, revoked or rescinded by the Board of Directors; that all monies due him are withheld
until cleared;
3. Resolution No. 176-84 dated September 25, 1984;
155
. . . that Resolution No. 151-84, dated September 15, 1984 stands as preventive suspension for GM
Peter M. Cosalan. 1
Respondent Cosalan nevertheless continued to work as General Manager of Beneco, in the belief that he could be suspended or removed only
by duly authorized officials of NEA, in accordance with provisions of P.D. No, 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645 (the statute creating the NEA,
providing for its capitalization, powers and functions and organization), the loan agreement between NEA and petitioner Beneco 2 and the NEA
Memorandum of 2 July 1980. 3 Accordingly, on 5 October and 10 November 1984, respondent Cosalan requested petitioner Beneco to release
the compensation due him. Beneco, acting through respondent Board members, denied the written request of respondent Cosalan.
Respondent Cosalan then filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") on 5 December 1984 against respondent
members of the Beneco Board, challenging the legality of the Board resolutions which ordered his suspension and termination from the
service and demanding payment of his salaries and allowances. On 18 February 1985, Cosalan amended his complaint to implead petitioner
Beneco and respondent Board members, the latter in their respective dual capacities as Directors and as private individuals.
In the course of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, Cosalan filed a motion for reinstatement which, although opposed by petitioner
Beneco, was granted on 23 October 1987 by Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen. Petitioner Beneco complied with the Labor Arbiter's order on
28 October 1987 through Resolution No. 10-90.
On 5 April 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (a) confirming Cosalan's reinstatement; (b) ordering payment to Cosalan of his
backwages and allowances by petitioner Beneco and respondent Board members, jointly and severally, for a period of three (3) years without
deduction or qualification, amounting to P344,000.00; and (3) ordering the individual Board members to pay, jointly and severally, to Cosalan
moral damages of P50,000.00 plus attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the wages and allowances awarded him.
Respondent Board members appealed to the NLRC, and there filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner Beneco did not appeal, but moved to
dismiss the appeal filed by respondent Board members and for execution of judgment. By this time, petitioner Beneco had a new set of
directors.
In a decision dated 21 November 1988, public respondent NLRC modified the award rendered by the Labor Arbiter by declaring that petitioner
Beneco alone, and not respondent Board members, was liable for respondent Cosalan's backwages and allowances, and by ruling that there
was no legal basis for the award of moral damages and attorney's fees made by the Labor Arbiter.
Beneco, through its new set of directors, moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but without success.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Beneco's principal contentions are two-fold: first, that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion
in accepting and giving due course to respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal had been filed out of time; and second, that
the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding petitioner alone liable for payment of the
backwages and allowances due to Cosalan and releasing respondent Board members from liability therefor.
We consider that petitioner's first contention is meritorious. There is no dispute about the fact that the respondent Beneco Board members
received the decision of the labor Arbiter on 21 April 1988. Accordingly, and because 1 May 1988 was a legal holiday, they had only up to 2
May 1988 within which to perfect their appeal by filing their memorandum on appeal. It is also not disputed that the respondent Board
members' memorandum on appeal was posted by registered mail on 3 May 1988 and received by the NLRC the following day. 4 Clearly, the
memorandum on appeal was filed out of time.
Respondent Board members, however, insist that their Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time because it was delivered for mailing on 1
May 1988 to the Garcia Communications Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The Board members in effect contend that the date of
delivery to Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal memorandum.
Respondent Board member's contention runs counter to the established rule that transmission through a private carrier or letter-forwarder ––
instead of the Philippine Post Office –– is not a recognized mode of filing pleadings. 5The established rule is that the date of delivery of
pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of
actual receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading. 6
There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial justice and the prevention of serious miscarriage of justice that might have
justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day reglementary period for perfection of an appeal by the respondent Board members. Accordingly,
the applicable rule was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file
an appeal within the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and no longer subject to review. 7 The respondent
Board members had thus lost their right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have forthwith dismissed their
appeal memorandum.
There is another and more compelling reason why the respondent Board members' appeal should have been dismissed forthwith: that appeal
was quite bereft of merit. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had found that the indefinite suspension and termination of services imposed
by the respondent Board members upon petitioner Cosalan was illegal. That illegality flowed, firstly, from the fact that the suspension of
Cosalan was continued long after expiration of the period of thirty (30) days, which is the maximum period of preventive suspension that could
156
be lawfully imposed under Section 4, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Secondly, Cosalan had been deprived of
procedural due process by the respondent Board members. He was never informed of the charges raised against him and was given no
opportunity to meet those charges and present his side of whatever dispute existed; he was kept totally in the dark as to the reason or reasons
why he had been suspended and effectively dismissed from the service of Beneco Thirdly, respondent Board members failed to adduce any
cause which could reasonably be regarded as lawful cause for the suspension and dismissal of respondent Cosalan from his position as General
Manager of Beneco. Cosalan was, in other words, denied due process both procedural and substantive. Fourthly, respondent Board members
failed to obtain the prior approval of the NEA of their suspension now dismissal of Cosalan, which prior approval was required, inter alia, under
the subsisting loan agreement between the NEA and Beneco. The requisite NEA approval was subsequently sought by the respondent Board
members; no NEA approval was granted.
In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring petitioner Beneco and respondent Board members solidarily liable for the salary,
allowances, damages and attorney's fees awarded to respondent Cosalan, the NLRC said:
. . . A perusal of the records show that the members of the Board never acted in their individual capacities. They were
acting as a Board passing resolutions affecting their general manager. If these resolutions and resultant acts transgressed
the law, to then BENECO for which the Board was acting in behalf should bear responsibility. The records do not disclose
that the individual Board members were motivated by malice or bad faith, rather, it reveals an intramural power play gone
awry and misapprehension of its own rules and regulations. For this reason, the decision holding the individual board
members jointly and severally liable with BENECO for Cosalan's backwages is untenable. The same goes for the award of
damages which does not have the proverbial leg to stand on.
The Labor Arbiter below should have heeded his own observation in his decision —
Respondent BENECO as an artificial person could not have, by itself, done anything to prevent it. But
because the former have acted while in office and in the course of their official functions as directors of
BENECO, . . .
Thus, the decision of the Labor Arbiter should be modified conformably with all the foregoing holding BENECO solely liable
for backwages and releasing the appellant board members from any individual liabilities. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
The applicable general rule is clear enough. The Board members and officers of a corporation who purport to act for and in behalf of the
corporation, keep within the lawful scope of their authority in so acting, and act in good faith, do not become liable, whether civilly or
otherwise, for the consequences of their acts, Those acts, when they are such a nature and are done under such circumstances, are properly
attributed to the corporation alone and no personal liability is incurred by such officers and Board members. 9
The major difficulty with the conclusion reached by the NLRC is that the NLRC clearly overlooked or disregarded the circumstances under
which respondent Board members had in fact acted in the instant case. As noted earlier, the respondent Board members responded to the
efforts of Cosalan to take seriously and implement the Audit Memoranda issued by the COA explicitly addressed to the petitioner Beneco, first
by stripping Cosalan of the privileges and perquisites attached to his position as General Manager, then by suspending indefinitely and finally
dismissing Cosalan from such position. As also noted earlier, respondent Board members offered no suggestion at all of any just or lawful
cause that could sustain the suspension and dismissal of Cosalan. They obviously wanted to get rid of Cosalan and so acted, in the words of the
NLRC itself, "with indecent haste" in removing him from his position and denying him substantive and procedural due process. Thus, the
record showed strong indications that respondent Board members had illegally suspended and dismissed Cosalan precisely because he was
trying to remedy the financial irregularities and violations of NEA regulations which the COA had brought to the attention of Beneco. The
conclusion reached by the NLRC that "the records do not disclose that the individual Board members were motivated by malice or bad faith"
flew in the face of the evidence of record. At the very least, a strong presumption had arisen, which it was incumbent upon respondent Board
members to disprove, that they had acted in reprisal against respondent Cosalan and in an effort to suppress knowledge about and remedial
measures against the financial irregularities the COA Audits had unearthed. That burden respondent Board members did not discharge.
The Solicitor General has urged that respondent Board members may be held liable for damages under the foregoing circumstance under
Section 31 of the Corporation Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be
jointly liable and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and
other persons . . . (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Solicitor General, firstly, that Section 31 of the Corporation Code is applicable in respect of Beneco and other electric
cooperatives similarly situated. Section 4 of the Corporation Code renders the provisions of that Code applicable in a supplementary manner
to all corporations, including those with special or individual charters so long as those provisions are not inconsistent with such charters. We
find no provision in P.D. No. 269, as amended, that would exclude expressly or by necessary implication the applicability of Section 31 of the
Corporation Code in respect of members of the boards of directors of electric cooperatives. Indeed, P.D. No. 269 expressly describes these
cooperatives as "corporations:"
157
Sec. 15. Organization and Purpose. — Cooperative non-stock, non-profit membership corporationsmay be organized,
and electric cooperative corporations heretofore formed or registered under the Philippine non-Agricultural Co-operative
Act may as hereinafter provided be converted, under this Decree for the purpose of supplying, and of promoting and
encouraging-the fullest use of, service on an area coverage basis at the lowest cost consistent with sound economy and the
prudent management of the business of such corporations. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Solicitor General, secondly, that respondent Board members were guilty of "gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation" in enacting the series of resolutions noted earlier indefinitely suspending and dismissing respondent Cosalan from
the position of General Manager of Beneco. Respondent Board members, in doing so, acted belong the scope of their authority as such Board
members. The dismissal of an officer or employee in bad faith, without lawful cause and without procedural due process, is an act that
is contra legem. It cannot be supposed that members of boards of directors derive any authority to violate the express mandates of law or the
clear legal rights of their officers and employees by simply purporting to act for the corporation they control.
We believe and so hold, further, that not only are Beneco and respondent Board members properly held solidarily liable for the awards made
by the Labor Arbiter, but also that petitioner Beneco which was controlled by and which could act only through respondent Board members,
has a right to be reimbursed for any amounts that Beneco may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan. Such right of reimbursement is
essential if the innocent members of Beneco are not to be penalized for the acts of respondent Board members which were both done in bad
faith and ultra vires. The liability-generating acts here are the personal and individual acts of respondent Board members, and are not properly
attributed to Beneco itself.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GIVEN DUE COURSE, the comment filed by respondent Board members is TREATED as their answer,
and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 21 November 1988 in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84 is hereby SET ASIDE
and the decision dated 5 April 1988 of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen hereby REINSTATED in toto. In addition, respondent Board members
are hereby ORDERED to reimburse petitioner Beneco any amounts that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by virtue of the
decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
158
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30353 September 30, 1982
PATRICIO BELLO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIA UBO and PORFERIO REGIS, defendants-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Defendants-appellants Eugenia Ubo and Porferio Regis pray in this appeal that the following be declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 4031 which is an action for recovery of real property with
damages, namely: (1) the order dated July 22, 1967, declaring defendants-appellants in default; (2) the judgment by default dated July 31,
1967; (3) the order dated September 16, 1967, denying defendants- appellants' motion for relief from judgment; and (4) the order dated
January 8, 1968, denying their motion for reconsideration. Defendants-appellants further pray that the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
The records of the case bear out the following antecedents:
On April 29, 1967, the plaintiff, thru counsel, filed with the Court of First instance of leyte a complaint for recovery of real property with
damages against the defendants praying, among other things, that he be declared the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land which had
been forcibly occupied by the defendants since 1962 under claim of ownership, and that the defendants be ordered to pay him the sums
representing the value of the coconuts harvested from the land since 1962; moral damages in an amount the court may find reasonable;
P260.00 for expenses of relocation survey; P300.00 attorney's fees and the incidental expenses and costs of the proceeding.
Summons were issued on May 4, 1967, requiring the defendants to file their answer to the complaint within 15 days from service thereof. A
certain Patrolman Castulo Yobia of the Police Department of Jaro, Leyte served the summons on the defendants on May 15, 1967.
As no answer was filed by the defendants, plaintiff's counsel, on July 17, 1967, filed a motion to declare defendants in default. Acting upon said
motion, the Court of First Instance of Leyte issued an order dated July 22, 1967, declaring the defendants in default and directing the plaintiff
to present ex-parte his evidence on the 24th day of the same month. Thereafter a judgment by default dated July 31, 1967, was rendered by
said court, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court renders decision declaring the plaintiff the owner of the western
portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-225 containing an area of 16,41 0 square meters as shown
in Exhibit "C- 1 "; ordering the defendants to vacate the said portion occupied by them; to pay the sum of P900.00 a year
from July, 1962, up to the time the said defendant will deliver the land in question to the plaintiff; to pay the amount of
P300.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The order of default and the judgment by default were received by the defendants on August 2, 1967, and August 11, 1967, respectively.
Upon receipt of the order of default, the defendants contracted the services of Atty. Generoso Casimpan who immediately inquired from Pat.
Castulo Yobia about the service of the summons. Pat. Yobia then showed him a copy of the complaint which he failed to deliver to the
defendants.
On August 17, 1967, defendants' counsel filed a motion for relief from judgment charging irregularity in the service of the summons and
praying that the order of default dated July 22, 1967, and the judgment by default dated July 31, 1967, be set aside and that defendants'
answer, which was attached to said motion, be admitted. The defendants alleged in said motion that the subject land was inherited by them so
that they have a good and valid right thereto. They further alleged that they had been paying taxes on the land that the complaint was filed
merely to compel them to settle a criminal case for frustrated homicide which they had filed against the plaintiff's son.
On September 16, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Leyte issued an order denying the motion for relief from judgment on the ground that
the same was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. A copy of said order was received by the defendants on September 28, 1967.
On October 4, 1967, defendants' counsel filed a motion for reconsideration contending that since the motion for relief from judgment was
predicated on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, the same need not be accompanied by an affidavit of merit. However,
before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the defendants' counsel amended the same and attached thereto, their affidavit
of merit which reads as follows:
159
WE, EUGENIA UBO and PORFERIO REGIS, the mother and son, respectively, the former-widow, and the latter married, both
of age, Filipinos and residents of Barrio Tuba, Jaro, Leyte, Philippines, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law,
hereby depose and say:
1. That 1, Eugenia Ubo, am the defendant in Civil Case No. 4031, entitled Patricio Bello vs. Eugenia Ubo, et al.,; that
although it appears that in the summons I received a copy of the complaint and served with the summons, the truth of the
matter is that I did not receive a copy of the complaint, nor my son, Porferio Regis. Said complaint was served instead to
the plaintiff, Patricio Bello, as appearing in the said summons, and that the signature appearing in the said summons is
actually not mine, not knowing how to read or write myself;
2. That 1, Porferio Regis, am a co-defendant in the aforementioned civil case; that the signature in the summons now
attached to the record of the case is mine, but although it appears that I was served with summons together with the
complaint, the truth about it is that I did not receive the complaint supposed to be delivered to me or my mother; instead,
the summons was withdrawn after I had signed it;
3. That sometime on August 2, 1967, through the aid of our lawyer, Atty. Generoso Casimpan, it was then that we received
a copy of the complaint from the serving policeman, Castulo Yobia, in the presence of Attys. Marcelo Caoelin and Alfredo
Lastrilla;
4. That because of our own ignorance and the mistake of the serving policeman, it was perhaps the reason why the Hon.
Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declared us in default and the default judgment rendered copy of which we received on August 11,
1967. "
On November 16, 1967, the plaintiff's counsel filed an opposition to the amended motion for reconsideration attaching thereto a counter-
affidavit executed before said counsel by Pat. Castulo Yobia, to wit:
I CASTULO YOBIA, of age, Filipino, married and a resident of Jaro, Leyte, Philippines, after having been duly sworn to
according to law, depose and say:
1. That I am presently a member of the Police Force of the Municipality of Jaro, Leyte; and that sometime in the month of
May, 1967, 1 was ordered by our Chief of Police to serve summons to which was attached a copy of the complaint upon
the persons of Eugenia Ubo and Porferio Regis, mother and son, respectively, in the outskirts of Bo. Tuba, Jaro, Leyte,
which is three kilometers away from the national road and only accessible on foot as there is no regular trip of passenger
vehicle to that place;
2. That definitely on May 15, 1967, taking the opportunity that there was a cargo truck which passed by the Municipal Hall
going to the aforementioned barrio to get copra, I hurriedly went inside the Office of the Police Department to get the
summons and the office clerk readily gave the same to me and to which was attached a copy of the complaint;
3. Upon reaching the said barrio I immediately went to the house of Eugenia Ubo, whom I know personally and was also
able to contact at the same place Porferio Regis. At first they refused to receive the summons and complaint. However,
after explaining to them the nature of the summons and the case against them, both of them signed the summons in my
presence reluctantly and I detached the complaint and handed the same to them although refusing. I further advised them
to look for a lawyer at once to handle their case;
4. That when I returned back to our office in Jaro I was told by the office clerk that there was another copy of the summons
and complaint intended for the other defendant;
5. That in the afternoon of the same day, I incidentally met plaintiff Patricio Bello and his son Juan Bello in the poblacion of
Jaro, Leyte, whom I informed that their complaint was already served on defendants that morning and requested Patricio
Bello to sign the summons, but was instead signed by the son Juan Bello to show that they were already informed about
the service upon defendants and so that they can inform their lawyer. I then requested the said Patricio Bello to give the
other copy of the complaint to the other defendant thru anybody in the barrio, as they are the ones that use to frequent
the said barrio Tuba of Jaro;
6. That almost a month after, the son of Patricio Bello came to my house handing me the copy of the complaint I gave to
Patricio Bello to be delivered to the other defendant thru anybody in barrio Tuba, telling me that the same copy of the
complaint was not delivered because his father was afflicted with rheumatism the past weeks.
On January 8, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Leyte issued an order denying defendants' motion for reconsideration, to wit:
After a consideration of the ground of the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, particularly the affidavit of Pat.
Castulo Yobia, the serving officer of the summons who had, upon the service of summons, explained to both defendants
160
the nature of the summons and the complaint which should have warned the defendants of the existence of a case against
them, especially because a copy of the complaint was delivered to both of them at the time of service, the irregularity
consisting in the failure of the serving officer to deliver to each one of them a copy of the complaint is, therefore,
neutralized by such explanation made by the policeman to them. It was, therefore incumbent upon the defendants to have
checked up their case. Their failure to do so does not constitute excusable negligence, nor could it be said to be one of
accident or excusable mistake. For lack of merit of the Motion for Reconsideration therefore, the same is hereby denied.
A copy of said order was received by the defendants on January 9, 1968.
On January 23, 1968, the defendants, thru counsel, filed a notice of appeal and a motion to appeal as pauper and submitted to the court for
approval their record on appeal. The plaintiff, on the other hand, filed on January 31, 1968, a motion for execution pending appeal.
On February 10, 1968, the Court of First Instance of Leyte issued an omnibus order approving defendants' record on appeal and directing that
the appeal be given due course; granting defendants' motion to appeal as pauper; and denying plaintiff's motion for execution pending appeal.
The main thrust of the appeal is that there was no valid and effective service of summons on the defendants and that, consequently, the Court
of First Instance of leyte did not acquire jurisdiction over their person.
The appellants contend that Pat. Castulo Yobia of the Police Department of Jaro, Leyte, was not a proper person to serve the summons under
Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court since he was not a sheriff or a court officer of the province where service was made; and neither was he a
person who, for special reasons, was specially authorized to serve the summons by the judge who issued the same. Furthermore, appellants
contend that even assuming that said policeman could be considers as a proper, person to serve the summond, still there was no valid and
effective service since he brought back the summons with. him together with the copy of 'the complaint.
The appellee, on the other hand, admits that the person who served the summons - Pat. Castulo Yobia of the Police Department of Jaro, Leyte
- is not one of those enumerated by Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as the proper person to serve the summons but contends that said
provision of the rules is merely directory and its specification of persons who are to serve summons is not exclusive. He claims that Pat. Yobia
had duly served the summons upon the defendants and had even explained to them the nature of the summons and advised them to look for
a lawyer. He contends that said policeman did equally if not more effectively what a sheriff or his deputy or a court officer was expected to
have done and, therefore, said service of summons had the same force and effect as though summons had been served by any of the regular
officers mentioned by the Rules.
After consideration of the material antecedents of this case and the pertinent jurisprudence on the matter, We hold that there was no valid
service of summons on the defendants and, consequently, the Court of First Instance of Leyte did not acquire jurisdiction over their person.
Sec. 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that summons may be served by the sheriff or other proper court officer of the
province or, for special reasons, by a person especially authorized to serve the summons by the judge of the court which issued the same.
Contrary to appellee's contention, this enumeration is exclusive. Thus, in Sequito vs. Letrondo, G.R. No. L-11588, July 20,1959,105 Phil. 1139,
We considered as irregular the service of summons by a police sergeant who was not a sheriff or a court officer and who was not authorized by
the court to deliver the summons. And in the more recent case of Spouses Olar vs. Cuna, G.R. No. L-47935, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 114, We
ruled that the postmaster of Bato, Leyte, not being a sheriff or court officer, or a person authorized by the court to serve the summons cannot
validly serve the summons. There, as in the case at bar where summons was served by one who is not included in the specification of Sec. 5,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, this Court had to rule that the court which issued the summons did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants.
Furthermore, the appellants point to other irregularities which attended the service of summons by Pat. Yobia. Thus, it is alleged that said
policeman merely tendered the summons to them and did not give then a copy of the same and of the complaint. While it is true that Pat.
Yobia had denied such allegation in his counter-affidavit which We have heretofore quoted, nevertheless, We find appellants' version to be
more credible. For, the records of the case are replete with indications that the serving policeman was grossly ignorant of the rules concerning
summons. Thus, the return of service shows that the summons was first served on the plaintiff (back of p. 3, records). Besides, such return of
service was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court - which requires that "the proof of service of a summons
... shall be sworn to when made by a person other than the sheriff or his deputy." And even if We were to give credence to Pat. Yobia's
counter-affidavit, We would still find the service of the summons to be irregular since it is expressly admitted therein that only one copy of the
summons and of the complaint was served on the two defendants.
Since a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant only by means of a valid service of summons, trial and judgment without
such valid service are, therefore, null and void.
WHEREFORE the trial court's order of default and judgment by default are set aside and said court is directed to accept defendants-appellants'
answer to the complaint and to conduct further proceedings on the case. Costs against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
161
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70661 April 9, 1987
FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO., INC., SPOUSES JAIME and ANA MARIA MIGUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; HON. TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 147, Makati Metro Manila; PIOQUINTO VILLAPANA, in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati, Metro Manila; and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Tomacruz, Manguiat & Associates for petitioners.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring their within the jurisdiction of the
court.
Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) on November 26, 1982 and
December 26, 1982 respectively. As security for the payment of the obligation stated in the promissory notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria
Miguel executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the payment of
the latter's obligation under the loan-accounts.
The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Hence, on May 5,1983, BPI filed a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 2807 for recovery of a sum of money against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Rizal.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were d in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. The plaintiff was
then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte after which the lower court on June 11, 1984 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, the former:
a) the sum of P308,525.17 plus 10% interest per annum and 12% penalty fee per annum from May 21, 1984 until the
amount is fully paid;
b) the sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees;
c) to pay the costs of suit. (p.52, Rollo)
On the ground that the period to appeal expired without any decision having been appealed, the plaintiff filed a motion for execution of
judgment before the lower court. This motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued against Filmerco and the Miguels.
Pursuant to the writ of execution, respondent Sheriff Villapana levied on and attached alleged properties of Filmerco and the Miguels. These
properties were scheduled for sale on September 20, 1984.
On September 25, 1984, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of execution, notice of levy/attachment and to restrain
the holding of the auction sale. The motion was premised on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants because no
valid summons was served on them.
On November 26, 1984, after opposition to motion, reply, rejoinder and sub-rejoinder had been duly submitted, the lower court issued an
order denying the aforesaid motion.
On December 3, 1984, while the public auction of the attached properties was in progress, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration
of the November 26, 1984 order.
Without waiting for the resolution of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the defendants filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, injunction and preliminary restraining order against the lower court's decision and orders.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
162
The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them. Therefore, they contend that the lower court had not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons thus resulting in the nullity of its decision.
According to the sheriff's return dated September 7, 1983, summons and copy of the complaint were not served on the petitioners at 31 Sta.
Escolastica Street, Pasay City, their given principal place of business and had to be returned to the court unserved for the reason that the
"defendants have already vacated the premises and/or addresses more than a year ago and no definite information could be had regarding
their present whereabouts." Three separate summons for each of the defendants were addressed to 31 Sta. Scholastics Street, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.
Upon motion of the private respondent (plaintiff in the case) the lower court issued alias summons.
According to the sheriff's return dated March 31, 1984, summons were duly served upon "defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel at
No. 18, Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, thru Mrs. Angle Morger, a person residing therein of
suitable age and discretion to receive service of that nature and who received the said court processes for and in behalf of the defendants but
refused to sign." It was noted therein that the defendant spouses are "duly served" but that the other defendant Filmerco was "not and could
not be served"and the summons pertaining to it was " returned unserved."
Petitioner spouses, Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel contend that the substituted service of summons upon their persons thru Mrs. Angle Morger
at No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was invalid for the following reasons: (1) at the time
of the service they were not residents of the said address, and (2) Mrs. Angle Morger was not authorized to receive papers or documents for
them. They submitted affidavits of Angle Morger to prove their point.
There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over his
person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void. (Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209).
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of court, summons must be served on the defendant. However, when the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the defendants could not be made because they moved out
from their given address and their whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's return. Hence, the court resorted to substituted
service of summons provided for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. — If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case of Keister v. Navarro (supra), we construed this rule as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
... [U]nder the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully
and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. (Ibid., pp. 1053-
1054).
Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to
give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him. (Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Dy Reyes v. Ortega, 16 SCRA
903)
xxx xxx xxx
... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to
leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal
therefrom." (72 C.J.S. 1059) They refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. Similary, the terms "office" or "regular
place of business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service. ... (at p. 215)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that no valid service of summons upon the defendant spouses could be effected thru Mrs.
Angle Morger. In her affidavits, Mrs. Morger manifested that she and her husband are the bona fide residents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific
Malayan Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that they leased the said premises from the owner thereof as evidenced by a contract of lease dated
August 8, 1983; that they have been occupying the premises since September 1, 1983; that on March 31, 1984, Sheriff Villapana attempted to
163
serve the official summons and a copy of a complaint against spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel and Filmerco Commercial Inc.; that she
informed the sheriff that the Miguels do not reside in the place and that neither was said residence the dwelling place of the Miguel spouses;
that she does not know Filmerco, Inc.; that despite the fact that she informed the sheriff that she is not authorized by the spouses and
Filmerco to receive any papers for them, the sheriff left, leaving some documents with her maid, Daday Lopez; that she did not affix her
signature on the documents being then served by the sheriff nor did the maid affix hers; that the documents left by the sheriff with the maid
were not even ascertained nor read by the affiant. Mrs. Morger's manifestation is not refuted or rebutted.
Obviously, the address No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was neither the "residence" nor
the "dwelling house" of the petitioners at the time summons was served upon them as contemplated by the Rules.
Moreover, Angle Morger is not a proper person with whom the copies of the summons could be left. The sheriff 's return indicates that she
refused to sign the summons and the same was returned to the court unsigned. This fact adds credence to Angle Morger's manifestation about
her informing the sheriff that she was not authorized to receive papers in behalf of the defendant-spouses and that she refused to receive
them. We ruled in the case earlier cited:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he rule designates the persons to whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation
of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and therefore, assumes that such
person win deliver the process to defendant or in some way give notice thereof. (Keister v. Navarro, supra)
Mrs. Morger's manifestation negates any close relationship between herself and the defendant-spouses to qualify her as representative of the
former to receive summons in their behalf.
The private respondent merely relies on the sheriff's return that summons was duly served on the spouses and states that to disregard the
return would be disastrous as "self-serving affidavits" would be preferred over the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official
functions. It urges that the sheriff's return should be given credence over the affidavit.
A sheriff's certification that he duly served summons on a defendant does not necessarily mean that he validly served the summons. In this
particular case, there is a strong showing that Mr. and Mrs. Jaime Miguel are notresidents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village,
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The respondent, itself, states that the spouses are hiding to escape their obligations. Sworn statements of Mrs. Angle
Morger assert that she and her husband are lessees of the premises and are the actual residents therein. The respondents claim these
statements are self-serving. Whether self-serving or not, the fact remains that Mrs. Morger was seen by the sheriff as the then person in that
house. The respondents have absolutely no grounds, other than suspicions, for their contention that the Miguels and not the Morgers are the
actual residents at that address.
In the light of these facts, the appellate court's reliance on the sheriff's return that summons upon defendant-spouses thru Angle Morger was
"duly served" in consonance with the principle of presumption in favor of regularity of performance of official functions of a public officer
(Section 5, Rule 13, Rules of Court) has no basis.
With regards to the petitioner corporation, the sheriff's return categorically states that the alias summons was not served upon the
corporation. Moreover, the private respondent filed a motion to declare defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel alone, in
default without including the petitioner corporation (Annex E, p. 64, Rollo)
These facts not withstanding the trial court declared all the defendants in default and rendered a decision also against the petitioner
corporation. This decision was affirmed by the appellate court which applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The
appellate court stated:
The records disclose that petitioner-spouses are both directors of respondent-Corporation being the majority stockholder
of FILMERCO (Annex "A," Comment). The records, also, reveal that both petitioner-spouses and petitioner-corporation
were impleaded as party defendants in the civil case filed before the lower court. Hence, petitioner-corporation cannot
now claim to have been improperly served with summons. This Court, therefore, finds justifiable reason for the lower
court's order piercing the veil of corporate fiction. ... (p. 56, rollo)
We have already found that there was no valid summons effected upon petitioner-spouses. Since, the appellate court considered service of
summons upon the petitioner-spouses as constituting service of summons upon the petitioner-corporation, the inevitable conclusion is that no
valid summons could have been effected upon the petitioner-corporation.
Moreover, even if we assume that there was valid service of summons upon the petitioner-spouses, it does not necessarily follow that there
was also valid service of summons upon the petitioner-corporation.
We have explained the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction in the following manner:
164
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it
is recognized and respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. (Borja v. Vasquez, 74 Phil. 56), When the
fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation,
the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or
crime, (Koppel Phil. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496; Lidell & Co. v. Collector, G.R. No. L-9687, June 30, 1961; Commissioner v. Norton
& Harrison Company, G.R. No. L- 17618, Aug. 31, 1964; and Guevarra, Phil. Corp. Law, 1961 ed., p. 7) the veil with which
the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be drifted to allow for
its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845-857).
In effect, this doctrine refers to determination of liability and not to determination of jurisdiction.
This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be applied, based on the evidence to be presented, it is imperative
that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation. For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a domestic corporation such as the
petitionercorporation, summons must be served upon it through the officers of the corporation enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court. There is not even a semblance of any effort to serve summons upon an officer as such Since, the summons intended for
the petitioner-corporation was "not and could not be served" as certified in the sheriff's return, the lower court never acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioner-corporation. It follows that the judgment against the petitioner-corporation is null and void
The allegations that the petitioners deliberately concealed their whereabouts to escape the payment of just and valid obligations appear to
have some basis. However, allegations such as these do not justify the appellate court's upholding a judgment wherein the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.
The private respondent has chosen to employ a procedure which is strictly in personam. As indicated in the cases of Citizens Surety and
Insurance, Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera (38 SCRA 369) and Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Nieto (125 SCRA 758) it is also possible to use proceedings in
rem or quasi in rem to achieve the same desired ends. There may be other ways which, if utilized, would insure that the courts acquire
jurisdiction over defendants in recovery of money cases but the shortcut method approved by the respondent court is not one of them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 2807 is SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the trial court for proper service of summons and trial.
SO ORDERED.
165
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 149797-98 February 13, 2004
NANCY L. TY, petitioner

vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, COURT OF APPEALS and HON. PATERNO V. TAC-AN, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of RTC Batangas City, Branch 84, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside and reverse the June 7, 2001 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed
the assailed Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.
On August 16, 1995, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino, for brevity) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 84, presided by respondent Judge Paterno V. Tac-an, an action for reconveyance of real property against petitioner
Nancy Ty, together with Tala Realty Services Corporation, Pedro B. Aguirre, Remedios A. Dupasquier, Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly
W. Lim, Cynthia E. Mesina, Rubencito M. Del Mundo, and Add International Services, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Tala, et al.).
On November 15, 1995, Tala, et al. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent judge granted the
motion and dismissed the complaint. However, on a motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino, the complaint was reinstated.2
Tala, et al., with the exception of Nancy Ty3 and Cynthia Mesina,4 filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however denied in an Order
dated June 3, 1996. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
On the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants, except Nancy Ty and Cynthia Mesina, the record shows that the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff dated February 23, 1996 was sent by mail on February 2, 1996 to this Court and received by the Court on
March 5, 1996. The copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration was furnished to Alampay Gatchalian Mawis Carranza and Alampay, Counsels
for the defendants at their address in Makati City on February 26, 1996. The copy sent to the Court was received on March 5, 1996. It could
safely (sic) assumed that copy sent to the defendant’s counsel at the nearer address at Makati City even before March 5, 1996 or on March 1,
1996, at least 4 days in transit. In the normal course of events or as a matter of practice, counsels file comments or opposition to Motions
without need of Court orders. So, from March 1, 1996, they could have filed comment and opposition within 10 days therefrom, or on March
11, 1996 without awaiting for a Court order. The Court does not believe that the said motion for reconsideration was received by said
defendant’s counsel on March 28, 1996 or one month and 2 days after mailing by plaintiffs counsel. The extension of 5 days given to
defendants contained in the Order of March 7, 1996 was only a matter of grace extended by the court, a reminder that their opposition must
be forthcoming. Lawyers must be vigilant in the defense of their clients. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
On July 8, 1996, petitioner and Tala, et al. filed their respective answers to the complaint. Two days later, Tala, et al. also filed a motion to
suspended proceedings, on the ground that an appeal by Banco Filipino to the April 1, 1996 Order of the respondent court is still pending
resolution. The motion to suspend proceedings was, however, denied by respondent court.
On October 21, 1996, Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to produce or make available books, documents and other papers
relevant to the case.5 Notwithstanding Tala, et al.’s opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to produce certain documents within
a specified period of time, despite failure by Banco Filipino to tender the costs for such production and inspection. In its Order dated
November 20, 1996, the trial court justified Banco Filipino’s failure to advance the expenses of production and inspection in this wise:6
Further to the Order dated November 1996, requiring the defendant Tala to produce certain documents within the specified period of time,
for those documents in which the defendant is bound to keep by law or regulation, their production cannot be the subject of assessment for
cost against plaintiff-movant. Otherwise, cost maybe assessed and billed but the same shall be submitted to the Court for approval. x x x.
Thereafter, Taal, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration to the afore-quoted Order, on January 14 1997.
In the meantime, on December 20 1996, Banco Filipino filed a manifestation/omnibus motion7 praying, among others, for the declaration of
certain allegations and propositions as being factually established and for the allegations/defenses in Tala, et al.’s answer to be stricken out.
The trial court granted Banco Filipino’s motion to declare certain facts as established in an Order on February 26, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which provides:8
Premises considered, and pursuant to Rules 27 and Section 3, Rule 29 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court hereby:
166
A) Declares
1) as having been established the fact that defendant TALA did not have the financial capacity to acquire by purchase the
disputed Batangas property at the time of their acquisition;
2) as having been established the fact that TALA had not the means of acquiring the Batangas property other than through
the advanced rental payments made by plaintiff;
3) as having been established the fact that the Batangas property had merely been transferred by way of trust to TALA, as
trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, which was there as purchaser of the property;
4) prohibits defendant TALA from introducing any evidence contrary to sections (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph A, above.
B) Strikes out allegations/defenses in defendant TALA’s Answer and/or other pertinent pleadings averring that:
1) TALA is an independent corporation, not a trustee of the plaintiff;
2) TALA acquired the Batangas property independently and using its own funds through armslength transaction;
3) TALA is the full and absolute owner of the disputed property.
Meanwhile, Tala, et al. failed to produce the requested documents. In a Supplemental Order dated April 15, 1998, Tala, et al. were directed to
produce additional documents. The Supplemental Order reads:9
Further to the Order dated February 26, 1998 and considering that the documents presented so far by the defendant Tala are not complete in
relation to those itemized in the said Order, defendant Tala is further ordered to produce the following documents from 1979 to 1985:
1. records of stocks subscribed, paid-in and issued;
2. for loans payable leasees’ deposit, subsidiary ledger, evidence of indebtedness;
3. for lands purchased, the deeds of sale.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 4, 1998, Banco Filipino’s urgent motion to reset hearing and for extension of time to appoint a commissioner, through its special
counsel, was granted. On May 11, 1999, Banco Filipino was directed to present its next witness.10
Thereafter, Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by the trial court. 11 Tala, et al.’s motion for reconsideration
of the order admitting the said exhibits was denied. Banco Filipino’s motion to withdraw certain exhibits was granted.
Thereafter, Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest
prejudgment and partiality.
On April 14, 2000, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the Orders of the court were based on facts and
applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondent judge likewise reprimanded Tala, et al. for filing several motions designed to delay the
proceedings.12
Separate motions for reconsideration were filed by Nancy Ty and Tala, et al., but the same were denied by the trial court in an Order dated
May 8, 2000.
Dissatisfied, Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 59576 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59173, assailing the two Orders of respondent judge dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000.
In a consolidated Decision dated June 7, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed Orders by respondent
judge.13
Hence, the instant petition, based on the following grounds:
167
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS CALLING FOR THE EXERCISE
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION AND REVIEW, WHEN IT CHOSE TO EXAMINE ONLY SOME, NOT ALL, OF THE ASSAILED
ORDERS OF JUDGE TAC-AN, WHICH, TAKEN COLLECTIVELY AND NOT INDIVIDUALLY, DEMONSTRATE A STRONG BIAS AND ANIMOSITY AGAINST
PETITIONER AND TALA ET AL AND REVEAL AN OBVIOUS PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF BANCO FILIPINO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY,
OR EVEN CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN FECUNDO V. BERJAMEN, LUQUE V.
KAYANAN AND OTHER SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE INTEMPERATE AND ACCUSATORY LANGUAGE OF JUDGE TAC-AN IN HIS ORDER DATED 14 APRIL 2000 IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE
LATTER’S "EXASPERATION BORDERING ON INDIGNATION" AT THE PETITIONER WHICH "MAY UNNECESSARILY CLOUD HIS IMPARTIALITY" AND
WHICH WARRANTS HIS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT AND FOUND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 20 MARCH 2000 DID NOT BETRAY THAT JUDGE TAC-AN HAD
ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CASE PENDING BEFORE RTC BATANGAS BRANCH 84.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED, ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
OR AT LEAST SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE BY JUDGE TAC-AN, WHEN IT DELIBERATELY SELECTED ONLY A FEW OF THE BADGES OF BIAS,
HOSTILITY AND PREJUDGMENT CITED BY THE PETITIONER AND, WORSE, WHEN IT WILLFULLY FAILED TO RESOLVE ISSUES RAISED IN
PETITIONER’S AND TALA ET AL’S RESPECTIVE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER’S OMNIBUS MOTION WAS INTENDED TO DELAY THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT TO AVAIL OF THE LEGAL REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE RULES OF COURT TO ENSURE THAT
HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED. 14
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for voluntary
inhibition.
Petitioner argues that, by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of respondent judge cited as "badges of hostility, bias and
prejudgment", the appellate court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and disregarded principles laid down
by jurisprudence.
Petitioner asserts that the Orders which were issued by respondent judge demonstrated his predilection to act with bias in favor of Banco
Filipino and manifested his escalating hostility and animosity towards petitioner and her co-defendants, Tala, et al.
In regard to the Order dated June 3, 1996, petitioner contends that it was not Tala, et al. but Banco Filipino, which was duty bound to establish
the date of actual receipt of its motion for reconsideration. She complains that respondent judge contravened the express provisions of the
Rules of Court when he "unilaterally relieved Banco Filipino of its statutory obligation to prove service of its motion for reconsideration and,
instead, applied, x x x a so-called safe assumption in determining when petitioner and her co-defendants should have received the
same."15Moreover, she takes offense to the respondent judge’s statement that he did not believe Tala, et al.’s claim of receipt of the pleading
on 28 March 1996, thus, in effect branding them as "liars".
Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he
fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.
In the case at bar, there is no postmaster’s certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to the
sender, after first notice was sent to and received by addressee on a specified date. Absent such notice, the disputable presumption of
completeness of service does not arise and by implication, respondent judge could not presume actual receipt by addressee.
Petitioner also alleges that the Order dated November 20, 1996 is another indicium of respondent judge’s manifest partiality when he granted
the motion for production of documents despite failure by Banco Filipino to advance the cost for such production and inspection. The
respondent judge justified his Order with a sweeping declaration that "the amount is insignificant by any standard and could readily been
resolved between the parties involved. Records reveal that Tala did not charge Banco Filipino for the documents it eventually produced
pursuant to the motion for production."16
168
Respondent judge’s peremptory act of absolving Banco Filipino from paying the expenses for the production of documents is disturbing for its
lack of basis. There was no basis for respondent judge to conclude that the amount involved was "insignificant" considering that, as the
records would show, no reference of any amount was made by the parties. Moreover, his categorical declaration that Tala, et al. did not
bother to charge Banco Filipino the amount of expenses runs counter to the evidence at hand. In opposing the motion for the production of
documents,17 Tala, et al. cited, as one of their grounds, the excessive expense it would incur in case the motion would be granted. Sound
judicial action dictates that he should have inquired first into the validity of Tala, et al.’s claim, whose rights were bound to be affected, instead
of making a sweeping and dismissive Order exempting Banco Filipino from complying with its legal obligation.
Petitioner also assails the Orders dated: (1) April 15, 1998 Order directing Tala, et al. to produce certain documents not requested by Banco
Filipino; and (2) May 11, 1999 Order directing Banco Filipino to present its witness.
The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution of
controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where the judge’s
participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Rule 3.06 which provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence
during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth.
There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a
corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on.
To our mind, respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what evidence to present to
prove its case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial,
the final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of their
primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the
court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false
impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people’s faith in
our courts.18
Petitioner also questions the manner with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits. The records show that on
November 29, 1999, petitioner filed her comment on Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits. On December 8, 1999, respondent judge granted
Banco Filipino and Tala, et al. five (5) days each within which to file their respective reply and rejoinders. On December 9, 1999, Tala, et al. filed
their comment. Yet the next day, December 10, respondent judge, without awaiting the reply and rejoinders of the parties, issued an order
admitting all the exhibits offered.
The seeming haste with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipino’s formal offer of exhibits cannot simply be ignored. It is true, as the
appellate court observed, that the filing of a reply lies in the sound discretion of the court. What is objectionable, however, is that respondent
judge expressly granted the parties a period of time within which to file their respective pleadings, only to disregard in the end, the period he
himself had set and, thus deprived the parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective sides and render the issues clearer.
Finally, petitioner argues that respondent judge prejudged the case when he issued the March 20, 2000 Order. She claims that the Order,
which categorically and unqualifiedly stated the existence of an implied trust, rendered a definite resolution of one of the principal issues in
the main case without awaiting her and Tala, et al.’s evidence.
In his April 14, 2000 Order, respondent judge brushed aside petitioner’s argument by declaring that the "finding is only interlocutory because
this can be rebutted by the defendants x x x. Necessarily, the Court must make an initial assessment of the evidence as presented by the
plaintiff if they constitute prima facie evidence x x x."
There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to conclude, out of necessity, the existence of a prima facie case on the basis alone of the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is only when the plaintiff demurs to evidence that the trial court
may rule on the case before the defense presents its evidence. Moreover, the assailed Order, being interlocutory in nature, is not the final
decision. As such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an interlocutory order, on the principal issue that effectively disposes of
the merits of the case. In the interest of substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between the parties must
be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory Order.
It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an impartial, unbiased and
dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith
and confidence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity. In the case of Bautista v.
Rebueno,19 we stated:
. . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At
the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself
from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his
169
honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such
circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is
more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. (Underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful
suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of
this Court’s previous pronouncements that to warrant the judge’s inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed
from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source,20 this rule does not apply where the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate
predisposition to deviate from established procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the
Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision that pertain to the judge’s judicial
functions may not be proper considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be erroneous. 21 However, where said complained
orders, taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, due process
dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The June 7, 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 &
59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner and affirmed the Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8,
2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is directed to inhibit himself from presiding in Civil Case No. 4521. The Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City is directed to re-raffle the said case to another judge.
SO ORDERED.
170
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129313 October 10, 2001
SPOUSES MA. CRISTINA D. TIRONA and OSCAR TIRONA, SPOUSES MA. PAZ D. BAUTISTA and CESAR BAUTISTA, SPOUSES MA. ARANZAZU D.
ORETA and CANUTO ORETA, SPOUSES MA. CORAZON D. BAUTISTA and PABLO S. BAUTISTA, JR., and DEO S. DIONISIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FLORO P. ALEJO as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, JUANITO IGNACIO and LUIS
NUÑEZ, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the joint decision1 dated April 10, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Cases Nos.
5169-V-97 and 5093-V-97.
The factual background for this petition are culled from the records of the cases.
A. Civil Case No. 5093-V-97:
On March 25, 1996, herein petitioners sued private respondent Luis Nuñez before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81. The
suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 6633 for ejectment. Petitioners claimed to be owners of various fishpond lots located at Coloong,
Valenzuela.2 They alleged, among others that: (1) on January 20, 1996, private respondent Nuñez, "by means of force, stealth, or strategy,
unlawfully entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same" against their will, thereby depriving them of possession of said fishpond; (2)
Nuñez illegally occupied a house owned by and built on the lot of petitioner Deo Dionisio; and (3) Nuñez unlawfully operated and used
petitioners's fishpond, despite their demands to vacate the same. Petitioners prayed that the court order Nuñez to vacate Dionisio's house;
surrender possession of the fishpond to them; remove all milkfish fingerlings at his expense; and pay a monthly compensation of P29,000.00
from January 20, 1996 to the time he surrenders possession, with interest at twelve percent (12%) yearly until fully paid.1âwphi1.nêt
Nuñez admitted in his answers that petitioners owned the fishponds, but denied the other allegations. He raised the following affirmative
defenses: (1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners' failure to allege prior physical possession in their complaint; (2)
petitioners' action was premature in view of the pendency of a complaint he filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), docketed as Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R, where the issue of possession in the concept of tenancy is the same as that raised by
petitioners in Civil Case No. 6633; and (3) petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping since by they were fully aware of the said DARAB case. He
moved that the ejectment suit be dismissed.
On October 1, 1996, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 81, decided Civil Case No. 6633 as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and all persons
claiming rights under him:
1. To peacefully vacate and surrender the subject premises to the plaintiffs:
2. To peacefully vacate and surrender the house belonging to plaintiff Deo S. Dionisio;
3. To pay the amount of P27,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation from January 20, 1996 up to the time he finally vacates the
subject premises;
4. To pay the amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.3
On November 15, 1996, Nuñez appealed said decision to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, which docketed the appeal as Civil Case No.
5093-V-97.
B. Civil Case No. 5169-V-97
On March 25, 1996, petitioners also instituted Civil Case No. 6632 for ejectment against private respondent Juanito Ignacio with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 82. The allegations were essentially the same as those against private respondent Nuñez,
except it is alleged that Ignacio "also illegally occupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the plaintiff Spouses Ma. Paz D.
Bautista and Cesar Bautista." Petitioners sought the same relief prayed for in Civil Case No. 6633.
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Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuñez in Civil Case No. 6633. Like Nuñez, he also moved for dismissal of the ejectment suit
against him.
On February 11, 1997, the MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82 issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 6633 against Ignacio, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, defendant's motion to cite plaintiffs in contempt of court is denied, and his other motion to
dismiss the case is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.4
In granting Ignacio's Motion to Dismiss, the MeTC said:
It is now clear to the mind of the Court that the issue of recovery of possession pursued by plaintiffs in this case is pending also for
adjudication among other issues in DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95. There is no dispute that both this case and the DARAB case
involve the same real property or at least, adjoining lots covered by titles in the names of some of the plaintiffs, which lots are also
involved in this case.
xxx
Clearly, said DARAB case is a prejudicial question to the case at bar, and or vice versa (stress in the original). The possibility that this
Court and the DARAB may come up with two contradicting decisions on issue of possession shall always be there, and since the
DARAB case was files first, there appears compelling necessity to halt proceedings in this case5
On February 27, 1997, petitioners appealed the foregoing Order to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, which docketed their appeal as Civil
Case No. 5169-V-97.
Since Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97 involved essentially the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same issues, the cases
were jointly heard before Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela.
On April 10, 1997, Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V97 were jointly decided.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Affirming the appealed Order of the trial court dated February 11, 1997 dismissing Civil Case No. 6632, with the modification that
the plaintiffs be made liable to pay the costs of suit; and
2. Reversing the appealed decision of the trial court dated October 1, 1996 in Civil Case No. 6633 and dismissing the above-entitled
case for the reasons stated above. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
In ruling against herein petitioners, the RTC found:
(1) As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the defendants in his memorandum on appeal, it is now settled that a complaint for
forcible entry to fall within the jurisdiction of the inferior court must allege plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property by any
of the means provided in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. Bare allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff was
deprived of the possession of the property is insufficient to make the action one for forcible entry (citation omitted)
In the instant case, while the complainants allege that the defendants (Ignacio in Civil Case No. 6632 and Nuñez in Civil Case No.
6633) by means of force, stealth or strategy "unlawfully entered the said fishpond lots and occupied the same against the will of the
plaintiffs," there is no allegation that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the property in dispute. The complaint(s) in the
above-entitled case therefore did not fall within the jurisdiction of the trial courts.
(2) The DARAB case (Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R) between the herein parties and covering the same subject matter was filed was
ahead of the instant cases. The allegation in the DARAB complaint that the complainants are agricultural or share tenants is opposed
to the claim of the respondents in their answer that the complainants are their industrial partners. The DARAB case thus presented a
dispute that is Agrarian Reform, thru the DARAB, is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters or agrarian
disputes.
172
The principal issue in the instant cases for forcible entry – whether or not to eject the defendants from the fishponds – is necessarily
connected with the agrarian dispute now pending resolution before the DARAB. It is therefore beyond the competence of the
inferior court to resolve.
xxx
(3) The plaintiffs were less that honest in certifying under oath that they have no knowledge of any case pending before any tribunal
or agency involving the same issues raised in the instant cases. At the time of their certification, there was pending before the
DARAB of a case between the same parties with the same subject matter and where the issue of possession as raised in the instant
cases is necessarily included in the larger issue of agricultural tenancy. The plaintiffs therefore violated Administrative Order No. 04-
94 of the Supreme Court, which is a ground for dismissal.7
On May 6, 1997, petitioners files with the RTC a joint Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 and a Motion for
Reconsideration, together with the proposed Amended Complaints. On May 20,1997, the RTC denied the aforementioned motions.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners assign the following as errors committed by the RTC:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE FAILURE OF PLAINTIFFS TO AVER THEIR COMPLAINT(S) THAT
THEY WERE IN POSSESSION AT THE TIME OF THE FORCIBLE ENTRY MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS WERE IN POSSESSION OF THEIR PROPERTIES AT THE
TIME OF FORCIBLE ENTRY THEREUNTO BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, FOR WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
3. THE PENDENCY OF THE SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM DID NOT PROSCRIBE
THE INSTITUTION OF THE EJECTMENT CASE(S).
4. THERE HAD BEEN NO INFRACTION ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING REQUIREMENTS.
The main issue for our resolution involves the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts: was petitioner's failure to allege prior physical
possession in a case for forcible entry fatal to the jurisdiction of the inferior courts? Ancillary thereto, we also must inquire (a) whether the
pendency of the Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R before the DARAB barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for forcible entry; and (b)
whether petitioners violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 proscribing forum shopping.
On the main issue, petitioners contend that the averment of the identities of the persons in possession of the disputed properties at the time
of the forcible entry thereunto is not jurisdictional in character. Petitioners argue that the deficiency, if any, could have been remedied by
amended or supplemental pleadings or by the submission of admissible evidence. They point out that the MeTC, Branch 81 in Civil Case No.
6633 had received evidence of petitioners' actual possession, resulting in a finding of fact of actual possession in its Decision of October 1,
1996. It was, therefore, an error for the RTC to have disregarded said finding of fact on the ground that the requisites for the MeTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the forcible entry cases had not been complied with. It was likewise error for the RTC to have denied the admission of
petitioners' Amended Complaints.
Private respondents argue that a closer scrutiny of the allegations in the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 filed with the court of
origin will clearly show that there is no allegation whatsoever of prior physical possession on petitioners' part. All that is averred is unlawful
deprivation by private respondents. They submit that this glaring defect is fatal enough to deprive the inferior court of jurisdiction over the
forcible entry cases. With respect to the denial of admission of petitioners Amended Complaints, private respondents point out that
amendments for the purpose of making the complaint confer jurisdiction upon the court are not allowed.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule is no different in actions for ejectment. 8 Thus, in
ascertaining whether or not the action is one for forcible entry falling within the exclusive of the inferior courts, the averments of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined. Petitioners' complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 are virtually
identical, save as to the names of the defendants and the owners of the houses allegedly occupied by private respondents. The pertinent
allegations in Civil Case No. 6633 read:
3) That plaintiffs in their individual rights, are respective owners in fee simple of fishpond lots located at Barangay Coloong,
Municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, With areas, lot numbers, and titles, xerox copies of which are Annexes hereto…
xxx
4) That on or about January 20, 1996, said defendant Luis Nuñez by means of force, stealth or strategy, unlawfully entered the said
fishpond lots and occupied the same against the will of the plaintiffs thereby depriving said owners of the possession of the same;
5) That defendant Luis Nuñez also illegally occupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to, plaintiff Deo S. Dionision.
173
6) That the said defendant also planted bangus fingerlings in the said fishponds and despite demands for them to remove the same
and vacate the fishponds… still continue to unlawfully, illegally, and wantonly occupy said house and operate said fishponds to the
great damage and prejudice of the plaintiffs.9
Petitioners submit that the phrase "thereby depriving said owners of the possession of the same" in paragraph 4 is tantamount to an averment
of prior physical possession since private respondents could not have deprived them of possession unless the latter had been previously in
possession of the subject properties.
We are not persuaded. It cannot be inferred from the aforecited phrase that the possession that petitioners were supposedly deprived of is a
prior physical possession. The question arises, what sort of prior physical possession is to averred? The word "possession" as used in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical possession, (stress supplied) not legal possession in the sense contemplated in
civil law.10 The allegation must likewise show priority in time. Both requisites are wanting in the phrase relied upon by petitioners.
A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners' action was once for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.
The distinctions between the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and
(2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of
possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings files in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the court jurisdiction
must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint is demurrable.11 Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are
mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second,
he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. 12 Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical
possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The
deficiency is fatal to petitioners' actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to
acquire jurisdiction. No reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial Court acquired no
jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for failure of the complaints to aver physical possession by petitioners.
But was the deficiency remedied, however, when petitioners submitted their Amended Complaints?
The policy in this jurisdictions is that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the interests of substantial justice. Thus,
amendments of the complaint may be allowed even if an order for its amendments of the complaint may be allowed even if an order for its
dismissal has been issued so long as the motion to amend is filed before the order of dismissal acquired finality.13 Note, however, that it is not
a hard and fast rule. An amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court,14 or where the action originally pleaded in the complaint was outside the jurisdiction of
the court.15 We have carefully perused petitioners' proposed amendments and found them to include the allegation that petitioners were in
prior physical possession of the disputed fishponds before said possession was allegedly disturbed. Clearly, the purpose is to sidestep the RTC
ruling that MeTC had no jurisdiction. Over their complaints and allow the inferior court to acquire jurisdiction. This we cannot allow. Where
the court of origin had no jurisdiction over the original complaint in the first place, amendments may not be had. It is axiomatic that before an
amendment can be permitted, the trial court must have acquired jurisdiction over the case in the first instance.16
Regarding the second issue, petitioners contend that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R. They submit that with the
passage of Republic Act No. 788117 on February 20, 1995, private lands directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds are exempt
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or Republic Act No. 6657. No agrarian relation thus subsisted between the
parties for the DARAB to take cognizance of. Thus, litis pendentia did not bar the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633. Stated differently, the
pendency of Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R did not divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction to hear and try the forcible entry cases.
Private respondents contend that a comparison between DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R and Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 would show
the same parties, the same subject matter of controversy, and the same issues. In other words, litis pendentia lies and may be availed of to
dismiss the cases for forcible entry filed with the MeTC.
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners' reliance upon Republic Act No. 7881 is off tangent. It is not disputed that at the time of the
filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, an agrarian relation's dispute was pending before the DARAB. The records show that private
respondents as the complainants in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R, were asserting tenancy rights, including the right to possession of the disputed
fishponds or parts thereof, under Republic Act Nos. 384418 and 1199.19 Private respondents were thus claiming vested substantive rights,
dating back to 1975 in the case of respondent Ignacio and 1979 in the case of respondent Nuñez, under substantive laws. A substantive law is a
law, which creates, defines, or regulates rights concerning life, liberty, or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the
administration of public affairs.20 Republic Act No. 7881, in exempting prawn and fishponds from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, is a substantive law. By its very nature and essence, substantive law operates prospectively21 and may not be construed
retroactively without affecting previous or past rights. Hence, in view of the absence of a contrary intent in its provisions, Republic Act No.
7881 should be given a prospective operation and may not affect rights claimed under previous agrarian legislation.
Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, litis pendentia or pendency of another action is a ground for the dismissal of the second action.
Recall that in the motions to dismiss filed by private respondents in Civil Cases No. 6632 and 6633, the pendency of the DARAB case was one of
174
the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both actions. For litis of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both actions.
For litis pendentia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for ;
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
4. Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the action under consideration.22
These requisites, in our view, are present in this case. For one, the parties in the DARAB case and in the forcible entry cases filed with the
MeTC are the same. Also, there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. The action in Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R is for "declaration
of tenancy, accounting, recovery of possession, specific performance, recovery of sum of money, plus damages" against petitioners. Note that
the properties that private respondents seek to recover possession of in the DARAB case form part of the properties from which petitioners
seek the ejectment of private respondents. The evident and logical conclusion then is that any decision that may be rendered in the DARAB
case regarding the question of possession will also resolve the question of possession in the forcible entry cases. Undergirding the principle
of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be subject of controversy in court more than once
in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of the stability in the rights and status of persons. The MeTC of
Valenzuela, Branch 82, recognized this doctrine when it dismissed Civil Case No. 6632 to avoid possibility of two contradictory decisions on the
question of possession emanating from the DARAB and the trial court. In turn, the RTC was correct in finding that the issue of possession was
inextricably intertwined with the agrarian dispute, an issue which was beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the inferior court to setlle. In
so doing, the RTC deferred to the primary jurisdiction and administrative expertise of the DARAB to settle agrarian cases. Thus, we are
constrained to conclude that under the concept of litis pendentia, the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R served as a bar to the
filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633.
On the third issue, petitioners maintain that the petitioner-affiant who subscribed the requisite Affidavit of Non-forum Shopping understood
that the issues pending resolution before the DARAB had no relation to petitioners' actions for forcible entry, and hence had seen no need to
report anymore the pendency of the DARAB case. Moreover, private respondents claim that in their pleadings they early enough disclosed the
pendency of the DARAB case to the courts hearing the ejectment cases. Hence, they aver that there was no violation whatsoever of the non-
forum shopping requirements.
Private respondents argue that petitioners' explanations on the matter amount to a mea culpa on account of wild speculation and assumption
of the facts of the case. They ask us to affirm the findings below that petitioners violated the Court's Circular proscribing forum shopping.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94, imposing additional requisites in civil complaints, petitions, and other initiatory pleadings
filed in all courts and agencies to prevent forum shopping, provides in part:
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commences any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c)
if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and
(d) if should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency
wherein the original pleading and sworn certificate contemplated herein have been filed.
xxx
2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading,
upon motion and after hearing…
That there was a DARAB case pending involving the same parties with the same subject matter at the time petitioners filed Civil Cases Nos.
6632 and 6633 is not contested. Petitioners admit that they assumed that the issues in the agrarian case and the forcible entry cases were
different and hence saw no need to report the pendency of the former to the trial court in their certification of non-forum shopping. We fail to
see the basis for this assumption. The records disclose that the issue of possession as raised in the forcible entry cases in necessarily included
in the question of agricultural tenancy raised in the DARAB case. Note that petitioners actively participated in the latter case and thus, could
not have been unaware that the possession of the subject fishponds or parts thereof was in issue before the Board. Petitioners' failure to see
that paragraph 1(b), 1(c), or 1(d) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 applied to them is simply incomprehensible. We agree with the RTC in
certifying under oath that they have no knowledge of any case pending before any other tribunal or agency involving the same issue raised in
their forcible entry cases, petitioners were less than candid.
175
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present
or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.23 Recall that as earlier discussed, the requisites of litis
pendentia barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 given the pendency of DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R. Based thereon, the
Regional Trial Court correctly dismissed the forcible entry cases on the additional ground of forum shopping.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-
97 and 5169-V-97 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
176
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120384 January 13, 2004
PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES, INC., PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., THE SOLID GUARANTY, INC., B.F. HOMES, INC., PILAR
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and TOMAS F. AGUIRRE, respondents-appellees.
DECISION
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation. Petitioner corporation seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
31483; the Resolution dated May 18, 1995 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; the Order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29)
of Manila, dated December 7, 1992, dismissing Civil Case No. 86-381692 and the Order dated April 12, 1993 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said dismissal order.
The case was commenced at the Regional Trial Court on October 30, 1986, upon the filing by herein petitioner of a complaint for
collection of sum of money against herein respondents Philippine Infrastructures, Inc. (PII for brevity), Philippine British Assurance
Co., Inc. (PBAC), The Solid Guaranty, Inc. (Solid), B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), Pilar Development Corporation (PDC) and Tomas B.
Aguirre (Aguirre). The complaint alleges that: petitioner issued five separate Letters of Guarantee in favor of the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as security for various credit accommodations extended by PNB to respondent PII; respondents PII, BF Homes, PDC and
Aguirre executed a Deed of Undertaking binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or reimburse petitioner upon demand such
amount of money or to repair the damages, losses or penalties which petitioner may pay or suffer on account of its guarantees; as
security for prompt payment by respondent PII, the latter submitted to petitioner, surety and performance bonds issued by
respondents PBAC and Solid; on April 24, 1985, the PNB called on the guarantees of petitioner, and so, the latter demanded from
respondent PII the immediate settlement of P20,959, 529.36, representing the aggregate amount of the guarantees of petitioner
called by PNB and the further sum of P351,517.57 representing various fees and charges; PII refused to settle said obligations;
petitioner likewise demanded payment from respondents Solid and PBAC but they also refused to pay petitioner; and because of the
unjustified refusal of respondents to comply with their respective obligations, petitioner was constrained to secure the services of
counsel and incur expenses for the purpose of prosecuting its valid claims against the respondents. It is prayed in the complaint that
judgment be rendered ordering respondents PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre to pay petitioner the amount of P21,311,046.93 plus
interest and penalty charges thereon, ordering respondents Solid and PBAC to pay P5,758,000.00 and P9,596,000.00, respectively,
under their surety and/or performance bonds and ordering respondents to pay petitioner the sums of P2,000,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Respondent BF Homes filed a Motion to Dismiss3 on the ground that it is undergoing rehabilitation receivership in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and pursuant to P.D. 902-A, the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Respondent PII also filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or
penalty because of the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent PII.
The other respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings.
On June 10, 1987, Judge Roberto M. Lagman issued an Order5 suspending the case only as against respondent BF Homes and denying
respondent PII’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, hearing on the merits ensued. On January 21, 1992, petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo, the
treasury department manager of petitioner, who testified that the amount of P19,035,256.57 was paid on July 28, 1990 by petitioner to the
PNB through the account of the National Treasury to cover the principal loan and interests, as guaranteed by petitioner; and, Exhibit "LL," a
debit memo issued by the PNB, showing that the latter was paid by the National Treasurer in behalf of petitioner corporation. Consequently,
on February 19, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence6 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Court, seeking to amend Paragraph 17 and the pertinent portion of the prayer in the complaint, to read as follows:
17. Because of the unjustified refusal of the defendants to comply with their respective obligations, the plaintiff as guarantor has
been constrained to pay the Philippine National Bank thru the account of the National Treasury the amount of Nineteen Million
Thirty-five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-six and 57/100 (P19,035,256.57) on July 28, 1990 representing payment of principal loan
of P12,790,094.83 and interest of P6,245,111.54 due March 16, 1987 on the Philippine Infrastructure, Inc./Philguaranty loan under
the PNB Expanded Loan Collection Program; and which amount was deducted from the equity share of the National Government in
Philguarantee. In view of defendants unwarranted failure and refusal to settle their respective accountabilities plaintiff was likewise
constrained to secure the services of counsel and incur expenses in the process of prosecuting its just and valid claims against the
defendants; accordingly, the defendants should be held liable, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees and expenses
of litigation in the amount of P2,000,000.00 or about ten (10%) percent of the guaranteed obligations.
177
...
PRAYER
...
(a) Ordering defendant PII, BF Homes, PILAR and AGUIRRE to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P19,035,256.57
plus P351,517.57 extension guarantee fees and amendment fees, plus interests and penalty charges thereon;
. . .7
Acting on the motion to amend, the trial court, at that time presided by Judge Joselito J. Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order dated December
7, 1992,8 dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing the
Order dated June 10, 1987 issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was
denied by Judge de la Rosa per his Order9 dated April 12, 1993.
On June 9, 1993, a petition for review on certiorari was filed by petitioner against the Regional Trial Court with this Court. On June 23, 1993,
the Court issued a Resolution10 which reads:
Considering that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals) now exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, the Court Resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals, for disposition.
The Court of Appeals re-docketed the petition as CA-G.R. SP No. 31483.
On August 31, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, dismissing the petition on the following grounds:
FIRSTLY, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is erroneous, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.
Hence, the same cannot be assailed by certiorari, as in this case (Marahay vs. Malicor, 181 SCRA 811). Considering the Supreme
Court Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 4 regarding an appeal by wrong mode, the order of dismissal in this case was therefore correctly
issued by the respondent court aquo.
SECONDLY, the real purpose of petitioner herein in asking the respondent court a quo for leave to amend its complaint was not
ostensibly to make the complaint conform to the evidence presented, as petitioner alleges, but to introduce a cause of action then
non-existing when the complaint was filed. The ruling in the leading case of Surigao Mine Exploration Co. vs. Harris (69 Phil.
113) does not allow such amendment.
Hence, the trial court was correct in denying the amendment and instead it dismissed the case.
THIRDLY, in the case at bar, the motion to dismiss was first denied but there is nothing in the Rules of Court which prohibits the court
from later on reversing itself and granting the motion to dismiss.
This ruling is supported by earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Lucas vs. Mariano, et al (L-29157, April 27, 1972) and Vda. De Haberer vs.
Martinez, et al. (L-39386, Jan. 29, 1975) where the trial court dismissed the complaint, then set it aside and finally again ordered it dismissed.11
On May 19, 1995, the appellate court issued a Resolution12 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, on June 14, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari, claiming that the Court of Appeals committed the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ AFFIRMATION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE’S ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO.
86-38169 MOTU PROPIO ON THE PREMISE THAT HIS PREDECESSOR JUDGE WAS IN ERROR IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED YEARS BACK, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE "THERE WAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT" IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ AFFIRMATION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE’S ORDER IN NOT ALLOWING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT OBJECTIONS, IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
178
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REAL PURPOSE OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN ASKING FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT WAS NOT TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BUT TO INTRODUCE A
CAUSE OF ACTION THEN NON-EXISTING WHEN THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONER-APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REVIEW.13
Respondents, on the other hand, asseverate that the petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a wrong remedy as the proper remedy was for
it to appeal from the order of dismissal and not to file a petition for review on certiorari; and that the Court of Appeals committed no error in
sustaining the lower court as the original complaint below failed to state a cause of action and the real purpose of the amendment was to
introduce a subsequently acquired cause of action.
The Court will first resolve the question whether an order dismissing a petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of ordinary
appeal, petition for review on certiorari or a petition for certiorari. Indeed, prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an order dismissing an
action may be appealed by ordinary appeal as what happened in Lucas vs. Mariano14 and Vda. de Haberer vs. Martinez,15 cited by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed decision. However, in the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1(h), Rule 41 thereof expressly provides
that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. It may be subject of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Considering that the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals was promulgated in 1994, respondent appellate court could not have committed any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 31483.
Nevertheless, in the higher interest of substantial justice and pursuant to the hornbook doctrine that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively,16 the Court gives due course to the present petition and will resolve the issue whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the lower court’s order dismissing the complaint on the ground that petitioner failed to state a cause of action for not alleging loss or actual
payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees.
The trial court issued an order of dismissal in stead of granting a motion to amend complaint to conform to evidence, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. – When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow
the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense
upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
It should be stressed that amendment was sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, more specifically, the testimony of
petitioner’s Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from the PNB (Exhibit "LL") proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the
amount of P19,035,256.57 pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent PII.
Petitioner avers that respondents did not raise any objection when it presented evidence to prove payment to PNB. Hence, as provided for in
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by respondents reveal that
none of them denied petitioner’s claim that said evidence was presented before the trial court without objections having been raised by
respondents. None of them claimed that they raised any objections at the time when petitioner presented its evidence to prove its payment to
PNB. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted the presentation of the said evidence.
Respondents contend that since they had already alleged the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense in
their answer, there was no further need for them to raise an objection at the time the evidence was introduced. This is not plausible.
In Bernardo, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 respondents therein also put up in their answer the affirmative defense of failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action and the parties went on to present their respective evidence. The Court did not consider the allegation of this
affirmative defense in the answer as an objection to evidence presented by the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court ruled that:
The presentation of the contrariant evidence for and against imputations undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may
be, whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been in the amended complaint. . . .
It is settled that even if the complaint be defective, but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, without objection, introduces
sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the original complaint, and the
defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established, an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as
179
if it had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings. Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.18
Evidently, herein respondents’ failure to object to the evidence at the time it is presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever
perceived defect the complaint had was cured by the introduction of petitioner’s evidence proving actual loss sustained by petitioner due to
payment made by it to PNB.
Thus, the contention of respondents that the amendment would introduce a subsequently acquired cause of action as there was none at the
time the original complaint was filed, is untenable.
Furthermore, petitioner’s cause of action against respondents stemmed from the obligation of respondents PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre
under their Deed of Undertaking that was secured by the surety and performance bonds issued by respondents PBAC and Solid. Said Deed of
Undertaking, which was annexed to and made an integral part of the complaint, provides as follows:
...
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the OBLIGOR [PII] and CO-OBLIGORS [BF HOMES, PILAR,
AGUIRRE] hereby promise, undertake and bind themselves to keep the OBLIGEE [PETITIONER] free and harmless from any damage or
liability which may arise out of the issuance of its guarantee referred to in the first "whereas" clause. By these presents, the OBLIGOR
and CO-OBLIGORS further bind themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or reimburse on demand, such amount of money, or repair
the damages, losses or penalties which the OBLIGEE may pay or suffer on account of the aforementioned guarantees. The OBLIGOR
and CO-OBLIGORS further undertake to comply with and be bound by the aforementioned terms and conditions enumerated in the
attached Annex "A" and to perform such other acts and deeds which the OBLIGEE may impose for the implementation of the
aforementioned guarantees.
It is a condition of this instrument that failure of the OBLIGOR and CO-OBLIGORS to comply with this undertaking and to make good
the performance of the other obligations herein undertaken and/or promised, shall be sufficient cause for the OBLIGEE to consider
such failure as an event of default which shall give to the OBLIGEE the right to take such action against the OBLIGOR and/or CO-
OBLIGORS for the protection of the OBLIGEE’s interests.
. . .19
A reading of the foregoing provisions of the contract, specially the phrase "the OBLIGOR and CO-OBLIGORS hereby promise, undertake and
bind themselves to keep the OBLIGEE free and harmless from any damage or liability which may arise out of the issuance of its
guarantee referred to in the first ‘whereas’ clause," shows that the Deed of Undertaking is actually an indemnity against liability.
In Cochingyan, Jr. vs. R & B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,20 the Court held thus:
The petitioners lose sight of the fact that the Indemnity Agreements are contracts of indemnification not only against actual
loss but against liability as well. While in a contract of indemnity against loss an indemnitor will not be liable until the person to
be indemnified makes payment or sustains loss, in a contract of indemnity against liability, as in this case, the indemnitor’s
liability arises as soon as the liability of the person to be indemnified has arisen without regard to whether or not he has suffered
actual loss.
...
(3) Petitioners are indemnitors of R & B Surety against both payments to and liability for payments to the PNB. The present suit is
therefore not premature despite the fact that the PNB has not instituted any action against R & B Surety for the collection of its
matured obligation under the Surety Bond.21 [Emphasis supplied]
In the present petition, petitioner had become liable to pay the amounts covered by said guarantees when, as the original complaint alleges,
the PNB called upon said guarantees. Respondents’ obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any
damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual
loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents. The mere inclusion in petitioner’s original complaint of the allegation that the
PNB had already called on the guarantees of petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. Clearly therefore, the
original complaint, by itself, stated a valid cause of action.
Verily, it was patently erroneous on the part of the trial court not to have allowed the amendments as to make the complaint conform to
petitioner’s evidence that was presented without any objection from respondents. The trial court likewise patently acted with grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction when, acting on a mere motion to amend the complaint, it
erroneously dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in sustaining the trial court.
180
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1995
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Manila, dated December 7, 1992 and April 12, 1993
are NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
Let the original records of Civil Case No. 86-38169 be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29), Manila, for continuation of the trial
on the merits. The presiding judge is directed to proceed with immediate dispatch upon receipt of the records of the case.
Treble costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
181
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127692 March 10, 2004
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.
DECISION
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
September 30, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40067, nullifying the decision and orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 10) in Civil
Case No. CEB-11103, for want of jurisdiction.
Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action for specific performance and/or rescission filed by herein petitioners, spouses Fortunato and Aurora
Gomez, against the heirs of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr., which include herein respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino.2
Filed on December 16, 1991, the complaint alleges: Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public
auction on July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of the redemption period, the spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners on December
12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino, however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to
petitioners, hence, the complaint.
On January 10, 1992, the trial court’s Process Server served summons on respondents, in the manner described in his "Return of Service," to
wit:
Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 10, the herein attached original summons issued in the
above-entitled case with the information that on January 8, 1992 summons and copies of the complaint were served to the defendants Jacob,
Jesus Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru defendant Caridad Trocino at their given address at Maria Cristina Extension
(besides Sacred Heart School for Girls), Cebu City, evidence by her signature found at the lower portion of the original summons.3
WHEREFORE I, respectfully return the original summons duly served to the court of origin.
Cebu City, Philippines, January 10, 1992.
(signed)
DELFIN D. BARNIDO
RTC Process Server
On January 27, 1992, the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin, filed their Answer. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino,
respondents’ mother, verified said pleading.4
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision on March 1993, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
The latter are hereby ordered to jointly and severally execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the plaintiffs and to deliver the owner’s duplicate
copies of TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, covering the properties sold, to the plaintiffs within ten (10) days from the finality of the judgment, after
which plaintiffs shall pay in turn to the defendants the balance of ₱2,000,000.00. Otherwise, the sale is rescinded and revoked and the
defendants are directed to return to the plaintiffs the amount of ₱500,000.00, with interest of 12% per annum computed from December 6,
1989, until the full amount is paid.
In addition thereto, defendants are to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱20,000.00 as
exemplary damages; ₱40,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and ₱10,000.00 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.5
Due to the defendants’ failure to deliver the owner’s duplicate of TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, the RTC issued an order on August 29, 1995
declaring said titles null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to issue new titles in the name of herein petitioners.6
182
Thereafter, or on March 13, 1996, respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for the annulment of the
judgment rendered by the RTC-Cebu (Branch 10) in Civil Case No. CEB-11103. Private respondents alleged that the trial court’s decision is null
and void on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and
the complaint. According to them, at the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A., and has been residing
there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been residing there since 1986. They also refuted the receipt of the
summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and the representation made by Atty. Bugarin in their behalf. Respondents also contended that they have a
meritorious defense.7 Petitioners filed their Comment/Answer to the petition.8
On September 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision granting the petition and annulling the decision of the RTC-Cebu
(Branch 10). The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 as well as all Orders issued to
implement the same are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ENJOINED from cancelling Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 10616 and 31856. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed the present petition, setting forth the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS TROCINO, REGARDING THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE RTC OF CEBU CITY AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR 04-94.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE NEED FOR PERSONAL AND/OR EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS, DESPITE THE
NATURE OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION BEING ONE IN REM.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT, CAUSING FURTHER USELESS LITIGATION AND UNNECESSARY EXPENSE ON
PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS, ESPECIALLY SINCE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY VALID DEFENSE AS GROUND FOR REVERSAL OF
JUDGMENT OF THE RTC.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT ITS JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE IN FAVOR OF CARIDAD TROCINO. 10
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person.11 Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void.12
The resolution of the present petition hinges on the issue of whether or not summons was effectively served on respondents. If in the
affirmative, the trial court had validly acquired jurisdiction over their persons and therefore its judgment is valid.
To resolve whether there was valid service of summons on respondents, the nature of the action filed against them must first be determined.
As the Court explained in Asiavest Limited vs. Court of Appeals, it will be helpful to determine first whether the action is in personam, in rem,
or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines apply according to the nature
of the action.13
In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,14 which states:
SEC. 7. Personal service of summons.-- The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him.
If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, substituted service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or by leaving the copies
at the defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 15 In substituted service, it is mandated
that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be explained in the proof of service.16
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal
service of summons within the State is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not
physically present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide
the case against him.17 An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs. Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-resident’s wife,
who was a resident of the Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by the
non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case.18
Meanwhile, in actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy the
183
due process requirements.19 Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines, and (1) the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines;
or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines, summons may be served extraterritorially by (a) personal service out
of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.20
In the present case, petitioners’ cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is anchored on the claim that the spouses Jesus and Caridad
Trocino reneged on their obligation to convey ownership of the two parcels of land subject of their sale. Thus, petitioners pray in their
complaint that the spouses Trocino be ordered to execute the appropriate deed of sale and that the titles be delivered to them (petitioners);
or in the alternative, that the sale be revoked and rescinded; and spouses Trocino ordered to return to petitioners their down payment in the
amount of P500,000.00 plus interests. The action instituted by petitioners affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action
in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. 21
Contrary to petitioners’ belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real
action because it affects title to or possession of the two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and 31856, it does not automatically
follow that the action is already one in rem. In Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Court made the following distinction:
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing
itself, instead of against the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in
rem.22
The objective sought in petitioners’ complaint was to establish a claim against respondents for their alleged refusal to convey to them the title
to the two parcels of land that they inherited from their father, Jesus Trocino, who was one of the sellers of the properties to petitioners.
Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an action in personam because it is an action against persons, namely, herein respondents, on
the basis of their personal liability. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire of
jurisdiction over their persons.23
A distinction, however, must be made with regard to service of summons on respondents Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino,
as records show, is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25 years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person
and validly try and decide the case against him.
On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be
served on him personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why efforts
exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.24
In the present case, the process server served the summons and copies of the complaint on respondents Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano,
Consolacion, Alice and Racheal,25 through their mother, Caridad Trocino.26 The return did not contain any particulars as to the impossibility of
personal service on Mariano Trocino within a reasonable time. Such improper service renders the same ineffective.
Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought to
determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. 27
Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriff’s return failed to state the facts and circumstances showing the impossibility of personal service of
summons upon respondents within a reasonable time, petitioners should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when the original summons is returned without being served on any or all of the
defendants.28 Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear the consequences of their lack of diligence.
The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents without any exception does not transform the ineffective service of
summons into a valid one. It does not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. There was not
even the slightest proof showing that respondents authorized Atty. Bugarin’s appearance for and in their behalf. As found by the Court of
Appeals:
While Caridad Trocino may have engaged the services of Atty. Bugarin, it did not necessarily mean that Atty. Bugarin also had the authority to
represent the defendant heirs. The records show that in all the pleadings which required verification, only Caridad Trocino signed the same.
There was never a single instance where defendant heirs signed the pleading. The fact that a pleading is signed by one defendant does not
necessarily mean that it is binding on a co-defendant. Furthermore, Caridad Trocino represented herself as the principal defendant in her
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. (Rollo, p. 80)
184
Since the defendant heirs are co-defendants, the trial court should have verified the extent of Atty. Bugarin’s authority when petitioners failed
to appear as early as the pre-trial stage, where the parties are required to appear. The absence of the defendant heirs should have prompted
the trial court to inquire from the lawyer whether he was also representing the other petitioners. As co-defendant and co-heirs over the
disputed properties, the defendant heirs had every right to be present during the trial. Only Caridad Trocino appeared and testified on her own
behalf. All the defenses raised were her own, not the defendant heirs.29
Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents were rendered without jurisdiction as there was neither a proper
service of summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the same is void, with regard to
private respondents except Caridad Trocino.
It must be pointed out that while it was the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino who sold the properties to petitioners, their right to proceed
against Jesus Trocino when he died was passed on to his heirs, which includes respondents and Caridad Trocino. Such transmission of right
occurred by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted.30 When the process server personally served the
summons on Caridad Trocino, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over her person alone. Hence, the trial court’s decision is valid and
binding with regard to her, but only in proportion to Caridad Trocino’s share. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
This Court’s decision is therefore applicable to all the defendant heirs with the exception of defendant Caridad Trocino considering that it was
the latter who entered into the alleged sale without the consent of her husband. She is therefore estopped from questioning her own
authority to enter into the questioned sale. Moreover, Caridad Trocino was validly served with summons and was accorded due process.31
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40067 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
185
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners,

vs.
Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also,
service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for specific
performance.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60888. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, on the basis of what prescinds, the assailed resolution and orders issued by the public respondent are perforce ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. This pronouncement is nonetheless rendered without prejudice to the refiling of the same case by the private respondents with the
court a quo."3
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo
Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public respondent Judge N.C. Perello. On July 21, 1998, respondent judge,
through the acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the [respondents]. As per return of
the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons
by Publication. On December 28, 1998, public respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons
by Publication. On July 30, 1999, the respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for
failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence ex-
parte. Ultimately, on December 7, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
‘x x x Therefore, Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit
of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title ‘to the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their names. Thereafter the Register of Deeds of Makati City or Muntinlupa City may cancel
Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 149635 of the Defendants and issue another to Plaintiff under the deed of sale, clean and free of any
reported encumbrance.
‘Defendants are also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount of ₱20,000 and attorney’s fees of ₱20,000 including costs of this
suit.’
xxxxxxxxx
"On January 5, 2000, [respondent] Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister
Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the respondent court. On January 18, 2000, [respondents] filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. On March 17, 2000, the public respondent
issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted [respondents’] supposed loss of standing in court. On March 29, 2000,
the [respondents] once again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration. On June 22, 2000, however, an
Order was issued by the public respondent denying the said motion. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of the controverted judgment
which the respondent judge ultimately granted."4
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court (RTC).
186
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the
requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate
them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication
was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the
Resolution and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the assailed Resolution dated December 7, 1999 was already final and
executory
"B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the Petition for Certiorari of private respondents despite the
pendency of an appeal earlier filed
"C. The Honorable Court erred in not holding that the Petition for Certiorari was time barred
"D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proceedings in the lower court are null and void due to invalid and
defective service of summons and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents." 6
In sum, the main issue revolves around the validity of the service of summons on respondents.1ªvvphi1.nét
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Service of Summons
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of summons on respondents was invalid. They submit that although the case filed
before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece
of real property located in the Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient
that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the substituted
service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void because of the invalid and defective service
of summons. According to them, the Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest
efforts to effect the service of summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July 22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella
Homes, Alabang. He, however, resorted to substituted service on that same day, supposedly because he could not find respondents in the
above address. They further allege that the person to whom he gave the summons was not even a resident of that address.
Respondents contend that when summons is served by substituted service, the return must show that it was impossible to serve the summons
personally, and that efforts had been exerted toward that end. They add that noncompliance with the rule on substituted service renders
invalid all proceedings relative thereto.
As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by petitioners, respondents argue that the case filed before the trial court was an
action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As such, the summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.
Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still
be defective and invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an Affidavit attesting that the latter
deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered
mail to the former’s last known address.1awphi1.nét
187
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where
the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the
procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
"Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
"Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof."
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot
be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of
service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant.7 It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in
the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the
service of summons ineffective.8
Defective Personal Service of Summons
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without actually
exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. A review of the records9 reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza
Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons states
that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not
mention exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process
server obtained the information on their whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is reproduced as follows:
"That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the same were ineffectual
and unavailing for the reason that defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in
Bicol thus substituted service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court." 10
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to
locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without
indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the
attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
The necessity of stating in the process server’s Return or Proof of Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the validity of
substituted service was explained by this Court in Hamilton v. Levy,11 from which we quote:
"x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements
of substituted service renders said service ineffective."12
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons and the effect of noncompliance with the subsequent proceedings therefor
were discussed in Madrigal v. Court of Appeals13 as follows:
"In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained
in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that
since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds."14
Summons by Publication Improper
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in
rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant,
and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.15
188
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit
incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right
over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam.16
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due
process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
189
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70661 April 9, 1987
FILMERCO COMMERCIAL CO., INC., SPOUSES JAIME and ANA MARIA MIGUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; HON. TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 147, Makati Metro Manila; PIOQUINTO VILLAPANA, in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of the
Office of the Provincial Sheriff, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati, Metro Manila; and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondents.
Tomacruz, Manguiat & Associates for petitioners.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the petitioners were served valid summons so as to bring their within the jurisdiction of the
court.
Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc., (Filmerco) obtained two separate loans from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) on November 26, 1982 and
December 26, 1982 respectively. As security for the payment of the obligation stated in the promissory notes, spouses Jaime and Ana Maria
Miguel executed a deed of continuing suretyship wherein the Miguels bound themselves jointly and solidarily with Filmerco for the payment of
the latter's obligation under the loan-accounts.
The loans remained outstanding even after they became due and demandable. Hence, on May 5,1983, BPI filed a complaint docketed as Civil
Case No. 2807 for recovery of a sum of money against Filmerco and spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Rizal.
Upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendants were d in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. The plaintiff was
then allowed to present its evidence ex-parte after which the lower court on June 11, 1984 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, the former:
a) the sum of P308,525.17 plus 10% interest per annum and 12% penalty fee per annum from May 21, 1984 until the
amount is fully paid;
b) the sum equivalent to 20% of the total amount due as and for attorney's fees;
c) to pay the costs of suit. (p.52, Rollo)
On the ground that the period to appeal expired without any decision having been appealed, the plaintiff filed a motion for execution of
judgment before the lower court. This motion was granted and a writ of execution was issued against Filmerco and the Miguels.
Pursuant to the writ of execution, respondent Sheriff Villapana levied on and attached alleged properties of Filmerco and the Miguels. These
properties were scheduled for sale on September 20, 1984.
On September 25, 1984, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the decision, writ of execution, notice of levy/attachment and to restrain
the holding of the auction sale. The motion was premised on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants because no
valid summons was served on them.
On November 26, 1984, after opposition to motion, reply, rejoinder and sub-rejoinder had been duly submitted, the lower court issued an
order denying the aforesaid motion.
On December 3, 1984, while the public auction of the attached properties was in progress, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration
of the November 26, 1984 order.
Without waiting for the resolution of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the defendants filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, injunction and preliminary restraining order against the lower court's decision and orders.
The appellate court dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
190
The petitioners submit that no valid summons was served upon them. Therefore, they contend that the lower court had not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons thus resulting in the nullity of its decision.
According to the sheriff's return dated September 7, 1983, summons and copy of the complaint were not served on the petitioners at 31 Sta.
Escolastica Street, Pasay City, their given principal place of business and had to be returned to the court unserved for the reason that the
"defendants have already vacated the premises and/or addresses more than a year ago and no definite information could be had regarding
their present whereabouts." Three separate summons for each of the defendants were addressed to 31 Sta. Scholastics Street, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.
Upon motion of the private respondent (plaintiff in the case) the lower court issued alias summons.
According to the sheriff's return dated March 31, 1984, summons were duly served upon "defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel at
No. 18, Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, thru Mrs. Angle Morger, a person residing therein of
suitable age and discretion to receive service of that nature and who received the said court processes for and in behalf of the defendants but
refused to sign." It was noted therein that the defendant spouses are "duly served" but that the other defendant Filmerco was "not and could
not be served"and the summons pertaining to it was " returned unserved."
Petitioner spouses, Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel contend that the substituted service of summons upon their persons thru Mrs. Angle Morger
at No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was invalid for the following reasons: (1) at the time
of the service they were not residents of the said address, and (2) Mrs. Angle Morger was not authorized to receive papers or documents for
them. They submitted affidavits of Angle Morger to prove their point.
There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over his
person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void. (Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209).
Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of court, summons must be served on the defendant. However, when the defendant
cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, substituted service may be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that personal service of summons upon the defendants could not be made because they moved out
from their given address and their whereabouts were unknown as indicated in the sheriff's return. Hence, the court resorted to substituted
service of summons provided for under Section 8, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. — If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In the case of Keister v. Navarro (supra), we construed this rule as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
... [U]nder the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully
and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. (Ibid., pp. 1053-
1054).
Indeed, the constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to
give the desired notice to the party of the claim against him. (Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Dy Reyes v. Ortega, 16 SCRA
903)
xxx xxx xxx
... The terms "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service, hence it is not sufficient "to
leave the copy at defendant's former dwelling house, residence, or place of abode, as the case may be, after his removal
therefrom." (72 C.J.S. 1059) They refer to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. Similary, the terms "office" or "regular
place of business" refer to the office or place of business of defendant at the time of service. ... (at p. 215)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we find that no valid service of summons upon the defendant spouses could be effected thru Mrs.
Angle Morger. In her affidavits, Mrs. Morger manifested that she and her husband are the bona fide residents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific
Malayan Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that they leased the said premises from the owner thereof as evidenced by a contract of lease dated
August 8, 1983; that they have been occupying the premises since September 1, 1983; that on March 31, 1984, Sheriff Villapana attempted to
191
serve the official summons and a copy of a complaint against spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel and Filmerco Commercial Inc.; that she
informed the sheriff that the Miguels do not reside in the place and that neither was said residence the dwelling place of the Miguel spouses;
that she does not know Filmerco, Inc.; that despite the fact that she informed the sheriff that she is not authorized by the spouses and
Filmerco to receive any papers for them, the sheriff left, leaving some documents with her maid, Daday Lopez; that she did not affix her
signature on the documents being then served by the sheriff nor did the maid affix hers; that the documents left by the sheriff with the maid
were not even ascertained nor read by the affiant. Mrs. Morger's manifestation is not refuted or rebutted.
Obviously, the address No. 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila was neither the "residence" nor
the "dwelling house" of the petitioners at the time summons was served upon them as contemplated by the Rules.
Moreover, Angle Morger is not a proper person with whom the copies of the summons could be left. The sheriff 's return indicates that she
refused to sign the summons and the same was returned to the court unsigned. This fact adds credence to Angle Morger's manifestation about
her informing the sheriff that she was not authorized to receive papers in behalf of the defendant-spouses and that she refused to receive
them. We ruled in the case earlier cited:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he rule designates the persons to whom copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation
of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and therefore, assumes that such
person win deliver the process to defendant or in some way give notice thereof. (Keister v. Navarro, supra)
Mrs. Morger's manifestation negates any close relationship between herself and the defendant-spouses to qualify her as representative of the
former to receive summons in their behalf.
The private respondent merely relies on the sheriff's return that summons was duly served on the spouses and states that to disregard the
return would be disastrous as "self-serving affidavits" would be preferred over the presumption of regularity in the discharge of official
functions. It urges that the sheriff's return should be given credence over the affidavit.
A sheriff's certification that he duly served summons on a defendant does not necessarily mean that he validly served the summons. In this
particular case, there is a strong showing that Mr. and Mrs. Jaime Miguel are notresidents of 18 Yuchengco Drive, Pacific Malayan Village,
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The respondent, itself, states that the spouses are hiding to escape their obligations. Sworn statements of Mrs. Angle
Morger assert that she and her husband are lessees of the premises and are the actual residents therein. The respondents claim these
statements are self-serving. Whether self-serving or not, the fact remains that Mrs. Morger was seen by the sheriff as the then person in that
house. The respondents have absolutely no grounds, other than suspicions, for their contention that the Miguels and not the Morgers are the
actual residents at that address.
In the light of these facts, the appellate court's reliance on the sheriff's return that summons upon defendant-spouses thru Angle Morger was
"duly served" in consonance with the principle of presumption in favor of regularity of performance of official functions of a public officer
(Section 5, Rule 13, Rules of Court) has no basis.
With regards to the petitioner corporation, the sheriff's return categorically states that the alias summons was not served upon the
corporation. Moreover, the private respondent filed a motion to declare defendant-spouses Jaime and Ana Maria Miguel alone, in
default without including the petitioner corporation (Annex E, p. 64, Rollo)
These facts not withstanding the trial court declared all the defendants in default and rendered a decision also against the petitioner
corporation. This decision was affirmed by the appellate court which applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The
appellate court stated:
The records disclose that petitioner-spouses are both directors of respondent-Corporation being the majority stockholder
of FILMERCO (Annex "A," Comment). The records, also, reveal that both petitioner-spouses and petitioner-corporation
were impleaded as party defendants in the civil case filed before the lower court. Hence, petitioner-corporation cannot
now claim to have been improperly served with summons. This Court, therefore, finds justifiable reason for the lower
court's order piercing the veil of corporate fiction. ... (p. 56, rollo)
We have already found that there was no valid summons effected upon petitioner-spouses. Since, the appellate court considered service of
summons upon the petitioner-spouses as constituting service of summons upon the petitioner-corporation, the inevitable conclusion is that no
valid summons could have been effected upon the petitioner-corporation.
Moreover, even if we assume that there was valid service of summons upon the petitioner-spouses, it does not necessarily follow that there
was also valid service of summons upon the petitioner-corporation.
We have explained the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction in the following manner:
192
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it
is recognized and respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. (Borja v. Vasquez, 74 Phil. 56), When the
fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation,
the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or
crime, (Koppel Phil. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496; Lidell & Co. v. Collector, G.R. No. L-9687, June 30, 1961; Commissioner v. Norton
& Harrison Company, G.R. No. L- 17618, Aug. 31, 1964; and Guevarra, Phil. Corp. Law, 1961 ed., p. 7) the veil with which
the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who compose it will be drifted to allow for
its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. (Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845-857).
In effect, this doctrine refers to determination of liability and not to determination of jurisdiction.
This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be applied, based on the evidence to be presented, it is imperative
that the court must first have jurisdiction over the corporation. For the court to acquire jurisdiction over a domestic corporation such as the
petitionercorporation, summons must be served upon it through the officers of the corporation enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court. There is not even a semblance of any effort to serve summons upon an officer as such Since, the summons intended for
the petitioner-corporation was "not and could not be served" as certified in the sheriff's return, the lower court never acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioner-corporation. It follows that the judgment against the petitioner-corporation is null and void
The allegations that the petitioners deliberately concealed their whereabouts to escape the payment of just and valid obligations appear to
have some basis. However, allegations such as these do not justify the appellate court's upholding a judgment wherein the trial court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.
The private respondent has chosen to employ a procedure which is strictly in personam. As indicated in the cases of Citizens Surety and
Insurance, Inc. v. Melencio-Herrera (38 SCRA 369) and Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Nieto (125 SCRA 758) it is also possible to use proceedings in
rem or quasi in rem to achieve the same desired ends. There may be other ways which, if utilized, would insure that the courts acquire
jurisdiction over defendants in recovery of money cases but the shortcut method approved by the respondent court is not one of them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 2807 is SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to
the trial court for proper service of summons and trial.
SO ORDERED.
193
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142406 May 16, 2005
SPOUSES CONRADO and MA. CORONA ROMERO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SATURNINO S. ORDEN, respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the Decision1 promulgated by the
Court of Appeals (CA) on September 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 49608 and the Resolution2 promulgated on January 26, 2000, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden.
In said contract, private respondent proposed to purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at Denver cor. New York Sts.,
Cubao, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145269, for the total amount of P17M. The contract stipulated that
private respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later
than December 19, 1996 and that private respondent shall shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property.3
When private respondent failed to pay the down payment, petitioner Corona told him that she was rescinding the contract to sell.4 Private
respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-31114 alleging that he has complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is
entitled to demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. 5
Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 145269.6
On August 11, 1997, Manuel Y. Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos, subsequent buyers of the subject property sold by petitioner Corona and her
siblings, filed a motion for leave to intervene with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. They filed a motion for the
cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution dated November 26, 1997. The RTC reasoned that:
In the instant case, the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff do[es] not bear out the main allegations in the complaint. While the
filing of the notice may not have been for the purpose of molesting the defendants and the defendants-in-intervenors, still the
inscription is not necessary to protect the alleged right of the plaintiff over the subject property. The plaintiff is not entitled to the
inscription of the notice on TCT No. 145269 in the name of the defendants and others because he does not have any actionable right
over the subject property there being no deed of sale executed between him and the defendants over the subject real properties as
offered in the alleged agreement dated April 23, 1996. The alleged agreement dated April 23, 1996 although with the conformity of
Maria Corona S. Romero cannot serve as sufficient basis for the inscription of the notice on TCT No. 145269. Therefore said notice
should be cancelled.7
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was denied by the RTC in its Resolution dated August 28, 1998. 8
On November 16, 1998, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC
and asked for the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT.9 The CA granted the petition in its Decision dated September 30, 1999,
portions of which read:
First, the general rule is that a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined except in
cases expressly provided by statute.
Section 77, P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally all
rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis
194
pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled
upon the registration of certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the manner
of disposal thereof.
In the instant case, there was not even a hearing upon which could be predicated a "proper showing" that any of the grounds
provided by law exists. The cited case of Victoriano presupposes that there must be a hearing where the evidence of the party who
sought the annotation of the notice of lis pendens must be considered.
Second, as shown in the above cited provisions, there are only two grounds for the court to order the cancellation of a notice
of lis pendens during the pendency of an action, and they are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. While the
parties are locked up in legal battle and until it becomes convincingly shown that either of the two grounds exists, the court should
not allow the cancellation.
Third, the Doctrine of Lis Pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if the private respondents are allowed to file a bond
regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice. Moreover, the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice
of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated.
In the case at bench, the judgment is even defective, in that the same does not specify who among the private respondents –
whether the defendants-vendors or intervenors-vendees—should file a bond.
Fourth, if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the petitioner and the private respondents-owners (which question of fact
is not for this court to determine in this petition), then the said parties are bound by the provisions of Article 1475 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object
of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the
form of contract.
As a matter of fact, there would have been no need for a notarial rescission if there was no actionable contract at all.
Without ruling on the merits of the case below, we are constrained to remind the public respondent that when a case is commenced
involving any right to land registered under the Land Registration Law, any decision therein will bind the parties only, unless a notice
of the pendency of such action is registered on the title of said land, in order to bind the whole world as well. Therefore, in order that
a notice of lis pendens may affect the right of a subsequent purchaser, such notice should be annotated on the back of the certificate
of title.
In any case, a notation of lis pendens does not create a non-existent right or lien. It serves merely as a warning to a person who
purchases or contracts on the subject property that he does so at his peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation. It is not
even required that the applying party must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated.
Thus, it was legally erroneous for the respondent court to order the cancellation of the notice.
Finally, when a judge improperly orders the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens, he is said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion, as held in the case of Sarmiento vs. Ortiz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the public respondent dated 26 November 1997 and 28 August
1998 are SET ASIDE for being NULL AND VOID. The public respondent is directed to issue an order for the Register of Deeds to
restore the annotation of the notice of lis pendens upon the affected title.10 (Citations omitted)
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied on January 26, 2000.11 Hence the present petition alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE REANNOTATION OF THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE SUBJECT TITLE
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONENT AFFECTED NEITHER THE TITLE TO NOR THE POSSESSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.12
Petitioners contend that: the notice of lis pendens is not necessary in this case since the complaint does not pray for an express award of
ownership or possession; what is involved in this case is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale, thus, no title has passed to private
respondent yet which needs to be protected by a notice of lis pendens; by ordering the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens, when private
195
respondent did not even assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property, the CA went against the doctrine in Villanueva vs. Court
of Appeals,13where this Court held that the applicant must, in the complaint or answer filed in the subject litigation, assert a claim of
possession or title over the subject property in order to give due course to his application; the CA, in concluding that there was no hearing
before the annotation was cancelled, overlooked the fact that the motion for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12, 1997, that
private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear, and that he was able to file his opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which
the RTC considered before promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, 1997.14
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that: the court a quo cancelled the notice of lis pendens even before it has been apprised of
all the relevant facts of the case; the CA was correct in ruling that while the parties are locked in legal battle and until it becomes manifest that
the grounds set forth in Sec. 77, P.D. No. 1529 exist, the trial court should not allow the cancellation of the lis pendens; the RTC ruling in this
case is proscribed by the case of Tan vs. Lantin15 which held that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel lis pendens pending litigation,
upon the mere filing of a bond; the danger sought to be prevented by the Tan ruling, i.e., the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent
alienation, already happened in this case because the subject property was sold on July 28, 1999 by petitioners to Mueller Trading
Corporation;16 said sale was made with evident bad faith by petitioners because they had full knowledge of the pendency of private
respondent’s petition for certiorari before the CA; and the sale of the property in favor of private respondent verily affects the title to or
possession of the real properties making it the subject of the law of lis pendens.17
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate their arguments and cited AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals18 where it was held that
a notice of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real
property. They further maintain that the requirement of prior hearing was sufficiently complied with in this case and petitioners did not act in
bad faith when she sold the subject property pending the outcome of this case since there was no outstanding injunction or restraining order
which would have prevented her from doing so.19
Clearly, the only issue that needs to be addressed in the present petition is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the re-annotation of the lis pendens.
We rule in the negative.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a
suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.20 Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to
keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation.21 Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a
warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.22
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not,
of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently.23
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power, meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions of
law.24 As provided for by Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if
the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title
of the party who caused it to be recorded.25
In Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,26 we held that a notice of lis pendens is appropriate in the following:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action to quiet title thereto;
(c) an action to remove clouds thereon;
(d) an action for partition; and
(e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp.,28 we further held that resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that
involve title to or possession of real property but also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a
specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. We clarified however that the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to
property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action or suit
includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right
196
of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a
case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. In such event, the notice of lis
pendens becomes functus officio.29
To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a party has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property. It is not necessary that ownership or interest over the property is proved. 30
We disagree with petitioners’ claim that lis pendens is not proper since private respondent has no title over the property neither did he pray
specifically in his complaint for the ownership or possession thereof.
The complaint for specific performance and damages filed by private respondent specifically prayed that petitioners, as defendants thereat, be
bound by the terms and conditions of their letter-contract. By praying thus, private respondent in effect asks the court to order petitioners to
fulfill their promise to sell the property covered by TCT No. 145269 for the amount of P17M.31 While private respondent did not explicitly state
that he was running after the ownership of the property, a simple reading of the complaint would show that such was his intent. This is
sufficient for purposes of annotating lis pendens.
Whether or not the claim of private respondent has merit is of no moment and should not affect the annotation of lis pendens on the title of
the subject property. There is nothing in the rules which requires a party seeking annotation of lis pendens to show that the land belongs to
him. There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be
annotated. Thus, we have held that even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title.
Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice
of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien.32 The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation
of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It only protects the applicant’s rights which will be determined
during trial.33
In fine, petitioners failed to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
197
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16636 June 24, 1965
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BATH CONSTRUCTION AND COMPANY, CARLOS N. BAQUIRAN GONZALO AMBOY, and ANDRES TUNAC,defendants-appellants.
De Santos and Herrera for plaintiff-appellee.

Andres A. Tunac for defendants-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On April 27, 1959 the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 15518 in favor of plaintiff Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. Defendants received copy thereof on May 2, 1959. On May 12 they filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 21 the court issued an
order stating that since the said motion contained no notice of the time and place of hearing, "the same cannot even be considered as a
motion; it presents no question which the Court could decide and the latter acquires no jurisdiction to consider it."
On May 30 defendants filed what they called a supplement to their motion for reconsideration. This had the requisite notice of hearing. On
June 6, 1959 the court denied the motion for reconsideration and its supplement. Copy of the order of denial was received by defendants on
June 13. They submitted their notice of appeal and appeal bond on June 18, 1959 and their record on appeal on June 25. Plaintiff then moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it had been filed out of time, alleging that the motion for reconsideration of May 12 was pro
forma and, therefore, did not interrupt the period for appeal. On July 15, 1959 the court sustained plaintiff's motion, stating that such period
had expired on June 15. A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants but was denied in an order dated August 1. On August 26,
defendants filed a petition for relief from the order of July 15 on the ground of excusable negligence, stating that their counsel inadvertently
forgot to put the notice of hearing in their motion for reconsideration and realized the omission only when he received a copy of the courts
order of May 21, whereupon he immediately filed the supplement of May 30; and that since the court in its order of June 6 acted on the merits
of both their motion for reconsideration and its supplement, counsel was led to believe in good faith that the said motion interrupted the
period for appeal. On August 29 the petition for relief was dismissed. This case is now before us on appeal by defendants from that order of
dismissal.
Neither the motion for reconsideration nor the so-called supplement thereto appears in the record. What does appear in reference to the said
motion is that the court declined to act thereon because it could not even be considered as a motion for lack of notice of the time and place of
hearing and because it presented no question which the court could decide.
Appellants maintain that the motion was in reality one for new trial under Rule 37, Section 1, paragraph (c), and that pursuant to Section 2 of
the same Rule they specifically pointed out the findings of the court which they honestly believed to be contrary to law, making express
reference to the pertinent documentary evidence and legal provisions. The suggestion is that when the motion is upon that ground the court
may act upon it even if the movant has not set the same for hearing. The Rules, however, are quite clear on the matter. Section 2 of Rule 37,
regarding motion for new trial, requires that a written notice thereof be served by the movant on the adverse party, and this requirement
applies whichever of the grounds allowed for such motion under the preceding section of the same Rule be relied upon.
The written notice referred to evidently is that prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provide
that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the, court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that
in such a case that motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Donasco, L-18638, February 28, 1963, citing,
Manakil v. Revilla 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 44 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands v. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
The reason is obvious; unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposition.
We are not impressed by the argument that the "supplement" filed by appellants on May 30 should be deemed retroactive as of the date the
motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, cured the defect therein. To so consider it would be to put a premium on negligence and
subject the finality of judgments to the forgetfulness or whims of parties-litigants and their lawyers. This of course would be intolerable in a
well-ordered judicial system.
Furthermore, in this particular case appellants were or should have been alerted to the fact that their motion for reconsideration of May 12
did not interrupt the period for appeal when they received the court's order of May 21, 1959, wherein it was stated that what appellants had
filed was not even a motion and "presented no question which. the court could decide."
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
198
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32450-51 June 10, 1971
HONORABLE ARMANDO B. CLEDERA in his capacity as Provincial Governor of Camarines Sur, MARIANO S. TRINIDAD, in his capacity as
Provincial Vice Governor of Camarines Sur, EMILIO C. TIBLE JR., HILARIO R. ABONAL and NICANOR A. ORINO in their capacities as Members
of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur; The PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur; the PROVINCIAL ENGINEER of Camarines Sur, and
the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE ULPIANO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of
Camarines Sur, and PLUTARCO CAMANO, et al., respondents.
Enrique A. Amador & Alfredo A. Rosero, Office of the Provincial Fiscal, for petitioners.
Bonot Favorito & Tordilla for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction seeks to nullify:
(1) the order dated November 20, 1969 (Annex F, p. 37 rec.) and the order dated December 4, 1969 (Annex G, pp. 38-40, rec.) issued by the
respondent Judge giving due course to and granting the motion for reconsideration (Annex D, pp. 32-35, rec.) allegedly defective for want of
notice of hearing filed by private respondents herein as Petitioners in Civil Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763, which orders allowed the respondents to
submit additional evidence after the said cases were submitted for decision;
(2) The order dated July 17, 1970 (Annex Q, pp. 110, rec.) granting herein private respondents' motion for execution dated June 16, 1970
(Annex 1, PP. 57-58, rec.);
(3) the order dated July 29, 1970 (Annex V, pp. 133-136, rec.) denying the urgent motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioners on July
17, 1970 (Annex R, pp. 111-118, rec.); and
(4) the writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge; with the additional prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without
bond claiming that the petitioner province of Camarines Sur being a political subdivision of, is exempt from such bond like the Republic of the
Philippines, to restrain the respondent Judge and the provincial sheriff of Camarines Sur from enforcing and carrying out the order of July 17,
1970 (Annex Q, pp. 90-110, rec.) and the writ of execution dated July 22, 1970 (Annex S pp. 119-121, rec.).
In a resolution dated August 31, 1970, We required respondents to file an answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P1,000 (pp. 138-140, rec.).
The private respondents herein were employees of the provincial government of Camarines Sur and paid under the plantilla of personnel of
the road and bridge fund budget.
The provincial board of the province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 176, series of 1968, which approved the road and bridge fund
budget of the province for the fiscal year 1968-1969 and abolished the positions of herein private residents, who as a consequence filed Civil
Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763 before the respondent Judge sitting at Naga City for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages seeking their
reinstatement and payment of back salaries as well as the restoration of their respective positions previously occupied by them in the plantilla
of personnel of the road and bridge fund budget.
After the pre-trial on July 10, 1969, the parties agreed that Civil Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763 be decided jointly "on the strength of the stipulation
of facts entered into by the parties and the evidence already presented in Civil Case No. 6591"; and the parties were given five (5) days from
July 14, 1969 or until July 19, 1969 to submit their respective memoranda, after which the two cases would be deemed submitted for decision
(Annex C, p. 29, rec.).
On July 18, 1969, private respondents filed a motion to re-open the cases and to allow them to present additional evidence consisting of the
budget and plantilla of personnel of the road and bridge fund for the fiscal year 1969-70 (Annex A, pp. 23-24, rec), to which on July 25, 1969
herein petitioners filed an opposition dated July 24 1969 (Annex B, pp. 25-28, rec.).
On September 10, 1969, respondent Judge denied the said motion of herein private respondents seeking to reopen the two cases (Annex C,
pp. 29-31, rec.).
199
On November 3, 1969, herein private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order dated September 10, 1969, which
motion does not contain any notice at all setting the time, date and place of hearing.
On November 20, 1969, herein private respondents filed a request addressed to the clerk of court to set for hearing on November 24, 1969
their aforesaid motion for reconsideration dated November 3, 1969, expressly stating that a copy of the same was delivered to the Provincial
Fiscal that same day, November 20, 1969 (Annex E, p. 36, rec.).
On November 26, 1969, respondent Judge issued an order requiring herein petitioners to submit within five (5) days from receipt their
opposition to herein private respondents' motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969 (Annex F, p. 37, rec.); bat
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique Amador did not file any opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration (Annex G, p. 38, rec.).
In an order dated December 4, 1969, herein respondent Judge set aside its order of September 10, 1969 (Annex C), re-opened the two cases
and allowed respondents to present additional evidence (Annex G, pp. 38-40, rec.), consisting of the budget and plaintiff of personnel for the
fiscal year 1969-70 of the road and bridge fund to further substantiate the claim herein private respondents that their items were abolished in
bad faith.
On April 27, 1970, respondent Judge rendered a decision in both Civil Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763 in favor of herein private respondents
declaring as null and void Resolution No. 176, series of 1968 of the herein petitioners provincial governor, governor and members of the
provincial board abolishing the positions of herein private respondents, as well as directing their immediate reinstatement and the payment of
back salaries from July, 1968 until actual reinstatement together with such amounts as may be necessary to pay the contribution of the
province of Camarines Sur to the G.S.I.S. in connection with the private respondents' insurance and/or retirement, and the costs.
On May 12, 1970, the Provincial Fiscal as counsel for herein petitioners received a copy of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970.
On June 8, 1970, the herein petitioners, through Assistant Provincial Fiscal Enrique A. Amador, filed a 15 page motion dated June 6, 1970 for
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision (pp. 41-55, rec.), together with a notice of hearing (p. 56, rec.) address to the clerk of court as
follows:
The Clerk of Court Court of First Instance Naga City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for resolution of the Honorable Court upon receipt hereof.
Naga City, June 6, 1970.
(Sgd.) ENRIQUE A. AMADOR 4th Asst. Provincial Fiscal
Copy Received:
Atty. Vicente T. Bonot
Counsel for Petitioners
Naga City
Both the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and said notice of hearing were personally delivered to and received on the same day June 8,
1970 by the counsel of herein respondents whose office is in Naga City itself. (See bottom of pp. 55-56, rec.; Annex H, pp. 41-56, rec.).
On June 16, 1970, herein private respondents filed a motion for execution on the ground that the decision had already become final since no
appeal therefrom had been interposed and perfected by herein petitioners within thirty (30) days from their receipt on May 12, 1970 of the
aforesaid decision.
In paragraph 3 of said motion for execution, herein private respondents expressly admitted that herein petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration dated June 6, 1970 of the aforesaid decision of April 27, 1970, claiming however that the same motion was "fatally
defective, pro forma, and should not be considered ... because it failed to comply with the mandatory and elementary provisions of See. 2 of
Rule 37 in relation to Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; consequently, the filing of such motion for reconsideration ... did not
and should not toll the running of the period for appeal." (Annex 1, pp. 57-58, rec.).
Herein petitioners filed their opposition dated June 17, 1970 to the aforesaid motion for execution on the ground that they had complied with
Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that their motion for reconsideration is
considered as a motion for new trial citing the case of Blouse vs. Moreno,1 and the filing of thereof in accordance with Rules 37 and 15 of the
Revised Rules of Court such suspends the period for perfecting the appeal citing YIanan vs. Mercado2 (Annex "J", pp. 56-60, rec.).
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Pursuant to the order of respondent Judge dated June 19, 1970 (Annex K, p. 61, rec.), herein private respondents and petitioners filed their
memoranda respectively on June 24 and June 25, 1970 in support of their respective positions in connection with the motion for execution and
position thereto (Annexes L & M, pp. 62-76, rec.); and herein private respondents filed their reply dated June 29, 1970 to herein petitioners'
memorandum (Annex "N", pp. 79-82, rec.), and supplemental memorandum dated June 29, 1970 (Annex "O", pp. 80-82, rec.). Herein
petitioners filed their reply (properly rejoinder) dated June 25, 1970 to herein private respondents' memorandum and reply memorandum
respectively dated, June 24 and June 26, 1970 (Annex "P", pp. 83-89, rec.).
In a well-reasoned order dated July 17, 1970, respondent Judge granted herein private respondents motion for execution, relying on the cases
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction,3 Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co.,4 Magno vs. Ortiz,5 in Re Disciplinary
Action vs. Atty. Vicente Raul AImacen in L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,6 and Sebastian vs. Cabal, et al.,7 where this High Tribunal repeatedly
enunciated that the requirements of Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory in relation to See. 2 of Rule 37 of the
Revised Rules of Court (Annex pp. 90-110).
Reiterating their invocation of the case of Sun Un Giok vs. Matusa,8 herein petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order dated July 17, 1970 granting the motion for execution insisting that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard" also citing Borja vs. Tan9 and Embate vs. Penolio 10 (Annex R, pp.
111-118, rec.).
The Branch clerk of court issued a writ of execution dated July 22, 1970 pursuant to the order dated July 17, 1970 (Annex S, pp. 119-121, rec.).
Herein petitioners filed a supplement dated July 24, 1970 to their urgent motion dated July 22, 1970 for the reconsideration of the order dated
July 17, 1970 (Annex T pp. 122-123, rec.), which urgent motion for reconsideration and he supplement thereto they set for hearing on July 27,
1970, notice of which was received respectively on July 23 and July 24, 1970 by counsel for herein private respondents (see pp. 118 & 123,
rec.).
At the hearing on July 27, 1970 of the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and the supplement thereto, both counsels for herein petitioners
and respondents appeared. The counsel for herein petitioners intimated to the court that he did not intend, by his defective notice of hearing,
to submit his motion for reconsideration of the decision to the respondent Judge for immediate resolution; that in a conference between 1
and 4 P.M. on June 8,1970 with the herein petitioners vice governor and provincial board members, he informed said herein petitioners that
he filed his motion for reconsideration with the clerk of court with the request that the same be given to the respondent Judge so that it can
be acted upon, and that Atty. Oriño, a provincial board member, told him to request the clerk of court to set the motion for hearing because
the members of the provincial board desire to argue by themselves; and that on that same day, June 8, 1970, he informed the respondent
Judge of the said desire of the board members, adding that he did not place the exact date of hearing, for he "had no inkling that his motion
will be questioned later" (Annex U pp. 124-127, t.s.n. of hearing of July 27, 1970 before respondent Judge).
At the said hearing on July 27 1970, the respondent Judge admitted that the counsel for herein petitioners so informed him on June 8, 1970 of
the desire of the respondents members of the provincial board to be heard by themselves on the motion for reconsideration (p. 127, rec.), to
which he replied "By all means", believing then "that the motion was in order" (p. 127, rec.).
In an order dated July 29, 1970, respondent Judge denied herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 17, 1970
(Annex V, pp. 133-136, rec.).
With respect to the orders dated November 26, 1969 and December 4, 1969 giving due course to and granting the motion of herein private
respondents dated November 3, 1969 for the reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969 as well as allowing them to submit
additional evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador, as counsel for herein petitioners, is already estopped
from questioning its validity for non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15, by reason of his failure to submit his opposition to the said
motion for reconsideration, despite the fact that he was granted by the respondent Judge in an order dated November 26, 1969, five (5) days
from receipt there of within which to submit his opposition. Such failure to contest the aforesaid motion dated November 3, 1969 for the
reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969 denying the motion of herein private respondents for the re-opening of the two cases
constitutes abandonment or waiver of the right on the part of herein petitioners to challenge the validity of the said motion for
reconsideration and the consequent order dated December 4, 1969 granting the same, and such want of notice cannot he raised for the first
time on appeal, 11 nor certiorari. 12 This abandonment or waiver was emphasized by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador in his motion dated
June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970 for the reconsideration of the decision dated April 27, 1970 and in his urgent motion dated July 22, 1970
for the reconsideration of the order of execution dated July 17, 1970, wherein he stated that he did not any more question the legality of the
said order because of the desire of petitioners to afford herein private respondents of "maximum opportunity to prove their cases" (Annexes G
& R, pp. 48 & 117, rec.). As a matter of fact, at the hearing on July 27, 1970 on the urgent motion dated July 22, 1970 of the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal for the reconsideration of the order of execution dated July 17, 1970, the respondent Judge intimated that had Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Amador filed an opposition to the motion of herein respondents for the reconsideration of the order dated September 10, 1969 or a motion
for reconsideration of the order dated December 4, 1969 granting the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of herein private respondents and
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allowing them to present additional evidence in the two civil case on the ground of absence of the notice of hearing required by the rules, he
(herein respondent Judge) would have corrected his mistake (Annex U, pp. 124, 130, rec.).
And as herein respondent Judge himself stated, the order dated September 10, 1969 was purely interlocutory as it is not a decision on the
merits of the two civil cases, which he motu propio could have rectified at anytime before the actual presentation of additional evidence by
herein private respondents.
II
We now come to the question whether the order of execution. dated July 17, 1970, the order dated July 29, 1970 denying herein petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the said order of execution and the writ of execution dated July 22, 1970 were validly issued. This issue in turn
hinges on whether the notice accompanying the motion dated June 6, 1970 and filed on June 8, 1970 for the reconsideration of the decision
dated April 27, 1970, complies with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
We have to sustain the learned respondent Judge, Honorable Ulpiano Sarmiento, who correctly rejected the contention of herein petitioner
that the said notice of hearing substantially complies with the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court, invoking the cases of Bath,
Fulton, Magno, Almacen and Sebastian, supra. All these five cases decided in 1965, 1967, 1969 and 1970 and after the effectivity on January 1,
1964 of the Revised Rules of Court, reiterated the rule that the requirements of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to Section 2 of Rule
37 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith renders any motion as a useless scrap of paper, which does not
merit the attention of the court. Said sections read thus —
Sec. 2, Rule 37: — Contents of motion for new trial and notice thereof. — The motion shall be made in writing stating the
ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. ... (Emphasis
supplied).
Sec. 4, Rule 15: Notice. — Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3)
days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying
it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may
dispose of on its own motion.
Sec. 5, Rule 15: Contents of notice. — The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall directed the time and
place for the hearing of the motion.
See. 6, Rule 15: Proof of service, to be filed with motion. — No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of
service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected.
The pertinent facts in the case of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath Construction and Company 13 where this Court dealt squarely with
the effect of lack of notice of hearing of a motion for reconsideration, are as follows: On April 27, 1959, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of plaintiff. Copy of the decision was received by the defendants on May 2, 1959. On May 12, 1959, the defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing. On May 21, 1959, the trial court issued an order stating that since
the said motion contained no notice of the time and place of hearing, "the same cannot even be considered as a motion; it presents no
question which the court could decide and the latter acquires no jurisdiction to consider it." On May 30, 1959 (the 29th day from receipt of a
copy of the decision), the defendants filed a supplement to their motion for reconsideration with the requisite notice of place and time of
hearing. The defect of the defendants' motion for reconsideration dated May 12, 1959 having been cured by their subsequent "supplement to
their motion for reconsideration," dated May 30, 1959, the trial court acted on the merit of the motion and supplement and denied both in an
order dated June 6, 1959. Copy of the order of denial of the motion was received on June 13, 1959 by the defendants who filed their notice of
appeal and appeal both on June 18, 1959 and their record on appeal on June 25, 1959. Plaintiff then moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it had been filed out of time, alleging that the motion for reconsideration of May 12, 1959 was pro forma and, therefore, did not
interrupt the running of the period for appeal. On July 15, 1959, the trial court sustained the plaintiff's motion stating that such period had
expired on June 15, 1959. The defendants appealed the order of dismissal.
This Court, thru Mr. Justice Querube Makalintal (with Justice Bautista Angelo not taking part and Justice Barrera then on leave), sustained the
trial court's order, and pointed out that:
The written notice referred to evidently is that prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, sections 4 and 5 (formerly
Rule 26), which provide that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same rule no motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece
of paper (PNB vs. Donasco
L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963, citing Manakil vs. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Unisan, 44
Phil. 866; Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious, unless the movant sets the time and place of
202
hearing the court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects,
to hear him on his objection, since the Rules do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
We are not impressed by the argument that the "supplement" filed by the appellants on May 30 should be deemed retrotive
as of the date the motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, cured the defect therein. To so consider it would be
to put a premium an negligence and subject to finality of judgments to the forgetfulness or whims of parties litigants and
their lawyers. This of course would be intolerable in a well-ordered judicial system.
Furthermore, in this particular case appellants were or should have been alerted to the fact that their motion for
reconsideration of May 12 did with interrupt the period for appeal when they received the court's order of May 21, 1959,
wherein it was stated that what appellants had filed was not even a motion and "presented no question which the court
could decide". (pp. 437-438; Emphasis supplied).
Confronted with the same question. on lack of notice of hearing, this Court, in the case of Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad
Co., 14 declared that the notice required by Section 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is mandatory, and the failure to
give the same is fatal. The pertinent facts therein are as follows: On September 30, 1964, the trial court rendered its decision, Notice of which
was received by the plaintiff on October 7, 1964. On October 12, 1964, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision without
setting the same for hearing, which was supplemented however, by a "motion to set", dated November 11, 1964, setting the aforesaid motion
for reconsideration for hearing on November 14, 1964. In order dated November 18, 1964, the trial court denied the motion, declaring itself
without jurisdiction to pass upon the same after the 30-day period for appeal. Upon a motion for reconsideration of this last order, the trial
court, on December 1, 1964, amended its decision of September 30, 1964. Defendants appealed.
Mr. Justice Eugenio Angeles, speaking for a unanimous COURT, declared the order of December 1, 1964 null and void, and stressed that:
The present provision of section 2, Rule 37 construed in relation to sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
provides that a written notice of a motion for new trial shall be served by the movant on the adverse party stating the time
and place of hearing thereof, and the court shall not act upon the motion without proof of such notice. Said provision
repealed the provision of section 146 of the old Code of Civil Procedure and the rulings founded therein, (Soriano vs.
Ramirez, 44 Phil. 519; Ignacio vs. Sison and Navarro, 56 Phil. 451), to the effect that the notice must be served by the court
on the adverse party (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. II [1163 Ed.] p. 212). The notice therein required is now mandatory, and
the failure of herein appellee to give notice of the time and place of hearing of the motion it filed in the court below, was
indeed fatal to its cause.
xxx xxx xxx
... We also cannot subscribe to the contention of herein appellee that the failure to give notice of the time and place of
hearing of its motion for reconsideration was cured when it subsequently filed a motion to set it for hearing. The motion
for reconsideration that failed to give the requisite notice of hearing, did not toll the running of the period for appeal, and
the said reglementary period naturally elapsed. The decision of September 30, 1964 therein sought to be reconsidered,
had then become final when the subsequent motion to set the same for hearing was filed on November 11, 1964. ... (pp.
981-983).
In the case of Magno vs. Ortiz, et al., 15 this COURT, in resolving issue as to "whether or not petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed in the
court a quo without a notice of hearing, but concerning which a notice was subsequently caused by the court itself to be served upon all
parties concerned, suspended the period for appeal", pointed out "that the duty to give such notice devolves upon the movant, not upon the
court", and that, as already pointed out in Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., supra, section 2 of Rule 37 repealed the provision
of section 146 of the old Code of Civil Procedure and the rulings founded thereon, to the affect that the notice must be served by the court on
the adverse party.
The pertinent facts of the Magno case are as follows: On October 31, 1963, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, copy of which was
received by intervenor Gualberto V. Magno on December 12, 1963. On January 11, 1964, the thirtieth day from receipt of the copy of the
judgment, the intervenor Magno filed by registered mail with the court a quo a motion for reconsideration. The said motion did not contain a
notice of hearing. On January 27, 1964, respondent Judge motu propio caused to be served upon all parties concerned a notice setting the
motion for hearing on February 8, 1964. On the same day, January 27, respondent Suazo moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
decision on the ground that it had already become final and executory since neither the defendants nor the intervenor perfected an appeal
within the reglementary period. On March 9, 1964, respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration and allowing the
issuance of a writ of execution. On March 17, 1964, petitioner moved to reconsider that petition of the order dated March 9, which allowed
the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in considering the subject motion for
reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, and that "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof
and lack of opportunity to be heard" citing Borja vs. Tan, Duran Embate vs. Penolio and Sun, Un Giok vs. Matusa.
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This COURT, in a unanimous decision again penned by Mr. Justice Querube Makalintal, ruled that the cases relied upon by petitioner are not in
point thus: .
As correctly stated by the trial Court, the subject motion for reconsideration was in fact a motion for new trial. The reasons
relied upon are equivalent to an assertion that the decision was contrary to law, which is a ground for new trial (Rule 37,
See. 1[c]. The applicable rule on the matter, therefore, is Sec. 2 of Rule 37, construed in relation to Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule
15, which provide that a written notice of a motion for new trial shall be served by the movant on the adverse party,
stating the time and place of the hearing thereof, and that without proof of service of the notice the motion shall not be
acted upon by the court. These provisions have been applied in the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Bath
Construction Co., et al., G. R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965 and reiterated in Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et
al., G.R. No. L-24263, November 18, 1967.
As regards the notice of hearing caused to be issued by respondent Judge, it is contended that it cured the defect of lack of
notice. Under the facts of this case, the contention is incorrect. In the first place, the duty to give such notice desolves
upon the movant, not upon the court. In Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., supra, it was pointed out
categorically that Sec. 2 of Rule 37 repealed the provision of Sec. 146 of the old Code of Civil Procedure and the rulings
founded thereon, to the effect that the notice must be served by the court on the adverse party. Secondly, even granting
that the court a quo had authority to issue motu propio the notice of hearing, such notice nevertheless did not cure the
defect of the motion for reconsideration. For while the motion was filed on the thirtieth day from notice of the decision
the notice of hearing was only issued sixteen (16) days thereafter. Considering that a defective motion for reconsideration
does not toll the running of the period for appeal, the decision in Civil Case No. 410 had already become final when the
notice of hearing was issued by respondent judge. (pp. 696-697).
"In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen in G.R. No. L-27654, Antonio H. Calero vs. Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay", 16 this COURT, thru Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (with Justice Enrique M. Fernando not taking part), reaffirmed the Bath case,
supra, and pronounced that "the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the 'accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings', it traced procedural
lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions." .... "As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew — or ought to have known, — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing
(which admittedly he did not)." (p. 575) .
Dealing with a motion for reconsideration without the requisite notice of time and place of hearing, the COURT once more than Mr. Justice
Querube Makalintal (with Justice Antonio Barredo not taking part), in Sebastian vs. Cabal, 17reiterated the rule in the Bath and Fulton cases
and held that:
The Rules of Court are quite clear. For motions in general, Rule 15, Secs. 4 and 5, provides that notice of a motion shall
state the time and place of hearing and shall be served upon all parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to See. 6 of the same Rule, no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it
has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper. The reason is obvious; unless the
movant sets the time and place of hearing the court would have no way to determine whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period
within which be may file his reply or opposition. (pp. 454-455).
The fact that the abovementioned cases dealt with motions which initially did not contain nor were accompanied by any
notice of hearing, while the motion in the case at bar contains a notice of hearing but deficient, does not preclude the
application of the rule enunciated in said cases because the notice of hearing in the present case is fatally defective, for it
failed to indicate the place and time of hearing of the motion as required by section 2 of Rule 37 in' relation to Sections 4,
5, and 6 of Rule 15, and therefore the same is as stated by the respondent Judge, "worse than no notice at all".
The provisions of the aforequoted rules are clear and are couched in simple language, understandable to any college student, even if he is not
a student of law. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 require that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place for the hearing of the motion, which notice shall also be served to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion and other supporting documents. Section 4 of Rule 15 does not state that such notice shall be
directed to the clerk of court, much less to the judge himself. Neither does it allow that the notice shall be served any time before or on the
day of the hearing, for the rule requires that the adverse parties should be served with such notice at least three days before the hearing, to
give them an opportunity to contest the motion and be heard thereon. There is no ambiguity nor vagueness in the rules. Failure to give at least
three days notice prior to the hearing vitiates the notice. 18
But as pointed out by the respondent Judge, the notice of hearing was addressed to the clerk of court, not to the adverse parties. It did not set
the time and place of hearing. On the contrary, from its tenor it was to be submitted for the immediate resolution of the court, without giving
the adverse party at least three (3) days to oppose the motion for reconsideration of the decision.
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Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador was still following the old form pursuant to Section 146 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure, which directed
the Judge to serve the notice of hearing upon the adverse party. This provision has been expressly repealed by Section 2 of Rule 37 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as categorically held in the cases of Fulton and Magno, supra.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador had still three (3) days within which to cure the very defective notice of hearing from June 8, 1970, when he
filed his motion of the reconsideration of the decision until June 11, 1970, when the 30-day period of appeal expired and the decision became
final. But he miserably neglected to do so, in spite of the fact that in the afternoon of June 8, 1970, respondent Atty. Nicanor E. Oriño, a
member of the provincial board and one of the herein petitioners, asked him to request the clerk of court to set the motion for hearing
because the respondent members of the provincial board desired to argue their motion for reconsideration by themselves, about which desire
he himself informed the respondent Judge that same afternoon of June 27,1970 on his urgent motion dated July 22, 1970 for the
reconsideration of the order of execution dated July 17, 1970 (Annex U, pp. 124-127, rec.), Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador admitted his
negligence in not submitting an appropriate notice of hearing regarding his motion for reconsideration of the decision as required by Sections
4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court. When he recalled at said hearing on July 27, 1970 that he
informed the respondent Judge about the desire of the provincial board members to argue their motion for reconsideration of the decisions,
respondent Judge replied that his answer to the aforesaid information was "by all means", believing then "that the motion was in oreder" and
that he had no inkling that the motion was defective (Annex U, p. 127, rec.).
Sections 4, 5,, and 6 of Rule 15 were decide against such negligence, forgetfulness or whim of party litigants and their lawyers, which are
intolerable in a well-ordered judicial system if the finality of a judgement abated thereby. 19
Herein petitioners lean heavily on the cases of Un Giok vs. Matusa 20 and Inesin et al., vs. Canonoy, et al., 21decided respectively in 1957 and
1960 — long before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964 — which do not govern, because the facts therein are at
variance with those ofthe case at bar.
In the 1957 Matusa case, the notice of hearing addressed to the clerk of court reads thus: "Please submit the foregoing Motion to Dismiss
Complaint and Amended Complaint for the proper consideration of the Honorable Court and as soon as thereafter as counsel can be heard",
followed by a certification by the counsel that he had sent a copy of the foregoing motion to plaintiff's counsel on September 9, 1955 "by
registered mail as evidenced by registry receipt No. 703 hereto attached, at Sibalom, Antique". The said motion to dismiss was received by the
clerk of court, who set it for hearing on September 24, 1955, although the plaintiff averred that he was not notified of said hearing. Counsel for
plaintiff did not appear on said date, but, because defendant was not able to present proof of service on the adverse party, the trial court
deferred action on the motion to dismiss and issued an order dated September 24, 1955 postponing consideration on the same until proof can
be shown that counsel for plaintiff had received a copy of said motion to dismiss. Plaintiff Matusa received a copy of said order of
postponement, but before counsel for defendant could present the required proof for service, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendant in default which was granted in order dated October 15, 1955, and, consequently, the trial court received plaintiff's evidence
and judgment was rendered thereon. 22
In reversing the order of default and the decision granted by the trial court on the ground that defendant Matusa was deprived of his day in
court, We held:
From the aforequoted sections (referring to Sees. 4 and 5 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, now Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court), it is required that notice of a motion directed to the parties concerned, must be served by the
movant stating therein the time and place for the hearing of the said motion. Counsel for defendant in addressing the
notice to the Clerk of Court requesting that said motion be submitted for the "consideration of the Honorable Court and as
soon as thereafter as counsel can be heard", and at the same time certifying that he had sent a copy of the motion to the
counsel for therein plaintiff, such notice seems to substantially comply with the requirement of section 5 of Rule 26, for in
virtue of said notice, the hearing was actually set by Clerk of Court for September 24, 1955, of which, We can presume,
counsel for respondent Hermogenes Matusa was notified. Respondents banked on the ruling laid down in the case
of Manakil vs. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81, but the pronouncement therein is based on the provision of section 6 of the same Rule
26 (Section 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court), which reads as follows:
See. 6. Proof of service, to be filed with motion. — No motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without
proof of service of the notice thereof.
It was in virtue of this requisite of proof of service that the trial court, in its order of September 24, 1955, deferred action
on the motion to dismiss, postponing the same indefinitely until counsel for defendant could produce the necessary
evidence that adverse party was furnished with copy of said motion, despite the fact that defendant's attorney certified
that a copy of said pleading was sent by registered mail to adverse party and even attached to it the registry receipt
thereof. The case of Manakil vs. Revilla, supra enunciated that notice of motions is necessary, and, without proof of service
thereof, a motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper which the clerk should not receive for filing, but the facts of the
case at bar are quite different.
But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the notice in question, as quoted above is defective, for failure to specify
the exact date when that motion should be heard. Even so, We believe that the Court in taking cognizance of the motion
on the date set for hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such pleading may have had, specially if it is taken into
account that upon receipt of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff was properly notified of the existence of said pleading. ....
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As was stated, the deficiency of the notice of hearing in the Matusa case was cured when the clerk of court set the motion for hearing and the
court took cognizance of the motion on the date set for hearing thereof by the clerk of court.
In the 1960 Canonoy case, counsel for the defendants received a copy of the order of dismissal on October 7, 1955, and on October 31, they
moved to reconsider the said Order. The motion for reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing, but on December 6, 1956, a motion
was presented asking the clerk of court to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing on December 22. The motion was opposed on the
ground that it contained no notice of hearing and therefore should be considered as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of
the period for the judgment to become final. Nevertheless, the court reconsidered and set aside its order of dismissal. This Court, in affirming
the order of the lower court, stated:
It is to be noted that the court of first instance holds its sessions in Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur, only once a year on the
dates to be fixed by the district judge (sec. 151, Rev. Adm. Code, superseded by See. 54 of Rep. Act No. 296). As the
sessions in Pagadian are not continuous throughout the year, and since it is not shown that, at the time the respondents
herein presented the motion to reconsider the order of dismissal, the Judge of the Court of First Instance had already set
the date for the next term, the attorney for the movant, respondent herein, could not set the motion for hearing, not
knowing on what date or in what month the next yearly session in Pagadian was to take place. It is true that the attorney
for the respondent could have set the motion for hearing, on the first day of the term, asking the clerk of court to set it for
hearing on that date, but the failure to adopt such a step could not have meant negligence or neglect on the part of the
attorney for the movants for said attorney had the alternative to set the motion for hearing as soon as the judge has fixed
the following term of the court in that municipality. Under the rules, which we have enjoined to be interpreted liberally,
and under the circumstances, we are not prepared to declare that the said motion, which was accepted by the clerk of
court was a mere scrap of paper. ....
It is patent in the Canonoy case that the failure on the part of counsel to set the date of hearing of his motion was not due to neglect or
negligence on his part but because he could not do so as he did not know the date or the month when the next yearly section of the court in
Pagadlian would take place as there was no showing that at the time he filed his motion the court had already fixed the date for the next term.
It is evident therefore that the circumstances which compelled the court to regard the notice of hearing in the Matusa case; as having been
remedied or which justified the failure inability of the counsel in the Canonoy case to fix a date for the hearing of his motion, dip not obtain in
the instant case. Here, the clerk of court did not set the motion of herein petitioners for reconsideration of the decision for hearing on a
definite date, much less did the respondent Judge take cognizance of the said motion for reconsideration. And the respondent Judge holds
hearing every business day throughout the year in Naga City, unlike the Judge in the Canonoy case.
Neither did herein private respondents file an opposition to the aforementioned motion of herein petitioners for the reconsideration of the
decision, so as to bring the case at bar within the purview of the doctrine in the case of Macasero vs. Saguin; 23 much less were the merits of
the said motion for reconsideration of the decision argued. The hearing and argument were limited to the motion for the reconsideration of
the order granting the motion for execution.
Withal, the facts in the instant case do not justify a liberal application of the rules.
To emphasize once more, the directives in Section 2 of Rule 37 and Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of Court are as
mandatory as they are clear and simple; and non compliance therewith is fatal to the cause of the movant, because the mere filing of the
motion for reconsideration, without the requisite notice of hearing, does not toll the running of the period for appeal. Unless the movant has
the time and place of hearing in the notice and serves the adverse party with the same, the court would have no way to determine whether
the party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period
within which to file his reply or opposition. The rules commanding the movant to serve of the adverse party a written notice of the motion
(Section 2, Rule 37) and that the notice of hearing "shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall estate the time and place for the
hearing of the motion" (Section 5, Rule 15), do not provide for any qualifications, much less exceptions. To deviate from the peremptory
principle thus uniformly reaffirmed in the cases aforecited in, and to exempt from the rigor of the operation of said principle, the case at bar
would be one step in the emasculation of the revised rules and would be subversive of the stability of the rules and jurisprudence thereon —
all to the consternation of the Bench and Bar and other interested persons as well as the general public who would thereby be subjected to
such an irritating uncertainty as to when to render obedience to the rule and when their requirements may be ignored. We had to draw a line
where and did when we promulgated on January 1, 1964 the Revised Rules of court wherein WE delineated in a language matchless in
simplicity and clarity the essential requirements for a valid notice of hearing on any motion, to eliminate all possibilities of equivocation or
misunderstanding.
WE have been so unyielding on this matter that even in the aforementioned case of Manila Surety, 24 WE ruled that the filing of the requisite
notice of hearing one day before the expiration of the period to appeal, does not retroact to the date of the filing of the motion for
reconsideration, which was filed much earlier or just ten days after receipt of the decision. In the Fulton case, 25 wherein the movant therein
filed the requisite notice of hearing five days after the 30-day period for appeal had expired, although the motion for reconsideration itself was
filed five (5) days after receipt of the decisions, WE maintained the same rule. In the case of Magno, 26 again WE reiterated the same principle,
even when the trial Judge himself caused to be served upon all the parties a notice of hearing. The movant in the Magno case filed his motion
for reconsideration on the thirtieth day from his receipt of the decision without the requisite notice of hearing, which he filed sixteen (16) days
after the expiration of the 30-day period for appeal.
206
WHEREFORE, the orders dated November 26, 1969, December 4, 1969, July 17, 1970, and July 29, 1970 as well as the writ of execution issued
on July 22, 1970 are hereby affirmed as valid; the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby lifted; and the petition is hereby
dismissed, with cost.
207
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994
LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO, respondents.
Jerome T. Paras for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In an effort to declog the courts of an increasing volume of work load and, most importantly, in order to accord contending parties with
expenditious alternatives for settling disputes, the law authorities, indeed encourages, out of court settlements or adjudications. Compromises
and arbitration are widely known and used as such acceptable methods of resolving adversarial claims.
Arbitrations, in particular, is governed by a special law, Republic Act 876, suppletory to which are laws and rules of general application. This
case before us concerns the jurisdiction of courts, in relation to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, and, in that respect, the
applicability of the doctrine of estoppel. The law (R.A. 876), specifically Section 6 thereof, provides:
Sec. 6. Hearing by court. — A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to perform under an agreement
in writing providing for arbitration may petition the court for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement. Five days notice in writing of the hearing of such application shall be served either
personally or by registered mail upon the party in default. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement or such failure to comply therewith is not in issue, shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the making of the agreement or default be in
issue the court shall proceed to summarily hear such issue. If the finding be that no agreement in writing providing for
arbitration was made, or that there is no default in the proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the
finding be that a written provision for arbitration was made and there is a default in proceeding thereunder, an order shall
be made summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
The court shall decide all motions, petitions or application filed under the provisions of this Act, within ten days after such
motions, petitions, or applications have been heard by it.
In chronology, the events that have led to the case at bench are detailed in the appealed decision of respondent appellate court, which we
here reproduce in toto.
Original action for Certiorari and Prohibition for Annulment of the Orders, dated April 26, 1990 and June 22, 1990,
respectively, of Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, in Special Case No. 6024 for Enforcement of ARBITRATION
Agreement with Damages. Petitioner assails that portion of subject Order of April 26, 1990, stating as follows:
(1) Petitioner's claim for damages predicated on alleged tortuous acts of respondents La Naval Drug
corporation such as their alleged interference and dilatory tactics, etc. in the implementation of the
Arbitration Agreement in the Contract of Lease, thereby compelling among others the petitioner to go
to Court for redress; and respondent La Naval Drug Corporation's counterclaim for damages may be
entertained by this Court in a hearing — not summary — for the purpose, under the Rules of Court.
(2) A preliminary hearing of the special and affirmative defense to show that Petitioner has not cause of
action against respondent's claim for damages is denied; a resolution on this issue is deferred after the
trial of the case on the merits.
And challenges the Order of June 22, 1990 denying its motion for reconsideration of the said earlier Order.
From the petition below of respondent Yao, it appears that he is the present owner of a commercial building a portion of
which is leased to petitioner under a contract of lease executed on December 23, 1993 with the former owner thereof, La
Proveedora, Inc., which contract expired on April 30, 1989. However, petitioner exercised its option to lease the same
208
building for another five years. But petitioner and respondent Yao disagreed on the rental rate, and to resolve the
controversy, the latter, thru written notices to the former, expressed his intention to submit their disagreement to
arbitration, in accordance with Republic Act 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration Law, and paragraph 7 of their lease
contract, providing that:
7. . . . Should the parties fail to agree on the rate of rentals, the same shall be submitted to a group of
Arbitrators composed of three (3) members, one to be appointed by LESSOR, another by LESSEE and
the third one to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators previously chosen and the parties hereto shall
submit to the decision of the arbitrators.
Thus, on May 6, 1989, respondent Yao appointed Domingo Alamarez, Jr. as his arbitrator, while on June 5, 1989, petitioner
chose Atty. Casiano Sabile as its arbitrator. The confirmation of the appointment of Aurelio Tupang, as third arbitrator, was
held in abeyance because petitioner instructed Atty. Sabile to defer the same until its Board of Directors could convene and
approve Tupang's appointment. Respondent Yao theorizes that this was petitioner's design to delay the arbitration
proceedings, in violation of the Arbitration Law, and the governing stipulation of their contract of lease.
On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, respondent Yao prayed that after summary hearing pursuant to Section 6 of the
Arbitration Law, Atty. Casiano Sabile and Domingo Alamarez be directed to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with
Section 7 of subject Contract of Lease and the applicable provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming
the appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be ordered to immediately convene and
resolve the controversy before it, pursuant to Section 12 and the succeeding sections of the Arbitration Law. (Annex "A,"
Petition.)
In its Answer with Counterclaim (Annex "C," Petition), petitioner here specifically denied the averments of the petition
below; theorizing that such petition is premature since respondent Yao has not yet formally required arbitrators Alamarez
and Sabile to agree on the third arbitrator, within ten (10) days from notice, and that the delay in the arbitration was due
to respondent Yao's failure to perform what is incumbent upon him, of notifying and thereafter, requiring both arbitrators
to appoint the third member of the Board of Arbitrators. According to petitioner, it actually gave arbitrators Sabile and
Alamarez a free hand in choosing the third arbitrator; and, therefore, respondent Yao has no cause of action against it
(petitioner). By way of Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that it suffered actual damages of P100,000.00; and incurred
attorney's fees of P50,000.00, plus P500.00 for every court appearance of its counsel.
On October 20, 1989, respondent Yao filed an amended petition for "Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with
Damages;" praying that petitioner be ordered to pay interest on the unpaid rents, at the prevailing rate of interest in
commercial banks, and exemplary damages of at least P250,000.00.
On October 24, 1989, despite petitioner's opposition to the motion to admit the amended petition, the respondent court
admitted the same.
On October 31, 1989, petitioner answered the amended petition; contending, among others, that the amended petition
should be dismissed on the ground of non-payment of the requisite filing fees therefor; and it being in the nature of an
ordinary civil action, a full blown and regular trial, is necessary; so that respondent Yao's proposition for a summary
hearing of the arbitration issue and separate trial for his claim for damages is procedurally untenable and implausible.
Invoking Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, petitioner presented a "Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing" of its
special and affirmative defenses, which are grounds fro a motion to dismiss.
In its Order of November 14, 1989, the respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa R. Narciso
as the third arbitrator. And on November 21, 1989, it ordered the parties to submit their position papers on the issue as to
whether or not respondent Yao's claim for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for enforcement of
arbitration agreement. It likewise informed the parties that petitioner's Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing" of
Special and Affirmative Defenses would be resolved together with the question of damages.
On April 26, 1990, the aforequoted assailed Order issued. In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner
argued that in Special Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and is not
competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action. But the
respondent court was not persuaded by petitioner's submission. On June 22, 1990, it denied the motion for
reconsideration. (Rollo, pp. 89-93).
While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its
special jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however,
considered petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings
private respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo.
209
It is hardly disputable that when a court is called upon to exercise limited and special jurisdiction, that court cannot stray to matters outside
the area of its declared authority or beyond what has been expressly invested by law (Elumbaring vs. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384, 387),
particularly, such as in this instance, where the proceedings are summary in nature.
Prefatorily, recalling the distinctions, pertinent to the case, between the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, on the
one hand, and its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, upon the other hand, should be useful.
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by this Court would likewise seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant from pursuing
that defense by alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the action.
A citation of a few of our decisions might be apropos.
In Wang Laboratories, Inc., vs. Mendoza (156 SCRA 44), this Court has ruled that if the defendant, besides setting up in a motion to dismiss his
objection to the jurisdiction of the court, alleges at the same time any other ground for dismissing the action, he is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In the process, it has equated the matter to a situation where, such as in Immaculata vs. Judge Navarro,
et al. (146 SCRA 5), the defendant invokes an affirmative relief against his opponent.
In De Midgely vs. Judge Ferandos (64 SCRA 23, 31), the Court elaborated thusly:
We are of the opinion that the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of Mrs. Midgely by reason of her
voluntary appearance. The reservation in her motion to dismiss that she was making a special appearance to contest the
court's jurisdiction over her person may be disregarded.
It may be disregarded because it was nullified by the fact that in her motion to dismiss she relied not only on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over her person but also on the ground that there was no showing that earnest efforts were exerted to
compromise the case and because she prayed "for such other relief as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper."
xxx xxx xxx
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be
for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to
object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A special
appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be
a general appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of the action upon the further
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Syllabus, Flores vs. Zurbito, supra, at page 751. That rule
was followed in Ocampo vs. Mina and Arejola, 41 Phil. 308).
The justification for the rule was expressed in Republic vs. Ker and Companry, Ltd. (18 SCRA 207, 213-214), in this wise:
We observed that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing the lower court's jurisdiction over
defendant's person, prayed for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action had prescribed. By
interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker & Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense on the basis of
which it prayed the court to resolve controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant Ker &
Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latter's person, who, being the proponent of the affirmative
defense, should be deemed to have abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Voluntary appearance cures defects of summons, if any, Such defect, if any, was further cured when defendant filed its
answer to the complaint. A defendant can not be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting to
the court's jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction over its person if and
when the judgment sustains its defenses.
The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. It is
a principle intended to avoid a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its said
counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become a most convenient and effective means of
injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principle that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, such as it concededly is, as a mere exception
from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
210
Tested by the above criteria, the Court sees it propitious to re-examine specifically the question of whether or not the submission of other
issues in a motion to dismiss, or of an affirmative defense (as distinguished from an affirmative relief) in an answer, would necessarily
foreclose, and have the effect of a waiver of, the right of a defendant to set up the court's lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Not inevitably.
Section 1, Rule 16, of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to dismiss may be made on the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or suit;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;
(c) The venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations;
(g) That the complaint states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
( i ) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds;
( j ) That the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.
Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may, as further set forth in Section 5 of the same rule, be pleaded as
an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. An answer itself contains the
negative, as well as affirmative, defenses upon which the defendant may rely (Section 4, Rule 6, Rules of Court). A negative defense denies the
material facts averred in the complaint essential to establish the plaintiff's cause of action, while an affirmative defense in an allegation of a
new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, would, nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff.
Inclusive of these defenses are those mentioned in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which would permit the filing of a motion to dismiss.
In the same manner that the plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under
Section 2, Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the
Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except for the failure to state a cause of
action, are deemed waived. We take this to mean that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his objection to the court's
jurisdiction over his person, all other possible defenses. It thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure to
so raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of course, we refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court that must be asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer.
Mindful of the foregoing, in Signetics Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Freuhauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (225 SCRA 737, 738), we lately ruled:
This is not to say, however, that the petitioner's right to question the jurisdiction of the court over its person is now to be
deemed a foreclosed matter. If it is true, as Signetics claims, that its only involvement in the Philippines was through a
passive investment in Sigfil, which it even later disposed of, and that TEAM Pacific is not its agent, then it cannot really be
said to be doing business in the Philippines. It is a defense, however, that requires the contravention of the allegations of
the complaint, as well as full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, which should not thus be within the
province of a mere motion to dismiss. So, also, the issue posed by the petitioner as to whether a foreign corporation which
has done business in the country, but which has ceased to do business at the time of the filing of a complaint, can still be
made to answer for a cause of action which accrued while it was doing business, is another matter that would yet have to
await the reception and admission of evidence. Since these points have seasonably been raised by the petitioner, there
should be no real cause for what may understandably be its apprehension, i.e., that by its participation during the trial on
the merits, it may, absent an invocation of separate or independent reliefs of its own, be considered to have voluntarily
submitted itself to the court's jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal
(Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as
211
this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73 93-94), this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent
position — that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has not bearing thereon.
The rule was reiterated in Calimlim vs. Ramirez (118 SCRA 399, 406), and quite recently, in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (206 SCRA 283).
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action, in concept, differs from jurisdiction over the subject matter. Illustrated, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action is the situation that arises when a court, which ordinarily would have the authority and competence to take a case, is
rendered without it either because a special law has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction on a particular matter or because the type of
action has been reposed by law in certain other courts or quasi-judicial agencies for determination. Nevertheless, it can hardly be questioned
that the rules relating to the effects of want of jurisdiction over the subject matter should apply with equal vigor to cases where the court is
similarly bereft of jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
In summary, it is our considered view, as we now so hereby express,

that —
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in
an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be
constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
(2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be
done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter
being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor
waiver shall apply.
In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the nature of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly
confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In
the affirmative, the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in
accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be
dismissed." The proceedings are summary in nature.
All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other
hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue. The circumstances obtaining in this case are far, we
hold, from justifying the application of estoppel against either party.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial court in question are SET ASIDE. The court a quo, in the instant
proceedings, is ordered to DESIST from further hearing private respondent's claim, as well as petitioner's counterclaim, for damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
212
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28975 February 27, 1976
VENANCIA B. MAGAY, assisted by her husband, VICTORIANO R. MAGAY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EUGENIO L. ESTIANDAN, defendant-appellant.
Valeriano V. Santos for appellant.
Inigo R. Pena for appellee.
ANTONIO, J:
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Palawan in an accion publiciana filed by plaintiff-appellee Venancia B. Magay,
assisted by her husband, Victoriano R. Magay, against the defendant-appellant Eugenio L. Estiandan in Civil Case No. 518, finding plaintiff-
appellee as the registered owner of the land in question under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004, ordering defendant-appellant to vacate
the property within fifteen (15) days after the decision has become final, and to pay plaintiff-appellee the amount of Ten Pesos (P10.00)
monthly as rentals on the land from October 1965 until he vacates the premises, and to pay the amount of Six Hundred Pesos (P600.00) by
way of attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
During the hearing of this case, the Court gathered from the evidence of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff Venancia B. Magay
bought the land. in question. from her mother-in-law, Soledad de los Reyes. The land was formerly titled in the name of
Soledad de los Reyes under Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 which was subsequently cancelled and transferred in the
name of the herein plaintiff under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004, Exhibit 'A'. The area bought by the plaintiff from
Soledad de los Reyes was resurveyed, Exhibit Al Exhibit 'A-1-a' is lot No. 1 of Exhibit Al which is the land in question: The
defendant has constructed two houses in the land in question: Exhibit 'A-1-a-1' which is an old house and Exhibit 'A-1-a-2'
which is a new house. Before this property was old by Soledad de los Reyes to the plaintiff, the former sent two letters,
Exhibits 'C' and 'D' to the defendant telling him to vacate the premises. After the plaintiff has acquired the property in
question, she sent other letters to the defendant advising him to vacate the premises, Exhibits 'E' and F The plaintiff has
declared the property in question for purposes of taxation, Exhibit 'G' and has paid the real estate taxes, Exhibit 'H'. Due to
the refusal of the defendant to vacate the premises in question, the plaintiff was obliged to hire the services of a lawyer
and spent P600.00 for attorney's fees.
On the other hand, the defendant testified that he has filed a miscellaneous sales application, Exhibit '6' over the land in
question. said application, according to him, is now pending in the Bureau of Lands and it has neither-been rejected nor
approved. The defendant bases his application on the decision rendered by Judge Bartolome Revilla in the case of El
Gobierno de las Islas Filipinos contra Antonio Aborot y otros Exhibit '5' adjudicating the land in question in favor of the
Government of the Philippines. Moreover, the defendant questions the validity of the title issued to Soledad de log Reyes,
alleging that the issuance and reconstitution thereof was done under anomalous circumstances.
Appellants brought this case on appeal directly to this Court on the representation that only questions of law are involved. After a careful
analysis of the issues raised, it appears that the principal question to be resolved is whether appellant can question in this proceedings the
validity of Original Certificate No. E-2020 issued to Soledad de los Reyes, now d and of the subsequent issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2W4 by the Register of Deeds to plaintiff-appellee as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale executed by Soledad de los
Reyes in favor of plaintiff-appellee dated June 26, 1963, on the ground that Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 was allegedly "fraudulently
issued" to the late Soledad de los Reyes in 1948.
It is well-settled that a torrens title cannot be co attacked. The issue on the validity of the title can only in action expressly instituted for that
purpose. 1 Even assuming that the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party to institute the
reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 2
Finally, We also find no merit in appellant's contention that the lower Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case. As clearly emphasized
by Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice of this Court) in Serrano v. Munoz Hi Motors, Inc.," 3 jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein-a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction
could depend almost entirely upon the defendant." The lower court did not commit any am in declaring that plaintiff-appellee's complaint is
actually an accion publiciana rather than one for unlawful detainer, within the intendment of Section 1, Rule 70 of the procedural law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
213
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74854 April 2, 1991
JESUS DACOYCOY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO V. BENEDICTO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal,
and RUFINO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue? This is the issue confronting the Court in the case at
bar.
On March 22, 1983, petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy, a resident of Balanti, Cainta, Rizal, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo,
Rizal, a complaint against private respondent Rufino de Guzman praying for the annulment of two (2) deeds of sale involving a parcel of
riceland situated in Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private respondent's refusal
to have said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand.
On May 25, 1983, before summons could be served on private respondent as defendant therein, the RTC Executive Judge issued an order
requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the allegations of the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real action as
it sought not only the annulment of the aforestated deeds of sale but also the recovery of ownership of the subject parcel of riceland located
in Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which in its decision of April 11, 1986,1 affirmed the order of
dismissal of his complaint.
In this petition for review, petitioner faults the appellate court in affirming what he calls an equally erroneous finding of the trial court that the
venue was improperly laid when the defendant, now private respondent, has not even answered the complaint nor waived the venue.2
Petitioner claims that the right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant and that the court or its magistrate does not
possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue was improperly laid, as venue is waivable. In other words, petitioner
asserts, without the defendant objecting that the venue was improperly laid, the trial court is powerless to dismiss the case motu proprio.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as (a) real action." He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil case is lodged is not even obliged to wait for the
defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice and motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as
real action and improperly filed before it. . . . the location of the subject parcel of land is controlling pursuant to Sec. 2, par. (a), Rule 4 of the
New Rules of Court . . .3
We grant the petition.
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously
attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue
is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue
relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. 4
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits; while venue deals on the locality, the place where the suit may be
had.5
In Luna vs. Carandang,6 involving an action instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Batangas for rescission of a lease contract over
a parcel of agricultural land located in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, which complaint said trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
leased land, we emphasized:
214
(1) A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over suits involving title to, or possession of, real estate wherever situated in the
Philippines, subject to the rules on venue of actions (Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, etc., et al., 20 Phil. 523; Central
Azucarera de Tarlac vs. De Leon, et al., 56 Phil. 169; Navarro vs. Aguila, et al., 66 Phil. 604; Lim Cay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, etc., et al.,
55 Phil. 692);
(2) Rule 4, Section 2, of the Rules of Court requiring that an action involving real property shall be brought in the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land lies is a rule on venue of actions, which may be waived expressly or by implication.
In the instant case, even granting for a moment that the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have jurisdiction
over the case, it being a regional trial court vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ." in accordance with Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. With respect to the
parties, there is no dispute that it acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff Jesus Dacoycoy, now petitioner, the moment he filed his complaint for
annulment and damages. Respondent trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, now private respondent, either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exercised over his person.7
Although petitioner contends that on April 28, 1963, he requested the City Sheriff of Olongapo City or his deputy to serve the summons on
defendant Rufino de Guzman at his residence at 117 Irving St., Tapinac, Olongapo City,8 it does not appear that said service had been properly
effected or that private respondent had appeared voluntarily in court9 or filed his answer to the complaint.10 At this stage, respondent trial
court should have required petitioner to exhaust the various alternative modes of service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
personal service under Section 7, substituted service under Section 8, or service by publication under Section 16 when the address of the
defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceeding,
particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where
defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue,
which is deemed waived.11
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid,
as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the
rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
by motu proprio dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu propriothe complaint on the
ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court to take its proper course. Although we are for
the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial
court faithfully adhere to the rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be heard on his cause.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, dated April 11, 1986, is hereby
nullified and set aside. The complaint filed by petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Branch LXXI is revived and reinstated.
Respondent court is enjoined to proceed therein in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
215
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of
the Estate of Regino Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO
and GLORIA CANONOY BASA, respondents.
Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for petitioner.
Wenceslao B. Rosales for private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of
administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested
person," and (b) whether the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for letters of administration filed by one who is
not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial
a claim against the said estate
Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8 January 1973 a
petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M.
Gonzalez, Petitioner" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that
he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The case was docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was
raffled to Branch II of the trial court.
On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an Order (1) setting the hearing on the petition for 23 March 1973 at 8:30
a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioner's expense, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a
nationwide circulation published regularly by a government agency or entity, or in any newspaper published and edited in any part of the
country which is in operation during the existence of the present national emergency and of general circulation in the province of Agusan del
Norte and in Butuan City, if any there be; and (3) ordering that copies of the order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the
petitioner's expense, to each of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, within the periods prescribed by Section 4, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court. 1
In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents, who are heirs of
Regino Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the intestate estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the
estate; he is a resident of Davao City and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he would
not be able to perform his duties efficiently;" and he is an employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he
would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that
since Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he
should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding letters of administration be issued in his favor."
On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of Regino
Canonoy, 3 having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or appealed therefrom. On 23
November 1973, herein petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim against the estate of the deceased Regino
Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the
latter contested by filing an Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the estate. 5 On 12 May 1975, the administrator filed his
Reply to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 6 On 25 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by Shell. 7 In the said Answer,
he interposes compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell
Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants, sales commission due the deceased Regino
Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.
Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial for 15
August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9
On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial administrator to file an inventory of the properties of the deceased. 10
216
At the pre-trial held on 23 September 1975, counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order
issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of
the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The
motion was filed on 30 September 1975. It alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof
because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12Shell
filed its Opposition to the Motion on 16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue
letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all,
Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator. In an Order dated 8
November 1975, respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed the case. 14 The motion for its
reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January
1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition; 16 the latter complied with the
same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court resolved, inter alia, to treat the petition for review as a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and require the parties to submit their respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum
on 4 April 1977 19 while the respondents filed theirs on 3 June 1977. 20
The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed SP PROC. No. 343
after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that
petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, serves only to compound the error.
1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court
is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in the
petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration in any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall
within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by
an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but
rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed
because the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said
case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. 26
The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be
barred by waiver or estoppel.
217
Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; 27 they
instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio
Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move
for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:
A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included
shall be deemed waived.
However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion, except for improper
venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. 28 Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading
if one is permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, 29 subject to the exception as hereinafter discussed.
In Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this Court ruled:
Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now too late
to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant below. Not
having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion.
By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or
ratified the filing of the petition by the latter.
In Eusebio vs. Valmores, 31 We held that:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did
not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances, such defect would
authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saquitan had
filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores,
however, had not objected to the application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the
appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as surviving spouse to be
appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the fatal
defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an
administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason
the proceedings may not be dismissed.
2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the filing of the case, the trial
court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973,
petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the
petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the
administrator and finally directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety
or property bond in the amount of P5,000.00. 32
It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss
petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim
against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35 praying thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to dismiss the above-mentioned "Amended Claim
Against the Estate" and to order the claimant to pay into the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy the said sum of
P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from the date hereof, the reasonable attorney's
fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs;
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and payable by the said intestate estate of Regino
Canonoy in favor of the said claimant, the said amount be deducted from the above-mentioned sum and, thereafter, to
order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, together with interest
thereon at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this
counterclaim, and costs.
Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of
Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's
218
amended claim against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of
the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in
a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.
In Tijam, et al. al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 36 this Court held:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether (sic) the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication,
but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S.
273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo.
58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy instead of peremptorily granting the motion to dismiss in an Order
which does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to be meritorious. He exhibited undue haste in removing the
case from his docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility. Howsoever viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP PROC. No. 343 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioner's claim against the estate in said case, unless supervening events
had occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and
terminated.
Costs against private respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
219
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111401 October 17, 1996
ERIBERTO G. VALENCIA, substituted by his heirs: REBECCA S. VDA. DE VALENCIA, MA. CAROLINA S. VALENCIA, MA. ANTONETTE S.
VALENCIA, PETER GELVIC S. VALENCIA, JOSE THERONE S. VALENCIA and MA. SOPHEA S. VALENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO BAGTAS and MIGUEL BUNYE, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
Should the action for rescission of a lease contract (commenced by petitioner-lessor against private respondents-lessees) be deemed to bar —
on the ground of litis pendentia — an action for damages brought by private respondents by reason of petitioner's violation of the restraining
orders issued by the Court of Appeals which required the parties to maintain the status quo insofar as the lease relationship is concerned?
The Court answers this query in the negative while resolving the instant petition for review on certiorari, which assails the Decision1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals2 promulgated on February 18, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27590, affirming the decision3 of the trial court4 awarding
moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees to herein private respondents.
The Facts
The facts are not controverted by the parties, and therefore, the factual recitals in the trial court's decision, which were quoted by the
respondent appellate court in its own Decision, are hereinbelow reproduced: 5
The evidence shows that (private respondents) were lessees of a 24-hectare fishpond owned by (petitioner as substituted
by his heirs) located at Paombong, Bulacan. The lease is covered by a lease contract by and between the said parties (Exh.
A). The lease [executed on March 1, 1982] was supposed to have expired on May 1987, but before the said date,
(petitioner) filed [on June 25, 1984] a complaint against (private respondents) for the rescission of the lease contract. The
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan which took cognizance of said case issued a writ of preliminary Mandatory
Injunction ordering (private respondents) to surrender to the (petitioner) possession of the fishpond. In view whereof,
(private respondents) filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court. The said court on September 21,
1984 issued a restraining order enjoining (petitioner) and the Regional Trial Court from enforcing the mandatory injunction
(Exh. J of [private respondents] and Exh. 11 of [petitioner]).
At the hearing in the Intermediate Appellate Court the parties agreed to maintain a status quo and the fishpond hut would
be utilized by (private respondents) until the case is resolved by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos (Exh. N). However,
despite this order of the Appellate Court (petitioner) filed an ex-parte motion for the designation of a member of the
Philippine Constabulary to maintain order in the place which the Regional Trial Court of Malolos granted. With said order
(petitioner) with the aid of PC men was able to eject plaintiffs from the main hut. (Petitioner) and their men also dried up a
portion of the leased property where (private respondents) have previously scattered chemicals and fertilizer to grow fish
food. As a result no fish food grew causing damage to (private respondents).
(Private respondents) were also prevented from transferring the bigger fish to a more spacious portion of the fishpond
resulting in death to many fishes which again caused damages to (private respondents). Subsequently another person
came to the fishpond and introduced himself as the new lessee. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos then issued another
order (Exh. 5-2) declaring that all the fishes located in the fishpond remain the properties of (private respondents) subject
to their disposal, however the same was not honored by (petitioner).
(Private respondents) then appealed again to the IAC which issued a resolution enjoining (petitioner) to maintain and
observe status quo (Exh. V-VI), and subsequently another resolution categorically declaring (petitioner) Valencia without
right of possession under status quo, and to vacate the main hut of the fishpond (Exh. Y). It was only then that (private
respondents) gained complete and total control of the subject fishpond including its huts.
(Private respondents) are now asking [the Regional Trial Court of Manila] for exemplary damages worth P400,000.00,
moral damages of P400,000.00, attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and costs of suit.
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by (petitioner) on April 8, 1985 which was opposed by (private respondents). The Motion to
Dismiss was denied by the court on March 4, 1986. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by (petitioner) which was
denied by the court.
220
After (petitioner) filed his Answer, pre-trial was set on November 14, 1986 and the same was terminated on February 26,
1987. Trial on the merits was held on April 3, 1987.
The evidence for the prosecution was brought forth through the testimonies of Ricardo Bagtas and Miguel Bunye and its
Exhibits A to CC.
Instead of presenting evidence . . . , (petitioner) filed [on February 24, 1989] a Second Motion to Dismiss which was
opposed by counsel for (private respondents). The Second Motion to Dismiss was denied by the court [on April 13, 1989].6
On August 31, 1989, the (petitioner) Eriberto Valencia testified, however his testimony was not terminated in view of the
objection of counsel for the (private respondents) who claimed that the questions propounded to the witness touched on
matters which have been passed upon by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos.
(Petitioner) contended that proceedings in this court [RTC of Manila] should be suspended until after the case in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos which was appealed to the Court of Appeals is resolved, and filed a Motion to this effect,
but the court denied the same.
The trial court gave counsel for petitioner time to file the necessary pleadings, as prayed for, but he failed to do so. During the subsequent
hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared. The trial court thus deemed petitioner to have waived his right to present further
evidence, and the case was considered submitted for decision. On March 23, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of private respondents,
the fallo of its decision reading as follows:7
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court orders defendant (petitioner herein) to pay the plaintiffs moral damages in
the amount of P30,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees.
Petitioner and private respondents, being equally dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, appealed to respondent Court. Petitioner
alleged litis pendentia and contested the award of damages by the trial court; private respondents on the other hand were aggrieved that the
trial court failed to award actual damages, and in addition sought an increase in the amount of moral and exemplary damages granted.
On appeal, respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Manila RTC, and held that there was no litis pendentia:8
It is not disputed that there was another suit, Civil Case No. 7554-M, then pending before the Regional Trial Court in
Bulacan between plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellant. To be sure, that case involved the same property. There,
appellant Valencia sought the rescission of the lease contract he had entered into with plaintiffs on March 1, 1982. He
based his claim upon the alleged failure of plaintiffs to abide by the stipulations of their agreement. In this case under
consideration, plaintiffs Bagtas and Bunye are asking for compensation for the damages that they had sustained by reason
of Valencia's violation of certain resolutions issued by this Court in (CA)-G.R. SP No. 04283 (Exhs. "J" & "N"). Clearly, the
causes of action in the two cases are not the same; they are founded on different acts; the rights violated are different; and
the reliefs sought are also different. Consequently, defendant-appellant's submission that lis pendens is a ground for
dismissal of plaintiffs' suit is not valid.
The dispositive portion of the now-assailed Decision reads:9
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the appealed decision with the modification that plaintiffs-appellants
[private respondents herein] are hereby additionally awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as and for actual damages. Costs
against defendant-appellant [herein petitioner].
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated March 9, 1993 was denied by respondent Court. Thus he comes to us seeking relief.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the following lone "legal issue:" 10
THE DENIAL ORDERS AND THE DECISION OF THE MANILA COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 85-29514 AND THE DECISION OF
RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 27590 ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND THE DECISIONS ON LITIS
PENDENTIA.
Petitioner contends that the error in the Decision lies in its failure to properly appreciate the complaint filed with the Manila court, which,
when taken together with private respondents' documentary and testimonial evidence, discloses that the alleged wrongful acts for which they
claimed damages arose out of, were connected with, and/or were incidents of the proceedings in the action for rescission before the Bulacan
court. Petitioner claims that the action for damages commenced by private respondents constitutes splitting of a single cause of action which
is prohibited by the Revised Rules of Court. 11
221
Petitioner argues that, for the aforesaid reasons, if indeed private respondents suffered any damage, they should have filed a compulsory
counterclaim or supplemental pleading for the alleged acts of violation of restraining orders which are "transactions, occurrence or event
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. 12 He insists that the filing of a compulsory counterclaim is
the proper recourse considering that petitioner had posted a bond in the rescission case to answer for damages that private respondents
might suffer by reason of the issuance of the preliminary mandatory injunction. 13 He also ventures to say that the case filed with the Manila
court can even be considered as a form of "forum shopping."14
In fine, petitioner asserts that under the rule on litis pendentia the action for rescission filed with the Bulacan court bars the action for
damages filed in Manila. It is interesting to note that petitioner does not contest the correctness of the award of damages made by respondent
Court; he merely insists on the dismissal (?) of the case for damages on the ground of litis pendentia, there being a pending case for rescission
in which private respondents could have asserted their claim for damages. This being his lone assigned issue, the clear and unavoidable
implication is that if his contention is struck down, he is deemed to have waived any objection against the award of damages by respondent
Court.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner's arguments are legally tenuous and patently unmeritorious.
Litis Pendencia and Splitting of a Single Cause of Action
Before discussing the petition on the merits, it is well to clarify certain concepts at the outset. If a party-litigant splits his single cause of action,
the other action or actions filed may be dismissed by invoking litis pendentia, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. A
party who splits his single cause of action cannot be accused of also "violating the rule against litis pendentia" as the former, a malpractice,
gives rise to the latter, a ground for a motion to dismiss. This is made clear by Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules, which speaks of cause and effect:
Sec. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. — If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single
cause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e)
of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others.
Now, to the main issues.
No Litis Pendentia
This Court has consistently held, in a long line of cases, that the requisites for the existence of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an
action are as follows:
1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
3) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other case.16
There may have been identity of parties in the two actions, but the other two requisites are not similarly satisfied. The case in Bulacan was of
course founded upon alleged violations by the private respondents as lessees of certain stipulations in their lease contract with petitioner, and
therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the rights asserted (by petitioner as lessor) and relief sought therein (i.e., rescission of the lease contract)
were entirely different from those asserted in Manila. The latter case stemmed from the prejudice suffered by private respondents due to
petitioner's violation of the IAC's restraining orders for the observance of status quo between the parties, the relief demanded therein
consisting of actual, moral and exemplary damages. Thus, the respondent Court committed no reversible error in holding that "the causes of
action in the two cases are not the same; they are founded on different acts; the rights violated are different; and the reliefs sought are also
different."
The third requisite constitutes the test of identity in the aforestated particulars, and in connection therewith, this Court quoted 1 Cyc.,
2817 thus
A plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior action is of such a character that, had a judgment
been rendered therein on the merits, such a judgment would be conclusive between the parties and could be pleaded in bar
of the second action. (emphasis supplied)
The res judicata test when applied to the two cases in question indicate in no uncertain terms that regardless of whoever will ultimately
prevail in the Bulacan case, the final judgment therein — whether granting or denying rescission of the lease contract — will not be conclusive
between the parties in the Manila case, and vice versa. In other words, to our mind, the outcome of the Bulacan case has nothing to do with
222
whether petitioner should be held liable for the damage inflicted upon private respondents as a result of his violating the IAC restraining
orders, the two cases having arisen from different acts and environmental circumstances.
No Forum-Shopping
Petitioner's allegations to the contrary notwithstanding, forum-shopping is not present in the case at bar. The established rule is that for
forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.18 As held by this Court in a recent case:19
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case
of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34, October 13, 1986), also by Chief Justice Narvasa, and that is, forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other . . .
(emphasis supplied)
We have already established that litis pendentia could not have been properly pleaded to abate the second action brought in Manila, and that
a final judgment in either case would not be res judicata with respect to the other. Thus, the allegation of forum-shopping must fail.
In Jose Cuenco Borromeo, et al., vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,20 this Court capsulized the essence of what is abhorrent in the
malpractice of forum-shopping, and the following excerpt shows why there can be no forum-shopping in this case:
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the different for a upon the same issue.
Claim for Damages

Not A Compulsory Counterclaim
Petitioner erroneously insists that private respondents' claim for damages should have been made through a compulsory counterclaim in the
same action for rescission. This could not have been done as the same cannot be considered or treated as a compulsory counterclaim in the
Bulacan case. This Court, in an early case,21 stated certain criteria or tests by which the compulsory or permissive nature of specific
counterclaims can be determined, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
In this instance, the answers to all four queries are in the negative.
Was Injunction Bond Sufficient Protection?
Petitioner's argument that the bond he posted for the issuance by the Bulacan trial court of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction could
have answered for the damages claimed by private respondents is untenable. Such bond was required for a specific purpose, to wit:22
(b) The plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed to the party
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to such party all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.
No further scrutiny is necessary. The said bond was supposed to answer only for damages which may be sustained by private respondents,
against whom the mandatory injunction was issued, by reason of the issuance thereof, and not to answer for damages caused by
the actuations of petitioner, which may or may not be related at all to the implementation of the mandatory injunction. The purpose of the
injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff
was not entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. Thus, the bondsmen are obligated to account to the defendant in the
injunction suit for all damages, or costs and reasonable counsel's fees, incurred or sustained by the latter in case it is determined that the
injunction was wrongfully issued.23
223
In the case at bar, the damages and expenses sustained by private respondents were a result of the willful contravention by petitioner of the
IAC restraining orders, and thus, outside the coverage of the injunction bond.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the appealed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
224
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157557 March 10, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION), Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON YU, TEOFISTA VILLAMALA, LOURDES YU and YU SE PENG, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 2, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53712 which set aside the dismissal
by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, of Civil Case No. CEB-12968 and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
This petition relates to this Court’s decision in Valdehueza v. Republic2 and the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in Yu v. Republic.3
In Valdehueza v. Republic (1966), we affirmed the judgment of expropriation of Lot No. 939 in Lahug, Cebu City, and ruled that therein
petitioners, Francisca Valdehueza, et al., were not entitled to recover possession of the lot but only to demand its fair market value.
The dispositive portion of the Court’s decision reads:
Wherefore, finding no reversible error therein, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance. So ordered.4
In Yu v. Republic (1986), the Court of Appeals annulled the subsequent sale of the lot by Francisca Valdehueza, et al., to herein respondents,
Ramon Yu, et al., and held that the latter were not purchasers in good faith. The parties did not appeal the decision and so, judgment became
final and executory.5
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision states:
WHEREFORE, in the view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. A new one is entered dismissing the complaint.
The land in question is owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.6
On October 1, 1992, herein respondents filed a complaint for reversion of the expropriated property. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the
Philippines, denied respondents’ right to reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the ground of res judicata, lack of cause of action and
forum-shopping.7
On November 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed the complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby DISMISSES the complaint filed in this case on the
ground of res judicata or bar by prior or final judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no res judicata and remanded the case to the trial court, thus,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated November 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and final determination of the issues on the
merit.
SO ORDERED.9
The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us in this petition for review. It raises the following issues, to wit: Whether –
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
II.
225
THE ABANDONMENT OF LAHUG AIRPORT AND RETURN OF OTHER EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES DID NOT GIVE RESPONDENTS A NEW CAUSE OF
ACTION.
III.
ASSUMING A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION, RESPONDENTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP IN THE FIRST PLACE. 10
Simply stated, the threshold issues are: Is the action barred by res judicata? Are respondents entitled to reversion of the expropriated
property?
Petitioner asserts that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata and maintains that respondents are bereft
of any right to assert ownership as the sale in their favor was invalidated in Yu v. Republic. Petitioner further asserts that the expropriation of
Lot No. 939 was absolute and unconditional. Thus, no reversion could be legally claimed despite the subsequent sale or reversion of the other
nearby lots.
Respondents counter that the action is not barred by res judicata because the abandonment of the government of the public purpose
constitutes a new cause of action. Further, respondents contend that the determination of their right to reacquire or repossess the lot
necessitates a full blown trial.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."11Res judicata
lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the
same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 12
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.13
In the present case, the first three elements are present. Only the presence of the identity of causes of action is at issue.
At this juncture, we need to stress that res judicata has two concepts:14(1) "bar by prior judgment" as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b)15of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment" in Rule 39, Section 47 (c) 16.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is "conclusiveness of judgment."17Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action.18The identity of causes of action is not required but
merely identity of issues.19
Conclusiveness of judgment clearly exists in the present case, because respondents again seek to enforce a right based on a sale which has
been nullified by a final and executory judgment. Recall that the question of validity of the sale had long been settled. The same question,
therefore, cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the
rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action.20Considering that the sale on which respondents based their right to reversion has long been nullified, they have not an iota of right
over the property and thus, have no legal personality to bring forth the action for reversion of expropriated property. Lack of legal personality
to sue means that the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that
the complaint evidently states no cause of action.21
Consequently, the second issue is now mooted and made academic by our determination of res judicata in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 2, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 53712 is SET ASIDE and
the Decision dated November 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11 in Civil Case No. CEB-12968 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
226
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165836 February 18, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
ADELA SIA and ROBERT NGO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated July 31, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated October 28, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49806.
The antecedents of the case, as culled from the records, are:
Midcom Interline Development Corporation (MIDCOM) was the registered owner of a 349-square meter lot with a ten-door apartment located
at the corner of Alvarez and Oroquieta Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156156.3 On August
20, 1984, MIDCOM signed a Contract to Sell4 the property to the spouses Felicisimo and Myrna Galicia (Galicias) for the amount of ₱480,000,
with the agreement that ₱150,000 be given upon the execution of the contract and the remaining ₱330,000 be paid in three monthly
installments. Out of the purchase price of ₱480,000, the Galicias left an unpaid balance of ₱70,000.
The subject property was again sold by MIDCOM to Apolonia Sia Ngo and respondent Adela Sia for ₱630,000, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale5 dated October 1, 1984. Thereafter, on October 9, 1984, the Galicias received a letter 6 that MIDCOM had already rescinded their
Contract to Sell.7
On October 22, 1984, the Galicias filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 29, a complaint 8against MIDCOM and its
president, Miguel G. Say, Jr., Apolonia Sia Ngo, and the Register of Deeds of Manila for Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for
Injunction. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27347, sought to compel MIDCOM to execute a Deed of Sale in the Galicias’ favor
upon payment of the balance of the purchase price. The Galicias also caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No.
156156 on February 12, 1985.9
On February 26, 1985, TCT No. 156156 registered to MIDCOM was cancelled, and TCT No. 16472610 was issued in the names of "Apolonia S.
Ngo, married to Robert Ngo, and Adela Sia," despite a temporary restraining order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 29, enjoining the
registration of the Deed of Sale and the issuance of a new title on the property.
On October 7, 1986, the RTC of Manila, Branch 29 decided Civil Case No. 84-27347 in favor of the Galicias, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants:
(1) Ordering defendant Midcom thru Miguel Say to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of plaintiffs upon payment of the
balance of the purchase price of the land in the amount of ₱70,000.00, and to deliver the duplicate owner’s copy of the title over the
land in question to the plaintiffs as well as such other documents necessary for the transfer or conveyance thereof to the plaintiffs;
(2) Ordering defendants Apolonia Ngo and all other persons claiming rights under them to turn over and deliver the duplicate
original of the title over the lot in dispute to plaintiffs and to convey the property to them;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Manila to issue the title in the name of plaintiffs over the premises in question and to
cancel the title in the name of Apolonia Ngo and other persons;
(4) Declaring the adverse claim of Apolonia Ngo as void and of no effect;
(5) Ordering the Register of [Deeds of] Manila or its deputy to cancel the adverse claim of Apolonia Ngo as appearing in the title of
the lot in question;
(6) Ordering the defendants Midcom thru Miguel Say and Apolonia Ngo to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(7) Ordering the defendants Midcom, Miguel Say and Apolonia Ngo to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of ₱30,000.00
attorney’s fees;
227
(8) Respondents Miguel Say, Apolonia Ngo and the Register of Deeds of Manila are hereby declared in contempt of court and are
hereby fined ₱100.00 each with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for violation of the restraining order;
(9) Ordering defendants to pay the costs. 1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.11
Upon finality of the said decision, a writ of execution12 was issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 29 on August 16, 1990. TCT No. 164726 was
cancelled and TCT No. 19537813 in the name of the Galicias was issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila on January 22, 1991.
On January 23, 1991, the Galicias and petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) signed a contract of real estate mortgage14 over the property
to secure a loan for ₱5,000,000 which the Galicias had taken.
On February 29, 1991, Apolonia Ngo and respondents Adela Sia and Robert Ngo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition 15 for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-27347 be declared void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, for failure to implead
therein the respondents Adela Sia and Robert Ngo as indispensable parties. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 22889. Being
insufficient in form and substance, however, the petition was denied due course on March 11, 1991. 16 Apolonia Ngo and respondents’ first and
second motions for reconsideration were likewise denied by the appellate court in its Resolutions dated May 31, 1991 and June 14, 1991. 17
Thereafter, on August 2, 1991, respondents Adela Sia and Robert Ngo, claiming that their title to the subject property was beclouded by the
decision and writ issued in Civil Case No. 84-27347, and joining an unwilling Apolonia as compulsory plaintiff, instituted a complaint18 for
quieting of title and/or reconveyance, damages, and annulment of judgment with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Manila, Branch 3 against the Galicias, the City Sheriff of Manila, the Sheriff of Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, the Register of
Deeds, and MIDCOM. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-58130, was later amended by deleting therein the action for annulment of
judgment.
On August 27, 1991, respondent Adela Sia, joining respondent Robert Ngo and his wife, Apolonia Ngo as compulsory petitioners, also filed a
petition19 for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 25819, likewise sought the
nullification of the same decision and writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 84-27347 allegedly for lack of jurisdiction for non-inclusion of
Adela Sia who was an indispensable party. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a cause of action.20The
appellate court held that respondent Adela Sia had no right to the subject property at the time the complaint in Civil Case No. 84-27347 was
filed since her claim as registered co-owner of the property arose only during the pendency of the case. Respondent Adela Sia moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied in the November 27, 1991 Resolution21 of the Court of Appeals. Not dissuaded by the dismissal, she
elevated the case to this Court via petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 103054.22 This Court, however, also denied the petition, as well as
the motions for reconsideration, and ordered that an entry of judgment be made in due course.23
The complaint lodged before Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 91-58130 was amended for the second time by
impleading PNB as a party defendant for having accepted the subject property as one of the collaterals in the loan it extended to the Galicias.
Respondents claim that the mortgage of the land to PNB was in bad faith since PNB accepted the subject property as collateral to the loan
obtained by the Galicias when the title of the property was still in the respondents’ names. They claim that they are entitled to have TCT No.
164726 restored and reinstated and to have all the entries and annotations of adverse claim, mortgage lien, and notice of lis pendens on their
title removed so as to quiet their title thereto.
On August 29, 1994, the RTC of Manila, Branch 3, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 91-58130, holding that the action is barred by res
judicata since the issues raised therein had already been answered with finality by the decision in Civil Case No. 84-27347. However, the trial
court held that respondents are entitled to recover from MIDCOM the purchase price of ₱630,000 plus legal rate of interest from October 1,
1984, and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.24 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Ordering MIDCOM Corporation to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱630,000.00 plus legal rate of interest from October 1, 1984 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
2. Dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint against defendants Felicisimo Galicia and Myrna Galicia.
3. Dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint against PNB.
As to counterclaim:
4. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to pay defendants Felicisimo and Myrna Galicia the sum of ₱20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees plus costs of litigation.
228
5. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to pay defendant PNB the sum of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of
litigation.
All other claims and counterclaims are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.25
On March 8, 1995,26 the trial court denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration. The respondents elevated the case before the Court of
Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49806.
On July 31, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the court a quo as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead[,] judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring Apolonia S. Ngo, married to Robert Ngo, and Adela Sia as co-owners of the litigated lot and its improvements;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to recall and cancel TCT No. 195378 in the names of the Galicias and to restore and
reinstate TCT No. 164726 in the names of Apolonia S. Ngo, married to Robert Ngo, and Adela Sia; and
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel and remove all pertinent notices/annotations of adverse claim, lis pendens,
mortgage and liens on TCT No. 164726.
SO ORDERED.27
The appellate court held that what was entered into by MIDCOM and the Galicias was a mere contract to sell. Accordingly, MIDCOM remained
the owner of the disputed property and could unilaterally rescind the contract to sell when the Galicias failed to pay the balance of the
purchase price. The appellate court likewise held that for failure to implead an indispensable party, the judgment in Civil Case No. 84-27347
cannot bind respondent Adela Sia, who was a co-owner holding a one-half pro-indiviso share of the property.
Further, the Court of Appeals held that PNB was a mortgagee in bad faith. It noted that while the Real Estate Mortgage and Credit Agreement
was entered into only on January 23, 1991 or a day after TCT No. 195378 in the name of the Galicias was issued on January 22, 1991, the loan
application offering the subject property as collateral was dated November 29, 1990 and the PNB Rizal Avenue branch recommended its
approval on December 14, 1990. It held that PNB committed lapses when it acted on the offer of the Galicias to secure their loan with a
mortgage on a property covered by TCT No. 195378, since said title was still inexistent at the time, having been issued only on January 22,
1991. If PNB had indeed conducted an investigation as it claimed it did, then PNB would have discovered this fact.
PNB28 and the Galicias29 separately moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, but the Court of Appeals denied their motions
in its assailed Resolution dated October 28, 2004.30
Hence, the instant petition where PNB alleges that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in
I.
…ORDERING THE [REGISTER OF DEEDS] OF MANILA TO RECALL AND CANCEL TCT NO. 195378 IN THE NAMES OF THE GALICIAS AND TO
RESTORE AND REINSTATE TCT NO. 164726 IN THE NAMES OF APOLONIA S. NGO, MARRIED TO ROBERT NGO, AND ADELA SIA.
II.
…RULING THAT PETITIONER PNB IS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD FAITH.
III.
…ORDERING THE CANCELLATION AND REMOVAL OF ALL PERTINENT NOTICES/ANNOTATIONS OF ADVERSE CLAIM, LIS PENDENS, MORTGAGE
AND LIENS ON TCT NO. 164726.31
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether Civil Case No. 91-58130 is barred by res judicata; and (2) whether PNB is a mortgagee
in bad faith.
PNB argues that res judicata applies in the present case. It maintains that the facts in the action for quieting of title (Civil Case No. 91-58130)
are also the very same facts evaluated in the proceedings before the Manila RTC, Branch 29 in Civil Case No. 84-27347, CA-G.R. SP No. 22889
and CA-G.R. SP No. 25819 which involve the same parties, same issues, and which have already been resolved with finality by the courts.32
229
Respondents counter that the vital elements of res judicata are not present because Adela Sia, an indispensable party, was not impleaded as
party defendant in Civil Case No. 84-27347.33
After careful review, we find merit in PNB’s petition.
The doctrine of res judicata as enunciated in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.–The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata
lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the
same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 34
For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, however, the following requisites must be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to
bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.35
In defending their title over the subject property, respondents insist that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-27347 is null and void for failure to
implead them as indispensable parties. However, these arguments adduced by respondents have already been raised, passed upon, and
rejected with finality in CA-G.R. SP No. 22889 and CA-G.R. SP No. 25819.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 22889, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
In that Civil Case No. 84-27347, defendant Apolonia S. Ngo filed her answer to the complaint. She thereby submitted to the jurisdiction of the
respondent court, she cannot now alleged (sic) in the petition at bar that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. If
petitioner Apolonia S. Ngo is indeed married to Robert Ngo, she kept silent about her marital status during the entire proceedings in Civil Case
No. 84-27347. Petitioner Apolonia S. Ngo could have assailed from the beginning the lower court’s jurisdiction over her person on the ground
that her husband Robert Ngo was not impleaded and could have thus invoked what she now claims that she cannot be sued for not being
joined with her husband, Robert Ngo. This Court frowns upon petitioners’ omission in not disclosing to the court below their status as husband
and wife. On the other hand, Robert Ngo, petitioner herein, as husband of Apolonia S. Ngo, cannot disclaim knowledge about the fact that his
wife is a defendant in Civil Case No. 84-27347. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner Apolonia S. Ngo is now estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 84-27347 after she had voluntarily submitted herself to its jurisdiction
(Tejones vs. Geronilla, 159 SCRA 100). Petitioners must be considered to have accepted the lower court’s jurisdiction. Estoppel is a bar against
any claims of lack of jurisdiction. (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37).
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner Apolonia S. Ngo lost her right to appeal by failing to avail of it seasonably. To remedy that loss, the petitioners
have now resorted to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari as a mode of obtaining reversal of the judgment from which they failed to appeal.
But since the decision in Civil Case No. 84-27347 has become final, it has gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive
aspect. . . .36
xxxx
In CA-G.R. SP No. 25819, the Court of Appeals held that:
What is important to note is that after due trial, the trial court found the property in question was the subject of a contract to sell on August
20, 1984…entered into by [the Galicias] and defendant Midcom through its President, Miguel Say, Jr. The [Galicias] made a down payment of
₱410,000.00, with a balance of ₱70,000.00 payable on October 20, 1984.
230
Upon receipt of information that defendant Miguel Say, Jr. was selling the property in question to another, the [Galicias] executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim on October 2, 1984 and annotated the same on the same date in TCT [No.] 156156.… The trial court declared the unilateral
rescission of the contract to sell executed by defendant Midcom and Say dated October 3, 1984 in favor of the [Galicias] null and void. The trial
court likewise declared Apolonia S. Ngo as a purchaser in bad faith when she purchased the property in question, being aware of facts that
ought to induce her to inquire into the status of said property. . . .
Considering that the validity of the contract to sell executed by defendant Midcom through Miguel Say, Jr. in favor of [the Galicias] was upheld
and the deed of sale executed by defendants Midcom thru Miguel Say, Jr. in favor of Apolonia Ngo, was in effect declared null and void, TCT
No. 164726 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila issued to Apolonia Ngo and her alleged co-owner Adela Sia pursuant to the invalidated deed of
sale and in violation of the restraining order issued by the respondent court on October 31, 1984 did not produce any right or title in favor of
the apparent registered owners of the property in question, and for which reason the respondent court correctly ordered Apolonia Ngo and all
persons claiming right under said TCT No. 164726 to turn over and deliver the duplicate owner’s copy thereof to plaintiffs and to convey the
subject property to them.
There is reason to believe that [the Galicias] could not at the time they filed the complaint have included petitioner Adela Sia as one of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 84-27347 before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila on the ground that said case was principally to ask
the court to compel Midcom to execute a deed of sale in favor of respondents Galicia and to deliver its owner’s copy of the title to the latter,
and incidentally to cancel the adverse claim annotated by Apolonia Ngo on the title of Midcom.
Upon the other hand, an adverse claim of plaintiff-spouses Galicia and notice of lis pendens having been annotated on the TCT of defendant
Midcom of which petitioner Adela Sia had constructive, if not actual notice, said petitioner who claims an interest in the property under
litigation should have intervened in the action (Civil Case No. 84-27347) brought by the spouses Galicia against Midcom, Say, Apolonia Ngo,
and the Register of Deeds of Manila. Having failed to intervene, the judgment rendered in said case is binding on her. . . .
Having acquired no right or title to the property in dispute, petitioner [Adela] Sia has no cause of action to ask for the annulment of the
judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 84-27347.37
xxxx
In denying Adela Sia’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 25819, the Court of Appeals in its November 27, 1991 Resolution reiterated
its earlier ruling that she is not an indispensable party in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 84-27347 before Branch 29 of the Manila RTC. The
appellate court held:
xxxx
In the third ground[, respondent Adela], claiming to be an indispensable party, argues that she was deprived of her property without due
process of law.
We cannot sustain [respondent’s] claim. Considering the manner how she and Apolonia Ngo obtained TCT No. 164726 of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila in violation of the restraining order issued by the trial court, and the nature of the complaint filed by the spouses Galicia against
Midcom [Interline] Development Corporation, et al., petitioner could not insist that she is an indispensable party therein.
Moreover, as we have said in the decision sought to be reconsidered that an adverse claim and notice of lis pendens having been annotated in
the TCT of defendant Midcom, of which she has notice, she should have intervened in said action. Additionally, she and Apolonia Ngo having
the same interest in the land in litigation through the alleged sale to them by Midcom, the judgment against Apolonia is binding on her.38
xxxx
As mentioned above, this Court denied the petition for review filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 25819 and ordered that an entry of judgment be made in
the case. There being no appeals made in CA-G.R. SP No. 22889, the latter has also attained finality.
In the present case, the first three elements of res judicata are present. As to the fourth element, it is important to note that the doctrine of
res judicata has two aspects: first, "bar by prior judgment" which is provided in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court and second,
"conclusiveness of judgment" which is provided in Section 47 (c) of the same Rule.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is "conclusiveness of judgment." Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but
merely identity of issues.39
231
In this case, conclusiveness of judgment exists because respondents again seek to enforce their right and title over the same subject matter,
the litigated property, basing their claim on the nullity of the judgment in Civil Case No. 84-27347, for failure to implead them therein as
indispensable parties, which had been overruled by final and executory judgments. The same question cannot be raised again even in a
different proceeding involving the same parties.
Anent the issue that PNB is a mortgagee in bad faith, PNB claims it was diligent in processing the loan application of the Galicias and that
respondents failed to dispute that prior to the signing of the Real Estate Mortgage Agreement on January 23, 1991, it conducted a credit
investigation on the Galicias as well as the parcels of land being offered as collaterals. PNB also contends that the fact that it conducted its
credit investigation prior to the issuance of TCT No. 195378 in the name of the Galicias should not be taken against it. It argues that what was
material to the grant of the loan was that the Galicias were able to secure a copy of the TCT issued to them on January 22, 1991. PNB contends
that without a copy of TCT No. 195378, the loan application would not have been granted.40
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that PNB is a mortgagee in bad faith as it closed its eyes to the infirmity of the Galicias’ collateral just to
accommodate them.41
We are of the opinion and so hold that PNB acted in good faith when it approved the loan application of the Galicias. We note that at the time
the Galicias applied for a loan with PNB on November 29, 1990,42 the decision in Civil Case No. 84-27347 was already final and executory. In
fact, the trial court already issued a writ of execution on August 16, 1990 to implement its decision. Moreover, the respondents themselves
alleged in their pleadings that the documents assessed by the bank in granting the loan application of the Galicias were the Contract to Sell
between MIDCOM and the Galicias dated August 20, 1984 and the September 26, 1990 Order43 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 84-27347
categorically ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the title of Apolonia Sia and all persons claiming rights under her and to issue a
new title in favor of the Galicias.44 Furnished with a copy of the September 26, 1990 Order, PNB can reasonably conclude that it has no more
reason to doubt that the Galicias are the recognized owners of the subject property because no less than the court ordered the Register of
Deeds of Manila to issue a title in their names. As a gesture of utmost precaution, PNB even waited for the title in favor of the Galicias to be
issued before it executed and signed the Contract of Real Estate Mortgage. For this reason, PNB cannot be considered a mortgagee in bad
faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 31, 2003 Decision and the October 28, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 49806 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 29, 1994 Decision45 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3 in Civil
Case No. 91-58130 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
232
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25530 January 29, 1974
ALFREDO VERGEL DE DIOS and EMILY B. VERGEL DE DIOS, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
BRISTOL LABORATORIES (PHILS.), INC., and P. P. LAGDAMEO, defendants-appellees.
Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo and Ongsiako for defendants-appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of La Union dismissing the complaint in its Civil Case No. 2109 upon the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.
On October 23, 1965, plaintiffs-appellants, Alfredo Vergel de Dios and his wife, Emily B. Vergel de Dios, filed a complaint against the
defendants-appellees, Bristol Laboratories (Phils.)., Inc., and P. P. Lagdameo, the latter in his capacity as Acting General Manager of the
former, in the Court of First Instance of La Union for recovery of damages. For the purposes of this decision, the pertinent allegations of the
complaint are as follows:
2. Plaintiff Vergel de Dios since about October 1964 had been hired by defendant company as a detailman in charge of
promoting and selling the company's products or, in other words, in creating demands therefor. Said plaintiff's area
embraced Pangasinan, La Union, Ilocos Sur and Abra. As detailman, plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios has had considerable
experience, not to mention the fact that he also sufficient educational background for his position.
xxx xxx xxx
5. On or about September 15, 1965 defendants, actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of
their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith, and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de
Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitary manner, dismissed said plaintiff Alfredo
Vergel de Dios by means of a libelous letter dated September 15, 1965, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a
part hereof as Annex "A". Plaintiffs over that the charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true and
defendants knowingly made the same in order to justify their dismissal of plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios.
6. Not satisfied with the sending to plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios of Annex "A", which fell into the hands of other
persons, defendants further circulated the contents thereof to the company's other employees and, in due course, other
third parties came to know of the false, groundless, and malicious charges, with the result that plaintiff Alfredo Vergel
de Dios was thereby placed and thereafter regarded in bad light and in disrepute in the eyes of his wife, family, relatives,
friends and community.
7. As a result of defendants' wanton, illegal tortious and willful acts as recited above, plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios and
his wife experienced untold suffering, moral shock, anxiety, wounded feeling and similar injury. Moreover, plaintiff
Alfredo Vergel de Dios, despite his still being young and competent, now finds if difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a
new employment, especially as a detailman, for which he has all the needed qualifications, training and experience.
8. By reason of defendants' acts, defendants jointly and severally should be ordered to pay plaintiffs damages they have
sustained and will sustain as follows:
(a) Unrealized income from September 1965, up to such time as plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios lands on a substantially
equivalent employment as he had as of September 15, 1965, such damages to be assessed based on his average monthly
income at the time of his unlawful dismissal, as shown by the records of defendant company;
(b) Moral and punitive damages in such amounts as this Honorable Court may fix but which in no case should be less
than P100,000.00;
(c) A reasonable sum of attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
233
9. Notwithstanding repeated demands, defendants have refused and continue to refuse to indemnify plaintiffs' damages
and also omitted to accede to plaintiff Vergel de Dios' request for an accounting to enable him to receive such amounts
as defendant company still holds for the account of said plaintiff.
Pertinent portions of the letter, Annex "A", attached to the complaint, which informs plaintiff Vergel de Dios of the termination of his
service, signed by defendant Lagdameo as acting general manager, read as follows:
In a routinary cheek up on your territory by our sales supervisors, we have found the following:
1) You have not been found working full time in your assigned territory. You had been staggering in a 6-day reports,
work performed during a lesser number of days.
2) You have been found tampering with the dates of your Collector Temporary Receipts, Sales Delivery Receipts and
Sample Acknowledgment Receipts in order to conform with your staggered daily reports. This, as you know, is not only
contrary to normal auditing procedures but also gives a distorted picture of your performance.
3) While in your home base in San Fernando, La Union, you have been charging per diems and other related expenses
which are normally incurred only while working outside of your home base.
4) The tampering of records mentioned above is not an isolated instance. Our records show that this practice has been
going on since the beginning of this year.
When confronted with the evidence in our possession, you readily admitted having committed the abovementioned
violations. These violations are considered grave in nature by this company as well as by other companies in the drug
industry, and are sufficient grounds for outright dismissal.
This you fully realize having been an experienced medical representative with past association with several other
pharmaceutical firms.
The reasons you have given in your defense are purely personal in nature and do not in any way justify the offenses
committed.
Under these circumstances, we have no other recourse but to terminate your employment effective September 15,
1965. Please arrange with the Administrative Manager to clear you of your accountabilities with the Company.
The complaint prays that the defendants be sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs such actual damages as plaintiffs may
prove by way of unrealized income from September 15, 1965; moral and punitive damages as the court may assess, but in no case less than
P100,000.00; a reasonable sum for attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs; and such amount as the court may find defendant
company is obligated to pay, upon accounting which said company should forthwith make, of monies still payable to plaintiff Alfredo Vergel
de Dios by reason of his employment.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss said complaint upon the ground that it states no cause of action against them.
The lower court sustained defendants-appellees' motion, and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
In their lone assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that the trial court erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on
defendants' motion to dismiss based upon the alleged failure of the complaint to state a sufficient cause of action.
The thrust of plaintiffs-appellants' contention in support of their assigned error is that the lower court, in dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action because the right of the employer to hire and fire its employees under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1052,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1787, is absolute, failed to thoroughly comprehend the nature of their action and the basis of their claim
for damages.1 According to the plaintiffs-appellants, they do not base their causes of action under Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1787. They say that are holding the defendants — appellees liable for damages they sustained by reason of the latter's
fabrication of a false ground for dismissal; use of libelous statements in the letter of September 15, 1965 and circulation of libelous matter
to other parties, thereby placing Alfredo Vergel de Dios in disrepute in the eyes of his wife, family, relatives, friends and community, thus
making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to obtain a new employment as a detailman for which he has all the needed qualification
training and experience.2 Plaintiffs-appellants further state that the allegations of the complaint call for the application by the courts of the
corresponding relief, principally on the strength of the provisions of Article 19, 20, 21, 33, 2176 and 2202 of the Civil Code.3 The allegations
referred to are those contained in paragraphs 5 to 9, inclusive, of the complaint. 4
Before discussing whether or not those allegations in the complaint referred to sufficiently state a cause or cause of action, it may be well to
state beforehand the rule, uniformly held by this Court, that in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
234
the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.5 The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well pleaded in the
complaint.6 Thus, it has been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not
admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law.<äre||anº•1àw> The
admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or
conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law;
nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.7 Examples of allegations considered by this Court as conclusions of law are: that
defendant had incurred damages as a consequence of the "malicious and unjustified" institution of the action; 8 that "with intent of
circumventing the constitutional prohibition that 'no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law', respondents "maliciously and illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance, reverted the fund of
the salary item ... and furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective July 1, 1960"; 9 that the "defendant usurped the office of
Senator of the Philippines". 10 From American jurisprudence come the following examples: 11
Bare allegations in employee's action for breach of employment contract that master had breach or violated the contract
or discharged him in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unjust, arbitrary or fraudulent manner or without authority are
compulsory and insufficient in absence of additional allegations and raise no triable issue." Wise vs. Southern Pacific Co., 35
Cal. Rptr. 652.
Allegations that defendants acted maliciously and unreasonably were conclusionary. Norkin vs. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 47 Cal.
Rptr. 15.
Allegations that acts of defendants are arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, wrongful, and unlawful are mere conclusions of
law not admitted by demurrer. Burt vs. Irvine Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 362.
A bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal conclusion and a wish of the pleader, and such a
legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give it life, has no standing in any court where issues must be
presented and determined by facts in ordinary and concise language" Petty vs. Dayton Musicians' Ass'n., 153 NE2d 218,
affirmed 153 NE2d 223.
Where acts of defendants were described as willful, wanton and malicious and an abuse of process, such descriptions were
mere conclusions of the pleader and were not admitted by motion to dismiss. Burr vs. State Bank of St. Charles, 100 NE2d
773, 344 Ill. App. 332.
Having in mind the foregoing rules and examples, let us examine the allegations of the complaint to determine whether or not they contain
ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against defendant-appellees. And by cause of action is meant "an act or
omission of one party of the legal right or rights of the other; its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 12 In this connection, it should be recalled that the plaintiffs-appellant have specifically pointed out in
their brief that their claim for damages is based on the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 to 9, inclusive of the complaint. Hence, the
examination should be made only on the allegations in said paragraphs.
As quoted above, paragraph 5 of the complaint avers that the "defendants actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with
abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due,
willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner, dismissed said plaintiff Alfredo Vergel Dios by means of a libelous
letter." It further avers the "charges and statements mentioned in said letter not true" and that the "defendants knowingly made the same in
order to justify their dismissal of Alfredo Vergel de Dios". In the light of the examples cited above, allegations that the defendants-appellees
were "actuated ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross evident bad
faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner", are
conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere the complaint
can be found any particular factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of the defendants-appellees; as to how they abused their position as
employer; as to how or why there was bad faith; and as to how plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios was deprived of his due. Likewise, the
allegation characterizing the letter of dismissal as a "libelous letter" is a conclusion of law without factual basis. And the allegations that the
"charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true", and that defendants "knowingly made the same", are legal conclusions or
mere expressions of opinion, there being no factual premises showing why the charges and statements in the letter are not true; nor is there
stated any particular fact or circumstance upon which the defendants-appellees' knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
Pursuant, therefore, to the rule stated above that conclusions of law, inferences or conclusions from facts not stated, and mere expressions of
opinion, are not deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss, what should be deemed admitted in paragraph 5 of the complaint would be the
bare allegation that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on September 15, 1965, per letter of dismissal of even date, a
copy of which was attached to the complaint and made part thereof as Annex "A". At this juncture, it should be pointed out that the
succeeding allegations of the complaint are anchored on the allegations in paragraph 5, except the later part of paragraph 9 alleging refusal of
the defendants-appellees to make an accounting of funds which allegation is an inference from facts not alleged, there being no allegation in
the pleading to the effect that any amount is due the plaintiffs-appellants and that the amount is being withheld by the defendants-appellees.
Since the only fact alleged and deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss is that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on
September 15, 1965, the other allegations premised on the allegations in paragraph 5 must be considered in that light alone.
235
Applying now the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a cause of action, can the court render a valid judgment upon the
facts alleged and deemed admitted, in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Certainly not, there being no alleged and admitted fact
showing that the defendants-appellees have committed acts constituting a "delict or wrong" by which the defendants-appellees violated the
right of the plaintiffs-appellants causing them loss or injury. Or more specifically, there is no alleged and admitted fact that defendants —
appellees fabricated a false ground to dismiss Alfredo Vergel de Dios from employment, the admitted fact being that his dismissal was for a
just cause, as shown by the letter of dismissal, Annex "A" of the complaint. In this regard, while the letter of dismissal is being attached to the
complaint to show it existence and character, in the absence of material fact well pleaded in the complaint and admitted, showing the nature
of the dismissal, the complaint should be read an interpreted with the aid of the exhibit, Annex "A", which on its face, shows that the dismissal
was for a just cause.
In addition to the foregoing, the court cannot render valid judgment upon the admitted facts in accordance with the prayer of the complaint
because the employer, in the absence of a contract of employment for a specific period, has the right to dismiss his employees at any time
with or without just cause. 13 Just as an employee in a commercial or industrial establishment may quit at any time, singly or collectively, with
or without just causes so the employer can dismiss any employee at any time with or without just causes. This right of the employer is
commonly referred to as his right to hire and fire his employee in the same way that the employee can stop working by himself or go on strike
with his fellow employees. 14 Thus, in Mariano vs. Royal Interocean Lines, 15 it was held that where an employee's dismissal was not due to
union activities, the employee has no cause of action against the employer for damages, considering that the employer, despite the
employee's right to self-organization, still retains his inherent right to discipline his employee or his normal prerogative to hire or dismiss
them.
Plaintiffs-appellants, in their manifestation and motion filed on November 4, 1966, urge this Court to resolve this appeal in the light of the
ruling of this Court in "Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Rodolfo Garcia, et al., 16 where the award of damages to the dismissed employees by the
lower court was affirmed by this Court.
We have examined the Garcia case and we have found it to have no factual similarity with the case at bar, i.e., considering the facts alleged in
the latter as admitted or proved. In the Garcia case, this Court found the employer to have been abusive, oppressive, anti-social and guilty of
bad faith in the dismissal of the employees. Said this Court:
The company's bad faith lies in its act in suspending them ostensibly until the theft case would be terminated, but actually
dismissing them before the investigation by the fiscal had ended, and making their dismissal retroactive to the date of the
pretended suspension. So that, even viewed from the standpoint of breach of contract of employment, as the company
advocates, the employer company would still stand liable for moral damages under the last sentence of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code, "where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
But to put things aright, the appealed decision in fact predicated the grant of moral damages on the —
circumstances under which the plaintiffs were illegally dismissed, the nature of the charge for which they were repeatedly
investigated by the officials of the company, the police department and the fiscal's office; and the attendant
embarrassment and humiliation to which they were unnecessarily exposed.
While the appealed decision does not cite the particular provision of law under which it held the company liable for moral
damages, yet the points upon which it predicated the award, when taken together, evidence anti-social and oppressive
abuse by the company of its right to investigate and dismiss its employees. The company's conduct violated Article 1701,
which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article 21 on human relations, the
sanction of which, by way of moral damages, is provided for in Article 2219, all of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the manner in which Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment has not been shown by facts well pleaded and
admitted, to have been abusive, oppressive, anti-social, or in bad faith. The Garcia case therefore, cannot serve the ends of the plaintiffs-
appellants. On the contrary, the ruling therein strengthens the cause of the defendants-appellees for it reaffirms the right of the employer to
dismiss his employees (hired without a definite period) whether for just cause or without it. Thus, this Court said:
... Republic Act 1052, as amended by Republic Act 1787, impliedly recognizes the right of the employer to dismiss his
employees (hired without definite period) whether for just cause, as therein defined, or enumerated, or without it. If there
be just cause, the employer is not required to serve any notice of discharge nor to disburse termination pay to the
employee. If the dismissal be without just cause, the employer must serve timely notice to the employee; but if he fails to
serve due notice, then, and only then, is the employer obliged to pay termination pay. Except where other applicable
statutes provide differently, it is not the cause for the dismiss but the employer's failure to serve notice upon the employee
that renders the employer answerable to the employee for terminal pay.
The employer's right to dismiss his employee, however differs from, and should not be confused with, the manner in which
the right is exercised. The manner in which the company exercised its right to dismiss in the case at bar was abusive;
hence, it is liable for moral damages, as previously discussed.
236
By and large, whether the plaintiffs-appellants seek redress under the provisions of the Civil Code or under Republic Act No. 1052, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1787, otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, the complaint, as shown above, fails to set forth sufficient well-
pleaded material and relevant facts to sustain a cause of action against the defendants-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants. It is so ordered.
237
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18512 December 27, 1963
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SIMACO BELLOSILLO, FERNANDO DIOPIDO, ARTURO PALACIO, CRISTOSTOMO GONZALES and FEDERICO FRABCISCO, defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Amado B. Atol for defendants-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the information in the above
entitled case, with costs de officio.
It is not disputed that, sometime in 1959, an information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and docketed therein as criminal
case No. 7689, charging defendants herein — Simaco Bellosillo, Fernando Diopido, Arturo Palacio, Crisostomo Gonzales and Federico Francisco
— with the crime of theft of coconuts, valued P300.00 and belonging to Pe Julian Lao, allegedly committed on December 23, 1958. Predicated
on the ground that, upon a reinvestigation conducted at the request of the accused, it turned out that the property from which the coconuts
were allegedly stolen was involved in a civil case between the complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other, said criminal case
was, on motion of the prosecution, and "with the express conformity" of the accused, dismissed on January 4, 1960. However, soon thereafter,
or on March 23, 1960, the prosecution filed against the accused an identical information which was docketed as criminal case No. 7997 of the
same court, and is the case at bar.
Before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the last information upon the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense, and that the previous information therefor had been dismissed. The lower court granted this motion, upon the theory that, having
failed to move for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal of January 4, 1960, or to appeal thereform the prosecution may no longer
maintain the present action. Hence, this appeal.
The order appealed from is untenable. The order of January 4, 1960, dismissing case No. 7689, cannot be an obstacle to the institution of the
present case for, not being a decision on the merits, said order cannot bar the present case upon the principles of res adjudicata, and the
provision of Rule 30, section 3, of the Rules of Court, to the effect that a "dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by the Court," does not apply to criminal cases, either does the present action place the accused twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense, not only because he had never been in jeopardy of punishment therefor in the previous case, the same
having been dismissed before arraignment and plea, but, also, because its dismissal took place with the express consent of the accused (Rule
113, section 9, Rules of Court; U.S. v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207; U.S. v. Solis, 6 Phil. 676; U.S. v. Sobrevinas, 35 Phil. 32; People v. Turla, 50 Phil. 676;
People v. Romero, L-4517-20, July 31, 1951; Gaudicela v. Lutero, L-4069, Resolution of May 21, 1951; People v. Reyes. L-7712, March 23,
1956).lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs de
officio. It is so ordered.
238
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82039 June 20, 1989
SPOUSES ANTONIO MARTINEZ AND BENEDICTA BALATBAT MARTINEZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE EUFROCINIO S. DE LA MERCED, BIENVENIDO U. JUAN and SACRED HEART SCHOOL MALABON, INC., respondents.
Nelly B. Molina and B.P. Faustino for petitioners.
Ricardo C. Fernandez for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Raised in this petition for review on certiorari is a novel issue in procedural law. More particularly, the question posed by petitioners is
whether or not the preliminary conference under the Rules of Summary Procedure 1 can be waived, albeit impliedly, by failing to object to its
non-observance in the proceedings had before the inferior court.
The subject provision is contained in Section 6 of the abovementioned rule which states:
SEC. 6. Preliminary Conference.-Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, the case shall be calendared for
a preliminary conference. Among other matters, should the parties fail to arrive at an amicable settlement, the court must
clarify and define the issues of the case, which must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately
after such preliminary conference, together with other matters taken up during the same.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: 2 On August 24, 1979, petitioners instituted before the Metropolitan Trial
Court an unlawful detainer case against the herein private respondents Bienvenido Juan and Sacred Heart School of Malabon, Inc., for the
recovery of possession of the premises being used by the latter as school building. For their causes of action, they claimed that the contract of
lease has expired, and the terms and conditions of the contract of lease were violated.
Private respondents filed their answer to the complaint alleging, among others, that the period of the contract of lease is for 25 years from
November 8, 1973 which has not expired, and that its terms have not been violated.
On December 13, 1979, private respondents filed a motion to suspend proceedings because of the pendency of their interpleader case, Civil
Case No. C-8046, with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioners and their predecessors-in- interest, the estates of
Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat, who were all claiming to be the owners of the leased premises. This motion was granted.
About five years thereafter or on August 17, 1984, petitioners filed a motion to lift the said order of suspension alleging therein that the
pendency of the interpleader case is not a bar to its trial. Private respondents opposed the motion by asserting that the petitioners in Civil
Case No. C-8046 were ordered to recover (sic) the titles of the leased premises to the estates of Ricardo and Soledad Balatbat. Consequently,
the motion was denied by the court.
On June 5, 1985, petitioners filed a Second Motion to Lift Order of Suspension invoking the same ground. This time, however, the court, in an
order dated July 11, 1985, lifted the suspension in view of the absence of any opposition and that there was no showing as to the progress of
Civil Case No. C-8046.
On October 24, 1985, the Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion for reconsideration and set the case for trial on the merits. On
November 23, 1985, private respondents filed a motion to implead necessary and/or indispensable parties inasmuch as the estates of Ricardo
and Soledad Balatbat or their lawful heirs have an interest over the leased premises.
In its order dated March 31, 1986, the Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion. In the same order, the court ordered the case to be tried
under the Rules on Summary Procedure and, without setting the case for pre-trial conference, required the parties to submit the affidavits of
their witnesses with supporting documents and position papers within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
On April 23, 1986, private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file the required pleadings for the reason that their counsel was
still recuperating from a recent major operation. The motion was granted in another order dated April 23, 1986, which reads as follows:
As prayed for in the "Motion for Extension of time to file Defendant's Position Paper" ... the same is hereby granted and
the said counsel is hereby given an extension of twenty (20) days from April 24, 1986 ... provided that he submit before this
239
court a medical certificate from the hospital attesting to the fact that he has recently underwent a major surgical operation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED. 3
On May 14, 1986 or within the given period, private respondents filed their position paper. However, the required medical certificate was
posted by registered mail only on May 18, 1986 and received by the court on May 21, 1986.
Earlier, on May 20, 1986, the court issued the following order:
Considering that no hospital record whatsoever ... was submitted by counsel for the defendants when he filed their
position paper and counter-affidavit ..., a condition given (by) the court when it granted defendant's Motion for Extension
of Time to File Defendants' Position Paper, the said position paper and counter-affidavit writs of the defendant Bienvenido
U. Juan which constitutes their evidence should be, as they are hereby, ordered stricken off the record as they were clearly
filed out of time, the last day of the filing the same being on April 24, 1986 (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, this case is now submitted for decision and let a judgment be rendered in accordance with Section 6 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure based on evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, on May 26, 1986, the lower court rendered an ex parte decision in favor of the petitioners, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants and all those claiming right under
them, to:
1. vacate the premises in question and restore complete and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
2. pay the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
3. pay the costs of the suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 5
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court presided by respondent Judge Eufrocinio de la Merced. On August 13, 1986, said
respondent judge rendered a decision declaring the judgment of the inferior court "null and void" on the ground that a preliminary conference
under the Rules on Summary Procedure is a jurisdictional requirement, the non-observance of which constitutes reversible error. 6
From this appealed decision, a petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals. In a decision promulgated on November 25, 1987, 7 the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court on two grounds: first, that the preliminary conference under the Rule on
Summary Procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional and second, that the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated May 20, 1986, ordering
private respondents' evidence expunged from the record, illegally denied them their day in court. 8
The Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases are designed primarily to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
particular cases to which it applies. To achieve this goal, the Rules adopted, among others, simplified procedures without regard to technical
rules; abbreviated periods of time to file responsive pleadings; certain pleadings and motions are expressly prohibited from its application; and
the Rules likewise provide for a "preliminary conference" by which parties are admonished to settle their dispute amicably, and if this is not
possible, to narrow, clarify and define the issues of the case. 9
At the outset, the issue appears simple.
Petitioners claim that the failure of private respondents to raise the matter of lack of preliminary conference during the proceedings in the
lower court effectively estops them from raising the same on appeal. 10
On the other hand the respondents seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, correctly ruled that the proceedings in the inferior court are illegal and, therefore, null and void, there being no preliminary
conference conducted. 11
240
While the Court of Appeals is correct in its view that Section 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure is made mandatory by the use of the
auxiliary verbs "shall" and "must" instead of the permissive "may," it does not, however, logically follow that the absence of a preliminary
conference would necessarily render nugatory the proceedings had in the court below. 12
While termed a "preliminary conference," a closer look thereat would reveal that the provision is akin and similar to the provision on "pre-
trial" under Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court. 13 Both provisions are essentially designed to promote amicable settlement or to avoid or
simplify the trial.
An analysis of existing jurisprudence on the matter reveals that proceedings undertaken without first conducting a pretrial or with a legally
defective pre-trial is voided because either of the parties thereto suffered substantial prejudice thereby or they were denied their right to due
process. 14 Be that as it may, petitioners cite as exceptions to the foregoing rule Santamaria vs. Court of appeals 15 ; Insurance Company of
North America vs. Republic 16 ; and Trocio vs. Labayo. 17 Notable in these cases is the fact that the issue of pre-trial did not affect the trial
court's jurisdiction because no injury was caused to any party therein. Additionally, facts and circumstances dictate that to conduct another
pre-trial would only be a superfluity, its purpose of expediting the proceedings having been attained otherwise.
Thus, unless there is a showing of substantial prejudice caused to a party, the trial court's inadvertent failure to calendar the case for a pre-trial
or a preliminary conference cannot render the proceedings illegal or void ab initio. A party's failure to object to the absence of a pre-trial is
deemed a waiver of his right thereto. This observation holds with more reason in the case at hand where private respondents have already
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the question of lack of preliminary conference first,
when private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their
position paper in which they sought native relief from the Metropolitan Trial Court; and third; when they filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the position paper of private respondents, in which motion private
respondents even urged the court to sustain their position paper. And yet, in none of these instances was the issue of lack of preliminary
conference raised or even hinted at by private respondents. 18 In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the
proceedings. For it has been consistently held by this Court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. 19
Private respondents claim that their failure to raise the issue at hand before the Metropolitan Trial Court is by reason of a legal impediment.
They argue that they could not raise the issue in the said court because a motion for reconsideration is one of the prohibited motions under
Sec. 15 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. 20 This argument is specious. Private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file their
position paper and a motion for reconsideration of the order expunging from the record their position paper. These two pleadings are also
disallowed in summary proceedings. 21 Obviously, the failure of private respondent to raise the issue was occasioned by negligence on their
part, if not a belief that it was not vital for their cause, and not because filing a motion for reconsideration invoking this ground was prohibited
by the rules.
The Court of Appeals observed that private respondents were illegally denied their day in court. Thus, it set aside the order of the
Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the position paper of private respondents.
This is erroneous. The order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated April 23, 1988 granting private respondents' motion for extension of time to
file position paper is conditioned upon the timely submission of the medical certificate to support the motion. We see no reversible error in
the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court in ordering private respondents' position paper stricken from the record for their failure to submit
the medical certificate with the position paper.
Nevertheless, while we hold in this case that the right to a preliminary conference under the Rules on Summary Procedure is deemed waived
by a party's failure to invoke the same before the trial court, this is not in the least to suggest that the trial courts may dispense with such a
preliminary conference. Courts should make full use of the pre-trial proceedings primarily so that all issues necessary to the early disposition of
a cause are properly determined and to explore all avenues towards a compromise or settlement of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
dated May 26, 1986 in Civil Case No. 4526 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
241
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30526 November 29, 1971
BATAMA FARMER'S COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION INC. and IGNACIO VICENTE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO ROSAL, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, ANTONIO VILLEGAS and JUAN
TEVES, respondents.
Geminiano M. Eleccion for petitioners.
Lenin R. Victoriano for private respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
On December 11, 1968, respondent Antonio Villegas filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in Civil Case No. 4784,
for injunction and damages with prayer for a restraining order against the petitioners, claiming that since he already resigned as a member of
petitioner BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. as of July 10, 1968, and revoked, effective August 30, 1968, the
"Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" which he executed in favor of said BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
said association and its agents should be enjoined from continuing or trying to continue, with the authority of the 1967-1968 "Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney," in the management, production, milling, and marketing of his sugar cane and sugar cane products for the
crop year 1968-1969 and succeeding crop years, or from doing or performing any act or acts thereunder (pp. 1-2, Petition; Appendix "A", 18-
22, rec.).
On December 18, 1968, the petitioners filed their Answer denying the material averments of the complaint and as asserting affirmative
defenses and counterclaims (p. 3, Petition; Appendix "G", pp. 24-27, rec.).
On January 6, 1969, respondent Juan Teves, claiming to have a legal interest in the subject matter of respondent Antonio Villegas' complaint or
in the success of the latter because "he has a common cause of action with the plaintiff i.e., the lack of authority of defendant association to
act on the strength of the already-expired 'Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney'," filed, thru the same course of respondent Antonio
Villegas, an urgent motion for intervention. Attached to said motion was his proposed complaint-in-intervention, in which he averred, among
others that as a sugar cane planter, he joined defendant association as a member and in 1967, signed with the association a "Marketing
Agreement and Power of Attorney" similar in substance as to terms and conditions to the "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" of
plaintiff Antonio Villegas with said association (pp. 3-4, Petition; Appendices "D" and "D-1", 29-35, rec.).
On January 21, 1969, petitioners filed their opposition to urgent motion for intervention, alleging that Juan Teves "Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney" with defendant BATAMA Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Association Inc., is entirely distinct and separate from the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" of plaintiff Antonio Villegas; that accordingly, a breach or grievances arising out of one
agreement, no matter how similar it may be to a breach or grievance arising out of another or agreement with another person, both in the
manner of the infliction and in the remedy for the redress thereof, does not and cannot give rise to a so-called "common cause of action" that
will justify intervention, or stated differently, that the rights of movant Juan Teves under his "Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney"
with defendant association are so entirely distinct and separate from the rights of plaintiff Antonio Villegas under the latter's separate
"Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney" with same defendant association, that their enforcement cannot be joined in one action or
complaint; and that the proposed intervenor's rights are not of such nature that may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding (Appendix
"H", pp. 40-42, rec.).
Private respondents filed their rejoinder to the opposition to the urgent motion for intervention dated February 5, 1969, asserting, among
others, that as "plaintiff-in-intervention has certainly an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of the plaintiff, since he has a
common cause of action with the plaintiff," the intervention is in order (Appendix "J", pp. 45-46, rec.).
On March 15, 1969, respondent judge issued an order (Appendix "K", p. 47, rec.) admitting respondent Juan Teves complaint-in-intervention,
on the ground that it "is in due form and substance and that it has, been shown that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of the plaintiff."
On March 27, 1969, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the last-mentioned order on the ground that said order is contrary to the
facts and the law of the case (Appendix "L", pp. 48-50, rec.). This motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent judge "for lack of
sufficient merits" in an order dated May 7, 1969 (Appendix "M", p. 51, rec.).
242
On May 12, 1969, petitioners filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to plead to respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention
(Appendix "N", p. 52, rec.).
On May 14, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion for suspension of proceedings on the complaint-in-intervention of respondent Juan Teves
(Appendix "P", pp. 54-56, rec.). Acting on said motion, respondent judge, on May 15, 1969, issued an order, as prayed for, suspending the
proceedings, insofar as the complaint-in-intervention of Juan Teves is concerned, in order to afford the petitioners an opportunity to test
before the appellate courts the validity of its order dated March 15, 1969, allowing the intervention of respondent Juan Teves, giving the
petitioners a period of fifteen (15) days for said purpose (Appendix "Q", p. 57, rec.).
On May 27, 1969, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction was filed with this Court, petitioners praying among others for
the annulment of the order of respondent Judge dated March 15, 1969 allowing respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention, as well as
his order dated May 7, 1969, and to disallow as a consequence, respondent Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention (p. 16, Petition).
On June 28, 1969, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering respondent Judge to refrain from taking any action on respondent
Juan Teves' complaint-in-intervention until further orders from this Court (pp. 64-65, rec.).
As clearly stated in Section 2 of Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, to be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party must have a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition if the property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant. If the party who has no true
interest in the subject matter of the action would be allowed to intervene, the proceedings will become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable, which contravenes the policies of the law.1
Herein private respondent Juan Teves signed a separate independent contract with herein petitioner Association. Nobody else, much less
herein private respondent Villegas, signed the said contract with him. Herein private respondent Villegas has likewise a separate independent
contract with herein petitioner Association, which he alone signed, without any intervention on the part of herein private respondent Teves.
Consequently, private respondent Teves has no legal interest in the subject matter of the contract signed by herein private respondent Villegas
with petitioner Association. The fact that their respective separate, distinct and independent contracts with herein petitioner Association
contain the same identical terms and conditions with respect to the management, production, milling and marketing of their sugar cane,
milled sugar and the by-products thereof, does not create in favor of private respondent Teves a legal interest in the contract of private
respondent Villegas or vice versa. Whatever may happen to the sugar cane, milled sugar, and its by-products belonging to private respondent
Villegas which are the subject matter of the contract between him and herein petitioner Association, or any breach of the terms of said
agreement, is no concern of herein private respondent Juan Teves. Consequently, any decision that may be rendered in the case filed by
herein private respondent Villegas against herein petitioner Association on the basis of Villegas' contract with petitioner Association, will not
affect one way or the other the interest of herein private respondent Juan Teves under his own contract with herein petitioner Association.
Respondent Teves is a total stranger to, and therefore has no legal interest in, the contract of respondent Villegas with petitioner
Association.2 A mere collateral interest in the subject matter of the litigation cannot justify intervention.3
The interest of herein private respondent Juan Teves in the contract between herein private respondent Villegas and herein petitioner
Association, cannot be likened to the interest of:
(1) an unpaid vendor who claims right of preference over the proceedings of the sale of the properties he sold to a
partnership under dissolution, by reason of which such unpaid vendor may validity intervene in the dissolution and
distribution of the proceeds of the property of the partnership; 4
(2) a third party who claims preference over the mortgaged property sought to be foreclosed, which interest justifies
intervention,5 unless said third party is merely a general unsecured creditor;6
(3) the heirs in the hereditary estate of a decedent, who believe that the acts of a judicial administrator are prejudicial to
their interests;7
(4) the Republic of the Philippines, which can properly intervene in an action instituted by a Filipino citizen against the
Philippine Alien Property Administration of the United States for the return of a parcel of land of which said entity divested
an enemy corporation of all title and rights and transferred the same to the United States government, because under the
Property Act of 1946, such properties will have to be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines;8
(5) the possessor of parcels of land, which are the subject matter of an action filed by a judicial administratrix of the estate
of her deceased husband against another party seeking the annulment of a deed of sale over said parcels of land, some of
which parcels were the exclusive property of her deceased husband and the others were conjugal property; 9
(6) the unpaid supplier of construction materials, who by reason thereof can intervene in an action by the plaintiff for
damages against the defendant contractor who abandoned the unfinished construction of a hospital; 10
243
(7) the alleged purchaser of the estate of the deceased who was allowed to intervene in the probate of the will and
testament of the said deceased; 11
(8) the transferee or assignee of the insured's interest in his insurance policy, who was allowed to intervene in an action
filed by the insured against the insurance company to recover on his policy under an agreement to pay certain fees to the
attorney employed in the litigation, because the transferee or assignee would in the end have to pay for such attorney's
fees; 12
(9) an alleged natural daughter of the decedent to intervene in the probate of his will, upon the production of a prima facie
evidence of her civil status, 13 although only such heirs whose rights have been prejudiced can intervene in the case of this
character; 14
(10) an heir who can intervene in order to protect the interest of the deceased, when the judicial administrator fails to
interpose the necessary and effective legal defenses in an action for the recovery of a claim rejected by the committee on
claims and appraisal; 15
(11) a testamentary heir who may properly intervene in a civil action filed against the administratrix of the estate of the
deceased to recover the unpaid balance on a promissory note signed by the deceased and his wife, where the wife alleges
that the said promissory note is fictitious, without consideration and was obtained through
fraud; 16
(12) an heir to intervene in the probate of a will and distribution of the testatrix's estate at any time after the court
acquired jurisdiction over the estate and establishes his right to participate in the final distribution or disposition thereof; 17
(13) an alleged partner of the deceased to intervene in the approval of the accounts of the said deceased on the allegations
that he and the deceased during his lifetime had formed a partnership which was dissolved upon the death of one of the
partners; 18 or
(14) the intervenor seeking possession of the vessel solely from the plaintiff who tried to remove from the defendant the
possession of said vessel. 19
The interest of the herein private respondent Teves does not even approximate the interest of a party whose intervention was disallowed in
the following cases:.
(1) one who claims that the goods sold by the plaintiff to the defendant were acquired from him, cannot intervene in the
case, where it was found that the sale by the intervenor to the plaintiff and the sale by plaintiff to the defendant were two
separate and distinct sales which had been consummated (similar to the case at bar) and such intervention would only
result in delay in the adjudication of the right of parties and the claim of the intervenor could be better threshed out in a
separate proceeding; 20
(2) in an action filed against the defendant for the recovery of the value of a certain promissory note, the heirs of the
deceased husband of the defendant, who on the date of the execution of the note was already married to another, cannot
intervene as they have no sufficient legal interest as their interest in the property of the deceased is, if not conjectural,
contingent and expectant; 21
(3) in an action for partition of property of a deceased person where an amicable settlement was reached whereby one of
the defendants ceded his interest and title in a parcel of land to the plaintiff, a third party who claims that the said land
ceded in the amicable settlement had already been adjudicated to them by the cadastral court, cannot properly intervene
as the proceeding is in personam, not in rem and therefore, he is not bound by the amicable settlement; 22
(4) in an action for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff, the
collector of internal revenue cannot properly intervene on the ground that the two defendants in said cases were indebted
to the government for a deficiency in a specific tax; 23
(5) the owner of merchandise lost by reason of a collision between two vessels, may not be allowed to intervene in an
action between the owners of the two steamships for damages; 24
(6) neither a mere creditor can intervene in a foreclosure suit since he has no right to the property litigated; 25 when the
rights of the intervenor may be fully protected in the separate proceedings, the intervention should be disallowed. 26
A fortiori the intervention of herein private respondent Teves should have been disallowed by the trial court, which erred in so permitting his
intervention in the case filed by private respondent Villegas against herein petitioner Association.
244
While it is true that the motion for intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court (Section 2[b], Rule 12, Rules of Court),
such discretion however is not without limitations. 27 Intervention should be denied when it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the right of the parties; 28 or when the claim of the intervenor can be properly decided in a separate proceedings like the claim of respondent
Teves.
To sustain the position of private respondent Juan Teves would be to permit persons similarly situated as he is, to save on filling fees and other
expenses of litigation by just intervening in cases analogous to the case filed by private respondent Villegas against herein petitioner
Association.
There are numerous borrowers from financing institutions and purchasers on credit from industrial concerns from Batanes in the North down
to Sulu in the South executing identical contracts with the same terms and conditions. Following the logic of herein private respondent Juan
Teves, the moment one borrower or purchaser on credit files a suit on the basis of his contract with the creditor firm, all other customers of
such firm with similar contracts can intervene in such suit. Such absurdity can never be envisioned as permissible under the rules on
intervention.
The respondent Judge therefore committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the intervention of private respondent Juan Teves in Civil
Case No. 4784.
As a consequence, private respondent Juan Teves should file against herein petitioner Association a separate action, which may be heard
jointly with Civil Case No. 4784, should the court and the parties find it feasible and convenient.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted; the orders of respondent Judge dated March 15, 1969 and May 7, 1969 are hereby set aside as
null and void; and the motion for intervention and the complaint filed by private respondent Juan Teves are hereby denied and disallowed,
with costs against private respondents Antonio Villegas and Juan Teves.
245
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents.
Sobreviñas, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for petitioner.
Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. to
recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmariñas) specifically denied any liability to the plaintiff
(hereafter simply APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.
The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL presented its first witness whose testimony was completed
on November 12, 1988. The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2) more witnesses in APL's behalf.
At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee
and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since
the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the
President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary — and it therefore prayed
— "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center,
Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons .
. . ."
The motion was opposed by Dasmariñas. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court
examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the
Philippine Court;" and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."
Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which APL submitted to
the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20,
1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in
consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department
of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting
information inter alia of the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a
Taiwan Court may be obtained.
By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by
deposition (upon written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED. The Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R.
Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition. Compliance with the Rules on the taking of testimony by
deposition upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of Rule 24, Rules of Court is enjoined.
Let this Order be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 4 dated April 6, 1987.
246
The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of
plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."
Dasmariñas sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following grounds: (1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
(AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a
foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by
commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4)
depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral
testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights
and liberties of citizens."
By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash of arguments
already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order authorizing the . . . (deposition-
taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce
additional evidence by deposition."
Dasmariñas instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just described. Said
Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to maintain the status quo and to prevent
the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner."
After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on September 23, 1992 denying Dasmariñas petition
for certiorari and upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmariñas sought reconsideration of an adverse disposition,
and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992.
Once again Dasmariñas has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the Appellate Court's
Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.
Dasmariñas ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witnesses
in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of their oral examination in
open Court considering that:
a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to
trial;
b) no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the departure from the accepted and
usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge;"
2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing private respondent, a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to
present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while
petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of
the Judge;" and
3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by
the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions."
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or
other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties;
requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the
adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or
suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not
therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be
presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides:
247
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done
in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a
different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent
in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial
evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions
and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or
represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following
provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as
a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for
any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that
the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party
offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it
which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court
to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may
be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is
in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign
state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters
rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After
answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any
intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the
action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the
name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24).
The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and
for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into"
or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
248
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission
or under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 provides as follows:
Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. — A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when necessary or
convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms and with such directions as are just and appropriate. Officers
may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and letters rogatory may be addressed "To
the Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the country)."
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take
depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or
court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness
who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p.
653). Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title,"
while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the
indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is
apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the inclusion in a "petition for letters
rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______, 19__, to take the testimony of (here name the witness
or witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the testimony is to be taken), before _________________ (name
of officer), was returned unexecuted by __________________ on the ground that ____________, all of which more fully
appears from the certificate of said __________ to said commission and made a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state
other facts to show commission is inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take
the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said Center may,
"upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of
Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the
Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition for review
on certiorari) — a prima facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.
It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No. 4 issued by
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs — directing "ALL JUDGES OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department
of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;"
this, "in the interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.
Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission on various grounds.
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy.'"
This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in
accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the
deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to trial." Not
so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law
authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate
their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of
execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
Dasmariñas further claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is "inherently unfair" to
allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating
scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing
questions of the Judge."
249
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the
deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and
probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance
than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc."
(Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) — is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754).
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written interrogatories, removing
the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the
questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the
determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the
condition — that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" — is "so as to give defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded
the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be
taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by
proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-
interrogatories.
One other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 — denying Dasmariñas motion for reconsideration of the earlier order dated March 15, 1991
(allowing the taking of deposition by commission) — one of the reasons adduced by the Regional Trial Court for the denial was that the motion
had been "filed out of time." Evidently, the Trial Court reached this conclusion because, as the record discloses, the motion for reconsideration
was filed by Dasmariñas on June 25, 1991, twenty-five (25) days after notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991 sought to be
reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a ground is incorrect. In the first place, it appears that there was a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration, ending on June 25, 1991 which was however not acted on or granted by the Court. More importantly, the
order sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order, in respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the time within which
reconsideration thereof should be sought.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review on certiorari. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
250
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156605 August 28, 2007
EDWARD T. MARCELO, MARCELO FIBERGLASS CORPORATION, PHIL-ASIA AGRO INDUSTRIES CORP., PHILIPPINE SPECIAL SERVICES CORP.,
PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES CORP., MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT CORP., FARMERS FERTILIZER CORP., INSULAR RUBBER
CO., INC., HYDRONICS CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARCELO RUBBER & LATEX PRODUCTS, INC., POLARIS MARKETING CORP., H.
MARCELO & CO., INC., MARCELO STEEL CORP., PHILIPPINE CASINO OPERATORS CORP., and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORP., Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
This joint petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution 1 dated August 27,
2001 of the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 21, a suit for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, with damages, initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic or RP, for short), denying herein petitioners’ respective motions for summary judgment and its Resolution2 of November
19, 2002 which likewise denied their separate motions for reconsideration.
At the core of the case is the contract entered into on June 10, 1982 by and between the Republic, though the Philippine Navy (PN), and
Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation (MFC), represented by its President, herein petitioner Edward T. Marcelo (Marcelo, hereinafter), for the
construction of 55 units of 16.46 fiberglass high-speed boats, at the unit price of ₱7,200,000.00, subject to adjustment upon the occurrence of
certain stated contingencies.3 The same contract underwent amendments, the first effected sometime in January 1984, 4 and the second, in
October 1984.5
The facts:
On February 16, 1987, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 1, series of 1986,
issued a writ of sequestration against MFC. The next day, PCGG agents proceeded to occupy MFC premises where four of the herein petitioner
corporations were holding office.
On July 27, 1987, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic, filed a Complaint 6 with the Sandiganbayan against Marcelo, Fabian Ver (Ver), now
deceased, and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for recovery of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth which they allegedly acquired in unlawful concert
with one another. The complaint, which would later undergo amendments7 and was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Civil Case No. 21,
alleged, in gist, that Marcelo and Ver, taking advantage of their relationship with the Marcoses, (a) obtained from the Republic, thru the PN, a
"favored contract" for the construction of high-speed fiberglass boats at the cost of millions of pesos; (b) collected from the Republic advances
representing 79% of the contract price; and (c) secured a loan from foreign banks which, upon the behest of then Pres. Marcos, was covered
by what amounts to a sovereign guarantee.
On November 20, 1987, the Republic filed its Second Amended Complaint to rectify its error in making reference to the "Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation," when it should properly be "Philippine Casino Operators Corporation."
On May 17, 1989, Marcelo filed his Answer8 to the Second Amended Complaint attaching thereto a copy of the PN-MFC boat-building contract,
the alleged "favored contract" adverted to. The Republic filed its Reply9 on June 30, 1989, followed later by Marcelo’s Rejoinder.10
Subsequently, the Republic served a Request for Admission11 dated June 5, 1991 on Marcelo. In his August 15, 1991 Response to PCGG’s
Request for Admission,12 Marcelo included his own counter-request for admission on matters stated in his response.
In the meantime, the Republic sought and was later granted leave to file a Third Amended Complaint13 dated October 30, 1991, therein
impleading the herein petitioner corporations and two others14 as additional defendants. As alleged, the newly impleaded sixteen (16)
corporations are beneficially owned and are dummies of the individual defendants.
To the third amended complaint, the other petitioner corporations filed their respective Answers, 15 which contained these common
allegations: they are not owned, controlled or were acquired by Marcelo who is merely an officer/stockholder; and that their assets were
acquired legally.
Following the filing by the Republic of its Pre-Trial Brief,16 Marcelo submitted his own Pre-Trial Brief With Written Interrogatories, First Set and
Request for Admission17 (to admit the truth of the matters of fact stated in his August 15, 1991 reply to the Republic’s June 5, 1991 request for
admission). On October 15, 1996, MFC filed its Pre-Trial Brief With Written Interrogatories, First Set and Request for Admission;18 the other
petitioner corporations, as defendants a quo, filed their Pre-Trial Briefs with Written Interrogatories First Set19 on the same day.
Of the written interrogatories and request for admission thus submitted, the Republic filed an answer20 to that of Marcelo’s.
251
On August 15, 1997, the petitioners filed three separate Motion for Summary Judgment.21 Marcelo’s motion was based on two major
arguments:
¨ There is no genuine issue of fact/cause of action against him; and,
¨ In his Pre-Trial Brief, he (Marcelo) requested the [Republic] to admit the truth of the matter of fact related in his 15 August 1991
‘Response (to PCGG Request for Admission) and Request on Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines for Admission’ but the Republic did
not reply to the request. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, "each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted."
For its part, MFC predicated its motion for summary judgment on two major points:
¨ Lack of a genuine issue/cause of action against it; and,
¨ The Republic’s failure and continued refusal to answer the written interrogatories and reply to the request for admission of certain
facts set forth in its pre-trial brief.
Finally, the other petitioner corporations22 submit their entitlement to a summary judgment on practically the same grounds invoked by
Marcelo and MFC vis-à-vis facts embodied in their own pre-trial brief. Thus, they argue that the matters set forth in their written
interrogatories are deemed established, more particularly the following: that they: a) are not parties or signatories to, and were not involved
in obtaining the PN-MFC contract in question; b) were not involved in and did not do any act in securing the approval of direct payment for the
subject boats, in violation of the stipulation in the contract that payment should be made by Confirmed Irrevocable and Divisible Letter of
Credit (L/C); c) did not receive/collect anything from the Republic and there is no document showing they ever received anything; and d) were
not involved in the procurement of the alleged aforementioned foreign loan.
The Republic filed separate Opposition23 only to Marcelo’s and MFC’s respective motions for summary judgment, alleging in refutation to the
former’s motion the following:
¨ MFC’s defense of having a personality separate from that of Marcelo and the other corporations was not raised in Marcelo’s
answer.
¨ The amended complaint alleges that Marcelo and Ver, taking undue advantage of their influence and relationship, by themselves
and/or in unlawful concert with the Marcos spouses, for unjust enrichment, engaged in schemes and strategies, including using the
other corporations for the above purposes.
¨ That MFC has a personality distinct from Marcelo is a legal issue, thus trial should not be dispensed with.
¨ The other corporations are merely the "fruits of the ill-gotten wealth of the individual defendants";
¨ The case is based on the theory of conspiracy.
Against MFC’s motion for summary judgment, the Republic advanced the following arguments:
¨ The complaint makes out an allegation that the other corporations were utilized as "fronts" for the perpetration of the illegal
schemes, devices and "stratagems";
¨ There is no allegation in the motion for summary judgment that defendant corporations were not used as a ‘front’ by … Marcelo.
As a matter of fact, Marcelo claims that it was MFC, not himself, which entered into the contract with the [PN] for the construction
of high-speed fiberglass boats labeled as ‘favored’ in the Third Amended Complaint.
Marcelo and MFC in turn filed their respective Replies24 to the opposition entered by the Republic.
Eventually, on August 27, 2001, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein assailed Resolution 25 denying the separate motions of Marcelo and
MFC, as defendants a quo, for summary judgment and the collective motion for such judgment interposed by the other defending
corporations. In a subsequent Resolution26 of November 19, 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ respective motions for
reconsideration. Hence, this recourse.
Before discussing the merits of the petition, the Court deems it appropos to delve into Criminal Case No. 20224 which involved the subject PN-
MFC boat supply contract.
252
In a Commission on Audit (COA) Report dated March 12, 1992 (COA Report), the COA alleged that the PN disbursed for the boat supply
contract ₱337,700,000.00. The disbursement, so the report claims, was contrary to pertinent laws and COA rules governing the disbursement
of public funds, such as:
(a) There was no certificate of availability of funds;
(b) No performance bond was posted, as required;
(c) No demand for delivery was made despite failure to deliver after payment of 80% of the contract price;
(d) Default provision was not invoked or enforced against MFC; and,
(e) Payments were not made in accordance with the terms of the contract.
On the basis of the COA Report, an Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20224, was filed against Marcelo, then Rear Admiral Simeon
Alejandro and three other PN officials for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) penalizing as corrupt practice
the act of a public officer and/or the conspiring private individual , inter alia, of causing injury to the government by giving unwarranted
benefits to a private party through evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. As alleged, the giving of unwarranted
benefits stems from the disbursement of ₱337,437,000 to MFC in partial payment of undelivered 55 units of high speed boats.
Following a review, however, on motion of Alejandro et al., the Ombudsman approved an Order27 of April 14, 1999, for the withdrawal of the
Information, on the strength of, inter alia, the ensuing findings of the Special Investigator embodied in the same Order:
Further, the failure to deliver the boats was for reasons not attributable to MFC. First, in breach of contractual stipulations, the PN incurred
delay in making the down payments until the foreign exchange crisis supervened.Second, due to the dollar crisis, the Central Bank (CB) refused
to authorize the opening of … (LCs) to finance the importation of the boat components. The CB finally authorized the opening of the LCs only
two years after the first request was made, and it was for restricted LCs. Third, when the shipment of the 55 MTU diesel engines …arrived in
the Philippines between June and December 1986, they were taken to the MFC manufacturing plant in Malabon so that boat manufacture
could be commenced. However, before the manufacture … could start, the PCGG, on February 16, 1987, sequestered not only the imported
boat components but also all the properties of MFC and padlocked its manufacturing plant. xxx..
The undisputed facts also show that the down payments made by the PN were used for the importation of boat engines, gearboxes and other
components needed for the construction of the boats, and that the PN could not lawfully demand the delivery of the boats from MFC since the
latter’s obligation to deliver the boats had not yet arisen.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, a corporation is a distinct juridical entity …. In this case, the party that entered into the Contract with PN for the construction of
speed boats was MFC, which exclusively assumed …the obligation to put up a performance bond; it was to MFC that down payments were
made by PN…; and it was MFC which, … was solely obligated to build the boats and deliver them to PN. Under the circumstances, if MFC
committed any culpable act, it alone bears the responsibility therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
As discussed earlier, there is … no injury or prejudice to the government. The down payments made by the PN to MFC …were used to import
MTU engines and other boat parts, which … were seized by the PCGG …. Also, the facts show that no party received any ‘unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference’ under the contract. It must be emphasized that none of the down payments or money subject of this case inured to
the benefit of MFC or Marcelo….
As no injury or prejudice was caused to the Government and no party received any unwarranted benefit under the Contract, it is baseless to
say that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits given through ‘manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.’ xxx the elements of the crime charged are not present in this case. 28 (Underscoring and words in brackets added)
The main issue tendered in this joint petition turns on whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for summary judgment of Marcelo, MFC and the other petitioner
corporations. According to the petitioners, "the pleadings of the parties, and the admissions and documentary evidence of the [Republic] show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [they] are entitled to a [summary] judgment as a matter of law."29 They thus
urgently urge the reversal of the assailed Resolutions and the consequent dismissal of Civil Case No. 21.
253
It needs to stress at the outset that Civil Case No. 21 is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that the Republic, through
the PCGG, has initiated. The Court has resolved several similar cases, establishing in the process doctrinal teachings. As it were, several sub-
issues in the present petition may have already been addressed, if not rendered moot and academic, in those cases. Accordingly, this petition
shall be resolved taking into stock and in the light of the relevant holdings and doctrines in those cases, foremost of which is Baseco v.
PCGG.30 There, the Court made it abundantly clear that the right and duty of the Government to recover ill-gotten wealth are undisputed. The
Court added the caveat, however, that plain and valid that right may be, a balance must still be sought to the end that "proper respect be
accorded and adequate protection assured, the fundamental rights of private property and free enterprise…." Among the things we stressed in
BASECO is the need, in ill-gotten wealth cases, to give due regard to the basic rights of the parties, with particular emphasis on the right to
property and the requirement of evidentiary substantiation.
It is the petitioners’ main posture, positing the propriety of summary judgment in Civil Case No. 21, that there is no more genuine factual
issues to be tried by the Sandiganbayan, the Republic, for failing to answer the petitioners’ requests for admission, having already admitted
certain vital facts in this case. Excepting, the Republic counters that the said requests for admission were sufficiently denied by its allegations
in the complaint.
In denying the motions for summary judgment, the Sandiganbayan wrote:
The answers of [the Republic] to the written interrogatories propounded by … Marcelo indubitably show the existence of genuine factual
issues between the parties, such as, whether or not … Marcelo … President of [MFC] was the real beneficiary of the amounts collected from
the [Republic] by [MFC] through the alleged favored contract mentioned in the complaint; and whether or not [MFC] was used as conduit by …
Marcelo allegedly to amass ill-gotten wealth.
It must be stressed that the crucial factual question that serves as underpinning of the alleged causes of action invoked by the [Republic] in this
case is whether or not the subject contract, including the amendments, … was a "favored contract", unlawfully obtained by the defendants in
conspiracy with one another. Corollary thereto, whether or not the other [petitioner] corporations allegedly owned or controlled beneficially
by the individual defendants were the fruits of the alleged ill-gotten wealth obtained through the said contract or whether individual
defendants … Marcelo and … Ver acted as dummies or agents of former President … Marcos in the defendant corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
Incidentally, the instant motions for summary judgment were filed before the [anti-graft] Court could issue an order under Section 1, Rule
931 of the Rules of Court relative to the written interrogatories. Moreover, the factual details alleged and conclusions of fact and law adduced
in the said pleadings largely rely on the terms and conditions of the [favored] contract … and its amendments which are precisely being
questioned … to be a "favored contract". From the allegations of the defendants, it is apparent that the [Republic] extended enormous sums of
money …. Even assuming … that the factual background alleged in the Answer of … Marcelo which was reiterated in the Answer of [MFC], to be
true or to have been established or admitted, still, a genuine factual issue remains to be tried and that is whether or not the subject contract …
was a "favored contract" … as it appears from the record that the implementation of its terms, as narrated by the defendants, had resulted in
the expenditure of hundreds of millions of pesos on the part of the [Republic] without a single delivery having been made or required to be
made …. The factual issue of whether or not the subject contract is a favored one, which we take to mean as "disadvantageous" to the
government, is not settled by the allegation that the contract was implemented in the midst of a foreign exchange crisis and that the
government failed to comply with the staggered payments which the government was required to tender before any delivery could be made
by the … [MFC] under the terms of the contract. For the defendant to invoke the terms of the contract to excuse the non-delivery of the
subject matter thereof simply begs the questions because the very stipulations of the contract are in issue in this case.32 (Words in brackets
added)
We examine the records and found that summary judgment is in order. Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, summary judgment
may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense of time involved in a trial. Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues,
summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. 33 The
presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A genuine issue, as
opposed to fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence. To the moving party rests the onus of
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial.34 In Estrada v. Consolacion,35 the Court stated that when the moving party is a defending party, his
pleadings, depositions or affidavits must show that his defenses or denials are sufficient to defeat the claimant’s claim. The affidavits or
depositions shall show that there is no defense to the cause of action or the cause of action has no merits, as the case may be. In fine, in
proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action and to show that the defense is
interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the plaintiff discharges its burden, the defendants has the burden to show facts sufficient to
entitle him to defend.
With the view we take of the case, there is really no more genuine issues to be tried in this case, the Republic having failed or refused to
answer the requests for admission and the written interrogatories of the petitioners. As it were, the Republic only answered petitioner
Marcelo’s request for admission or interrogatories. But then the Republic’s answer serves only to highlight and confirm the fact that petitioner
Marcelo’s participation in all the transactions subject of this case is as President of MFC, 36 thus:
254
1.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, sub-paragraph (d), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
"(d) illegally securing a loan with a foreign bank with the ‘Guarantee of the Government,’ upon the personal behest of defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which loan remains unpaid to date"
1.1. Was the alleged loan for defendant … Marcelo personally?
ANSWER: The loan was for the [MFC] of which … Marcelo is the President, who stands to benefit from the proceeds of the loan.
1.2. In the affirmative, what documents indicate that the loan was for defendant …. Marcelo personally?
ANSWER: The loan was negotiated by … Marcelo in his capacity as President of [MFC] with the Swiss Bank Corporation. The Monetary Board
[in] … August 12, 1983 approved the loan.
2.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, sub-paragraph (c), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
"(c) unlawfully received and collected from plaintiff hundreds of millions of pesos by way of advances representing 79% of the contract price
for the construction of the aforementioned high-speed fiberglass boats, without, to date, delivering a single boat to the prejudice and damage
of Plaintiff and the Filipino people"
2.1 Was the amount allegedly received and collected from plaintiff for the personal account of defendant Edward T. Marcelo?
ANSWER: The amounts collected from plaintiff were for the account of [MFC] but only as conduit. The real beneficiary of the amount is …
Marcelo. The Contract to Build…and its Amended Contract…provide that payments should be "by CONFIRMED IRREVOCABLE, DIVISIBLE LETTER
OF CREDIT established in favor of the BUILDER." However, payments were made directly to [MFC] as shown in Land Bank application for
Cashier’s Check…;
2.2 In the affirmative, what documents indicate that the amount allegedly received and collected went to the personal account of defendant
Edward T. Marcelo?
ANSWER: The defendant, as President of [MFC] stands to benefit from the proceeds of the amount collected. The Amended Article of
Incorporation…shows that … Marcelo is the President of the Corporation, a wholly owned family corporation.
3.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, sub-paragraph (b), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
"(b) securing the approval of direct payments on the above-mentioned contracts, in violation of the stipulation that payment should be by
confirmed, irrevocable and divisible letter of credit"
3.1 Was the direct payment allegedly secured for … Marcelo personally?
ANSWER: The direct payment was secured by defendant as President of [MFC] as shown in his letter dated November 4, 1982 requesting for
release of the first downpayment of ₱127,710.00.
3.2 In the affirmative, what documents indicate that the direct payments allegedly secured went to the personal account of defendant Edward
T. Marcelo?
ANSWER: The defendant, as President of [MFC] stands to benefit from the proceeds of the direct payments made by plaintiff.
4.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, sub-paragraph (a), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
"(a) unlawfully obtaining a favored contract with the [PN] for the construction of high-speed fiberglass boats at the cost of hundreds of millions
of pesos"
4.1 Is … Marcelo personally a party to the contract referred to by plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes, defendant is signatory to the contract as President of [MFC]. Defendant Marcelo’s letter-request…dated November 4, 1982, to
then President Marcos who approved it in his marginal note…dated November 10, 1982. 37 (Words in bracket added.)
It is basic that a corporation is clothed with a personality distinct from that of its officers, 38 its stockholders and from other corporations it may
be connected.39 Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate existence, however, the corporation’s separate personality may be
disregarded when the separate identity is used to protect a dishonest or fraudulent act, justify a wrong, or defend a crime. In such instance,
255
the wrongdoing must clearly and convincingly be established;40 it cannot be presumed.41 Absent malice or bad faith, the officer or shareholder
cannot be made personally liable for corporate obligations and cannot be held liable to third persons who have claims against the corporation.
A reading of the Republic’s answers to Marcelo’s interrogatories leads us to view, like the Ombudsman,42 that there was nothing irregular with
the boat supply contract. Neither were the circumstances leading to the contract award tainted with irregularity. For, the answers yield
nothing more than a reiteration of mere conclusions of fact stated in the underlying complaint. The complaint does not even state how the
conclusion was arrived at that Marcelo was the real beneficiary of the amounts collected under the contract, absent factual averments that
would support the same. The Republic’s argument that since MFC did not allege in its motion for summary judgment that it is not used as a
front by Marcelo, then the two should be treated as one and the same,43 is simply specious. There is no such principle as "presumption of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction." Nor could it be simply assumed that by the mere bare allegation or conclusion of law, in an answer to
written interrogatories, that Marcelo is a conduit of the Marcoses, a genuine issue has been created. On this score, the Sandiganbayan was
certainly in error.
As the Court distinctly notes, the complaint in Civil Case No. 21 imputes an unlawful or at least a highly improper act against petitioner
Marcelo in that he obtained a "favored contract" with the PN, collected hundreds of million of pesos by way of advances and illegally secured a
foreign loan with sovereign guarantee courtesy of then Pres. Marcos. The complaint, however fails to disclose why the contract
characterization "favored" was, a conclusion of law, as it were. The Court will go further. The complaint violates fundamental rules of pleading.
For one, it yields a substantial lack of specific averments constituting the Republic’s cause or causes of action against the petitioners,
particularly Marcelo. In fine, the complaint does not state with definiteness how or in what specific manner the petitioners committed the
alleged illegal and fraudulent acts so broadly enumerated therein. For another, it is replete with sweeping generalizations, conclusions of fact
and law, and contains inferences derived from facts that are not found in the complaint. In short, the complaint is an embodiment, a concrete
example, of how one should not prepare a legal complaint. The Court’s disposition in Remitere v. Montinola Vda. De Yulo 44 should be
enlightening:
It is not stated anywhere in the complaint why the sale … was absolutely void, nor were there stated any particular facts or circumstances
upon which the alleged nullity of the sale or transaction is predicated. The averment that "the public sale … was and still is absolutely a void
sale …." is a conclusion of law or an inference from facts not stated in the pleading. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the
rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from a mere conclusion of fact, or conclusion of law. An allegation that a contract is valid
or void, as in the instant case, is a mere conclusion of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Not being statements of ultimate facts which constitute the basis of a right of the plaintiffs-appellants, nor are they statements of ultimate
facts which constitute the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants-appellees that violated the right of the plaintiffs-appellants the
allegations of the complaint in the present case have not fulfilled the requirements of Section 3, Rule 6 of the … Rules of Court xxx that the
complaint should contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action". (Emphasis added.)
It cannot be over-emphasized that the Republic cannot any more prove malice or wrongdoing on the part of either Marcelo or MFC, or that
the separate corporate identity of MFC was used for unlawful means. For, the Republic has veritably acknowledged the regularity of the boat-
construction contract by its failure to answer written interrogatories and the request for admission propounded by petitioner MFC. To be
precise, the Republic did not answer the following written interrogatories45 of MFC:
1.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, sub-paragraph (d), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
(d) illegally securing a loan with a foreign bank with the ‘Guarantee of the Government,’ upon the personal behest of defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which loan remains unpaid to date"
1.1. Was there any loan with a foreign bank ever availed of for … Republic… to say that the "loan remains unpaid to date?
1.2. Who availed of such loan with a foreign bank?
1.2. When was such loan with a foreign bank availed of?
1.3. How much of such loan with a foreign bank was availed of?
1.4. What is the name of the foreign bank from which such loan was secured and availed of?
1.5. Why was the loan with foreign bank secured?
1.6. In 1982, what were the loan options proposed by the Republic[’s]… Philippine National Bank for plaintiff Republic[’s]… [PN] to pay for the
domestic/deferred letter of credit which the latter was supposed to open in favor of defendant [MFC]?
256
1.7. In 1983, without a long term foreign loan to pay for the letter of credit which … [the] … [PN] was to open with …[the] Land Bank of the
Philippines, was plaintiff Republic[’s]… Central Bank of the Philippines willing to approve the importations by defendant [MFC] under the boat-
building contract?
1.8. What specific provision of law in 1982 was violated for plaintiff Republic… to conclude that securing a loan with a foreign bank with the
guarantee of the government is "illegal"?
1.9. Who required and why was the "Guarantee of Government" secured for the loan with a foreign bank?
1.10. In 1982, without the guarantee of the Republic[’s]… National Government, was plaintiff Republic’s… own [PNB] Bank willing to lend
plaintiff Republic[’s]… own [PN] the amounts to pay for the latter’s opening of a domestic/deferred letter of credit in favor of defendant
[MFC]?
1.11. In 1982, who in … [the] National Government has power to approve the issuance of … [the] National Government’s guarantee of a loan?
1.12. In 1982, in what a particular form, document or writing should the approval of the issuance of plaintiff Republic[’s]… National
Government’s guarantee of a loan appear?
2.0 Regarding the "Specific Averments of Illegal Acts" in paragraph 11, subparagraph (c), of the Third Amended Complaint which reads:
"(c) unlawfully received and collected from Plaintiff hundreds of millions of pesos by way of advances representing 79% of the contract price
for the construction of the aforementioned high-speed fiberglass boats, without, to date, delivering a single boat to the prejudice and
2.1. How much exactly was received and collected from plaintiff Republic…
2.2 Who among the defendants received and collected such amount?
2.3. What does plaintiff Republic… mean by the word "advances"?
2.3.1.Were the amounts received and collected borrowed from plaintiff Republic…?
2.3.2. If they were borrowed, what are the loan documents evidencing the loan?
2.3.3. If they were not borrowed, why were they received and collected from plaintiff Republic…?
2.4. In its 5 June 1991 Request for Admission, plaintiff Republic… asserts and acknowledges that there is an upward adjustment of the contract
price from ₱425.7 Million to ₱926.524 Million. This was the agreement in November 1985. What is the "contract price" plaintiff Republic… is
referring to in the aforequoted allegations in the Third Amended Complaint?
2.4.1. Under the June 1983 amendment to the contract, the parties agreed that "the foreign exchange risk shall be for the account of the
Philippines. With the contract price of ₱425.7 Million in June 1982 at the exchange rate of ₱8.00 to US$1.00, what is the additional amount
assumed by the plaintiff Republic… [PN] by November 1985 when the exchange rate had changed to ₱18.00 to US$1.00?
2.5. What are the pre-conditions for the delivery by defendant [MFC] of any boat under the contract?
2.6. Which of these preconditions have been satisfied for plaintiff Republic… to rightfully complain of the non-delivery of the boats to date?
2.7. Article VIII, part B, of the contract stipulates that "delivery of the boats shall be effected" provided that … [PN] shall have fulfilled all its
obligations as stipulated in this contract." Has plaintiff Republic… fulfilled all its obligations as stipulated in the contract?
2.8. Article XIII, part A of the contract signed and executed on 18 June 1982, stipulates and obligates plaintiff Republic… to make the following
payments:
"1. THIRTY (30) PERCENT of the total contract price as downpayment upon the signing of the Contract on 18 December 1982."
2. TWENTY (20) PERCENT of the total contract price xxx for the engines, gear boxes, fiberglass materials, radar and communication equipment
xxx after SIX (6) MONTHS from date of the execution of this contract xxx or by 18 December 1982."
2.8.1. How many payments were received by defendant [MFC] from plaintiff Republic…?
2.8.2. On what dates were each of such payments received?

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2.8.3. What were the amounts received on each of such dates?
2.8.4. How many years, months and/or days had elapsed from 18 June 1992 before each of such payment was received?
2.8.5. How many years, months and/or days had elapsed before or after 18 November 1995 when each payment was received?
2.8.6. What percentage of the adjusted contract price of ₱926.524 Million was received in each of the payment was received?
2.9. Article XIII, part A, of the contract further stipulates and obligates plaintiff Republic… to open a ‘CONFIRMED, IRREVOCABLE, DIVISIBLE
LETTER OF CREDIT" in favor of defendant Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation.
2.9.1. When did plaintiff Republic… open such a [L/C] for either the full value of the contract price or any part thereof?
2.9.2. What efforts did plaintiff Republic… exert on its own to comply with this obligation?
2.10. Article X, part A, of the contract further provides:
"If, at any time, either the construction of the boat, or any performance required hereunder as a prerequisite to the delivery of the boat, is
delayed due to acts of state, xxx by destruction of the shipyard xxx by fire and/or other causes beyond the control of either contracting party,
the time of delivery of the boat under this Contract shall be extended for a period of time corresponding to the duration and cause of such
events."
2.10.1. Was not the construction of the boats and a prerequisite to the delivery of the boats delayed by an act of state or by cause beyond the
control of defendant [MFC] when the state, plaintiff Republic…, paid the 20% of the original contract price, intended for the engines, gear
boxes, fiberglass materials, radar and communication equipment of the boats, only in November 1985 or almost three years past due and
when the contract price to be paid had increased because of the change foreign exchange rate?
2.10.2. Was not the construction of the boats and a prerequisite to the delivery of the boats delayed by an act of state and by cause beyond
the control of defendant [MFC] when the state, plaintiff Republic… never delivered the full 20% of the increased contract price intended for
the very engines, gear boxes, fiberglass materials, radar and communication equipment of the boats?
2.10.3. Was not the construction of the boats delayed by an act of state or by cause beyond the control of defendant [MFC] …when the Central
Bank …. from 1982 to 1986, because of the dollar crisis which was aggravated by the murder of Senator Benigno S. Aquino on 21 August 1983,
refused or could not provide the foreign exchange necessary for … [MFC] to import the engines, gear boxes, fiberglass materials and radio and
communications equipment for the boats?
2.10.4. Was not a prerequisite to the delivery of the boats delayed by an act of state or by cause beyond the control of defendant [MFC] when
the State, plaintiff Republic… never opened or could not open the required [L/C]?
2.10.5. Was not the construction of the boats further delayed by an act of state or by cause beyond the control of defendant [MFC] when the
state, plaintiff Republic…, sequestered on 17 February 1987 all assets of … [MFC], padlocked its offices and shipyard/plant, and barred entry by
anyone thereto up to this day?
2.10.6. Was not the construction of the boats further delayed by an act of state or by cause beyond the control of defendant [MFC] when the
State, plaintiff Republic…, negligently caused in 1994 the destruction by fire of the shipyard/plant of defendant [MFC] while under its full and
exclusive sequestration, control and custody?
2.10.7. Considering that the foregoing causes of the delay in the construction of the boats and delay in the prerequisite to the delivery of the
boats, most of which are still existing up to this day, is not the extension of time granted in the contract for the delivery of the boats still
continuing?
xxx xxx xxx
3.2. Is such direct payment in violation of the stipulation in the amended contract of June 1983 which allows the payment of the 30%
downpayment either by bank draft or [L/C]?
xxx xxx xxx
3.3. Is plaintiff Republic… aware of its own documentary evidence consisting of the 22 December 1983 letter of its own Defense Ministry,
through then Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, who explained therein that:
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"The Office of Budget and Management (OBM) released the amount of ₱127.71 M. representing the 30% downpayment required in the
contract. The amount was subsequently paid to MFC to save for the government front-end fee and other bank charges amounting to
₱1,915,650.00"
3.4. Does plaintiff Republic… know that, for the reason stated by its own Defense Ministry, it was itself who requested defendant [MFC] to
accept payment and that the latter merely acceded to the request?
3.4. Who "secured" the approval of, and who "approved"’ the direct payments?
3.4.1. What is the basis of plaintiff Republic… in identifying such person (s) as the one who "secured" the approval?
xxx
4.1. What does plaintiff Republic… mean by the phrase "favored contract"?
4.1.2. What circumstances made the contract being referred to a "favored" one?
4.2. What specific provision of law was violated for plaintiff Republic… to conclude that the contract or the act of obtaining it is "unlawful"?
4.2.1. Is obtaining the contract "unlawful" because it is a "favored" one?
4.2.2. Or, is the contract "favored" because obtaining it is "unlawful"?
4.2.3. What is the reason for the answers to the two preceding questions?
4.3. Without using "unlawful" "favored" or words of similarly sweeping conclusionary import, what is wrong with "obtaining that contract with
the [PN] for the construction of high speed fiberglass boats at the costs of hundreds of millions of pesos"?
4.4. What did plaintiff Republic…, its then Ministry of National Defense, its [AFP] and its [PN] do to the offer made in 1979 by defendant [MFC]
to construct the boats required by the [PN] until the contract was signed on 18 June 1982?
4.5. What did plaintiff Republic…, its then Ministry of National Defense, its [AFP], and its [PN] do to comply with the contract entered into on
18 June 1983 up to the time defendant [MFC] was sequestered in February 1987?
4.6. With its sovereignty and all resources and powers …, what efforts did plaintiff Republic… exert to know what itself, its then Ministry of
National Defense, its [AFP] and its [PN] did within the periods of almost four (4) years each referred to in the two preceding questions?"
(Words in brackets added.)
The Republic did not also answer the written interrogatories of the other defendant corporations. In effect, the Republic admitted the non-
participation of the other defendant corporations in the contracts in question. This is evident from the following written interrogatories which
were deemed admitted by the Republic:
1.1. What is the specific involvement of, or the specific acts done by, each of the other Defendant Corporations in securing the alleged loan?
xxx xxx xxx
2.1. How much exactly was received and collected by each of the Other Defendant Corporations from plaintiff?
2.2. When did each of the Other Defendant Corporations receive the amounts allegedly received from plaintiff, if any?
2.3. What documents indicate that each of the Other Defendant Corporations received such amount allegedly received from plaintiff?
xxx xxx xxx
4.1. Which of the other defendant corporations is a party or signatory to the contract referred to by plaintiff?
4.2. What is the specific involvement of, or the specific acts done by, each of the other defendant corporations in obtaining the contract
referred to by plaintiff?"
259
The Republic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written interrogatories and requests for admission. If the
plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify
such failure or refusal.46
To be sure, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedures and defines all the consequence/s for refusing to comply with the different modes of
discovery. The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan,47 a case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth where the defendants served upon the PCGG
written
interrogatories but the latter refused to make a discovery, is relevant. Some excerpts of what the Court said thereat:
The message is plain. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue--fully and fairly; xxx
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties;… "ultimate facts" are set
forth in the pleadings; xxx. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a … concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which
the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness
or particularity to enable x x (an adverse party) properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking
a "more definite statement" may be ordered …. xxx.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters' may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of
the law that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant
to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that
civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set
forth in Rules 24 to 29. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions …
under Rule 24,(b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of
court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes
of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. xxx.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery … in accordance with Rule 27, or … under Rule 28, which may be granted
upon due application and a showing of due cause.
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the 'law imposes serious sanctions on the party
who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, …; taking the matters inquired into as established
in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or
defenses; xxx
xxx xxx xxx
One last word. xxx all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of questions with the request that they be answered
individually. That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the
questions "separately and fully in writing under oath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories …" The
sanctions for refusing to make discovery have already been mentioned. So, too, discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex
than the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth … be admitted
in writing. That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the
party requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth
in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted." xxx. (emphasis supplied)
While earlier touched upon, other considerations obtain which should have impelled the Sandiganbayan to grant the motion for summary
judgment. We refer to the defect in the Republic’s complaint itself. We start with the very PN-MFC contract itself which served as the main
prop of the Republic’s case. There is no dispute that the Republic did not attach to its complaint a copy of what it claims to be a "favored
contract," let alone set out therein the relevant terms and conditions of the contract, or pertinent averments as would show, in general, why
the same is unlawful or grossly disadvantageous to the State as would merit the tag "favored." The rule obtains that when a claim is based on a
written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy
260
thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be
set forth therein:48
"SECTION 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the
substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the
pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading."
The record reveals that it was petitioner Marcelo no less who brought out the contract first, as an attachment to his Answer.
On the alleged illegal advances, the particulars on the matter are not alleged; the circumstances that would justify its conclusion that either
petitioner Marcelo or MFC received the 79% monetary equivalent of the contract without delivering a single boat could not be found. Again,
the specific information was volunteered by Marcelo himself in his answer.lavvphil
As to the allegation that the petitioners "secured a loan with a foreign bank with the guarantee of the government, upon the personal behest
of defendant Ferdinand Marcos, which loan remains unpaid to date," a copy of the alleged loan document is not appended to the complaint.
Neither is there a reference to the pertinent provisions of the loan agreement made in the complaint, nor were the circumstances surrounding
the alleged incurring of the obligation enumerated. This is material in the sense that the petitioners deny that there was any loan at all
obtained.
On the allegation that petitioners secured the approval of direct payments on the alleged "favored boat supply contract" in violation of the
stipulation that payment should be by "confirmed, irrevocable and divisible letter of credit," the existence of a cause of action based on the
allegation could not be determined since a copy of the contract was not attached to the complaint, nor was there made a reference to the
particular stipulation claimed to have been violated.
With respect to the allegation that the petitioners acted as dummies, nominees or agents of "Ferdinand E. Marcos in corporations such as the
Philippine Casino Operators Corporation, beneficially owned and/or controlled by the latter," it is noted that allegation partakes of a
conclusion of fact unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will show why such inference or conclusion was arrived at. In
this regard, we are reminded of the Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan: 49
Under paragraph 6-A of the Amended Complaint, the Companies alleged to be beneficially owned or controlled by defendants Lucio Tan,
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and/or the other individual defendants were identified and enumerated, including herein corporate
respondents. But except for this bare allegation, the complaint provided no further information with respect to the manner by which herein
corporate respondents are beneficially owned or controlled by the individual defendants. Clearly, the allegation is a conclusion of law that is
bereft of any factual basis. (emphasis supplied)
To stress, the Rules of Court require every pleading to "contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense."50 A transgression of this rule is fatal. 51
In view of the absence of specific averments in the Republic’s complaint, the same is defective for it presents no basis upon which the court
should act, or for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.52 The complaint, to stress, did not present the very documents claimed
to be the source of the Marcelo-Marcos vinculum: it did not attach the alleged boat supply contract which is the main cause of action against
the petitioners; the unpaid loan document from which another claimed cause of action arose; and other relevant documents and information.
The Republic tags, at every turn, the PN-MFC contract to be a "favored contract," without, however, so much as stating with sufficient
particularity the circumstances that led it to arrive at such conclusion.
The foregoing is nonetheless true with respect to the case against the other petitioner corporations (except MFC). There is no cause of action
against them. Not only because the complaint does not, as to them, spell out specific illegal acts and omissions committed by them, but also
on account of our ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,53 or what subsequent opinions would later refer to as The Final Dispositions case, which
proscribes their being impleaded in the case. Thus:
As regards actions in which the complaints seek recovery of defendants' shares of stock in existing corporations (e.g., San Miguel Corporation,
etc.) because (they were) allegedly purchased with misappropriated public funds,… the impleading of said firms would clearly appear to be
unnecessary. If warranted by the evidence, judgments may be handed down against the corresponding defendants divesting them of
ownership of their stock, the acquisition thereof being illegal and consequently burdened with a constructive trust, and imposing on them the
obligation of surrendering them to the Government.
Quite the same thing may be said of illegally obtained funds deposited in banks. The impleading of the banks would also appear unnecessary.
xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct — in other words,
the companies themselves are the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof — there is no need to implead them either. Indeed,
261
their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on
their part. The judgment may simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth.
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant
identifying the corporations in question with the persons who formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent
acquisition to illegally amassed wealth — at the least, not so as (to) place on the Government the onus of impleading the former together with
the latter in actions to recover such wealth. xxx. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth,
and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions.
The Government is, thus, not to be faulted for not making such corporations defendants in the actions referred to.1avvphi1 It is even
conceivable that had this been attempted, motions to dismiss would have lain to frustrate such attempts. (Underscoring supplied)
It does not escape our notice that, in line with our ruling in Republic immediately adverted to, petitioner corporations were perhaps not
originally impleaded because it was unnecessary, they being perceived to have been formed with ill-gotten wealth. As against them, there is
no cause of action other than that they constitute the res of the action. However, the fact that they were subsequently impleaded in Civil Case
No. 21 could only mean that a cause of action exists against them, one that must be specifically alleged in the amended complaint. It appears,
however, that their inclusion was made without the corresponding insertion of general or specific averments of illegal acts they are alleged to
have committed as should constitute the cause of action against them. It may not be said that those general and specific averments already
existing in the complaint before the amendment apply to them, because they refer only to the boat building contract, a transaction for which
only Marcelo and MFC have been specifically made answerable.
The Republic’s argument in their Opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment that the Final Dispositions case suggested that the other
petitioner corporations should be impleaded does not commend itself for concurrence. On the contrary, we categorically ruled therein that
their impleading is not at all proper.
In all then, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ separate motions for a summary
judgment. To us, the petitioners were entitled to a summary judgment owing to the interplay of the following premises:
1. The Republic’s complaint, as couched and presented to the Sandiganbayan does not contain concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which it relies for its claim against petitioners Marcelo and MFC. Worse still, it does not specify the act or omission
by which the other petitioners wronged the Republic. In net effect, the complaint no less does not present genuine ill-gotten wealth
issue; and
2. In view of the Republic’s failure to respond to MFC’s interrogatories, the Republic veritably conceded the regularity of the PN-MFC
contract, that no wrongdoing was committed vis-à-vis the conclusion of that contract and that the separate personality of MFC was
not used for unlawful means to activate the piercing of corporate veil principle. The questions in the interrogatories were simple and
direct and the answers thereto would have constituted the fact/s sought to be established. We do not see any reason why the
Republic could not have answered them. They refer to relevant matters that could clarify the important facts left out by, to borrow
from Republic v. Sandiganbayan,54 the "roaming generalities in the complaint."
Assume the element of regularity and the bona fides of the transaction and no genuine issue as to any material fact would come into fore.
With the foregoing disquisitions, each of the petitioners’ counterclaim for damages need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that resolution
thereof entails factual determination which is not proper in a certiorari proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated August 27, 2001 and November 19, 2002 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint against the petitioners in Civil Case No. 21 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
262
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.
Lozano Law Office & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Gregorio A. Palabrica for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao City, Branch II (Judge Alfredo I. Gonzalez presiding), rendered in its Civil Case No.
4018, dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of prosecution.
The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II, where appellant therein had filed suit to recover from defendant Emilio
Mapayo the sum of P2,800, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by the plaintiff to the
defendant, plus attorney's fees. The answer admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended that by reason of hidden defects of
the article sold, the defendant had been forced to spend P2,800 for repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due
on the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees. The City Court, after trial, disallowed the defenses and
ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,500.00 and costs (Record on Appeal, pages 9-16).
Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance, filing an answer therein that was a virtual reproduction of his original defenses in
the City Court. When, after several continuances, the case was called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as well as his counsel,
failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence,
and from the unchallenged stenographic notes quoted in appellant's brief, pages 11-14 (Transcript, pages 4-7), the following transpired:
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, before I present my witness I should like to present the issue because all the
allegations of the complaint are admitted and I am going to specify by the answer, your Honor.
(Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
The issue is void on the hidden defect.
ATTY. LOZANO:
That is why, if your Honor please, the point if your Honor please, is I do not have to prove that there is
a gasoline engine that was taken by the defendant from the plaintiff for an agreed amount of P6,800.00
because the allegation in paragraph 1, No. 2 and No. 3, is admitted in the answer.
In other words, if your Honor please, the promissory note in the amount of P2,800.00 ... (interrupted by
court).
COURT:
Wait a minute, are you going to present evidence or not?
ATTY. LOZANO:
Will you please give me a chance, if your Honor please, because my purpose is, it will turn out that it
will be the defendant to present evidence to prove that there is hidden defect. He admitted the
263
allegation, he admitted that there is a balance of P2,800.00; it is not paid by him but at the same time
he said that there is a hidden defect.
In other words, if your Honor please, it should be the defendant to present the evidence ... (interrupted
by court).
COURT:
Are you going to present evidence, substantial, oral, or not? Answer the question of the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, on the complaint, on the allegation of the complaint, all are admitted by the
defendant ... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
The attorney does not answer the question of the Court.
Answer the question, are you going to present evidence OR NOT AND SUBMIT THE CASE ON THE
PLEADINGS. (Capitals supplied)
ATTY. LOZANO:
Would you please allow me, your Honor, because in the answer of the defendant ... (interrupted by
court)
COURT:
I do not need discussion; I want you to answer the question of the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
I am not going to present my evidence yet because this moment I am submitting my evidence on the
pleading until after the defendant will present evidence and I reserve my right to present rebuttal
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
Make it of record that the attorney refuses to present evidence either oral or documentary when
required by the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
Motion for reconsideration, if your Honor please, that is not what I said, if your Honor please, I
manifested that it should be the defendant to prove first, to present evidence and we reserve our right
to present rebuttal evidence, if your Honor please. (Emphasis supplied).
COURT:
All right, denied.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
The court then issued an order on the same day in the following terms (Record on Appeal, page 24):
ORDER
Make it of record that the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to present evidence, either oral or documentary, when required
by the Court.
264
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration having been filed by counsel for plaintiff, it was denied by the court by an order of 21 March, and the case was
dismissed for lack of prosecution (Record on Appeal, pages 34-35), the trial judge reasoning that —
When the case is called for trial on 19 March 1968, defendants counsel asked again for another postponement of the trial
on the ground that defendant and his witnesses were not able to come for lack of transportation, notwithstanding a stern
warning by the Court, per its order of 9 March 1968 that it would not entertain further motion for continuation of trial.
Counsel for the plaintiff vehemently objected to such motion and insisted in presenting his evidence which the Court
grants inspite of another civil case and one miscellaneous case which were ready for hearing at the same time.
Court ordered the plaintiff to present his evidence. Plaintiff's counsel refused to comply with said order. Instead of calling
his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said
counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked to his
demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal. This is dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful
command and a violation of the order of trial provided in the Rules of Court.
This is an appealed case from the Municipal Court elevated to this Court on 18 May 1963 and from that time several
postponement were granted at the instance of the parties which cause delay and is detrimental to the interest of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, let this case be dismissed for failure to prosecute on the part of counsel for the plaintiff without
pronouncement as to costs.
Finding defendant's counterclaim not meritorious, same is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Further motions to reconsider having proved futile, the plaintiff appealed.
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were
pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Section 2
of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
palpable mistake.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain from observing that the trial judge's despotic and
outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support of allegations that were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was
totally unwarranted, and was made worse by the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation of the rules of
Judicial Ethics.
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby revoked and set aside, and the court below is directed to enter judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P2,800.00, plus attorney's fees which this Court considers just and reasonable (Civil Code,
Article 2208, paragraph 11). Costs against defendant-appellee.
265
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999
SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown
by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court, dated April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land registration case 1 filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that
petitioners were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of rentals
from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private
respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. 2
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while
private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the
contrary, they alleged that possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a
writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao, the return thereof having
been received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court; that
petitioners' claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private
respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she
was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents. 3
On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful."
In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other things, that
earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties was unsuccessful.
On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents' answer did not tender an issue
or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. 4 Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had
denied petitioners' claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after
trial.5
On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to
arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial court reads: 6
The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, is of the opinion and so
holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their answer, particularly
in its paragraph 3 to the amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of
the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA 307), citing Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled
that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that failure to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admission of said allegations, there is
however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be
proved. This ruling is in accord with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise with the
defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified as provided in Article 151 of the Family Code.
266
Besides, it is not believed that there were indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two feuding
brothers, Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.
The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the same is not necessary or
jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioner, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Ganong, et al.,
respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977, is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the fact is the
rationale in that case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:
a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a member of the Hontiveros Family,
is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio also denied in their verified answer to the amended complaint.
b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in the land that was litigated by
Gregorio and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaleta where it was shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain
right;
c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the name of Teodora Ayson as part-
awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was therein described as a widower. Moreover,
Teodora was never mentioned in said decision, nor in the amended complaint and in the amended motion for judgment on
the pleadings that she ever took any part in the act of transaction that gave rise to the damages allegedly suffered by the
plaintiffs for which they now claim some compensation.
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby orders, the dismissal of this case with
cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contend:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE
MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT DENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this case on appeal to the Court of Appeals
since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on the merits. On the other hand, even if petition for certiorari were the proper
remedy, they contend that the petition is defective because the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent.8
Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As explained
in Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals:9
Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision is
contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No.
5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to
the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of law have to be through the filing
of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:
. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct mode of
elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error,
involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal — except only if the appeal is taken in special
proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which even the
filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely
questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder) specified in
Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.
267
By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March 9, 1930 Circular No. 2-90,
paragraph 2 of which provides:
2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. — Except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed
to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by
petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein petitioner adopted the correct
mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Regional Trail
Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.
In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10
It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner's complaint was, whether it was
right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter
therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a firmly
settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal may be solely on
questions of law, in which case it may be taken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal
should be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should be by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which an appeal can be taken. It is final in the
sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and puts an end to the litigation so that nothing more was left for the trial court
to do. 11 Furthermore, as the questions raised as the questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the proper mode of appeal. These
questions are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court could dismiss their complaint motu
proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which provides that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it appears from the complaint, which must be verified, that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but the same have
failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions do not require an examination of the probative value of evidence
presented and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted which questions of fact would entail. 12
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motion to that effect was made by any
of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, private respondents did not seek the dismissal of
the case but only the denial of petitioners' motion. Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.
Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without a motion to that effect filed by any of the
parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13 this Court mentioned these cases, to wit:
The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff's right to be heard, except in the following
instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to prosecute his action for unreasonable length of
time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit.
However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.
Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that [private respondents] in their
answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the [rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must
satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. . . . " Necessarily, a trial must be held.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14
Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegation
of the adverse party's pleadings, the court may, on motion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions
for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 When there are actual issues raised in the answer, such as one involving
damages, which require the presentation of evidence and assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render
judgment based on the pleadings alone. 16 In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to be
resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson's participation and/or liability, if any to petitioners and (2) the nature,
extent, and duration of private respondents' possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied
petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
268
However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that, although it alleged that earnest efforts had been made
toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the
veracity of the allegation.
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court
doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have
ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. 17 Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part
of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts proved
unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the
court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among the family
members. Citing several cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family
members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is
admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case
out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and
wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19 As this Court held in Guerrero
v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as
member of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized
that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family," we
find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a
compromise before filing the present suit.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. 21Consequently, private
respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who
is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art.
151.
Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of Court. This,
according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings
and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this
question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET
ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
269
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners,

vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of Appeals’1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution
of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought
payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned
check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his
complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and
this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on
the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed
the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit
("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this
law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996,
respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated
August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden
affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals
considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
270
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the
supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the
supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals
concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure
prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT SERVE AS
PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the
stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a trial
on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since
Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden
affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by
affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s
complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for
what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense
that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted
in Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the
Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows
that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal
trial.
271
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The
resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by
any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the
testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated
that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said
law.Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents’ witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent "testified that as an
active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the
lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851
(a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring’s California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And
as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by respondents."Likewise, in several naturalization cases,
it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the
Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause.
These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be
established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court.1a\^/phi1.net The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded both
in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove" actual
damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal
damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use
the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase in all published New York cases,
and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
Guerrero’s claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful dishonor. However,
the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check for
reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a forgery, § 3-510, Official Comment 2. ….. to the
Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature card on …. and could not verify Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion,
consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither
consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law". UCC 4-
103 further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the
New York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a
wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction Corp. v.
272
Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep’t 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National
Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387,
390 (3d Dep’t 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep’t 1976). Damage to reputation is also
not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.1a\^/phi1.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the
performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at the time of the
breach, Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dep’t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463
N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were the type that would naturally arise from the
breach and if they were "brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to
contracting." Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N.Y.
32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless they are provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d
165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep’t 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dep’t 1991).
There is no statute that permits attorney’s fees in a case of this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted
with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of …chester11 _v. Insurance
Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep’t 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110
A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dep’t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by
defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401,
179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of
contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance
Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep’t 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws
and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute
proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply
with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state
of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of
Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just
because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit did not
establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the
Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing
affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of
fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.14
273
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to
be opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his
complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters
already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment.
There is a need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages
under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank’s resort to a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully
defeated the very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
274
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124049 June 30, 1999
RODOLFO P. VELASQUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, INC., respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari prays for reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated 28 September 1995 which affirmed
the summary judgment of 20 June 1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, a default judgment against petitioner, and its 19 February
1996 Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The case arose from a complaint for a sum of money with preliminary attachment filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City by private
respondent Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) against petitioner Rodolfo P. Velasquez together with Mariano N. Canilao Jr., Inigo
A. Nebrida, Cesar R. Dean and Artemio L. Raymundo. 1
Sometime in December 1994 the Pick-up Fresh Farms, Inc. (PUFFI), of which petitioner Velasquez was an officer and stockholder, filed an
application for a loan of P7,500,000.00 with PCIB under the government's Guarantee Fund for Small Medium Enterprises (GFSME). 2 On 16
April 1985 the parties executed the corresponding loan agreement. As security for the loan, promissory notes numbered TL 121231 and TL
121258 for the amounts of P4,000,000.00 and P3,500,000.00, respectively, were signed by Inigo A. Nebrida and Mariano Canilao, Jr. as officers
of and for both PUFFI and Aircon Refrigeration Industries, Inc. (ARII). 3 A chattel mortgage was also executed by ARII over its equipment and
machineries in favor of PCIB. Petitioner along with Nebrida and Canilao, Jr. also executed deeds of suretyship in favor of PCIB. Separate deeds
of suretyship were further executed by Cesar R. Dean and Artemio L. Raymundo.4
When PUFFI defaulted in the payment of its obligations PCIB foreclosed the chattel mortgage. The proceeds of the sale amounted to
P678,000.00. 5 Thus, PCIB filed an action to recover the remaining balance of the entire obligation including interests, penalties and other
charges. Exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 25% of the total amount due were also sought. On 9 October 1989 a writ of preliminary
attachment was granted by the trial court. 6
Petitioner and Canilao filed their joint answer with counterclaim denying personal liability and interposing the defense of novation. At the pre-
trial on 11 April 1989 petitioner and counsel failed to appear despite due notice. On 11 April 1989, upon motion of PCIB, petitioner was
declared as in default and the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment as against Canilao. 7 Both PCIB and Canilao submitted their
respective position papers. Petitioner, who was still in default as he did not move to lift the order of default, adopted Canilao's position paper
through an ex parte manifestation. 8 On 8 November 1989 an ex parte hearing was conducted as against petitioner. 9
On 20 June 1990 the trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of PCIB holding petitioner and Canilao solidarily liable to pay
P7,227,624.48 plus annual interest of 17%, and P700,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. The case was dismissed without prejudice
with regard to the other defendants as they were not properly served with summons. 10
On 31 July 1990 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the order of default be lifted and that the summary judgment be set
aside. 11 On 13 September 1991 the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit. 12 On appeal, the Court of Appeals on 28 September 1995
affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. 13 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Hence this petition which maintains that
the appellate court committed reversible error in sustaining or affirming the summary judgment despite the existence of genuine triable issues
of facts and in refusing to set aside the default order against petitioner.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner, in raising the first error, invokes our ruling in Viajar v. Estenzo 14 that a party who moves for a summary
proceeding has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so
patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the
movant.
While this rule is true in the summary proceedings under Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court, it does not apply to summary proceedings
under Rule 35. A different rationale operates in the latter for it arises out of facts already established or admitted during the pre-trial held
beforehand, unlike in the former where the judge merely relies on the merits of the movant's allegations. 15 Rule 34 pertains to a judgment on
the pleadings while Rule 35 relates to a summary judgment which was the holding in this case.
Petitioner further insists that there are triable issues of fact raised in his answer, namely: (a) the denial of personal liability on his part in the
deed of suretyship since he signed thereon as an officer of ARII; (b) PCIB's acceptance of royalties coming from the Franchise Agreement
275
between PUFFI and Arturo Rosales who novated the loan agreement between PUFFI and PCIB; and, (c) the propriety of payment of the entire
debt. According to petitioner, the fact that the addresses stated under the names of petitioner and fellow surety signors were those of ARII
implies that they signed as officers of the corporation, otherwise, their personal addresses would have been used. Petitioner further avers that
any ambiguity in the contract should be decided against PCIB under the contract of adhesion doctrine.
A mere perusals of the deed of suretyship readily shows petitioner's personal liability under the loan contract, hence, proper for summary
judgment. Moreover, the more appropriate doctrine in this case is that of the "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine which
we enunciated in National Power Corporation v. CA 16 —
The surety bond must be read in its entirety and together with the contract between the NPC and the contractors. The
provisions must be construed together to arrive at their true meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then
made to control.
That the "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine applies in this case finds support in the principle that the surety contract is
merely an accessory contract and must be interpreted with its principal contract, which in this case was the loan agreement. This doctrine
closely adheres to the spirit of Art. 1374 of the Civil Code which states that —
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
Applying the "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine leaves no doubt that it was the intention of the parties that petitioner
would be personally liable in the deed of suretyship because the loan agreement, among others, provided 17 —
Art. 3. LOAN SECURITY. — . . . . 3.4 Suretyship. — To further secure the obligations of the BORROWER to the LENDER,
Messrs. Nebrida, Raymundo, Canilao, Dean and Velasquez and Aircon and Refrigeration Ind. Inc. shall each execute a
suretyship agreement in favor of the LENDER in form and substance acceptable to the LENDER.
It would have been a different matter had petitioner properly contested the deed of suretyship under Sec. 8, Rule 8, of the Rules of Court. But
he did not. The omission, as properly noted by the trial court, was fatal for it resulted in petitioner's admission of the due execution and
genuineness of the contract. The admission effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document,
e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized. 18
Petitioner also claims that PCIB's acceptance of royalty fees which were the fruits of the Franchising Agreement between PUFFI and Arturo
Rosales 19 constituted a novation of the loan agreement and deeds of suretyship, therefore, a genuine issue of fact.
This contention is untenable. Extinctive novation has these requisites: (a) the existence of a previous valid obligation; (b) the agreement of all
the parties to the new contract; (c) the extinguishment of the old obligation or contract; and, (d) the validity of the new one. Thus, novation is
effected only when a new contract has extinguished an earlier contract between the same parties. 20 Necessarily, there is no novation when the
new contract is not between the same parties as in the old contract.
The franchise agreement was only between PUFFI and Rosales. PCIB was never mentioned therein; neither was there any reference to the
subject loan agreement. What PCIB simply did was to accept royalty payments out of the franchise — an act which was already beyond the
scope of the franchise agreement but which was not in conflict with the payment arrangement in the loan agreement. Our ruling in
the Magdalena Estates Inc. v. Rodriguez is instructive, to wit 21 —
An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated, in a new instrument wherein the old is ratified, by changing only the
terms of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible with the old one, or wherein the old contract is merely
supplemented by the new one. The mere fact that the creditor receives a guaranty or accepts payments from a third
person who has agreed to assume the obligation, when there is no agreement that the first debtor shall be released from
responsibility, does not constitute a novation, and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original debtor.
As regards the defense of overpayment, since it is being raised for the first time we need not discuss it for it is deemed waived pursuant to Sec.
2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court.
At this point, it must be stressed that insofar as petitioner is concerned, the RTC decision was not a summary judgment but a judgment default
as hearing was held ex parte against him. Even so, the RTC decision is still without grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the CA could not be in error
in upholding it despite claims by petitioner that the default order should have been set aside because he could not be bound by the negligence
of his counsel.
Petitioner attempts to avoid any personal blame by claiming that a special power of attorney in favor of his lawyer was drawn up because he
could not attend the pre-trial due to previous commitments abroad. The lawyer, however, failed to attend thereby prejudicing his interest.
276
However, the findings of the Court of Appeals, as fully substantiated by the records, showed that the lawyer was not the only one negligent,
thus 22 —
Velasquez appears to have appointed his counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Vega, as his attorney-in-fact to represent him at the pre-
trial but the said lawyer failed to appear, hence Velasquez was declared as in default. The records show that the Order of
April 11, 1984 declaring him as in default was sent to his counsel and was received by the latter as early as May 10, 1989.
No steps were taken to have the said Order lifted or reconsidered. This is binding on Velasquez who is himself guilty of
negligence when, after executing the special power of attorney in favor of his lawyer, he left for abroad and apparently
paid no further attention to his case until he received the decision. There is therefore no fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which will warrant a lifting of the Order of Default.
As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel; 23 more so by the result of his own negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of 28 September 1995 of the Court of Appeals affirming the 20 June 1990 judgment of the
RTC- Br. 61, Makati City, ordering petitioner Rodolfo P. Velasquez and Mariano N. Canilao, Jr. to solidarily pay respondent Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) the amount of P7,227,624.48 with annual interest of 17% and attorney's fees of P700,000.00 plus cost
of suits as well as its Resolution of 19 February 1995 denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
277
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173289 February 17, 2010
ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED TERESA MALABANAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision 1 dated February 28,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the
Resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.
The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following:
Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a Complaint 2 dated March 2, 1998 for
Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City against petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc.
Respondents claimed that they are the owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan
Ap-04-008367, situated in Barangay Iruhin, Tagaytay City, containing an area of Two Hundred Forty-Four Thousand One Hundred Twelve
(244,112) square meters, by occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) 3 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended.
For having been in continuous, public, and adverse possession as owners of the said lot for at least thirty years, respondents stated that they
were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until the time they were requesting that
the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was the subject of a land registration proceeding that had already been
decided by the same court4 where their complaint was filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, was
already issued on August 20, 1997 to the petitioner pursuant to the Decision dated June 7, 1994 of the same court. They averred that they
were not notified of the said land registration case; thus, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic
fraud. Thus, they argued that they were also entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its privies,
agents, representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were served on the petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998, petitioner filed an Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time,5 which the trial court granted6 for a period of ten (10) days within which to file a responsive
pleading. Petitioner filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer7 dated April 29, 1998, which the trial court likewise granted.8
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 dated May 9, 1998, stating that the pleading asserting the claim of respondents stated no
cause of action, and that the latter were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, setting the same for hearing on May
21, 1998. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an Order,10 which granted the respondents ten (10) days from that day to file a
comment, and set the date of the hearing on July 23, 1998. Respondents filed a Motion to Admit Comment/Opposition to Defendant
Eland,11 together with the corresponding Comment/Opposition12 dated June 8, 1998.
On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial court issued an Order,13 considering the Motion to Dismiss submitted for resolution
due to the non-appearance of the parties and their respective counsels. The said motion was eventually denied by the trial court in an
Order14 dated September 25, 1998, ruling that the allegations in the complaint established a cause of action and enjoined petitioner Eland to
file its answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed two Motions for Extension to File an
Answer.15
Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the trial court's Order dated September 25, 1998, denying the
former's Motion to Dismiss. Again, petitioner filed a Motion for Final Extension of Time to File Answer17 dated November 6, 1998. Respondents
filed their Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 1998. Subsequently, the trial court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in an Order18dated January 11, 1999.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default19 dated November 17, 1998. On December 4, 1998 Petitioner
Eland filed its Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default)20dated December 2, 1998, while respondents filed a
Reply to Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in Default)21 dated December 29, 1998. Thereafter, the trial court issued
an Order22 dated January 11, 1999 declaring the petitioner in default and allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 11 January 1999)23 dated February 5, 1999 on the trial court's denial of its motion to
dismiss and in declaring it in default. The trial court in an Order24 dated March 18, 1999, denied the former and granted the latter. In the same
Order, the trial court admitted petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam.
278
Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With Compulsory Counterclaim)25 dated November 12, 1998. Respondents countered by filing
a Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records26 dated December 2, 1998. Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff's Motion to
Expunge Eland's Answer from the Records)27 dated December 21, 1998, as well as a Comment (on Plaintiff's Motion to Expunge Eland's Answer
from the Records)28 dated January 26, 1999.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte29 dated January 18, 1999, which was granted in an
Order30 dated January 22, 1999.
On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their evidence before the Clerk of Court of the trial court which ended on February 3, 1999; and,
on February 10, 1999, respondents filed their Formal Offer of Evidence.31 However, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Plaintiff's Ex
Parte Presentation of Evidence32 dated February 8, 1999. In that regard, the trial court issued an Order33 dated February 11, 1999 directing the
Clerk of Court to suspend the proceedings.
On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification34 as to whether or not the evidence presented ex parte was nullified by the
admission of petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam. Petitioner filed its Comment35 dated May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs.36However, petitioner filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings37 dated May 24, 1999 on the ground that the same petitioner had filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
asking for the nullification of the Order dated March 18, 1999 of the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier Order denying petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss. The petition for certiorari was subsequently denied; and a copy of the Resolution38 dated June 14, 1999 was received by the
trial court. Hence, in an Order39 dated July 7, 1999, the trial court ruled that the reception of evidence already presented by the respondents
before the Clerk of Court remained as part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right to cross-examine the witness and to
comment on the documentary exhibits already presented. Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated July 19, 1999,
but it was denied by the trial court in an Omnibus Order41 dated September 14, 1999.
Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment42 dated August 5, 1999, while petitioner filed its Opposition43 to the Motion
dated August 31, 1999. In its Resolution44 dated November 3, 1999, the trial court found favor on the respondents. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, subject to the rights of
occupancy of the farm workers on the one-third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No.
N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and void;
3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled, as well as tax declaration covering Lot 9250, Cad-355.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with the CA, which dismissed it in a Decision dated February 28, 2006, which reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated November 3, 1999, of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City, in Civil Case No. TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following:
5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 05, 1999 DID NOT
VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE.
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE ARE NO GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-1784.
279
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO, BASED ON
TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS' WITNESSES TAKEN WITHOUT GRANTING HEREIN PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND
UPON DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BASED ON FALSIFIED
"EVIDENCE."
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER'S ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.
According to the petitioner, a motion for summary judgment must be served at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing thereof, and
that a hearing must be held to hear the parties on the propriety of a summary judgment, per Sec. 3 of Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which was not observed because the petitioner received a copy of the respondents' motion for summary judgment only on August 20, 1999, or
the very same day that the motion was set for hearing. Petitioner further claims that the trial court never conducted any hearing on the
motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to a claimant seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory relief, and does not include cases for quieting of title. Furthermore, petitioner also averred that a summary judgment
has no place in a case where genuine factual and triable issues exist, like in the present case. It added that the genuine and triable issues were
all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to cross-examine the witnesses for the respondents without fault on its part. It also
stated that the trial court did not issue any order admitting in evidence the documentary exhibits presented by the respondents. Hence,
according to the petitioner, the trial court gravely erred in relying upon the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondents, without having
the latter cross-examined; and upon the documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its Resolution dated November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence.
Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering summary judgment, the trial court deprived the former of its right to due process.
Respondents, in their Comment45 dated October 16, 2006, countered the first issue raised by the petitioner, stating that their filing of the
motion for summary judgment fourteen (14) days before the requested hearing of the same motion was in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court.
As to the second and third issues, respondents argued that petitioner had a constricted perception of the coverage of the Rules of Summary
Judgment, and that the latter's citation of cases decided by this Court showed the diverse causes of action that could be the subject matters of
summary judgment. Respondents also posited that petitioner's statements in its Answer Ad Cautelam, although denominated as Specific
Denial, were really general denials that did not comply with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed that despite the opportunity, or the right allowed in the Order dated July 17, 1999 of
the trial court, for the petitioner to cross-examine respondents' witnesses and to comment on the documentary evidence presented ex
parte after the default order against the same petitioner, the latter evasively moved to set aside respondents' evidence in order to suspend
further proceedings that were intended to abort the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner neglected to avail itself of, or to comply
with, the prescription of the rules found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by opting not to avail itself of the hearing of its opposition to the
summary judgment after receiving the Order dated August 20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or admission in the
records; and by not objecting to the decretal portion of the said Order dated August 20, 1999, which stated that the motion for summary
judgment has been submitted for resolution without further argument. With regard to the contention of the petitioner that the trial court
wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted that petitioner's counsel failed to study carefully the records of the proceedings
for the presentation of the evidence ex parte to be able to know that it was not only a single-day proceeding, and that more than one witness
had been presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on the photographs of the houses of the occupants of the
property in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents asseverated that their complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title
under Art. 476 of the New Civil Code and for the review of the decree of registration pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree or
P.D. No. 1529, because they are complimentary with each other.

280
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court is the propriety of the summary judgment in this particular case of quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief
may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 46
In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for a summary judgment.
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served only on
August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if the petitioner received a copy of the motion only on
August 20, 1999, there was no hearing conducted on that date because the trial court issued an order giving petitioner 10 days within which to
file its comment or opposition.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation that there was substantial compliance with due
process. The CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule was substantially complied with because when the respondents filed
the motion for summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day as shown in the registry
receipt and that the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and in all situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one's evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the
absence of previous notice, but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.47
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an action for quieting of title. This particular argument, however, is
misplaced. This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.48
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.49
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, and
the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate
conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely
reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to
wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more litigious or genuine issue of
basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already become nil because of not only the lack of seriousness in the
allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel of land Lot 9250 was proven by the approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was
already presented and offered in evidence as Exhibit "B" for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing considering that the vital documentary
evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423 before this Honorable Court the markings and descriptions of such documents
are stated in the Judgment quoted as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; x x x.
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; x x x.
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; x x x.
281
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" x x x.
are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued
on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant to the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by
the acting presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in the complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing evidence as the well-
nigh or almost incontrovertible evidence of a registerable title to the subject land in the proceedings conducted on the reception of evidence
ex-parte for the plaintiffs establishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession as aspects of acquisitive
prescription as confirmed in the affidavit herein attached as Annex "A";
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved, the trial court merely stated that:
This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that plaintiffs’ cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on
the alleged fraud in the substitution of their landholdings of Lot 9250, Cad 355, Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of 244,112 square
meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre, containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While defendant Eland in its answer
practically and mainly interposed the defenses of: (a) the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel of land subject matter
of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this Court in said Land Registration Case; and
(c) plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case No. TG-423 that was decided previously by this Court with the case at bench was
imperatively made by this Court. Being minded that the Court has and can take judicial notice of the said land registration case, this Court
observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly, because the supposed identity crisis of the controverted parcel
of land covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275 (Exhibit "N") LRC
Case No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit "B" of the plaintiffs) and the Technical Description of Lot 9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit "B-1" of the
plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior judgment rule cannot be availed of by defendant Eland since not only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were
alleged in and established by the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 1184436, pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is
incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one
(1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom.
March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings, the observation of this Court is that
the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as hereinafter illustrated.
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial court, propounded thus:
The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable. Summary judgment is not only limited to solving actions involving money claims. Under
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Court, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. The term "genuine issue" has been defined as an issue
of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact, which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Thus, even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, but when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered the assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very court that decided the
LRC Case No. TG-423. Such being the case, the court a quo was privy to all relevant facts and rulings pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it
considered and applied to this case. Thus, where all the facts are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary judgment may be
granted as a matter of right.
On the contrary, in petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam, genuine, factual and triable issues were raised, aside from specifically denying all the
allegations in the complaint, thus:
2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint insofar as it alleges the
personal circumstances of the plaintiff and one A. F. Development Corporation for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof.
282
2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of said allegations. And if the property referred to in said
paragraphs is that parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 which was previously decided by
this Honorable Court with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically denied for the obvious reason that the said property had
already been adjudged with finality by no less than this Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering defendant as will
be further discussed hereunder.
2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint insofar as it alleged that
"(u)pon exercise of further circumspection, counsel for the plaintiffs once followed-up in writing the 1994 request of the plaintiffs to
have the subject parcel of land be declared for taxation purposes" and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein plaintiffs were never
mentioned during the entire proceedings in said land registration case and by reason of the Affirmative Allegations contained
hereunder.
2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10 (c), 10 (d), 10 (e), 10 (f),
10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason that there is no showing that the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiff is the same parcel
of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG- 423, and in the remote possibility that the parcel of land
being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, the allegations
contained in said paragraphs are still specifically denied for the reason that no less than the Honorable Court had decided with
finality that the parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein defendant to the exclusion of all other persons as attested to by the
subsequent issuance of an Original Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant and for reasons stated in the Affirmative
Allegations.
2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint for the obvious reason that it
was the plaintiffs who appear to have been sleeping on their rights considering that up to the present they still do not have any
certificate of title covering the parcel of land they are claiming in the instant case, while on the part of herein defendant, no less than
the Honorable Court had adjudged with finality that the parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is
absolutely owned by herein defendant.
2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint for the reason that defendant
has never ladgrabbed any parcel of land belonging to others, much less from the plaintiffs, and further, answering defendant
specifically denies the allegations therein that plaintiffs engaged the services of a lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge r information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Complaint for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as the truth thereof.
2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the reason that, as above-
stated, if the parcel of land being claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject matter of Land Registration Case
No. TG-423, this Honorable Court had already decided with finality that said parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant and additionally, for those reasons stated in defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the same Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
xxxx
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff states no cause of action as asserted in the Motion To Dismiss filed by herein
answering defendant and for the reason that there is no evidence whatsoever showing or attesting to the fact that the parcel of land
being claimed by the plaintiffs in the Complaint is the same parcel of land which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case
No. TG-423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment rendered by this Honorable in Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation in that OCT No. 0-660 had become incontrovertible by virtue of the Torrens
System of Registration; and to allow plaintiffs to question the validity of answering defendant's title through the instant complaint
would be a collateral of OCT No. 0-660 which is not permissible under the law.
4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or omission from filing the present complaint under the principles of estoppel and
laches.
283
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as they appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said Land Registration
Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such knowledge, plaintiffs never bothered to present their alleged claims in the proceedings.
4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice, given everyone his due, and observed honesty and good faith in his dealings.
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and contested by petitioner,
raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.50 In the present case, the petitioner was able to point out the genuine
issues. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim.51
It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is already the registered owner (Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 0-660 issued by
the Register of Deeds) of the parcel of land in question, pursuant to a decree of registration (Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. 62686)
based on the ruling of the same court that granted the summary judgment for the quieting of title.
Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in the disputed summary judgment were obtained through judicial notice of the facts and
rulings pertaining to that earlier case (LRC Case No. TG-423) wherein the same trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
disorienting that the same trial court reversed its earlier ruling, which categorically stated that:
x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record that the vendors listed in Exhibit "HH," with submarkings, are the previous owners of
the parcel of land mentioned in the same deed of sale and aside form the tax declarations covering the same property (Exhibits "Q" to "T,"
inclusive), the uncontroverted testimony of Atty. Ruben Roxas establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant's (referring to herein
defendant-appellant) sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the grandchildren, great grandchildren and great great grandchildren of the spouses
Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of the same property, whose ownership is further bolstered by tax receipts showing
payments of realty taxes (Exhibits "U" to "GG," inclusive, with submarkings).
xxx
On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and considering that applicant is a domestic corporation not otherwise disqualified from
owning real properties in the Philippines, this Court finds that applicant has satisfied all the conditions/requirements essential to the grant of
its application pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law, as amended, inspite of the opposition filed by the Heirs of the late
Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant of applicant's petition appears to be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant petition for land registration and, thus, places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-006275 and containing an area of Two
Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Four (242,794) square meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part
of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of the applicant, ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal office at
No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (España Extension), Quezon City, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of possession and ownership of the
same land for more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original
certificate of title issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number of years, is already a
clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure of the respondents to show that there were no
genuine issues involved, should have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant
consideration. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as
to any material fact.52
Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to delve briefly on the nature of the action of quieting of title as applied in this case. This
Court's ruling in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al.53 is instructive on this matter, thus:
To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held
in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:54
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an adjudication
that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one
who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
284
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use,
and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title
to real property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need
not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the
real property subject of the action and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs.
CA,55 we ruled:
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to
be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have become the owners in fee-simple title of the subject land by occupation and possession
under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Thus, it appears that the first requisite
has been satisfied. Anent the second requisite, respondents enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the invalidity of the claim of
the petitioner. All of these claims, which would correspond to the two requisites for the quieting of title, are factual; and, as discussed earlier,
the petitioner interposed its objections and duly disputed the said claims, thus, presenting genuine issues that can only be resolved through a
full-blown trial.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the quieting of title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the decree of registration
come into question. Under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition
for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree
issued on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998;
hence, applying the above provisions, it would seem that the period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration has not
elapsed for the review thereof. However, a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate that the action filed, which was
for quieting of title, was not the proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within
one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.56 However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.
Shedding light on the matter is a discussion presented in one of the recognized textbooks on property registration, 57 citing decisions of this
Court, thus:
285
The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is
recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.58 One of the remedies available to him is a
petition for review. To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.59
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Torrens system. An important feature of a
certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether
actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their
own estate or interest in the property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the absence of fraud,
such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone
sufficient to do so.60
As further pointed out in the same book,61 the petition for review must be filed within one year from entry of the decree of registration. As
written:
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not elapsed from the date of
entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the registration court.62 After the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or
review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed "not later than one year from and after the date of
entry of such decree of registration." Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot
be presented until the final decree has been entered. However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition
of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v.
Moran,63 there can be no possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim for
fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree of registration refers to the decree of
registration described in Section 31, which decree is prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.64
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or
other disability or by any proceeding in court, save only in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the entry of the decree, must
be understood as referring to final and unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it is sometimes called after entry, a decree of a
registration court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen days after the interested parties have been notified of its entry, and
during that period may be set aside by the trial judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated in the Rules of Court.65 An
appeal from the decision of the trial court prevents the judgment from becoming final until that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the
appellate court.66
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and the right to the remedy is not
affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners
acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in these
circumstances, they can hardly be considered innocent purchasers in good faith.671avvphi1
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is filed within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it is error for the court to
deny the petition without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated.
The petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation.68
In the present case, the one-year period before the Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired; thus, a review
of the decree of registration would have been the appropriate remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised by the petitioner are necessarily rendered inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and the decision dated February 28,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the
resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently,
286
the resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. TG-1784 are hereby
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
287
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 144294 March 11, 2003
SOLEDAD CHANLIONGCO RAMOS, FRANCISCO D. CHANLIONGCO, ADELBERTO D. CHANLIONGCO, ARMANDO D. CHANLIONGCO and
FLORENCIO D. CHANLIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
TERESITA D. RAMOS, Spouses TERESITA and EDMUNDO S. MUYOT, Spouses VEDASTA and FLORENCIO M. DATO, LORETO MUYOT, Spouses
TERESITA and ELMER SOLIS, LICERIA TORRES, Spouses CORAZON and VICENTE MACATUNGAL, Spouses PRECILLA and CRISOSTOMO MUYOT,
and Spouses CARIDAD and SALVADOR PINGOL, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-settled is the rule that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The only exceptions to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the July 31, 2000 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29507 which denied petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside the CA Decision3 dated September 28, 1995. The
assailed Resolution disposed as follows:
"Finding the opposition of [respondents] to be well-taken, the [Court hereby DENIES the Motion."4
The Facts
Petitioners are children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr., who was the co-owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision
Plan SWO No. 7308. Situated in Tondo, Manila, it was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio. By virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold the lot to herein
respondents on different days in September 1986. Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the sale,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 a Complaint6 for interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims.
The RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned. It ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other
co-owners, because the Special Power of Attorney had been executed in favor only of her mother, Narcisa.
On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. It held that while there was no Special Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was
nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latter’s sub-agent. There was thus no need to execute another
special power of attorney in her favor as sub-agent. This CA Decision was not appealed, became final and was entered in favor of respondents
on August 8, 1996.7
On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision. They contended that they had not been served a copy of
either the Complaint or the summons. Neither had they been impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC. As it was, they argued, the CA
Decision should be set aside because it adversely affected their respective shares in the property without due process.
In denying the Motion of petitioners, the CA cited the grounds raised in respondents’ Opposition: (a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the Decision sought to be set aside had long become final and executory; (c) the movants did not
have any legal standing; and (d) the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit.8
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise this sole issue for the Court’s consideration:
"x x x [W]hether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners’ Motion and allowing its Decision dated September 25, 1995 to
take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing
petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without due process of law."10
The Petition is unmeritorious.
288
Main Issue:
Entitlement to Summons
It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law;11 and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court in the land.12 The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.13 To determine whether the CA Decision of September 28,
1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be addressed. 14
To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the
service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person;15 while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation.16
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in
question.17 Specifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned
the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular
person. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property. 18 As such, the Complaint was brought against
the deceased registered co-owners: Narcisa, Mario, Paulino and Antonio Chanliongco, as represented by their respective estates.
Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They
had no standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an executor or
administrator.19 Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had
already been made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court were still in effect. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule
3,20 an executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended. 21 The
present rule,22 however, requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose benefit the action is brought. Under the former Rules,
an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the estate of petitioners’
father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan Quiming and Associates, that was included as defendant23 and served summons.24 As
it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Not being parties, they were not entitled to be served summons.
Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco, on the other hand, was impleaded in the Complaint, but not served summons. However, the service of
summons upon the estate of his deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and on behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs
of Paulino Chanliongco, including Florencio.
We also note that the counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., is a partner of the law firm that represented the estate of the
deceased father. Hence, it can reasonably be expected that the service upon the law firm was sufficient notice to all the beneficiaries of the
estate, including Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
289
EN BANC
G.R. No. 159139 June 15, 2005
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MA. CORAZON M. AKOL, MIGUEL UY, EDUARDO H. LOPEZ, AUGUSTO C.
LAGMAN, REX C. DRILON, MIGUEL HILADO, LEY SALCEDO, and MANUEL ALCUAZ JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS SR.; COMELEC BIDDING and AWARD COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
EDUARDO D. MEJOS and MEMBERS GIDEON DE GUZMAN, JOSE F. BALBUENA, LAMBERTO P. LLAMAS, and BARTOLOME SINOCRUZ JR.;
MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC CONSORTIUM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Our Decision1 in the present case voided the Contract entered into by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) for the supply of automated
counting machines (ACMs) because of "clear violation of law and jurisprudence" and "reckless disregard of [Comelec’s] own bidding rules and
procedure." Moreover, "Comelec awarded this billion-dollar undertaking with inexplicable haste, without adequately checking and observing
mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. x x x. The illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the Commission have not only
desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms, but have also cast serious doubts upon the poll body’s ability and capacity to conduct automated
elections." As a result, the ACMs illegally procured and improvidently paid for by Comelec were not used during the 2004 national elections.
In its present Motion, the poll body expressly admits that the Decision "has become final and executory," and that "COMELEC and MPC-MPEI
are under obligation to make mutual restitution." Otherwise stated, this admission implies that the ACMs are to be returned to MPC-MPEI,
and that the sum of over one billion pesos illegally paid for them be refunded to the public purse.2 In short, ownership of the ACMs never left
MPC-MPEI and the money paid for them still belongs, and must be returned, to the government.
Consequently, the ACMs, which "admittedly failed to pass legally mandated technical requirements" cannot be used during the forthcoming
elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Apart from formidable legal, jurisprudential, technical and financial
obstacles, the use of the machines would expose the ARMM elections to the same electoral pitfalls and frauds pointed out in our Decision. If
the ACMs were not good enough for the 2004 national elections, why should they be good enough now for the 2005 ARMM elections,
considering that nothing has been done by Comelec to correct the legal, jurisprudential and technical flaws underscored in our final and
executory Decision?
The Motion
Before us is the Commission on Election’s "Most Respectful Motion for Leave to Use the Automated Counting Machines in [the] Custody of the
Commission on Elections for use (sic) in the August 8, 2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)," dated
December 9, 2004. In its January 18, 2005 Resolution, the Court required the parties to comment. After careful deliberation on all pleadings at
hand, we now resolve the Motion.
Background Information
At the outset, we stress that the Decision in the present case, promulgated on January 13, 2004, has long attained finality.3 In our February 17,
2004 Resolution, we denied with finality Comelec’s Motion for Reconsideration dated January 28, 2004, as well as private respondents’
Omnibus Motion dated January 26, 2004. The Decision was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on March 30, 2004.
Recall that our Decision declared Comelec to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when, by way of its Resolution No. 6074, it awarded
the Contract for the supply of automated counting machines (ACMs) to private respondents. It did so, not only in clear violation of law and
jurisprudence, but also with inexplicable haste and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures; particularly the mandatory
financial, technical and legal requirements. It further manifested such grave abuse of discretion when it accepted the subject computer
hardware and software even though, at the time of the award, these had patently failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to
safeguard the integrity of the elections. Consequently, this Court was constrained to exercise its constitutional duty by voiding the assailed
Resolution No. 6074 awarding the Contract to Mega Pacific Consortium, as well as the subject Contract itself executed between Comelec and
Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.
Comelec was further ordered to refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement it had entered into with regard to the said
project. We also declared that, as a necessary consequence of such nullity and illegality, the purchase of the ACMs and the software, along
with all payments made for them, had no basis in law. Hence, the public funds spent must be recovered from the payees and/or the persons
who made the illegal disbursements possible, without prejudice to possible criminal prosecutions against them. 4
Likewise, our February 17, 2004 Resolution denying reconsideration found movants to have raised the same procedural and substantive issues
already exhaustively discussed and definitively passed upon in our Decision. In that Resolution, we emphasized (and we reiterate here) that
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the Decision did not prohibit automation of the elections. Neither did the Court say that it was opposed to such project (or the use of ACMs) as
a general proposition. We repeated our explanation that the reason for voiding the assailed Resolution and the subject Contract was the grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec; as well as its violations of law -- specifically RA 9184, RA 8436, and RA 6955 as amended by RA
7718; prevailing jurisprudence (the latest of which was Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.5); and the bidding rules and
policies of the Commission itself.
Comelec’s Claims
Notwithstanding our Decision and Resolution, the present Motion claims, inter alia, that the ARMM elections are slated to be held on August
8, 2005, and are mandated by RA 9333 to be automated; that the government has no available funds to finance the automation of those
elections; that considering its present fiscal difficulties, obtaining a special appropriation for the purpose is unlikely; that, on the other hand,
there are in Comelec’s custody at present 1,991 ACMs, which were previously delivered by private respondents; that these machines would
deteriorate and become obsolete if they remain idle and unused; that they are now being stored in the Comelec Maxilite Warehouse along UN
Avenue, at "storage expenses of ₱329,355.26 a month, or ₱3,979,460.24 annually."
The Motion further alleges that "information technology experts," who purportedly supervised all stages of the software development for the
creation of the final version to be used in the ACMs, have unanimously confirmed that this undertaking is in line with the internationally
accepted standards (ISO/IEC 12207) for software life cycle processes, "with its quality assurance that it would be fit for use in the elections x x
x."
Comelec also points out that the process of "enhancement" of the counting and canvassing software has to be commenced at least six (6)
months prior to the August 8, 2005 ARMM elections, in order to be ready by then. It asserts that its Motion is (a) without prejudice to the
ongoing Civil Case No. 04-346 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, entitled "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. v.
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Commission on Elections)," for the collection of a purported ₱200 million balance due from
Comelec under the voided Contract; and (b) with a continuing respectful recognition of the finality and legal effects of our aforesaid Decision.
At bottom, Comelec prays that it be granted leave to use the ACMs in its custody during the said ARMM elections.
Private Respondents’ Contentions
Commenting on the present Motion, private respondents take the position that, since the subject ACMs have already been delivered to, paid
for and used by Comelec, the Republic of the Philippines is now their owner, without prejudice to Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.’s claim for
damages in the case pending before the RTC of Makati; and that, consequently, as far as private respondents are concerned, the question of
using the subject ACMs for the ARMM elections is dependent solely on the discretion of the owner, the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners’ Comment
On the other hand, petitioners contend that Comelec is asking this Court to render an advisory opinion, in contravention of the constitutional
provision6 that explicitly states that the exercise of judicial power is confined to (1) settling actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable; and (2) determining whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Petitioners assert that there is no longer any live case or controversy to speak of -- an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not merely conjectural or anticipatory; and that Comelec’s allegations in its Motion do not amount to an actual case or
controversy that would require this Court to render a decision or resolution in the legitimate exercise of its judicial power. This lack of actual
controversy is clearly seen in the relief prayed for in the Motion: the grant of a leave to use the ACMs during the ARMM elections. Obviously,
Comelec merely seeks an advisory opinion from this Court on whether its proposal to use the ACMs during the said elections might be in
violation of this Court’s Decision dated January 13, 2004, and Resolution dated February 17, 2004.
Assuming arguendo that the present Motion might somehow be justified by the government’s fiscal difficulties, petitioners further argue that
permitting Comelec to use the ACMs would nevertheless allow it to do indirectly what it was not permitted by this Court to do directly. They
argue that the instant Motion is merely a subterfuge on the poll body’s part to resurrect a lost case via a request for an advisory opinion.
The OSG’s Comment
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) declares in its Comment that, in compliance with this Court’s directive for it to "take measures to
protect the government and vindicate public interest from the ill effects of the illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the
void [Comelec] Resolution and Contract," it filed on behalf of the Republic on July 7, 2004, an Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 04-
346. The OSG prayed for the return of all payments made by Comelec to Mega Pacific under the void Contract, amounting to ₱1,048,828,407.
The OSG also manifests that it received a copy of the Complaint-Affidavit dated September 15, 2004, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
by the Bantay Katarungan Foundation and the Kilosbayan Foundation against the Comelec commissioners who had awarded the Contract for
the ACMs; and the private individuals involved, including the incorporators and officers of Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. This Complaint-
Affidavit was for violation of the Anti-Plunder Law (RA 7030), the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019 as amended), and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713).
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The complainants alleged immense kickbacks and horrendous overpricing involved in the purchase of the 1,991 ACMs. Based on the OSG’s
available records, it appears that Comelec withdrew from Land Bank ₱1.03 billion, but actually paid Mega Pacific only ₱550.81 million.
Furthermore, commercial invoices and bank applications for documentary credits reveal that each ACM cost only ₱276,650.00, but that
Comelec agreed to pay Mega Pacific ₱430,394.17 per unit -- or a differential of ₱153,744.17 per unit or an aggregate differential of ₱306.10
million. Moreover, Mega Pacific charged ₱83.924 million for value-added taxes (VAT) and ₱81.024 million more for customs duties and
brokerage fees, when in fact -- under the nullified Contract -- it was supposed to be exempt from VAT, customs duties and brokerage fees.
Lastly, Comelec agreed to peg the ACM price at the exchange rate of ₱58 to $1, when the exchange rate was ₱55 to $1 at the time of the
bidding, resulting in additional losses for the government amounting to about ₱30 million.
The OSG hews to the view that the automation of elections, if properly carried out, is a desirable objective, but is mindful of the need for
mutual restitution by the parties as a result of the final Decision nullifying the Contract for the ACMs. Nevertheless, in apparent response to
Comelec’s clamor to use the ACMs in the ARMM elections, the OSG manifests that it has no objection to the proposal to use the
machines, provided however that (1) Comelec should show with reasonable certainty that the hardware and software of the ACMs can be
effectively used for the intended purpose; (2) Mega Pacific should be made to return to the Republic at least a substantial portion of the
overprice they charged for the purchase of the ACMs; and (3) the use of these machines, if authorized by this Court, should be without
prejudice to the prosecution of the related criminal cases pending before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB).
The OMB’s Manifestation
For its part, the Office of the Ombudsman manifested that as a result of the nullification of the Contract, various fact-finding investigations had
been conducted, and criminal and administrative charges filed before it against the persons who appeared to be responsible for the
anomalous Contract; and that the various cases had been consolidated, and preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the non-
impeachable Comelec officials and co-conspirators/private individuals. Furthermore, the OMB is in the process of determining whether a
verified impeachment complaint may be filed against the poll body’s impeachable officials concerned.
A Supplemental Complaint prepared and filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman reveals that the ACMs were overpriced by
about ₱162,000.00 per unit; that, additionally, Mega Pacific unduly benefited by including VAT and import duties amounting to ₱194.60 million
in its bid price for the ACMs, despite Section 8 of RA 8436 exempting such equipment from taxes and duties; that Comelec nonetheless
awarded the Contract to Mega Pacific at the same bid price of ₱1.249 billion, inclusive of VAT, import duties and so on; and that the
Commission allowed Mega Pacific to peg the ACM price using an exchange rate of ₱58 to $1 instead of ₱53 to $1, which further inflated Mega
Pacific’s windfall.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the OMB had allegedly prepared a comment on the present Motion, stating its position on the issue of utilizing
the ACMs, but upon further reflection decided not to file that comment. It came to the conclusion that ventilating its position on the matter
might engender certain impressions that it had already resolved factual and/or legal issues closely intertwined with the elements of the
offenses charged in the criminal and administrative cases pending before it. "For one, utilizing illegally procured goods or the intentional non-
return thereof to the supplier may have a bearing on the determination of evident bad faith or manifest partiality, an essential element in any
prosecution under the anti-graft law, and may, at the same time, be constitutive of misconduct penalized under relevant disciplinary laws."
Consequently, out of prudential considerations, the OMB prayed to be excused from commenting on the merits of the present Motion, to
avoid any perception of prejudgment, bias or partiality on its part, in connection with the criminal and administrative cases pending before it.
Decision Subverted by the Motion
There are several reasons why the present Motion must be denied. First, although it professes utmost respect for the finality of our Decision of
January 13, 2004 -- an inescapable and immutable fact from which spring equally ineludible consequences -- granting it would have the effect
of illegally reversing and subverting our final Decision. Plainly stated, our final Decision bars the grant of the present Motion.
To stress, as a direct result of our January 13, 2004 Decision, the Contract for the supply of the subject ACMs was voided, and the machines
were not used in the 2004 national elections. Furthermore, the OSG was directed "to take measures to protect the government and vindicate
public interest from the ill-effects of the illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the void Resolution." Accordingly, in Civil Case
No. 04-346, the government counsel has prayed for mutual restitution; and for the "return of all payments, amounting to ₱1,048,828,407.00
made by Comelec to Mega Pacific under the void Contract."
In the meantime, Comelec has done nothing -- at least, nothing has been reported in the present Motion -- to abide by and enforce our
Decision. Apparently, it has not done anything to rectify its violations of laws, jurisprudence and its own bidding rules referred to in our
judgment. Neither has it reported any attempt to correct and observe the "mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements" needed to
computerize the elections.
Apparently, it has simply filed the present Motion asking permission to do what it has precisely been prohibited from doing under our final and
executory Decision. If law and jurisprudence bar it from using the subject ACMs during the last elections, why should it even propose to use
these machines in the forthcoming ARMM elections? True, these elections are important. But they cannot be more important than the 2004
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national elections. Note that the factual premises and the laws involved in the procurement and use of the ACMs have not changed. Indeed,
Comelec has not even alleged, much less proven, any supervening factual or legal circumstances to justify its Motion.
Basic and primordial is the rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. In other
words, such a judgment may no longer undergo any modification, much less any reversal, even if it is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law; and even if it is attempted by the court rendering it or by this Court. 7 Equally well-entrenched is the
doctrine that what is not permitted to be done directly may not be done indirectly either. In the instant case, it is unarguable that the
inexorable result of granting the present Motion will precisely be a subversion of the Decision, or at least a modification that would render the
latter totally ineffective and nugatory.
To support its present Motion, Comelec appended as Annex 1 a letter dated January 22, 2004. Addressed to its chairman, the Annex was
signed by four8 self-proclaimed "information technology experts,"9 who had gratuitously contended that this Court’s Decision was "one of the
most inopportune rulings ever to come out of the hallowed halls of that High Tribunal"; blame the Decision for supposedly forcing our people
"to entrust their votes to a manual system of counting and canvassing that have been proven to be prone to massive fraud in the past"; and
mouth legal/technical arguments that have already been repeatedly debunked in the Decision and Resolution here. The letter also included a
long-winded, tortuous discussion of the software development life cycle.
A quick check of the case records confirmed our suspicion. The very same letter dated January 22, 2004 had previously been appended as
Annex 2 to private respondents’ "Omnibus Motion A) for reconsideration of the Decision dated 13 January 2004; b) to admit exhibits in
refutation of the findings of fact of the Court; c) to have the case set for hearing and/or reception of evidence if deemed necessary by the
Court." The only difference is that this time around, Comelec overlooked or failed to photocopy the last page (page 17) of the letter, bearing
the signatures of the four other purported "information technology experts."10 In other words, to support its present Motion, it merely
recycled an earlier exhibit that had already been used in seeking reconsideration of our aforesaid Decision.
While expressing utmost reverence for the finality of the Decision, Comelec implicitly seeks, nevertheless, to have this Court take up anew
matters that have already been passed upon and disposed of with finality.
It is a hornbook doctrine that courts are presumed to have passed upon all points that were raised by the parties in their various pleadings,
and that form part of the records of the case. Our Resolution, disposing of respondents’ arguments on reconsideration, did not explicitly and
specifically address all of the matters raised in the said letter of January 22, 2004. It is presumed however, that all matters within an issue
raised in a case were passed upon by the Court,11 as indeed they were in the instant case. And as we have held elsewhere,12 courts will refuse
to reopen what has been decided; they will not allow the same parties or their privies to litigate anew a question that has been considered and
decided with finality.
Besides, the letter of January 22, 2004, laden as it is with technical jargon and impressive concepts, does not serve to alter by even the
minutest degree our finding of grave abuse of discretion by Comelec, on account of its clear violations of law and jurisprudence and its
unjustifiable and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures.
Furthermore, the letter would obviously not contain anything that might serve to persuade us that the situation obtaining in January 2004 has
so changed in the interim as to justify the use of the ACMs in August 2005.
The Commission seems to think that it can resurrect the dead case by waving at this Court a letter replete with technical jargon, much like a
witch doctor muttering unintelligible incantations to revive a corpse.
In its main text, the Motion concedes that our Decision "has become final and executory," and that all that remains to be done is "to make
mutual restitution."13 So, what is the relevance of all these useless argumentations and pontifications in Annex 1 by the Commission’s self-
proclaimed "experts"? For its own illegal acts, imprudence and grave abuse of discretion, why blame this Court? For Comelec to know
immediately which culprit should bear full responsibility for its miserable failure to automate our elections, it should simply face the mirror.
Recovery of Government Funds Barred by the Motion
Second, the grant of the Motion will bar or jeopardize the recovery of government funds improvidently paid to private respondents, funds that
to date the OSG estimates to be over one billion pesos. At the very least, granting the Motion will be antagonistic to the directive in our
Decision for the OSG to recover the "illegal disbursements of public funds made by reason of the void Resolution and Contract."
Indeed, if the government is conned into not returning the ACMs but instead keeping and utilizing them, there would be no need for Mega
Pacific to refund the payments made by Comelec. In fact, such recovery will no longer be possible. Consequently, all those who stood to
benefit (or have already benefited) financially from the deal would no longer be liable for the refund. They can argue that there was nothing
wrong with the voided Resolution and Contract, nothing wrong with the public bidding, nothing wrong with the machines and software, since
the government has decided to keep and utilize them. This argument can be stretched to abate the criminal prosecutions pending before the
OMB and the impeachment proceedings it is considering. After all, "reasonable doubt" is all that is needed to secure acquittal in a criminal
prosecution.
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In brief, the poll body’s Motion not only asks for what is legally impossible to do (to reverse and subvert a final and executory Decision of the
highest court of the land), but also prevents the Filipino people from recovering illegally disbursed public funds running into billions of pesos.
Verily, by subverting the Decision of this Court, the Motion would be unduly favoring and granting virtual immunity from criminal prosecution
to the parties responsible for the illegal disbursement of scarce public funds.
Use of the ACMs and Software Detrimental to ARMM Elections
Third, the use of the unreliable ACMs and the nonexistent software that is supposed to run them will expose the ARMM elections to the same
electoral ills pointed out in our final and executory Decision. Be it remembered that this Court expressly ruled that the proffered hardware and
software had undeniably failed to pass eight critical requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections, especially the following
three items:
"· They failed to achieve the accuracy rating criterion of 99.9995 percent set up by the Comelec itself.
"· They were not able to detect previously downloaded results at various canvassing or consolidation levels and to prevent these from being
inputted again.
"· They were unable to print the statutorily required audit trails of the count/canvass at different levels without any loss of data."14
The Motion has not at all demonstrated that these technical requirements have been addressed from the time our Decision was issued up to
now. In fact, Comelec is merely asking for leave to use the machines, without mentioning any specific manner in which the foregoing
requirements have been satisfactorily met.
Equally important, we stressed in our Decision that "[n]othing was said or done about the software -- the deficiencies as to detection and
prevention of downloading and entering previously downloaded data, as well as the capability to print an audit trail. No matter how many
times the machines were tested and retested, if nothing was done about the programming defects and deficiencies, the same danger of
massive electoral fraud remains."15
Other than vaguely claiming that its four so-called "experts" have "unanimously confirmed that the software development which the Comelec
undertook, [was] in line with the internationally accepted standards (ISO/IEC 12207) [for] software life cycle processes," the present Motion
has not shown that the alleged "software development" was indeed extant and capable of addressing the "programming defects and
deficiencies" pointed out by this Court.
At bottom, the proposed use of the ACMs would subject the ARMM elections to the same dangers of massive electoral fraud that would have
been inflicted by the projected automation of the 2004 national elections.
Motion Inadequate and Vague
Fourth, assuming arguendo that the foregoing formidable legal, financial and technical obstacles could be overcome or set aside, still, the
Motion cannot be granted because it is vague; it does not contain enough details to enable this Court to act appropriately.
The sham nature of the Motion is evident from the following considerations. While Comelec asserts a pressing need for the ACMs to be used in
the ARMM elections, strangely enough, it has not bothered to determine the number of units that will be required for the purpose, much less
tried to justify such quantification. It contracted for a total of 1,991 ACMs, intended for use throughout the entire country during the 2004
elections. Are we to believe that all 1,991 units would be utilized to count and canvass the votes cast in the ARMM elections? Such a scenario
is highly unlikely, even ridiculous.
A genuine, bona fide proposal for the utilization of the ACMs would naturally have included a well-thought-out plan of action, indicating the
number of units to be deployed, places of utilization, number of operators and other personnel required, methods/periods of deployment and
recovery or retrieval, assessments of costs and risks involved in implementing the proposal, and concomitant justifications, among other
things. Now, either "The Plan" is being kept absolutely top secret, or it is completely nonexistent.
Furthermore, once the ACMs are deployed and utilized, they will no longer be in the same condition as when they were first delivered to
Comelec. In fact, it is quite probable that by the time election day comes around, some of the machines would have been mishandled and
damaged, maybe even beyond repair. What steps has the poll body taken to make certain that such eventualities, if not altogether
preventable, can at least be minimized so as to ensure the eventual return of the ACMs and the full recovery of the payments made for them?
A scrutiny of the 4-page Motion16 ends in futility. It is all too clear that a failure or inability of Comelec to return the machines sans damage
would most assuredly be cited as a ground to refuse the refund of the moneys paid. Yet, if Comelec has given any thought at all to this or any
other contingency, such fact has certainly not been made evident to us.
ARMM Elections Not Jeopardized by Nonuse of ACMs
Fifth, there is no basis for the claim that unless the subject ACMs are used, the ARMM elections would not be held.
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At the outset, if such elections are not held, the blame must be laid squarely at the doorstep of Comelec. To stress, had it not gravely abused
its discretion, the automation of the vote counting and canvassing processes would have already become a reality over a year ago, and the
ACMs that would have been used in the 2004 national elections would now be available for the ARMM elections.
In any event, the Commission in its Motion argues that the government, given its present fiscal difficulties, has no available funds to finance
the automation of the ARMM elections. Without even asking under what authority it has assumed the role of Treasury spokesman, we
emphasize that there would not now be any lack of funds for election automation had it not improvidently turned over ₱1 billion of taxpayers’
moneys to Mega Pacific’s bank accounts.
Nevertheless, had the poll body been honestly and genuinely intent on implementing automated counting and canvassing for the ARMM
elections, it ought to have informed Congress of the non-availability of the subject ACMs due to our Decisions and of the need for special
appropriations, instead of wasting this Court’s time on its unmeritorious Motion. In fact, if only it had taken proper heed of our Decision of
January 13, 2004, it could have conducted an above-board public bidding for the supply of acceptable ACMs.
Certainly, this option or course of action was not foreclosed by our Decision. Moreover, there was sufficient time within which to conduct the
public bidding process. RA 9333, which set the second Monday of August 2005 (August 8, 2005) as the date of the ARMM elections, was
enacted on September 21, 2004. Undoubtedly, Comelec was made aware of the proposed date of the ARMM elections way before the passage
of RA 9333. Thus, the poll body had about ten (10) months at the very least (between the end of September 2004, when RA 9333 came into
force and effect, and August 8, 2005) to lobby Congress, properly conduct a public bidding, award the appropriate contracts, deliver and test
the new machines, and make final preparations for the election.
Even assuming that a new public bidding for ACMs was not a viable option, still, Comelec has had more than sufficient lead time -- about ten
months counted from the end of September 2004 until August 8, 2005 -- to prepare for manual counting and canvassing in the ARMM
elections. It publicly declared, sometime in late January 2004, that notwithstanding our Decision nullifying the Mega Pacific Contract, it would
still be able to implement such manualization for the May 10, 2004 national elections. It made this declaration even though it had a mere three
months or so to set up the mechanics. In this present instance involving elections on a much smaller scale, it will definitely be able to
implement manual processes if it wants to.
There is therefore absolutely no basis for any apprehension that the ARMM elections would not push through simply because the present
Motion cannot pass muster. More to the point, it would be ridiculous to regard the grant of permission to use the subject ACMs as
the conditio sine qua non for the holding of the ARMM elections.
What is most odious is the resort to the present Motion seeking the use of the subject ACMs despite the availability of viable alternative
courses of action17 that will not tend to disturb or render this Court’s final Decision ineffectual. Thus, the present Motion is wholly
unnecessary and unwarranted. Upon it, however has Comelec pinned all its hopes, instead of focusing on what the poll body can and ought to
do under the circumstances. The consequences of granting its lamentable Motion, we repeat, will indubitably subvert and thwart the Decision
of this Court in the instant case.
Equally reprehensible is the attempt of the Commission to pass the onus of its mismanagement problems on to this Court. For instance, the
Motion quotes the cost of storage of the ACMs in its Maxilite Warehouse at ₱329,355.26 per month or ₱3,979,460.24 per annum. Assuming
for the nonce that the machines have to be held in storage pending the decision in the civil case (as it would simply not do to throw the
machines out into the streets), why must it assume the cost of storage? Per our Decision, the machines are to be returned to Mega Pacific. If it
refuses to accept them back, it does not follow that Comelec must pick up the tab. Instead of further wasting the taxpayers’ money, it can
simply send the bill to Mega Pacific for collection.
It would be entirely improper, bordering on unmitigated contempt of court, for the Commission to try to pass on the problem to this Court
through its Motion.
No Actual Case or Controversy
Finally, the Motion presents no actual justiciable case or controversy over which this Court can exercise its judicial authority. It is well-
established in this jurisdiction that "x x x for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy -- one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. x x x [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging."18 The controversy must be justiciable -- definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. 19 In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue.20 There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive
in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 21
A perusal of the present Motion will readily reveal the utter absence of a live case before us, involving a clash of legal rights or opposing legal
claims. At best, it is merely a request for an advisory opinion, which this Court has no jurisdiction to grant.22
EPILOGUE
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We close this Resolution by repeating the last two paragraphs of our final and executory Decision:
"True, our country needs to transcend our slow, manual and archaic electoral process. But before it can do so, it must first have a diligent and
competent electoral agency that can properly and prudently implement a well-conceived automated election system.
"At bottom, before the country can hope to have a speedy and fraud-free automated election, it must first be able to procure the proper
computerized hardware and software legally, based on a transparent and valid system of public bidding. As in any democratic system, the
ultimate goal of automating elections must be achieved by a legal, valid and above-board process of acquiring the necessary tools and skills
therefor. Though the Philippines needs an automated electoral process, it cannot accept just any system shoved into its bosom through
improper and illegal methods. As the saying goes, the end never justifies the means. Penumbral contracting will not produce enlightened
results."23
Comelec must follow and not skirt our Decision. Neither may it short-circuit our laws and jurisprudence. It should return the ACMs to MPC-
MPEI and recover the improvidently disbursed funds. Instead of blaming this Court for its illegal actions and grave abuse of discretion, the
Commission should, for a change, devise a legally and technically sound plan to computerize our elections and show our people that it is
capable of managing the transition from an archaic to a modern electoral system.
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
296
EN BANC
G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO., LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERIA, J.:
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new
trial.
The issue in this case is whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of
the Regional Trial Court may be extended.
Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for appeal from final orders or judgments of the
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases
where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal
is no longer required except in appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on
appeal is required. Moreover Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and Section 4
thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to avoid the procedural delays which plagued the
administration of justice under the Rules of Court which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice.
However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and ruled that the failure of
defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect, and,
consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration could not be granted.
In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs
decision to support a statement that a motion to extend the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or
is not in order.
The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on the basis of the original decision in this case.
After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved that the interest of justice would be
better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair
to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly prohibited or
allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for
review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of
cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and
clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may
in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
297
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion
for extension of time to file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831;
Heirs of Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken
within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for
appeal (Reyes vs. Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for
appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of
Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228).
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be
allowed and determined on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of, and to set aside, the decision of August 5, 1985 is granted and the petition is dismissed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
298
EN BANC
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs
of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and
(2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as
follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription,
was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could
very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration 3 which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on
July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. 6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice
of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal.7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final
and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:
299
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON.
ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12,
1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON
JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute
and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment
or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of
the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed
his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
300
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their
notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th
day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days
from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had
the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,16 premised on the
long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days
from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside
the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within
the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15
days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to
shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this
reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better
serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential
part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be
cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay
incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions
were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial
system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
Appeals, particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
301
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts;
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance
still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at
some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on
July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. 34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in
its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
302
G. R. No. L-60036 January 27, 1987
INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TOBACCO INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The petitioner seeks the nullification by certiorari of two resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. Sp.08253-R: one dated
December 9, 1981, denying its motion inter alia to declare void the auction sale held on August 24,1981 at the instance of respondent Tobacco
Industries of the Philippines, Inc.; and another dated January 13, 1982 denying its motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner also seeks to compel respondent Court by mandamus to enforce an earlier resolution in the same case dated
December 12, 1979, for the return to it of the chattels sold at public auction.
The instant petition originated from Civil Case No. 116617, instituted by Investments, Inc. (hereinafter referred to simply as "Investment's) on
July 7, 1978 in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the private respondent, Tobacco Industries of the Philippines, Inc., ("TIP"). 1 The
action was for the annulment of a chattel mortgage executed by Investments in TIP's favor covering five cigarette-making machines, which
were about to be sold on foreclosure by the latter. Initially a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court ex-parte enjoining the Sheriff
from proceeding with the auction sale of the machines. But not long afterwards, the Trial Court promulgated an order denying Investments'
application for a writ of injunction and dissolving the temporary restraining order.2 Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the order,
Investments brought the matter to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and prohibition.3
That Court, on December 21, 1978, directed issuance of a writ of preliminary irijunction against the threatened auction sale upon Investments'
posting a bond in the amount of P75,000.00. Subsequently, however, by resolution dated May 15, 1979, the Court dismissed Investment's
petition and lifted the injunction. Investments filed a motion for reconsideration, at the hearing of which it argued for the reinstatement of the
preliminary injunction since "the hearing on the merits of the main case below is about to be terminated." The Appellate Court then suggested
that the injunction bond be increased to P650,000.00 to cover the principal obligation. The suggestion having been accepted by both parties,
Investments accordingly filed a bond in the increased amount. The Court approved the bond on September 24, 1979 and issued a restraining
order which in effect reinstated the injunction earlier granted.
On December 12, 1979 the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution declaring that without prejudice to the early conclusion of the case in
the Trial Court, it deemed the proceedings before it terminated because it had already "stopped the sale ... of the machines ... until final
judgment shall have been rendered in Civil Case No, 116617." 4 In due course, the Clerk of Court caused entry of judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-
08253-R, but what was inadvertently entered was the dispositive portion of the previous resolution of May 15, 1979 dismissing the petition for
certiorari, and no reference whatever was made to the subsequent resolutions of September 24 and December 12, 1979. 5
Trial in Civil Case No. 116617 having continued in the meantime, judgment therein was rendered on December 19, 1980, dismissing
Investment's complaint for lack of merit, and awarding moral and exemplary damages to TIP. Investments appealed that decision to the Court
of Appeals.
TIP filed with the Trial Court a motion for execution pending appeal; 6 and with the Court of Appeals — in CA-G.R. No. SP-08253-R — a motion
to lift the writ of preliminary injunction. 7 Investments opposed both motions on the ground that the injunction issued by the Appellate Court
against the holding of the auction sale was meant to subsist until "final in Civil Case No. 116617," and since the decision rendered in said case
was not yet final and executory, said injunction was still in force. What the Court of Appeals did, however was to declare, by Resolution dated
June 9, 1981, that it was no longer entertaining the pending incidents on the ground that the case before it (CA-G.R. No. SP-08253) had long
been terminated. In so declaring the Court evidently relied only on the dispositive portion of its resolution of May 15, 1979 erroneously
entered by the Clerk of Court (dismissing Investment's petition for certiorari and prohibition) and failed to take account of the injunction it had
issued thereafter (upon the filing of a bond in the increased amount of P650,000.00). TIP then caused the mortgaged chattels to be sold by the
Sheriff at a public auction on August 24, 1981, at which sale it was the successful bidder.
Investments forthwith filed with respondent Court of Appeals a motion for contempt and for annulment of the sale. The Court's response was
to issue on August 28, 1981 a temporary restraining order stopping TIP from taking possession of the machines, and commanding their return
to Investments if already in TIP's possession. 8Subsequently, however, by Resolution dated December 9, 1981, the Court denied Investment's
plea for nullification of the sale and for an adjudication of TIP's liability for contempt. In that resolution of December 9, 1981, the Appellate
Court sustained TIP's position that the restraining order enjoining the sale of the mortgaged chattels had lapsed upon the rendition of final
judgment in Civil Case No. 116617, irrespective of the appeal taken therefrom. The Court also declared valid the auction sale of August 24,
1981, and dissolved the restraining order embodied in the Resolution of August 28, 1981 said resolution having been "intended as a temporary
measure pending determination of the status of the main case below." Finally, the respordent Court dismissed the contempt charges, finding
TIP's offer to put up a counterbond in lieu of returning the machines to be substantial compliance with said resolution of August 28, 1981.9
Investments then presented a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, pleading time pressure, 10 which was denied
for lack of merit. 11 Hence, the present petition.
303
As is at once apparent, the crux of the controversy is the effective life of the preliminary injunction of the Appellate Court as regards the
auction sale of Investments' cigarette-making machines, dated December 21, 1978 which, after having been lifted, was reinstated upon the
filing by Investments of the increased injunction bond of P650,000.00 on September 24, 1979. The parties do not dispute the fact that the
injunction was to subsist "until final judgment shall have been rendered in Civil Case No. 116617." The point about which they differ is the
meaning to be accorded to the term, "final judgment" in the context of Civil Case No. 116617. Investments theorizes that the judgment
rendered by the Trial Court in said Civil Case No. 116617 on December 19, 1980 was not a "final judgment" because it was an appealable
judgment and had, in fact, been appealed seasonably. TIP, for its part, asserts that that judgment was in truth a "final judgment" as the term is
used in procedural law, even if appealable and hence, upon its rendition, the preliminary injunction of the Appellate Court expired, its life
having precisely been fixed to endure until such judgment shall have been rendered.
The concept of "final" judgment, as distinguished from one which has "become final" (or "executory" as of right [final and executory]), is
definite and settled. A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, 12 leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorir-ally what the
rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for
instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the
rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."
* * * (A)n order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be
done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the litigation. . . When the order or
judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely
interlocutory. 13
A final order or judgment finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or right of the parties,
either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed
or set aside. . . Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact or compliance or non-compliance with the
terms of the judgment or order, such judgment or order is final and appealable. 14
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
"interlocutory," e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents
or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned
on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
** Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal No interlocutory order shall stay the progress of an action, nor
shall it be subject of appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party oranother. 15
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party
by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. 16
Now, a "final judgment" in the sense just described becomes final "upon expiration of the peirod to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected" 17 or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of
the case are returned to the Court of origin. 18 The "final" judgment is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in
respect to which, as the law explicitly provides, "execution shall issue as a matter of right." 19 It bears stressing that only a final judgment or
order, i.e., "a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action of proceeding" 20 can become final and executory.
There is no showing that the parties and their counsel intended to give the term "final judgment" a special signification, a meaning other than
that accorded to it by law and established usage. Their agreement must therefore be construed to mean exactly what it says, that upon
rendition by the Trial Court. on December 9, 1981 of its judgment on the merits, i. e., its " final judgment," the life and effectivity of the
preliminary injunction came to an end, regardless of the appealability of, or the actual taking of an appeal froia said judgment. The petitioner's
theory of the case, founded on its concept of a "final judgment" is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
304
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41053 February 27, 1976
FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, as Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch VII, and PABLO SAN MIGUEL, respondents.
Victoriano R. Aldava for petitioners.
Manuel P. Pun for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
The prime issue presented to Us in this special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus, which was certified by the Court of Appeals on July
15, 1975, involves the rule in determining whether an order is final and appealable or is merely interlocutory. Sometime in 1962, Pedro San
Miguel, 1 the predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioners, commenced a "Complaint for Partition of Real Estate" before the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2624, sought the partition of Lot
No. 4543 of the Lolomboy Estate, which is a portion of original Lot No. 3237 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15369 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Traversing the complaint, respondent Pablo San Miguel disclaimed co-ownership and asserted exclusive ownership of Lot No. 4543.
Subsequently, on March 19, 1964, the then trial judge, Ricardo C. Puno, ordered the dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court for "apparent lack of interest in the prosecution of the respective claims of the litigants."
Eleven years thereafter, another complaint for partition, docketed as Civil Case No. 4300-M of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, was
instituted by the same Pedro San Miguel against private respondent Pablo San Miguel. This time, the complaint prayed for the partition of Lot
No. 4543 (covered by TCT No. T-15369, Bulacan) and Lot No. 3269 (covered by TCT No. T-15370, Bulacan). In due time, Pablo San Miguel filed
his answer, pleading therein the defense of res judicata. For him, the same subject matter and cause of action had already been litigate . d
upon and resolved in the previous Civil Case No. 2624. After preliminary hearing, the respondent Judge issued an order on December 10, 1973,
dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M "insofar as Lot 4543 is concerned" in view of the principle of res judicata.
The case was ordered to proceed as regards Lot No. 3269, and on July 31, 1974, respondent Judge rendered a decision ordering the parties "as
CO-OWNERS to present to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, a PROJECT OF PARTITION, dividing Lot No. 3269 (Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15370, Bulacan) into two equal parts." Petitioners received a copy of this decision on August 13,1974.
On September 12, 1974, petitioners interposed their appeal from this judgment of the trial court. On said date, their notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal were filed.
On December 9, 1974, respondent Judge approved petitioners' corrected record on appeal but "insofar only as Lot No. 3269 is concerned ...
because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL, cannot be appealed anymore, and therefore any record on appeal
thereon will be useless, moot and academic ...
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a "Petition for certiorari And/Or Mandamus" before the Court of Appeals
on February 5, 1975, but the latter court elevated the petition to Us upon discovering that only questions of law are raised.
It is readily discernible that the decisive question in this case is whether or not the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973,
dismissing Civil Case No. 4300-M as regards Lot No. 4543, is final and appealable.
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocuootry or
incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered
for one party or the other." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the mertis of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, if is final." 2 A court order is final
character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter threin disposed of, 3 such that no further questions
can come before the court except the execution of the order. 4 The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which
disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or direction for future determination. 5 The order or judgment may
validly refer to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch threof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final
judgment, order decree has been held to be ... one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the
parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set
aside. 6 The central point to consider is, threfore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is
305
merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. 7 The word
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is
not a final decision of the whole controversy." 8
1. We find that the order of dismissal entered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 4300-M on December 10, 1973, is a clear final and
appealable order. The said order is a final disposition of the whole controversy between the parties with respect to the ownership of Lot No.
4543. It is absolute and conclusive on all questions in regard thereto. 9 The trial court's order is not a mere narrow acceptance of private
respondent's plea of res judicata. It has more the far-ranging effect of confirming private respondent's claim of exclusive ownership of Lot No.
4543, as previously adjudicated in the prior Civil Case No. 2624. It imports that private respondent is the sole owner of this specific lot; as a
result of which, the deceased Pedro San Miguel or his succesors-in-interest for that matter stand to suffer the loss of what they claim is their
rightful share thereto.10 After the issuance of this order, nothing more was left for the trial court to try or decide, as the conflicting claims of
the parties over the subject lot have already been resolved. As a matter of fact, the final order of dismissal cannot even be assailed by
certiorari. The remedy is appeal, which petitioners herein have failed to undertake. 11 The fact that the other lot, Lot No. 3269, remained under
litigation and the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of the subject
order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved for future consideration .12
2. Reason lies in the order of the respondent Judge, dated December 10, 1973, foreclosing the relitigation of Lot No. 4543 because of the
March 19, 1964 order of the then trial Judge, Ricardo C. Puno, in Civil Case No. 2624, which involves the same lot, dismissing the case for lack
of interest to prosecute. This dismissal order of the said trial Judge has the effect and consequences of a dismissal on the merits under Section
3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was neither without prejudice nor based upon lack of jurisdiction. 13 It is worthy to note that
the deceased Pedro San Miguel interposed no appeal therefrom. Instead, he attempted to revive the subject matter of that Civil Case No. 2624
(Lot No. 4543) eleven years threafter, when he commensed Civil Case No. 4300-M, praying for the partition of Lot No. 3629 and Lot No.
4543. This, the deceased Pedro San Miguel could not do so. Litigation on this particular Lot No. 4543 must reach a terminal point. The principle
of estoppel by judgment, on of the aspects of the doctrine of res judicata, precludes the re-litigation in another action of a specific
question actually litigated and determined in a former one. 14 The second casde, Civil Case No. 4300-M, is barred by the prior judgment in the
first case, Civil Case No. 2624, insofar as it relates to Lot No. 4543. For, thre is Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between
the first case where the jdugment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred as far as Lot No. 4543 is concerned.
Likewise, the judgment in the first case is a final one rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits. 15
3. There is no doubt that access to the courts is a constitutional guarantee. This is, however, subject to limitation s. Once the rights of a party-
litigant have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, the party-litigant can no longer litigate the same again. 16 A right,
question or fact distinctly placed in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit
between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so
determined must, as between the same parties or privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the firs suit remains
unmodified. 17 Public policy and sound practice jdemand that "at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law." 18 Reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
It results, thjrefore, that respondent Judge did not abusde his discetion when he issued the order of December 9, 1974, approving petitioners'
corrected record on appeal "insofar only as Lot 3269 is concerned ... because the case with respect to Lot 4543 has long became (sic) FINAL ...
."
ACCORDINGLY, the order of December 9, 1974, subject matter of this petition, issued by respondent Judge in his Civil Case No. 4300-M,
approving petitioners corrected record on appeal with respect only to Lot 2369, is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
306
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168985 July 23, 2008
ACCESSORIES SPECIALIST INC., a.k.a. ARTS 21 CORPORATION, and TADAHIKO HASHIMOTO, Petitioners,
vs.
ERLINDA B. ALABANZA, for and in behalf of her deceased husband, JONES B. ALABANZA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1dated April 15, 2005 and the
Resolution2 dated July 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84206.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the CA:
On September 27, 2002, private respondent Erlinda B. Alabanza (Erlinda, for brevity), for and in behalf of her husband Jones B. Alabanza
(Jones, for brevity) filed a complaint against petitioners Accessories Specialists, Inc. (ASI, for brevity) also known as ARTS 21 Corporation, and
Tadahiko Hashimoto for non-payment of salaries, separation pay, and 13th month pay.
In her position paper, respondent Erlinda alleged, among others, that her husband Jones was the Vice-President, Manager and Director of ASI.
Jones rendered outstanding services for the petitioners from 1975 to October 1997. On October 17, 1997, Jones was compelled by the owner
of ASI, herein petitioner Tadahiko Hashimoto, to file his involuntary resignation on the ground that ASI allegedly suffered losses due to lack of
market and incurred several debts caused by a slam in the market. At the time of his resignation, Jones had unpaid salaries for eighteen (18)
months from May 1995 to October 1997 equivalent to ₱396,000.00 and US$38,880.00. He was likewise not paid his separation pay
commensurate to his 21 years of service in the amount of ₱462,000.00 and US$45,360.00 and 13th month pay amounting to ₱33,000.00.
Jones demanded payment of his money claims upon resignation but ASI informed him that it would just settle first the money claims of the
rank- and-file employees, and his claims will be paid thereafter. Knowing the predicament of the company, Jones patiently waited for his turn
to be paid. Several demands were made by Jones but ASI just kept on assuring him that he will be paid his monetary claims. Jones died on
August 5, 2002 and failed to receive the same.
On the other hand, the petitioners contend that Jones voluntarily resigned on October 31, 1997. Thus, Erlinda’s cause of action has already
prescribed and is forever barred on the ground that under Article 291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrues. Since the complaint was filed only on September 27,
2002, or almost five (5) years from the date of the alleged illegal dismissal of her husband Jones, Erlinda’s complaint is now barred.
On September 14, 2003, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to pay Erlinda the amount of
₱693,000.00 and US$74,040.00 or its equivalent in peso or amounting to a total of ₱4,765,200.00 representing her husband’s unpaid salaries,
13th month pay, and separation pay, and five [percent] (5%) on the said total award as attorney’s fees.
On October 10, 2003, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal with motion to reduce bond and attached thereto photocopies of the receipts for
the cash bond in the amount of ₱290,000.00, and appeal fee in the amount of ₱170.00.
On January 15, 2004, public respondent NLRC issued an order denying the petitioner’s motion to reduce bond and directing the latter to post
an additional bond, and in case the petitioners opted to post a surety bond, the latter were required to submit a joint declaration, indemnity
agreement and collateral security within ten (10) days from receipt of the said order, otherwise their appeal shall be dismissed. The pertinent
portion of such order reads:
After a review however of respondents-appellants['] instant motion, We find that the same does not proffer any valid or justifiable reason that
would warrant a reduction of the appeal bond. Hence, the same must be denied.
WHEREFORE, respondents-appellants are hereby ordered to post a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award of
Four Million Seven Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand and Two Hundred Pesos (₱4,765,200.00) granted in the appealed Decision (less the Two
Hundred and Ninety Thousand Pesos [₱290,000.00] cash bond already posted), and joint declaration, indemnity agreement and collateral
security in case respondents-appellants opted to post a surety bond, as required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Section 6, Rule
VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure as amended within an unextendible period of ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Order;
otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed for non-perfection thereof.
SO ORDERED.
307
On February 19, 2004, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said order. However, the public respondent in its resolution dated
March 18, 2004 denied the same and dismissed the appeal of the petitioners, thus:
The reduction of appeal bond is not a matter of right but rests upon our sound discretion. Thus, after We denied respondents-appellants[']
Motion to Reduce [B]ond, they should have immediately complied with our 15 January 2004 Order directing them to post an additional cash or
surety bond in the amount equivalent to the judgment award less the cash bond already posted within the extended period of ten (10) days. In
all, respondents had twenty (20) days, including the ten (10)-day period, prescribed under Article 223 of the Labor Code and under Section 6,
Rule VI of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure, within which to post a cash or surety bond. To seek a reconsideration of our 15 January 2004
order is tantamount to seeking another extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal, which is however, not allowed under
Section 7, Rule VI of the NLRC Rule. x x x
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents-appellants is hereby DENIED and the instant appeal
DISMISSED for non-perfection thereof.
SO ORDERED.
On April 22, 2004, the aforesaid resolution became final and executory. Thus, herein private respondent Erlinda filed a motion for execution.
On May 31, 2004, the petitioners filed an opposition to the said motion for execution. On June 11, 2004, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo Abdon issued
an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution.3
On May 28, 2004, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. On June 30, 2004, the CA issued a TRO directing the respondents, their
agents, assigns, and all persons acting on their behalf to refrain and/or cease and desist from executing the Decision dated September 14,
2003 and Resolution dated March 18, 2004 of the Labor Arbiter (LA).
On April 15, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 12, 2005,
the CA issued the assailed Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On September 8, 2005, petitioners posted the instant petition presenting the following grounds in support of their arguments: 1) the cause of
action of respondent has already prescribed; 2) the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed the appeal of petitioners for failure to post the complete amount of the appeal bond; and 3) the monetary claim was resolved by the
LA with uncertainty.
The Issues
The following are the issues that should be resolved in order to come up with a just determination of the case:
I. Whether the cause of action of respondents has already prescribed;
II. Whether the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from the decision of the LA to the NLRC is an indispensable
requirement for the perfection of the appeal despite the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond; and
III. Whether there were sufficient bases for the grant of the monetary award of the LA to the respondent.
We resolve to deny the petition.
Petitioners aver that the action of the respondents for the recovery of unpaid wages, separation pay and 13th month pay has already
prescribed since the action was filed almost five years from the time Jones severed his employment from ASI. Jones filed his resignation on
October 31, 1997, while the complaint before the LA was instituted on September 29, 2002. Petitioners contend that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 2914 of the Labor Code had already set-in, thereby barring all of respondent’s money claims arising from their
employer-employee relations.
Based on the findings of facts of the LA, it was ASI which was responsible for the delay in the institution of the complaint. When Jones filed his
resignation, he immediately asked for the payment of his money claims. However, the management of ASI promised him that he would be
308
paid immediately after the claims of the rank-and-file employees had been paid. Jones relied on this representation. Unfortunately, the
promise was never fulfilled even until the time of Jones’ death.
In light of these circumstances, we can apply the principle of promissory estoppel, which is a recognized exception to the three-year
prescriptive period enunciated in Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should
be relied upon, as in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would virtually sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in
other injustice.5 Promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is
claimed.1avvphi1 The promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the court can understand the obligation
assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms.6
In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: (1) a promise was
reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance; (2) such promise did, in fact, induce such action or forbearance; and (3) the party
suffered detriment as a result.7
All the requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Jones relied on the promise of ASI that he would be paid as soon as the
claims of all the rank-and-file employees had been paid. If not for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, we see no
reason why he would delay filing the complaint before the LA. Thus, we find ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed
under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if we will brush aside the employee’s claims on a mere technicality,
especially when it was petitioner’s own action that prevented respondent from interposing the claims within the required period.8
II
Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for failure to post the complete amount of the
bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award rendered by the LA due to financial incapacity.
They say that strict enforcement of the NLRC Rules of Procedure9that the appeal bond shall be equivalent to the monetary award is oppressive
and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.10
Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in case of a judgment of the LA involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer to the
NLRC may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission, in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA.11 The
intention of the lawmakers to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the
provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." The word "only" makes it
perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and exclusive means by
which an employer's appeal may be perfected. The word "may" refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the defeated
party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. The meaning and the intention of the legislature in
enacting a statute must be determined from the language employed; and where there is no ambiguity in the words used, then there is no
room for construction.12
The filing of the bond is not only mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the NLRC.13 Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final and executory.14 This requirement is intended to assure the
workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It is
intended to discourage
employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.15
In the instant case, the failure of petitioners to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the monetary award is
fatal to their appeal. Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC mandates, among others, that no motion to reduce bond shall be
entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. The
NLRC has the full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the NLRC that petitioners
did not present sufficient justification for the reduction thereof is generally conclusive upon this Court absent a showing that the denial was
tainted with bad faith.
Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail
themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by
law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to
perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. 16
III
309
The propriety of the monetary award of the LA is already binding upon this Court. As we have repeatedly pointed out, petitioners’ failure to
perfect their appeal in the manner and period required by the rules makes the award final and executory. Petitioners’ stance that there was no
sufficient basis for the award of the payment of withheld wages, separation pay and 13th month pay must fail. Such matters are questions of
facts requiring the presentation of evidence. Findings of facts of administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise on
specific matters, are accorded weight and respect by the Court. They are deemed final and conclusive, unless compelling reasons are
presented for us to digress therefrom.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated April 15, 2005 and the Resolution dated July
12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84206 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
310
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120804 June 14, 1996
FLORENTINO PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES EVELYN and REX HILL, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This petition for certiorari provides an occasion to revisit the doctrine that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional so that failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court
of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal.
Petitioner Florentino Pedrosa filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent spouses Evelyn and Rex Hill. 1On 8 April 1994 the trial
court rendered judgment ordering respondent spouses to pay petitioner the sum of P148,153.24 with legal interest plus costs of the suit.
The Hill spouses elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On 8 December 1994 they were required by the appellate court to pay the docket
fees within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof with a warning that non-compliance therewith would necessarily warrant the abandonment
and dismissal of their appeal. Respondent spouses failed to pay the docket fees within the fifteen-day (15-day) period prescribed by the Court
of Appeals.
On 7 April 1995 counsel for the Hill spouses filed a Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee admitting inadvertence on his part as he
failed to take note of the period to pay the docket fees and for having completely forgotten the appealed case. Pedrosa filed not only
an Opposition to Appellants' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docketing Fee but also a Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
On 19 May 1995 the appellate court denied petitioner Pedrosa's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and granted instead the Motion for Admission of
Payment of Docket Fee filed by the Hill spouses. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
On 7 August 1995 we required respondents Evelyn and Rex Hill to comment on the petition until 9 September 1995. But respondent spouses
did not still take advantage of this accommodation by the Court. Consequently for failure to file their comment we required their counsel to
explain why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.
By way of explanation Atty. Ignacio Moleta averred that he misplaced the resolution of the Court requiring them to file comment. As regards
the favorable resolution on the admission of the payment of the docket fees despite the delay he maintained that the appellate court did not
abuse its discretion.
We disagree. In Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon2 we held --
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the
corresponding respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. Thus, appeal being a purely statutory right,
an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
Section 5 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court emphasizes the duty of appellant upon receipt of the notice to pay docket fees --
It shall be the duty of the appellant, within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding
section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing appeal . . . .
Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. Non-compliance therewith may cause the dismissal of the
appeal pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court --
Sec. 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that
of the appellee, on the following grounds . . . (d) Failure of the appellant to pay the docketing fee as provided in section 5
of Rule 46 . . . .
311
Squarely in point is Guevarra v. Court Appeals.3 In that case docket fees were not paid within fifteen(15) days as required by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, they were paid forty-one (41) days late allegedly due to "inadvertence, oversight and pressure of work." The appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. When the case was elevated to us, we said --
It is the "duty of the appellant" in the Court of Appeals, "within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred in the
preceding section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal." The appellants did
not comply seasonably with this duty. Concededly, they paid forty one (41) days late. For such tardiness, they must suffer
the sanction imposed by the Rules of Court -- dismissal of their appeal . . . .
In Palteng v. Court of Appeals4 we pronounced that there was no abuse of discretion in the Court of Appeals' ruling that there had been proper
and adequate notice to defendants (petitioners) to pay the docket fees, a requirement that they failed to observe, and as failure to pay the
docket fee is ground for dismissal of an appeal, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in issuing the resolution in question. Earlier in Lee
v. Republic of the Philippines5 we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed
perfected where the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona6 we
reiterated that if the appellate docket fee of P20.00 is not paid in full within the reglementary period the decision of the municipal court
becomes final and no longer appealable.
Appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with. In Bello v. Fernando7we stressed that "(t)he
right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law."
In the instant case the requirements for the perfection of an appeal were not religiously complied with despite timely notice and admonition
from the appellate court for non-compliance. Respondents herein not only failed to pay the docket fees within the 15-day reglementary
period; they paid the docket fees four (4) months from date of notice. They also ignored this Court's resolution requiring them to comment on
the petition for certiorari.
The reasons adduced by private respondents are far from satisfactory. According to their counsel, the reason for their failure to pay the docket
fees seasonably was that appellants were in Australia while some of their children were sick thus lending to their inability to attend to his
communications. Thus, counsel "by sheer inadvertence, failed to note the period of payment of the docket fee and/or forgot about the instant
appeal . . ." Counsel also claims he misplaced his copy of the Court resolution requiring comment. Under the circumstances we are convinced
more than ever that the actuations of counsel and his clients merely reflect their lack of interest if not their inexcusable lethargy in pursuing
their appeal. The Court of Appeals therefore gravely erred in admitting appellants' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee and in
denying appellee's (petitioner's) Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
In Rodillas v. Commission on Elections8 we held that the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the
payment of the correct amount of appeal fee. In other words, the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court or
body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the
appeal.9 This requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.
While the strict application of the rule on the payment of docket fees has been relaxed in some cases the Court took cognizance of the peculiar
circumstances attendant to said cases. The case before us is no exception as we explained in Galang v. Court of Appeals 10 --
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice
to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 19 May 1995 denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and granting instead private respondents' Motion for Admission of Payment of Docket Fee is SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the decision dated 8 April 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Br. 32, is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. Costs
against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
312
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43714 January 15, 1988
FELIX GUEVARRA and EMERENCIANA GUEVARRA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GAUDENCIO GADDI, LOURDES BUSTOS GADDI, VICTORIA, MYRNA, SHEILA and MARIA LOURDES, all surnamed
BUSTOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners herein were adjudged by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1 to pay the private respondents, plaintiffs therein,
P36,000.00 by way of unrealized income (actual damages), P40,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the
suit. From this adverse decision, the defendants in the trial court, now petitioners, sought to appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals. 2 They
complied with the requisite filing of the Notice of Appeal and the Record on Appeal (then required). They failed however to pay the docketing
fee of P48.00 plus the amount of P5.00 required under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3870 (legal research fee), or a total of P53.00, * within the 15-
day period from receipt of notice granted to them by the Court of Appeals as provided by the Rules of Court. The said period of fifteen (15)
days expired on December 10, 1975. They paid the P53.00 only on January 20, 1976, or forty-one (41) days late. By counsel, they manifested
"inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work" 3 as their excuse for such delay of forty-one (41) days.
The respondent Court of Appeals, on February 19, 1976, denied the prayer of the defendants-appellants, now the petitioners, "that said
payment (of the docket and legal research fees) be admitted and the above manifestation be taken into account, in the interest of justice." In
dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled:
RESOLVED: Since payment of docket fee was late by 41 days, this is too much; no prima facie showing has been made why
it should be admitted.
In view whereof, DENIED and APPEAL is DISMISSED. 4
On March 3, 1976, the respondent court provoked by the subsequent comment and opposition of the plaintiffs-appellees, now private
respondents, as well as the appellants' reply, reiterated its previous resolution (of February 19, 1976), courtly saying:
"Noted, but resolution re-affimed." 5
Undaunted, the appellants moved for a reconsideration invoking the contradictory grounds of "substantial compliance" and "excusable
negligence," as well as liberal construction of the rules, and "that substance should not be sacrificed for technicality." 6 This was promptly
denied on April 6, 1976 in a resolution 7 as compendious, as the first two, stating:
DENIED for lack of sufficient merit and reasons given do not convince.
The defendants-appellants now come to us by this petition for review on certiorari. Finding the petition inappropriate, in a resolution dated
July 28, 1976, "[T]he Court Resolved (a) to TREAT the petition for review as a special civil action; (b) to REQUIRE the petitioner(s) to deposit
P80.40 for costs and clerk's commission with five (5) days from notice hereof, and (c) to declare this case SUBMITTED for decision." 8
The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the delay in paying the docket and legal research fees tolled the petitioners' right to appeal. We
hold that it did.
It is "the duty of the appellant" in the Court of appeals "within fifteen (15) days from the date of the notice referred to in the preceding
section, to pay to the clerk of the Court of Appeals the fee for the docketing of the appeal." 9 The appellants did not comply seasonably with
this duty. Concededly, they paid forty one (41) days late. For such tardiness, they must suffer the sanction imposed by the Rules of Court-
dismissal of their appeal which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or
on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Failure of the appellant to pay the docketing fee as provided in section 5 of Rule 46; 10
And that is what precisely the respondent Court of Appeals did-dismissed their appeal. It is thus clear that, in doing so, the respondent court
did not err and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Be that as it may, the counsel of the petitioners tries to exculpate himself from
the adverse effect of his admitted delay of forty-one (41) days in paying the required docket and legal research fees by claiming that the notice
313
to pay docket and legal research fees within fifteen (15) days "was misplaced in my office due to accident, mistake, inadvertence, and
excusable negligence." He added that he had "been very busy attending to various cases in different courts in Metro Manila and in the
provinces, and because I have only one secretary in the office, when the said notice was found missing, it took me several days to locate the
same among the files." 11
The explanation is very flimsy. It does not impress us at all. It is an "old hat," a hackneyed pretext, resorted to by negligent or lazy lawyers,
which has never been given the badge of excusability by the Court.
In a very early case, Lazaro v. Endencia, 12 we held:
... Examining the statute (Act No. 190, old Code of Civil Procedure) there can be no question that payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal, which in cases of forcible entry and
detainer, must be within a period of five days from notice. The statute looks to early determination of such cases, and if
the contention of the respondent should be upheld there would be no definite rule in such cases. There would be as much
right to contend for twenty-eight days or forty-two days as there is to contend for fourteen, as is done herein. In the
absence of an indispensable step, the appeal was not perfected and the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan was
therefore without jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal. (Schultz v. Concepcion, 32 Phil. 1).
In Palteng v. C.A., 13 we pronounced that there was no abuse of discretion in the Court of Appeals' ruling that there had been proper and
adequate notice to defendants (petitioners) to pay the docket fees, a requirement that they failed to observe, and as failure to pay the docket
fee is ground for dismissal of an appeal, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in issuing the resolutions in question. Earlier, in Lee v. Republic of
the Philippines, 14 we decided that even though half of the appellate court docket fee was deposited, no appeal is deemed perfected, where
the other half was tendered after the period within which payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona, 15 we reiterated that if the
appellate docket fee of P20.00 is not paid in full within the reglementary period, the decision of the municipal court becomes final and no
longer appealable.
In a later decision, 16 we decreed:
The Court of Appeals did not err in motu proprio Alvendia's appeal for failure to pay on time the docket fee and to submit
forty copies of his printed record on appeal (Alvero vs. Dela Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 434: Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39 Phil. 922;
Dorego vs. Perez, L-24922, January 2, 1968, 22 SCRA 8).
Attorney Viola was negligent in not apprising Alvendia of the notice to pay the docket and legal research fees and to file
forty copies of the printed record on appeal. Alvendia is bound by his lawyers negligence (Robles vs. San Jose, 99 Phil. 658).
xxx xxx xxx
Under the environmental circumstances of this eleven-year-old litigation, it was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals to reinstate Alvendia's appeal and to relax the rule regarding dismissal of an appeal for appellant's
failure to pay on time the docket and legal research fees and to file forty copies of his record on appeal within the sixty-day
period (Cf. Chavez and Celeste vs. Ganzon and the Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 6, 10, and Urdaneta Rural Bank va. San Juan,
L-28346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1390).
It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the necessity of a strict compliance with the periods for
performing certain acts incident to the appeal and that transgressions thereof, as a rule, would not be tolerated;
otherwise, those periods could be evaded by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would ultimately become inutile.
We also note that Atty. Porfirio B. Yabut, the counsel of record of the defendants-appellants in the Court of appeals, has his law office at Suites
513-515 May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila (the same location as the address of the present lawyer, Atty. Clemente M. Soriano). What
appears inexplicable to our mind is why petitioners' counsel had to keep on looking for forty (40) days for the misplaced notice, until he found
it on January 20, 1976, after forty-one (41) days of search, when all he should have done was to visit the office of the respondent Court of
Appeals to inquire about it. This is considering the fact that the counsel's law office is just here also in Manila, not more than seven (7)
kilometers from where the respondent Court of Appeals sits.
Finally, while the trial court may in its discretion extend the time for appeal beyond the period fixed by law, it must be satisfactorily shown that
there is justifiable reason for such action, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or similar supervening ty without fault on the
part of the appellant. 17 The herein petitioners failed in presenting to us a fact constituting excusable negligence to support this petition.
Hence, their failure to pay the appeal docket and legal research fees on time, unjustified as it was, became fatal to their appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated February 19, 1976, March 3, 1976, and March 27, 1976, of the respondent Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
314
EN BANC
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro,Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs
of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and
(2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as
follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and
matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription,
was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could
very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration 3 which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.5 This was received by petitioners on
July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. 6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice
of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal.7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the
order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final
and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:
315
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON.
ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12,
1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON
JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS
APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. 10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute
and procedural rules. BP 129,11 as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment
or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of
the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed
his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed out of time.
316
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the order denying
petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their
notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th
day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days
from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had
the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,16 premised on the
long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days
from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside
the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within
the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.19 (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15
days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization20 that drafted BP 129, the raison d’ etre behind the amendment was to
shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this
reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal, 22 and only in very exceptional instances to better
serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we declared that appeal is an essential
part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be
cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay
incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions
were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where
procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial
system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
Appeals, particularly Rules 42,27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
317
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of
receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance
still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at
some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on
July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. 34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in
its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
318
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162518 August 19, 2009
RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and EVA DAMASO Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution2 dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment (Civil Case No. 93-2588) against
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73. Petitioner is also the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos.
92-8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with respondent Generoso Damaso as accused. Upon motion of respondents,
said civil and criminal cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 dated January 16, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds
of insufficiency of evidence.
As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor
of the defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to the defendants the following:
a. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
b. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c. the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003, stating that he received a duplicate original copy of the
decision on February 21, 2003. Respondents opposed said motion. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, on May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that he received a copy
of the decision dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration on
May 19, 2003.
On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time, emphasizing that the
decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in the presence of both parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have
received a copy of the decision on said date of promulgation, the RTC ruled that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the
13th day (March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after allegedly receiving the Order of May 9,
2003 on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on June 20, 2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October
1, 2003.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed the same in its
Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that petitioner was bound by his judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC when it
was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner’s period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice of
Appeal was filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated February 20,
2004.
Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s period to appeal had lapsed, as such ruling was premised on
misapprehension of facts and contradicted by evidence on record. The CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the
particular evidence upon which the same was based; and there were supposedly some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
319
The petition deserves some consideration.
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals5 that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the
RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the
appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court
stated:
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,7 to wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present Petition was already pending
before us. x x x
xxxx
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file
a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be taken
"within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or"
in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the "final order," x x x.
xxxx
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of
judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed
five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of
the therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.1avvphi1
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal
either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating that procedural law refers to the
adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not
come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule"
is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore,
can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September
14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,8 stating thus:
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal
had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule
that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:
320
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftnProcedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftn
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the
motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should
be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in
the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.9
Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the
foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner’s
receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he
filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal
had not yet lapsed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22,
2003, and the Resolution dated February 20, 2004, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 73, dated June 2, 2003 in Civil Case No. 93-2588, and its Order dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the June 2, 2003 Order, are hereby
declared NULL and VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal
dated May 28, 2003. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
321
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 143331 October 5, 2007
FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC., represented by its President SALVADOR BOOC, petitioner,
vs.
JAMES L. BOOC, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Iligan City dated April
25, 2000 in Civil Case No. 5023 which set aside the Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Iligan City dated November
10, 1999 in Civil Case No. (10808-AF) I-1201; and the RTC's Order3 dated May 30, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws,4 the incorporators of which include the children of the late
Antonio Booc and Ong Chuy Tiok, namely, Sheikding, Rufino, Felisa, Salvador, Jose, and Roque. 5 Said corporation came into existence in 1979,
when the heirs of the late Nicolas Abarca offered to sell to the heirs of the late Antonio Booc Lot 69-A located in Quezon Avenue, Iligan
City.6 Considering that the siblings were to contribute unequal shares of the purchase price, they decided to create a corporation, Five Star
Marketing Company, Inc., the petitioner herein, whose shares of stock reflected the amount of their contribution in purchasing the subject
property.7 On December 12, 1979, the heirs of Nicolas Abarca and petitioner executed a Deed of Sale8where the former sold Lot 69-A to
petitioner for the sum of P50,000. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19209 (a.f.)9 was issued in the name of petitioner.
In 1982, when the existing structure in the subject property was completely razed by fire, petitioner constructed thereon a four-storey building
financed mainly by a loan secured from Northern Mindanao Development Bank using the subject property as collateral. 10 The entire ground
floor and the fourth floor were allotted to Rufino, the second floor to the family matriarch, Ong Chuy Tiok, and the third floor to Sheikding, all
of whom occupied the same rent-free.11
Sometime in the late 1980, on the insistence of Ong Chuy Tiok, James Booc, the son of Sheikding and respondent herein, was allowed to use
one-half of the ground floor for his business rent-free. In 1993, petitioner and respondent entered into an Agreement12 wherein the latter
became the lessee of the space formerly occupied by Rufino and that of De Leon Gun Store.
Several years later, the board of directors of petitioner passed and approved a resolution13 terminating the free-rental privilege given to all the
occupants of the building. It stressed that the privileges shall be good only up to March 31, 1999, after which, the building will be open for
lease with the following rates.
Ground floor door 1 P 50,000

Ground floor door 2 40,000
2nd floor 50,000
3rd floor 40,000
4th floor 30,000
Roof deck 15,00014
On March 15, 1999, petitioner notified all the occupants that it had withdrawn all privileges granted to them. It likewise notified them of the
rental rates of the units concerned and further required any interested occupant to negotiate and enter into a lease agreement with
petitioner.15 Respondent was informed that the rental rate for ground floor, door 2, is P40,000.00 per month effective April 1,
1999.16 However, respondent did not enter into a lease contract with petitioner and, despite repeated demands, failed to vacate the
premises.17
Thus, on May 25, 1999, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent before the MTCC, Iligan City. The same was
docketed as Civil Case No. (10808-AF) I-1201 and raffled to Branch 1.
Petitioner prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiff most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant by:
a) Ordering the defendant to vacate the above-described premises, and return the possession thereof to the plaintiff;
322
b) Ordering the defendant to pay the monthly rentals of P40,000.00 of said premises from April 1999 until the defendant delivers
possession of the premises to the plaintiff, as and by way of actual and compensatory damages;
c) Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P20,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees plus P2,000.00 per court appearance;
d) To pay costs of suit.
Other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.18
In his answer, respondent raised several defenses among which being that petitioner has no cause of action for ejectment against respondent;
that petitioner has no legal personality to sue; that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and that the premises in question
have been occupied by the respondent for free since the erection of the building, they being the share of his father Sheikding; and that
respondent and his father filed a case in the Securities and Exchange Commission against petitioner and against the president of petitioner
corporation.19
During the preliminary conference on July 13, 1999, the MTCC directed the parties to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement.
Consequently, the preliminary conference was reset to August 3, 1999.
On July 24, 1999, respondent, through counsel, sent petitioner a telegram asking for a postponement of the preliminary conference set on
August 3, 1999.20 On July 26, 1999, respondent's counsel filed a Motion to Reset21the preliminary conference set for August 3, 1999 to August
24, 1999, allegedly due to an unpostponable personal engagement.
Petitioner, through counsel, opposed the motion arguing that the motion violated the provision of Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,22 hence, it is considered as not filed; that it is a dilatory motion, a prohibited pleading pursuant to Sec. 19 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure;23 and that no motion for postponement of the preliminary conference shall be allowed except on meritorious grounds.24
On August 3, 1999, the scheduled preliminary conference pushed through. Petitioner and its counsel appeared but respondent and his counsel
failed to appear despite due notice.
On August 18, 1999, the MTCC issued an Order25 denying respondent's motion to reset on the grounds that it failed to comply with the
required explanation why service was not done personally pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the Rules 26 and that counsel failed to establish that
his motion is meritorious. Consequently, the court ruled on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint. The dispositive portion of the order
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the defendant's motion to reset the preliminary conference not sufficiently impressed with merit, the same is
hereby denied. The court shall now render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint pursuant to Sec. 7 &
8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
A Verified Motion for Reconsideration,27 dated September 13, 1999, was filed by respondent, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration,28 dated September 15, 1999, which the MTCC denied in its Order29dated October 12, 1999.
On November 10, 1999, the MTCC rendered a Decision30 in favor of petitioner and against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering that:
1. Defendant vacate the premises in question, and return possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rental of P40,000.00 for the said premises from April 1999 until possession thereof is restored
to the plaintiff;
3. Defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
4. Defendant to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC reasoned that respondent's stay on the property is merely by tolerance of petitioner. Since there is no lease agreement between
the parties and respondent is not paying any rental for the subject premises, respondent's occupancy on the subject premises is entirely
dependent upon the will of petitioner. As such, respondent is liable to surrender the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their
use.
323
Respondent appealed the decision to the RTC, assigning the following errors:
[1] THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING EX-PARTE THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEE
BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT – ALLEGATIONS WHICH MISERABLY FAILED TO SHOW COMPLIANCE WITH
THE TWIN JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF A DEMAND TO PAY RENTALS IN ARREARS AND A DEMAND TO VACATE
[2] THE LOWER COURT GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S FIRST MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE PRE-TRIAL AND IN
DENYING APPLLANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On January 14, 2000, the RTC issued an Order31 setting aside the decision appealed from, as well as the order denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration and consequently remanding the case to the court of origin. The RTC opined that in denying respondent's motion to reset the
preliminary conference, the MTCC gave more weight to procedural technicalities than in hearing and deciding the case on the merits. The RTC
reiterated that judgment by default is frowned upon because it is something which is only a little less than a denial of due process. Also, the
RTC added that the MTCC should have passed upon the issue of ownership considering that ownership is indispensable to the resolution of the
issue of possession. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the default judgment appealed from is hereby set aside, and the Order of the Court a quo, dated
October 12, 1999 denying the appellant's motion for reconsideration is also set aside.
Let the records of the above-entitled complaint be remanded to the court of origin, MTCC Branch 01, for further proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order32 assailing the order of the RTC for being contrary to law, insisting that it was not given the
opportunity to submit its own memorandum as required by the rules. On February 4, 2000, the RTC issued a Resolution 33 in favor of petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the motion to be impressed with merit and hereby sets aside the questioned order of the Court dated
January 14, 2000 and in its stead, allows the plaintiff appellee to submit its memorandum within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.34
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, which motion was denied by the RTC in its
Order35 dated March 29, 2000. Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus36 before the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the said order, but
the petition was later dismissed by the appellate court.
On March 31, 2000, petitioner filed its appeal memorandum.37
On April 25, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision38 reiterating its January 14, 2000 order. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the default judgment appealed from is hereby set aside, and the Order of the Court a quo, dated
October 12, 1999 denying the appellant's motion for reconsideration is also set aside.
Let the record of the above-entitled complaint be remanded to the court of origin, MTCC Branch 01, for further proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC opined that respondent had been in effect denied his day in court; that procedural laws are technicalities which are adopted not as
ends in themselves but means conducive to the realization of law and justice.39
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration40 which was denied in the assailed Order41 dated May 30, 2000.
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DENIED HIS DAY IN COURT BY
THE COURT A QUO IN SPITE OF RESPONDENT AND HIS COUNSEL'S UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE TO APPEAR DURING THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE WHICH IS MANDATORY UNDER THE RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE;
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT CAN SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 12, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BY MERE
CONCLUSION.
324
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT CAN SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DATED NOVEMBER 10, 1999,
WITHOUT JUSTIFIED CONCLUSION OF ITS OWN VOID ORDER OF JANUARY 14, 2000 (ANNEX "N")
(D) WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE BASED ON THE RECORD, PLEADINGS, OR MEMORANDA
FILED PURSUANT TO THE RULES INSTEAD OF REMANDING (THE) CASE TO THE COURT OF ORIGIN FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, THAT
WOULD ONLY UNDULY PROLONG AND DELAY THE RESOLUTION OF THIS SIMPLE EJECTMENT SUIT.
Petitioner maintains that respondent's motion to reset the preliminary conference and his subsequent motion for reconsideration of its denial
are violative of the Rules on Summary Procedure and the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 70, Sec. 13 regarding prohibited pleadings and
motions.
Petitioner also argues that it is no longer necessary to delve into the issue of ownership since respondent already acknowledged that fact that
it is the registered owner of the subject property.
Finally, petitioner insists that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MTCC no longer conducts hearing for the reception of testimonial
evidence and the adjudication of ejectment cases is done merely on the basis of affidavits and such position papers as may be required by the
court. Consequently, the RTC may decide the case without remanding the case to the MTCC. To rule otherwise would only delay the final
adjudication of the present case.
The instant case arose from an ejectment case commenced by the petitioner before the MTCC which was later elevated to the RTC on appeal
under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Aggrieved by the RTC's reversal of the MTCC decision, petitioner directly elevated the case to this Court on
pure questions of law.
The Court, in Murillo v. Consul,42 Suarez v. Villarama, Jr.43 and Velayo-Fong v. Velayo,44 had the occasion to clarify the three modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, namely: a) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and c) petition for review to this Court. The first mode of appeal is governed by Rule 41, and is taken to the CA on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode, provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to this Court only on questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.45 For a questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides
on the given set of circumstances.46
In the present case, petitioner comes before this Court raising a pure question of law. It impugns the propriety of decision of the RTC which
would remand the ejectment case to the MTCC for the reception of evidence and for further proceedings on the issue of ownership of the
subject property. Petitioner further assails the finding of the RTC that the respondent was denied due process when the MTCC decided on the
basis of the complaint alone for failure of the respondent and his counsel to appear during the preliminary conference. Otherwise stated, the
issues are: the effect of the non-appearance of defendant and counsel during the preliminary conference of an ejectment case and the
propriety of remanding the case for further proceedings.
Clearly, petitioner raises only questions of law which require the interpretation and application of the rules of procedure laid down by the
Rules of Court. However, considering that the assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was
brought before it from the MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42 via the second mode of appeal, instead of
appealing directly before this Court under Rule 45.
Section 447 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this
Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally, direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the
appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.48
Petitioner, therefore, availed itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal. On this score alone, the petition could have been outrightly
dismissed.49 Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and in view of the erroneous conclusion of the trial judge clearly shown in the RTC decision,
this Court shall proceed to address the issues involving a well-settled question of law.50
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time
procedure" designed to remedy the situation.51 Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and
order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of
325
self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling
over possession of property for it involves perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details
of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided. 52
In accordance with the above objective, the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure set forth the steps to expeditiously dispose of the cases
covered by the rules, as in ejectment. Specifically, the rules prohibit dilatory motions for postponements without justifiable cause; and make
the appearance of parties and their counsels, during the preliminary conference, mandatory.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure, provide:
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the
court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint
and limited to what is prayed for therein xxx.
SEC. 7 Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counter-claim in accordance with Section 6 hereof, all
cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If the sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This rule
shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall appear at the preliminary conference.53
Applying the foregoing provisions, the MTCC was indeed empowered to decide the case on the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
The Court once pronounced in the case of Tubiano v. Razo54 that the MTC and the RTC were correct in declaring the decision submitted for
decision based solely on the complaint, upon failure of the petitioner (respondent herein) to appear at the preliminary conference.55 The word
"shall" used in the above cited provision makes the appearance of the parties mandatory. The Court excuses the non-appearance only in cases
where there is a justifiable cause offered for the failure to attend.
The record reveals that both the respondent and his counsel failed to appear at the preliminary conference scheduled on August 3, 1999. The
only explanation offered to justify their non-appearance was the counsel's unpostponable personal engagement in Manila, without
specification as to the details thereof. Assuming that the counsel's justification is acceptable, the same should be applied only as an
explanation for the his non-appearance. However, no explanation at all was offered with respect to the respondent's failure to appear. At the
very least, the respondent should have attended the preliminary conference notwithstanding the absence of his counsel. Absent any clear
justification for the party and counsel's non-appearance, the defiance of the lawful order of the court as well as the well-entrenched rule laid
down by the rules of procedure on the effect of non-appearance, cannot be allowed.
This Court cannot ignore the fact that even on appeal to the RTC, the respondent likewise failed to offer a sufficient explanation for defying the
Rules. It is thus unfortunate that the RTC ruled in his favor on the sole ground that Rules may be liberally applied especially when its strict
observance will result in the denial of due process.
Rules of procedure are essential to the proper, efficient and orderly dispensation of justice. Such rules are to be applied in a manner that will
help secure and not defeat justice.56 Thus, the Court had the occasion to rule against the dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities,
especially so when the appellant had substantially complied with the formal requirements. Substantial compliance warrants a prudent and
reasonable relaxation of the rules of procedure. Circumspect leniency will give the appellant the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his complaint rather than to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.57 The Rules are relaxed when rigidity would result in a defeat
of equity and substantial justice.58
To reiterate, respondent offered no explanation for his defiance of the rules on preliminary conference. Neither did he exert effort to
substantially comply by appearing before the court even without his counsel. Thus, there is no reason to affirm the theory of the RTC on the
relaxation of the Rules.
The Court notes that the decision and order of the RTC are for remanding the case to the MTCC on the mistaken conclusion that there was
denial of due process for failure of the respondent to present his evidence. As discussed above, the decision of the MTCC on the basis of
petitioner's complaint is fully warranted. Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not
prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the MTCC. It must be emphasized that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, no hearing is conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit their respective position papers. On appeal to the RTC, the
parties are required to submit their memoranda. The RTC should have decided the appeal on the basis of the records elevated by the MTCC, as
well as the memoranda of the parties. To remand it is a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of the case. Finally, had the RTC
decided the case in the manner required, the result could only have been to affirm the MTCC decision, since respondent did not contest it on
the merits.
326
All told, therefore, the decision and order of the RTC must be set aside and the decision of the MTCC must stand, there being no contrary
evidence presented by respondent, and the fact of ownership by petitioner of the building being undisputed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated April 25, 2000 and its Order
dated May 30, 2000 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities dated November 10, 1999
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
327
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141115 June 10, 2003
POSADAS-MOYA and ASSOCIATES CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JARDINE LAND, INC. and CASTLETON PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Dismissals based on pure technicalities should be avoided when the parties have substantially complied with the Rules. When a petition
presents prima facie allegations of errors committed by a lower tribunal, the reviewing court should, as much as practicable, endeavor to
decide the case on its merits.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 29, 1999 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 55051. The assailed Resolution reads:
"This Court resolved to DISMISS the above-entitled petition for failure on the part of the petitioner to attach thereto all pleadings (such as the
complaint) and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations therein, a requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."3
The Facts
On March 23, 1999, Petitioner Posadas-Moya & Associates Construction Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Posadas-Moya") filed with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Request for Adjudication,4 through arbitration proceedings, of its formal Complaint against
respondent corporations:5 Jardine Land, Inc. ("JLI"); Greenfield Development Corporation ("GDC"); and United Laboratories, Inc. ("ULI"). The
case was docketed as CIAC Case No. 08-99. In their Answer with Counterclaim6 dated April 23, 1999, respondents interposed both negative and
affirmative defenses. Petitioner then filed its Reply7 on May 19, 1999.
On June 29, 1999, all the parties appeared for a preliminary conference to finalize the draft Terms of Reference (TOR),8 a copy of which had
earlier been furnished them. Like a pretrial order, a TOR limits the issues to be tried to those formulated therein and otherwise controls the
course of arbitration proceedings. After lengthy discussions leading to the incorporation of suggestions for modifications of the TOR, the
parties and their respective counsels, along with the Arbitral Tribunal,9 signed it on the same date.
In the same preliminary conference, the parties were informed that in arbitration proceedings, a witness’ testimony on direct examination
should be in the form of an affidavit. A list of the pieces of documentary evidence -- each containing the exhibit marking, the description and
the purpose for submission -- should also be prepared and attached to the affidavit wherein they were mentioned. The affidavit should be
personally served on opposing counsel at least three days before the hearing. Cross-examination would then be undertaken by the opposing
counsel on the basis thereof.
The parties then agreed to a hearing on August 4, 1999. During the scheduled hearing, Posadas-Moya presented its president, Januario P.
Posadas, as its lone witness. He was subjected to an extensive cross-examination by the counsel of respondents. The following day, August 5,
1999, they presented their witnesses: 1) Bob C. Zulueta, vice-president of JLI; 2) Zaldy Masarate, head of GDC’s Construction Management
Department and Construction Management Services; 3) Glenn Gaid, resident engineer of GDC; 4) Josephine de la Rosa, engineering assistant
of GDC’s Technical Services Division; and 5) Juan del Rosario, head of GDC’s Technical Services Division. They executed a Joint Affidavit,
whereupon they were cross-examined by petitioner’s counsel.
At the close of the hearing, the parties were given until August 31, 1999 to submit their respective draft decisions. They did so on the said
date, upon which the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On September 10, 1999, the CIAC rendered its 59-page Decision,10 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"AWARD
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered and award is made on the monetary claims made by the parties as follows:
I. FOR THE CLAIMANT-CONTRACTOR PMACCI:
₱1,052,233.78 -- for its work accomplishment for the period from 01–15 September 1998 to be paid separately, as follows:
328
₱137,138.50 -- for GDC
610,298.28 -- for JLI
304,797.00 -- for CPDC
₱191,373[.19] -- for the total net additive costs to be paid separately, as follows:
[₱]47,302.69 -- for the net additive claim uncontested by JLI
143,615.66 - GDC
454.84 - CPDC
₱1,311,900.17 -- for the value of construction materials left at project site. Said obligation shall be jointly and severally paid to the Claimant by
the Respondents.
₱5,400,735.25 -- as refund of retention moneys to be paid separately as follows:
JLI -- ₱2,708,356.05
GDC -- 1,395,780.56
CPDC -- 1,296,599.12
Total -- ₱5,400.735.25 –
₱7,956,242.39 -- GRAND TOTAL DUE TO THE CLAIMANT BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS:
₱1,676,534.72 -- from GDC
3,35,957.0211 -- from JLI
1,601,850.96 -- from CPDC
1,311,900.17 -- from all collectively
₱7,956,242.39 -- GRAND TOTAL
II. FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
P8,800.00 – for the value of 100 bags of Portland Cement borrowed by the Claimant
P55,200.00 – for rental of construction equipment used by the Claimant in the works
₱2,466,546.57 – for the refund of the unrecouped downpayment
₱259,780.13 – for reimbursement of the amount paid for utilities
₱74,455.58 – for liquidated damages on the SDUs
₱2,864,782.28 – Total due to GDC
329
CASTLETON PROPERTIES & DEVELOPMENT CORP.
₱1,847,254.47 – for the refund of the unrecouped downpayment
274,156.34 – for liquidated damages on the SDUs
₱2,121,410.81 – Total due to CPDC
JARDINE LAND, INC.
[₱]3,432,163.86 – for the refund of the unrecouped downpayment
675,044.89 – for liquidated damages on the SDUs
₱4,107,208.75 – Total due to JLI
ALL RESPONDENTS COLLECTIVELY
₱353,364.89 – reimbursement of unliquidated value of owner-assisted materials
₱65,268.45 – reimbursement of amounts advanced for occupancy permit fee, inspection fee, certificate of electrical inspection,
miscellaneous fee and city ordinance contractors’ tax
₱623,094.58 – as liquidated damages on the amenities contract
₱1,041,727.92 – Total due to all Respondents collectively
₱10,135,129.76 – GRAND TOTAL DUE TO RESPONDENTS
"Claimant is hereby further required to turn over to the Respondents the original of the building permits for the project and the project
logbook.
"OFFSETTING the grand total amounts due to the Claimant-Contractor and the Respondents, respectively, a balance of ₱2,178,887.37 remains
in favor of the Respondent-Owners. Claimant-Contractor POSADAS-MOYA AND ASSOCIATES CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. (PMACCI) is accordingly
directed to pay said balance of ₱2,178,887.37 to the Respondents collectively. Interests on the foregoing amount shall be paid at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of this Decision. After finality of this Decision, interest at the rate of 12% per annum shall be paid thereon until
full payment of the awarded amount shall have been made, ‘this interim period being deemed to be at that time already a forbearance of
credit.’"12
Petitioner received a copy of the foregoing Decision on September 16, 1999. On September 24, 1999, it filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review13 before the CA, which received it on October 13, 1999. Petitioner had annexed the following documents to its Petition:
1. Annex "A" - Decision of the CIAC
2. Annex "B" - Request for Adjudication (Narrative Facts & Figures - An Arbitral Presentation)
3. Annex "C" - Respondents’ Answer with Counterclaims
4. Annex "D" - petitioner’s Reply to Respondents’ Answer with Counterclaims
5. Annex "E" - Terms of Reference, which was signed by the parties, their counsels and the Arbitral Tribunal
330
Respondents averred that they had filed their own Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure on October 18, 1999.14 This Petition, docketed as CA-GR No. 55185, was raffled to and is pending before the Ninth Division of the
CA.15
In dismissing the appeal of Posadas-Moya, the CA ruled that the Petition had no attached pleadings -- such as the Complaint and other
material portions of the record -- that would support the allegations therein. 16 The court a quo based its dismissal on the requirements of
Section 2 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court.17
The Issues
In its Memorandum,19 petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition dated October 11, 1999, and docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP
55051, on the supposed ground that petitioner failed to attach a copy of the ‘complaint,’ inasmuch as petitioner indeed attached such copy as
Annex ‘B’ to the CA petition.
"II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not exercising its jurisdiction to correct the grave error of law by the CIAC when the
latter declared that, as of September 15, 1998, petitioner was ‘in delay’ in the completion of the Project, despite the undisputed facts on
record.
"III
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not exercising its jurisdiction to strike down the CIAC’s holding that respondents’
termination of the construction contract is legal.
"IV
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in sustaining, by its inaction, the illegal award of liquidated damages by the CIAC, and
the latter’s denial of petitioner’s claim for unrealized income."20
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether the CA erred in dismissing Posadas-Moya’s Petition for Review; and, (2) if so, whether this
Court can immediately take cognizance of the appeal without necessarily remanding the case to the CA.
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Propriety of the Dismissal of Petitioner’s Appeal
Petitioner faults the CA for dismissing its Petition on the basis of the requirements of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, when its appeal was based
on Rule 43. Furthermore, the CA allegedly erred in ruling that the original Complaint had not been attached to the Petition. Petitioner explains
that "[w]hat probably misled that Court into concluding otherwise was the caption used by petitioner in denominating that complaint. For,
instead of ‘complaint,’ petitioner captioned it as ‘Narrative Facts and Figures - An Arbitral Presentation.’"21
According to petitioner, nobody questioned the caption at the CIAC level. In fact, there was absolutely no uncertainty that, to all intents and
purposes, it was an initiatory pleading. Petitioner contends that respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim and the CIAC rendered its
Decision based on the pleading.
We agree with petitioner. It should be clear that the Petition filed by Posadas-Moya was governed by Rule 43, not Rule 42, of the Revised Rules
of Court. Petitioner was appealing from a Decision of the CIAC. Rule 42 governs appeals from a decision of the regional trial court rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,22 whereas Rule 43 governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA.
331
Section 1 of Rule 43 provides:
"SECTION 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance
Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law."23 (Emphasis supplied)
As to what should be the contents of the Petition for Review filed by Posadas-Moya is governed by Section 6 of Rule 43, which reads:
"SECTION. 6. Contents of the petition. – The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the
court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied
upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such materials portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall
state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein." 24
Respondents argue that petitioner failed to meet this requirement. Specifically, the latter allegedly failed to attach ‘"all material portions of
the record referred to’ in the petition for review and all other supporting papers." 25 According to them, since petitioner was raising factual
issues, it should have attached certified true copies of the following:
1. The Affidavit of petitioner’s sole witness, Mr. Januario Posadas
2. The Joint Affidavit of private respondents’ five witnesses
3. The Supplemental Affidavit of Engineer Gaid
4. The Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSNs) of the hearings held on August 4 and 5, 1999
5. Petitioner’s Draft Decision
6. Private respondents’ Draft Decision
Respondents’ argument clearly shows that the CA was indeed mistaken in ruling that petitioner had failed to attach the Complaint to its
Petition. Obviously, even respondents accept that the "Narrative Facts and Figures - An Arbitral Presentation" was truly the Complaint of
petitioner in the CIAC. If they honestly believed that there was no such attachment, then they should have included the Complaint in the
above list.
Respondents harp on the alleged failure of petitioner to submit the foregoing list of documents, which they deem essential to prevent an
outright dismissal of the Petition. They cite, as basis for dismissing the Petition, Section 7 of Rule 43, which reads:
"SEC. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." 26
We disagree. As we have previously observed, the Petition for Review filed before the CA had a certified true copy of the Decision of the
CIAC,27 from which the appeal had been made. Properly appended to the Petition were the allegations of petitioner contained in its "Narrative
Facts and Figures - An Arbitral Presentation" and the counter-allegations of respondents in their Answer with Counterclaims. Also annexed to
the Petition was the TOR, which was agreed upon by all the parties, and which contained all the admitted facts.
The TOR even confirms that all of petitioner’s positions are stated in the Request for Adjudication (which is the same as the "Narrative Facts
and Figures"), while those of respondents are in their Answer with Counterclaims. This fact clearly shows that the allegations of both petitioner
and respondents are contained in those documents. It is therefore erroneous for respondents and for the appellate court to look for other
documents on which to base the disposition of this case.
In dismissing the Petition, the court a quo clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case. The crucial
issue we must now consider is whether the documents accompanying the Petition before the CA sufficiently supported the allegations
therein.28
332
Without a doubt, the CA had sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.1âwphi1 The other documents that respondents
insist should have been appended to the Petition will not necessarily determine whether the CA can properly decide the case. Besides, these
documents were already part of the records of this case and could have easily been referred to by the appellate court if necessary.
Time and time again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate rather than to
frustrate the attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed if it would subvert their primary
objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
Parties or litigants must be accorded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes, free from the constraints
of technicalities.29
In denying due course to the Petition, the appellate court gave premium to form and failed to consider the important rights of the parties. At
the very least, petitioner substantially complied with the procedural requirements of Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections.30 In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. 31 A strict and rigid
application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.32 In fact, Section
6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. 33
Second Issue:
Remand to the CA
Petitioner then asks this Court to decide its appeal on the merits without need of remanding the case to the CA.
We cannot grant the prayer. The issues raised by petitioner on the merits of its appeal are questions that should be addressed to the CA. It is
the appellate court that has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Rule 43. Section 3 thereof provides:
"SECTION. 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule [Rule 43] may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner
herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law." 34
In the present case, the determination of the rights of petitioner and respondents involves questions of both fact and law.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts.35
Explained the Court:
"A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation." 36
Clearly, an examination of the evidence presented is required in the determination of the scope, the extent and the effects of the construction
projects, contracts and agreements of petitioner and respondents. Such examination will also determine the liability of the parties between
and among them. Hence, we cannot grant the prayer of petitioner that the substantive issues of the case be decided by this Court, since the
CA has not yet passed upon the factual issues raised by the parties.37
Furthermore, respondents’ appeal is also pending in the CA. It is thus best that, as much as possible, petitioner’s cause should also be decided
in the same proceedings where respondents’ appeal is lodged.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Resolution, dated October 29, 1999 dismissing petitioner’s appeal is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the CA for decision on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
333
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002
SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA, petitioners,

vs.
HUMBERTO D. MEER, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
SP No. 52942 dated October 10, 2000 and January 26, 2001, respectively. The first Resolution2 denied petitioners’ Petition for Relief from
Judgment while the second Resolution3 denied reconsideration thereof. The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Lot 15, Block 5, Pandacan, Manila evidenced by TCT No.
158886. Sometime in June 1993, he applied for a loan to construct a house thereon. However, he discovered that his certificate of title has
been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 166074, was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin. The latter acquired said
property by virtue of a deed of sale dated June 3, 1985 purportedly executed by respondent in their favor.4
On January 12, 1994, respondent sought the cancellation of TCT No. 166074 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10. On the
same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the back of TCT No. 166074.5
On June 15, 1994, while the case was pending, TCT No. 166074 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of the
petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina. It appears that the subject property has been conveyed to the petitioners on
September 28, 1993, even prior to the annotation of lis pendens. The Absolute Deed of Sale evidencing the conveyance was notarized on the
same day, including the payment of taxes appurtenant thereto. The transfer of the title from Lerma Bunquin to petitioners was effected only
on June 15, 1994 because of some requirements imposed by the National Housing Authority.6
Due to the foregoing developments, Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants.7
Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during the hearings, leading the court to declare them in default. Petitioners, however,
participated actively in defense of their position.8
In its Decision dated February 16, 1998, the trial court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Banquin was fraudulent. However,
petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus were entitled to the possession of the subject property. Pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
"It bears notice that defendant-spouses Mesina not only relied on what appeared in Lerma Bunquin’s title but beyond the latter’s
title and even made verification with the NHA and sought legal advice prior to the subject property’s purchase. Their actuations
incline the court to hold and consider that defendant-spouses Mesina acted in good faith when they acquired subject property.
As a basic rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and issued
therefore and the law will no longer oblige to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property (Director of Lands
vs. Abache, 73 Phil. 606). Also, persons dealing with the property covered by the Torrens certificate of title are not required to go
beyond what appears on the face of the title (Pino vs. CA, 198 SCRA 434).
Measured by the above criteria, defendant-spouses Mesina were indeed purchasers in good faith and purchasers for value of subject
property, and consequently, they have the right to the possession thereof which is presently titled in their names. xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint against defendant-spouses Michael and Grace Mesina and the
Register of Deeds of Manila. The counter-claim of defendant spouses Mesina against the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Defendant spouses Sergio and Lerma Bunquin are ordered:
1. To pay plaintiff the value of the subject property based on the prevailing price on the date of the decision;
2. To pay the plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of P20, 0000.00;
3. To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P30, 000.00.
SO ORDERED."9
334
Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said Decision but the trial court denied the same. Respondent thereafter filed
an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court.
Reversing the ruling of the MeTC, the Regional Trial Court10 ruled that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith, reasoning that it is the
registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the date of its consummation that will confer title to the property. Since the Deed of Sale was
registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis pendens, petitioners were bound by the outcome of the case, viz:
"Having thus correctly ruled that the Deed of Sale between plaintiff Humberto Meer and Sps. Bunquin was a forgery and that the
signature of Humberto Meer was forged and having recognized that a priorly registered lis pendens is superior to a belatedly
registered Deed of Sale because the efficacy of the belatedly registered Deed of Sale depends upon the outcome of the case for
which the lis pendens was annotated and having come to the conclusion that the case filed by Humberto Meer against the Bunquin is
legally correct and justified, this court therefore has no other alternative but to rule in favor of the appellant and order the
cancellation not only of the title issued in favor of the Bunquin but also of the title issued in favor of the Mesinas. The Court cannot
consider the latter as buyers in good faith.
WHEREFORE and considering the foregoing, the appealed decision is therefore reversed and a new one is issued in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Humberto Meer in favor of defendants Sergio and Lerma
Bunquin and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 166704 issued in the name of the defendants Bunquin and
TCT No. 216518 in the name of defendant Mesinas and restore TCT No. 158886 in the name of plaintiff Humberto Meer; ordering the
defendant jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P 50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit. The counterclaim of
defendant Mesina is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."11
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 2000.12
On July 17, 2000 and after reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the
Court of Appeals set aside its Resolution dated May 10, 2000 for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic fraud was committed which prevented
petitioners from presenting his case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b)
mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good
and substantial defense in his action.13
On the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been collusion between the respondent and the Bunquins during the trial of the case at
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Had the Bunquins testified in court as to the validity of the Deed of Sale as well as the authenticity of the
respondent’s signature, petitioners argued that the result would have been in their favor. Anent the second ground, petitioners averred that
their failure to file the requisite appeal on time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to produce the requested documents of the
case. Finally, petitioners claim that they have good and substantial defense.14
As aforesaid, the Court of Appeals denied the petition reasoning that:
"As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses should have been filed before the court of
origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended. As
to the second ground, the petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, did not
mention the alleged extrinsic fraud when the case was on appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners cannot now challenge
the decision of this Court for the fraud allegedly perpetrated in the court of origin.
Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may be availed of from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioners’ Petition for Relief from Judgment is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."15
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this Petition for Review raising as issue the availability of Petition for Relief under
Rule 38, as a remedy against the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. If the remedy is
thus available, petitioners pray that this Court rule whether or not the grounds relied by them are sufficient to give due course to the
petition.16
After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the petition.
Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from
the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.17
335
Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be.18 Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz:
"Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.- When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside." 19
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case
or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of municipal trial
courts should be filed with the regional trial court, viz:
"Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from Judgment of inferior court.- When a judgment is rendered by an
inferior court on a case, and a party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a
hearing therein, or has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside and the case tried upon its merits.
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or other proceeding thereof.- When a judgment order is
entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside."
Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief to include judgments or orders of the Court of
Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase "any court".20 We disagree.
The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for municipal and regional trial courts21 and designation
of municipal/metropolitan trial courts as courts of record.22 While Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court", it refers only to municipal/metropolitan
and regional trial courts.23
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court 24 and may, from time
to time, be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the
Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals25 allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners beg this Court, on equitable grounds, not to strictly construe the Rules, arguing that their "only earthly possession" is at
stake.26 Indeed, in certain occasions, this Court has, in the interest of substantial justice and in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, construed the
Rules of Court with liberality.
Nevertheless, the circumstances obtaining in the present case do not convince this Court to take exception.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners’ allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the
Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned this
from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as
the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed
the finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. This
Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their petition. These contentions should have been
raised in the MeTC, as they have been available to them since the beginning.
Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by
counsel.27 Petitioners, however, place the blame on their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend that they lack legal
education, hence, were not aware of the required period for filing an appeal. 28
336
In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second
opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the
various opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a belated
effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
337
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155018 December 11, 2003
PHILADELPHIA AGAN, petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. ANDRES NUEVA and DIOSDADO NUEVA, represented by LOU NUEVA and AL NUEVA,respondents.
R E S O L U T IO N
TINGA, J.:
Mistake, to constitute a ground for petition for relief, refers to a mistake of fact, not of law. The Court finds occasion to reiterate this basic
principle in this case.
The narration of facts by the Court of Appeals is not disputed:
On April 13, 1988, Diosdada Nueva, with marital consent, sold under a pacto de retro, a parcel of land with an area of 2,033 square meters
situated in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, to Philadelphia Agan for ₱21,000.00. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 25370 and registered in the name of Spouses Andres and Diosdada Nueva.
The agreement is evidenced by a public instrument entitled "Deed of Sale under a Pacto de Retro" executed and duly signed by the late
Diosdada Nueva with the marital consent of her husband, Andres Nueva, and Philadelphia Agan. The parties agreed that the Nuevas are
granted the right to repurchase the property sold, within six (6) months from and after the date of the document for the same consideration of
₱21,000.00.
Petitioners failed to repurchase the property within the stipulated six-month period.
On July 5, 1991, upon the death of Diosdada Nueva, the property was extrajudicially partitioned where Andres sold his interest in the land in
question to his daughter Ann and son Lou. Since the title to the property was allegedly lost during the fire that razed the property on March
19, 1990 where Diosdada died, title was reconstituted and subsequently transferred and registered in the name of Ann and Lou Nueva under
TCT No. 63403.
On June 19, 1992, Philadelphia Agan filed a petition for consolidation of ownership against Spouses Andres and Diosdada Nueva with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Cagayan de Oro City. . . . In their answer filed on October 28, 1998, the Nuevas alleged that the pacto
de retro sale was actually an equitable mortgage, the consideration for the sale being only ₱21,000.00 as against its Fair Market Value of
₱81,320.00 pursuant to Tax Declaration No. 34661.
Trial proceeded. On May 10, 2000, the RTC admitted Agan’s exhibits and submitted the case for decision in view of the absence despite due
notice of the Nuevas and their counsel on record. A motion for reconsideration filed by the Nuevas couple was denied. On August 3, 2000, the
judgment consolidating ownership over the disputed property in favor of the vendee, Philadelphia Agan, was rendered by the trial court.
However, the second paragraph of the dispositive portion gave the vendors a period of thirty [days] from receipt of the decision within which
to redeem the property. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the evidence presented, the ownership in the vendee is hereby consolidated by virtue of the failure of the vendors to
redeem the property described in the Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro dated April 13, 1988 covered by the TCT No. T-25370 over Lot 1355-E
of the Subdivision Psd 182568, being a portion of Lot 1355, Cagayan Cadastre; situated in the Barrio of Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City,
consisting of an area of 2,033 square meters, more or less.
["]However, the vendors can still exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision pursuant to
Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code.
["]SO ORDERED."
Because of the refusal of Agan to accept the amount of ₱52,080.00 as redemption price, the Nuevas were constrained to consign the amount
with the court.
On September 12, 2000, Philadelphia Agan filed a petition for relief from the August 3, 2000 decision. She argued that she did not find it
necessary to file an appeal from the said decision considering that the grant of the third-day period to redeem the property is a mere
surplusage and hence, unenforceable and illegal in view of the court’s order consolidating ownership of the property in her favor. Respondent
Agan prayed for the court to delete the said portion of the decision.
338
On October 9, 2000, the trial court rendered its questioned Order, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the decision of August 4, 2000 is hereby amended by deleting the second paragraph of the disposition thereof.
["]SO ORDERED."
On October 31, 2000, a motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution was filed by the Nuevas, but the court denied the same in
its resolution dated November 17, 2000.1
Respondent heirs filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, contending that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting
the petition for relief. In its Decision dated August 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed the Order of the RTC and rendered judgment in
favor of respondent heirs. It held that:
The remedy of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a remedy provided by law to any person
against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Relief is not however available
when a party had another adequate remedy available to him which was either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision and
he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking an appeal (Ibabao v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76).
The ground relied upon by the private respondent in her petition for relief below the court a quo is her honest belief that the pertinent portion
of the decision granting the seller a retro thirty (30) days to redeem the property is a surplusage and hence unenforceable and illegal. She
relied on the assumption that since the grant of the period of redemption is an erroneous application by the lower court of Articles 1606 and
1607 of the Civil Code, the same cannot be enforced. As the trial court upheld the validity of the sale under a pacto de retro and granted her
petition for consolidation of ownership over the disputed property, she did not find it necessary to appeal the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion.
We do not find the circumstances of this case a proper subject of a petition for relief from the judgment of the court a quo.
The erroneous opinion of a party concerning the incorrectness of the judicial decision of the court cannot constitute a ground for a petition for
relief. This, while it constitutes a mistake of the party, is not such a mistake as confers the right to the relief. This is so because in no wise has
the private respondent been prevented from interposing an appeal. If a party complains of a decision as being void, then the proper remedy is
to appeal said judgment (Air Services Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 101).
The relief provided for under Rule 38 of the Rules is of equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other
available or adequate remedy. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the
mode of procedure by counsel (Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76).
The failure of the private respondent to avail of the remedy of appeal within the reglementary period notwithstanding receipt of the lower
court decision rendered the decision final and executory. She cannot make a complete turn around and assail the decision in a petition for
relief where she had all the opportunity to correct on appeal what [she] believed to be an erroneous decision. If a litigant loses a right by
sleeping on it, then with good reason may it be said that he should not be given equitable relief under [the] rules of procedure which he
disdains or which he fails to take advantage of by gross negligence (Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 529). The law helps the vigilant but
not those who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and
contemners of their own rights (Salandanan v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 671).
Further, We do not agree with the contention of the private respondent that Article 1606 of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case.
In their answer to the petition for consolidation filed on October 22, 1998, petitioners raised the defense that the transaction between the
parties was actually an equitable mortgage, considering that they remained in possession of the subject property and continued to pay the real
taxes thereon. The lower court, in its August 3, 2000 decision, ruled that the transaction is one of sale under a pacto de retro, hence it acted
within its authority under Article 1606 of the Civil Code in giving the petitioners thirty days as redemption period. 2
Petitioner reiterates her argument that a mistake prevented her from filing an appeal. She believes that an appeal was unnecessary because
the inclusion of the second paragraph in the RTC Order of October 9, 2000 was mere surplusage. Petitioner further submits that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had thirty (30) days within which to redeem the property under the third paragraph of Article 1606 of
the Civil Code, which states:
…the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the
basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.
The Court, however, finds no reversible error in the foregoing discussion of the Court of Appeals.
339
Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases.1âwphi1 It is an act of grace. It is not regarded with
favor.3 For relief to be granted, the petitioner must show that the judgment or final order was entered, or the proceeding thereafter against
him was taken, through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.4
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, pertains generally to one of fact, not of law.
In Guevara v. Tuason & Co.,5 the Court held that the "word ‘mistake,’ according to its signification in the act referred to, does not apply, and
never was intended to apply, to a judicial error which the court in question might have committed in the trial referred to. Such errors may be
corrected by means of an appeal. The act in question can not in any way be employed as a substitute for the said remedy." The Court in
Guevara elaborated:
. . . the erroneous opinion of one of the parties concerning the incorrectness of the judicial decision of the court can not constitute grounds for
the said relief. For example, the court renders judgment in a matter against the defendant. The said defendant believes at the time that said
judgment is correct and understands that an appeal would be useless and therefore he does not interpose the same. Later he believes firmly
that the said judgment was incorrect, as indeed it was, and that he committed a mistake when he believed that it was correct. This, although it
constitutes a mistake of the party, is not such a mistake as confers the right to the relief. This is so because in no wise has he been prevented
from interposing his appeal. The most that may be said is that by reason of an erroneous interpretation of the law he believed that all recourse
of appeal would be useless.
The above illustration applies equally in this case where petitioner believed that an appeal from the Decision of the RTC would be
"unnecessary."
Moreover, the Court is not convinced that petitioner sincerely believed in her theory that the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of
the RTC decision was surplusage. Had it been so, she would have moved to rectify the alleged error immediately, not after respondents had
offered to repurchase the property in question. Her failure to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal before the lapse of the
reglementary period constitutes an acceptance of the trial court’s judgment, and her rationalization now appears to have been made only on
hindsight.
Petitioner submits that the RTC had no jurisdiction to allow the respondents to repurchase the property, such judgment purportedly being
contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. This contention has no merit. If there were any error at all in the Decision of the RTC, the same would be
a mere error in judgment, not one of jurisdiction.
Petitioner likewise invokes the case of Ilacad v. Court of Appeals,6 holding that:
. . . a judgment, even after it had become final, where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, the
court may clarify such ambiguity, mistake or omission by an amendment and in so doing it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the
court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision. 7
There is no ambiguity at all in the decision that would warrant clarification.1âwphi1 If at all, the ambiguity is merely ostensible. At first blush,
the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision declaring the consolidation of ownership of the property in petitioner, on one hand, and granting
respondents thirty (30) days to repurchase the property, on the other, appears inconsistent. The dispositive portion, however, also makes
reference to the third paragraph of Article 1606 of the New Civil Code. Taken together, it becomes obvious that the consolidation of the
property in petitioner is subject to the suspensive condition of respondents’ failure to repurchase within the thirty-day period.
At any rate, the grant of the right to repurchase to respondents is in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 1606, a provision not found
in the old Civil Code. The legislative intent behind this Article, along with Articles 1602-1605 and 1607 of the same Code, is "to accord the
vendor a retro the maximum safeguards for the protection of his legal rights under the true agreement of the parties. Experience has
demonstrated too often that many sales with right to repurchase have been devised only to circumvent or ignore our usury laws and for this
reason, the law looks upon then with disfavor."8
Article 1606 is intended to cover suits where the seller claims that the real intention was a loan with equitable mortgage but decides
otherwise.9 The seller, however, must entertain a good faith belief that the contract is an equitable mortgage. In Felicen, Sr., et al v. Orias, et
al.,10 cited by petitioner, the Court explained:
The application of the third paragraph of Article 1606 is predicated upon the bona fides of the vendor a retro. It must appear that there was a
belief on his part, founded on facts attendant upon the execution of the sale with pacto de retro, honestly and sincerely entertained, that the
agreement was in reality a mortgage, one not intended to affect the title to the property ostensibly sold, but merely to give it as security for a
loan or obligation. In that event, if the matter of the real nature of the contract is submitted for judicial resolution, the application of the rule is
meet and proper: that the vendor a retro be allowed to repurchase the property sold within 30 days from rendition of final judgment declaring
the contract to be a true sale with right to repurchase. Conversely, if it should appear that the parties’ agreement was really one of sale –
transferring ownership to the vendee, but accompanied by a reservation to the vendor of the right to repurchase the property – and there are
no circumstances that may reasonably be accepted as generating some honest doubt as to the parties’ intention, the proviso is inapplicable.
The reason is quite obvious. If the rule were otherwise, it would be within the power of every vendor a retro to set at naught a pacto de retro,
or resurrect an expired right of repurchase, by simply instituting an action to reform the contract – known to him to be in truth a sale
with pacto de retro – into an equitable mortgage. As postulated by the petitioner, "to allow herein private respondent to repurchase the
340
property by applying said paragraph x x x to the case at bar despite the fact that the stipulated redemption period had already long expired
when they instituted the present action, would in effect alter or modify the stipulation in the contract as to the definite and specific limitation
of the period for repurchase (2 years from the date of sale or only until June 25, 1958) thereby not simply increasing but in reality resuscitating
the expired right to repurchase x x and likewise the already terminated and extinguished obligation to resell by herein petitioner." The rule
would thus be a made a tool to spawn, protect and even reward fraud and bad faith, a situation surely never contemplated or intended by the
law.
This court has already had occasion to rule on the proper interpretation of the provision in question. In Adorable v. Inacala, where the proofs
established that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties’ intention, that the transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de
retro, the Court adjudged the vendor a retro not to be entitled to the benefit of the third paragraph of Article 1606.11
The RTC in this case made no finding in its Decision that respondents’ defense that the pacto de retro sale was an equitable mortgage was not
made in good faith. Indeed, it does not appear that petitioner even attempted to prove bad faith on the part of respondents during the trial,
which accounts for the RTC Decision’s utter silence on the matter.1âwphi1
Moreover, respondents alleged in their answer that the consideration for the alleged sale, which was ₱21,000.00 was inadequate, considering
that the fair market value of the property was ₱81,320.00.12 Respondents also averred that they remained in possession of the subject
property and paid the real taxes thereon, and that their predecessor continued to pay the loan under which the mortgage was
constituted.13 Respondents even reconstituted their title over the property, and partitioned the property with the other heirs, after which
respondents purchased the latter’s share and caused the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in their name. 14 Such title, however, was
subsequently annulled.
The law presumes good faith and, in the absence of a contrary finding by the RTC in its Decision, respondents are entitled to the right to
redeem the property pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 1606 of the New Civil Code.
The Court also notes that the RTC erred in allowing petitioners the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
RTC Decision. By express provision, Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty (30) days "from the time final judgment was rendered," not
from the defendant’s receipt of the judgment. The Court has construed "final judgment" to mean one that has become final and executory.15
This observation, of course, is moot, as it is not disputed that respondents offered to pay petitioner the redemption price within the period
fixed by the trial court and, subsequently, consigned the amount in court. The Court makes the observation only for the enlightenment of the
RTC.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
341
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147082 January 28, 2008
HEIRS OF MAURA SO, namely, YAN LAM LIM, JIMMY SO LIM, and FERDINAND SO LIM, petitioners,
vs.
LUCILA JOMOC OBLIOSCA, ELVIRA JOMOC GARDINAB, and HEIRS OF ABUNDIA JOMOC BALALA, namely, ROSITA BALALA ACENAS,
EVANGELINE BALALA BAACLO, OLIVER JOMOC BALALA, and PERLA BALALA CONDESA, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 18, 2000, and Resolution dated January
11, 2001, denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The assailed decision declared that a petition for annulment of
judgment cannot be availed of when the petitioner had already filed an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 496 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
19648, and located at Cogon District, Cagayan de Oro. Upon his death, the property was inherited by his wife, brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces (collectively referred to as the Jomoc heirs). The respondents, Lucila Jomoc Obliosca and Abundia Jomoc Balala, sisters of the deceased,
and Elvira Jomoc, a niece, were among those who inherited the property.
In February 1979, the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land 2 in favor of petitioner,
Maura So, over the property for P300,000.00. However, the three respondents and Maura So failed to affix their signatures on this document.
Moreover, the document was not notarized. Nonetheless, petitioner made a partial payment of P49,000.00 thereon.
Thereafter, petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc heirs ignored the demand. On February 24, 1983,
petitioner filed a Complaint3 for specific performance against the Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable
deed of sale over the lot. The Jomoc heirs, except for the respondents, were impleaded as defendants. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
8983.
On February 28, 1983, the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land4 in favor of the
spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00. The spouses Lim intervened as defendants in Civil Case No. 8983.
On February 12, 1988, the trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with the modification
that the award of damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation was deleted. The defendant heirs and the spouses Lim filed separate
petitions for review with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, which petitions were later consolidated.
On August 2, 1991, the Court rendered a Decision5 in these consolidated cases upholding petitioner’s better right over the property.6 The
decision became final and executory on November 25, 1991.
On February 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The respondents opposed the motion on the ground that
they did not participate in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land and they were not
parties to the case. Despite the opposition, the trial court granted the motion for execution. The respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but the trial court denied the same.
On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution and divesting all the Jomoc heirs of their titles over the
property.7 Accordingly, the Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the Jomoc heirs and issued TCT No. T-68370 in the name of the petitioner
on July 24, 1992.
All the Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the said order of the RTC. They alleged that herein respondents were not
parties to the case, therefore, they should not be bound by the decision therein and be deprived of their right over the property. On December
8, 1992, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that respondents were bound by the said decision. The CA ratiocinated that respondents were
aware of the pendency of the case, yet they did not intervene, and that the case is barred by res judicata. Respondents elevated the case to
this Court through a petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 110661. In a Resolution dated December 1, 1993, the
Court denied the petition, thus:
In the case of Vda. de Jomoc v. Court of Appeals (200 SCRA [1991]), this Court concluded that the contract of sale between the heirs
of Pantaleon Jomoc and the private respondent Maura So, even if not complete in form, so long as the essential requisites of consent
of the contracting parties, object and cause of the obligation concur, and they were clearly established to be present, is valid and
effective between the parties.
342
The lower court found that petitioners were aware of the pendency of the specific performance case brought by Maura So and we
agree with the Court of Appeals that their failure to intervene in said suit for the protection of their rights binds them to the decision
rendered therein.
This Court has held that a writ of execution may be issued against a person not a party to a case where the latter’s remedy, which he
did not avail of, was to intervene in the case in question involving rights over the same parcel of land (Lising vs. Plan, 133 SCRA 194
[1984]; Suson vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 70 [1989])
It appears that petitioner Elvira Jomoc Gadrinab signed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Fellermo Jomoc to represent her in all
proceedings regarding Civil Case No. 8983. It also appears that all the Jomoc heirs wanted to realize a higher price by selling the same
piece of land a second time to the Lim spouses. Petitioner Lucila, Abundia and Elvira shared the same goal, and kept quiet while
Maura So sought relief before the trial court. The other heirs sought to capitalize on Lucila’s, Abundia’s and Elvira’s non-participation
in the first sale to Maura So. The heirs’ (all of them) position is bereft of moral and equitable basis.
As for the issue of res judicata, we believe that the same applies as a bar to the instant Petition. In G.R. No. 92871 and G.R. No.
92860, this Court had occasion to rule that herein private respondent had the right to compel the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc to
execute the proper public instrument so that a valid contract of sale of registered land can be duly registered and can bind third
persons. In effect, this Court had already determined the right of private respondent to a proper registerable deed of sale which
petitioners seek to challenge again in this Petition. A party cannot avoid the application of the principle of bar by prior judgment by
simply varying the form of the action or by adopting a different mode of presenting its case or by adding or dropping a party
(Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 360 [1992]).
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit.
The resolution became final and executory on June 20, 1994.
It appears that, on March 12, 1992, respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Misamis Oriental. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-135. Respondents posited therein that, since they did not sell their
shares in the property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by the other heirs. They prayed
that they be allowed to exercise their right to redeem their co-heirs’ shares and that petitioner execute all papers, documents and deeds to
effectuate the right of legal redemption.
On April 27, 1994, the RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the pleadings and evidence of the parties on record, affidavits and other documents
submitted, there being but purely legal issues involve[d], ordering the defendant herein, MAURA SO, to allow the plaintiffs to
exercise their substantive right of legal redemption of the shares of plaintiffs’ co- heirs, defendant Maura So, for the purpose of
redemption by the plaintiffs, Lucita Jomoc Obliosca, Abundia Jomoc Balala (deceased) substituted by her children: Rosita Balala
Acenas, Evangeline Balala Baaclo, Oliver J. Balala, and Perla Balala Condesa; and Elvira Jomoc Gardinab, is ordered to receive and
accept the amount tendered by the plaintiffs in the amount of P49,000.00 deposited in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental at Cagayan de Oro City, and to execute a deed of redemption in favor of the herein plaintiffs
reconveying to the latter the property, and to pay Plaintiffs for attorney’s fees in the reasonable sum of P20,000.00.
Other claims and for counterclaims for monetary damages of the parties are dismissed, with costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.8
In a Resolution dated July 14, 1994, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.9 Respondents moved for reconsideration of the
said resolution. On September 7, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 granting respondents’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating the April
27, 1994 Resolution.
On November 14, 1994, acting jointly on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and respondents’ Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a
Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a Resolution,11 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and granting respondents’ motion for
execution.
On December 28, 1994, petitioner, later substituted by her heirs, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment, particularly the
September 7, 1994 Order, which reinstated the RTC’s April 27, 1994 and November 14, 1994 Resolutions, which denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. On October 18, 2000, the CA denied the petition, holding that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no
longer available since petitioner Maura So had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the same orders of the trial court.12
Apparently, on December 19, 1994, prior to the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, petitioner Maura So filed a
petition for review on certiorari13 with this Court assailing the same RTC Order and Resolution. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 118050. In a
Minute Resolution dated March 1, 1995, the Court denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted
343
with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy.14 On June 7, 1995, the Court likewise denied petitioner’s first motion for
reconsideration,15and on July 27, 1998, the second motion for reconsideration. The March 1, 1995 Minute Resolution became final and
executory on September 1, 1998.16
On January 11, 2001, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its decision denying the petition for annulment of
judgment.17 Petitioners then filed this petition for review, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 92-135 BECAUSE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY
RULED THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION HAD BEEN SOLD TWICE BY ALL THE HEIRS OF PANTALEON TO MAURA SO AND LATER TO THE LIM
SPOUSES IN G.R. NOS. 92871 AND 98860 AND G.R. NO. 110661 AND SAID FINAL DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION CANNOT BE REVISED
AND REVERSED BY SAID TRIAL COURT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL
PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 50059 IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN G.R. NO. 118050 DID NOT
AND CANNOT REPEAL THE FINAL AND EXECUT[ORY] DECISIONS IN G.R. NO. 92871 AND G.R. NO. 92860, AND THE FINAL AND
EXECUT[ORY] RESOLUTION IN G.R. NO. 110661, AS THE RESOLUTION IN G.R. NO. 118050 IS NOT ON THE MERITS, OR BY THE
SUPREME COURT EN BANC.18
The Court resolves to grant the petition despite the prevailing procedural restrictions, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, in
order to avoid causing a grave injustice to petitioners.
But before we discuss these circumstances which impel us to grant the petition, we must acknowledge extant procedural principles.
First, annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy.19 Thus, it may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.20 We,
therefore, agree with the CA that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available to petitioners since their
predecessor-in-interest, Maura So, had already availed herself of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Further, none of the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, is present in this case.
Petitioners argue that the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered the Resolution which recognized respondents’ right to redeem the
property because this, in effect, amended the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and the Resolution in G.R. No.
110661, which sustained the sale of the property to Maura So.
Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered
therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.21 The error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority
to decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant
the petition for annulment of judgment.
Second, well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.22 The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party,
through a mere subterfuge, be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.23
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law.24 The only
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.25 Again, none of these exceptions is present in this case.
Notwithstanding these principles, however, the higher interests of justice and equity demand that we brush aside the procedural norms. After
all, rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical
344
sense. Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; they are promulgated to aid the court in the
effective dispensation of justice. The Court has the inherent power and discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is
necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.26
If the rigid application of the Rules would frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court’s power to suspend the Rules or
except a particular case from its operation.27 The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even
that which this Court itself has already declared to be final.28
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and executory judgments. The first is this Court’s Decision in G.R. Nos.
92871 and 92860 which upheld the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura So.
The second is the Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the order of execution of the said decision against the herein
respondents despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in the first case. And the third is the Court’s Minute Resolution in G.R. No.
118050 which denied Maura So’s petition for review of the RTC Decision granting respondents’ right to redeem the property.
It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous judgments. It rendered final and executory the April 27, 1994
Resolution of the RTC which recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from Maura So. To recall, the RTC
premised its decision on its finding that respondents did not actually sell their shares in the property to Maura So because they did not sign the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of So; hence, they remained co-owners. This ruling is patently
erroneous because this Court had already pronounced in the first two final and executory judgments (in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and G.R.
No. 110661) that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC was barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment.
The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action.29
In Collantes v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court offered three options to solve a case of conflicting decisions: the first is for the parties to assert
their claims anew, the second is to determine which judgment came first, and the third is to determine which of the judgments had been
rendered by a court of last resort. In that case, the Court applied the first option and resolved the conflicting issues anew.
Instead of resorting to the first offered solution as in Collantes, which would entail disregarding all the three final and executory decisions, we
find it more equitable to apply the criteria mentioned in the second and third solutions, and thus, maintain the finality of one of the conflicting
judgments. The principal criterion under the second option is the time when the decision was rendered and became final and executory, such
that earlier decisions should be sustained over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest rights in the winning party. The major
criterion under the third solution is a determination of which court or tribunal rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be
accorded more respect than those made by the lower courts.
The application of these criteria points to the preservation of the Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 dated August 2, 1991,
and its Resolution in G.R. No. 110661 dated December 1, 1993. Both judgments were rendered long before the Minute Resolution in G.R. No.
118050 was issued on March 1, 1995. In fact, the August 2, 1991 Decision was executed already —respondents were divested of their title over
the property and a new title, TCT No. T-68370, was issued in the name of Maura So on July 24, 1992. Further, while all three judgments
actually reached this Court, only the two previous judgments extensively discussed the respective cases on the merits. The third judgment (in
G.R. No. 118050) was a Minute Resolution, dismissing the petition for review on certiorari of the RTC Resolution in the legal redemption case
for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned resolution was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy. In a
manner of speaking, therefore, the third final and executory judgment was substantially a decision of the trial court.
Obviously, the complaint for legal redemption was deliberately filed by the respondents with the RTC to circumvent this Court’s previous
decisions sustaining the sale of the whole property to Maura So. The Court cannot condone this ploy, even if it failed to uncover the same
when the case was erroneously elevated to it directly from the trial court (G.R. No. 118050).
The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court to set things right in order to prevent a grave injustice from being
committed against Maura So who had, for 15 years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself to be the owner of the
property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final
judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 2000, and Resolution
dated January 11, 2001, are REVERSED. The April 27, 1994 Resolution and September 7, 1994 Order of the RTC are SET ASIDE. The complaint
for legal redemption docketed as Civil Case No. 92-135 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
345
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 50480 December 14, 1979
CONTINENTAL BANK, petitioner-appellant

vs.
HON. JOEL P. TIANGCO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, STAR
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, respondents appellees.
Vicente P. Fernando for appellant.
Pacifico B. Tacub for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated September 26, 1967, ordering Income and Acceptance Corporation, Star Life
Insurance Corporation and Primitive E. Domingo to pay solidarily Lo the Continental Bank the sum of forty-six thousand three hundred pesos
and eighty-one centavos (P46,300.81), with twelve percent interest per annum from June 1, 1967 until the principal has been fully paid, plus
attorney's fees of three thousand pesos and the costs (Civil Case No. 69703).
That judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence which was presented before the deputy clerk of court who was commissioned Lo
receive the same after the defendants were declared in default for nonappearance at the pre-trial. As no appeal was interposed from the said
judgment, it became final and executory. It was not satisfied.
The sheriff in his return dated August 30, 1968 stated that he served the writ of execution upon the judgment debtor, P.E. Domingo, who
manifested that he would settle the case with the bank. After the expiration of the sixty-day period, without the judgment having been
satisfied, the sheriff returned the writ to the court.
On March 17, 1977, the bank, "through the Statutory Receiver", filed a complaint also in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the revival of
the said judgment (Civil Case No. 107556). lt was alleged therein that the judgment debtors (now the private respondents) had made partial
payments and that the amount due as of March 15, 1977 was thirty-four thousand six hundred twenty-two pesos and nineteen centavos
(P34,622.19) with twelve percent interest a year from March 16, 1977. The bank prayed that the judgment be revived.
The defendants answered the complaint. Then, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action for revival of judgment had
prescribed and that the plaintiff bank had no cause of action because the judgment sought to be revived is void since it was based on the
evidence received by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the bank. The trial court granted the motion in a minute order which reads: "Considering the
allegations contained, the arguments advanced and the doctrine cited in defendants' motion to dismiss as well as those of the opposition filed
thereto by the plaintiff, the Court resolves to grant the motion." The plaintiff appealed under Republic Act 5440.
We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order lie the one under appeal. A trial court should specify in its order the reasons
for the dismissal of the complaint so that when the order is appealed, this Court can readily determine from a casual perusal thereof whether
there is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.
The contention that the action for revival of the judgment had prescribed is manifestly devoid of merit. "A judgment may be executed on
motion within five (5 years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before
it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." (Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.) The prescriptive period for
enforcing a judgment is ten years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code).
In this case, the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment had not yet expired when the action for its revival was filed on March 17, 1977
because, as already stated, the judgment was rendered on September 26, 1967. Respondents' contention that between September 26, 1967
and March 17, 1977 a period of ten years, five months and twenty-one days had elapsed is a palpable error.
There can be no doubt that the action herein was filed within ten years from the rendition of the judgment, not to mention the date of the
entry thereof, which, although not shown in the record, can be assumed to be much later.
Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents' contention that the judgment in question is void and unenforceable because it was based
on evidence which was heard by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner. That judgment is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by
346
a court of competent jurisdiction and it was not impaired by extrinsic fraud nor by lack of due process. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the judgment debtors. They acquiesced in the validity of the judgment when they made partial payments to satisfy it.
The defendants or private respondents did not question in the lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the duty to receive
plaintiff's evidence. 'There is no showing that they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the commissioner committed any mistake or
abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and collateral fraud. It is too late at this hour for them to question the
reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner. (See CCC Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, L-
25920, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 264; 2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970, Ed., pp. 159-160 citing Apurillo vs. Garciano L-23683,
July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1054: Province of Pangasinan and Soriano vs. Palisoc, 116 Phil. 609, 614. Cf. Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, L-40098, August
29, 1975, 66 SCRA 425, 453-4.)
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
347
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28301 March 30, 1970
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JUAN DELOSO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Conrado C. Medina for plaintiff-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Appeal on questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 6276 dismissing the plaintiff's
appeal on the ground that the action for revival of judgment has already been barred by prescription.
On January 25, 1951, judgment was rendered by the abovementioned court in Civil Case No. 1044 ordering the defendants-appellees Juan
Deloso, Francisco Imperial and Magno Jamito to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Philippine National Bank, hereinafter referred to as the
PNB, the sum of P600.00 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. For one reason or another the said judgment was not executed within five (5)
years from the date of its finality. On June 28, 1960, the PNB filed with the same court an action (Civil Case No. 4953) against the same
defendants for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044. On September 30, 1964, the case was dismissed by the court for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the same being within the original jurisdiction of the City Court of Naga in accordance with Republic Act
No. 2613 (which took effect on August 1, 1959), in view of the amount involved.
Accordingly, on January 11, 1965, the PNB filed with the City Court of Naga a similar action for revival of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044.
The same was, however, on motion of the defendants, dismissed by the said court on August 18, 1966, on the ground that the action was
already barred by prescription, more than ten (10) years having elapsed from the date the judgment in Civil Case No. 1044 became final. The
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
The PNB appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur; but that court, finding that the judgment sought to be
revived became final and executory on February 26, 1951, or thirteen (13) years, ten (10) months and fifteen (15) days before the filing of the
case with the City Court of Naga, dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription, pursuant to Articles 1144 and 1152 of the Civil Code
which respectively provide:
ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Upon a judgment.
ART. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the PNB, but the same was denied.
Plaintiff-appellant has come directly to this Court urging the reversal of the dismissal order on the following legal grounds: (1) The complaint in
Civil Case No. 4953 — which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction — should at least be considered an extrajudicial demand under Article 1155
of the Civil Code, which interrupted the running of ten-year prescriptive period; consequently, deducting from the period arrived at by the
court below the period of four (4) years, three (3) months and two (2) days from the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 on June 28,
1960, to its dismissal on September 30, 1964, it would result that the present action had been instituted within the ten-year period provided in
Article 1144. (2) Assuming arguendo that the filing of the complaint did not interrupt prescription, still the present action should be considered
as seasonably instituted because the ten-year prescriptive period provided for in Article 1144 of the Civil Code commences to run only from
the expiration of the five (5) years within which a judgment may be executed by mere motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
inasmuch as Article 1150 of the Civil Code provides that the prescriptive period for all kinds of actions shall be counted
from the day they may be brought, and an action for revival of a judgment can only be brought after the lapse of five (5)
years from finality thereof.
348
Plaintiff-appellant's contention that the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 which, as stated above, was dismissed by the court a quo for want of
jurisdiction, should be considered a written extrajudicial demand which interrupted the statute of limitations, is unmeritorious. Article 1155 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a writer
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
In Philippine National Bank vs. Osete, et al., G.R. No. L-24997, July 18, 1968 (24 SCRA 63), this Court, in holding that Article
1155 of the Civil Code refers to actions to collect not based on a judgment sought to be revived, said:
Moreover, the lower court expressed the view that said 'Art. 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the tolling of the period
of prescription of the action to collect, not to the action to enforce' or revive — a "judgment". Understandably, either an
'extrajudicial demand' by the creditor or an 'acknowledgment of the debt' may interrupt the prescription of the action to
collect, not based upon a judgment, since the demand indicates that the creditor has not slept on his rights — and removes
the basis of the statute of limitations of actions — but, was vigilant in the enforcement thereof, whereas an
acknowledgment by the debtor provides a tangible evidence of the existence and validity of the debt. Who would,
however, make an "extrajudicial demand" for the payment of a judgment, when the same may be enforced by a writ of
execution? And, how could an acknowledgment or partial payment affect the rights of a creditor, when the same are
based, no longer upon his contract with the debtor or upon the law, but upon no less than a judicial decree, which is final
and executory?
The doctrine in the Osete case was reiterated in Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, G.R. No. L-22675,
March 28, 1969 (27 SCRA 766), where this Court added:
Even under the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a distinction was made between a debt based on contract and one
already confirmed by judgment insofar as the effect of acknowledgment was concerned. Under Section 43 thereof an
action upon a contract or upon a judgment prescribed in ten years; but under Section 50 the renovating effect of payment
or of a written acknowledgment of the debt is limited to the first kind of action, thus: "when payment has been made upon
any demand founded upon contract, or a written acknowledgment thereof or a promise to pay the same has been made
and signed by the party sought to be charged, an action may be brought thereon within the time herein limited, after such
payment, acknowledgment or promise."
The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that even if the complaint in Civil Case No. 4953 be considered a written
extrajudicial demand, it could not have interrupted the prescription of the action to revive the judgment in Civil Case No.
1044.
The other question raised by plaintiff-appellant was squarely ruled upon by this Court in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. De la Riva, 46 Phil. 827 (1923),
where it held that the ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from the date of finality of the judgment and not from the expiration of
five (5) years thereafter. Three reasons were there advanced, to wit: (1) Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which is similar to the last
sentence of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court) should be construed in relation to Section 43, No. 1, of the said Code (which is
similar to Article 1144 of the Civil Code); and as thus construed, "the conclusion one arrives at is that after the expiration of the five years
within which execution can be issued upon a judgment, the winning party can revive it only in the manner therein provided so long as the
period of ten years does not expire from the date of said judgment, according to section 43, No. 1, of the same Code." (2) The right of the
winning party to enforce the judgment against the defeated party "begins to exist the moment the judgment is final; and this right, according
to our Code of Procedure, consists in having an execution of the judgment issued during the first five years next following, and in commencing
after that period the proceeding provided in section 447 to revive it, and this latter remedy can be pursued only before the judgment
prescribes, that is to say, during the five years next following. It is so much an action to ask for an execution as it is to file a complaint for
reviving it, because, as we know by action is meant the legal demand of the right or rights one may have." (3) if it is held that the winning party
has still ten (10) years within which to revive the judgment after the expiration of five (5) years, then the judgment would not prescribe until
after fifteen (15) years, which is against No. 1 of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "[a]nd it cannot be said that such is the letter, and
much less, the intention of the law, for there is nothing in section 447 of the said Code, making this new period different from the one
prescribed in said section 43, No. 1, or reconciling these two provisions, there being no other way of reconciling them than to say that after the
expiration of the first five years next following the judgment, there remain to the victorious party only another five years to review it." The
doctrine in Gutierrez Hermanos has tacitly, yet consistently, been adhered to by this Court (Cf. Asociacion Cooperativa de Credito Agricola de
Miagao vs. Monteclaro, et al., 74 Phil. 281 (1943); PNB vs. Silo, G.R. No. L-3498, March 19, 1951; Ansaldo vs. Fidelity and Surety Co., G.R. No. L-
2378, April 27, 1951; Carrascozo vs. Fuentebella, G.R. No. L-5888, April 22, 1953; Miciano vs. Watiwat, et al., G.R. No. L-8769, November 21,
1957; Lazaro, et al. vs. Gomez, et al., G.R. Nos. L-12664-65, September 30, 1960; Potenciano vs. Gruenberg, et al., G.R. No. L-16956, February
27, 1962; PNB vs. Monroy, G.R. No. L-19374, June 30, 1964; PNB vs. Bondoc, G.R. No. L-20236, July 30, 1965); so that it is now settled that the
ten-year period within which an action for revival of a judgment should be brought, commences to run from the date of finality of the
judgment, and not from the expiration of the five-year period within which the judgment may be enforced by mere motion (Art. 1152, Civil
Code).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with treble costs against plaintiff-appellant.
349
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,
MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio T. Lacdan for defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved therein.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No. 20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization
Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly and severally plaintiff PRATRA the
sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the
amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to
plaintiff in this decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.,
interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed plaintiff of the said amount.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing
Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case
and judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63701 thereof, against the same defendants,
for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion and plaintiff's opposition
thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of
jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same
court, the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on
December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of
365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two
days too late.
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on March 20, 1969t certified the case to this
Court, upon the ground that the only question therein raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a
judgment is barred by the statute of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become
final." This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment — which was received by the defendants
herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from
December 21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years ...
it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964
being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from
December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965. The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.
350
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws,
by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of
computation. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following year is one year. If the extra
day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year
where it falls and, therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" — as the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil
Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "natural" month or
"solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently
promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the law,
it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by
name," in which case "they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was later, modified in the Philippines, by
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." 4 In the language
of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the
provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or
civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the
term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days."
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for failure to conform with ordinary experience
or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect, repealing an act of Congress. If public
interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by
judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
351
SECOND DIVISION
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI) and
ERNESTO SALAZAR, respondents.
Labaquis, Loyola & Angara Law Offices for petitioner.
Cecilio D. Ignacio for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari, with prayer for restraining order or preliminary injunction, filed by petitioner Filinvest Credit
Corporation seeking to annul the Orders issued by respondent Judge dated February 2, 1979 and April 4, 1979 in Civil Case No. 109900.
As shown by the records, the antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows:
On August 2, 1977, Filinvest Credit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as FILINVEST) filed a complaint in the lower court against defendants
Rallye Motor Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as RALLYE) and Emesto Salazar for the collection of a sum of money with damages and
preliminary writ of attachment. From the allegations of the complaint, 1 it appears that in payment of a motor vehicle described as: "One (1)
Unit MAZDA DIESEL SCHOOL BUS, Model: E4100, Serial No.: EXC43P-02356, Motor No.: Y-13676," Salazar executed a promissory note dated
May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE for the amount of P99,828.00. To secure the note, Salazar also executed in favor of RALLYE a deed of chattel
mortgage over the above described motor vehicle. On May 7, 1977, RALLYE, for valuable consideration, assigned all its rights, title and interest
to the aforementioned note and mortgage to FILINVEST. Thereafter, FILINVEST came to know that RALLYE had not delivered the motor vehicle
subject of the chattel mortgage to Salazar, "as the said vehicle (had) been the subject of a sales agreement between the codefendants."
Salazar defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of the aforesaid promissory note and chattel mortgage. RALLYE, as assignor who
guaranteed the validity of the obligation, also failed and refused to pay FILINVEST despite demand. According to FILINVEST, the defendants
intentionally, fraudulently and with malice concealed from it the fact that there was no vehicle delivered under the documents negotiated and
assigned to it, otherwise, it would not have accepted the negotiation and assignment of the rights and interest covered by the promissory note
and chattel mortgage. Praying for a writ of preliminary attachment, FILINVEST submitted with its complaint the affidavit of one Gil
Mananghaya, pertinent portions of which read thus:
That he is the Collection Manager, Automotive Division of Filinvest Credit Corporation;
That in the performance of his duties, he came to know of the account of Ernesto Salazar, which is covered by a Promissory
Note and secured by a Chattel Mortgage, which documents together with all the rights and interest thereto were assigned
by Rallye Motor Co., Inc.;
That for failure to pay a stipulated installment, and the fact that the principal debtor, Ernesto Salazar, and the assignor,
Rallye Motor Co., Inc. concealed the fact that there was really no motor vehicle mortgaged under the terms of the
Promissory Note and the Chattel Mortgage, the entire amount of the obligation stated in the Promissory Note becomes
due and demandable, which Ernesto Salazar and Rallye Motor Co., Inc. failed and refused to pay, so much so that a
sufficient cause of action really exists for Filinvest Credit Corporation to institute the corresponding complaint against said
person and entity;
That the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1, Rule 57 of his Rules of Court, particularly an action against parties
who have been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought;
That there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the
applicant Filinvest Credit Corporation is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims;
That this affidavit is executed for the purpose of securing a writ of attachment from the court. 2
The specific provision adverted to in the above Affidavit is Section 1(d) of Rule 57 which includes "an action against a party who has been guilty
of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for
the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is brought" as one of the cases in which a "plaintiff or any proper party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered."
352
Judge Jorge R. Coquia (now Justice of the Court of Appeals), then presiding Judge of the lower court, granted the prayer for a writ of
attachment in an Order dated August 17, 1977 stating that:
Finding the complaint sufficient in form and substance, and in view of the sworn statement of Gil Mananghaya, Collection
Manager of the plaintiff that defendants have committed fraud in securing the obligation and are now avoiding payment of
the same, let a writ of attachment issue upon the plaintiff's filing of a bond in the sum of P97,000.00.
In the meantime, let summons issue on the defendants. 3
More than a year later, in an Urgent Motion dated December 11, 1978, 4 defendant Salazar prayed that the writ of preliminary attachment
issued ex parte and implemented solely against his property be recalled and/or quashed. He argued that when he signed the promissory note
and chattel mortgage on May 5, 1977 in favor of RALLYE, FILINVEST was hot vet his creditor or obligee, therefore, he could not be said to have
committed fraud when he contracted the obligation on May 5, 1977. Salazar added that as the motor vehicle which was the object of the
chattel mortgage and the consideration for the promissory note had admittedly not been delivered to him by RALLYE, his repudiation of the
loan and mortgage is more justifiable.
FILINVEST filed an Opposition, but on February 2, 1979, the court a quo, this time presided over by herein respondent Judge, ordered the
dissolution and setting aside of the writ of preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977 and the return to defendant Salazar of all his
properties attached by the Sheriff by virtue of the said writ. In this Order, respondent Judge explained that:
When the incident was called for hearing, the Court announced that, as a matter of procedure, when a motion to quash a
writ of preliminary attachment is filed, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the truth of the allegations which were
the basis for the issuance of said writ. In this hearing, counsel for the plaintiff manifested that he was not going to present
evidence in support of the allegation of fraud. He maintained that it should be the defendant who should prove the truth
of his allegation in the motion to dissolve the said writ. The Court disagrees. 5
FILINVEST filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order, and was subsequently allowed to adduce evidence to prove that Salazar
committed fraud as alleged in the affidavit of Gil Mananghaya earlier quoted. This notwithstanding, respondent Judge denied the Motion in an
Order dated April 4, 1979 reasoning thus:
The plaintiff's evidence show that the defendant Rallye Motor assigned to the former defendant Salazar's promissory note
and chattel mortgage by virtue of which plaintiff discounted the note. Defendant Salazar refused to pay the plaintiff for the
reason that Rallye Motor has not delivered to Salazar the motor vehicle which he bought from Rallye. It is the position of
plaintiff that defendant Salazar was in conspiracy with Rallye Motor in defrauding plaintiff.
Ernesto Salazar, on his part complained that he was himself defrauded, because while he signed a promissory note and
chattel mortgage over the motor vehicle which he bought from Rallye Motor, Rallye Motor did not deliver to him the
personal property he bought; that the address and existence of Rallye Motor can no longer be found.
While it is true that the plaintiff may have been defrauded in this transaction, it having paid Rallye Motor the amount of
the promissory note, there is no evidence that Ernesto Salazar had connived or in any way conspired with Rallye Motor in
the assignment of the promissory note to the plaintiff, because of which the plaintiff paid Rallye Motor the amount of the
promissory note. Defendant Ernesto Salazar was himself a victim of fraud. Rallye Motor was the only party which
committed it. 6
From the above order denying reconsideration and ordering the sheriff to return to Salazar the personal property attached by virtue of the
writ of preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977, FILINVEST filed the instant Petition on April 19, 1979. On July 16, 1979, petitioner
FILINVEST also filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order 7 alleging, among others, that pending this certiorari proceeding in this court,
private respondent Salazar filed a Motion for Contempt of Court in the court below directed against FILINVEST and four other persons
allegedly for their failure to obey the Order of respondent Judge dated April 4, 1979, which Order is the subject of this Petition. On July 23,
1979, this Court issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge or any person or persons acting in his behalf from hearing
private respondent's motion for contempt in Civil Case No. 109900, entitled, 'Filinvest Credit Corporation, Plaintiff, versus The Rallye Motor
Co., Inc., et al., Defendants' of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI. " 8
Petitioner FILINVEST in its MEMORANDUM contends that respondent Judge erred:
(1) In dissolving the writ of preliminary attachment already enforced by the Sheriff of Manila without Salazar's posting a
counter-replevin bond as required by Rule 57, Section 12; and
(2) In finding that there was no fraud on the part of Salazar, despite evidence in abundance to show the fraud perpetrated
by Salazar at the very inception of the contract.
353
It is urged in petitioner's first assignment of error that the writ of preliminary attachment having been validly and properly issued by the lower
court on August 17, 1977, the same may only be dissolved, quashed or recalled by the posting of a counter-replevin bond under Section 12,
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:
Section 12. Discharge of Attachment upon, gluing counterbond.—At any time after an order of attachment has been
granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice
to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court, in which the action is pending, for
an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the
discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on
behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to the
value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. ...
Citing the above provision, petitioner contends that the court below should not have issued the Orders dated February 2, 1979 and April 4,
1979 for failure of private respondent Salazar to make a cash deposit or to file a counter-bond.
On the other hand, private respondent counters that the subject writ of preliminary attachment was improperly or irregularly issued in the
first place, in that it was issued ex parte without notice to him and without hearing.
We do not agree with the contention of private respondent. Nothing in the Rules of Court makes notice and hearing indispensable and
mandatory requisites for the issuance of a writ of attachment. The statement in the case of Blue Green Waters, Inc. vs. Hon. Sundiam and
Tan 9 cited by private respondent, to the effect that the order of attachment issued without notice to therein petitioner Blue Green Waters,
Inc. and without giving it a chance to prove that it was not fraudulently disposing of its properties is irregular, gives the wrong implication. As
clarified in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee in the same cited case, 10 a writ of attachment may be issued ex parte.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 57, merely require that an applicant for an order of attachment file an affidavit and a bond: the affidavit to be executed
by the applicant himself or some other person who personally knows the facts and to show that (1) there is a sufficient cause of action, (2) the
case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, (3) there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced, and (4) the
amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims; and the bond to be "executed
to the adverse party in an amount fixed by the judge, not exceeding the applicant's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally
adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
We agree, however, with private respondents contention that a writ of attachment may be discharged without the necessity of filing the cash
deposit or counter-bond required by Section 12, Rule 57, cited by petitioner. The following provision of the same Rule allows it:
Sec. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance.—The party whose property has been attached may
also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been
actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge
of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was
improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has been
attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in
addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge of the attachment if
it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not cured forthwith."(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provision grants an aggrieved party relief from baseless and unjustifiable attachments procured, among others, upon false
allegations, without having to file any cash deposit or counter-bond. In the instant case the order of attachment was granted upon the
allegation of petitioner, as plaintiff in the court below, that private respondent RALLYE, the defendants, had committed "fraud in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought," covered by Section i(d), Rule 57, earlier quoted. Subsequent to the
issuance of the attachment order on August 17, 1977, private respondent filed in the lower court an "Urgent Motion for the Recall and
Quashal of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment on (his property)" dated December 11, 1978 11 precisely upon the assertion that there was
"absolutely no fraud on (his) part" in contracting the obligation sued upon by petitioner. Private respondent was in effect claiming that
petitioner's allegation of fraud was false, that hence there was no ground for attachment, and that therefore the attachment order was
"improperly or irregularly issued." This Court was held that "(i)f the grounds upon which the attachment was issued were not true ..., the
defendant has his remedy by immediately presenting a motion for the dissolution of the same. 12 We find that private respondent's
abovementioned Urgent Motion was filed under option 13, Rule 57.
The last sentence of the said provision, however, indicates that a hearing must be conducted by the judge for the purpose of determining
whether or not there reality was a defect in the issuance of the attachment. The question is: At this hearing, on whom does the burden of
proof lie? Under the circumstances of the present case, We sustain the ruling of the court a quo in its questioned Order dated February 2,
1979 that it should be the plaintiff (attaching creditor), who should prove his allegation of fraud. This pronouncement finds support in the first
sentence of Section 1, Rule 131, which states that: "Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations." The last part of the same provision
also provides that: "The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side." It must be b•rne in
mind that in this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. FRAUS EST IdIOS ET NON PRAESUMENDA. 13 Indeed, private transactions are presumed
to have been fair and regular. 14 Likewise, written contracts such as the documents executed by the parties in the instant case, are presumed
to have been entered into for a sufficient consideration. 15
354
In a similar case of Villongco, et al., vs. Hon. Panlilio, et al., 16 a writ of preliminary attachment was issued ex parte in a case for damages on the
strength of the affidavit of therein petitioners to the effect that therein respondents had concealed, removed or disposed of their properties,
credits or accounts collectible to defraud their creditors. Subsequently, the lower court dissolved the writ of attachment. This was questioned
in a certiorari proceeding wherein this Court held, inter alia, that:
The affidavit supporting the petition for the issuance of the preliminary attachment may have been sufficient to justify the
issuance of the preliminary writ, but it cannot be considered as proof of the allegations contained in the affidavit. The
reason is obvious. The allegations are mere conclusions of law, not statement of facts. No acts of the defendants are ever
mentioned in the affidavit to show or prove the supposed concealment to defraud creditors. Said allegations are
affirmative allegations, which plaintiffs had the obligation to prove ... 17
It appears from the records that both herein private parties did in fact adduce evidence to support their respective claims. 18 Attached to the
instant Petition as its Annex "H" 19 is a Memorandum filed by herein petitioner FILINVEST in the court below on March 20, 1979. After private
respondent filed his Comment to the Petition, 20 petitioner filed a Reply 21,attaching another copy of the aforesaid Memorandum as Annex
"A" 22 In this case on February 28, 1979 and March 1, 1979, the plaintiff (FILINVEST) presented in evidence documentary exhibits "marked
Exhibit A, A- I, B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, C, C-1, D, E, F, G and G-1. The Memorandum goes on to state that FILINVEST presented as its witness
defendant Salazar himself who testified that he signed Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and G; that he is a holder of a master's degree in Business
Administration and is himself a very careful and prudent person; that he does not sign post-dated documents; that he does not sign contracts
which do not reflect the truth or which are irregular on their face, that he intended to purchase a school bus from Rallye Motors Co., Inc. from
whom he had already acquired one unit; that he had been dealing with Abel Sahagun, manager of RALLYE, whom he had known for a long time
that he intended to purchase the school bus on installment basis so he applied for financing with the FILINVEST; that he knew his application
was approved; that with his experience as a business executive, he knew that under a financing arrangement, upon approval of his application,
when he signed Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and G, the financing company (FILINVEST) would release the proceeds of the loan to RALLYE and that he
would be obligated to pay the installments to FILINVEST; that he signed Exhibits A, B and C simultaneously; that it was his wife who was always
transacting business with RALLYE and Abel Sahagun. 23
Without disputing the above summary of evidence, private respondent Salazar states in his Comment that "the same evidence proferred by
(petitioner's) counsel was adopted by (private respondent) Ernesto Salazar during the proceedings. 24
According to the court a quo in its assailed order of April 4, 1979, Emesto Salazar "was himself defrauded because while he signed the
promissory note and the chattel mortgage over the vehicle which he bought from Rallye Motors, RALLYE did not deliver to him the personal
property he bought." And since no fraud was committed by Salazar, the court accordingly ordered the sheriff to return to Salazar the
properties attached by virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment issued on August 17, 1977.
We do not agree. Considering the claim of respondent Salazar that Rallye Motors did not deliver the motor vehicle to him, it follows that the
Invoice, Exhibit "C", for the motor vehicle and the Receipt, Exhibit "G", for its delivery and both signed by Salazar, Exhibits "C-1 " and "G-1",
were fictitious. It also follows that the Promissory Note, Exhibit "A", to pay the price of the undelivered vehicle was without consideration and
therefore fake; the Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit "B", over the non-existent vehicle was likewise a fraud; the registration of the vehicle in the
name of Salazar was a falsity and the assignment of the promissory note by RALLYE with the conforme of respondent Salazar in favor of
petitioner over the undelivered motor vehicle was fraudulent and a falsification.
Respondent Salazar, knowing that no motor vehicle was delivered to him by RALLYE, executed and committed all the above acts as shown the
exhibits enumerated above. He agreed and consented to the assignment by RALLYE of the fictitious promissory note and the fraudulent chattel
mortgage, affixing his signature thereto, in favor of petitioner FILINVEST who, in the ordinary course of business, relied on the regularity and
validity of the transaction. Respondent had previously applied for financing assistance from petitioner FILINVEST as shown in Exhibits "E " and
"E-1 " and his application was approved, thus he negotiated for the acquisition of the motor vehicle in question from Rallye Motors. Since he
claimed that the motor vehicle was not delivered to him, then he was duty-bound to reveal that to FILINVEST, it being material in inducing the
latter to accept the assignment of the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. More than that, good faith as well as commercial usages or
customs require the disclosure of facts and circumstances which go into the very object and consideration of the contractual obligation. We
rule that the failure of respondent Salazar to disclose the material fact of non-delivery of the motor vehicle, there being a duty on his part to
reveal them, constitutes fraud. (Article 1339, New Civil Code).
We hold that the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in dissolving and setting aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued on
August 17, 1977.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed Orders of the lower court dated February 2, 1979 and April 4, 1979 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by Us on July 23, 1979 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Petition granted.
SO ORDERED.
355
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner, Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco, seeks a review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67489 dated August 27, 2003,
which denied her petition for annulment of judgment, and the Resolution2 dated December 15, 2003 which denied her motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as succinctly stated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch
manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank as evidenced by the following promissory notes:
Feb. 17, 1998 ₱ 65,000.00
Mar. 18, 1998 30,000.00
May 6, 1998 60,000.00
May 20, 1998 350,000.00
July 30, 1998 155,000.00
Sept. 8, 1998 40,000.00
Sept. 8, 1998 120,000.00
As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land
described in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-14423. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand on
September 28, 1999. The amount due as of September 30, 1999 had already reached ONE MILLION EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY
SIX AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,080,676.50).
The written demand, however, proved futile.
On February 22, 2000, respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at
Jofelmor Bldg., Mortola Street, Cagayan de Oro City.
Ernesto received the summons but for unknown reasons, he failed to file an answer. Hence, the spouses Biaco were declared in default upon
motion of the respondent bank. The respondent bank was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court who was
then appointed by the court as Commissioner.
Arturo Toring, the branch manager of the respondent bank, testified that the spouses Biaco had been obtaining loans from the bank since
1996 to 1998. The loans for the years 1996-1997 had already been paid by the spouses Biaco, leaving behind a balance of ₱1,260,304.33
representing the 1998 loans. The amount being claimed is inclusive of interests, penalties and service charges as agreed upon by the parties.
The appraisal value of the land subject of the mortgage is only ₱150,000.00 as reported by the Assessor’s Office.
356
Based on the report of the Commissioner, the respondent judge ordered as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants spouses ERNESTO R. BIACO and MA. THERESA [CHAVES] BIACO to pay plaintiff
bank within a period of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred (100) days from receipt of this decision the loan of ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS and THIRTY THREE CENTAVOS (₱1,260,304.33) plus litigation
expenses in the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (₱7,640.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY TWO THOUSAND THIRTY PESOS and FORTY THREE CENTAVOS (₱252,030.43) and cost of this suit.
In case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot, a parcel of registered
land (Lot 35802, Cad. 237 {Lot No. 12388-B, Csd-10-002342-D}), located at Gasi, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental and covered by TCT No. P-
14423 to satisfy the mortgage debt, and the surplus if there be any should be delivered to the defendants spouses ERNESTO and MA. THERESA
[CHAVES] BIACO. In the event however[,] that the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage[d] property is not enough to pay the
outstanding obligation, the defendants are ordered to pay any deficiency of the judgment as their personal liability.
SO ORDERED.
On July 12, 2000, the sheriff personally served the above-mentioned judgment to Ernesto Biaco at his office at Export and Industry Bank. The
spouses Biaco did not appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court. On October 13, 2000, the respondent bank filed an ex parte motion
for execution to direct the sheriff to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction. The respondent bank alleged that the order of the court requiring
the spouses Biaco to pay within a period of 90 days had passed, thus making it necessary to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction, as
previously mentioned in the order of the court. The motion for execution was granted by the trial court per Order dated October 20, 2000.
On October 31, 2000, the sheriff served a copy of the writ of execution to the spouses Biaco at their residence in #92 9th Street, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro City. The writ of execution was personally received by Ernesto. By virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial court, the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction in favor of the respondent bank in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱150,000.00).
The amount of the property sold at public auction being insufficient to cover the full amount of the obligation, the respondent bank filed an
"ex parte motion for judgment" praying for the issuance of a writ of execution against the other properties of the spouses Biaco for the full
settlement of the remaining obligation. Granting the motion, the court ordered that a writ of execution be issued against the spouses Biaco to
enforce and satisfy the judgment of the court for the balance of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SEVENTY FOUR PESOS AND SEVENTY CENTAVOS (₱1,369,974.70).
The sheriff executed two (2) notices of levy against properties registered under the name of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. However, the
notices of levy were denied registration because Ma. Teresa had already sold the two (2) properties to her daughters on April 11, 2001.3
Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the
judicial foreclosure proceedings. According to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6)
months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against her because the bank failed to verify the authenticity of her
signature on the real estate mortgage and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory notes. She
moreover asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any
explanation as to why personal service could not be made.
The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner in the dark about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the
failure of the sheriff to personally serve summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioner’s husband’s concealment of his knowledge of the
foreclosure proceedings. On the validity of the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are
actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over
the res. Noting that the spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the fraud committed by
one against the other cannot be considered extrinsic fraud.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, 4 asserting that even if the action is quasi in
rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband’s
office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that
such efforts failed. Petitioner contends that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated not so much by her husband, who did not inform her of the judicial
foreclosure proceedings, but by the sheriff who allegedly connived with her husband to just leave a copy of the summons intended for her at
the latter’s office.
Petitioner further argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her
person.
Respondent PCRB filed its Comment,5 essentially reiterating the appellate court’s ruling. Respondent avers that service of summons upon the
defendant is not necessary in actions quasi in rem it being sufficient that the court acquire jurisdiction over the res. As regards the alleged
conspiracy between petitioner’s husband and the sheriff, respondent counters that this is a new argument which cannot be raised for the first
time in the instant petition.
357
We required the parties to file their respective memoranda in the Resolution6 dated August 18, 2004. Accordingly, petitioner filed her
Memorandum7 dated October 10, 2004, while respondent filed its Memorandum for Respondent8dated September 9, 2004.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) provide that judgments may be annulled only
on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.9
Petitioner asserts that extrinsic fraud consisted in her husband’s concealment of the loans which he obtained from respondent PCRB; the filing
of the complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage; service of summons; rendition of judgment by default; and all other proceedings which
took place until the writ of garnishment was served. 10
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party.11 Extrinsic fraud
is present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and
connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.12
With these considerations, the appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no fraud perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner,
noting that the spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance concealed by the
husband from the wife cannot be attributed to respondent bank.
Moreover, petitioner’s allegation that her signature on the promissory notes was forged does not evince extrinsic fraud. It is well-settled that
the use of forged instruments during trial is not extrinsic fraud because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the
proceedings.13
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or
quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. 14
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power
of the court is recognized and made effective.15
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.16
A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as
provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over
the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being
sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
There is a dimension to this case though that needs to be delved into. Petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons. Instead,
summons was served to her through her husband at his office without any explanation as to why the particular surrogate service was resorted
to. The Sheriff’s Return of Service dated March 21, 2000 states:
xxxx
That on March 16, 2000, the undersigned served the copies of Summons, complaint and its annexes to the defendants Sps. Ernesto R. & Ma.
Teresa Ch. Biaco thru Ernesto R. Biaco[,] defendant of the above-entitled case at his office EXPORT & INDUSTRY BANK, Jofelmore Bldg.[,]
Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City and he acknowledged receipt thereof as evidenced with his signature appearing on the original copy of the
Summons.17 [Emphasis supplied]
358
Without ruling on petitioner’s allegation that her husband and the sheriff connived to prevent summons from being served upon her
personally, we can see that petitioner was denied due process and was not able to participate in the judicial foreclosure proceedings as a
consequence. The violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process arising from want of valid service of summons on her warrants
the annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
There is more, the trial court granted respondent PCRB’s ex-parte motion for deficiency judgment and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution against the spouses Biaco to satisfy the remaining balance of the award. In short, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over
the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco. This cannot be countenanced.1awphil.net
In Sahagun v. Court of Appeals,18 suit was brought against a non-resident defendant, Abelardo Sahagun, and a writ of attachment was issued
and subsequently levied on a house and lot registered in his name. Claiming ownership of the house, his wife, Carmelita Sahagun, filed a
motion to intervene. For failure of plaintiff to serve summons extraterritorially upon Abelardo, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publication upon Abelardo. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff
later filed an amended complaint against Abelardo, this time impleading Carmelita and Rallye as additional defendants. Summons was served
on Abelardo through publication in the Manila Evening Post. Abelardo failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Carmelita went on
certiorari to the Court of Appeals assailing as grave abuse of discretion the declaration of default of Abelardo. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition and denied reconsideration.
In her petition with this Court, Carmelita raised the issue of whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her husband, a non-resident
defendant, by the publication of summons in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Court sustained the correctness of
extrajudicial service of summons by publication in such newspaper.
The Court explained, citing El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca,19 that foreclosure and attachment proceedings are both actions quasi in
rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the (non-resident) defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident defendant
who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property belonging to
him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity
to defend in the action, should he be so minded.
Significantly, the Court went on to rule, citing De Midgely v. Ferandos, et. al.20 and Perkins v. Dizon, et al.21 that in a proceeding in rem or quasi
in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid
service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.
Similarly, in this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It
cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s personal liability. In doing so without first having
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the
annulment of the judgment rendered in the case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 27, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67489 are SET ASIDE. The Judgment dated July 11, 2000 and Order dated February 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20, are likewise SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
359
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141849 February 13, 2007
ISABEL JAEL MARQUEZ, CELIA M. IDEA, LUISITA M. ECLAVEA, MELVIRA M. VILLASANTE, RUEL MARQUEZ, ZAIDA M. SARACENA, and ELOISA
M. PENAMORA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PRESIDING JUDGE (HON. ISMAEL B. SANCHEZ), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City; THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF RTCs of Lucena City; THE
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP); and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 5, 1998 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 29904, which affirmed the October 29, 1992 and December 23, 1992 Orders of the Lucena City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 58; and its January 31, 2000 Resolution3 denying Marquez’s Motion for Reconsideration. It raises the core issue of the
propriety of the denial by respondent former Lucena City RTC Presiding Judge Ludivico C. Lopez of Marquez’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 92-150 entitled Marcial M. Marquez v. The Development Bank of the Philippines and the Provincial Sheriff of
Quezon Province for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order.
The Facts
Marcial M. Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena Entrepreneur and Agri-Industrial Development Corporation (LEAD), which was
incorporated on November 26, 1975 primarily to venture into and engage in commercial deep-sea or "purse seine" fishing. LEAD’s principals
were graduates of the Development Bank of the Philippines’ (DBP’s) Entrepreneurship Development Program.
To carry out its objectives, LEAD needed capital for the construction of a fishing vessel and the procurement of the required equipment and
other accessories. It applied for a loan with respondent DBP, which, on November 9, 1977, granted LEAD an agricultural loan of PhP
2,105,000.00 that would cover the construction and procurement of the fishing vessel and the required equipment,4 subject to the required
level of capitalization or equity ratio by LEAD’s principals.5
Moreover, DBP required that the principals, including Marquez, be held jointly and severally liable with borrower-corporation DEAL.6 To secure
the loan, some of the principals of LEAD, namely, Mr. and Mrs. Venuso Bibit and Mr. and Mrs. Eduardo Murallon, entered into a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) of two (2) properties with DBP, particularly those covered by TCT Nos. T-136995 and T-140765 with areas of 6,859 square
meters and 7,222 square meters, respectively.7
To protect itself from manipulated and/or overpriced contract, the construction of the fishing vessel and the procurement and installation of
the equipment and other accessories were subjected to DBP’s local competitive bidding in consonance with its standing
policies.8 Consequently, Trigon Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation (Trigon), based in Cebu City, won the bid and was duly approved by
DBP.9 Thus, the corresponding Boat-building Contract10 was executed by and between LEAD and Trigon on June 2, 1978, which stipulated, inter
alia, that Trigon would complete the work within 150 calendar days from the perfection of the contract and, as consideration, LEAD would pay
Trigon PhP 1,955,000.00.11
However, there were some problems encountered in the implementation of the loan. First, some scheduled releases of the loan were withheld
by DBP as the capitalization or equity ratio of the principals of LEAD was not complied with. Second, there were defects in the construction of
the fishing vessel which required compliance by Trigon before any subsequent releases of the loan could be made. These contretemps delayed
the construction of the fishing vessel for over two (2) years, yet the fishing vessel was only 77.14% complete by then. Third, the delay
aggravated the situation for the boat construction was overtaken by increases in costs of materials and machinery. Thus, the project could not
be completed at the original cost stipulated in the boat construction contract.
After threshing out the problem through a tripartite conference between LEAD, Trigon, and DBP, it was agreed that LEAD would get the fishing
vessel at its present state and LEAD would complete the construction and installation of the equipment and accessories, for which DBP would
grant LEAD an additional loan of PhP 714,600.00.12 The additional loan was granted on July 29, 1981 and was consolidated with the first loan.
To secure the additional loan, an additional REM, a second mortgage, was undertaken by Marquez and his wife on their property covered by
TCT No. T-24506 with an area of 3,315 square meters.13 The loan was fully released on February 8, 1982. In short, the fishing vessel christened
"F/B LEAD 1" was completed and launched; and because a chattel mortgage was constituted on the fishing vessel, together with the
machineries and equipment on it, to secure the loan with DBP, it was insured with the GSIS Property Insurance Fund in favor of DBP and/or
LEAD.
360
Meanwhile, shortly after the additional loan was fully released to LEAD, on September 3, 1982, DBP informed LEAD of the arrearage of PhP
906,887.58 of its outstanding loan and to remit PhP 363,022.01 for the loan’s interest. When LEAD was not able to pay, DBP formed a
collection committee; however, the conferences with LEAD principals yielded negative results.
Subsequently, on the nights of June 21-22, 1985, disaster struck F/B LEAD 1 as it sank off the coast of Unisan, Quezon at the height of a
typhoon. Upon receiving notice of such event, DBP filed an insurance claim with the GSIS, which covered the fishing vessel for the period 1985-
1986, and collected the proceeds of PhP 1,186,145.00 which DBP applied to the loan account of LEAD on December 9, 1986.
For having defaulted on its contractual obligations, on July 21, 1992, DBP demanded LEAD and its principals to settle their outstanding loan
obligation, with warning that non-settlement would compel DBP to institute the necessary legal action to protect its interest, including
appropriate actions to foreclose the mortgaged properties. With the inaction of LEAD and its principals, on August 25, 1992, DBP was
compelled to file with the Clerk of Court of the Quezon RTC an application for foreclosure sale of the REMs constituted to secure its loan with
DBP.
On September 3, 1992, the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Quezon issued a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale on October 6, 1992 of the following
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-136995, T-140765, and T-24506 to satisfy the mortgaged indebtedness of PhP 4,595,450.00.14 The spouses
Bibit and spouses Murallon did not contest the scheduled sale.
Marquez, however, on October 5, 1992, instituted the instant action for Damages, Cancellation of Mortgage and Certiorari with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order before the Lucena City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-150, to
forestall the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property covered by TCT No. T-24506.15 In gist, Marquez alleged that LEAD’s involvement in
purse seine fishing was premised substantially on a "partnership" with DBP and not that of a simple debtor–creditor relationship; that the loan
contracts and REM constituted for them were legally impaired, bereft of consideration, and did not reflect the true and proper relationship
between LEAD and DBP; that DBP was liable for breach of agreement when it failed to deliver a seaworthy and well-equipped fishing vessel;
that DBP reneged on its commitment to render technical expertise on purse seine fishing when needed most; that LEAD was prejudiced by
DBP’s bureaucracy and the controversy with its commissioned boat-builder, Trigon; that having collected the insurance proceeds from GSIS
after the sinking of the fishing vessel, it had extinguished whatever obligations LEAD had with DBP; and that DBP refused in bad faith to render
an updated accounting or allow Marquez to scrutinize the loan account.
On October 6, 1992, the scheduled day for the extra-judicial sale, respondent Presiding Judge issued an Order16granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and set
the hearing on October 14, 1992 for said action.
On October 14, 1992, respondent judge heard Marquez and DBP on the propriety of issuing the injunctive writ. Parenthetically, on October 16,
1992, DBP filed its Answer17 with counterclaims against Marquez. On October 29, 1992, respondent Judge issued the first assailed
Order18 denying Marquez’s prayed for injunctive writ, to which he filed his Motion for Reconsideration.19 On December 2, 1992, Marquez filed
an Urgent Motion to Restrain20 the extra-judicial foreclosure sale scheduled on December 28, 1992. Earlier, after the order of denial was
issued on October 29, 1992, DBP applied for an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the property covered by TCT No. T-24506, which was granted
through the Notice of Extra-judicial Sale21 issued on November 24, 1992 by respondent provincial sheriff.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1992, respondent Judge issued the second assailed Order22 denying Marquez’s Motion for Reconsideration
and Urgent Motion to Restrain. Consequently, on December 28, 1992, as scheduled, Marquez’s property covered by TCT No. T-24506 was sold
to DBP as the highest bidder.23
However, the certificate of sale was not issued as Marquez was granted a TRO24 by the CA through a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, where he assailed the Orders denying the issuance of a preliminary injunction. After DBP filed its Comment26 on April 23,
1993, the CA rendered the assailed Decision27 on November 5, 1998 affirming the RTC Orders. Marquez’s Motion for Reconsideration28 of said
Decision was however denied on January 31, 2000.29
The appellate court held that P.D. 385 applied in the instant case and found neither manifest abuse committed by the trial court nor any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the issuance of the injunctive writ.
Unfortunately, Marcial M. Marquez died on January 24, 1995.30 He was then substituted by his heirs on January 20, 1999.31
The Issues
In the instant petition for review filed by the heirs of Marcial M. Marquez, the crucial issue to be dealt with in this petition is whether the trial
court's refusal to grant an injunction against the threatened extra-judicial foreclosure sale by DBP constitutes grave abuse of judicial discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
361
In support of the instant petition, petitioners raise the issues of applicability of P.D. 385, denial of due process, and the extent of the loan
covered by the REM constituted on petitioners’ realty under TCT No. T-24506.
However, the petition lacks merit.
Requisites for issuance of injunctive writ
The writ of preliminary injunction is issued to
prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and
unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant. 32
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the
following grounds are established, thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
Prescinding from the provisions mentioned above, we have consistently held that the requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory
or prohibitory are the following:
(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.33
Requisites for injunctive writ not present
We have reviewed the records and the pleadings of the parties and found that, as contended by respondent DBP, Marquez and petitioners
failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the trial court did not commit any
manifest abuse nor gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the writ of preliminary injunction as well
as Marquez’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Issuance of injunctive writ on sound discretion of the trial court
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the
existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on
the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. 34 Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in
the exercise of such discretion.35 It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands
it.36 The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the
case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.37
In the instant case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that Marquez was not entitled to the injunctive writ. Verily, the trial
court has exercised its sound discretion in denying the writ. The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court in injunctive matters
should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.38Indeed, a scrutiny of the records fails to show any manifest abuse committed
by respondent Presiding Judge.
Main Issue: Applicability of P.D. 385
362
P.D. 385 is clearly applicable in the instant case. The trial and appellate courts’ primary basis for denying the injunction sought by Marquez was
P.D. 385, which makes it mandatory for government financial institutions x x x to foreclose the collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit,
accommodation and/or guarantees granted by them whenever their arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other charges,
amount to at least twenty percent (20%) of the total outstanding obligations, including interests and other charges, as appearing in the books
of account and/or related records of the financial institution concerned.39
Pursuant to the aforesaid law:
Sec. 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any
action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof whether such restraining order,
temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is
established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding
arrearages had been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings x x x (emphasis supplied).
A close examination of the attendant factual milieu of the instant case shows that it is an undisputed fact that LEAD loaned from DBP PhP
2.105 million and PhP 714,600.00. It is also undisputed that the spouses Marquez were constituted jointly and severally liable in their personal
capacity with LEAD as regards the loan obligation. And, for the additional loan of PhP 714,600.00, the Marquez spouses entered into a second
mortgage (REM) of their property covered by TCT No. T-24506. As of September 3, 1992, the loan balance with the arrearages amounted to
PhP 4,595,450.00 despite the previous application of PhP 1,186,145.00 insurance proceeds from the GSIS. The account clearly reveals that
LEAD was in arrears in the payment of the loans. As a consequence, the agreed 14% per annum interest had to be imposed. Absent any
showing by petitioners that LEAD had complied with the required 20% payment of the arrearages, P.D. 385 must be obeyed.
Petitioners rely on Filipinas Marble Corporation (FMC) v. Court of Appeals40 to bolster their position that the trial court committed manifest
abuse and gravely abused its discretion in denying the issuance of the prayed for injunctive writ.
We are not convinced.
The FMC case is not on all fours with the instant case. FMC had a $5 million loan with DBP conditioned on its entering into a three (3)-year
management contract with Bancom Systems Control, Inc. (Bancom), whose key officers shall be appointed only with DBP's approval and made
directly responsible to DBP. In a complaint for annulment of the deeds of mortgage and deed of assignment in favor of DBP, FMC averred
failure of consideration as regards the execution of the deeds and that DBP and Bancom mismanaged and misspent the loan.
We ruled that we cannot make any conclusions on whether DBP and Bancom actually misappropriated and misspent the $5 Million loan as this
should properly be litigated in the main action; thus, pending the outcome of such litigation, P.D. 396 cannot automatically be applied for if it
is really proven that respondent DBP was responsible for the misappropriation of the loan, even if only in part, then the foreclosure of the
petitioners' properties under the provisions of P.D. 385 to satisfy the whole amount of the loan would be a gross mistake and would unduly
prejudice FMC. It is only after trial on the merits can the true amount of the loan which was applied wisely or not, for the benefit of the
petitioner, be determined. And consequently, the foreclosure proceedings under P.D. 385 will have to await the determination of the trial on
the merits. Thus, since the issue of misappropriation of the proceeds of the loan was still being litigated, the liability of FMC for the loan which
was the basis of the mortgage being foreclosed was not yet settled; hence, the Court granted an injunction against the foreclosure sale.
In the instant case, the factual antecedents of FMC could hardly find parallelism with the factual milieu of LEAD. While it is true that DBP
released most of the 2.105 million loan to Trigon, nonetheless, it was LEAD which dealt and entered the contract with Trigon and the boat-
building contract duly signed by LEAD principal, Bibit. Moreover, while petitioners questioned the outstanding amount of the mortgage loan,
nevertheless, given the undisputed loans extended to LEAD and the 14% per annum interest stipulated in the loan contracts, the outstanding
amount could hardly be contested given the undisputed delinquency of LEAD. Besides, unlike in FMC, the instant case does not involve the
issues of a management contract and misappropriation of the proceeds of the loan.
It is our ruling in FMC that:
P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of government lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation,
lead that corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who, after ruining it, use the mandatory
provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their misdeeds.
The designated officers of the government financing institution cannot simply walk away and then state that since the loans were obtained in
the corporation’s name, then P.D. 385 must be peremptorily applied and that there is no way the borrower corporation can prevent the
automatic foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties once the arrearages reach twenty percent (20%) of the total obligation no matter who
was responsible.41
This ruling could hardly find application in the instant case. Thus, we now hold that P.D. 385, proscribing the issuance of an injunctive writ,
applies. More so, during the hearing for the issuance of the injunctive writ, Marquez and petitioners had not shown that 20% of the arrearages
of the mortgage loan had been duly paid.
Petitioners failed to show a right in esse to be protected

363
We uphold the trial court and CA in their finding that Marquez had not shown a right in esse to be protected. Indeed, the applicant’s right must
be clear or unmistakable, that is, that the right is actual, clear and positive especially calling for judicial protection.42 Thus, an injunction will
not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
While not preempting the disposition of the main case, a close review of the records at hand would show that the loan and the REM seem to
be above scrutiny. Respondent DBP had shown documentary evidence of how the assailed transactions transpired, and how and why Marquez
and other LEAD principals signed and agreed to be solidarily liable for LEAD’s loans as well as their voluntary mortgage of their properties to
secure said loans.
We need to stress that the original loan was granted in 1977 while the additional loan was granted in 1981. Marquez signed as solidarily liable
for both loans but constituted a REM of his property (TCT No. T-24506), on second mortgage, only for the additional loan. It cannot be gainsaid
by the foregoing facts that there was bad faith or malice in DBP’s part in granting the loan, much less were there circumstances shown that
Marquez and the other LEAD principals were compelled to enter into said contracts. Indeed, the acknowledgements in front of a notary public
of the loan and REM contracts show the dealings between the parties to be apparently at arms length. Be that as it may, if indeed there were
defects and lack of consideration in the contracts, Marquez was in delay in pursuing an action to defend his rights until the time that the
foreclosure sale was already well nigh imminent.1awphi1.net
Application for injunctive relief construed strictly
The allegations in Marquez’s complaint did not clearly make out his entitlement to the injunctive relief prayed for. The rule requires that in
order for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the
requisites.43 It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader. 44 As previously discussed,
the trial court and the CA were not convinced, based on the pleadings and the evidence presented in the hearing for the issuance of the
injunctive writ, that petitioners demonstrated a strong basis for the grant of the injunctive writ. The allegations of the complaint on the
defense that the agreement was that of a partnership is at war with the loan and mortgage documents they signed. Apparently, in resolving
the prayer for injunction, the courts a quo relied more on these documents than the bare averments of petitioners on the alleged partnership.
Second Issue: No Denial of Due Process
We find no denial of due process as alleged by petitioners. They contend that Marquez was denied his day in court as regards the hearing for
the issuance of the injunctive writ on October 14, 1992. A close scrutiny of the records, specifically the excerpt of the transcript45 of the
October 14, 1992 hearing, shows otherwise. In that hearing, the trial court properly ruled to dispense with the testimony of Marquez as it
already involved the merit of the case. Besides, the points that Marquez wanted to testify on were included in the verified complaint to prove
that the relationship between LEAD and DBP was not that of a mere debtor–creditor but a form of partnership. This issue has already been
tackled, but we will resolve the main case which cannot be done in a hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that is a mere
ancillary remedy.
Due process is served when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard for the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in
their favor.46 In the instant case, Marquez was present at the October 14, 1992 hearing and was able to argue his case for the issuance of the
injunctive writ. Thus, he cannot claim that respondent judge denied him due process. Verily, the trial court must not delve into the primary
issues raised in the main action in the hearing for the issuance of an injunctive writ. The grant of an injunctive writ, being an ancillary remedy,
which could result in a premature resolution of the case—or will grant the principal objectives of the parties—before the merits can be passed
upon, is proscribed, and the prayer for the relief will be properly denied,47 as in the instant case. Indeed, the evidence required for the trial
court to consider during the hearing was only a sample and intended merely to give it an idea of the justification for the injunctive writ
pending decision of the case on the merits, which must rest on solid grounds.48 As it is, Marquez had been given ample opportunity to present
evidence to support his prayer for the injunctive writ and was therefore not denied due process.
Third Issue: Mortgage of Family Home
The issue of the property being a family home and not a corporate property veers away from the clear contractual agreement of the REM.
Undeniably, the subject REM was a second mortgage as Marquez already mortgaged his property (TCT No. T-24506) to another bank. Besides,
it bears stressing that the Marquez spouses were solidarily liable with LEAD for the loans. Thus, respondent DBP could have even gone after
the other properties of the Marquez couple given such solidary liability for the outstanding loan with DBP. DBP has reasonably and properly
exercised its right to have the property covered by TCT No. T-24506 subjected to an extra-judicial foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE, we DENY this petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the assailed CA Decision and Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
364
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, JOSE B. LAUREL, MARCELO B. FERNAN, CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA, EDMUNDO B. CEA, ANTONIO CUENCO, HOMOBONO
ADAZA, CIRIACO ALFELOR, ROLANDO ANDAYA, HONORATO AQUINO, JOSE ATIENZA, JR., NATALIO BELTRAN, JR., CESAR V. BOLANOS,
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, FERRER MIN A. CARAM, NENITA C. DALUZ, ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, EMILIO N. DELA PAZ, HILARIO DE PEDRO, DEMETRIO
G. DEMETRIA, MANUEL C. DOMINGO, CARLOS C. FERNANDEZ, JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, JAIME N. FERRER, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROGELIO
GARCIA, ROLLEO L. IGNACIO, EVA ESTRADA KALAW, RAFAEL L. LAZATIN, EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PEDRO M.
MARCELLANA, JR., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO C. MARTINEZ, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, ROGACIANO M.
MERCADO, RAMON V. MITRA, JR., JUANITA L. NEPOMUCENO, ROY B. PADILLA, HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GONZALO G. PUYAT, II, HIALMAR P.
QUINTANA, ISIDRO E. REAL, JR., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, VIRGILIO P. ROBLES, AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, OSCAR F. SANTOS, FRANCISCO S.
SUMULONG, EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR E. YÑIGUEZ, MANUEL M. GARCIA, GUARDSON R. LOOD, RENATO L. CAYETANO, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, DAMIAN V. ALDABA,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ADELINO B. SITOY, LEONARDO PEREZ, ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS, SALACNIB F. BATERINA, LUIS S. ETCUBAÑEZ,
CONCORDIO C. DIEL, REGALADO E. MAAMBONG, TEODULO C. NATIVIDAD, MACACUNA DIMAPORO, SALVADOR B. BRITANICO and
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
Napoleon J. Poblador for respondent R. Cayetano.
PATAJO, J.:
Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives
and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.
Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan, filed with the Batasan on August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644
calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were
referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient
in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved Resolution No. 644 and dismissed all the charges contained in the
complaint attached thereto on August 14, 1985. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the
verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.
On September 7, 1985, the present petition was filed with this Court. In said petition, petitioners pray that after hearing this Court declare
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules on Impeachment which was approved by the Batasan on August 16, 1984 by a vote of 114 in favor
and 58 against, unconstitutional, and Committee Report No. 154 of the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
dismissing Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment attached thereto, null and void. They also pray that this Court issue a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining respondents from enforcing and questioned provisions of the aforementioned Rules and a Writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the
archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment in order that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the
Batasan as a body.
In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of good standing of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the resolution of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, the very same resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing the complaint for the
impeachment of the President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on
Justice and the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint for impeachment. In denying due course to said
petition and dismissing outright the same, We held:
1. The l973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. The
action of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the complaint for the impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing
said petition for being insufficient in form and substance involves a political question not cognizable by the Courts. The dismissal of said
petition is within the ambit of the powers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provision of Sec. 2, Article XIII of the Constitution and it
is not within the competence of this Court to inquire whether in the exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely. There is no allegation in
the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its powers the Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution. The fact that the
Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same day it was filed after deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the
newspapers, radio and television (which must have been the basis of petitioners' claim that the Committee had acted with undue haste in
unceremoniously dismissing the complaint for impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding that there had been a violation of any
provision of the Constitution which would justify the Court's intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms and conduct.
365
Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its Members and that no official shall be
convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the Constitution says no more. It does not lay down the
procedure to be followed in impeachment proceedings. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment
proceedings, which it had already done, The interpretation and application of said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The
powers of the Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form and substance
are discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.
2. The doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973 Constitution though in a modified form made necessary because of the
adoption of certain aspects of the parliamentary system in the amended 1973 Constitution. The major powers of the Government have been
distributed by the Constitution to the President, who is the head of the State and chief executive of the Republic, the Batasan Pambansa and
the Judiciary. Under the doctrine of separation of Powers as interpreted by the decisions of the Court, mandamus will not he from one branch
of the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. More specifically, this
Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give due course to the complaint for impeachment. 1
We did not dismiss outright the present petition as We did G.R. No. L-71688 but required respondents to comment thereto in view of the claim
of petitioners that the provisions of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more specifically Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to
which the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had dismissed Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for the
impeachment attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying thereby that the Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of
powers vested upon it by the Constitution, transgressed or violated the Constitution, certainly a justiciable question.
The provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment claimed by petitioners to be violative of the Constitution are the following:
SEC. 4. Notice to Complainant and Respondent.— Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government shall
determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. if it finds that the complaint is not sufficient in form and substance, it
shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder. If it finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall
furnish the respondent with copy of the resolution and verified complaint with advise that he may answer the complaint within fifteen (15)
days from notice. The answer may include affirmative defenses. With leave of the Committee, the complainant may file a reply and the
respondent, a rejoinder.
SEC. 5. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. —After receipt of pleadings provided for in Section 4, or the expiration of the time within
which they maybe filed, the Committee shall determine whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist. If it finds that sufficient grounds for
impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report requited hereunder. If the Committee finds that
sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall require the parties to support their respective allegations by the submission of
affidavits and counter- affidavits, including duly authenticated documents as may appear relevant. The Committee may, however, require that
instead of affidavits and counter-affidavits, oral testimony shall be given. It may at all events examine and allow cross- examination of the
parties and their witnesses.
After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for
resolution.
SEC. 6. Report and Recommendations. —The Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government shall submit it a
report of the Batasan containing its findings and recommendations within thirty (30) session days from submission of the
case for resolution.
If the Committee finds by a vote of majority of all its members that probable cause has been established it shall submit with its report a
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee.
If the Committee finds that probable cause has not been established, the complaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 9 of these Rules.
SEC. 8. Vote Required for Trial.—A majority vote of all the members of the Batasan is necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth
the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then be set for trial on the merits by the Batasan. On
the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, the same shall result in the dismissal of the complaint for
impeachment.
It is petitioners' contention that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I I of the 1973 Constitution,
without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body
to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisitive 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said
questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach
or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.
Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition
precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the
members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not
366
required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed.
It is the contention of the respondents Speaker Nicanor Yniguez and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa that
the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises
questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without
admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body
sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court
cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
Respondent Renato L. Cayetano on the other hand contends that (1) the question involved is purely political; (2) the petitioners are not proper
parties; (3) the petition is in reality a request for an advisory opinion made in the absence of an actual case or controversy; (4) prohibition and
mandamus are not proper remedies, and (5) preliminary mandatory injunction is not proper; while respondent Salacnib P. Baterina contends
that the petitioners lack standing to sue and impeachment is a power lodged exclusively in the Batasan.
A closer look at the substance than the form of the petition would reveal that resolution of the constitutionality of the questioned provisions
of the Rules is not even necessary, What petitioners are really seeking is for this Court to compel the Batasan to proceed with the hearing on
the impeachment of the President since more than one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan had filed a resolution for the impeachment of
the President and the Batasan as a body is bound under the Constitution to conduct said trial and render judgment only after said trial and
that the Committee on Justice has no authority to dismiss the complaint for impeachment on the ground that it is not sufficient in form and
substance. Petitioners, therefore, ask that this Court order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the
Archives the Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment "in order that the impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the
Batasan as a body. (Prayer of the Petition, subpar, (ii) of Par, 2).
The question squarely presented before this Court is therefore: Has this Court jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? Can this court, assuming
said resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained
in said resolution and complaint for impeachment?
What is important to note is that when the Batasan denied the motion of MP Ramon Mitra for the recall from the Archives of Resolution No.
644 and the complaint for impeachment, it had in effect confirmed the action of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government dismissing said resolution and complaint on impeachment. That the Batasan by even a majority vote can dismiss a complaint for
impeachment cannot be seriously disputed. Since the Constitution expressly provides that "no official shall be convicted without the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all its members," a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government disapproving the resolution calling for the impeachment of the President and
dismissing all the charges contained in the complaint attached thereto, makes mathematically impossible the required at least two-thirds vote
of all members of the Batasan to support a judgment of conviction. What purpose would be served by proceeding further when it is already
obvious that the required two-thirds vote for conviction cannot be obtained? Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in
order.
A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP
Mitra's motion to recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what
authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the
Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the
Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by
petitioners.
The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, not the Batasan itself, which shall
be commanded by this Court to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment is of no moment. Aside
from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or
rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said
Committee is in no position to comply with any murder from this Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would
actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. Such in effect was the ruling in Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil. 83, where this Court said:
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the
Philippine Senate, yet we would be justified in having our mandate run not against the Philippine Senate or against the President of the
Philippine Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, the disbursing officer of the Senate. But this begs the
question. If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees
acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate
who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, we might have the spectacle presented of the court
ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate
ordering them to do another thing. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is
directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich. 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.) (On page 94).
See also Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612, 636, where the Court said:
367
. . . While it has been decided in many cases that the courts will not interfere with the legislative department of the government in the
performance of its duties, does that rule apply to the committees duly appointed by the legislative department of the government and its
officers? The powers and duties conferred upon said committee by the Legislature granting the legality of the object and purpose of said
committee, and granting that the Legislature itself had the power to do and to perform the duties imposed upon said committee, then an
interference by the courts with the performance of those duties by it would be tantamount to interfering with the workings and operations of
the legislative branch of the government itself. An interference by the judicial department of the government with the workings and
operations of the committee of the legislative department would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the
legislative department itself. And, again, we are called upon to say, that one branch of the government cannot encroach upon the domain of
another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree, on a strict observance of this salutary rule. (Sinking Fund
Cases, 99 U.S., 700, 718; Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U.S., 361, 37 1; Wise vs. Bigger, 79 Va., 269).
Moreover, while in their petition petitioners merely asked for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding the Batasan
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out subject resolution and verified
complaint for the impeachment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos," their ultimate objective is to have the Batasan as a body proceed with the
impeachment trial. Recall of the resolution and complaint for impeachment would be meaningless unless the Batasan can also be compelled to
conduct the impeachment trial.
For this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, would be but an empty and
meaningless gesture unless it would also order the Batasan to proceed to try the impeachment proceedings. This, of course, the Court cannot
do. Quoting Judge Cooley in Sutherland us. Governor of Michigan 29 Mich. 320:
. . . in a case where jurisdiction is involved, no doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to pronounce
judgments which may be disregarded with impunity. . .
The admonition of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra is of much relevance:
. . . But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It
should not be awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous
consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or
which might be disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any possible collision
between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of a coordinate department, or
between the Court and the Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature. (On page 95).
In any event, We find no basis for the contention of petitioners that Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are
violative of the provisions of the Constitution on Impeachment. As We said in Arturo de Castro vs. Committee on Justice, et at (G.R. No. L-
71688), "beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least one-fifth of all its members and that no official shall be
convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the Constitution says no more." The Batasan pursuant to
its power to adopt rules of its proceedings (Article VIII, Sec. 8[31, may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of procedure to govern
impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing for dismissal of a complaint for impeachment which is not sufficient in form or
substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring a majority vote
of all members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with the
provision of Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.
More specifically, the provision requiring concurrence of at least two-thirds votes of all members of the Batasan for conviction is not violated
by any provision of the Rules which authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since with such number of votes it is
obvious that the two-thirds vote of all members necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained. Such being the case, the Batasan can
specify in its rules how and when the impeachment proceedings can be terminated or dismissed for Section 3, Article XIII merely provides for
how a judgment of conviction can be sustained but is respondent on how a complaint for impeachment can be dismissed when it becomes
apparent that a judgment of conviction by the required number of votes is not possible.
Neither is the Constitutional provision to the effect that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of the members violated
by the provision of the Rules authorizing the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to dismiss the complaint for
impeachment which it finds not sufficient in form and substance (Sec. 4), does not have sufficient grounds for impeachment (Sec. 5), or where
probable cause has not been established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for impeachment
initiated by at least one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or not a complaint for impeachment
initiated by the required number of members of the Batasan warrants being referred to the Batasan for trial. They are not properly part of the
"initiation phase" of the impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such actions
are liken to actions taken by this Court in determining whether a petition duly filed should be given due course or should be dismissed
outright.
While the Batasan has assigned to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government the task of determining whether the
petition is sufficient in form or substance, or that sufficient ground for impeachment exist or that probable cause has been established, said
Committee is required to submit its report to the Batasan which has the ultimate decision whether to approve or disapprove said report. If the
Batasan approves the Committee report dismissing the complaint, said report is noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives.
368
That the Rules on Impeachment of the Interim Batasan in the judgment of petitioners is better is no argument against the validity or
constitutionality of the Rules on Impeachment approved by the Batasan. More importantly, said Rules are always within the power of the
Batasan to modify, change or replace any time. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the
orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not substantive (43 C.J. 527). They may be
waived or disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no concern. (South Georgia Power Co. vs. Baumann 169 Ga.
649; 151 SE 513). As the Court said in State vs. Alt, 26 Mo. A. 673, quoted in 46 C.J. 1383 Note 31:
The rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the form of a 'manual and formally adopted by the body, or whether consisting of a
body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in memory and by tradition are matters of which the judicial courts, as a general rule, take no
cognizance. It is a principle of the common law of England that the judicial courts have no conusance of what is termed the lex et consuetudo
parliamentary And, although this doctrine is not acceded to, in this country, to the extent to which it has gone in England, where the judicial
courts have held that they possess no jurisdiction to judge of the powers of the House of Parliament, yet no authority is cited to us, and we do
not believe that respectable judicial authority exists, for the proposition that the judicial courts have power to compel legislative, or quasi-
legislative bodies to proceed in the conduct of their deliberations, or in the exercise of their powers, in accordance with their own rules If the
Congress of the United States disregards the constitution of the United States, or, if the legislature of one of the states disregards the
constitution of the state, or of the United States, the power resides in the judicial courts to declare its enactments void. If an inferior quasi-
legislative body, such as the council of a municipal corporation, disregards its own organic law, that is, the charter of the corporation, the
judicial courts, for equal if not for stronger reasons, the same power of annulling its ordinances. But we are not aware of any judicial authority,
or of any legal principle, which will authorize the judicial courts to annul an act of the legislature, or an ordinance of a municipal council merely
because the one or the other was enacted in disregard of the rules which the legislature, or the municipal council or either house thereof, had
prescribed for its own government.
To the same effect is 67 Corpus Juris Secundun 870, where it was said:
Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not substantive. The rules of procedure adopted by deliberative bodies have not
the force of a public law, but they are merely in the nature of by-laws, prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of their own
proceedings. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. Where a deliberative body adopts rules of order for its parliamentary governance, the fact that it violates one of the rules so adopted
may not invalidate a measure passed in compliance with statute. The rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding on a
subsequent legislative body operating within the same jurisdiction, and, where a body resolves that the rules of a prior body be adopted until a
committee reports rules, the prior rules cease to be in force on the report of the committee. It may be of assistance, in determining the effect
of parliamentary law, to consider the nature of the particular deliberative body.
Finally, in 'The present case, injunction to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules will not lie (aside from the fact that
the question involved is political) because the acts of the Committee sought to be restrained have already been consummated. They are fait
accomplish. Prohibition or injunction would not issue to restrain acts already performed or consummated. Remonte us. Banto, 16 SCRA 257;
Aragones us. Subido, 25 SCRA 95.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
369
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5005 January 11, 1911
CELSO DAYRIT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
JUAN DE LOS SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
Ramon Diokno for appellant.

Mariano Lim for appellees.
MAPA, J.:
The judgment rendered in this case in first instance and which was appealed by the defendant, is of the following tenor:
The plaintiffs ask in this suit that the defendant be restrained from preventing the plaintiffs from destroying the dam constructed by
him on their property, repairing the damage done to the property, and performing any other act which may tend to protect the
property from damage; the plaintiffs further ask that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court be made perpetual, and
that the defendant be sentenced to pay more than P250 for loss and damage, besides the amount of the damage which may be
caused to the said property, pending the action, by the construction of the dam, together with the costs of this suit.
From the evidence adduced, we hold the following facts to have been proved: (1) That the plaintiffs herein own the property
described in the complaint and which is crossed from west to east by the Panipuan estero; (2) that in August, 1906, the defendant
constructed a dam in the said Panipuan estero within the plaintiffs' property and a canal or ditch to convey the water from the
said estero to his fields; (3) that Gregorio Dizon, the husband of the plaintiff Eulogia Dayrit, opposed the creation of this servitude,
and the defendant answered (Exhibits G and H) by stating that he, the defendant, had intercepted the water of an estero which
belonged to nobody, but formed the boundary line between the land of the said Gregorio Dizon and that which he held under lease.
In this answer of the defendant no right by prescription is alleged; however, the defendant's principal defense is that he has acquired
a right to the servitude through a prescription of twenty years.
The witness Felix Urquico testified that he was the owner of the land held by the defendant; that he acquired the said land from one
Telesforo Pineda, in June, 1878 that since its acquisition, and without opposition, he annually constructed a dam in the same place
where the defendant built one in 1906; that he conveyed the property to Juan de los Santos, in 1905; that in 1904, Saturnino Aguas,
a lessee of his of the said land, also constructed a dam in the same place, without opposition; that the land previously belonging to
him, and afterwards sold to the defendant, is bounded on the north by the said Panipuan estero, and that this circumstance was
recorded in the private instrument which was executed when he acquired the said land from Telesforo Pineda; that prior to his
occupancy of this land, it was occupied by his brother-in-law, Mariano Pamintuan, and that already, at the time it was held by the
latter and by Telesforo Pineda, the said dam was constructed each year in order that they might utilize the water from the estero.
There exists a private instrument, not shown to have been destroyed, which would have been the best proof of the date when Felix
Urquico, according to his testimony, acquired the land in question, as well as the true boundaries of the land now owned by the
defendant. Mariano Pamintuan and Telesforo Pineda are cited. These parties would have thrown much light on this matter; but they
did not testify and it is not known why these witnesses were not summoned to give testimony. With respect to Saturnino Aguas, it is
true that in 1904 he constructed a dam in the same place where the defendant constructed his; but he was sued by Gregorio Dizon
and the matter was settled by the defendant's agreement not to construct any more dams in the same place; and finally, according
to the rough sketch, Exhibit A, the area comprised between the dam, marked with the numbers 10 and 11, and the boundary of the
swamp land, marked 5 and 6, belongs to the plaintiffs.
In the defendant's Exhibit No. 1 is shown a strip of land, letters A and C, which he did not venture to state belonged to him. It
appears unquestionable to us that this strip, planted with cañas espinas, belongs to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as, according to Exhibit
B, the plaintiffs' land does not adjoin the Panipuan estero on the south. It is maintained by the plaintiffs that the construction of the
dam caused them some loss and damage. In regard to this, there is no proof other than that some clumps of cañas espinas, placed in
the middle of the estero, will now probably not grow on account of the stagnant water. There is no proof that the said clumps of
cañas espinas were destroyed, nor that it is now impossible for them to be utilized by their owner.
In view of the foregoing, it is ordered that judgment be entered restraining the defendant from preventing the plaintiffs' destroying
the dam constructed by him in the Panipuan estero and referred to in the complaint, and from repairing damages to the property
and performing any other act which may tend to preserve the property from any injury. Let it be entered in the judgment,
furthermore, that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is made perpetual. The costs shall be assessed against the
defendant and the plaintiffs shall be absolved from the counterclaim filed by the said defendant.
The writ of preliminary injunction, made final in the judgment just above transcribed, was issued in the following terms:
370
Whereas the plaintiffs, Celso Dayrit and Eulogia Dayrit, together with the latter's husband, Gregorio Dizon, in the above-cited case
have presented an amended complaint against the defendant, Juan de los Santos, wherein, as an incidental remedy, it is asked that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendant, his agents and representatives from entering upon the said
property, making excavations thereon, opening ditches and building dams to intercept the water of the Panipuan estero, the said
plaintiffs having furnished the bond of P500 required by this court;
Therefore you (the defendant), your agents and representatives, are hereby prohibited from repeating and again committing the
acts above specified, during the trial of this case and until final judgment shall have been rendered therein.
In the counterclaim, from which the plaintiffs were absolved, the defendant asked that they be sentenced to the payment of P500, the amount
of the damages caused to him by the issuance of the said writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground that the said plaintiffs had no legal
reason whatever to apply for the same.
As grounds for his appeal, the appellant sets forth seven assignments of error in his brief, of which the second and third refer only to questions
of fact, and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh are mere conclusions drawn from the premises established in the two former above mentioned.
After a careful study of the evidence, we decided that the findings of fact contained in the judgment appealed from are sufficiently supported
by the evidence and that there is no preponderance of proof against the findings such as might oblige us to modify the same, wherefore they
must be sustained.
In the first of the appeal, the appellant maintains that the lower court incurred error in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's
complaint.
The demurrer is based on two grounds: (1) That the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action; and (2) that he
complaint is ambiguous, unintelligible and vague. This last ground was abandoned in this instance, and only the first was maintained, in
support of which it is stated in the appellant's brief that:
The plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant is performing, or intends to perform, or endeavors to perform or permits the
performance of, any act tending to prejudice any rights of the plaintiffs in the land in question. They only allege that the defendant
did perform certain acts, and it is unquestionable that a writ of injunction can not be issued to prohibit an act already performed.
The appellant's assertion is inexact with respect to his avernment that, in the complaint, only acts were alleged which were already completely
performed by the defendant. It is set forth in the complaint that the defendant entered upon the land belonging to the plaintiffs, without
permission and against the latter's will, made excavations thereon, opened a ditch and built dams to intercept the natural course of the water
of the Panipuan estero which crosses the said land, to divert such water to adjoining land held by the defendant under lease, thereby causing
detriment to the plaintiffs' said property. The complaint further recites, textually, that "the defendant will continue to perform the said acts on
the plaintiffs' property . . . unless he, his agents and other representatives are prohibited by the court . . . from repeating and continuing to
commit the acts above specified."
From this, it is very clear that the complaint alleges, not only acts already affected, but also others which the defendant endeavored to effect
by repeating or continuing those already executed by him on the plaintiffs' property. It being conceded that acts already consummated can not
be subject of injunction, there is no doubt whatever that those acts which the defendant is about to perform or intends to effect, whenever
they infringe the plaintiffs' rights and tend to render the judgment inefficacious, can be enjoined. It is, moreover, to be noted that not only the
commission or execution of such acts, but also their continuation can be prevented or prohibited by the said injunction, according to the
express terms of section 164 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. As a consequence derive from the preceding premises, the facts alleged
in the complaint constitute a right of action, and the demurrer set up by the defendant under contrary grounds was, therefore, very properly
overruled.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
371
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 177486 December 21, 2009
PURISIMO BUYCO, Petitioner,

vs.
NELSON BARAQUIA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Nelson Baraquia (respondent) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a complaint1 against Dominico Buyco and Clemente
Buyco (Buycos), for the establishment of a permanent right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road within their property which he has been using to go to and from the
public highway to access his poultry farm.
The Buycos died during the pendency of the case, and were substituted by Purisimo Buyco (petitioner) and his brother Gonzalo.
Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC granted respondent’s application for preliminary injunction.
By Decision2 of February 14, 2007, the trial court dismissed respondent’s complaint for failure to establish the concurrence of the essential
requisites for the establishment of an easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.3 It accordingly lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Respondent filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed too a notice of partial appeal bearing on to the non-award of
prayer for damages.
Respondent later filed with the trial court a motion to cite petitioner and his brother Gonzalo in contempt, alleging that they had closed off the
subject road, thus violating the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court, by Resolution of March 13, 2007,4 noting that respondent
received on March 5, 2007 his copy of its decision while petitioner received his on February 21, 2007, held that the February 14, 2007 decision
had not yet become final and executory, hence, the writ of preliminary injunction remained to be valid, efficacious and obligatory, rendering
petitioner’s act of closing the road on March 1, 2007 an indirect contempt of court. It thus declared petitioner and his brother in contempt of
court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s March 13, 2007 Resolution, contending that a preliminary injunction, once quashed,
ceases to exist, and that he and his brother cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt by mere motion.
By Resolution5 of April 18, 2007, the trial court set aside the March 13, 2007 Resolution and granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
ruling that petitioner and his brother cannot be held in contempt of court by mere motion and not by verified petition.
On the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court held that it is its "illumined opinion that the matter of whether a writ of
preliminary injunction remains valid until the decision annulling the same attains finality is not firmly entrenched in jurisprudence, contrary to
the position of the defendants." It thereupon quoted a portion of the ruling in the 2006 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals, 6 to wit:
Furthermore, notwithstanding the stand of both parties, the fact remains that the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the grant of
preliminary injunction in favor of petitioners has not yet become final on 14 December 2000. In fact, such Decision has not yet become final
and executory even on the very date of this Decision, in view of petitioners’ appeal with us under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The preliminary injunction, therefore, issued by the trial court remains valid until the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
same attains finality, and violation thereof constitutes indirect contempt which, however, requires either a formal charge or a verified
petition.7 (underscoring in the original decision)
Hence, this petition for review, raising a question of law – whether the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the
complaint is immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.8 It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject
to the latter’s outcome.9 It is not a cause of action in itself.10Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the
action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes
of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.
372
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a
mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.11
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. 12
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon respondent’s showing that he and his
poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not
entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was
lifted.1avvphi1
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its
purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
Unionbank v. Court of Appeals13 enlightens:
"x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a
judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary
injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action." (italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lower court’s citation of Lee v. Court of Appeals14 is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the present case, the original complaint for specific
performance and cancellation of real estate mortgage was not yet decided on the merits by the lower court. Thus, the preliminary injunction
therein issued subsisted pending appeal of an incident.
There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondent’s favor, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on
December 1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 18, 2007 of the trial court is REVERSED. The writ of preliminary injunction
which Branch 39 of the Iloilo Regional Trial Court issued on December 1, 1999 was automatically dissolved upon its dismissal by Decision of
February 14, 2007 of Civil Case No. 26015.
SO ORDERED.
373
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor arbiter, entertain an
action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private
respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions?
This is the pivotal issue presented before us in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the
nullification of the injunctive writ dated April 3, 1995 issued by the NLRC and the Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the said Orders were issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3,
1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition1 for injunction praying that:
I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner herein) from
effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22, 1995, or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;
II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent to reinstate petitioners to their
former positions pending the hearing of this case, or, prohibiting respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February
22, 1995 while this case is pending adjudication;
III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made permanent, that petitioners be
awarded full backwages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00 each and exemplary damages of PHP 500,000.00 each,
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of whatever amount is awarded, and the costs of suit.
On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction 2 enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22,
1995 Memorandum of dismissal. In granting the writ, the NLRC considered the following facts, to wit:
. . . that almost two (2) years ago, i.e. on April 15, 1993, the petitioners were instructed to attend an investigation by
respondent's "Security and Fraud Prevention Sub-Department" regarding an April 3, 1993 incident in Hongkong at which
Joseph Abaca, respondent's Avionics Mechanic in Hongkong "was intercepted by the Hongkong Airport Police at Gate 05 . .
. the ramp area of the Kai Tak International Airport while . . . about to exit said gate carrying a . . . bag said to contain some
2.5 million pesos in Philippine Currencies. That at the Police Station. Mr. Abaca claimed that he just found said plastic bag
at the Skybed Section of the arrival flight PR300/03 April 93," where petitioners served as flight stewards of said flight
PR300; . . the petitioners sought "a more detailed account of what this HKG incident is all about"; but instead, the
petitioners were administratively charged, "a hearing" on which "did
not push through" until almost two (2) years after, i.e, "on January 20, 1995 . . . where a confrontation between Mr. Abaca
and petitioners herein was compulsorily arranged by the respondent's disciplinary board" at which hearing, Abaca was
made to identify petitioners as co-conspirators; that despite the fact that the procedure of identification adopted by
respondent's Disciplinary Board was anomalous "as there was no one else in the line-up (which could not be called one)
but petitioners . . . Joseph Abaca still had difficulty in identifying petitioner Pineda as his co-conspirator, and as to
petitioner Cabling, he was implicated and pointed by Abaca only after respondent's Atty. Cabatuando pressed the former
to identify petitioner Cabling as co-conspirator"; that with the hearing reset to January 25, 1995, "Mr. Joseph Abaca finally
gave exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any participation or from being the owners of
the currencies, and at which hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca volunteered the information that the real owner of said money was
one who frequented his headquarters in Hongkong to which information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael
Khan," opined "for the need for another hearing to go to the bottom of the incident"; that from said statement, it
appeared "that Mr. Joseph Abaca was the courier, and had another mechanic in Manila who hid the currency at the plane's
skybed for Abaca to retrieve in Hongkong, which findings of how the money was found was previously confirmed by Mr.
Joseph Abaca himself when he was first investigated by the Hongkong authorities"; that just as petitioners "thought that
they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended
374
"additional hearings" mandated by the Disciplinary Board," they were surprised to receive "on February 23, 1995. . . a
Memorandum dated February 22, 1995" terminating their services for alleged violation of respondent's Code of Discipline
"effective immediately"; that sometime . . . first week of March, 1995, petitioner Pineda received another Memorandum
from respondent Mr. Juan Paraiso, advising him of his termination effective February 3, 1995, likewise for violation of
respondent's Code of Discipline; . . .
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adapted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly
dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court in the ease at PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, (G.R. No.
85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was formulated by the petitioner without the participation of its employees as
required in R.A. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code; (2) the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents
which "caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law"
except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC is empowered under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code not only to
restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the performance of a particular act in
any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary
power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in the case of Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union, DFA, et. al. vs. Chemo-
Technische Mfg., Inc. [G.R. No. 107031, January 25, 1993].
On May 4, 1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration3 arguing that the NLRC erred:
1. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or

restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves
or arises from labor disputes;
2. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when the termination of private respondents have long
been carried out;
3. . . . in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents on the basis of their mere allegations, in
violation of PAL's right to due process:
4. . . . in arrogating unto itself management prerogative to discipline its employees and divesting the
labor arbiter of its original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases;
5. . . . in suspending the effects of termination when such action is exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Labor;
6. . . . in issuing the temporary injunction in the absence of any irreparable or substantial injury to both
private respondents.
On May 31, 1995, the NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, ruling:
"The respondent (now petitioner), for one, cannot validly claim that we cannot exercise our injunctive power under Article
218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that what we have here is not a labor dispute as long as it concedes that as
defined by law, a" (l) "Labor Dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment." If
security of tenure, which has been breached by respondent and which, precisely, is sought to be protected by our
temporary mandatory injunction (the core of controversy in this case) is not a "term or condition of employment", what
then is?
xxx xxx xxx
Anent respondent's second argument . . . . Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code . . . empowered the Commission not only to
issue a prohibitory injunction, but a mandatory ("to require the performance") one as well. Besides, as earlier discussed,
we already exercised (on August 23, 1991) this temporary mandatory injunctive power in the case of "Chemo-Technische
Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc., et. al." (supra) and effectively enjoined one (1)
month old dismissals by Chemo-Technische and that our aforesaid mandatory exercise of injunctive power, when
questioned through a petition for certiorari, was sustained by the Third Division of the Supreme court per its Resolution
dated January 25, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's fourth argument that petitioner's remedy for their dismissals is "to file an illegal dismissal case against PAL
which cases are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter' is ignorant. In requiring as a condition for
the issuance of a "temporary or permanent injunction" — "(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;" Article
218 (e) of the Labor Code clearly envisioned adequacy, and not plain availability of a remedy at law as an alternative bar to
375
the issuance of an injunction. An illegal dismissal suit (which takes, on its expeditious side, three (3) years before it can be
disposed of) while available as a remedy under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code, is certainly not an "adequate; remedy at
law, Ergo, it cannot as an alternative remedy, bar our exercise of that injunctive power given us by Article 218 (e) of the
Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, Article 218 (e), as earlier discussed [which empowers this Commission "to require the performance of a particular
act" (such as our requiring respondent "to cease and desist from enforcing" its whimsical memoranda of dismissals and
"instead to reinstate petitioners to their respective position held prior to their subject dismissals") in "any labor dispute
which, if not . . . performed forthwith, may cause grave and irreparable damage to any party"] stands as the sole "adequate
remedy at law" for petitioners here.
Finally, the respondent, in its sixth argument claims that even if its acts of dismissing petitioners "may be great, still the
same is capable of compensation", and that consequently, "injunction need not be issued where adequate compensation
at law could be obtained". Actually,
what respondent PAL argues here is that we need not interfere in its whimsical dismissals of petitioners as, after all, it can
pay the latter its backwages. . . .
But just the same, we have to stress that Article 279 does not speak alone of backwages as an obtainable relief for illegal
dismissal; that reinstatement as well is the concern of said law, enforceable when necessary, through Article 218 (e) of the
Labor Code (without need of an illegal dismissal suit under Article 217 (a) of the Code) if such whimsical and capricious act
of illegal dismissal will "cause grave or irreparable injury to a party". . . . .4
Hence, the present recourse.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive
relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire
showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation.5 Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.6
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC —
(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; . . ." (Emphasis Ours)
Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. — A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended,
when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising
from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them
in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strikes
or lockout. 7 (Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by
a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in
favor of such party."
The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." 8
376
The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or
in equity; a justiciable dispute."9
A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other
concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue." 10
Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending
parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet
been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the
petition which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees.
As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages,
rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-
employee relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality
of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims arising from employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or
household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not
accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. 11
The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or
tribunal can take cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration
pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portions of which reads:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same.
On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of
the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the
private respondents' petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not
provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes." 12
Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering
the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
The argument of the NLRC in its assailed Order that to file an illegal dismissal suit with the labor arbiter is not an "adequate" remedy since it
takes three (3) years before it can be disposed of, is patently erroneous. An "adequate" remedy at law has been defined as one "that affords
relief with reference to the matter in controversy, and which is appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case." 13 It is a remedy which
is equally, beneficial, speedy and sufficient which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the acts complained of. 14
377
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
labor arbiter. 15 In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction
praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. In Lamb vs. Phipps, 16 we ruled that if the remedy is specifically
provided by law, it is presumed to be adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the private respondents in
their petition before the NLRC can also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as shown earlier, has the ancillary power to issue
preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an incident in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the parties
during the pendency of the case. 17
Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any
urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and
frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, 18 or where there is no standard by which
their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered
irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or
property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. 19
In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately
compensated and therefore, there exists no "irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction
sought for. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from employment shall be entitled to
reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
The ruling of the NLRC that the Supreme Court upheld its power to issue temporary mandatory injunction orders in the case of Chemo-
Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA, et. al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. et. al., docketed as G.R. No. 107031, is misleading. As
correctly argued by the petitioner, no such pronouncement was made by this Court in said case. On January 25, 1993, we issued a Minute
Resolution in the subject case stating as follows:
Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, as well
as the comments of both public and private respondents thereon, and the reply of the petitioners to private
respondent's motion to dismiss the petition, the Court Resolved to DENY the same for being premature.
It is clear from the above resolution that we did not in anyway sustain the action of the NLRC in issuing such temporary mandatory
injunction but rather we dismissed the petition as the NLRC had yet to rule upon the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Thus,
the minute resolution denying the petition for being prematurely filed.
Finally, an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective
means of settling labor disputes. 20 It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation
and compromise, mediation and arbitration. 21 Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds
clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly
absent in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated April 3, 1995 and May 31, 1995, issued by the National Labor
Relations Commission (First Division), in NLRC NCR IC No. 000563-95, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
378
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25138 August 28, 1969
JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.
Beltran, Cendaña, Camu, Pelias and Manuel for plaintiffs-appellants.

Government Corporate Counsel Tomas P. Matic Jr. and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel Romualdo Valera for defendants-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal on purely questions of law from an order of dismissal of the complaint for interpleader, on the ground that it does not state a cause of
action, as certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. We affirm the dismissal on the ground that where the defendants sought to be
interpleaded as conflicting claimants have no conflicting claims against plaintiff, as correctly found by the trial court, the special civil action of
interpleader will not lie.
This interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City,
praying that the two defendant-government corporations be compelled to litigate and interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting
claims involving said Project 4.
Plaintiffs' principal allegations in their complaint were as follows: Since they first occupied in 1953 their respective housing units at Project 4,
under lease from the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and paying monthly rentals therefor, they were assured by competent
authority that after five years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units. On February 21, 1961, the PHHC
announced to the tenants that the management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred by the PHHC to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in payment of PHHC debts to the GSIS. In the same announcement, the PHHC also asked the
tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as
down payment on the selling price, thirty (30%) percent of what had been paid by them as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and
on March 27, 1961, the PHHC announced in another circular that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961 would be considered
as amortizations or installment payments. The PHHC furthermore instructed the Project Housing Manager in a memorandum of May 16, 1961
to accept as installments on the selling price the payments made after March 31, 1961 by tenants who were up-to-date in their accounts as of
said date. In September, 1961, pursuant to the PHHC-GSIS arrangement, collections from tenants on rentals and/or installment payments were
delivered by the PHHC to the GSIS. On December 27, 1961, the agreement of turnover of administration and ownership of PHHC properties,
including Project 4 was executed by PHHC in favor of GSIS, pursuant to the release of mortgage and amicable settlement of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings instituted in May, 1960 by GSIS against PHHC. Subsequently, however, PHHC through its new Chairman-General
Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to recognize all agreements and undertakings previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its
legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of
Justice. Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between the defendants-corporations caused them great inconvenience and
incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not know to whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments. They further
alleged that as the majority of them were GSIS policy holders, they preferred to have the implementation of the outright sale in their favor
effected by the GSIS, since the GSIS was "legally entitled to the management, administration and ownership of the PHHC properties in
question." 1
Upon urgent ex parte motion of plaintiffs, the trial Court issued on August 23, 1962 its Order designating the People's First Savings Bank at
Quezon City "to receive in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only upon
proper authority of the Court." 2
On August 29, 1962, the two defendant corporations represented by the Government Corporate Counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to
receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.
The trial Court heard the motion on September 1, 1962 in the presence of all the parties, and thereafter issued its Order of September 6, 1962,
dismissing the Complaint, ruling that: "During the hearing of the said motion and opposition thereto, the counsel for the defendants ratified the
allegations in his motion and made of record that the defendant Government Service Insurance System has no objection that payments on the
monthly amortizations from the residents of Project 4 be made directly to the defendant People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. From
what appears in said motion and the statement made in open court by the counsel for defendants that there is no dispute as to whom the
residents of Project 4 should make their monthly amortizations payments, there is, therefore, no cause of action for interpleading and that the
order of August 23, 1962 is not warranted by the circumstances surrounding the case. In so far as payments are concerned, defendant GSIS has
expressed its conformity that they be made directly to defendant PHHC. Counsel for defendants went further to say that whatever dispute, if
379
any, may exist between the two corporations over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments made to the PHHC will not and cannot in any
way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited by either of the two defendants." 3
Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for reconsideration and the trial court, "with a view to thresh out the matter once and for all," called
the Managers of the two defendants-corporations and the counsels for the parties to appear before it for a conference on October 24, 1962.
"During the conference," the trial court related in its Order of November 20, 1962, denying plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, "Manager
Diaz of the GSIS made of record that he has no objection that payments be made to the PHHC. On the other hand, Manager Eco of the
PHHC made of record that at present there is a standing arrangement between the GSIS and the PHHC that as long as there is showing that the
PHHC has remitted 100% of the total purchase price of a given lot to the GSIS, the latter corporation shall authorize the issuance of title to the
corresponding lot. It was also brought out in said conference that there is a new arrangement being negotiated between the two corporations
that only 50% of the purchase price be remitted to the GSIS by the PHHC, instead of the 100%. At any rate the two Managers have assured
counsel for the plaintiffs that upon payment of the whole purchase price of a given lot, the title corresponding to said lot will be issued." 4
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint "raise questions of
fact that can be established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral manifestations in open
court," and that they "do not know who, as between the GSIS and the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive their monthly
amortizations as would eventually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling units." 5
Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 63, section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14)
requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-
interpleader "who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."
While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and
ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in
their complaint that any corporation other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on
them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the
enforceability, and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of December 27, 1961 between the two
defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two
corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court
that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone.
The record rejects plaintiffs' claim that the trial courts order was based on "mere oral manifestations in court." The Reply to Opposition of
September 11, 1962 filed by the Government Corporate Counsel expressly "reiterates his manifestation in open court that no possible injustice
or prejudice would result in plaintiffs by continuing to make payments of such rentals or amortizations to defendant PHHC because any such
payments will be recognized as long as they are proper, legal and in due course by anybody who might take over the property. Specifically, any
such payments will be recognized by the GSIS in the event that whatever conflict there might be (and this is only on the hypothetical
assumption that such conflict exists) between the PHHC and the GSIS should finally be resolved in favor of the GSIS". 6 The assurances and
undertakings to the same affect given by the Managers of the defendants-corporations at the conference held by the trial Court are expressly
embodied in the Court's Order of November 20, 1962 quoted above. The GSIS' undertaking to recognize and respect the previous
commitments of PHHC towards its tenants is expressly set forth in Par. III, section M of the turnover agreement, Annex "F" of plaintiffs'
complaint, wherein it is provided that "GSIS shall recognize and respect all awards, contracts of sale, lease agreements and transfer of rights to
lots and housing units made and approved by PHHC, subsisting as of the signing of this agreement, and PHHC commitment to sell its housing
projects 4, 6 and 8-A at the selling prices less rental credits fixed by PHHC and as finally approved by the OEC. PHHC, however, shall be liable
and answerable for any and all claims and consequences arising from double or multiple awards or in the case of awards of non-existing
houses and/or lots." 7
In fine, the record shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant corporations as against plaintiff-tenants, which they may
properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among themselves. Both defendant corporations were agreed that
PHHC should continue receiving the tenants' payments, and that such payments would be duly recognized even if the GSIS should eventually
take over Project 4 by virtue of their turnover agreement of December 27, 1961. As held by this Court in an early case, the action of
interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to litigate among themselves in order to
determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation. "The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double
liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability." 8 Thus, in another case, where the occupants of two different
parcels of land adjoining each other belonging to two separate plaintiffs, but on which the occupants had constructed a building encroaching
upon both parcels of land, faced two ejectment suits from the plaintiffs, each plaintiff claiming the right of possession and recovery over his
respective portion of the lands encroached upon, this Court held that the occupants could not properly file an interpleader suit, against the
plaintiffs, to litigate their alleged conflicting claims; for evidently, the two plaintiff did not have any conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter against the occupants, but were enforcing separate and distinct claims on their respective properties. 9
Plaintiffs' other contention in their appeal is that notwithstanding that the issue as to which of the defendants is authorized to receive the
tenants' payments was resolved in favor of the PHHC, they had raised other issues that were not resolved and would require rendition of
judgment after trial on the merits, such as "the issue of the right of ownership over the houses and lots in Project 4 (and) the issue of the
status of the commitment agreements and undertakings made by the previous PHHC Administration, particularly those of the then PHHC
General Manager Bernardo Torres." 10 This contention is without merit, for no conflicting claims have been made with regard to such issues
380
upon plaintiffs by defendant corporations, who both bound themselves to recognize and respect the rights of plaintiffs-tenants. The resolution
of such issues affecting the defendant corporations exclusively may not properly be sought through the special civil action of interpleader.
Should there be a breach of the PHHC undertakings towards plaintiffs, plaintiffs' recourse would be an ordinary action of specific performance
or other appropriate suit against either the PHHC or GSIS or both, as the circumstances warrant.
We find no error, therefore, in the trial court's order of dismissal of the complaint for interpleader and the lifting, as a consequence, of its
other order designating the People's First Savings Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.
ACCORDINGLY, the trial Court's order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
381
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 73022 February 9, 1989
GEORGIA ADLAWAN, Owner, RAMON VILLORDON and MANUEL VILLORDON, Shareholders and Operators/Managers of the GALLERA
BAGONG LIPUNAN, and the SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MINGLANILLA, CEBU, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch XIII, Cebu City, the PHILIPPINE GAME FOWL
COMMISSION, NICOLAS ENAD, ABELARDO LARUMBE and MARTINIANO DE LA CALSADA, all Shareholders of the MINGLANILLA JUNIOR
COLISEUM, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to declare null and void the decision of the former Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XIII, in Special Civil
Action No. R-13186 for declaratory relief with injunction, and the resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dismissing the appeal
therefrom. Petitioners further seek the cancellation or setting aside of the entry of judgment made on September 17, 1985 by the respondent
appellate court consequent to its aforesaid dismissal of the appeal.
Prior to the advent of martial law, there were two cockpits operating under license in the municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu, namely, (1) the
Minglanilla Junior Coliseum (hereinafter also referred to as the Coliseum), which has been existing since July, 1955, now owned and operated
by private respondents after their acquisition thereof from their predecessor-in-interest Felix Obejero, 1 and which is located in the center of
the poblacion of the Municipality of Minglanilla; and (2) the Gallera Bagong Lipunan, formerly known as Bag-Ong Bulangan, and later also
known as La Gallera de Minglanilla (hereinafter also referred to as Gallera), which was established in 1967, then owned and operated by
Catalino Villaflor who was succeeded by several operators and eventually by herein petitioners, and which is located in Barrio Calajoan of the
same municipality. 2
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which provided for the "one cockpit
for every municipality" rule, the present controversy arose.
The findings of respondent trial court establish that on November 27, 1972, the Office of the Mayor of Minglanilla, Cebu, received a radio
message from the Cebu Provincial Command of the Philippine Constabulary laying down the policy governing cockpits, the pertinent provisions
of which state that: (1) only licensed municipal cockpits shall be allowed to operate in every municipality; (2) barrio cockpits, even if licensed
shall not be allowed to operate; (3) if there is no municipal cockpit, a barrio cockpit may be allowed or considered a municipal cockpit when
the mayor certifies to that effect; and (4) in no case shall the operation of more than one cockpit be allowed in every municipality. With the
receipt of the aforesaid message, the question arose as to which cockpit shall remain to operate and which shall be closed, the final
determination whereof was held in abeyance, with the municipal council of Minglanilla instead referring the matter to the Philippine
Constabulary unit which had jurisdiction over the same. Thereafter, the Provincial Command rendered a decision, dated December 8, 1972,
upholding the Coliseum, private respondents' cockpit, as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu. The then operator of the barrio cockpit
Bag-Ong Bulangan, or Gallera as previously indicated, appealed the decision to the Zone Commander who in turn referred the matter back to
said municipal council. 3
Thereafter, the Committee on Laws and Ordinances of the Municipal Council of Minglanilla submitted a report on the cockpit controversy,
which was adopted 4 and later approved by the Municipal Council 5 recommending the retention and certification of the Bag-Ong Bulangan, or
the Gallera, as the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla. The Committee based its recommendation on Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1224, which
was approved on May 7, 1955 and was then the prevailing law on cockpits, and an Unnumbered Provincial Circular, supposedly circularized by
the Office of the Provincial Governor of Cebu on January 3, 1969 and entitled "Prohibition to Establish and/or Operate Cockpits within the
Poblaciones of Municipalities and Municipal Districts and within a Radius of 200 Lineal Meters from any Public Building, Schools, Hospitals and
Churches, Request for —." 6
The committee reported that under Republic Act No. 1224 the power to determine the distance limit of cockpits from certain public structures
is left to the discretion of the municipal board or council, except that no municipal ordinance fixing the distances of cockpits shall apply to
those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal ordinance. It also noted that Paragraph 5 of the
aforestated Unnumbered Provincial Circular provides that, in the exercise of their discretion, the local officials are requested to prohibit the
establishment, maintenance and/or operation of cockpits within the poblacion of the municipality, the same to be allowed only within a
reasonable distance but in no case less than 200 lineal meters from any public buildings, schools, hospitals and churches, as in the case of
other amusement places mentioned in the law. 7
On the basis of the actual distances of the Coliseum and the Gallera cockpits from the aforesaid public structures, the committee concluded
that the Coliseum failed to meet the required distance limit, hence it opined that the Gallera should rightfully be maintained as the municipal
cockpit. The committee agreed that Republic Act No. 1224 prohibits the retroactive application of any municipal ordinance, which may
subsequently be passed pursuant thereto, to a licensed cockpit already existing at the time of the enactment of the ordinance. In this regard,
the committee observed that Municipal Ordinance No. 4 adopted by the Municipal Council on February 9, 1969 provided for only a 50 meter
382
limit, but it contended that said ordinance could not be properly invoked by herein private respondents because of its theory that the same is
not valid and enforceable for lack of approval from the Provincial Board of Cebu.8
Subsequently, Resolution No. 40, Series of 1973, was passed wherein the municipal council "resolved to request the Municipal Mayor of this
municipality to make and issue a Certification to the effect that the "BAGONG BULANGAN" Cockpit is the Municipal Cockpit at Calajoan of this
municipality ..." 9
Aggrieved by the actuations and resolutions of the municipal council, herein private respondents Nicolas Enad and Abelardo Larumbe filed an
action for declaratory relief with injunction, as petitioners praying for a judicial interpretation of their rights under all pertinent laws governing
cockpits, against the municipal council, the mayor of Minglanilla and Catalino Villaflor, the then owner of Gallera, before the aforementioned
Court of First Instance of Cebu which in due course rendered the decision subject of this petition, the fallo of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents, as
follows:
a. Orders the Municipal Mayor to issue immediately upon receipt of the decision the license-permit for the year 1982 to
and in favor of petitioners for having complied (sic) all requirements of pertinent laws;
b. Orders the Sangguniang Bayan of Minglanilla to pass a resolution confirming the license-permit issued by the Mayor to
the petitioners immediately upon receipt of this decision;
c. Orders the Philippine Gamefowl Commission to register, accept the registration or cause the registration immediately
upon receipt of this decision, the petitioners' cockpit for the year 1982 and all the years thereafter;
d. Orders the immediate closure of respondent's cockpit, Bagong Bulangan, now known as Gallera de Minglanilla; and
e. Declare (sic) the Writ of Preliminary Injunction as PERMANENT, against the Municipal Mayor of Minglanilla, Cebu, the
Sannguniang Bayan of Minglanilla, Cebu, all police agencies local or otherwise and the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. 10
From this decision, Ma. Luz Rosete Diores, who had acquired the Gallera cockpit from Catalino Villaflor, appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court under CA-G.R. UDK No. 4914. During the pendency of this appeal, Diores executed a deed of absolute sale, dated July 14,
1984, whereby she ceded and transferred all her rights and interests over the Gallera cockpit to herein petitioner Georgia Adlawan, payable on
installment basis until October 15, 1985. 11
Thereafter, Diores filed a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss her appeal on September 12, 1985 and respondent appellate court granted the
same and considered the appeal withdrawn. 12 Said resolution became final and was entered on September 13, 1985. 13
On September 19, 1985, petitioner Georgia Adlawan, allegedly as the new owner of the Gallera, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of dismissal alleging, inter alia, that Diores acted with malice and bad faith in moving for the withdrawal and/or dismissal of
the appeal since the latter was no longer the owner of the Gallera cockpit the same having been sold to said petitioner who thus became the
real party in interest in the appeal. 14
On October 14, 1985, upon motion of herein private respondents, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the
enforcement of its decision by reason of the dismissal of the appeal therefrom. 15
Meanwhile, on October 10, 1985 the Philippine Gamefowl Commission passed a resolution ordering the cancellation and revocation of the
certificate of registration of Gallera Bagong Lipunan and approving the registration of Minglanilla Junior Coliseum. 16
Subsequently, on November 27, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that
entry of judgment had already been made on September 13, 1985. 17
Hence, this resort to Us, petitioners contending that the decision of the respondent trial court is illegal for having been rendered with obvious
disregard of existing laws and is, therefore, null and void.
Such submission cannot be sustained; the denial of this recourse is irremissible.
Prior to the imposition of martial law, the governing law on Philippine cockfighting was Republic Act No. 1224, effective on May 17, 1955,
which specifically vested regulatory and supervisory powers over cockpits in the local legislative bodies, thus:
Section 1. The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each municipality and
municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation
of cockpits, ... and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: Provided, however, That no such
383
places of amusement mentioned herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of 200 lineal
meters in the case of nightclubs, ... and 50 lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, ...except cockpits the distance of
which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal council, from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches:
Provided, further, that no municipal or city ordinance fixing distances at which such places of amusement may be
established or operated shall apply to those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal
ordinance, nor will the subject opening of any public building or other premises from which distances shall be measured
prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and operating, ...(Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from this statutory provision that it is discretionary upon the municipal council to fix the location of cockpits in their jurisdiction and
determine the allowable distance thereof from public buildings, thru the passage of a municipal ordinance. Republic Act No. 1224, however,
specifically prohibits the retroactive application of any such municipal ordinance to cockpits already existing at the time of its enactment,
specifically with respect to the fixing of distances at which said cockpits may be established.
In accordance therewith and as hereinbefore stated, the Municipal Council of Minglanilla passed Ordinance No. 4 on February 9,1969 which
provided that municipal cockpits must be at least 50 lineal meters away from public buildings.
Considering the specific proscription against the retroactive application of such municipal ordinances, since the Minglanilla Junior Coliseum
was established in 1955 whereas Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed only in 1969, obviously the provisions thereof cannot prejudice or
adversely affect the existence and operation of said cockpit.
Assuming arguendo that private respondents' cockpit is indeed covered by the municipal ordinance, the same is well within the limits allowed
therein. It was duly certified by the Provincial Engineer of Cebu City, 18 after proper investigation, that the Minglanilla cockpit is located more
than the required 50 lineal meter distance from the public buildings contemplated, in accordance with the mandate of the pertinent local
legislation.
Contrary to petitioners' pretension that the law unqualifiedly provides for a 200 lineal meter distance limit, a cursory perusal of Presidential
Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law) and Presidential Decree No. 1802 (creating the Philippine Gamefowl Commission) reveals that neither of
these issuances imposed any mandatory delimitation except when there is no existing local ordinance which prescribes a limit on distances.
Presidential Decree No. 449 specifically states in Section 5 thereof that:
(c) Cockpits Site and Construction. Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in
the Zoning Law or Ordinance. In the absence of such law or ordinance, the local executives shall see to it that no cockpits
are constructed within or near existing residential or commercial areas, hospitals, school buildings, churches, or other
public buildings. ...
This subsequent law merely adopted and upheld the discretionary power of the local officials in determining the proper location of cockpits
vis-a-vis the public buildings contemplated in and recognized by Republic Act No. 1224. That the limitation prescribed by the zoning ordinance
controls is further stressed by the later enactment, Presidential Decree No. 449. This discretionary power was thereafter exercised with the
passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 4. We do not find the enactment of Id ordinance to have been attended with grave abuse of discretion or
any flaw which would render it invalid and for which reason it should remain enforceable until it is repealed or revoked.
On this score, We have reviewed the research findings of the court a quo which are hereunder quoted with approval:
A careful study on all laws on cockpits as: RA 1224, PD 449 and PD 1802, this Court finds that it is not mandatory that a
cockpit should not be less than 200 meters from a public building except when there is no ordinance in a given
municipality. As petitioners had correctly claimed, there is no law before, during and after Martial Law which mandates
that a cockpit should not be less than 200 meters from a public building. While RA 1224 mentions about 200 meters
distance from public buildings, the same refers only to nightclubs, cabarets, and similar places, but when it comes to
cockpit, the local government is given the authority to determine the distance. Again this (sic) substantially reiterated in
Sec. 6, PD 449; while PD 1802 is silent on the specific distance of a cockpit from a public building. The implementing rules
and regulations duly promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission practically quoted and reproduced verbatim
Sec. 6 of PD 449. It reiterates the provision in PD 449 that a cockpit shall be operated in accordance with existing
ordinance. This is the first phase of the provision. In the absence of an existing ordinance the local executive, referring to
the may, must see to it that no cockpit shall be allowed to operate within 200 meters from a residential or commercial
area. In the Municipality of Minglanilla Ordinance No. 4 is the prevailing ordinance. 19
The Municipal Council of Minglanilla, relying on the Unnumbered Provincial Circular 20 in recommending the retention of Bag-Ong Bulangan, or
Gallera, as the municipal cockpit, merely cited the title of the alleged circular. However, there is no showing, nor did the council demonstrate,
how that circular affected or could have negated the application of the exclusionary clause in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1224.
Consequently, such exception continues to operate in favor of private respondents' cockpit.
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 449 empowered the municipal mayors to issue licenses for the operation of cockpits, initially subject to
the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representative and, as later amended, subject to the review and supervision of the
384
Philippine Gamefowl Commission. 21 For all intents and purposes, this provision of law specifically entrusts the sole authority to issue permits
to the mayors. The municipal council's duty is merely to ratify the mayor's decision before the same can be actually implemented. But the
Council cannot, on its own instance or initiative, pass upon the licensability of a particular cockpit and thereafter recommend it to the mayor
for approval. This reverse procedure is what petitioners would wish to be adopted, albeit erroneously, in pleading the aforementioned
Resolution No. 40 which recognized petitioners' Gallera as the legal municipal cockpit. Furthermore, Resolution No. 40 was passed by the
Municipal Council of Minglanilla with the concurrence only of the vice- mayor. The then mayor of Minglanilla, the late Felicisimo Cana, had no
participation therein, as correctly found by the trial court. 22 On these considerations, said ultra vires resolution has no binding effect and
cannot be plausibly invoked by petitioners.
Advertence is made to the fact that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission subsequently ordered the cancellation of the registration certificate
of petitioner's cockpit, but that in 1986 it granted an interlocutory order to Gallera to operate. We have, however, held that with regard to
ordinary local cockpits, and where the holding of international derbies is not involved, it is the mayor who has the primary authority to issue
permits, with the authorization of the Sanggunian and on the basis of guidelines issued by said commission. The commission can merely
supervise compliance with said guidelines but cannot disapprove a license granted by the mayor and issue a cockpit license to another. Its
aforesaid actuations, therefore, do not detract from the factual and legal conclusions as hereinbefore discussed. 23
The observations of the trial court correctly show that the equities of this case also decidedly incline in favor of private respondents' cause.
While the contending cockpits both possess the qualifications as to distance, even from the standpoint of seniority the Coliseum enjoys the
distinct advantage of having been in operation since 1955 while the Gallera was established only in 1967. Also, the former is located in the
poblacion while the latter is in a barrio. These, and the other points already discussed, establish the right of private respondents' Coliseum to
be considered the municipal cockpit of Minglanilla, Cebu.
With the resolution of the foregoing decisive issues, it is not necessary to pass upon the other minutiae posed by the parties, some of which
are of dubious factual or probative value.
A note on a procedural aspect in this case is, however, in order. This action was initiated on a petition for declaratory relief, ostensibly for a
declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties under the laws and ordinances involved therein or invoked by them. Consequently, in
such special civil action the judgment does not essentially entail an executory process since generally, other than a declaration of such rights
and duties, 24 other affirmative reliefs, as these are understood in ordinary civil actions, are not sought by the proponent.
However, the Court has held that although the action is for a declaratory judgment but the allegations in the complaints are sufficient to make
out a case for specific performance25 or recovery of property 26 with claims for damages, and the defendants did not raise an issue in the trial
court to challenge the remedy or form of the action availed of, the court can grant such affirmative relief as may be warranted by the
evidence. This decisional rule applies to the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
385
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9325. May 30, 1956.]
ROSARIO MATUTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO B. MACADAEG, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, and ARMANDO
MEDEL, Respondents.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
In an action for legal separation brought by Armando Medel against Rosario Matute, upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother
and her brother-in-law, Ernesto Medel — which action was docketed as civil case No. 14190 of the Court of First Instance of Manila — decision
was, on November 6, 1952, rendered by the latter, finding Rosario guilty of the charge against her, decreeing said legal separation, and
awarding to Armando the custody of their four (4) minor children, Florencia, Manuel, Carmelita and Benito, all surnamed Medel, then 12, 10, 8
and 4 years of age, respectively. Thereafter, Armando went to the United States, leaving the children in the City of Davao under the care of his
sister Pilar Medel, in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned to the Philippines late in
1954. At the close of the then current school year, during which the children were enrolled in a school in Davao, or in March, 1955, they joined
their father in Cebu. With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila in April, 1955, to attend the funeral of her father. Armando
alleges that he consented thereto on condition that she would return the children to him within two (2) weeks. However, Rosario did not do
so. Instead, on June 10, 1955, she filed, in said civil case No. 14190, a motion the prayer of which is of the following
tenor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“WHEREFORE, movant respectfully prays this Honorable Court, after due hearing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“(1) to issue an order awarding the custody of the above-named children to the herein movant, their mother, in deference to the preference
expressed by the children (Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
“(2) to order Armando Medel, father of the said minor children, to support said children by paying their school fees and giving them a
reasonable allowance both items in an amount not less than P200 a month.”
Said motion was based upon the ground that the children — three (3) of whom, namely, Florencia, Manuel and Carmelita, were then 16, 14
and 12 years of age, respectively — do not want to go back to their father, because he “is living with a woman other than” their mother.
Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court, in view of her failure and
alleged refusal to restore the custody of their children to him. After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by Hon.
Higinio B. Macadaeg, Judge, issued an order, dated June 29, 1955, absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court, she having secured
Armando’s consent before bringing the children to Manila, but denying her motion for their custody and ordering her to deliver them to
Armando within twenty-four (24) hours from notice. The dispositive part of said order reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, motion for the custody of the minor children, Florencia, Manuel, Carmelita, and Benito, all surnamed Medel, is
hereby denied. Rosario Matute is hereby ordered to deliver to Armando Medel the persons of the said minor children, within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of copy of this Order.
“Let copies of this Order be served immediately by the Sheriff of this Court, not only on the lawyers appearing in this case, but also on the
parties themselves.”
Thereupon, Rosario instituted, against Armando and Judge Macadaeg, the present action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, upon the ground that said order of June 29, 1955, had been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no other plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. The prayer in her petition, is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction upon Petitioner’s filing a bond in such
sum as this Honorable Court may fix, ordering Respondents, their attorneys, agents and other persons acting by and under their orders to
cease and desist from enforcing in any way the order of the Respondent Court dated June 19, 1965, and after hearing, to annul the said Order
and to award the custody of the children to your Petitioner.
“Petitioner likewise prays for such other or further relief as may be just and equitable, without costs.”
Upon the filing of the petition, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction therein prayed for, without bond.
Briefly stated, Petitioner herein maintains that the children should be under her custody, because:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) she is their
legitimate mother and they wish to stay with her, not their father Armando Medel; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) three (3) of the children are
over ten (10) years of age, and, hence, their aforementioned wish must, pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules of Court, be heeded,
unless “the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge” of them “by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or
poverty”; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(3) the act of infidelity of which she had been found guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952, does not
involve “moral depravity”; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(4) in any event, it is a thing of the past, not a present reality; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(5) Respondent Armando Medel is now unfit to have the children under his care, for he is living maritally with a woman
by the name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (6) although he had married the latter, after securing in the United
States a decree of divorce dissolving his marriage with Petitioner herein, said decree is null and void and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy.
In the present action, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the merits of such pretense. The case before us is one of certiorari and
prohibition, governed by sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, end adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
386
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer as the law requires, with costs.
“SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal corporation board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial
or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the Defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or
matter specified therein, with costs.”
Pursuant to these provisions, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of prohibition lies unless the act complained of has been performed
“without or in excess of” jurisdiction “or with grave abuse of discretion”. There is no question but that Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue raised by Petitioner’s motion of June 10, 1955, for custody of the children, and the petition of Respondent Medel, dated
June 22, 1955, to declare Petitioner guilty of contempt of court, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary whether said custody should be retained
by Respondent Medel, as adjudged in the decision of November 6, 1952, or should be given to Petitioner herein. Which ever alternative taken
by Respondent Judge would not vitiate his choice as being “without or in excess” of jurisdiction. Whatever mistakes, if any, he may have
committed in the appraisal of the situation — on which we do not express our view — in determining the best solution to said issue or which
one of the litigants is best qualified or least disqualified to take charge of the children, would, at best, constitute “merely errors of judgment.”
They are not “errors of jurisdiction”, but errors in the exercise of the jurisdiction which the lower court admittedly had. Such errors do not
affect the legality or validity of the order complained of. They may be reviewed by appeal, not by writ of certiorari or prohibition. (Comments
on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. II, pp. 167 and 168).
Neither does the aforementioned order of June 29, 1955, involve a grave abuse of discretion for it merely enforces the award made in the
decision of November 6, 1952, which is admittedly final and executory. It is true that, insofar as it refers to the custody of the minor children,
said decision is never final, in the sense that it is subject to review at any time that the Court may deem it for the best interest of said minors. It
is no less true, however, that, unless and until reviewed and modified, said award must stand. No such modification having been made, at
yet, RespondentJudge had, not only the authority; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, also, the duty to execute and implement said award.
Furthermore, by virtue of said decision of November 6, 1952, Respondent had, admittedly, the custody of said minors. Petitioner merely
obtained his permission to bring them to Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather, which took place in
April, 1955. Thus, Petitioner obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. She holds it in the name, on behalf
and by authority of Respondent Medel, whose agent she, in effect, is. He may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to
comply immediately with such demand. She cannot even question his authority to make it, although she is free to seek a review of the order or
decision awarding the custody of the minors to him, and to ask that they be placed under her charge.
Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may choose which parent they
prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason of “moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity or poverty” (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court). Without deciding whether the adultery committed by herein Petitioner with her
own brother-in-law involves moral depravity, it is clear to our mind that the affirmative assumption implicit in the order complained of cannot
be characterized as an “abuse of discretion”, much less a “grave” one.
Lastly, said order further declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw The facts remains that Defendant-movant is without means of livelihood and, according to her own admission, she lives on the charity
of her brothers. She has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only she would shelter them under the roof of her brothers.”
and the substantial accuracy of this statement is not contested. We are not prepared to hold, that a grave abuse of discretion was committed
when the lower court impliedly deduced, from these circumstances, that “poverty”, among other causes, rendered Petitioner unfit to take
charge of her children or made it unwise to place them under her care.
Wherefore, without prejudice to such appropriate action as Petitioner may deem fit to take for the purpose of securing a review of the order
of Respondent Judge of June 29, 1955, or a modification of the award made in the decision of November 6, 1952, relative to the custody of the
children, or both, the petition is denied and the case dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved, with
costs against the Petitioner. It is SO ORDERED.
387
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3430 August 7, 1906
ROCHA & CO., Sociedad en Comandita, plaintiff,

vs.
A. S. CROSSFIELD, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and FRANCISCO T. FIGUERAS,defendants.
Chicote and Miranda, for plaintiff.

Coudert Brothers, for defendants.
WILLARD, J.:
On the 25th of January, 1906 Francisco T. Figueras, one of the defendants, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action
against Rocha & Co. in which he alleged, among other things, that in 1898 a limited partnership had been formed under the name of "Carman
& Co.;" that he and two others were general partners and that there were various special partners; that in accordance with the terms of the
articles of partnership any one of the partners had the right to withdrawn from the partnership upon six months' notice; that upon giving the
said notice his participation in the profits of the partnership should cease but that his capital should draw interest at the market rate until it
was returned, and that it should be returned in four installments, one part upon giving notice, the second part six months after the notice, the
third part twelve months after the notice, and the fourth part eighteen months after the notice. He further alleged that on the withdraw from
the partnership and waived his right to receive at the time the fourth part of his capital and consented that the fourth part should be paid at
the end of six months. It was further alleged that on the 15th day of February, 1904, the partnership of Carman & Co., was reorganized under
the name of Rocha & Co., which latter company assumed all the debts and liabilities of Carman & Co., and took possession of all its assets.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's participation in the business consisted (1) of the capital which he had paid in, P12,000 (2) his
proportionate part of a reserve fund, and (3) his proportionate part of a sinking fund, and that he was entitled to receive from the partnership
the sum of P51,484.17; that the partnership alleged that his interest did not exceed P34,218.22, and on the 2d day of August, 1904, the
partnership paid, and the plaintiff received, one-fourth of the amount which the partnership admitted that the plaintiff was entitled to.
The prayer of the complaint is as follows:
Therefore the plaintiff prays that judgment be granted in his favor in the amount of P43,574.95, with interest at 6 per cent per
annum from August 2, 1904, and costs of this action.
There was no allegation in the complaint that the partnership of Carman & Co., was dissolved by the withdrawal of Figueras, nor was there any
allegation that after that withdrawal he was the owner of an undivided or of any interest in the physical property which belonged to the
partnership and which consisted of lorchas, launches, and cascos, nor was there any allegation that he had any lien upon any of this property.
It is apparent that the real controversy between the parties is over the right of Figueras to receive his proportionate part of the reserve fund
and of the sinking fund.
Notwithstanding the want of these allegations, Figueras, after the presentation complaint and after the defendants had demurred thereto,
made an application to the court below for the appointment of a receiver of the property of Rocha & Co. A receiver was appointed who
afterwards took possession of the entire property of Rocha & Co., and thereupon Rocha & Co., commenced this original action of certiorari in
this court, asking that the proceedings in reference to the appointment of a receiver be certified of this court and that after such certification
they be examined and that the order appointing the receiver be declared void because the court making it had no jurisdiction to appoint such
receiver. A preliminary injunction was granted by one of the justices of this court restraining the receiver and the defendants in this action
from taking further proceedings in the matter during the pendency thereof.
The defendants, having been cited, appeared and answered the complaint, admitting practically all of the facts alleged therein, a hearing was
had upon said complaint and answer, and order was made by this court requiring the court below to send to it all of the proceedings in the
case relating to the appointment of the receiver. Those proceedings have been remitted, a hearing has been had thereon, and the case is now
before us for final disposition.
Section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows:
SEC. 174. When a receiver may be appointed. — A receiver may be appointed in the following cases:
(1) When a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate
rights.
(2) Where it is made to appear by the complaint or answer, and by such other proof as the judge may require, that the party making
the application for the appointment of receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action and it shown
388
that the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured unless a receiver shall be appointed to guard and
preserve it.
(3) In an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgaged where it appears that the property is in danger of being wasted
or materially injured and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.
(4) Whenever in other cases it shall be made to appear to the court that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and
feasible means of preserving and administering the property which is the subject of litigation during the pendency of the action.
The case at bar does not fall within any of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint, as has been before stated, that
the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Rocha & Co., nor is there any allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there any facts
alleged in the complaint from which it could be inferred that he was owner of such property or had any lien thereon. On the contrary, from the
facts that are alleged in the complaint it would seem that his separation from the partnership of Carman & Co., left that partnership as a going
concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions of the articles of partnership which are referred to in the complaint is that after the
withdrawal of any partner the remaining partners became the owners of all the assets of the partnership and he became a general creditor of
the partnership.
After this action had been commenced in this court, and after a preliminary injunction had been issued as aforesaid, Figueras applied to the
court below for leave to amend his complaint in the action therein opening and such leave was granted. This amendment, having been made
after the action was commenced in this court and after a receiver was appointed, can not be considered.
In one of the orders made by the court below relating to the receiver, its authority for making it was based on paragraphs 2 and 4 of section
174 of the Code of Civil Procedure above quoted. In a subsequent order this ground was abandoned and the appointment was based on
paragraph 1 of said section, the court holding that a special partnership was corporation within the meaning of said section 174. This claim can
not be sustained and, in fact, it was not urged in the argument of this case in this court.
The case not being one in which a receiver could be appointed, the order making such appointment was void and was beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, although that court had jurisdiction of the main action has been settled adversely to the defendants in this suit by the case of
Bonaplata vs. Ambler (2 Phil. Rep., 392). (See also Encarnacion vs. Ambler,1 2 Off Gaz., 490; Findlay & Co., vs. Ambler,2 2 Off. Gaz., 491).
That certiorari is the proper remedy in such a case was decided in the case of Blanco vs. Ambler3 (2 Off. Gaz., 281, 492.)
In the argument in this court it was claimed that this extraordinary remedy would not lie because the plaintiff, Rocha & Co., had a right to
appeal from the order appointing a receiver, although that appeal could not be taken until a final judgment had been entered in the case. That
argument is answered by what is said in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (Phil. Rep., 404).
The order of the court below appointing a receiver in this case was illegal and void, and it all proceedings taken therein are hereby annulled.
Let judgment be entered to that effect in favor of the plaintiff in this action and against the defendants, and with costs against the defendant,
Figueras. At the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith. So ordered.
389
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134913 January 19, 2001
ZAIPAL D. BENITO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IBRAHIM PAGAYAWAN, and the MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CALANOGAS, LANAO DEL
SUR, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of an en banc Resolution1 dated
August 10, 1998 by the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for brevity) which dismissed SPA No. 98-333, a petition to
declare a failure of elections and to call for a special elections in several precincts in the Municipality of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur.
The facts are:
Petitioner ZAIPAL D. BENITO and private respondent IBRAHIM PAGAYAWAN were two (2) of eight (8) candidates vying for the position of
municipal mayor in Calanogas, lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. Of the municipality's election precincts, five (5) were clustered
in Sultan Disimban Elementary School. These were precincts 15A (Barangay Tagoranao), 6A/6A1 (Barangay Luguna), 17A (Barangay Tambak),
2A/2A1 (Barangay Calalanoan), and 13A (Barangay Pindulonan). The election in the first three (3), namely precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A are
the subject of BENITO's petition to declare failure of elections filed before the respondent COMELEC.1âwphi1.nêt
On the day of the election, voting started peacefully at the polling place. Shortly before noon, however, the proceedings were interrupted
when some thirty (30) armed men appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed panic among the voters and
election officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. A spot report2 issued by the commanding officer of the Alfa Company,
28th Infantry Battalion, 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army, Captain Benedicto S. Manquiquis summarized the incident in the following
manner:
00a 1113009 May 98, election held at Sultan Disimban Elem School comprising Brgys Luguna, Calalanoan, Pindolonan, Tagoranao,
and Tambak. All of Calanogas Lanao del Sur was suspended when more or less 30 armed men with cal. 30 LMG under Mayoralty
candidate Jabbar Macapodi Maruhom fired shots on the air which cause the voters and BEIs to scamper in different direction
(signed)
BENEDICTO S. MANQUIQUIS
CAPT (INF) PA
CO, "A" CO, ISIB, 4ID
Both parties contest alleged events transpiring after the interruption of the voting. By petitioner's account, the ballot boxes and
other election materials were taken to the municipal hall by the military forces providing security. From then on, the voting allegedly
never resumed, even when voters who had not yet cast their ballots returned to their respective polling places after the lawless
elements had left.
In direct opposition, private respondent avers that voting in fact resumed when the armed men left at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. There were no further untoward incidents until voting closed at 3:00 o'clock. As proof, private respondent submitted a
"Final Incident Report"3 issued by the same Captain Manquiquis, the full text of which is hereunder reproduced.
"HEADQUARTERS
ALFA COMPANY, 28TH INFANTRY BATTALION, 4TH INF DIV, PA
Calanugas, Lanao del Sur
28A-
11 May 1998
SUBJECT: Final Incident Report
TO: Atty. Wynnie Asdala

Head, COMELEC Task Force Team
Marawi City
390
THRU: Acting Election Officer
Calanugas, Lanao del Sur
1. 00A 111200H May 98, election held at Sultan Disimban Elementary School comprising Brgys Laguna,
Calalanoan, Pindulonan, Tagoranao and Tambak all of Calanugas, Lanao del Sur was suspended when more or
less thirty (30) armed men equipped with HPFAs including Cal. .30 LMG under Mayoralty Candidate Jabbar
Macapodi Maruhom fired shots on the air which cause the voters and BEIs to scamper into different directions.
2. That about one (1) hour thereafter, the voting resumed in an orderly and peaceful manner until about 1500H
same day without any trouble or untoward incident. After 1500H when no voter was in the premises of the
voting precincts, the casting of votes was closed by the different BEIs.
(signed)
BENEDICTO S.
MANQUIQUIS
CAPT (INF) PA
Commanding Officer
These turn of events, notwithstanding, the ballot boxes for the five (5) precincts in Disimban Elementary School were taken together with
those from the nineteen (19) other precincts of Calanogas, to Marawi City for counting. The votes from precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A were
excluded upon objection by petitioner's counsel who, it is claimed, arrived only after the ballots from the other nineteen (19) precincts had
already been tabulated.
After counting, these results emerged:
CANDIDATE NO. OF VOTES
Ibrahim Pagayawan 927
Zaipal Benito 879
Amoran Macaborod 524
Jabbar Maruhom (no data available)
Private respondent won over petitioner by forty-eight (48) votes.
On the other hand, the total votes cast for the three (3) excluded precincts numbered forty-one (41) only, which is broken down as follows:
PRECINCT NO. OF REGISTERED VOTES VOTES CAST
15A 177 1
6A/6A1 225 19
17A 188 21
TOTAL 590 41
Considering that private respondent would still lead petitioner by seven (7) votes even if all forty-one (41) votes from the three (3) excluded
precincts were counted in the latter's favor, private respondent was proclaimed mayor of Calanogas.
On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed an amended petition4 to declare failure of election and to call a special elections in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1
and 17A, docketed as SPA No. 98-333. He also filed a separate petition5 for the annulment of the proclamation of private respondent,
docketed as SPC No. 98-159.
391
On June 15, 1998, the COMELEC issued an Order6 consolidating SPC No. 98-159 with SPA No. 98-333. On June 29, 1998, it also issued
Resolution No. 30497 wherein SPA No. 98-333 and SPA No. 98-159 were included among those cases certified as active even beyond June 30,
1998.
Abbreviating the proceedings, after the parties had filed their respective answers, replies, memoranda, and other related pleadings, on August
10, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Precincts 6A/6A1, 15A and 17A functioned on
11 May 1998 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur is hereby ordered to reconvene and count
the remaining uncounted votes for the three precincts aforementioned. Thereafter, they shall proclaim the three other un-
proclaimed municipal councilors and enter the correct votes garnered by the parties in the Consolidation of Votes and Proclamation.
Considering that the remaining uncounted votes will no longer affect the lead of the winning candidate for the position of mayor,
the Commission hereby affirms the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Calanogas, Lanao del Sur.
The following issues are submitted for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
(A) IN DISMISSING THE PETITION OF PETITIONER DOCKETED AS SPA NO. 98-333 (INCLUDING SPC 98-159 WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED
TO SPA 98-333 BY ORDER OF THE COMELEC ON JUNE 10, 1998) FOR LACK OF MERIT AND (B) IN DECLARING THAT THE ELECTIONS IN
PRECINCTS 6A & 6A1, 15A AND 17A HAVE CONTINUED AN HOUR AFTER THEY WERE SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED
FINAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN MANQUIQUIS;
IN NOT HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NOS. 15A, 6A & 6A1 AND 17A ON GROUND OF FAILURE OF ELECTION OR OF A
SUSPENDED ELECTION BEFORE THE CLOSING OF THE VOTING AT 3:00 O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTION
DAY ON GROUND OF THREATS, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM; AND
IN NOT ANNULLING THE CERTIFICATE OF PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DATED MAY 15, 1998.
It is the COMELEC en banc which has the exclusive power to postpone, to declare a failure of election, or to call a special election.8 In relation
thereto, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code9 provides:
SEC. 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting,
or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding
or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause
of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Elucidating on the aforesaid provision, we held in Hassan v. Commission on Elections10 that two (2) pre-conditions must exist before a failure of
election may be declared, thus: (1) no voting has been held in any precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the
votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes
or on the day of the election.11
Coming to the merits of the petition, we are not sufficiently persuaded that the public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
denying BENITO's petition to declare a failure of election in precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and 17A of Calanogas. Grave abuse of discretion means
"such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."12 It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in
the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.13
It is obvious at the outset that petitioner raises issues foreign to the remedy he seeks. He avers that a failure of elections must be declared in
the precincts in question since the voting therein was interrupted by the sudden and threatening arrival of armed goons of a rival candidate.
He unequivocally states that there was never any resumption of voting since the ballot boxes and other election materials were taken into
custody by the military and brought to the municipal hall. In contrast, it is private respondent's contention that, in truth, voting resumed
peacefully at about one o'clock in the afternoon on election day or after the departure of the armed men. It is clear to us that whether there
was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.14
392
In the same vein, neither may petitioner ask us to judge which of the two (2) incident reports issued by Captain Manquiquis should be given
more credence. In this connection, it will not be amiss to point out that the purported inconsistency between the two reports appear to be
more imaginary than real. Petitioner characterizes the final incident report as "a product of falsification" on the ground that its alleged time
and date of execution was at "OOA 111200H May 98" whereas the handwritten spot report was prepared at "OOa 111300H May 98." How
then, petitioner bewails, could such a final report have been issued ahead of the initial report? We disagree with petitioner; we have read the
final incident report and conclude that the time stated therein referred not to the time of execution of the said report but to the time of the
occurrence of the incident. We note that this is an approximation of the time when the armed strangers appeared and disrupted the
theretofore peaceful conduct of the elections.
Similarly, nor would it be proper for us to pass upon the authenticity of the contradictory affidavits supposedly executed by the members of
the board of election inspectors of the affected precincts. Both parties seek to introduce into evidence affidavits ostensibly executed by the
same persons yet whose recitations are contradictory to each other. As regards the incident reports, evaluation of evidentiary matters is
beyond the province of a writ of certiorari.15 In any event, we find that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to give
credit to either party's version. Naturally, petitioner and private respondent attest to the authenticity of the affidavits favorable to them. To
illustrate, petitioner insists that the genuineness of the affidavits attached to the amended petition he filed before the COMELEC is allegedly
confirmed by the second set of affidavits16 in turn repudiating those relied upon by private respondent in his answer.17 Just as the COMELEC
was reluctant to treat petitioner's claim as gospel truth, so too do we hesitate to accord weight to this rigmarole of sworn statements. As aptly
held by the COMELEC,
In his reply, petitioner vehemently denied the allegation of respondent that the voting in the three precincts continued. He again
presented the affidavits of the members of the different BEIs saying that they did not execute the affidavits presented by respondent
Pagayawan and that their signatures therein were forged. On its face, however, the signatures appear to have been made by the
same persons. This notwithstanding, WE shall not base our resolution of this case on the affidavits submitted by the members of the
different BEIs for the reason that they are contradictory to each other but rather on the merits of the pleadings and other evidences
presented.
In dismissing BENITO'S petition for lack of merit, the COMELEC further ruled thus:
It is noteworthy to mention that of all the five precincts whose elections were held in Disimban Elementary School, petitioner Benito
claimed only three precincts failed to function therein. In fact he reiterated this in his reply though averring that he has no objection
to Macaborod's prayer that failure of election be likewise declared in precinct nos. 2A/2A1 and 13A and that special election be also
held therein. Records of the case per pleadings of the parties show that results of the elections in nineteen (19) precincts our of the
twenty two (22) precincts were already counted. Verification on the project of precincts also showed that there were actually five
precincts whose polling places were in Disimban Elementary School. Per report of the Acting Election Officer of Calanogas, it was
only the counting of votes in precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17a which was actually objected to by the counsels of petitioner. The strong
objections to the counting of the three precincts prompted by Atty. Wynne Asdala (COMELEC TASK FORCE) and Col. Atienza (PA) to
suspend the counting of votes for the municipality of Calanogas.
The Commission gives more weight to the report made by Captain Manquiquis whose final report to the Commission says that the
voting resumed an hour after the firing occurred which disrupted the voting in all the five precincts clustered in Disimban Elementary
School. His final report dated 11 May 1998 confirms that no failure of elections in the five precincts occurred. This is buttressed by
the fact that counsels of petitioner and all other parties and candidates during the counting did not question the counting of votes
for precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A whose polling place were also in the same school. This fact gives us the impression that indeed voting
in all the five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in Disimban Elem. School. There was no objection raised to
the count of votes in the said two precincts during the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the
three precincts herein? Even candidate Macaborod did not object to the count o the other two precincts namely 2A/2A1 and 13A. If
votes for precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A were counted, the same must also be done for precincts 6A/6A1, 15A, and 17A notwithstanding
the fact that only very few voters cast their votes. The disruption of voting in all these precincts was caused by the same act: firing
guns to intimidate all the voters therein to stop them from casting their votes. If voters in these precincts really wanted to vote, they
could have done so after the cessation of the terroristic acts. In precinct 15A, at 11:45 A.M., only one vote was cast therein. Lack of
interest may have been the problem herein that the cause alluded to by petitioner.
After a careful consideration of the parties' submissions, we find that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying BENITO's
petition to declare a failure to election and to call a special election. It is indeed odd that petitioner singles out only precincts 15A, 6A/6A1 and
17A as the subjects of his petition when there were two (2) other precincts in the same school.18 It was only in his reply with
memorandum19 did he signify his lack of objection to a declaration of failure of election in precincts 2A/2A1 and 13A, as prayed for by
candidate Amoran Macaborod's answer with counter-petition.20 Likewise, he never objected to the inclusion of the two (2) other precincts
during the canvassing and counting of votes.
Petitioner attempts to overcome the oversight by alleging that he had no opportunity to object thereto because his counsel, Atty. Hussein N.
Mambuay, was not present, allegedly because the latter did not possess the prescribed identification for lawyers. In this regard, we have
reviewed the record and we concur with private respondent that this claim of petitioner appears to be a mere afterthought. Petitioner never
raised this particular issue in his earlier pleadings filed with the COMELEC. Be that as it may, his counsel should have exercised more prudence
in securing beforehand his proper identification papers.1âwphi1.nêt
393
In a sense, petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the number of registered voters in the subject
election precincts. However,
[t]here can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it
can be determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes,
regardless of the actual number of ballots cast. Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. xxxx21
As we also explained in Sardea v. Commission on Elections,22
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care and only under circumstances which
demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great
body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise [citations omitted]
xxx xxx xxx xxx
There is failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people
is determinable, the same must as far as possible be respected.
A final observation: petitioner should not ask us to declare a failure of elections in the questioned precincts simply because public respondent
COMELEC declared a failure in other precincts in Lanao del Sur. In the recently decided case of Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections,23 we
unanimously24 upheld the very same Omnibus Order25dated July 14, 1998 relied upon by petitioner, on these premises:
Petitioner's argument that respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by failing to declare a total failure of elections in the
entire province of Lanao del Sur and to certify the same to the President and Congress so that the necessary legislation may be
enacted for the holding of a special election, likewise fails to persuade.
No less than the petitioner himself concedes that there was total failure of elections in twelve (12) municipalities and partial failure
in eleven (11). Yet he now insists a total failure of elections should have been declared in the entire province of Lanao del Sur. Suffice
it to state that the propriety of declaring whether or not there has been a total failure of elections in the entire province of Lanao del
Sur is a factual issue which this Court will not delve into considering that the COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is
in the best position to assess the actual conditions prevailing in that area. Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
findings of fact of the COMELEC or any administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on
the Court. There is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule in this case.
Hence, in view of all the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the Resolution of COMELEC under review.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
394
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 138792-804. March 31, 2005
DANTE GUEVARRA, AUGUSTUS F. CESAR and ADRIANO SALVADOR, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENAIDA P. PIA and CRESENCIANO D.
GATCHALIAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999 in Criminal Case Nos. 23082,
23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097, ordering the reinstatement of said criminal cases.
Cresenciano Gatchalian and Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint2 for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 with the Office of the Ombudsman against the administrators of PUP, namely, petitioners Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, the
President, Dr. Dante Guevarra, the Vice-President for Administration and Finance, Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, Administrative Officer V, and Mr.
Adriano A. Salvador, the Acting Chief of the Accounting Office. The charges were made in connection with certain questionable transactions
entered into by the PUP. A special audit team of the Commission on Audit (COA) had, likewise, conducted a special audit of selected
transactions, and its findings were contained in SAO-SOG Report No. 93-19. The case was docketed as COA Case No. 92-290. Petitioner Olonan
submitted a copy of the said report, the Memorandum of the COA Review Panel, and her request for reconsideration of the findings of the
special audit team in the said report.
An Information was, thereafter, filed in the Sandiganbayan against all the accused, including petitioner Olonan. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about 1989 and for a period subsequent thereto, in Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, a public officer, being then the President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (P.U.P.),
accused Dr. Dante G. Guevarra, likewise a public officer, being then the Vice-President for Administration and Finance, of the P.U.P., accused
Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, also a public officer, being then an Administrative Officer V of the P.U.P., and accused Adriano A. Salvador, a public
officer too, being then the Acting Chief of the Accounting Division of the P.U.P., taking advantage of their positions and the offense being
committed in relation to their office, acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality with a single criminal intent, and all together,
conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, commit the following acts, to wit:
1. After the construction of eight school buildings with a total cost of ₱20,912,229.31, allow the non-turnover of unused construction materials
and scrap construction materials to the P.U.P.;
2. Make an overpayment of ₱1,107,056.45 as terminal leave benefits to Dr. Nemesio Prudente;
3. Make a payment of ₱1.74 Million to 64 employees of the Bureau of Construction (B.O.C.), Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), which amount is over and above the prescribed fees for technical and supervision services, and also make honoraria payments to 19
P.U.P. officials in the amount of ₱556,367.00 without legal basis;
4. Incur an overpayment of ₱133,200.00 on a parcel of land in Lopez, Quezon Province, by failing to register on time a Deed of Donation
covering 1,332 square meters of the aforestated property, which was embodied in a Deed of Sale covering 15,919 square meters of land;
5. Make payments in the total amount of ₱10,646,230.28 based on blind certifications in violation of Sec. 46 of P.D. 1177, the names of
creditors submitted to the DBM for purposes of cash allocation, being different from the names of the creditors in the Schedule of Accounts
payable;
6. Make payment for the purchase of curtains for the C.M. Recto Auditorium, exceeding the required quantity of 159 yards worth ₱27,462.00;
7. Make payments with a total amount of ₱167,627.13 with the necessary documents to validate payments thereto in the: repainting of the
elevated concrete tank; floor sanding and varnishing of the gymnasium; renovation of the four (4) tennis courts; and repair and painting of the
Pacia Board High School Building; and
8. Make an overpayment of ₱1.99 Million when six change-work orders in the construction of the library building were imposed with the
indirect cost of 19% instead of only 16%;
thus, causing undue injury to the government in the aforestated amounts, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
395
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 22854 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. On motion of the Special
Prosecutor, the arraignment of the accused was reset to November 14, 1995.4
Graft Investigation Officer II Evelina S. Maglanoc-Reyes, recommended that the charges be dismissed.5 However, the Ombudsman disapproved
this recommendation and adopted that of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero D. Jurado, Jr., dated July 28, 1995, to charge the accused with 17
counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.6 The accused filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution.
Meanwhile, Special Prosecution Officer I Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili reviewed the recommendation of Jurado, and submitted a Memorandum to
the Ombudsman recommending that 17 Informations be filed against all the accused, and that the Information in Criminal Case No. 22854 be
withdrawn. Hence, the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No. 22854 7 dated January 8, 1996. Appended thereto
were the 17 Informations adverted to by the Special Prosecutor.
On January 12, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Case No. 22854. The bond posted by the accused was,
likewise, cancelled.8 On February 28, 1996, Agcaoili submitted a Memorandum9 to the Office of the Ombudsman recommending that the 17
Informations be maintained.
It appears, however, that the recommendation of Agcaoili was referred to retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen, a
Special Assistant in the Office of the Ombudsman, for review. On May 24, 1996, Justice Marigomen submitted a Report 10 recommending the
dropping of some of the charges against petitioner Olonan, and her retention as one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and
23098. The Ombudsman approved the recommendation.11
On June 4, 1996, the COA rendered a decision12 in Case No. 92-290 granting the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Olonan in SAO-SOG
Report No. 93-19 and exonerating her of the charges therein. On August 15, 1996, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution13 requiring the
Prosecutor to inform the Court when the Ombudsman received the decision of the COA in Case No. 92-290 and whether the said decision will
alter the position of the prosecution.
On November 27, 1997, the Special Prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion14 praying, inter alia, that the arraignment of all the accused in
Criminal Case No. 23098 proceed as scheduled. They, likewise, manifested that, based on the recommendation of retired Justice Marigomen,
dated May 24, 1996, 13 cases filed against the accused, specifically Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090,
23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097 were recommended for dismissal; he had no objection to the withdrawal of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 23097 since it was merely a repetition of Criminal Case No. 23096; and with respect to the remaining four cases, it appears
that one of them, specifically Criminal Case No. 23095 (withholding of RATA of Buscaino), was recommended for dismissal; in regard to the
three cases, Criminal Case No. 23083 (blind certification); Criminal Case No. 23088 (floor sanding and varnishing of gymnasium) and Criminal
Case No. 23098 (irregular payment of salary of COA Auditors), it appears that petitioner Olonan’s participation was undisputed.15The accused
opposed the motion.
During the hearing of November 28, 1997, the graft court consequently, directed the Special Prosecutor to file the appropriate motion with
reference to the 13 criminal cases.16 On January 8, 1998, the Prosecutor filed a Joint Reply to the pleadings of the accused, appending thereto
the Report of Justice Marigomen.17 On January 26, 1998, the graft court issued an Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085,
23086, 23087, and 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094 and 23096 to 23097; and, with reference to Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088
and 23098, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was given a period of 30 days within which to further review the records of the said cases and
to report to the graft court, within the same period, its findings and recommendation, and the Ombudsman’s action thereon, more specifically
as to whether the said cases should proceed to trial or should be dismissed. The said order was purportedly based on the recommendation of
Justice Marigomen which was cited by the Special Prosecutor in his Manifestation and Motion.
Consequently, the graft court held in abeyance the arraignment of petitioners Olonan, Cesar and Salvador in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088
and 23098 until further assignment. Likewise, the consideration of the "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite" dated December 3, 1995
was held in abeyance until the graft court had received the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor containing its findings and
recommendations in Criminal Case Nos. 23083, 23088 and 23098, and the Ombudsman’s final action thereon.18
When the Special Prosecutor received a copy of the Order of January 26, 1998, he filed, on February 20, 1998, a motion for the partial
reconsideration of the order contending that, in his report, Justice Marigomen merely recommended that only petitioner Olonan be dropped
as one of the accused persons in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096
and 23097; that the said cases should be maintained as against the three other accused; that the inclusion of accused Olonan in Criminal Case
Nos. 23082, 23088 and 23098 remain undisturbed; and that Criminal Case Nos. 23095 should be dismissed.19
The Special Prosecutor reasoned out that, as gleaned from the Memorandum of retired Justice Marigomen, the recommendation of dropping
of the 13 criminal cases applied only to petitioner Olonan. Hence, there was no legal and factual basis for the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases
as against petitioners Guevarra, Cesar and Salvador.20
The Special Prosecutor then prayed that the January 26, 1998 Order of the graft court, dismissing the above-mentioned cases against the
petitioners, be reconsidered, and the 13 cases filed against them be reinstated.21
396
The petitioners opposed the motion, contending that the January 26, 1998 Order of the graft court had become final and executory. Since no
appeal or a motion for reconsideration thereof was filed within the period therefor, the order of the graft court was based on no less than the
Manifestation and Motion of the Special Prosecutor.
On April 6, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion of the Special Prosecutor and modified its January 26, 1998
Order. The graft court set aside its Order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092,
23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097 as against the petitioners and ordered the reinstatement of the said cases as against them. 22
The graft court declared that, while the motion of the Special Prosecutor was filed three days beyond the period therefor, nevertheless, it
granted the motion in the interest of substantial justice.23
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, assailing the April 6, 1999 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan where the following issues are raised:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REINSTATING THE THIRTEEN (13) CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS ON THE BASIS OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTION FILED BEYOND THE FIFTEEN-
DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
ON THE BASIS SOLELY OF THE GROUNDS CITED BY THE PROSECUTION. 24
The petitioners aver that under Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan, respondent People of the Philippines, as plaintiff, had only 15 days from notice of the graft court’s final order within which to
file a motion for the reconsideration thereof. The petitioners also assert that under Section 2, Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
respondent People of the Philippines, had only 15 days from receipt of notice of the final order or the resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration thereof within which to file a petition for review with this Court. The failure of the respondent People of the Philippines to file
the said motion within the period therefor rendered the order issued by the graft court final and executory. As such, no matter how erroneous
the said orders may have been, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to set aside or nullify them. Citing the ruling of this Court
in Icao v. Apalisok,25 the petitioners posit that the rule applies even to criminal cases. They further posit that penal laws should be observed
strictly against the State. The petitioners point out that the Special Prosecutor has not cited any justification for his failure to file the motion
for partial reconsideration within the period therefore, given the fact that he was present when the graft court issued its order in open court
on January 26, 1998, dismissing the 13 cases.
The petitioners further assert that in resolving whether to dismiss the 13 cases or not, it behooved the respondent People of the Philippines
and the Sandiganbayan to consider not only the Report of Justice Marigomen, but also the decision of the COA in Case No. 92-290.
In its comment on the petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts that the general rule that the periods prescribed to do certain acts
must be followed is subject to exceptional circumstances. A delay may be excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity, and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction. The respondent emphasized that when the graft court gave a verbal order dismissing the 13 cases during the
hearing of January 26, 1998, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto. The respondent argues that the graft court did not commit any grave
abuse of its discretion in issuing its April 6, 1999 Resolution, and insists that it acted in the interest of substantial justice when it rectified its
January 26, 1998 Order upon realizing that it erred in dismissing the 13 cases on the basis of the Report of Justice Marigomen since it did not
contain any such recommendation of dismissal.
In their reply, the petitioners insist that substantial justice alone without any justification of the respondent’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period should not prevail over the clearly laid down policy on finality of judgment and rules on
reglementary period.
The petition has no merit.
The petitioners are correct in claiming that an order or resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering the dismissal of criminal cases becomes final
and executory upon the lapse of 15 days from notice thereof to the parties, and, as such, is beyond the jurisdiction of the graft court to review,
modify or set aside, if no appeal therefrom is filed by the aggrieved party. However, if the Sandiganbayan acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the dismissal is null and void. A
tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal,
being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. 26 A void judgment or order has no legal and
binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.27 Such judgment or order may be resisted in any
action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may
simply be ignored.28
In the present case, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of its jurisdiction
when it issued the Order of January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases based on the Manifestation and Motion of the Special
Prosecutor, which was, in turn, based on the report of retired Court of Appeals Justice Marigomen. The records further show that the report of
Justice Marigomen was triggered by the Recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer I Cicero Jurado, Jr., dated July 28, 1995,
recommending that the 17 charges against the accused be maintained which, in effect, denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner
397
Olonan. The report of Justice Marigomen did not delve into and resolve the matter of the retention or dismissal of the 13 criminal cases
against the petitioners precisely because the same was not referred to him for study and recommendation. Hence, Justice Marigomen merely
recommended that petitioner Olonan be dropped as accused in the 13 criminal cases, and that her inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083,
23088 and 23098 be maintained, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby recommended that movant Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan be dropped as one of the accused persons in Criminal Case Nos.
23082, 23084, 23085, 23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097. Her inclusion in Criminal Case Nos. 23083,
23088 and 23098 shall remain undisturbed. The entire Criminal Case No. 23095 should be dismissed.29
The Sandiganbayan was well aware of Justice Marigomen’s report since the Special Prosecutor appended a copy thereof to his Joint Reply filed
on January 8, 1998, in compliance with the graft court’s Order of December 10, 1997.
The Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of the 13 cases as against the petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor on its
erroneous perception that Justice Marigomen recommended in his report the dismissal of the 13 cases against the petitioners. By its Order,
the graft court deprived the respondent People of the Philippines of its right to due process. In fine, the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and committed grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners. 30 Hence, its Order dated
January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases, as against the petitioners, was null and void; 31 it may thus be rectified, as did the graft court,
per its Resolution dated April 6, 1999 despite the lapse of fifteen days from notice of the Special Prosecutor of its January 26, 1998 Order. By
rectifying its void Order, it cannot be said that the graft court acted with grave abuse of its discretion, amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
Indeed, in so doing, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with law. It bears stressing that the State, like the accused, is also entitled to due
process of law. Not too long ago, the Court emphasized that:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and
an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. 32
The Special Prosecutor must share the blame with the Sandiganbayan because in his Manifestation and Motion, the Special Prosecutor averred
therein that Justice Marigomen recommended the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases against all the accused, without specifically stating therein
that the recommendation for dismissal pertained only to petitioner Olonan, and not to the other accused who are the petitioners herein. The
Special Prosecutor should have been more precise and forthright so as not to mislead the graft court.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999, is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
398
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN
ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded
Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case,
the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain
situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area
of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the
parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended.
The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as
amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing
zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the
premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent flied its answer.
At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue
to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on
April 2, 1981.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the
properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The
respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to
the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the
fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner Med a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of February 19, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report
on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to file
its objection to the Commissioner's Report.
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the
trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed
amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another
way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the
applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint
399
commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in
order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property
owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to
be heard before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the
property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher
administrative boards, is valid and constitutional.
Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this Court has interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution and
established the meaning, under the fundametal law, of just compensation and who has the power to determine it. Thus, in the following cases,
wherein the filing of the expropriation proceedings were all commenced prior to the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees, we laid
down the doctrine onjust compensation:
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),
xxx xxx xxx
"And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando,
reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything
beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which
is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity."
Garcia v. Court ofappeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
xxx xxx xxx
"Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it
is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All
the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in
estimating its value."
Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
"According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record
(Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286)."
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set aside the above and many other precedents hammered out in the
course of evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously deliberated, and judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees
categorically and peremptorily limited the definition of just compensation thus:
P.D. No. 76:
xxx xxx xxx
"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the
current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor,
whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In determining just compensation which
private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower."
P.D. No. 794:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. — In determining just compensation when private
property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower."
400
P.D. No. 1533:
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation
to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or
determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property."
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the
instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by
the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that
a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be
nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and
its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245), this Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224
and 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing Authority contended that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be
lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent's property under section 92 of P.D. No. 464. On the other
hand, the private respondent stressed that while there may be basis for the allegation that the respondent judge did not follow the decree, the
matter is still subject to his final disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his judicial discretion
in the light of the constitutional clauses on due process and equal protection.
To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled ihat under the conceded facts, there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be
applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocably calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks
in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize that the
rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional
provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained
uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President
himself did not seem assured or confident with his own enactment. It was not enough to lay down the law on determination of just
compensation in P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D.
1259 and P.D. 1313. Inspite of its effectivity as general law and the wide publicity given to it, the questioned provision or an even stricter
version had to be embodied in cases of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the Tambunting Estate and P.D. 1670
expropriating the Sunog Apog area in Tondo, Manila.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same
provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of
what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection to the commissioner's report, the trial court said:
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just compensation of these properties
under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover
from expropriating authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the
province, plus consequential damages — including attorney's fees — from which the consequential benefits, if any should be
deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for determining just
compensation which the Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving at 'just compensation,' as envisage in the Constitution.
In the words of Justice Barredo, "Respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing short of an
unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of
independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing." (Lina v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344, 351; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of
Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80 SCRA 117) Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of just
compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower, it may
result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by
401
the Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of
taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that the
judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, 462;
citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes,
supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal,
later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in
figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below
the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors
are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual
differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or
other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three
classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal
clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is
made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the
judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR 2d,733,742):
"In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that
'one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel must be furnished counsel by the State,' conceded that '[E]xpressions in the opinions
of this court lend color to the argument. . .' 316 U.S., at 462, 463, 86 L ed. 1602, 62 S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in deciding as it did-that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" — the Court in Betts v. Brady made an ubrupt brake with its own
well-considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice. . ."
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
402
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 71412 August 15, 1986
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., (now Benguet Corporation), petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose P. O. Aliling for petitioner.
Antonio C. Amor for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in an expropriation case, insofar as the decision affects the
petitioner.
On June 18, 1958, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the then Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio a complaint for
expropriation against ten (10) defendants, among them Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The Republic stated that it needed the property for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining a permanent site for the Philippine Military Academy, a training institution for officers in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, under the direct authority and supervision of the Department of National Defense. It also averred that it had
occupied since May 6, 1950, the area covered by the mining claims of the defendants and had already installed therein permanent buildings
and other valuable improvements with no less than P3,000,000.00 in the belief that the area was unoccupied portions of the public domain,
and that according to the Appraisal Committee constituted under Administrative Order No. 144, dated October 10, 1955, by the President of
the Philippines, the reasonable and fair market value of the rights and interests of all the defendants which win be affected by these eminent
domain proceedings cannot exceed the total sum of P532,371.40.
The locations of the petitioner's four mining claims with a total area of 25.1082 hectares were made on the following dates:
JEAN May 18, 1933 DOLORES FR May 15, 1933 NUGGET FR August 24, 1930 SMOKE May 11 & 12, 1933
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that, insofar as it is concerned, the Republic did not need and has not occupied the
areas covered by the above-mentioned mining claims and neither have improvements been made on the said areas and that the area covers
ground which is rugged in terrain for which the Philippine Military Academy could have no use. By way of separate and special grounds for
dismissal, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleged that the authority given by the President of the Philippines for the expropriation proceedings
refers to privately owned mineral lands, mining interests, and other private interests of private individuals and entities of private individuals in
certain portions of the site surveyed for and presently occupied by the Philippine Military Academy at Loakan, Baguio and that the
expropriation of Benguet Consolidated, Inc.'s mineral claims is in violation of law.
On December 28, 1955, the trial court heard Benguet Consolidated Inc.'s motion to dismiss. Valentin Camado was presented as witness and he
testified that he performed the annual assessment work for movant's mineral claims. Since the possibility of an amicable settlement was
raised, the representatives of both parties agreed that pending any definite settlement, the hearing of the motion to dismiss would be held in
abeyance. On this same day, the trial court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of the fact that the defendants are no longer challenging plaintiff's right to condemn the property, subject of the
instant case, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is hereby declared to have lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. took exception to the order of condemnation by filing a motion stating that at no time, had it manifested, either
expressly or impliedly, that it was no longer challenging the plaintiff's right to expropriate its former mineral claims. In the same motion,
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. moved for the setting of a date for the continuation of the hearing of its motion to dismiss.
Acting on this motion, the trial court in its Order dated February 23, 1960, stated that " ... to satisfy Benguet Consolidated, Inc., this Court
makes it of record that, pending negotiations between the Government and Benguet Consolidated, Inc. said corporation has not waived its
right to challenge plaintiff's right to condemn the mineral claims in question."
In the course of the proceedings, a Board of Commissioners to assess and establish the reasonable amount of compensation was formed.
Appointed by the court as members of the board of Commissioners were Engineer Ernesto C. Bengson and Attorney-Engineer Rolando J.
Gamboa representing the court and the army respectively and Mining Engineer Francisco G. Joaquin, nominated by the defendants to
represent all of them.
403
Commissioner Joaquin resigned after attending eight (8) hearings leaving the two other commissioners to conduct 56 more hearings.
On February 28, 1963, the Board of Commissioners submitted their report recommending the payment of P43,703.37 to the ten (10)
defendants as just compensation for their expropriated properties.
The parties filed their objections to the Commissioners' report.
The trial court rejected the Commissioners' Report and made its own findings and conclusions. On July 5, 1973, the trial court promulgated a
decision awarding various sums to the defendants.
Benguet Consolidated filed a motion to clarify the decision since the dispositive portion of the decision computed the respective amounts to
be paid by the Republic to the defendants without, however, including the amount to be paid to Benguet Consolidated for the expropriation of
its four (4) mining claims. In other words, the petitioner was excluded from the awards made by the trial court.
After Benguet Consolidated filed two other motions (motion for new trial and/or reconsideration; second motion for clarification) reiterating
its objection to the decision in not providing for just compensation for their expropriated properties, the trial court issued an order fixing the
"just compensation of the surface area of the four (4) claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. in the amount of P128,051.82 with interest at 6%
per annum from May 6, 1950 until fully paid, plus attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5 % of the sum fixed by this Court." A motion to
reopen the case praying for a new trial to allow it to present evidence as to the value of the properties filed by Benguet Consolidated was
denied by the trial court.
Among all parties, only the plaintiff and defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. pursued their appeal before the then Court of Appeals.
On June 28, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Courts promulgated a decision setting aside the trial court's decision. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one is rendered (1) condemning the
mineral claims described in the complaint belonging to the defendants for the public use therein stated; and (2) ordering
the plaintiff to pay the defendants as follows:
Demonstration Gold Mines, Ltd. 22.0037 Has. x P600.00 P13,202.22
Benguet Goldfields Mining Co. 50.6633 Has. x P300.00 15,198.99
Crown Mines, Inc. none Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 25.1082 Has. x P300.00 7,532.46
Josephine McKenzie none Josephine Murphy 5.8432 Has. x P300.00 1,752.96
J.E.H. Stevenot 1.1151 Has. 334.53 x P300.00
Andres Trepp none Gregoria Beley 18.9407 Has. x P300.00 5,682.21
No costs.
The petitioner asserts that there is a need to review and reverse the appellate court's decision because of the following reasons:
A.
THE CONDEMNATION OF PETITIONER'S MINERAL CLAIM IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
B.
THE APPROVAL OF THE COMMISSIONER'S REPORT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
The petitioner states that its mineral claims were located since 1933 at the latest. It argues that by such location and perfection, the land is
segregated from the public domain even as against the government. Citing Gold Greek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, et al (66 Phil. 259), it
states that when the location of a mining claim is perfected, this has the effect of a grant of exclusive possession with right to the enjoyment of
the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim and that this right may not be infringed.
The petitioner's arguments have no merit. The filing of expropriation proceedings recognizes the fact that the petitioner's property is no longer
part of the public domain. The power of eminent domain refers to the power of government to take private property for public use. If the
404
mineral claims are public, there would be no need to expropriate them. The mineral claims of the petitioner are not being transferred to
another mining company or to a public entity interested in the claims as such. The land where the mineral claims were located is needed for
the Philippine Military Academy, a public use completely unrelated to mining. The fact that the location of a mining claim has been perfected
does not bar the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain covers all forms of private property,
tangible or intangible, and includes rights which are attached to land.
The petitioner next raises a procedural point-whether or not in expropriation proceedings an order of condemnation may be entered by the
court before a motion to dismiss is denied.
Citing the case of Nieto v. Ysip, etc., et al (97 Phil. 31), the petitioner claims that this cannot be done.
We ruled in the Nieto case that:
A cursory reading of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rules 69 of the Rules of Court discloses the steps to be followed, one after
another, in condemnation proceedings from the institution thereof. Thep is the presentation by defendants of their
objections and defenses to the right of plaintiff to take the property for the use specified, which objections and defenses
shall be set forth in a single motion to dismiss (Section 4). The second is the hearing on the motion and the unfavorable
resolution thereon by the court. That an adverse resolution on the motion to dismiss, if objections and defenses are
presented, is required because the rule (Sec. 5) authorizes the court to enter an order of condemnation only if the motion
to dismiss is overruled, or if no motion to dismiss had been presented. The second step includes the order of
condemnation, which may be embodied in the resolution overruling the motion to dismiss. The third is the appointment of
commissioners to assess the just compensation for the property (Sec. 6). That the above steps must follow one another is
evident from the provisions of the rules as well as from the inter-relation between the steps and the dependence of one
upon the previous step. Thus no order of condemnation may be entered if the motion to dismiss has not been passed upon
and overruled, and no assessment should be undertaken unless and until an order of condemnation has already been
entered.
In the instant case the ruling on the motion to dismiss was deferred by the trial court in view of a possible amicable settlement. Moreover,
after the trial court entered an order of condemnation over the objection of the petitioner, the court issued an order to the effect that the trial
court"... makes it of record that, pending negotiations between the Government and Benguet Consolidated, Inc. said corporation has not
waived its right to challenge plaintiff's right to condemn the mineral claims in question."
At the hearing conducted by the Board of Commissioners, the counsel for the petitioner manifested that its motion to dismiss was still pending
in court, and requested that the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the petitioner be cancelled. At this point, negotiations between
the government and the petitioner were still going on.
In its original decision, the lower court overlooked an award of just compensation for the petitioner. This triggered off the filing of the
following motions by the petitioner: (1) motion for clarification praying that an order be issued clarifying the decision insofar as the
compensation to be paid to the petitioner is concerned; (2) motion for new trial and/or reconsideration on the ground that the court did not
award just compensation for the properties of the petitioner; (3) motion to re-open case on the ground that the issues insofar as the petitioner
is concerned have not been joined since its motion to dismiss has not been resolved; and (4) a second motion for clarification praying therein:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a clarification of the decision rendered on July 9th 1973 be made particularly
with respect to defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., so as to make a specific award, as in the case of all the other
defendants, for the just and fair market value of the surface rights to its four condemned mineral claims at the very least
on the basis of the same rate of P0.51 per square meter, or for the total amount of P128,051.82; with interest thereon at
6% per annum from May 6, 1950 until fully paid; plus attorney's fees in an amount equal to 5% of the sum fixed to be just
and fair market value of the mineral claims.
The lower court denied the motion to re-open the case by stating in its Order:
xxx xxx xxx
When this Court issued the order declaring that plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,it
impliedly overruled defendant's Motion to dismiss which in expropriation cases takes the place of an answer (Sec. 3, Rule
67, Rules of Court), and what defendant could have done at the time would have been to present evidence on the fair
market value of its properties. Having slept on its rights, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can no longer have this case reopened
for the presentation of its evidence.
This order was not challenged by the petitioner. Instead, it filed its above-mentioned second motion for clarification. It is to be noted that in its
motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, the petitioner stated:
405
Defendant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., does not dispute the right of the government to exercise the power of eminent
domain with respect to its property. However, in so doing this court failed to comply with the basic constitutional provision
that said power can only be exercised upon payment of just compensation ...
Under these circumstances, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the proceedings of condemnation followed by the court. We cannot
condone the inconsistent positions of the petitioner. (See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 505). it is very clear from the statements of
the petitioner that it had already abandoned its earlier stand on the propriety of expropriation and that its intent shifted to the just
compensation to be paid by the plaintiff for its condemned properties.
The second issue centers on the amount of just compensation which should be paid by the respondent to the petitioner for the condemned
properties.
The petitioner assails the appellate court's approval of the Commissioners' Report which fixed the amount of P7,532.46 as just compensation
for the mineral claims. The petitioner contends that this amount is by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered just and that in
fact the commissioners' report was rejected by the trial court.
The Commissioners' Report was submitted by Ernesto C. Bengson, chairman of the board and Rolando J. Gamboa, Francisco Joaquin,
representing the defendants resigned after attending eight (8) hearings due to ill health. The defendants did not ask for a replacement.
The conclusion of the Commissioners are the result of documentary evidence presented by the parties, testimonies of several mining experts
and executives of mining companies including Mr. Ralph W. Crosby, the then vice-president of the petitioner, and ocular inspections of the
mining claims involved in this case. Among those present during the ocular inspection were Mr. Joventino S. Perfecto and Mr. Kevin A. Callow,
the Chief Engineer of the Acupan Mines and the Exploration Geologist of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., respectively. Among those considered
by the commissioners in order to determine the just compensation to be paid to the defendants were the ore reserves, base metal
concentrates, and gypsums deposits of the mining claims.
The P7,532.46 just compensation for the petitioner was based on the following findings of the Board of Commissioners:
The Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of the mining claims involved in this case, on October 14, 1961, with
prior notice to all the parties. At this ocular inspection, Mr. Joventino S. Perfecto and Mr. Kevin A. Callow, Chief Engineer of
the Acupan Mines and Exploration Geologist, respectively, of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., also took part. In the mining
claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc., involved in this case, namely, Dolores, Nugget, Jean and Smoke mining claims, there
are some exploration tunnels and trenches to explore the mineral character of these claims. However, the exploration
and/or development work on these claims is not sufficient for making any estimate of the value of these claims for mining
purposes. The property has possibilities; but, with the limited work done on these claims, no ore body has as yet been
found. Consequently, the value of these claims cannot be determined at the present time.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the mining claims of Benguet Consolidated, Inc., which are considered apart from the other mining claims
involved in this case, the mineral value of these claims cannot possibly be determined for the present, as these claims are
not yet sufficiently developed.
Upon the foregoing considerations, it would appear that authorities that the defendants would be entitled to would be the
value of the surface rights of their mining claims.
xxx xxx xxx
According to the 'Schedule of Assessed Value of Mineral Lands (Exhs. B and B-1), the assessed value of a patented lode
claim (producing or non-producing) or a non-patented producing claim is P600.00 per hectare, and for a non- producing
unpatented claim, it is P300.00 per hectare.
The petitioner's mining claims were classified as non-producing unpatented claims. It was established that the area of the mineral claims
belonging to the petitioner and included in the Philippine Military Reservation was 25.1082 hectares. Hence, the commissioners arrived at the
total amount of P7,532.46 (25.1082 x P300.00) as just compensation to be paid to the petitioner for its mining claims.
The Schedule of Assessment Value of Mineral Lands (Exhibits B, B-1) presented by the government, is a "SCHEDULE of Assessed Values of
mineral lands, furnished by the Provincial Assessor of Mountain Province on June 30, 1955" issued by Onofre D. Alabanza, ex-oficio Mining
Recorder of the Office of the Mining Recorder, City of Baguio, Bureau of Mines, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
These findings negate the trial court's observation that the commissioners only took into consideration the surface value of the mineral claims.
In fact, the lower court affirmed the commissioners' report to the effect that the petitioner herein is only entitled to the surface value of the
mineral claims when it said:
406
The Court regrets that it has no basis on which to evaluate the value of the other claims the mineral reserves of which were
not included or taken into consideration in the above- mentioned evaluations. The Court, however, realizes that these
mineral claims have values. In the absence of any evidence as to their positive, possible and probable ore contents, said
claims shall be evaluated only on the basis of their surface areas.
"Other claims" include the petitioner's mining claims. Thus, the trial court computed the amount to be paid to the petitioner as just
compensation on the basis of the surface value of its mining claims.
We find no reason to disturb the lower court's findings on this matter. The petitioner has not advanced any reason for us to reject such
findings.
As stated earlier, the appellate court based its findings on the Commissioners' Report. The petitioner now assails the approval of the
commissioners' report regarding the P7,532.46 just compensation to be paid by the government for its four (4) mining claims.
While it is true that a court may reject a Commissioners' Report on the ground that the amount allowed is palpably inadequate (Republic v.
Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336, citing Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326) it is to be noted that the petitioner herein has not
supported its stand that the P7,532.46 just compensation for its mining claims is by any standard ridiculously low and cannot be considered
just.
On the other hand, the appellate court said:
The integrity and impartiality of the remaining Commissioners, Engrs. Bengson and Gamboa, were not questioned by the
defendants. They are experienced mining engineers and members of the bar. And the Commissioners did give value to the
mineral contents of the claims. Pages 168 to 206 of the Report will show that the Board considered the ore reserves and
the base metal concentrates and gypsum deposits. The Board concluded that it was not profitable to operate the claims,
taking into account the cost of production, rehabilitation and depletion, depreciation and smelting and marketing
expenses. Although Engineer Joaquin resigned after eight hearings of the Board, the defendants did not ask for a
replacement. Anyway, the Court was ably represented by Engineer Bengson. The Board held a total of 64 hearings. Besides
documentary evidence, and an ocular inspection of the mining claims involved made with prior notice, twelve witnesses
were presented by the parties.
We are not inclined to reject these findings of facts of the appellate court in the absence of any contrary evidence pointed to by the petitioner.
Moreover, it is to be noted that unlike the plaintiff and other defendants, the petitioner did not file any opposition to the Commissioners'
Report in the lower court.
The appellate court, however, should have provided for the payment of legal interest from the time the government took over the petitioner's
mining claims until payment is made by the government. (See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665).
We ruled in Republic v. Juan (92 SCRA 26):
xxx xxx xxx
...[S]aid interest ... 'runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed
in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking' (30 CJS 230). Stated otherwise: 'Where the
payment of compensation does not accompany the taking of property for public use but is postponed to a later date, the
owner of the property is ordinarily entitled to the award of an additional sum which will compensate for delay (cases cited)
or which was in other words, produce the full equivalent of the value of the property paid contemporaneously with the
taking' (29-A CJS 762). Under this view, the interest awarded is deemed part of the just compensation required to be paid
to the owner (27 Am. Jur. 112). ...
The appellate court's decision is, therefore, modified in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is MODIFIED in that the government is directed to pay the petitioner the
amount of SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS) and 46/100 (P7,532.46) plus 6% interest from May 6, 1950 to July 29, 1974
and 12% thereafter until fully paid, and AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
407
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15870 December 3, 1919
VISAYAN REFINING COMPANY, DEAN C. WORCESTER, and FRED A. LEAS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. MANUEL CAMUS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal and HON. QUINTIN PAREDES, Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands, respondents.
Kincaid and Perkins for petitioners.

Assistant Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition, directed to the Supreme Court, containing an alternative prayer for a writ of certiorari or prohibition, as the facts
may warrant, to stop certain condemnation proceedings instituted by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and now pending in the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. The respondents have interposed what is called an answer, but which is in legal effect merely a
demurrer, challenging the sufficiency of the allegations of the petition. The matter having been submitted upon oral argument, the cause is
now before us for the decision of the question thus presented.
It appears that upon September 13, 1919, the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be
begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of an area of about 1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as the site of Camp
Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the municipality of Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of Manila Bay, a few miles
south of the city of Manila. It is stated in communication of the Governor-General that the property in question is desired by the Government
of the Philippine Islands for military and aviation purposes.
In conformity with the instructions of the Governor-General, condemnation proceedings were begun by the Attorney-General on September
15, 1919, by filing a complaint in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal.
Numerous persons are named in the complaint as defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended to be
expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded appear the names of the three petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C.
Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question.
In the communication of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General was directed immediately upon filing the complaint to ask the court to
give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated, after the necessary deposit should be made as provided by law.
Accordingly in the complaint itself the Attorney-General prayed the court promptly and provisionally to fix the sum of P600,000 as the total
value of the property and to put the Government in immediate possession when said sum should be placed at the disposition of the court. An
order was accordingly made on September 15, 1919, by the Honorable Judge Manuel Camus, of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Rizal, fixing the value of the property provisionally at the amount stated and ordering that the plaintiff be placed in possession, it being made
to appear that a certificate of deposit for the amount stated had been delivered to the provincial treasurer.
At this stage of the proceedings in the Court of First Instance the three respondents already mentioned, to wit, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean
C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, interposed a demurrer, questioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of the
Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes.
Contemporaneously with the filing of their demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of First Instance to revoke its order of September 15,
giving the plaintiff provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative
authority for the proposed expropriation, but it contains one additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of
P600,000, had been made without authority of law. In support of this contention it was shown, by means of an informal communication from
the Insular Auditor, that the money in question had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by Acts Nos. 2748 and
2785 of the Philippine Legislature for the use of the Militia Commission. This appropriation showed, upon the date said deposit of P600,000
was made, an unexpended balance of P1,144,672.83.
On October 3, 1919, the Judge of the Court of First Instance overruled the demurrer interposed by the three parties mentioned and denied
their motion to vacate the order granting possession to the Government. The present proceeding was thereupon instituted in this Court in the
manner and for the purpose already stated.
General authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is expressly conferred on the Government of the Philippine Islands, as now
constituted by section 63 of the Philippine Bill, which reads as follows:
That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, subject to the limitation and conditions prescribed in this Act to
acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain. (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.)
408
Section 3 of the Jones Act contains the further provision that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." In
addition to this there is found in the same section the familiar provision, already expressed in section 5 of the Philippine Bill, that no law shall
be enacted which shall deprive any person of property without due process of law, or deny any person the equal protection of the laws. (Acts
of Congress of August 29, 1916, sec. 3.)
Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government General the power, among
others:
To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the
Philippine Islands; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings
to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.
The procedural provisions relative to the conduct of expropriation proceedings are contained in section 241 to 253, inclusive, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, supplemented as they are by various later Acts of the Legislature. Among the salient features of the scheme of expropriation
thus created are these: (1) If the court is of the opinion that the right of expropriation exists, three commissioners are appointed to hear the
parties, view the premises, and assess the damages to be paid for the condemnation (sec. 243 Code Civ. Proc.); (2) after hearing the evidence
submitted by the parties and assessing the damages in the manner prescribed by law (sec. 244), the commissioners make their report to the
court, setting forth all their proceedings; and it is expressly declared that "none of their proceedings shall be effectual to bind the property or
the parties until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance with its recommendations" (sec. 245); (3) the
court then acts upon the report, accepting the same in whole or in part, or rejecting, recommitting, or setting aside the same, as it sees fit (sec.
246).
It is further declared in section 246 that —
The court . . . may make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall require payment of the
sum awarded as provided in the next section (i.e., sec. 247) before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the
public use.
Sections 247 and 251 of the same Code are of sufficient importance in this connection to warrant quotation in their entirety. They are as
follows:
SEC. 247. Rights of Plaintiff After the Judgment. — Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of compensation as fixed by the
judgment, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiffs shall have the right to enter in and
upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. In case the defendant and his
attorney absent themselves from the court or decline to receive the same, payment may be made to the clerk of the court for him,
and such officer shall be responsible on his bond therefor and shall be compelled to receive it."
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. — The record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely, by meters
and bounds and adequate description, the particular land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the
public use. A certified copy of the record of the judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province in
which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so described.
The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate possession when the Government of the Philippine Islands is the plaintiff are found in
Act No. 2826, which is in part as follows:
SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government . . . in any competent court of the
Philippines, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately upon the land covered by such proceedings, after depositing with the
provincial treasurer the value of said land in cash, as previously and promptly determined and fixed by the competent court, which
money the provincial treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final decision of the court: Provided, however, That the court
may permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited with the provincial treasurer a certificate of deposit of any depository of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited by the court. The
certificate and the sums represented by it shall be subject to the order and final decision of the court, and the court shall have
authority to place said plaintiff in possession of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the proper orders and a mandate, if
necessary.
SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendants of the compensation awarded by the sentence, or after the tender of
said sum to the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or in case the court orders the price to be paid into court, the plaintiff
shall be entitled to appropriate the land so condemned to the public use specified in the sentence. In case payment is made to the
court, the clerk of the same shall be liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall be obliged to receive the same.
In connection with the foregoing provisions found in laws enact under the American regime is to be considered the following provision of the
Civil Code:
409
ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority for some purpose of proven public utility and
after payment of the proper compensation.
Unless this requisite has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner of such property in its possession
or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be.
Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the authority from its ultimate source in
sovereignty, providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the expropriator finally dependent upon payment of the
amount awarded by the court.
As has already been indicated the petition before us proceeds on the idea that the expropriation proceedings in question cannot be
maintained by the Philippine Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain for military and
aviation purposes; and while it is not urged that a special legislative Act must be passed every time any particular parcel of property is to be
expropriated, it is
claimed — and this really amounts to the same thing — that the Government cannot institute and prosecute expropriation proceedings unless
there is already in existence a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to be taken.
We are of the opinion that the contentions of the petitioners, in whatever way they may be understood or expressed, are not well founded.
There is one point at least on which all must agree, namely, that if land can be taken by the Government for a public use at all, the use
intended to be made of the land now in question, that is, for military and aviation purposes, is a public use. It is undeniable that a military
establishment is essential to the maintenance of organized society, and the courts will take judicial notice of the recent progress of the military
and naval arts resulting from the development of aeronautics.
The question as to the abstract authority of the Government to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the initiative of the Governor-
General should not be confused with that which has reference to the necessity for a legislative appropriation. They really involve different
problems and will be separately considered.
Upon the first, we are of the opinion that in this jurisdiction at least expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative
of the Governor-General, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that already on the statute books. Furthermore, if the
Government complies with the requirements of law relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be
at once given to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to exercise the power eminent domain.
Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of pain; and in
the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is that should be able to
comply with the conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.
The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the Chief Executive, is in our
opinion wholly erroneous and apparently has its basis in a misconception of fundamentals. It is recognized by all writers that the power of
eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. Philosophers and legists may differ as to the grounds upon which the exercise of this high power is to be justified, but no one
can question its existence. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any government exercising
sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
As is well said by the author of the article on Eminent Domain in the encyclopædic treaties Ruling Case Law.
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty
and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state
constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the
state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. (10, R. C. L., pp. 11, 12.)
In other words, the provisions now generally found in the modern laws of constitutions of civilized countries to the effect that private property
shall not be taken for public use without compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity for restraining the sovereign and
protecting the individual. Moreover, as will be at once apparent, the performance of the administrative acts necessary to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain in behalf of the state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive. Therefore, when the Philippine
Legislature declared in section 64 of the Administrative Code, that the Governor-General, who exercises supreme executive power in these
Islands (sec. 21, Jones Act), should be the person to direct the initiation of expropriation proceedings, it placed the authority exactly where one
would expect to find it, and we can conceive of no ground upon which the efficacy of the statute can reasonably be questioned.
We would not of course pretend that, under our modern system of Government, in which the Legislature plays so important a role, the
executive department could, without the authority of some statute, proceed to condemn property for its own uses; because the traditional
prerogatives of the sovereign are not often recognized nowadays as a valid source of power, at least in countries organized under republican
forms of government. Nevertheless it may be observed that the real check which the modern Legislature exerts over the Executive
Department, in such a matter as this, lies not so much in the extinction of the prerogative as in the fact the hands of the Executive can always
be paralyzed by lack of money — something which is ordinarily supplied only by the Legislature.
410
At any rate the conclusion is irresistible that where the Legislature has expressly conferred the authority to maintain expropriation
proceedings upon the Chief Executive, the right of the latter to proceed therein is clear. As is said by the author of the article from which we
have already quoted, "Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The
executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent." (10 R. C. L., p. 14.)
The power of eminent domain, with respect to the conditions under which the property is taken, must of course be exercised in subjection to
all the restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law. The two provisions by which the exercise of this power is chiefly limited in this
jurisdiction are found in the third section of the Jones Act, already mentioned, which among other things declares (1) that no law shall be
enacted which shall deprive any person of property without due process of law and (2) that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. The latter of these provisions is directly aimed at the taking of property under the exercise of the power of
eminent domain; and as this requirement, in connection with the statutes enacted to make sure the payment of compensation, usually affords
all the protection that the owner of property can claim, it results that the due process clause is rarely invoked by the owner in expropriation
proceedings.
Nevertheless it should be noted that the whole problem of expropriation is resolvable in its ultimate analysis into a constitutional question of
due process of law. The specific provisions that just compensation shall be made is merely in the nature of a superadded requirement to be
taken into account by the Legislature in prescribing the method of expropriation. Even were there no organic or constitutional provision in
force requiring compensation to be paid, the seizure of one's property without payment, even though intended for a public use, would
undoubtedly be held to be a taking without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
This point is not merely an academic one, as might superficially seem. On the contrary it has a practical bearing on the problem before us,
which may be expressed by saying that, if the Legislature has prescribed a method of expropriation which provides for the payment of just
compensation and such method is so conceived and adapted as to fulfill the constitutional requisite of due process of law, any proceeding
conducted in conformity with that method must be valid.lawphi1.net
These considerations are especially important to be borne in mind in connection with the second contention made by counsel for the
petitioners, namely, that land cannot be expropriated by the Government in the absence of a legislative appropriation especially destined to
pay for the land to be taken. To this question we now address ourselves; and while we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just compensation
must be made, the further fact must not be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional provision in force in these lands Islands
requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation.
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is true that in rare instances the proceedings may be voluntarily abandoned before the
expropriation is complete or the proceedings may fail because the expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases the owner retains
the property; and if possession has been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted that the
title does not actually pass to the expropriator until a certified copy of the record of the judgment is recorded in the office of the register of
deeds (sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the proceedings is reached the compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the
court is plainly directed to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the defendant just compensation for the land taken. (Sec.
246, Code Civ. Proc.). Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of compensation by
him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247, Code Civ. Proc.).
It will be observed that the scheme of expropriation exemplified in our statutes does not primarily contemplate the giving of a personal
judgment for the amount of the award against the expropriator; the idea is rather to protect the owner by requiring payment as a condition
precedent to the acquisition of the property by the other party. The power of the court to enter a judgment for the money and to issue
execution thereon against the plaintiff is, however, unquestioned; and the court can without doubt proceed in either way. But whatever
course be pursued the owner is completely protected from the possibility of losing his property without compensation.
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the award as a
condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could not be realized upon execution. It is
presumed that by appearing as plaintiff in condemnation proceedings, the Government submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and
thereby waives its immunity from suit. As a consequence it would be theoretically subject to the same liability as any other expropriator.
Nevertheless, the entering of a personal judgment against it would be an unnecessary, as well as profitless formality.
In the face of the elaborate safeguards provided in our procedure, it is frivolous to speculate upon the possibility that the Legislature may
finally refuse to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award. That it
may do. But the Government can not keep the land and dishonor the judgment. Moreover, in the eventuality that the expropriation shall not
be consummated, the owners will be protected by the deposit from any danger of loss resulting from the temporary occupation of the land by
the Government; for it is obvious that this preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of a prepayment upon the value of the property, if
finally expropriated and as an indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the proceedings should fail of consummation.
It appears that the money represented by the certificate of deposit which was placed at the disposal of the lower court, pursuant to the
requirements of section 2 of Act No. 2826, was taken from certain appropriations under the control of the Militia Commission, a body created
by section 29 of Act No. 2715, for the purpose, among others, of advising the Governor-General upon measures relative to the organization
equipment, and government of the National Guard and reserve militia. Counsel for the petitioners say that money appropriated for the
411
purpose of the Militia Commission cannot be lawfully used to acquire the land which is now the subject of expropriation, because no authority
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is to be found in any of the Acts appropriating money for said Commission; from whence it is
argued that the certificate of deposit affords no protection to the owners of property.
The point appears to be one of little general importance, and we will not multiply words over it. Suffice it to say that in our opinion the Insular
Auditor was acting within his authority when he let this money out of the Insular Treasury; and being now within the control of the lower
court, it will doubtless in due time be applied to the purpose for which the deposit was made.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the action taken by the lower court in the condemnation proceedings aforesaid was in all
respects regular and within the jurisdiction of the court. The writ prayed for in the petition before us, therefore, can not be issued. The
application is accordingly denied, with costs against the petitioners.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves the right to prepare a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., concurring:
I agree with the conclusion arrived at in the majority decision. I am clearly of the opinion that the alternative application for a writ
of certiorari or prohibition should not be granted. An analysis into their simplest elements of the various questions presented may easily be
made as follows: 1. The power of the Philippine Government in eminent domain; (2) The constitutional prohibition that (A) private property (B)
shall not be taken for public use (C) without just compensation; and 3. The constitutional prohibition that no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.
1. The power of eminent domain is expressly vested in the Government of the Philippine Islands be section 63 of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. The Philippine Legislature has, in turn by section 64 (h) of the Administrative Code of 1917,
expressly delegated to the Governor-General the specific power and duty to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the
right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands. This delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General
was authorized in view of the nature of eminent domain, which necessitates administrative agents for its execution, in view of the previous
attitude assumed by the Judiciary with relation to similar delegations of power, and in view of the undeniable fact that the Governor-General
is a part of the same Government of the Philippine Islands to which was transferred the right of eminent domain by the Congress of the United
States. (See Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binangonan [1916], 34 Phil. 518.) When, therefore, the Governor-General
directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the object of having
the Government obtain title to the site commonly known as "Camp Tomas Claudio," the Governor-General was merely acting as a mouthpiece
of American sovereignty, pursuant to a delegated power transmitted by the Congress of the United States to the Government of the Philippine
Islands and lodged by this latter Government in the Chief Executive. Any other holding would mean that section 64 (h) of the Administrative
Code is invalid, a result to be avoided.lawphi1.net
2. In the existing Philippine Bill of Rights (last sentence, paragraph 1, section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) is a provision that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." It seems undeniable (A) that Camp Claudio was "private property," and
(B) that it was being "taken for public use," namely, for military and aviation purposes. The only remaining point concerns "just compensation,"
which can better be discussed under our division 3.
3. Another provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights (paragraph 15, section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) is, "that no money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." The same Auditor who shall "audit, in accordance with law and
administrative regulations, all expenditure of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust, by the Government." His administrative
jurisdiction is made "exclusive." The Philippine Legislature could, of course, have specifically appropriated an amount for the purchase of the
Camp Claudio site just as it could have specifically enacted a law for the condemnation of such site, but instead it preferred to include in the
general Appropriation Acts, under the heads of The Philippine National Guard or Philippine Militia, a large amount to be expended in the
discretion of the Militia Commission, which may "use the funds appropriated for other purposes, as the efficiency of the service may require."
This transfer of power of the Militia Commission, like the delegation of some of the general legislative power to the Governor-General, raises
no constitutional bar. The Insular Auditor has stated that there is in the treasury over a million pesos available for the condemnation of Camp
Claudio, and this decision for present purposes must be taken as final and conclusive. The six hundred thousand pesos deposit is merely the
provisional determination of the value of the land by the competent court, and in no way jeopardizes the financial interests of the owners of
the property. No additional security is required since the sovereign power has waived its right to be sued, has pledged the public faith, and
cannot obtain title until the owners receive just compensation for their property. (See Sweet vs. Rechel [1895], 159 U. S., 380.)
412
In resume, therefore, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands had the right to authorize the condemnation of this land for military and
aviation purposes, and no constitutional provision has been violated. The Court of First Instance of Rizal has merely acted in strict accord with
law, and its action should, consequently, be sustained.
413
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21593 April 29, 1966
RAYMUNDA S. DIGRAN, in her capacity as Administratrix of Estate of Deceased Ruperta Cabucos, petitioner,
vs.
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPUTY AUDITOR GENERAL, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS and CITY ENGINEER OF CEBU CITY, respondents.
D. de la Victoria and L. D. de la Victoria for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. C. Zaballero and Solicitor C. V. Bautista for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On June 22, 1909, Ruperta Cabucos bought from, and fully paid to the Government, Lot No. 638 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate situated in
Cebu City for which a formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor on November 27, 1915 by the Friar Lands Agency. On February 28,
1916 Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-3918 (T-320) was issued to her. The Banilad Friar Lands Estate was among the friar lands acquired by
the Government for resale to actual tenants or occupants pursuant to Act 1120 of the Philippine Commission.
Sometime in 1914 or 1915, without prior expropriation proceedings, the government constructed Mango Avenue, a municipal road, 1 passing
through Lot No. 638. A claim for compensation was filed with the Municipality of Cebu but it was still unpaid when World War II broke out.
In 1927 Ruperta Cabucos subdivided Lot No. 638 into Lots Nos. 638-A, 638-B and 638-C. Lot No. 638-B is the portion of Lot No. 638 covered
and traversed by Mango Avenue.
Ruperta Cabucos died in 1940. In 1951 her heirs subdivided Lot No. 638 into eight lots, namely, Lots Nos. 638-A-1, 638-A-2, 638-B, 638-C-1,
638-C-2, 638-C-3, 638-C-4, and 638-C-5, and apportioned them to themselves except Lot No. 638-B, the road lot, which remained in the name
of her estate. Candido Samson, her son, became extrajudicial administrator of the estate. The extrajudicial partition and adjudication was
submitted to the Court of First Instance of Cebu for approval, and on May 30, 1953 said court decreed the issuance of the corresponding
certificates of title to the heirs but ordered the annotation on the certificate of title of Lot No. 638-B of the following: "... this lot shall not be
closed nor disposed of to the prejudice of the using public as such highway, ..."
On April 20, 1961 Candido Samson filed with the City Appraisal Committee of the City of Cebu a claim for the value of Lot No. 638-B as
compensation therefor. He amended said claim on July 12, 1961. On August 15, 1961 he supplemented it with a demand for the payment of
interests and attorney's fees. Thereupon, the City Appraisal Committee appraised the land at P15.00 per square meter or P13,245.00 for 883
square meters, the area traversed by the road. The claim was thereafter referred to the City Fiscal of Cebu who recommended payment
thereof. However, the City Engineer, to whom said claim was later indorsed, recommended its denial. This recommendation was concurred in
by the Cebu Division Engineer of the Bureau of Public Highways and, on the strength of said recommendation, the Commissioner of Public
Highways denied the claim in question. A request for reconsideration was denied.1äwphï1.ñët
On July 9, 1962 the Commissioner of Public Highways transmitted the aforesaid claim to the Auditor General. The City Auditor of Cebu whose
comment was requested by the Auditor General recommended its payment, but such recommendation notwithstanding, the Deputy Auditor
General, on February 18, 1963 denied the claim on the grounds that (1) claimant failed to register the same with the Committee on Claims
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 6 dated July 29, 1946; (2) claimant and his predecessors are guilty of laches; (3) the right to enforce the
claim has prescribed; (4) the owner presumably consented to the construction of the road; (5) the road already existed when the title was
actually issued, thus making said title subject to the road encumbrance pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act; and (6) the
annotation on Lot No. 638-B — "that this lot shall not be claimed nor disposed of to the prejudice of the using public as such highway" —
should be respected by the heirs of Ruperta Cabucos.
On February 16, 1963 Raymunda S. Digran, a daughter of Candida Samson, became administratrix of the estate of Ruperta Cabucos. On
February 18, 1963 the Deputy Auditor General, as stated, denied the claim. This decision was the subject of two motions for reconsideration,
the later one having been denied on June 10, 1963. On July 9 of the same year Raymunda S. Digran appealed to this Court from said decision
altho on July 1, 1963 she filed an amended claim for compensation with the Auditor General. On August 7, 1963 the Auditor General desisted
from rendering a decision on the amended claim on July 1, 1963 for the reason that the case was already sub judice.
The bone of contention is whether or not the heirs of Ruperta Cabucos are entitled to compensation for Lot No. 638-B, the road lot.
The Government denies the obligation to give due compensation for Lot No. 638-B mainly on the grounds that Ruperta Cabucos' title over Lot
No. 638 was subject to the Government's reservations for public use, such as rights of way and other public servitudes under Sections 19, 20
and 21 of Act 1120 and Section 39 of Act 496; and, that the right to enforce the claim for compensation is barred by prescription and laches.
The grounds relied upon by the Government, stated above, lack merit. Firstly, Sections 19, 20 and 21 of Act 1120 sanction no authority for the
Government to take private lands covered by said Act for public use without just compensation. Sections 19, 20 and 21 state:
414
SEC. 19. No purchaser or lessee under this Act shall acquire any exclusive rights to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation
works, or to any water supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent, but all of such irrigation works and water
supplies shall remain under the exclusive control of the Government of the Philippine Islands and be administered under the
direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for the common benefit of those interests dependent upon them. And the
Government reserves as a part of the contract of sale in each instance the right to levy an equitable contribution or tax for the
maintenance of such irrigation works, the assessment of which shall be based upon the amount of benefits received, and each
purchaser under this Act, by accepting the certificate of sale or deed herein provided to be given, shall be held to assent thereto. And
it is further provided that all lands leased or conveyed under this Act shall remain subject to the right of way of such irrigation canals,
ditches, and reservoirs as now exist or as the Government may hereafter see fit to construct.
SEC. 20. All persons receiving title to lands under the provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject to the same public servitudes
as existed upon lands owned by private persons under the sovereignty of Spain, including those with reference to the littoral of the
sea and the banks of navigable rivers and rivers upon which rafting may be done.
SEC. 21. The Civil Governor, when authorized by resolution of the Commission, may by proclamation, designate any tract or tracts of
said lands as nonalienable, and reserve the same for public use, and thereafter such tracts shall not be subject to sale, lease, or other
disposition under this Act.
Section 19 withholds from a purchaser of a friar land exclusive right to any canal, ditch, reservoir, or other irrigation works, or to any water
supply upon which such irrigation works are or may be dependent which were already existing at the time of purchase. It also subjects the land
so purchased to the right of way of such canal, ditch, reservoir or irrigation works. Section 20 holds the friar lands subject to public servitudes
also imposed on other lands owned by private persons. Section 21 gives the Civil Governor, upon resolution of the Philippine Commission, the
authority to designate any tract or tracts of friar land as non-alienable and reserve the same for public use. Needless to say, the road
construction through Lot No. 638-B is not the servitude contemplated in Sections 19 and 20, above quoted. Moreover, it has not been shown
that Lot No. 638-B was declared nonalienable by the Civil Governor prior to sale to, and purchase by, Ruperta Cabucos so as to prevent her
from acquiring ownership thereover.
The provision of Section 39 of the Land Registration Act which states:
SEC. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted
on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law or any Government irrigation canal or lateral thereof; where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.
has no application in this case for the reason that Mango Avenue was constructed subsequent to the acquisition of Lot No. 638 by Ruperta
Cabucos. In other words, Mango Avenue is not an "encumbrance which may be subsisting" when Ruperta Cabucos purchased the land from
the Government in 1909.
Furthermore, it would be unfair for the Government to invoke the above statutory reservations and take back from Ruperta Cabucos Lot No.
638-B without just compensation after selling it to her and collecting the full price therefor. To do so would abridge her individual right,
guaranteed by the Constitution, to own private property and keep it, free from State appropriation without due process and without just
compensation. Ours is a government dedicated to uphold and preserve the right of an individual, a fundamental concept in a democratic
society which spells the big difference between democracy and totalitarianism. The Government must respect and observe individual rights
for, otherwise, the citizenry would be liable to lose confidence in it. Said Mr. Justice Montemayor in the celebrated case of Herrera vs. Auditor
General:2
Here before us is a case of law abiding citizen and taxpayer who as far back as 1934, realizing the need of the Government of his lot
for road purposes, instead of compelling said Government to resort to expropriation proceedings, readily and in all ingenuousness
allowed the Government to immediately occupy it. In his implicit trust in his Government, he did not even bother to require it to
make a judicial deposit of the approximate value of his land, not even to make an offer of a price it would pay for it. But since then,
he has continuously asked for the payment of said fair price as a condition precedent to his conveyance and sale of the property. But
the Government neglected to make an offer, much less make payment, then evidently forgot all about, and now it flatly refuses to
pay, evidently forgetting that it had also neglected to secure a conveyance of the property, so that Herrera, as already stated, is still
the owner of the same. ... There is nothing that can more speedily and effectively embitter a citizen and tax-payer against his
Government and alienate his faith in it, than an injustice and unfair dealing like the present case.
Secondly, laches and prescription cannot deprive Ruperta Cabucos of her ownership over Lot No. 638-B nor would they dispossess her of her
right to demand compensation due for its taking. The land being registered under the Torrens System the Government cannot acquire
ownership over the same by prescription in derogation of the registered owner.3 Such was the ruling of this Court in Herrera vs. Auditor
415
General,4 whose facts are very similar to the instant case. There the Government took a registered property for road purposes sometime in
1934 without prior expropriation proceedings or payment of compensation. The owner, who executed no formal deed of conveyance in favor
of the Government, filed his claim for compensation only in 1955.
This case would be resolved differently from Jaen vs. Agregado,5 cited by the Government, where the landowner had formally conveyed the
property to the Government but did not file his claim for the price therefor until after 33 years later. Jaen's claim being merely one for a sum
of money rather than one involving a question on acquisitive prescription, the some was found and declared to have prescribed. Such is not
the nature of the claim instituted in this case.
It is not so clear as to what measures Ruperta Cabucos took to prosecute her claim against the municipal government of Cebu. But the
allegation is to the effect that she in fact filed a claim which, since no payment has yet been made, was probably simply ignored or lost in the
malestrom of official red tape. It should be borne in mind that as of today her heirs are still the registered owners of lot in question. Their title
is clean and they have not transferred it in favor of the Government thru any instrument or verbal agreement. Their right cannot be more aptly
stated than in Alfonso vs. City of Pasay, L-12754, January 30, 1960, where this Court, through Mr. Justice Montemayor, said:
. . . As registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership of land. However, said restoration of possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible because it is now
and has been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could
and should have done years ago since 1925.
Mindful as we are that said right is guaranteed by paragraph (2), Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
and by Article 435 of the Civil Code, we see no reason why petitioner's claim should not be sustained.
With respect to the contention that petitioner lost her right to demand compensation for Lot No. 638-B because she failed to register her claim
in 1946 with the Claims Committee created by Administrative Order No. 6 of July 29, 1946, suffice it to state that said committee was created
only for the purpose of determining the obligations of the National Government and failure to register any claim with it did not bar such claim
inasmuch as Administrative Order No. 6 did not so provide.
Having actually appealed from the decision signed by the Deputy Auditor General of February 18, 1963, petitioner is estopped from
maintaining that said decision is not the one appealable under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, it may be worth
pointing out that the Deputy Auditor General, being the next highest official in the General Auditing Office, has charge of said office in the
absence of the Auditor General6 and as such performs the functions of the latter, e.g., signing decisions on money claims. That the Deputy
Auditor General regularly performed his duties when he signed the decision appealed from is presumed in the absence — as herein — of a
contrary showing.
The authorities are agreed that the owner of the land expropriated for public use is entitled to recover the fair market value of the property at
the time of taking plus interest at the legal rate.7 However, only the fair market value of Lot No. 638-B as of August 1961, the date the
amended claim was filed with the City Engineer of Cebu, is disclosed by the records. In fairness to the heirs of Ruperta Cabucos who have been
deprived of the use of the lot in question for quite a long time, this Court is inclined under the circumstances to award as reasonable
compensation the amount of P13,245.00 fixed by the Cebu Appraisal Committee.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Petitioner-appellant Raymunda S. Digran, as administratrix of the estate of Ruperta
Cabucos, is hereby ordered to execute a formal deed of conveyance on Lot No. 638-B in favor of the Republic of the Philippines for which the
Republic of the Philippines shall pay, as it is hereby ordered to pay, petitioner-appellant Raymunda S. Digran the sum of P13,245.00 plus
interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of her claim on April 20, 1961 until the full amount is paid and attorney's fees in the amount of
P1,500.00. No costs. So ordered.
416
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 139927 and 139936 November 22, 2000
SALVADOR BIGLANG-AWA, REMEDIOS BIGLANG-AWA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE MARCIANO I. BACALLA in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 216 - Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS), respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
seeking to annul and set aside the Orders of the respondent Court dated August 5, 1998, ordering the issuance of Writs of Possession of the
properties of herein petitioners, and the Order dated August 12, 1998, issuing the corresponding Writs of Possession, as well as the Order
dated July 7, 1999, denying the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the August 5, 1998 Orders. The petition further prays for the
dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. Q-97-31368 and Q-97-31369 for being premature due to failure to comply with the substantive requirements of
Executive Order No. 1035 (1985).1
Petitioners Remedios Biglang-awa and Salvador Biglang-awa are the registered owners of certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa,
Novaliches, Quezon City. The parcel of land owned by petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa is covered by T.C.T. No. RT-101389 (362966) with an
area of 769 sq. m., while that owned by Salvador Biglang-awa is covered by T.C.T. No. RT-101390 (19352) with an area of 2,151 sq. m. The
government needed to expropriate 558 sq. m. of the aforesaid property of petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa, and 881 sq. m. of that belonging
to petitioner Salvador Biglang-awa for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension, Stages II-B and II-C..
On August 29, 1996, the petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa received a Notice from the respondent Republic, through the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Project Manager Patrick G. Gatan, requiring her to submit the documents necessary to determine the just
compensation for her property.2
On October 15, 1996, Final Notices, signed by Project Director Cresencio M. Rocamora, were given by the DPWH to the petitioners to submit
within five (5) days the pertinent documents, otherwise, expropriation proceedings would be filed against their properties. 3 As the petitioners
failed to comply with these final notices, the respondent Republic, through the DPWH, filed with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City4 separate cases for expropriation against the petitioners, docketed as Civil Case Nos. Q-99-31368 and Q-97-31369.
On July 10, 1997, the petitioners received summons from the respondent court, and were ordered to file their respective Answers to the
Complaints for expropriation. The petitioners filed their Answers on August 11, 1997.
Subsequently, the respondent Republic, through the DPWH, deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines the amounts of P3,964,500.00
and P2,511,000.00 for the properties of Salvador and Remedios Biglang-awa, respectively, based on the appraisal report of the Quezon City
Appraisal Committee.
On April 24, 1998, respondent Republic filed separate Motions for the Issuance of Writs of Possession of the properties of the petitioners with
the respondent court. The court issued Orders giving the petitioners, through counsel Atty. Jose Felix Lucero, ten (10) days within which to
submit their Opposition to the said motions. The petitioners failed to file their Opposition to the Motion.
On August 5, 1998, the respondent court issued separate Orders5 granting the motions for the issuance of writs of possession. Accordingly, the
writs of possession were issued by the respondent court on August 12, 1998.6
On September 11, 1998, petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa received a Notice to Vacate her property. A similar Notice was likewise received by
petitioner Salvador Biglang-awa at about the same time.
On January 25, 1999, the petitioners filed a joint Manifestation with the respondent court to the effect that they were retaining the law firm of
Gumpal and Valenzuela, in lieu of Atty. Jose Felix Lucero whose services they had already terminated due to the latter’s inaction and
abandonment of their cases.
On May 10, 1999, the petitioners, through their new counsel, moved for a reconsideration of the respondent court’s Orders dated August 5,
1998, and a recall of the writs of possession issued on August 12, 1998, mainly on the ground that the respondent Republic failed to comply
with the provisions of E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and
negotiation prior to the acquisition of, or entry into, the property being expropriated.
417
On July 7, 1999, the respondent court issued an Order denying the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, a copy of which was received by
the petitioners on July 26, 1999.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the respondent court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction,
when it issued the questioned orders.
We rule in the negative.
The petitioners contend that due process of law in relation to expropriation proceedings mandates that there be compliance with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, particularly Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6, claimed to constitute the substantive requirements of the
expropriation law, prior, and as a condition precedent, to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, a writ of
possession pursuant to the above provision of Rule 67 will issue only upon showing that the said provisions of E.O. 1035 have already been
complied with. As the writs of possession in the instant case were issued by the respondent court without the respondent Republic, through
the DPWH, having furnished the petitioners any feasibility study and "approved" parcellary survey in connection with the Mindanao Avenue
Extension Project,7 despite formal request by the latter,8 and therefore without showing prior compliance with E.O. 1035, the petitioners
contend that such issuance of the writs of possession by the respondent court was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
We do not agree.
The provisions of law adverted to by petitioners are as follows:
Title A. Activities Preparatory To Acquisition Of Property
Sec. 2. Feasibility Studies. Feasibility studies shall be undertaken for all major projects, and such studies shall, in addition to the usual technical,
economic and operational aspects, include the social, political, cultural and environmental impact of the project.
Sec. 3. Information Campaign. Every agency, office and instrumentality of the government proposing to implement a development project
which requires the acquisition of private real property or rights thereon shall first make consultations with the local government officials,
including the regional development councils having jurisdiction over the area where the project will be undertaken to elicit their support and
assistance for the smooth implementation of the project. The implementing agency/instrumentality concerned with the assistance of the local
government officials and representatives of the Office of Media Affairs shall conduct an extensive public information campaign among the
local inhabitants that will be affected by the project to acquaint them with the objectives and benefits to be derived from the project and thus
avoid any resistance to or objection against the acquisition of the property for the project.
Sec. 4. Detailed Engineering/Surveys. The implementing government agency/ instrumentality concerned shall, well in advance of the scheduled
construction of the project, undertake detailed engineering, including parcellary surveys to indicate the location and size of the sites and to
determine ownership of the land to be acquired, including the status of such landownership.
xxx xxx xxx
Title B. Procedure For Acquisition Of Property
Sec. 6. Acquisition Through Negotiated Sale. As an initial step, the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall negotiate
with the owner of the land that is needed for the project for the purchase of said land, including improvements thereon. In the determination
of the purchase price to be paid, the Ministry of Finance and the Provincial/City/Municipal Assessors shall extend full assistance and
coordinate with the personnel of the government implementing agency concerned in the valuation of lands and improvements thereon taking
into consideration the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator of the land, or such current market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower, prior to the negotiation. [Executive Order No. 1035 (1985)]
Nothing in the foregoing provisions supports the contention of the petitioners. A careful perusal of the provisions cited do not yield the
conclusion that the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign and detailed engineering/surveys are conditions precedent to the
issuance of a writ of possession against the property being expropriated. Although compliance with these activities should indeed be made
prior to the decision to expropriate private property, the requirements for issuance of a writ of possession once the expropriation case is filed,
are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
Sec.2. Entry of the plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary.-- Upon the filing of the complaint or at anytime
thereafter, and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for the
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court xxx xxx .
418
xxx xxx xxx
If such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.
As clearly enunciated in Robern Development Corporation vs. Judge Jesus Quitain9 :
"Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous
doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive
pleading to a complaint in eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not be issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the
property owner." (Emphasis Ours)
Thus, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and the Robern Development Corporation case, the only
requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
and substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance
with the requirements the issuance of the writ of possession becomes "ministerial."10
The antecedents and the rationale for the rule are explained thus:
"There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken,
provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. However, the
requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.
To start with, in Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, [Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes, 31 Phil 118, 135, March 31 & December 17, 1915]
the Court held that the railway corporation had the right to enter and possess the land involved in condemnation proceedings under Section 1,
Act No. 1592, immediately upon the filing of a deposit fixed by order of the court.
The Rules of Court of 1964 sanctioned this procedure as follows:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or Provincial Treasurer. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter
the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National
or Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be
held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. . . . (emphasis ours.)
Subsequently, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed into law Presidential Decree No. 42 and its companion decrees, which removed
the court's discretion in determining the amount of the provisional value of the land to be expropriated and fixed the provisional deposit at its
assessed value for taxation purposes. Hearing was not required; only notice to the owner of the property sought to be condemned.
On the issue of the immediate possession, PD 42 (Authorizing The Plaintiff In Eminent Domain Proceedings To Take Possession Of The Property
Involved Upon Depositing The Assessed Value, For Purposes of Taxation) provided:
WHEREAS, the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is not expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved as soon as possible, when needed for public purposes;
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]hat, upon filing in the proper court of the complaint in eminent domain proceedings or at anytime thereafter, and after due notice to
the defendant, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the Philippine
National Bank, . . . an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, to be held by said bank subject to the
orders and final disposition of the court.
The provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Paragraph 3 of PD No. 1224 (Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property for Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just
Compensation) also authorized immediate takeover of the property in this manner:
3. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of just compensation as provided for herein, the
Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance or the higher
courts.
419
Where the "taking" was for "socialized housing," Section 3, PD 1259 (Amending Paragraphs 1, 2, And 3 Of PD No. 1224 Further Defining The
Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending the above-quoted
paragraph, provided:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit of the amount of the just compensation provided for in Section 2 hereof, the
Government, or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the
improvements thereon even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian
Relations or the higher courts.
Similarly, Section 1, PD No. 1313 (Further Amending Paragraph 3 Of Presidential Decree No. 1224 As Amended By Presidential Decree No.
1259, Defining The Policy On The Expropriation Of Private Property For Socialized Housing Upon Payment Of Just Compensation), amending
paragraph 3 of PD 1224, decreed:
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of its branches of the
amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the just compensation provided for in Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1259, the government,
or its authorized agency or entity, shall immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the improvements
thereon with the power of demolition, if necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First
Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or the higher Courts.
In this connection, we also quote Section 7 of PD No. 1517 (Proclaiming Urban Land Reform In The Philippines And Providing For The
Implementing Machinery Thereof), which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of its branches of the
amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the declared assessment value in 1975, the Government, or its authorized agency or entity shall
immediately have possession, control and disposition of the real property and the improvements thereon with the power of demolition, if
necessary, even pending resolution of the issues that may be raised whether before the Court of First Instance, Court of Agrarian Relations, or
the higher Courts.
Finally, PD 1533 (Establishing A Uniform Basis For Determining Just Compensation And The Amount Of Deposit For Immediate Possession Of
The Property Involved In Eminent Domain Proceedings) mandated the deposit of only ten percent (10%) of the assessed value of the private
property being sought to be expropriated, after fixing the just compensation for it at a value not exceeding that declared by the owner or
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Section 2 thereof reads:
Sec. 2. Upon the filing of the petition for expropriation and the deposit in the Philippine National Bank at its main office or any of its branches
of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of compensation provided in Section 1 hereof, the government or its authorized
instrumentality agency or entity shall be entitled to immediate possession, control and disposition of the real property and the improvements
thereon, including the power of demolition if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the courts.
Accordingly, in San Diego v. Valdellon [80 Phil 305, 310, November 22, 1977], Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals [93 SCRA 503, 525,
October 18, 1979], and Haguisan v. Emilia [131 SCRA 517, 522-524, August 31, 1984], the Court reversed itself and ruled that Section 2, Rule 67
of the 1964 Rules, was repealed by Presidential Decree No. 42. The judicial duty of ascertaining and fixing the provisional value of the property
was done away with, because the hearing on the matter had not been "expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to take possession of the
property involved as soon as possible, when needed for public purpose."
In Daet, the Court clarified that the provisional value of the land did not necessarily represent the true and correct one but only tentatively
served as the basis for immediate occupancy by the condemnor. The just compensation for the property continued to be based on its current
and fair market value, not on its assessed value which constituted only a percentage of its current fair market value.
However, these rulings were abandoned in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay [149 SCRA 305, 311 & 316, April 29, 1987], because
"[t]he method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitute[d] impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogatives. It tend[ed] to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution [was] reserved to it for final determination." The
Court added:
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
420
xxx xxx xxx
More precisely, Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture [264 SCRA 708, 719, November 27, 1996.] ruled that the judicial determination of
just compensation included the determination of the provisional deposit. In that case, the Court invalidated the Writ of Possession because of
lack of hearing on the provisional deposit, as required under then Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules. In the light of the declared
unconstitutionality of PD Nos. 76, 1533 and 42, insofar as they sanctioned executive determination of just compensation, any right to
immediate possession of the property must be firmly grounded on valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67, pre-1997 Rules; that is, the
value of the subject property, as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings, must
be deposited with the national or the provincial treasurer.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule 67 and clearly reverted to the San Diego, Daet and Haguisan rulings.
Section 2 now reads:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with government depositary. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after
due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits
with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by
such bank subject to the orders of the court. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. [Emphasis ours.]
In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Possession
was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. As earlier stated, procedural rules are given immediate
effect and are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that take
place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the prevailing and governing law in
this case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional compensation
mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus, in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
NPC's Motion for the issuance of the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the provisional deposit.
The Court nonetheless hastens to add that PD 1533 is not being revived.
Under Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules, the provisional deposit should be in an amount equivalent to the full assessed value of the
property to be condemned, not merely ten percent of it. Therefore, the provisional deposit of NPC is insufficient. Since it seeks to expropriate
portions, not the whole, of four parcels of land owned by Robern, the provisional deposit should be computed on the basis of the Tax
Declarations of the property: xxx"
Hence, the issuance of writs of possession by the respondent court in favor of the respondent Republic after the latter, through the DPWH,
filed complaints for expropriation and deposited the amounts of P3,964,500.00 and P2,511,000.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the
properties of the petitioners is proper and not without basis.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
alone is neither "capricious" nor "oppressive", as the said rule affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation of their property in
expropriation proceedings, one of which is the deposit requirement which constitutes advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds,
and stands as indemnity for damages should the proceedings fail of consummation.11 The deposit likewise sufficiently satisfies the
compensation requirement of the Constitution.12 Moreover, the owners of the expropriated lands are entitled to legal interest on the
compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or
deposited in court.13
It is the ruling of this Court that there is no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
court in issuing the orders and the writs of possession herein questioned. Accordingly, the prayer for the dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. Q-97-
31368 and Q-97-31369 on the ground of prematurity for failure to comply with E.O. 1035 is denied.
As regards Section 6 (Acquisition through Negotiated Sale) of E.O. 1035, records show that there had been an attempt on the part of the
Republic to negotiate with the petitioners through the Notices sent by the former through the DPWH. The Notice dated August 29, 1996 sent
to petitioner Remedios Biglang-awa by the respondent Republic14 was intended not only to inform her formally of the planned expropriation,
but also to require her to submit several documents needed for the determination of the just compensation for her property. The petitioner
failed to submit the required documents. The respondent Republic sent both petitioners Remedios and Salvador Biglang-awa Final Notices
dated October 15, 1996 stating that failure to submit the required documents "significantly delay[ed] the completion of the xxx project", and
that the petitioners were given five (5) days to "cooperate by way of submitting the documents being requested", otherwise expropriation
421
proceedings would be initiated against them.15These notices were ignored by the petitioners. Consequently, the respondent Republic, through
the DPWH, filed expropriation cases against the petitioners, conformably with Section 7 of E.O. 1035, to wit:
Sec. 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the preceding section, the government
implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to immediately institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of
the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be. The just compensation to be paid for the property acquired
through expropriation shall be in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on
expropriation and shall immediately issue the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No.
1533; Provided, That the period within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days from the date
such deposit was made.
Thus, the filing of the expropriation cases against the petitioners was not in violation of Section 6 of E.O. 1035, and was, on the contrary, in
accordance with the provisions of the said special law.1âwphi1
The petitioners also claim that they are not bound by the gross and inexcusable abandonment of their cases by their former lawyer, Atty. Jose
Felix Lucero, resulting to the non-filing of their Opposition to the respondents’ Motion for the Issuance of Writs of Possession.
Although the general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client,16 the rule is not without an exception. Petitioners rely on the case
of Aceyork Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals17 wherein the court relaxed the rule to prevent miscarriage of justice. We find no such prejudice to
petitioners caused by the failure of their counsel.
When petitioner Remedios received a Notice to Vacate her property on September 11, 1998, the petitioners immediately tried to get in touch
with their former counsel, Atty. Jose Felix Lucero, but to no avail as the latter refused to talk to them or even answer their letter.18 No reason
was given for the behavior of the counsel. The petitioners wasted no time in hiring the services of a new counsel, the law firm of Gumpal and
Valenzuela. Considering that once the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure has been made, the
expropriator becomes entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial on the part of the
trial court, no opposition on the part of the petitioners on the grounds now pleaded could have prevented such issuance. Therefore, the
petitioners were not prejudiced by the lost opportunity to file their opposition to the respondent’s Motions for the Issuance of Writs of
Possession.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
422
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146886 April 30, 2003
DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, petitioner,

vs.
BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the
value of the subject property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the January 10, 2001 Decision and the February 5,
2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals2 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 61088. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED,
for lack of merit."3
The assailed Resolution4 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"At the root of this present [P]etition is the controversy surrounding the two (2) [C]omplaints for eminent domain which were filed
by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a ONE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise
known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna and owned by herein petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 383605 of the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation the said
lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by and between the former and the latter on October 7, 1996.
"The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 3648 and entitled 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A.
Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E. Bardillon,' was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna ('MTC') on February
23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili
a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.
"On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 'for lack of interest' for failure of the [respondent] and its
counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in its Order dated May 3, 1999, denied [respondent's] [M]otion for [R]econsideration
thereof.
"The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case No. 2845-99-C and entitled 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v.
Devorah E. Bardillon' was filed before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna ('RTC') on October 18, 1999. This
[C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but
petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in
that [respondent's] cause of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
"On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding.
"With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261 on July 10, 2000, and the submission thereof in compliance
with [the] Judge's Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring herein respondent to produce the authority for the expropriation through the
Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili x x x and, on
August 16, 2000, the corresponding order for the issuance of the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381-D."5
In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37)6 did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No. 2845-99-C) was not barred
423
by res judicata. The reason is that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No.
3648), had no jurisdiction over the action.
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"A. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
denied and dismissed petitioner's appeal;
"B. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not pass upon and consider
the pending Motion for Reconsideration which was not resolved by the Regional Trial Court before issuing the questioned Orders of
4 and 16 August 2000;
"C. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in taking the total amount of the assessed
value of the land and building to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo;
"D. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the fact that there is an
existing multi-purpose hall erected in the land owned by Eugenia Almazan which should be subject of expropriation; and
"E. Whether or not, the Honorable Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider the issue of forum
shopping committed by Respondent Masili."8
Simply put, the issues are as follows: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case; (2) whether the dismissal of that case
before the MTC constituted res judicata; (3) whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises; and (4) whether
respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue:
Jurisdiction Over Expropriation
Petitioner claims that, since the value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.9
On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960. 10 Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority
and right to take property for public use.11 As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.12
This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor:13
"It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of
the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
"True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the
court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation."
"Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that 'condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts
of First Instance,' the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of
1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over 'all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation.' The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not
intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.14
424
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is
the government's exercise of eminent domain — a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Second Issue:
Res Judicata
Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the
contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed on
account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment.15 It provides that a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.16
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — an identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action.17
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application even if the Order of
dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.
Third Issue:
Legality of Entry Into Premises
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC's Writ of Possession over her property, issued despite the pending Motion for
Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint. We are not persuaded.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18 On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local
Government Code.19 Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.20
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and
deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If
petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. 21 The RTC has the power
to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.22
Fourth Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioner claims that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, because it scouted for another forum after obtaining an unfavorable Decision
from the MTC.
The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present in two or more pending cases,
such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.23
Be it noted that the earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been dismissed when the Complaint was filed before the RTC. Even
granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a final judgment in the MTC case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the
former had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
425
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 136171 July 2, 2002
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
KER AND COMPANY LIMITED, respondent.
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Department of Public Works and Highways, assailing the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 54256 entitled,
"Republic of the Philippines v. Ker and Company Limited." The decision in question affirmed the trial court in ordering petitioner to pay herein
respondent Ker Company Limited the sum of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) per square meter as just compensation for the 1,186 square
meter lot (Site I) which was expropriated by the government.
The factual background:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition for expropriation of portions of two (2) parcels of land owned by
respondent described as follows:
Lot No. TCT No. Total Area Affected Area

Site I 2-D-1-A-2 T-212616 29.583 sq. m. 1,186 sq. m.
Site II 2-D-1-B-1 T-212617 2,902 sq. m. 1,035 sq. m.
Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Interchange in Davao City. The
provisional value of the properties sought to be expropriated was fixed at the aggregate sum of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty One
Thousand Pesos (P2,221,000.00) or One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter. Respondent claimed that the value of the properties
subject for expropriation is more than Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) per square meter.
After study and investigation, the duly appointed commissioners, Ms. Lucia E. Pelayo and Mr. Oliver Morales of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. gave
the following estimates as just compensation for the areas affected:
Site I 1,186 sq. m. = P 8,788.70/square meter

Site II 1,035 sq. m. = P 5,423.48/square meter
While petitioner found the valuation of respondent’s property in Site II reasonable, petitioner, in its comment on the Report of the Appraisers
found the estimate for Site I excessive, stating that:
1) the provincial Appraisal Committee in a joint Appraisal Report dated January 14, 1993 recommended the market value of Ker and
Company’s property at P1,000.00 per square meter;
2) the highest valuation of lots within the JP Laurel-Buhangin area adjudicated by the RTC, Davao City in a decision rendered on
December 23, 1993 is at P4,000.00 per sq. meter; and,
3) the appraisers did not take into account that the areas in the proceedings are being expropriated for use in a government project
vested with public interest.
On September 27, 1996, the RTC rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"With the determination of just compensation, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiff to have a lawful right to acquire possession of and title to:
a) 1,186 square meters only of defendant Ker’s parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title T-212616 described as Site I;
b) 1,035 square meters only of defendant Ker’s parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title T-212617 described as Site II;
426
2. Condemning portions of the above-described parcels of land including improvements thereon, if there be any, free from all liens
and encumbrances;
3. Ordering plaintiff to pay:
a) Defendant Ker P6,000.00 per square meter for the P1,186 in Site I;
b) Defendant Ker P5,423.48 per square meter for the 1,035 in Site II
as fair and just compensation."1
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the value fixed by the trial court as just compensation for Site I should be reduced.
Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at only
Four Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (P425.00) per square meter while its market value was only Eight Hundred Forty Nine Pesos (P849.00) per
square meter. Petitioner cited the case of Civil Case No. 22-052-93 entitled "Republic v. Laong"2 where the RTC of Davao City (Branch 17) fixed
the value of the lots within the area of J.P. Laurel Buhangin at Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) per square meter.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto, ruling that just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value
of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values approved by the Provincial Appraisal Committee and that for the
purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money
which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. The appellate court brushed aside petitioner’s reliance on Republic v.
Laong.
Petitioner in the present petition raises essentially the same issues which were raised before the trial court and the appellate court. In addition
however, petitioner avers that since Site I is adjacent to Site II, there are no substantial distinctions to warrant different valuations.
The appellate court did not err in not upholding petitioner’s claim that the valuation for the lot in Site I is excessive and unreasonable since the
tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed value at only Four Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (P425.00) per square meter while its
market value was only Eight Hundred Forty-Nine Pesos (P849.00) per square meter based on the revised 1993 schedule of market values. We
have declared in Manotok v. National Housing Authority3, that the statements made in tax documents by the assessor may serve as one of the
factors to be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination after expert commissioners have examined the
property and all pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cases
before a competent and unbiased tribunal.
That the tax declaration of the property in Site I indicated a much lower assessed or market value therefore does not make commissioners’
valuation of just compensation for the property excessive or unreasonable. The duly appointed commissioners of both parties made a careful
study of the properties subject of expropriation. They considered factors such as the location, the most profitable likely use of the remaining
area, size, shape, accessibility as well as listings of other properties within the vicinity to arrive at a reasonable estimate of just compensation
for both lots due the respondent. Petitioner, in fact, does not question the commissioners’ appraisal value as just compensation for the area
affected in Site II.
Petitioner maintains that the assessment of just compensation for the lot in Site I is excessive since the highest valuation made for the
properties within the vicinity of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Road was pegged at Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) in a decision rendered by Branch 17
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao in December 1993. This contention is not plausible. In computing just compensation for expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of
judgment which should be taken into consideration.4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is
to be determined as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct
in disregarding petitioner’s claim.
Nonetheless, we find merit in petitioner’s contention that there are no substantial distinctions between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to
warrant different valuations.
The lots subject of expropriation are adjacent to each other. The Appraisal Report even indicated that the remaining area of the lot in Site II
has the same problem as in Site I with respect to access. The construction of the service road has created a problem pertaining to ingress or
egress to the remaining portions of both Sites.5 Considering that there is no evidence showing substantial distinctions between the lots
affected by Site I and Site II and no explanation was given by the commissioners as to why Site I had been given a higher valuation than Site II,
we find it just and reasonable that the undisputed sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Forty-Eight Centavos
(P5,423.48) per square meter as just compensation for Site II should likewise apply to Site I.
427
Wherefore, the petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court in C.A. G.R. CV No. 54256
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only in so far as the value for the lot in Site I is concerned. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is ordered
to pay respondent Ker Company Limited Five Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos and Forty-Eight Centavos (P5,423.48) per square
meter as just compensation for the 1,186 square meter lot expropriated in Site I.
SO ORDERED.
428
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79906 June 20, 1988
RAFAEL BARICAN and ARACELI ALEJO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which granted an alias writ of possession in favor of the
respondent bank and set aside the order dated March 21, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 which denied the
private respondent bank's application for the issuance of such writ pending the resolution of a civil case before the court.
Spouses Antonio Regondola and Dominga Zabat obtained a loan from the respondent bank. As security for the payment of the loan, the
Regondolas and the respondent bank entered into a contract of real estate mortgage.
For failure of the Regondolas to fulful the terms of the contract, the respondent bank extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage.
The mortgaged property covered by TCT No. 57677 (495811, Caloocan Register of Deeds) was then sold at a public auction sale conducted by
the Assistant City Sheriff of Caloocan City. The respondent bank was declared the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was
registered on October 7, 1980.
The Regondola spouses failed to redeem the property within the one-year period of redemption. Hence, the title to the property was
consolidated in the name of the respondent bank. The transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the mortgagor-spouses was later
annulled and a new one (TCT No. 117068) was issued in favor of the private respondent.
On October 28, 1984, the respondent bank sold the property to Nicanor Reyes.
On October 5, 1985, the bank filed with the lower court a petition for issuance of a writ of possession. On October 7, 1985, the lower court
issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of possession over the foreclosed property including the buildings and improvements therein in
favor of the respondent bank.
However, before the writ of possession could be implemented, petitioner-spouses Rafael Barican and Araceli Alejo filed a petition to stay its
implementation. They opposed the writ of possession claiming that they are the real owners and actual possessors of the foreclosed property
as evidenced by a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage they executed with spouses Regondolas.
The petitioner-spouses disclosed that they had actually filed a complaint for declaration of ownership over the foreclosed property and
damages with preliminary injunction against the respondent bank and Nicanor Reyes with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
128. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-11232.
On October 16, 1985, the lower court issued an order to stay the writ of possession on the ground that the rights of the plaintiffs in the civil
case (petitioner-spouses herein) would be prejudiced if the execution proceeds. Likewise, a petition exparte for the issuance of an alias writ of
possession filed by the respondent bank was denied by the lower court in its order dated March 21, 1986.
Upon appeal the questioned March 21, 1986 order was set aside by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ordered the lower court to issue
the writ of possession in favor of the respondent bank.
Their motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision having been denied, the petitioners interposed the present petition.
In a resolution dated October 1, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the appellate court's decision.
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11232 for ownership of the foreclosed property is a bar
or legal impediment to the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent bank, the highest bidder in the auction sale of the said
foreclosed property.
Relying on Sections 7 and 8 of Act No. 3135, Section 4 of P.D. 385, and the cases of De Los Angeles v. Court of Appeals, et al. (60 SCRA 116); De
Gracia U. San Jose (94 Phil. 623); Marcelo Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals(54 SCRA 89); IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v.
Nera (19 SCRA 181); and Philippine National Bank v. Adil (118 SCRA 110), the appellate court ruled that the lower court was left with no
discretion but to issue a writ of possession because the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a
429
mortgaged property is a ministerial act of the court. More important, the appellate court mentioned Section 4 of Presidential Decree 385
which provides for the rights of government financial institutions as purchasers in extra-judicial foreclosure sales. It states:
Section 4. As a result of foreclosure or any other legal proceedings wherein the properties of the debtor which are
foreclosed, attached, or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment are sold to a government financial institution, the said
properties shall be placed in the possession and control of the financial institution concerned, with the assistance of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines whenever necessary. The Petition for Writ of Possession shall be acted upon by the court
within fifteen (15) days from the date of filing.
which was interpreted by this Court in the case of Philippine National Bank v. Adil (supra) in the following manner:
Pursuant to the above provision, it is mandatory for the court to place the government financial institution, which
petitioner is, in the possession and control of the property. As stated, the said decree was enacted in order to effect the
early collection of delinquent loans from government financial institutions and enable them to continue effectively
financing the development needs of the country" without being hampered by actions brought to the courts by borrowers.
(at pp. 114-115)
The petitioners take exception to the application of Section 4, P.D. No. 385 and the cited cases because "there is a peculiar circumstance
where the alias writ of possession could not be issued not only because of the present possession of the petitioners but also of the fact that
the property in question was already sold to Nicanor Reyes by the respondent Development Bank of the Philippines."
In the instant case, the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was set for hearing. During the hearing, the lower court
discovered certain facts, among them: In Civil Case No. C-11232, the petitioner-spouses claim ownership of the foreclosed property against the
respondent bank and Nicanor Reyes to whom the former sold the property by negotiated sale; the complaint alleged that the DBP knew the
assumption of mortgage between the mortgagors and the petitioner-spouses and the latter have paid to the respondent bank certain amounts
to update the loan balances of the mortgagors and transfer and restructuring fees which payments are duly receipted; the petitioner-spouses
were already in possession of the property since September 28, 1979 and long before the respondent bank sold the same property to
respondent Nicanor Reyes on October 28, 1984; and the respondent bank never took physical possession of the property.
Under these circumstances, the obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure of mortgage case
ceases to be ministerial.
The well-settled rule is that the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and that upon an ex-
parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial upon the court to issue such writ of possession in favor of the purchaser (Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank v. Pardo, 151 SCRA 481; Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 142 SCRA 44;
Philippine National Bank v. Adil, supra; De los Angeles v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; De Gracia v. San Jose, supra; and IFC Service Leasing
and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, supra).
However, the rule is not an unqualified one. As we stated in IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation, v. Nera (supra) citing Tan Soo
Huat v. Ongwico (63 Phil. 746):
There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate
and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the
sheriffs final certificate of sale. There is neither legal ground nor reason of public policy precluding the court from ordering
the sheriff in this case to yield Possession of the property purchased at public auction where it appears that the judgment
debtor is the one in possession thereof and no rights of third persons are involved (Emphasis supplied) (See also Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgaged Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)"
Section 4 of P.D. 385 does not apply in the instant case because the respondent bank already divested itself of ownership over the foreclosed
property when it sold the same to respondent Nicanor Reyes. As early as 1979, the judgment debtor was no longer in possession. There is a
pending civil case involving the rights of third parties. The bank accepted payments on the loan from the petitioners who had assumed the
mortgage of the Regondola spouses.
We agree with the lower court's observations to the effect that:
There is no question that "it is ministerial upon the Court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property ... But under the circumstances in the instant case, the Court can not just ignore
the claims of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11232 who are in possession that they are the owners of the property in
question without first ventilating this issue in a proper hearing of the case on its merits. Likewise, the mind of the Court can
not rest at ease after finding that why did the DBP take five years, after the property mortgaged was foreclosed on October
10, 1980, to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession only on August 16, 1985? When Nicanor Reyes bought
the property on October 28, 1984, why did the DBP not place Reyes in physical possession of the property? And why did
Reyes not take possession of the property? And considering further that the DBP knew that Rafael Barican and his wife are
430
in possession of the property, which is deduced from the argument of counsel for DBP that the Baricans are possessors in
bad faith, why then did the DBP not file a complaint of ejectment against them? (p. 55, Rollo)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order dated
March 21, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128 is REINSTATED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 1,
1987 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
431
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11721 April 3, 1918
ANDRES GRIMALT, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MACARIA V. VELAZQUEZ, and SY QUIO, defendants-appellants.
Varela Calderon & Moreno Lacalle for the appellant Velasquez.

Francisco & Lualhati for the appellant Sy Quio.
No appearance for appellee.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
FISHERS, J.:
The plaintiff, Grimalt, brought an action to foreclose a mortgage upon defendant's property. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff and, not
having paid within the time limited, the mortgaged property was offered for sale. The highest bidder at the sale was Sy Quio, the appellant,
who paid the Sheriff the full amount of his bid. The court, without notice to the mortgagor, affirmed the sale upon the motion of the
purchaser. Shortly after the mortgagor moved to set aside the order of affirmance upon the ground that it was void for lack of notice, and at
the same time deposited the full amount due under the judgment of foreclosure, with interest and costs. The court granted the motion to set
aside the affirmance of the foreclosure sale, but imposed upon the mortgagor the condition of paying Sy Quio interest at the rate of 10 per
cent per annum upon the amount of his bid from the time it was paid to the sheriff until its return to the bidder. From that part of the decision
decreeing the payment of interest the judgment debtor appealed, as did the bidder. Sy Quio, from that part of the decree by which the
affirmance of the sale to him was set aside. The appeal of Sy Quio was disposed of by a decision dated October 2, 1917 (36 Phil. Rep., 936) The
present decision relates only to the appeal of the mortgagor.
DECISION.
Acting upon the petition filed by the appellant, Macaria Velazquez, under date of October 11, 1917, the dispositive part of the decision
rendered herein, under date of October 2, 1917, is hereby modified to read as follows:
The appealed judgment is hereby affirmed in so far as it denies the affirmance of the sale of the mortgaged property, but is reversed
in so far as it requires upon the defendant, Macaria V. Velazquez, to pay the appellant, Sy Quio, interest upon the money deposited
by him to cover his bid at the sale so set aside, and the action of the said Sy Quio against defendant with respect to such interest is
dismissed.
Persons who bid at a foreclosure sale are assumed to know that the mere fact of being the highest bidder does not vest such bidder with the
ownership of the property. The action by which the ownership of the property is conveyed is the approval of the sale by the court. If the
debtor discharges the obligation at any time before a valid order is entered, confirming the sale, the right of the bidder is limited to the return
of the money paid by him to cover his bid. The debtor, in paying the creditor the amount of the judgment for the purpose of discharging his
property from the lien of the mortgage of discharging his property from the lien of the mortgage, infringes no right whatever of the bidder.
Consequently, it is error to require the mortgagor to pay the bidder interest upon sum deposited by him. Interest is payable by virtue of a
contractual undertaking, or as a result of the breach of an obligation after the obligor has been put in default. With respect to one who
becomes a bidder at a foreclosure sale, the owner of the mortgaged property is in no sense a debtor of any person who voluntarily takes part
in the bidding. The mortgagor by paying to the plaintiff the amount of her debt, for the purpose of freeing her property from the lien of the
mortgage, makes use of a right which in no sense violates any right of the bidder. The latter, by making his bid and depositing the money, does
not acquire a right but a mere expectancy, subject to the contingency of a valid approval of the sale by the court before the mortgage on the
property is discharged by payment.
432
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137792 August 12, 2003
SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES and ERLINDA SIBUG, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES ALFONSO and LOURDES SUBA, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions1 dated November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 49634, "Spouses Ricardo Rosales and Erlinda Sibug vs. Alfonso and Lourdes
Suba."
On June 13, 1997, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila rendered a Decision 2 in Civil Cases Nos. 94-72303 and 94-72379, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale of Exhibit D, G and I, affecting the property in question, as an equitable mortgage;
(2) Declaring the parties Erlinda Sibug and Ricardo Rosales, within 90 days from finality of this Decision, to deposit with the Clerk of
Court, for payment to the parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, the sum of ₱65,000.00, with interest at nine (9) percent per
annum from September 30, 1982 until payment is made, plus the sum of ₱219.76 as reimbursement for real estate taxes;
(3) Directing the parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, upon the deposit on their behalf of the amounts specified in the
foregoing paragraph, to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property in question to Erlinda Sibug, married to Ricardo Rosales, and
the Register of Deeds of Manila shall cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150540 in the name of the Macaspacs (Exh. E) and issue
new title in the name of Sibug;
(4) For non-compliance by Sibug and Rosales of the directive in paragraph (2) of this dispositive portion, let the property be sold in
accordance with the Rules of Court for the release of the mortgage debt and the issuance of title to the purchaser.
"SO ORDERED."3
The decision became final and executory. Spouses Ricardo and Erlinda Rosales, judgment debtors and herein petitioners, failed to comply with
paragraph 2 quoted above, i.e., to deposit with the Clerk of Court, within 90 days from finality of the Decision, ₱65,000.00, etc., to be paid to
Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao. This prompted Macaspac, as judgment creditor, to file with the trial court a motion for execution.
Petitioners opposed the motion for being premature, asserting that the decision has not yet attained finality. On March 5, 1998, they filed a
manifestation and motion informing the court of their difficulty in paying Macaspac as there is no correct computation of the judgment debt.
On February 23, 1998, Macaspac filed a supplemental motion for execution stating that the amount due him is ₱243,864.08.
Petitioners failed to pay the amount. On March 25, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering the sale of the property subject of
litigation for the satisfaction of the judgment.
On May 15, 1998, an auction sale of the property was held wherein petitioners participated. However, the property was sold for ₱285,000.00
to spouses Alfonso and Lourdes Suba, herein respondents, being the highest bidders. On July 15, 1998, the trial court issued an order
confirming the sale of the property and directing the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale in their favor.
On July 28, 1998, Macaspac filed a motion praying for the release to him of the amount of ₱176,176.06 from the proceeds of the auction sale,
prompting petitioners to file a motion praying that an independent certified public accountant be appointed to settle the exact amount due to
movant Macaspac.
Meanwhile, on August 3, 1998, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the subject property in the
names of respondents.
433
On August 18, 1998, respondents filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of possession, contending that the confirmation of the sale
"effectively cut off petitioners’ equity of redemption." Petitioners on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July
15, 1998 confirming the sale of the property to respondents.
On October 19, 1998, the trial court, acting upon both motions, issued an order (1) granting respondents’ prayer for a writ of possession and
(2) denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled that petitioners have no right to redeem the property since the case is
for judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Hence, respondents, as purchasers of the
property, are entitled to its possession as a matter of right.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49634, alleging that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of possession to respondents and in denying
their motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of the property to said respondents.
On November 25, 1998, the CA dismissed outright the petition for lack of merit, holding that there is no right of redemption in case of judicial
foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Hence this petition.
In the main, petitioners fault the Appellate Court in applying the rules on judicial foreclosure of mortgage. They contend that their loan with
Macaspac is unsecured, hence, its payment entails an execution of judgment for money under Section 9 in relation to Section 25, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,4 allowing the judgment debtor one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale within which to redeem the foreclosed property.
Respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners are actually questioning the decision of the trial court dated June 13, 1997 which has
long become final and executory; and that the latter have no right to redeem a mortgaged property which has been judicially foreclosed.
Petitioners’ contention lacks merit. The decision of the trial court, which is final and executory, declared the transaction between petitioners
and Macaspac an equitable mortgage. In Matanguihan vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court defined an equitable mortgage as "one which although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to
charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law." An equitable mortgage is not different from a
real estate mortgage, and the lien created thereby ought not to be defeated by requiring compliance with the formalities necessary to the
validity of a voluntary real estate mortgage.6 Since the parties’ transaction is an equitable mortgage and that the trial court ordered its
foreclosure, execution of judgment is governed by Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, quoted as
follows:
SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. – If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to
be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as
approved by the court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to the
judgment obligee within a period of not less that ninety (90) days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of
judgment, and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property, effect. – When the defendant, after being directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails
to pay the amount of the judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion, shall order the property to be sold in the
manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale shall not effect the
rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon
motion, it shall operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.
x x x."
In Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,7 we held that the right of redemption is not recognized in a judicial foreclosure, thus:
"The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage–understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after
registration of the foreclosure sale–exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a
judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National bank or a bank or a banking institution.
"Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the
registration of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale.
"Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure
sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights
in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.’ Such rights exceptionally ‘allowed by law’ (i.e., even after
the confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Act Nos. 2747 and 2938), and the
434
General Banking Act (R.A.337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the
right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure–after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale–which right may be exercised within a
period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
"But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or
banking institution. In such a case, the foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x x shall operate to divest the rights of
all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.’ There then exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This
is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation.
xxx
"This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period
‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale.
After such order of confirmation, no redemption can be effected any longer." (Italics supplied)
Clearly, as a general rule, there is no right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The only exemption is when the mortgagee is
the Philippine National Bank or a bank or a banking institution. Since the mortgagee in this case is not one of those mentioned, no right of
redemption exists in favor of petitioners. They merely have an equity of redemption, which, to reiterate, is simply their right, as mortgagor, to
extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale.
However, instead of exercising this equity of redemption, petitioners chose to delay the proceedings by filing several manifestations with the
trial court. Thus, they only have themselves to blame for the consequent loss of their property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 in CA G.R. SP
No. 49634 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
435
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152195 January 31, 2005
PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43758 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch 25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership of his one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of
land covered by Tax Declaration (T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third (1/3) share in several other lots covered
by T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310, 26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in Danao, Cebu); and for the partition thereof
among the co-owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which the private respondent’s mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from
her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition2 dated April 16, 1937 submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the
administrator of the former’s estate, duly approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0. Under the said deed, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother and Dulce’s uncle Santiago Sepulveda,
was the undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro
and Santiago, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3)
share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was survived
by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulce’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25,
1920,3 and Dulce was then only about four years old. According to the private respondent, his grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded the
delivery of her mother’s share in the eleven (11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela,
refused to do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused,
claiming that he needed to continue to possess the property to reap the produce therefrom which he used for the payment of the realty taxes
on the subject properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the delivery of his mother’s share in the subject
properties on so many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit4 on November 28, 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of
Dionisia when she died intestate on June 5, 1921, when, in fact, the latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale5 on July 24, 1968 over the property covered by T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of
the City of Danao for ₱7,492.00. According to the private respondent, his granduncle received this amount without his (private respondent’s)
knowledge.
The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of
the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of the NINE (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3
of the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s ONE-THIRD (1/3) share of the SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
NINETY-TWO PESOS (₱7,492.00) representing the purchase price of the parcel of land described in paragraph 3(a) of the complaint
with interest thereon until the amount is fully paid;
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the TWO (2) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
436
2. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion belonging to the plaintiff of the remaining EIGHT (8) parcels
of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the amount of which is left to the discretion of this Honorable
Court;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latter’s share of the fruits of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of land subject-matter
of this complaint, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, the value of which will be proven during the trial;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00);
6. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be entitled to in accordance with law and equity.6
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by T.D. No.
19804 in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right
to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulce’s share of the subject
properties from the latter’s mother Carlota, or from the private respondent.
During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for the settlement of his estate was filed on May 8, 1975 with the RTC of Cebu,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate in July
1976. In compliance with the decision of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,7 docketed as G.R. No. L-45809 and promulgated on December
12, 1986, the deceased was substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulce’s share under the project of partition, the petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolidation she executed in
October 1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which were deeded to her under the Project of Partition,8 as well as
the Order9 dated March 24, 1962 of the then CFI in Special Proceeding No. 778-R, denying Carlota’s motion for the reconstitution of the
records of the said case, and for the delivery of Dulce’s share in the eleven parcels of land. The court likewise declared therein that Dulce,
through her grandchildren and her mother, Carlota, had already received her share of the estate from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as early as January
10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by the
complaint would serve as the latter’s compensation for his services as administrator of Dionisia’s estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special
Proceeding No. 778-0, and subsequent to the distribution of the shares of Dionisia’s heirs, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. then became the sole owner of
Dulce’s shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their
then minor children.10 It was pointed out that the private respondent failed to implead Paz Sepulveda and her minor children as parties-
defendants in the complaint.
It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered by T.D. No. 1819911 under his name for taxation purposes since
the beginning of 1948.12 It was likewise alleged that the eleven (11) parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the Project of Partition had been
declared for taxation purposes under the name of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes thereon.13
On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment14 in favor of the private respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring that the plaintiff is
legally and rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the two (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the
one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-owner thereof, and ordering the partition
and segregation of the said one half (1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said one third (1/3) portion of the nine (9)
parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court must be followed
(Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro Lawas, as administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to
deliver to plaintiff the latter’s one third (1/3) share of the ₱7,492.00 representing the purchase price of the parcel of land sold to Danao City
with interest of twelve [per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the date of filing of the Complaint until the
amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to pay attorney’s fees to plaintiff’s attorney in the sum of ₱10,000.00, and to pay the costs. The
counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.15
437
The trial court ruled that the private respondent’s action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the
subject property among the adjudicatees thereof was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with
modification.
The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF ART. 494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT’S FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.].
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS AS PROVEN IN THE CASE
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 IN DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT
WAS MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS INVOLVED IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN RESPONDENT SHOULD
BE PAID BY PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE PURCHASE PRICE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE
ELEVEN (11) PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT ATTORNEY’S FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND
EVEN INCREASING THE AMOUNT THEREOF.16
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for therein, the private respondent, as plaintiff therein, sought
the recovery of the ownership and possession of the ten (10) parcels of land and the partition thereof; and for the payment of his share in the
proceeds of the sale of the property which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to ₱7,492.00, which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr.
claimed was left unpaid. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when
his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent.
Under Article 996 of the New Civil Code,17 Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding
by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. The rights of the usufructuary are provided in
Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil Code.18 In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,19 we held that:
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the
deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who have
not been bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of the surviving spouse to have a
share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse is provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be
ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this
rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie
without the joinder of the said parties.20 The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the
respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.21 As the
Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:22
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does
in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
438
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be
effected for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and
an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question….23
In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father,
Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao which purchased the
property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of
the property.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be
joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable
parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.24 One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court,
otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not
validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as
parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said case, and
rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity.25
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 26 Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.27
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the Regional
Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
439
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83982 January 12, 1990
JESUS C. JAKIHACA, petitioner,

vs.
SPS. LILIA AQUINO and APOLONIO AQUINO, JOSE TORALDE, and HON. EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA, respondents.
Romeo C. San Pedro for petitioner.

Juan R. Moreno for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
On September 10, 1986, petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, and
Jose Toralde before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 616, on account of the latter's refusal to remove
their houses which they have allegedly illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent and against the will of the former on a
residential land situated in Buntong Palay, Ampid, San Mateo, covered by TCT No. N-103650, despite verbal demand.
Initially, the matter was referred to the Barangay Captain of Ampid, San Mateo, Rizal, for conciliation processes pursuant to the requirements
of P.D. No. 1508. But due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before the Barangay Lupon, the Lupon Chairman and Secretary
thereafter issued a "certification to file action."
Served with summons pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure, the defendants on November 3, 1986 filed an answer with Special and
Affirmative Defenses alleging among others, that there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the defendants and the former owner of the
land in question which they planted to fruit bearing trees and devoted the same primarily to rice and corn products, and so therefore, they can
not be ejected under the Land Reform Law more particularly P.D. No. 1 from this land which they had occupied and cultivated for more than
ten (10) years with the consent of the former owner Gloria Gener. In addition, they said that there is no showing that the case was first
brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for certification that this case is proper for trial before said Court.
On December 22, 1987, the respondent trial court found that the private respondents are not agricultural tenant-farmers of the land in
question, either through 'its former owner Gloria Gener or through the present owner-petitioner Jesus Jakihaca that private respondents
entered the premises some 10 to 20 years ago and built their houses thereon by tolerance from the former owner Gloria Gener and as such
they are bound by their implied promise that they will vacate the land upon demand. Private respondents were ordered to: (1) remove their
respective houses on the portion of the land occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to the petitioner; (2) pay the petitioner
jointly and severally the amount of P 3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (3) reimburse the petitioner for the cost of the suit. Their claim for
moral and exemplary damages was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal by the private respondents to the Regional Trial Court, said appellate court on April 8, 1988 dismissed the case on the ground that
the lower court acted without jurisdiction as the complaint shows nothing when the verbal demand to remove the houses on the lot of the
petitioner was made on the private respondents. (Decision of the RTC, p. 13, Rollo).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal on April 21, 1988 which was denied on June 25, 1988. Not satisfied, this
petition was filed on July 12, 1988. On March 15, 1989, this Court in a minute resolution gave due course to the petition.
Petitioner claims that the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 616 for lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. On the
other hand, private respondents contended that the petition was filed out of time; that the petition was filed with the wrong court; that the
Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that there was no allegation in the complaint of prior
physical possession of the land by the petitioner.
The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to remove their houses on the lot of the
former but the latter refused and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds." (p. 44, Rollo) Such is sufficient compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements, in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the case of Hautea v. Magallon, 12 SCRA 514, to wit:
An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused
to restore the land, is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand.
440
As to whether or not the demand was brought within the one year period, this We have to say. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case may be objected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. In the case of Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30, cited in Tejones v. Cironella, 159 SCRA 104, We held:
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief
to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said . . . to the effect that we frown
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if favorable and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.
Nowhere in the Answer of respondents contain an allegation attacking the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court based on the issue on
demand. Again, in PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 305, We held:
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. (p. 48, Rollo)
Another reason for the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as alleged by the respondents in their answer to the complaint
filed with the Municipal Trial Court, was that said court has no jurisdiction to try the case as they are tenants-farmers and that as such they
cannot be ejected from their farmholdings without a certification by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform that the case is proper for hearing. On
the other hand, petitioners argue that when the Municipal Trial Court required them to submit their respective position papers, respondent
did not raise this particular issue anymore but instead centered on the issue of actual possession and the elements of forcible entry and illegal
detainer. Petitioners, in their position paper, attached the report of Mr. Maines of the Agrarian Office which categorically states that there is
no evidence whatsoever to show that the subject land is devoted to the production of rice and corn; that the occupants are not sharing with
the present landowner, hence, they are classified as illegal occupants; that the subject land is not tenanted, not devoted to the production of
palay and/or corn, hence, not covered by P.D. No-27 or the Operation Land Transfer of the government (p. 47, Rollo). Considering the report of
said office, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal was proper.
Respondents contend that the petition was filed out of time. They allege that when petitioner received the decision of the Regional Trial Court
on April 20, 1988 and the appeal to this Court was filed only on July 12, 1988 or only after a 3 month period, such appeal was definitely outside
the 15 day reglementary period within which to appeal. Respondents added that the motion for reconsideration filed with said Regional Trial
Court did not stop the running of the period within which to validly file his appeal. The instant case, being an ejectment case was prosecuted
under the Rule on Summary Procedure where it expressly prohibits a Motion for Reconsideration. (Memorandum for private respondents, p.
49, Rollo).
Respondents are in error. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts.
Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of
the latter court.
Respondents likewise contend that the petition was filed with the wrong court. Again, they are mistaken.
In the case of Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643, We held that the final judgment
or order of the Regional Trial Court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with Section 22 of the
Interim Rules, or to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section
25 of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the petitioners filed this appeal with a proper court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated April 8, 1988 and the order dated June 25, 1988 both of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 415, are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, dated December 22, 1987 in Civil Case No. 616 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
441
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990
MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases Division) and PLAZA ARCADE, Inc., respondents.
Rogelio L. Orio for petitioner.
Perfecto V. Fernandez for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The legal issue raised in this petition is whether the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court in order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may be served by registered
mail.
On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc.,
alleging that despite the expiration of the written contract of lease over a portion of the ground floor of the former Manila Times Building,
petitioner refused to vacate the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several letters of demand, the last of
which was sent to petitioner by registered mail.
During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila or on August 27, 1982, petitioner voluntarily vacated the
disputed premises, turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent.
On May 17, 1984, the inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative
value to the three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to receive. The court held that since
none of the demand letters was served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person found on the premises, or (3) by
posting such notice on the premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
there was no valid demand. If none was made, the case came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Whereupon, it ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay petitioner P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and another P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for
reconsideration by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case in its order of October 9, 1985. 1
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision dated July 3, 1988 the Appellate
Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. Motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari.
In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the lower courts to task for taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule 70, and
declaring that the service of demand letters to vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3) modes enumerated therein. They failed to
note the common practice of serving said notices on the tenant by registered mail with return card so that the registry receipt and the receipt
thereof by the addressee through the return card could be presented in evidence to prove the fact of delivery, in the event of a litigation.
We agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case indicate personal service on the lessee. In arriving at this conclusion, we have been
greatly aided by respondent's citation of American cases which, by and large, represents a practical, if not realistic, approach to the problem.
In the cases of Nunlist vs. Motter,2 and Gehring vs. Swoll 3 the Court held that where the notice to leave the premises is transmitted by
registered mail with a return card and thereafter the receipt bearing the signature of the defendant was returned, a prima facie case is
established of the fact of delivery of said notice to the defendant personally by the Postal Office Department although he refused to accept the
same. 4 Indeed, notice by registered mail is considered an effective service on the person concerned. It cannot be avoided by the mere
expediency of declining to accept delivery after notification thereof. The service is deemed complete regardless of such refusal to accept if the
addressee fails to claim his mail from the postal office after the lapse of five (5) days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster. 5
In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased premises, required by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry
or unlawful detainer action can be commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is a substantial compliance with the modes
of service enumerated under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
442
At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they involve a
disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which
only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has
personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The undisputed
facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc.
was the new owner of the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the
premises but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final
demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on the supposition that there
was no personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioner's blatant attempts at evasion which compelled the new
landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further
injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal order of the trial
court is affirmed. Civil Case No. 071279-CV is hereby ordered reinstated in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
So ordered.
443
FIRST DIVISION
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1533 January 28, 2008
VICKY C. MABANTO, petitioner,

vs.
Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Vicky Mabanto against Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1, Cebu City, charging him with Serious Misconduct, Inefficiency, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) in connection with her supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. R-35618.
The antecedents are as follows:1
Complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. R-35618 for ejectment. Judgment was rendered against her and she appealed the decision to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. She posted a supersedeas bond in the amount of P45,000 to stay the execution of the judgment.
On February 17, 1997, the RTC resolved the appeal and remanded the case to the MTCC for re-trial. Complainant’s counsel filed a motion to
withdraw the supersedeas bond.
On May 19, 1997, complainant learned from the Clerk of Court of MTCC, Cebu City that respondent, in an Order dated September 23, 1996,
granted plaintiffs’ ex-parte motion to withdraw rental deposit under the bond and release the same to plaintiff, hence, the latter withdrew it
on said date. Complainant claimed that respondent concealed from her and her counsel plaintiffs’ motion to release the deposit under
the supersedeas bond as they were not notified of the motion or the approval of the same.
Respondent, in his Comment,2 denied having concealed from complainant and her counsel his Order dated September 23, 2006. Respondent
stated that complainant’s counsel, Atty. Cynthia M. Matural, was furnished a copy of the Order. He likewise explained that he directed the
release of the bond upon plaintiffs’ ex-parte motion because the bond would be applied to the back rentals owing to the latter. He added that
from the amount of P45,000 withdrawn, P15,000 was returned to the court by plaintiffs on September 25, 1996, which amount remained as
complainant’s supersedeas bond.
Complainant replied that she and her counsel never received a copy of the aforestated motion and order. Her counsel filed several motions for
the release of the supersedeas bond expecting that the same was still intact. Complainant likewise insisted that respondent had no basis for
issuing the assailed order because the purpose of the supersedeas bond is to guarantee the performance of the judgment appealed from if
affirmed by the appellate court, and this did not happen in this case because the RTC remanded the case for re-trial.
On January 10, 2005, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
In a Memorandum dated July 12, 2005, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. The OCA considered the fact that no malice attended respondent’s action, and that the offense took place prior to the
amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which imposes a heavier penalty for gross ignorance of the law.
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well taken.
A supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case it be affirmed
wholly or in part by the appellate court. It should therefore subsist as security for the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff.3
Section 19(2) (3), Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that all moneys deposited by the defendant to stay execution of the judgment shall be
held until the final disposition of the appeal, and shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment. It likewise provides
that the plaintiff will be allowed to withdraw the money when the defendant agrees or fails to oppose plaintiff’s petition. The purpose of this is
to avoid damage that the defendant may suffer if plaintiff should be allowed to withdraw the money deposited when the plaintiff’s right to
collect the money is in issue.4
Here, complainant failed to oppose the motion because of the lower court’s failure to inform her. Indeed, Mr. Jose Legaspi, Clerk of Court of
MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, stated that complainant was not notified about the motion to release the supersedeas bond and the Order
allowing the release of the bond. The court interpreter, Ms. Rebecca L. Alesna, also confirmed that she prepared the notice for complainant
upon the instruction of respondent but due to inadvertence, she was not able to send the same to the parties.5
444
Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court requires that adverse parties be served copies of pleadings and processes. A motion without a notice of
hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.6 In Cui v. Madayag,7 this Court held that motions that do not contain proof of
service of notice to the other party are not entitled to judicial cognizance.
Without any proof of service having been made upon complainant, respondent erred in granting the motion to withdraw the deposit under
the bond, and is, thus, guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge which is penalized with either dismissal from service, suspension for three (3) months without
salary and benefits or a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.
The administrative offense, however, took place prior to the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC on
September 11, 2001. In Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla,8 Padua v. Judge Eufemio R. Molina,9 Dizon v. Judge Demetrio D.
Calimag,10 and Prosecutor Contreras v. Judge Eddie P. Monserate,11 citing gross ignorance of the law but taking into account that no nefarious
motive on the part of respondents had been shown, this Court imposed a fine of P2,000 with a warning.
Thus, consistent with the sanctions imposed in the aforementioned cases, this Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is found GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAWfor which he is FINED P2,000 to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
445
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MT-01-1381 January 14, 2002

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 97-426-MTJ)
FR. ROMELITO GUILLEN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO K. CAÑON, respondent.
MELO, J.:
In Civil Case No. 185-H entitled, "Barangay Lacasa, Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, as represented by Bebiana Sayson, Barangay Captain vs. Eloy
Ampis, et al.," Barangay Lacasa sought the eviction of 40 residents for illegally and unlawfully occupying a 1-hectare land they claimed to own.
In order to prevent said residents from making repairs, improvements, or construction within the 1-hectare land, Judge Antonio K. Canon,
Presiding Judge of the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Hinatuan-Tagbina, Surigao del Sur, issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
on December 27, 1996. The residents allegedly continued to disobey said order, thereby prompting the court to issue three separate orders of
arrest all dated September 5, 1997, against 11 individuals for direct contempt. These arrest orders became the seed of the present
case. 1âwphi1.nêt
In a sworn letter-complaint dated September 9, 1997, complainant Fr. Romelito Guillen, parish priest of San Agustin, Barangay Poblacion,
Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, in his capacity as representative of the Social Action Center of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, charged
respondent Judge Antonio K. Canon with issuing unjust orders of arrest and with gross ignorance of the law relative to the ejectment case.
Complainant asserted that the orders of arrest against the 11 individuals, whose affidavits were included in his letter-complaint, were
defective since: 1) the 11 affiants, except for Abon Lebeste, were not among the 40 defendants in Civil Case No. 185-H; 2) the orders were
issued without any motion to cite affiants in contempt of court and were issued solely at the court's instance; 3) the orders were issued
without giving affiants notice that they violated the court's orders and did not give them a chance to explain and defend their actions; and 4)
affiants merely initiated repairs on their nipa huts without disturbing the status quo sought to be preserved by respondent. Complainant
further contended that respondent acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner in causing the arrest of affiants who, as of the writing of the
letter-complaint, were still detained at the Municipal Jail of Hinatuan. Finally, complainant averred that respondent is no longer physically and
mentally fit to sit as presiding judge since he is almost completely paralyzed, unable to write, speak, or walk unaided.
In his comment dated February 28, 1998, respondent admitted having issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 27,
1996 and the three separate orders of arrest all dated September 5, 1997. He alleged that through an affidavit filed by the Lacasa Barangay
Council on September 5, 1997, he found that defendants Julie Lisayan and Abon Lebeste had violated said writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the former for having made major repairs and improvements on her house, and the latter for having constructed a concrete or
hollow-block toilet. The Barangay Kagawads, at their examination following the filing of their joint affidavit, reported that Abet Antonio, Lino
Costan, Ely Engalan, Eme Suan, Maning Davenes, Celso Davenes, Ronnie Capunong, Bellie Morales and Carlos Munion had also violated the
aforementioned order upon the prodding and inducement of Lisayan and Lebeste.
Respondent claimed that these surrounding events were enough reasons for affiants to be brought to court and to show cause why they
should not be held for contempt. He contended that since Civil Case 185-H is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the summary
issuance of the warrants by virtue of the affidavit filed by the Lacasa Barangay Council and the aforementioned circumstances was justified
and not unjust, arbitrary, or despotic. Respondent further claimed that summary hearings were held in his chambers, and after the parties had
given their explanations on why they should not be held in contempt, he concluded that only Lisayan and Lebeste had indeed defied the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and not the 9 other affiants. Respondent subsequently lifted the orders of arrest against these 9
individuals, while Lisayan and Lebeste were committed at the municipal jail for 3 days as a punitive lesson for their defiance. Respondent also
alleged that the imputation made by complainant that affiants were all detained as of September 9, 1997 is absolutely bereft of truth. In fact,
the 9 individuals were not even arrested despite the orders of arrest as seen in the indorsement warrant of arrest issued by the warrant officer
of the Office of the Chief of Police of Hinatuan-PNP and duly confirmed by a certification from the officer-in-charge of the same office.
Lastly, respondent disputed complainant's allegation that he is no longer physically and mentally fit to maintain his position, claiming that he
has been regularly attending to his official duties in his station in Hinatuan every Wednesday and Thursday, in his sub-station at Tagbina which
is 27 kilometers from Hinatuan, every Friday, and as judge-designate of the 8th MCTC of Bislig-Lingap at Bislig which is approximately 55
kilometers from Hinatuan, every Monday and Tuesday. Respondent claimed that he shuttles through the poor third-class gravel road which is
tattered with potholes riding in passenger jeeps, or at times, even only on two-wheel motorcycles. Respondent argued that this weekly travel
through long distances cannot be made by one who is said to be almost completely paralyzed.
Both complainant and respondent were required by the Court on February 21, 2000 to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed, but no response was made by them despite proper service of notice. Further arguments
were, therefore, deemed waived.
In the report and recommendation dated January 19, 2000 submitted by then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently
observed that respondent is liable for issuing unjust orders of arrest and of gross ignorance of the law.
446
We agree.
Respondent is liable for issuing unjust orders of arrest in that he failed to observe the proper procedure laid down in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically the provisions on contempt. It must be noted that affiants were charged with direct contempt for having violated the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent. This is contrary to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which defines direct
contempt as, "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same x x x."
Clearly, the supposed contemptuous acts of affiants fall under the definition of indirect contempt as explained in the case
of Industrial & Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (284 SCRA 144 [1998]), that:
There is no question that disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a
court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, respondent almost simultaneously issued the orders of arrest after the members of the Barangay Kagawad filed their joint affidavit
and gave their oral report that the persons later disobeyed the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. This is in direct violation of Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt....
The records of the case makes no mention of the fact that prior to the issuance of the orders of arrest, affiants were given the opportunity to
comment on the charge.
Respondent tried to justify his actions by claiming that affiants were not deprived of due process since a summary hearing was conducted in
his chambers wherein the individuals were given the chance to be heard on their positions and justifications on why they should not be held in
contempt. What respondent fails to realize is that for indirect contempt charges, a different procedure is laid down by the law. According to
Section 4, Rule 71:
If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
In the instant case, no docketing was done by respondent nor was a formal hearing conducted as required. Veritably, assuming for the sake of
argument that a proper charge in writing accusing the affiants with committing acts constituting indirect contempt was filed, this fact will not
cure the proceedings of the taint of irregularity because the record shows that no previous hearing was afforded to petitioner. To restate what
was pointed out earlier, in cases of indirect contempt, the contemnor "may be punished only after a charge in writing is filed and an
opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel", and without a hearing, an order citing a person in contempt violates the
person's right to due process (Salome D. Cañas vs. Lerio C. Castigador, G.R. No.139844, December 15,2000).1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent's actions also visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law. No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct). Indeed, competence is
a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence
of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to
be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules (Jovenal Oporto, Jr. vs. Judge Eddie P. Monserate, A.M. No.
MTJ-96-1109, April 16, 2001). Thus, this Court has consistently held that:
A judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary , not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law (Agunday vs. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134 [1999]).
Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is
excused, and surely not a judge (De Austria vs. Beltran, 313 SCRA 443 [1999]).
However, with regard to the question of whether respondent caused the detention of the 11 affiants as claimed by complainant, the Court
finds for respondent who has indubitably shown that 9 of 11 individuals were not even arrested. Indeed, it can be plainly seen through the
indorsement on the warrant issued by the office of the chief of police of Hinatuan-PNP on September 8, 1997 that the 9 individuals were not
arrested. This fact is further bolstered by the certification given by the officer-in-charge of the Hinatuan-PNP on February 25, 1998 to the effect
that the 9 individuals were never arrested or detained.
As regards respondent's physical condition, inasmuch as both complainant and respondent failed to present medical evidence to support their
respective claims, this Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the same.
447
Lastly, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant complaint, respondent has six other administrative complaints currently pending before
the Office of the Court Administrator.
WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio K. Canon is hereby found guilty of issuing unjust orders and of gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a
fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely. 1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
448
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142649 September 13, 2001
ANTONIO C. SAN LUIS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NELSON BAYOT, as Presiding Judge, RTC, Pasay City, Branch 118, and T N. LAL & CO., LTD., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in the petition for review in this case is the Resolution1 of 24 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 56549, which
dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari for having been filed out of time, as well as its Resolution of 13 March 2000, denying the
motion for reconsideration of the former.
The record discloses that private respondent T.N. Lal & Co., Ltd. filed a petition for indirect contempt against herein petitioner, Antonio C. San
Luis, Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The petition was docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-0480 and raffled to Branch 118 of said court. The action arose from the alleged failure or refusal of petitioner to comply with the
order of 7 April 1999 of Hon. Ernesto A. Reyes, presiding judge of Branch 111 of said court in Civil Case No. 97-0423. The order directed the
LRTA to immediately restore the power supply of private respondent's sound system in all places, sites and locations in its area of
responsibility within 24 hours from receipt of the same.2
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt on the ground that it states no cause of action and private respondent,
as petitioner therein, was guilty of forum-shopping.3
On 15 July 1999, public respondent Hon. Nelson Bayot, presiding judge of Branch 118, issued an order, a copy of which was received by
petitioner on 9 August 1999, directing that the petition for indirect contempt, Civil Case No. 99-0480, be transferred to Branch 111 for
disposition and appropriate action, since it was that branch which issued the order of 7 April 1999 and against which the contemptuous act
was committed; hence, Branch 111 was in a better position to determine whether or not the order of 7 April 1999 had been violated.4
On 18 August 1999, petitioner moved to reconsider the 15 July 1999 order of Judge Bayot. The latter issued an order on 22 October 1999,
stating that the records of the case had already been transferred to Branch 111 and that he believed the assailed order was correct and
proper. Accordingly, he would not act anymore on the motion for reconsideration.5 A copy of said order was received by petitioner on 8
November 1999.
On 7 January 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the
petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56549, petitioner sought to annul Judge Bayot's orders of 15 July 1999 and 22 October 1999 on
the ground that the latter acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when he did not act on petitioner's
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration and, instead, transferred the case to Branch 111 of the court below.6
In its Resolution of 24 January 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time. 7Forthwith, petitioner filed a
"Motion for Reconsideration" as well as a "Motion to Admit Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and to Relax Strict Rules on Procedure,"
both of which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution of 13 March 2000.8
Petitioner is now before us, asking for a liberal application of the procedural rules. He raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISSED THE SAME FOR ITS FAILURE TO FILE THE SAID PETITION ON TIME, OVERLOOKING
THE FACT THAT THE FAILURE TO FILE THE SAME WAS DUE TO AN HONEST MISTAKE AND HUMAN ERROR IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD
FOR FILING THE INSTANT PETITION BY HANDLING COUNSEL.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT CASE IS WARRANTED SO THAT PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS WITH
THE COURT OF APPEALS COULD BE REINSTATED AND PROCEED IN DUE COURSE IN ORDER NOT TO DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF ITS [SIC]
RIGHT TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS SO THAT IT CAN BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON ITS
TECHNICALITY ASPECT.9
On the procedural aspect, we rule in favor of petitioner.
In finding that the petition for courtroom and mandamus was filed out of time, the Court of Appeals applied Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of 21 July 1998, which reads:
SECTION 4. Where petition filed — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
449
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it
is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the
period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining
period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file
the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
The Court of Appeals reckoned the counting of the 60-day period from petitioner's receipt on 9 August 1999 of a copy of the assailed 15 July
1999 order, considered the interruption of the running of the period by the filing on 18 August 1999 of the "Motion for Reconsideration," and
held that the remaining period resumed to run on 8 November 1999, the date petitioner received the 22 October 1999 order. Accordingly,
petitioner should have filed the petition on or before 29 December 1999. He filed the petition only on 7 January 2000, or nine days after the
expiration of the period.
It must be pointed out, however, that Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was subsequently amended in the Court's
Resolution in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on 1 September 2000. As amended, said section reads as follows:
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if one is filed. In our decision in Systems Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al.,10 reiterated in Unity Fishing
Development Corp. and/or Antonio Dee vs. Court of Appeals et al .,11 the new period was made applicable to pending cases, such as in the case
at bar. Settled is the rule that remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new rights or take
away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the purview of
the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive
application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise
therefrom.
Conformably with Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, the 60-day period of petitioner to file the petition for certiorarishould be counted from his
receipt on 8 November 1999 of the Resolution of 22 October 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition
for certiorari having been filed on 7 January 2000, the last day of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the
same on ground of late filing.
In view of the foregoing, our next logical step would be to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on its merit CA-G.R. SP No. 56549 by
determining the issue raised therein on whether Judge Bayot committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in transferring the case for indirect contempt to Branch 111 of the court below. Such step would, however, unduly prolong the disposition of
the main action. We shall act on said petition, considering that the lone issue raised is one of law. 12 It is already an accepted rule of procedure
for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. 13If, based
on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice, instead of
remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.14
In his petition for review on certiorari the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56549, petitioner contended that Judge Bayot committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act on his motion to dismiss the indirect contempt case and on his motion for reconsideration, and, instead,
referred the case to Branch 111 of the court below, the court which issued the order subject of the case for indirect contempt.
The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which read:
SECTION 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against
which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.
450
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified
true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
SECTION 5. Where charge to be filed — Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or
a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court. Where such
contempt has been committed against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the
lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
such place in the same manner as provided in section 11 of this Rule.
"In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an
affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt
to properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy.'' 15 Only the court which rendered the order commanding the
doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason
has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt has been committed.16 It is a well-established rule that the power to
determine the existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to punish a contempt against
another.17
"The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule. . . is that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court
against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel
due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel
obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.''18
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt must be filed with the court contemned.
Although this provision is permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of court, it would be a good
practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty
party.19
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition's, we find and so hold that public respondent Judge Nelson Bayot committed no error and did not act
with abuse of discretion in ordering the transfer of the petition for indirect contempt, Civil Case No. 99-0480, to Branch 111 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, whose order was the subject of the contempt suit.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 24 January 2000 and 13 March 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56549 are hereby SET ASIDE.
For the reasons set forth above, said case is ordered DISMISSED, and the orders of public respondent judge dated 15 July 1999 and 22 October
1999 in Civil Case No. 99-0480 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge of Branch 111, Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, shall forthwith
conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-0480, including the resolution of petitioner's motion to dismiss the case.
SO ORDERED.
451
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,

vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
DECISION
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision1 and April
30, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against
Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent
Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with
his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third
(1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to
the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land. 6 The public auction
sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house)
standing on the subject land.7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of
Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject
house included in the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property should not be included in
the auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that
nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's]
initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house
in its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the
court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a]
right which has never been considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.
452
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the
aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be
declared as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be
erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to
proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil
Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the subject
lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 14 of April 30, 2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for contempt of court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those advanced by petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified
true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings
for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in
its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases
supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated
by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado
v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of
initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by
the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without
complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended
section.
xxxx
453
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended
court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall
be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
xxxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the
rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on
non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.
xxxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not
initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond
question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the
amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was
tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of the
mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified
petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification
against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it
dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed the
same oversight by delving into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the
proper disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for
contempt filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown that will
likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be included in the
public auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the parties. We must
therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the subject
house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.17 On the other
hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and 44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the
subject house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by
his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the
subject land but also the subject house.21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the
subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people. We are very much pleased with the
decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Piñas, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Piñas City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the
1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item (2),
detailed as follows:
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
x x x x.22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling
does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive
proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
454
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the
subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes
with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house constructed on the subject lot was not
alleged in the complaint and its ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in
its adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to
accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the
improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which
they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house
which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the
house which is permanently attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. 24 Petitioners never controverted such claim.
There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the
parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject
house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission
of said common property from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop
short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first,
the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the
segregation of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties,
and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact
nature of the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. 29 Petitioners add that said house has been
their residence for 20 years.30 Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a
family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil
Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as
the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from
the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home. (Emphasis supplied.)
455
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family
home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a
longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid
periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any
compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through
auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this
fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of
the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this
time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years
from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order
the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up
and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
house although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The
same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the
family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period
of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land
covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership
of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the
period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
456
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 158971. August 25, 2005
MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his capacity as owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING CENTER, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELENA EMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent Elena Embang’s motion to cite Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in
contempt of court for delaying this case and impeding the execution of the judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 12 1 and Rule
12.042 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against
petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The dispositive portion of his September 29, 2000
decision3 read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to be a regular employee of the PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and ordering the
latter to reinstate her to her former position and pay her backwages from the date of her dismissal on February 18, 2000 until her
reinstatement which computed as of today amounts to ₱37,771.50 (₱5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the amount of ₱3,147.62 as
corresponding 13th month pay for the period.
An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since [,] compelled to litigate [,] [Embang] had to engage the services of counsel.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision
of the labor arbiter with modification. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be made jointly and severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that
[Embang] is entitled only [to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded 13th month pay as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a
petition for certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit, the appellate court dismissed the same.5 The motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner was likewise denied.6
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the CA’s decision (dismissing his petition) and
resolution (denying his motion for reconsideration). Since we found no reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the
petition in our September 22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the same with
finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December 30, 2003.
In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang’s counsel filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated February
16, 2004 before the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the motion
for writ of execution.7 He alleged that Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her by petitioner; hence, she should be
entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the date of the promulgation of the labor arbiter’s decision.
This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions between the parties.8 Finding that his office was never informed by
petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on their part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued
an order dated July 30, 20049 granting the February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages should be computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no
backwages should accrue thereafter because of Embang’s refusal to be reinstated.
457
Embang’s counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the appeal was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center did not post the required cash or surety bond. Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite
Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of
Embang’s refusal to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embang’s part constituted a
supervening event that justified the filing of an appeal ― notwithstanding the finality of the decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the
proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter.
Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution10 on February 28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal and to
remand the case to the regional arbitration branch for further proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not appealable.
Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration of the NLRC’s February 28,
2005 resolution.
For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice.11Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct
or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same.12 Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court.13 It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle,
degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. 14
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is committed by a person who commits the following acts,
among others: disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court; 15any abuse of or any unlawful interference
with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt;16 and any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. 17
We denied with finality the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed
with modification by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo’s sly maneuvers
on behalf of his client.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of
his victory while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v.
Court of Appeals:18
…well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary to Atty. Quevedo’s contention, there existed no supervening event
that would have brought the case outside the ambit of the general rule on the immutability of final and executory decisions.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment becomes final and executory or to new circumstances which
develop after judgment acquires finality.19 The "refusal" of Embang to be reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before the finality
of our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before the decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and executory.
In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embang’s rejection of the same was not a new one and had already been passed
upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo himself admits that petitioner brought the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and
December 3, 2002 memorandum. The appellate court brushed it aside and found neither factual nor legal merit in the petition. The matter
was again raised in petitioner’s June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration which was denied on the ground that the basic issues had already
been previously considered by the court. Embang’s alleged refusal to be reinstated was also alleged in the petition for review on certiorari filed
by petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a reversible error had been committed by the CA.
458
Atty. Quevedo’s client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the modified decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried,
under the guise of a flimsy appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should he have raised anew matters
previously considered and issues already laid to rest.
Atty. Quevedo’s act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of a final and executory
decision. Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a writ of execution is not appealable.20 Thus, Atty. Quevedo’s deceptively
"innocent" appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of procedure resulting in the obstruction of justice.
By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the fruits of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying
the hands of justice and preventing it from taking its due course. His conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final and executory decision.
By appealing an order which he knew to be unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the dispensation of justice. His dilatory
tactics were an affront to the dignity of the Court, clearly constituting indirect contempt.
We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court was his violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While a lawyer’s violation of his duties as an officer of the court may also constitute contempt, the
grounds for holding a person in contempt and for holding him administratively liable for the violation of his lawyer’s oath are distinct and
separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. A finding of contempt on the part of a lawyer does not preclude
the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him for his contravention of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus:
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the
exercise of the other. A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand,
the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the
court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of
the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme
Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of
justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent
charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner, an attorney’s conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise
been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show
cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme
Court and are equally incidents of the court’s basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial
functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al.:
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here: the Court’s inherent power to
discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to
punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court’s disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of
court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his
part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct
calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. 21
We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedo’s behavior to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for an investigation of his possible liabilities under Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of ₱30,000 is imposed upon him,
payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
459
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-
PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains,
providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and
a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth
₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner
herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed
that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of
letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernalproperties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being
a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.10 Both
were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims
were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate,"
considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.
460
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this
regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine
‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the
deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondent’s
unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or
ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can
be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the
propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with
an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose
of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on
respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate
461
court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted
the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4,
1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation
placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered
to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding
therefrom those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he
acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included
in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had
interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a
need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns
the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a
material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the
propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk
of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her
day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true
owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close
review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as
to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches
us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum
for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership,
still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real
estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are
considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s
pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
462
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership.
We quote her testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In accordance with the
Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and
leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family
despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate of your
late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad,
interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam
Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are
agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
463
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San
Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin…
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she
present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture.
Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal properties. 26 Sensing that such assertion could not
strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that
she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death,
such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children. 28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she
believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be
submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are
hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
464
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177066 September 11, 2009
JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner,
vs.
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled
to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137.
The facts of the case follow:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito
Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that
he is the son of the deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and
privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate
book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income
pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.2
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names
him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno"
were one and the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity
and relation to Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and
the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as
genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for pretrial. 3
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books
and records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the corporation.
The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order
shall be the subject of a bill of costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able
to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the
participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be
allowed to examine respondent’s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an
heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper
action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.5
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution6 dated March 6, 2007.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING
THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR
ESTABLISHED.
465
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE
PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED
ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[’S] MOTION TO DISMISS.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE
BOOKS OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION.7
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the
stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was
not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal
via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 9
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth
certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.11
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus —
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — x x x.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts
from said records or minutes, at his expense.
xxxx
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation
shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or
loss of statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its operations. 12
The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the
necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs. 13 Such right rests upon
the stockholder’s underlying ownership of the corporation’s assets and property. 14
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the
shares.151avvphi1
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges
of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of
the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.16 During such interim period, the heirs stand as
the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed
to inspect respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the
shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has
participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
466
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is
an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The
status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedent’s estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for
the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance — to direct respondent corporation
to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March
6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
467
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ,
MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5,
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine
and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the
probate of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the
amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate
court approved the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the
will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It
prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and
concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of
the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a
bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments
which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact
that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year. 7
468
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such
amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors.8 The court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz to
take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed
the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby
reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for administration
including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli Ruiz before the
amount required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate
court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's order in a decision dated November 10, 1994 10 and a resolution dated January
5, 1995.11
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156,
DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN
PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS
OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to
order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive
allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for
an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the
deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to
support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. 15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was
error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator
pending settlement of his estate.
469
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution
of the estate which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the
estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of
the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice"
to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not
yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their
respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The
probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 23
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to
his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner
assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his mother and allegedly
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the
decedent and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of
the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court
certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to
require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle
Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the lease.29Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
470
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been
fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and
he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. 31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order
granting an allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors
are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.
471
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 promulgated on May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970. The CA Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 142,
Makati City dated November 29, 20022 in Civil Case No. 00-1553 (entitled "Accounting of All Corporate Funds and Assets, and Damages") which
denied petitioner Oscar C. Reyes’ (Oscar) Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro,
Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by
their family. Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro’s estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in
the 1970s, no similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia’s estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith.
As of June 30, 1990, Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned 8,715,637 and 4,250 shares, respectively.3
On May 9, 2000, Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against Oscar, docketed as SEC Case
No. 05-00-6615. The complaint stated that it is "a derivative suit initiated and filed by the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an
accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control, custody, and/or possession
of respondent [herein petitioner Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were
arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition,
distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the income from the
time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and respective shares."5 [Emphasis supplied.]
In his Answer with Counterclaim,6 Oscar denied the charge that he illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia Reyes. He asserted, as a defense,
that he purchased the subject shares with his own funds from the unissued stocks of Zenith, and that the suit is not a bona fide derivative suit
because the requisites therefor have not been complied with. He thus questioned the SEC’s jurisdiction to entertain the complaint because it
pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 87997 took effect, the SEC’s exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special commercial court.8 The records of Rodrigo’s SEC case were thus
turned over to the RTC, Branch 142, Makati, and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553.
On October 22, 2002, Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit.9He claimed that the complaint is a mere
nuisance or harassment suit and should, according to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed; and that
it is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is
outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The RTC, in its Order dated November 29, 2002 (RTC Order), denied the motion in part
and declared:
A close reading of the Complaint disclosed the presence of two (2) causes of action, namely: a) a derivative suit for accounting of the
funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner Oscar]
with prayer to appoint a management committee; and b) an action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses
Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these shares to the
parties’ brothers and sisters. The latter is not a derivative suit and should properly be threshed out in a petition for settlement of
estate.
Accordingly, the motion is denied. However, only the derivative suit consisting of the first cause of action will be taken cognizance of
by this Court.10
Oscar thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus11 and prayed that the RTC Order be annulled and set
aside and that the trial court be prohibited from continuing with the proceedings. The appellate court affirmed the RTC Order and denied the
petition in its Decision dated May 26, 2004. It likewise denied Oscar’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 21, 2004.
Petitioner now comes before us on appeal through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
472
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Petitioner Oscar presents the following points as conclusions the CA should have made:
1. that the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be dismissed under the Interim Rules of Procedure of Intra-Corporate
Controversies; and
2. that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit but is in fact in the nature of a petition for settlement of estate; hence, it is outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special commercial court.
Accordingly, he prays for the setting aside and annulment of the CA decision and resolution, and the dismissal of Rodrigo’s complaint before
the RTC.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find the petition meritorious.
The core question for our determination is whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Rodrigo’s complaint. To resolve it, we rely on the judicial principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein."12
JURISDICTION OF SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURTS
P.D. No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the SEC (now the RTC acting as a special commercial court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnership, and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners,
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the
stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations,
partnerships, or associations.
The allegations set forth in Rodrigo’s complaint principally invoke Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) above as basis for the exercise of the RTC’s
special court jurisdiction. Our focus in examining the allegations of the complaint shall therefore be on these two provisions.
Fraudulent Devices and Schemes
The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action
and must specify the relief sought.13 Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.14 These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D.
No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to the
stockholders.
In an attempt to hold Oscar responsible for corporate fraud, Rodrigo alleged in the complaint the following:
3. This is a complaint…to determine the shares of stock of the deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily
and fraudulently appropriated for himself [herein petitioner Oscar] which were not collated and taken into account in the partition,
distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes, for which he should be ordered to
account for all the income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just
and respective shares with the corresponding equivalent amount of P7,099,934.82 plus interest thereon from 1978 representing his
obligations to the Associated Citizens’ Bank that was paid for his account by his late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes. This amount was not
collated or taken into account in the partition or distribution of the estate of their late mother, Anastacia C. Reyes.
473
3.1. Respondent Oscar C. Reyes, through other schemes of fraud including misrepresentation, unilaterally, and for his own
benefit, capriciously transferred and took possession and control of the management of Zenith Insurance Corporation which is
considered as a family corporation, and other properties and businesses belonging to Spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes.
xxxx
4.1. During the increase of capitalization of Zenith Insurance Corporation, sometime in 1968, the property covered by TCT No.
225324 was illegally and fraudulently used by respondent as a collateral.
xxxx
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother,
Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest
and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation,
the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic] the majority
stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and
sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein.
xxxx
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally and
fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s [herein petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority stockholder
of ZenithInsurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including
complainant hereto.
xxxx
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic] shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred
solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or
distributed equally amongst the children, including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein, to their damage and prejudice.
xxxx
11.1 By continuous refusal of the respondent to account of his [sic] shareholding with Zenith Insurance Corporation[,] particularly the
number of shares of stocks illegally and fraudulently transferred to him from their deceased parents Sps. Pedro and Anastacia
Reyes[,] which are all subject for collation and/or partition in equal shares among their children. [Emphasis supplied.]
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without supporting
statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently state an effective cause of action. 15 The late Justice Jose
Feria, a noted authority in Remedial Law, declared that fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to enable the
opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake.16
Tested against these standards, we find that the charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual
allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to
bring the controversy within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of
law: how and why the alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as "illegal and fraudulent" were not explained nor elaborated on.
Not every allegation of fraud done in a corporate setting or perpetrated by corporate officers will bring the case within the special commercial
court’s jurisdiction. To fall within this jurisdiction, there must be sufficient nexus showing that the corporation’s nature, structure, or powers
were used to facilitate the fraudulent device or scheme. Contrary to this concept, the complaint presented a reverse situation. No corporate
power or office was alleged to have facilitated the transfer of the shares; rather, Oscar, as an individual and without reference to his corporate
personality, was alleged to have transferred the shares of Anastacia to his name, allowing him to become the majority and controlling
stockholder of Zenith, and eventually, the corporation’s President. This is the essence of the complaint read as a whole and is particularly
demonstrated under the following allegations:
5. The complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes discovered that by some manipulative scheme, the shareholdings of their deceased mother,
Doña Anastacia C. Reyes, shares of stocks and [sic] valued in the corporate books at P7,699,934.28, more or less, excluding interest
and/or dividends, had been transferred solely in the name of respondent. By such fraudulent manipulations and misrepresentation,
the shareholdings of said respondent Oscar C. Reyes abruptly increased to P8,715,637.00 [sic] and becomes [sic] the majority
stockholder of Zenith Insurance Corporation, which portion of said shares must be distributed equally amongst the brothers and
sisters of the respondent Oscar C. Reyes including the complainant herein.
xxxx
474
9.1 The shareholdings of deceased Spouses Pedro Reyes and Anastacia C. Reyes valued at P7,099,934.28 were illegally and
fraudulently transferred solely to the respondent’s [herein petitioner Oscar] name and installed himself as a majority stockholder
of ZenithInsurance Corporation [and] thereby deprived his brothers and sisters of their respective equal shares thereof including
complainant hereto. [Emphasis supplied.]
In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured
by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a
prohibited pleading.17 It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if
the complainant wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction.
We note that twice in the course of this case, Rodrigo had been given the opportunity to study the propriety of amending or withdrawing the
complaint, but he consistently refused. The court’s function in resolving issues of jurisdiction is limited to the review of the allegations of the
complaint and, on the basis of these allegations, to the determination of whether they are of such nature and subject that they fall within the
terms of the law defining the court’s jurisdiction. Regretfully, we cannot read into the complaint any specifically alleged corporate fraud that
will call for the exercise of the court’s special commercial jurisdiction. Thus, we cannot affirm the RTC’s assumption of jurisdiction over
Rodrigo’s complaint on the basis of Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A.18
Intra-Corporate Controversy
A review of relevant jurisprudence shows a development in the Court’s approach in classifying what constitutes an intra-corporate
controversy. Initially, the main consideration in determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy was limited to a
consideration of the intra-corporate relationship existing between or among the parties.19 The types of relationships embraced under Section
5(b), as declared in the case of Union Glass & Container Corp. v. SEC,20 were as follows:
a) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the public;
b) between the corporation, partnership, or association and its stockholders, partners, members, or officers;
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the State as far as its franchise, permit or license to operate is
concerned; and
d) among the stockholders, partners, or associates themselves. [Emphasis supplied.]
The existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of the subject matter of
the dispute. This came to be known as the relationship test.
However, in the 1984 case of DMRC Enterprises v. Esta del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.,21 the Court introduced the nature of the controversy
test. We declared in this case that it is not the mere existence of an intra-corporate relationship that gives rise to an intra-corporate
controversy; to rely on the relationship test alone will divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction for the sole reason that the dispute involves
a corporation, its directors, officers, or stockholders. We saw that there is no legal sense in disregarding or minimizing the value of the nature
of the transactions which gives rise to the dispute.
Under the nature of the controversy test, the incidents of that relationship must also be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the controversy itself is intra-corporate.22 The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but
must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. If the relationship and its incidents are merely incidental to the controversy or if there will
still be conflict even if the relationship does not exist, then no intra-corporate controversy exists.
The Court then combined the two tests and declared that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship
of the parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy.23 This two-tier test was adopted in the recent case of Speed Distribution,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals:24
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC
specifically designated by the Court to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of the
parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations between any or all of the
parties and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. The second
element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature
of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate
controversy.
475
Given these standards, we now tackle the question posed for our determination under the specific circumstances of this case:
Application of the Relationship Test
Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as an intra-corporate dispute?
We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to
the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her name.
What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is Rodrigo’s interest as an heir since the subject
matter of the present controversy centers on the shares of stocks belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigo’s personally-owned shares nor on his
personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings of
the deceased Anastacia and the parties’ interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly,
upon Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to
the estate’s partition, deemed co-owners thereof.25 This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them
stockholders of the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring
shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – The capital stock of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which
certificates signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal
of the corporation shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally
authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded
in the books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of
the certificate or certificates, and the number of shares transferred. [Emphasis supplied.]
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the
decedent’s estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the
corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and by third parties.26
We note, in relation with the above statement, that in Abejo v. Dela Cruz27 and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals28 we did not require
the registration of the transfer before considering the transferee a stockholder of the corporation (in effect upholding the existence of an
intra-corporate relation between the parties and bringing the case within the jurisdiction of the SEC as an intra-corporate controversy). A
marked difference, however, exists between these cases and the present one.
In Abejo and TCL Sales, the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the corporation; after the
transferee had established prima facie ownership over the shares of stocks in question, registration became a mere formality in confirming
their status as stockholders. In the present case, each of Anastacia’s heirs holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this
point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of
inheritance will not be determined until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what
remains after payment of the decedent’s debts;29 whether there will be residue remains to be seen. Justice Jurado aptly puts it as follows:
No succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the assets and debts left by the decedent shall have been made and
all his creditors are fully paid. Until a final liquidation is made and all the debts are paid, the right of the heirs to inherit remains
inchoate. This is so because under our rules of procedure, liquidation is necessary in order to determine whether or not the
decedent has left any liquid assets which may be transmitted to his heirs.30 [Emphasis supplied.]
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally
belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined
only in a settlement of the decedent’s estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the
shares allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until he has established his
specific allotment (and prima facieownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of Anastacia’s estate, there can be no definite partition
and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the
registration, we cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as premise
for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
In sum, we find that – insofar as the subject shares of stock (i.e., Anastacia’s shares) are concerned – Rodrigo cannot be considered a
stockholder of Zenith. Consequently, we cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this case
within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended. Rodrigo’s complaint, therefore, fails the
relationship test.
476
Application of the Nature of Controversy Test
The body rather than the title of the complaint determines the nature of an action.31 Our examination of the complaint yields the conclusion
that, more than anything else, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement of successional rights. The controversy it presents is
purely civil rather than corporate, although it is denominated as a "complaint for accounting of all corporate funds and assets."
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we read only one cause of action alleged in the complaint. The "derivative suit
for accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein
petitioner Oscar]" does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by Oscar, only an incident to the "action for
determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the
corresponding delivery of these shares to the parties’ brothers and sisters." There can be no mistake of the relationship between the
"accounting" mentioned in the complaint and the objective of partition and distribution when Rodrigo claimed in paragraph 10.1 of the
complaint that:
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his shareholdings in the company, he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely
in his name wherein [sic] the shares of stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or distributed
equally amongst the children including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes herein to their damage and prejudice.
We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation that justified the need for an accounting other than to determine
the extent of Anastacia’s shareholdings for purposes of distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the complaint are Rodrigo’s repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers
of Anastacia’s shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other heirs of the decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his
demand for the collation and distribution of Anastacia’s shares to the heirs. These claims tell us unequivocally that the present controversy
arose from the parties’ relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as shareholders of Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing his
rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his
successional rights) and not by the corporation nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is
the distribution of Anastacia’s shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate – an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence,
cannot be done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of a
deceased. A relevant provision – Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court – that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one
of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir. [Emphasis supplied.]
Worth noting are this Court’s statements in the case of Natcher v. Court of Appeals:32
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
xxxx
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is
subject to specific prescribed rules. [Emphasis supplied.]
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and value of Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a
probate court and not by a special commercial court is completely consistent with the probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It has the power to
enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its authority to determine the properties included in the inventory of the estate to be
administered, divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to
Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as a question of collation or advancement. We had occasion to recognize
the court’s authority to act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or advancement situation in Coca v. Pangilinan33 where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
477
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. [Citations
omitted. Emphasis supplied.]
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be classified as an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the
jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve. In short, Rodrigo’s complaint also fails the nature of the controversy test.
DERIVATIVE SUIT
Rodrigo’s bare claim that the complaint is a derivative suit will not suffice to confer jurisdiction on the RTC (as a special commercial court) if he
cannot comply with the requisites for the existence of a derivative suit. These requisites are:
a. the party bringing suit should be a shareholder during the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of shares not
being material;
b. the party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate
relief, but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation; the wrongdoing or harm having been or being caused to the corporation
and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.34
Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only
stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded. With respect to his own individually-held shareholdings,
Rodrigo has not alleged any individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed against Oscar.
Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his
complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or other officers for
appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue if relief is denied.35 Paragraph 8 of the complaint hardly satisfies this requirement since
what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion of remedies within the corporate setting:
8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the
dispute with the end view of amicably settling the case, but the dispute between them ensued.
Lastly, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due to Oscar’s acts. If indeed he illegally and
fraudulently transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own name, then the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful
transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has Rodrigo alleged any particular cause or
wrongdoing against the corporation that he can champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record. 36
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC – sitting as special commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear
Rodrigo’s complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes.
Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74970.
The complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1553, is ordered DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
478
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted
for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S.
Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of
its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will
of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety,
as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due
execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of
the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the
testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will
was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence
adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed
to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the
petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written entirely,
dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the
handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with
which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then
the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
479
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified
in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981,
at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient
that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her
bounty, and the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge
of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The
objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book which
contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the
character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be
resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was
alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of
some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted
on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the
execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that
she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of
superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly
pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein
only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of
another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the
will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession
should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the
disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to
probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New
Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the
same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other
person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his
will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
480
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or
of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at
the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time
the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of
said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment
requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic
will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case
of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la
salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
481
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's
signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles
813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The
distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are
taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in
Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its
entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However,
in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the
will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate
the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
482
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,

vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators
holographic will has been established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will.
Reversal of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called for. The rule is that after
plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the
ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is
reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment
may, therefore, be rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the probate of the holographic will of the
testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate of the holographic will
of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed
the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written
voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic
will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true
hand" of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was
the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as
regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a
demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the
petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is
denied for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal,8 and in support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will
of the deceased was filed. He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased,
483
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated
or admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However,
the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's
husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close
association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to
this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the deceased
to her creditors.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August
30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the
signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the
pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar
with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She
testified that she processed the application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the
latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the
holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:
Instruction
August 30, 1978
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.
(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.
August 30, 1978
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:
1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay
484
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta.
Cruz, once I am no longer around.
August 30, 1978
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.
Mama
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision9 ruling that the appeal was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola
vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code
can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of the holographic will, none
being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no
available witness acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to give a positive
opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why
the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that —
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to.
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the
deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no
contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v.
Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of
three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that
what the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for
expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may
still, and in fact it should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for
the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot
be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under
485
penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic will. And the rule requiring
the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the
authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that
the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still
needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms
testified that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained
the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.
The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was
applicable to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been able to present credible evidence to that
the date, text, and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as
a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is
the genuine signature of the testator.1âwphi1.nêt
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order.
We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.11
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to
achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their
benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and
objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of
testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special
Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that of
the deceased.
Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's
affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer available.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:
Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would
you tell the court what was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?
A. Collecting rentals.
Q. From where?
A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12
xxx xxx xxx
486
Q. Who sometime accompany her?
A. I sometimes accompany her.
Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
A. Yes, sir.13
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to
them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs. Binanay?
A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
A. I am familiar with her signature.
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say so?
A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.
Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?
A. In handwritten.14
xxx xxx xxx
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of sale which you said what else did you do
to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
A. Posting records.
Q. Aside from that?
A. Carrying letters.
Q. Letters of whom?
A. Matilde.
Q. To whom?
A. To her creditors.15
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with its title "tugon" is this the document
you are referring to?
487
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is this?
A. My Aunt.
Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was not found in the personal belongings of the
deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said,
yes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was in possession of that will?
A. I.
Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?
A. It was in my mother's possession.
Q. So, it was not in your possession?
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the possession of your mother?
A. 1985.17
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you and therefore you have that in your
possession?
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.
Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?
A. I presented it to the fiscal.
Q. For what purpose?
A. Just to seek advice.
Q. Advice of what?
A. About the will.18
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the
deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal.
488
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.19
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are retracings in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.
Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued towards letter D.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A. Yes, sir.20
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R.
This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda
de Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?
A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she
was exhausted?
A. In writing.
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the
apparent inconsistencies?
A. That was I think. (sic).
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice
that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the name
Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature appearing in the alleged holographic will
marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?
A. Yes, sir.21
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
489
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell
the court the services if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her transactions.
Q. What else? What services that you rendered?
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.
Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
A. I used to be her personal driver.
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?
A. Because I lived with her since birth.22
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1,
will you tell this court whose signature is this?
A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.
Q. Why do you say that is her signature?
A. I am familiar with her signature.23
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her
since birth. She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:
Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by
consanguinity.
Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?
A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have legitimate children?
A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?
490
A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case is that, Fiscal?
A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court before.26
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal
and there appears a signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the other assistance wherein you were
rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to show that I have assisted then I can
recall.28
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether
you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?
A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.
Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is that?
A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar.29
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the
signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
491
Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her
signature because it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?
A. That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in
case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not
mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic
will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the
deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of
the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and
executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of
petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and
she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the
testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the
will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978,33 and the signatures in several documents such as the application
letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978,35the strokes are different. In the letters, there are
continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be
certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin with instructions to
allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de
Ramonal.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
492
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for appellant.

Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in
Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan,
Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. ............................................. 5 Bahagi

Fausto E. Gan ......................................................... 2 Bahagi
Rosario E. Gan ......................................................... 2 Bahagi
Filomena Alto .......................................................... 1 Bahagi
Beatriz Alto .............................................................. 1 Bahagi
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa
kondisyong siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng
Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking
asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament
during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, 1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-
page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina
Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She
confided however that it would be useless if her husband discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan, nephew of
Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter replied it could be done without any witness, provided the document
was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra lost no time in transmitting the information, and on the strength of
it, in the morning of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will
substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In
the afternoon of that day, Felicidad was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the presence of
Felina Esguerra, who again read it.
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the
presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
493
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was contained
in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason
of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina, only to
demand it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad. Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the
toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from heart disease for several years before her death; that
she had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and wife journeyed
to the United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease; that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting
places, the couple returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred, she suffered several attacks, the most serious of
which happened in the early morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole household was surprised and alarmed, even
the teachers of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the Yap spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr.
Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her husband. Injections and
oxygen were administered. Following the doctor's advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the whole day, her husband and her
personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side. These two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could
have made no will on that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if according to his
evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence of
Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the
decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see and read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the
decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its
contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would
carry it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the
husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without
destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed
such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to
discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to induce
the court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over
the same matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on the weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the
evidence of the petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved
August 7, 1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other forms, including holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950)
required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of
sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee
their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed the testator would succeed
him and be benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be brushed aside
when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off. Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that
purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three
must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and
of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances
its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses;
provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or
not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
494
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses,
(familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the
handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also
know the testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have
come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such
contradictory testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed
been written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only
guaranty of authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and
who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's
handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify, because there is no way to
compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or proven to be, in the testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be
caught between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove
its falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may have been shown a faked document, and having no
interest to check the authenticity thereof have taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the
knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that they have not "been shown" a document which they
believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could
be tested by exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what witness or lawyer would not
foresee such a move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his
statement: he has seen and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the oppositor would
practically be at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as to the contents of the will. Does the law
permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of
witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly
made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen 4 — an implied admission
that such loss or theft renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and
require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the
testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these,
imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the
legitimate ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any statement they may desire to submit with respect to the
authenticity of the will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent
others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to
state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't
do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to
oppose it, if they think it spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that
such choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage,
and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection
thereof from them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925,
which denied protocolization or probate to a document containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but
apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations and testimonial evidence (which
was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will. The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision
of the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea
valido el testamento olografo debera estar escrito todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del año, mes y dia en que se
otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos, no basta la demostracion mas o menos cumplida de que
cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que de la expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el
verbo se emplea, se desprende la necesidad de que el documento se encuentre en dichas condiciones en el momento de ser
495
presentado a la Autoridad competente, para au adveracion y protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es
affirmar que el de autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de
firma, y sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados, bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la
persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the
matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta
... annos muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen
fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda, sea confirmada la manda. E
depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo o el juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta
manera vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho
Civil Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of such
holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision
of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by
testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the
handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the
holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy
with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent
scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a
clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see
and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness
and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to
expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or
three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go
undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the
several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and
teachers of Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw,
namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors,
because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious
circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who
had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or
threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from
her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a
few days after the alleged execution of the will.
496
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule
77, sec. 6.11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
497
EN BANC
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL B. PINEDA, as one of the heirs of deceased ATANASIO PINEDA, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Manuel B. Pineda for and in his own behalf as respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On May 23, 1945 Atanasio Pineda died, survived by his wife, Felicisima Bagtas, and 15 children, the eldest of whom is Manuel B. Pineda, a
lawyer. Estate proceedings were had in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 71129) wherein the surviving widow was appointed
administratrix. The estate was divided among and awarded to the heirs and the proceedings terminated on June 8, 1948. Manuel B. Pineda's
share amounted to about P2,500.00.
After the estate proceedings were closed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue investigated the income tax liability of the estate for the years 1945,
1946, 1947 and 1948 and it found that the corresponding income tax returns were not filed. Thereupon, the representative of the Collector of
Internal Revenue filed said returns for the estate on the basis of information and data obtained from the aforesaid estate proceedings and
issued an assessment for the following:
1. Deficiency income tax

1945 P135.83
1946 436.95
1947 1,206.91 P1,779.69
Add: 5% surcharge 88.98
1% monthly interest from November
30, 1953 to April 15, 1957 720.77
Compromise for late filing 80.00
Compromise for late payment 40.00
Total amount due P2,707.44

===========
P14.50
2. Additional residence tax for 1945
===========
3. Real Estate dealer's tax for the fourth
quarter of 1946 and the whole year of P207.50
1947 ===========
Manuel B. Pineda, who received the assessment, contested the same. Subsequently, he appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals alleging that he
was appealing "only that proportionate part or portion pertaining to him as one of the heirs."
After hearing the parties, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner on the ground that his right
to assess and collect the tax has prescribed. The Commissioner appealed and this Court affirmed the findings of the Tax Court in respect to the
assessment for income tax for the year 1947 but held that the right to assess and collect the taxes for 1945 and 1946 has not prescribed. For
1945 and 1946 the returns were filed on August 24, 1953; assessments for both taxable years were made within five years therefrom or on
October 19, 1953; and the action to collect the tax was filed within five years from the latter date, on August 7, 1957. For taxable year 1947,
however, the return was filed on March 1, 1948; the assessment was made on October 19, 1953, more than five years from the date the
return was filed; hence, the right to assess income tax for 1947 had prescribed. Accordingly, We remanded the case to the Tax Court for
further appropriate proceedings.1
In the Tax Court, the parties submitted the case for decision without additional evidence.
On November 29, 1963 the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment corresponding to his
share of the following taxes:
498
Deficiency income tax
P135.8
1945
3
1946 436.95
Real estate dealer's fixed tax
4th quarter of 1946 and
whole year of 1947 P187.50
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to Us and has proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes
found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate in the total amount of P760.28 instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his
share in the estate.1awphîl.nèt
Manuel B. Pineda opposes the proposition on the ground that as an heir he is liable for unpaid income tax due the estate only up to the extent
of and in proportion to any share he received. He relies on Government of the Philippine Islands v. Pamintuan2 where We held that "after the
partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims against the estate in
proportion to the amount or value of the property they have respectively received from the estate."
We hold that the Government can require Manuel B. Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As an heir he is
individually answerable for the part of the tax proportionate to the share he received from the inheritance.3 His liability, however, cannot
exceed the amount of his share.4
As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for he tax up to the amount of the property in his possession. The reason is
that the Government has a lien on the P2,500.00 received by him from the estate as his share in the inheritance, for unpaid income taxes4a for
which said estate is liable, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 315 of the Tax Code, which we quote hereunder:
If any person, corporation, partnership, joint-account (cuenta en participacion), association, or insurance company liable to pay the
income tax, neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the Government of the
Philippines from the time when the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interest,
penalties, and costs that may accrue in addition thereto upon all property and rights to property belonging to the taxpayer: . . .
By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax
assessment in the sum of P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of contribution from his co-heirs,5 to achieve an adjustment of
the proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.
All told, the Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them
the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. This remedy was adopted in Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Pamintuan, supra. In said case, the Government filed an action against all the heirs for the collection of the tax. This action rests on the
concept that hereditary property consists only of that part which remains after the settlement of all lawful claims against the estate, for the
settlement of which the entire estate is first liable.6 The reason why in case suit is filed against all the heirs the tax due from the estate is levied
proportionately against them is to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in
the distributed estate as lessened by the tax.
Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belonging to the
taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the
tax due, the estate. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took in this case to collect the tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
should be given, in instances like the case at bar, the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax as may
be envisioned in the particular provision of the Tax Code above quoted, because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need.7 And as afore-stated in this case the suit seeks to achieve only one objective: payment of the tax. The
adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for contribution by
the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified. Manuel B. Pineda is hereby ordered to pay to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the
sum of P760.28 as deficiency income tax for 1945 and 1946, and real estate dealer's fixed tax for the fourth quarter of 1946 and for the whole
year 1947, without prejudice to his right of contribution for his co-heirs. No costs. So ordered.
499
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and
ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two
pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by
respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2
August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and
issuing letters of administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and
Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private
respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and
₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated
inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, 9praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private
respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene,
according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of
petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before
other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth
furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the
said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission
by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. 16
500
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the
Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally
preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special
proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the
reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it
were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the
reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate
in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2)
Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors,
and "to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the estate" to
petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to
the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest
therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s
account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may
hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any
person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations
are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim,
even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178,
whereas the other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the
intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief
narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a
hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the
property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise
filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the
administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court
ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on
the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it
appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever
is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate.
In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its
existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
501
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the
separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the
separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value
would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to
close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which
declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be
determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered
nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23(Emphasis
supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the
Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict
against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have
already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to
participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is
under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as
the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be
duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would
allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain
to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and
pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of
all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden
the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court
heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records
of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that
"the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x." The Court
ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and
proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of
an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have
an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court
x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are
being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather
than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome
on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors
in the estate are preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the petitioners as
"interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10,
502
Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89
concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real
estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the
administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto,
with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the
deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs
available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party
entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the
estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do
not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the
estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is
necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
503
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No.
88180 denying the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She
was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He
made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty,
he filed a petition for habeas corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia)
were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her
legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. 7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or
not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is
available not only if the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears or
is illegally being detained is of legal age and is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the
legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful
deprivation of liberty.
In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez.
Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.9
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed.
Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the
deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These
demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of
Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of
Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty
either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such
custody.
504
In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being
restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that
respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s
personal freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.12
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty.14 If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.15 If the alleged
cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.16 Needless to state, if otherwise, again
the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition.17 Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the
petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.20
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of
her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
505
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan,
Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC,
became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases
against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of
judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC
Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and
executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties
to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated
August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are
hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same
determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan,
Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the
determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s
Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On
motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day,
been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand,
thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was
for lease.
506
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a
memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,"
entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for
direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action
No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment,
tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of
February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of
amparo and habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-
M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil
Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22,
2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and
some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and
stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when
enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners,
subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police
brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for
Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived
of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are
hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which
is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been
issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of
the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on
October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was
promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
507
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs
cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations
omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a
property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its
effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo –
in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for
the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the
therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or
to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.18 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use
of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present.
In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.20
508
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even
an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:
xxxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT
INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo
ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN
POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or
storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were
already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.22
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas
corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition
was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil,
criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1
It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used
as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings
against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of
the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial
and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the
aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED
NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
509
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA, petitioners,

vs.
NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I – XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result
of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme
Court is the only solution to this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules – the "RULE ON THE WRIT OF
AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have
either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-called "syndicates" clothed with
governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the
Government must be the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protégées. If unabated would certainly
ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country. It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the
herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be
summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private
Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in
the possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court’s dismissal of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed
before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition
should not in any way be treated as such motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of
the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448,
180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside,
even its own previous decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of merits and evidence.
This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which
the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory
judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise
that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless
there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
510
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said
writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of
the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the
date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
511
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also
assails the CA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007,
petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted
inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion
and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales
issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of
national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of
Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon
Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that
under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable
cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and
the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and
other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd
Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing one’s
sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew
beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is
knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s
right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also
written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45
still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List;
that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to
Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would
present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion
of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner
further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on
petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.
512
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following
affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of
19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the
case against herein petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent’s
pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC
dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in
an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioner’s
counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of
the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because
to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-
year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying
respondent DOJ’s Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion should be dismissed
outright for being filed out of time. 4
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner
argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution6 dated March 25, 2008.
Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE
JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED
(IN THE PAST).
II.
THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT
MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III.
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL
THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.
IV.
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARY’S CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS
NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND
NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.7
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
513
In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the
Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,10 which were
issued pursuant to said Secretary’s mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the
constitutionality of the DOJ Secretary’s authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a
writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of
the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present
form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage,
in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."12
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as follows:
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown
or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."14
aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis supplied)
514
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to
the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is
thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life;
(2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is
not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in
life and property… pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the
right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which
are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 16
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,17 in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to
embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to
say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted
in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this
right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person
in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
515
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis
supplied) 19
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.20 As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a person’s
right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether
the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion." 22
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any
person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to
petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No.
07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case.
Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the
lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.24 We quote
with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul 25that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court.
Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No.
07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the
instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the
criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).26
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo,
as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,27 thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion
in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the
HDO.28 Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure
Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders
and for Other Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
516
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No.
00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the
petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance" within the
meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL.
JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his
men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE
TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced
Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their
actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to
respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and
distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life,
liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well
as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and
procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is
unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by
boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
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with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor
at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to
what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her
Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and
Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances
and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
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7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple
of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without
the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was surprised to find out that subject
Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they
discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside
the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police
agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when
he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted
by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of
Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the
office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur
who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military who do not
want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
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17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking
their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not
missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help and provide
police assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide
truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced
Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
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20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and
also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all
these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby
resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the [respondent], informed her that they are
not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request for help and failure and refusal of the
[petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing
since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and
custody of [respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
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25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent]
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the
[petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and
directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were
baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any personal knowledge of, or any
participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body
called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated
with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave the following
summary:13
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4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on the alleged disappearance of
one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about
6:00 in the morning and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said
victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough
investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting
investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The said report stated among others that:
subject person attended an Education Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga,
Zamboanga City together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly
arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 o’clock in the
morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from
Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as
stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the
pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a
continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly
abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough
search, records show that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions available under the circumstances and
continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the
citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them
before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
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The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting
that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following: 14
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That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I
immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at
Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He
was assisted by his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said
seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At
around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the
afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was
nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is
not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or
indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or
illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show
that no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the
undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution
of the person or persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit which alleged that:16
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That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR.
MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated
by elements of PACER nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by
our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic]
considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing
or eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or
illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone
is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct
pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve
evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to
identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police Regional Office, Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are
ongoing with the instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are
brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he
had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz:17
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3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
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4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances and when they are being alluded
to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-
07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared
before the Office of the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of
Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the Philippine National Police but rather
he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of
forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by him to purchase a
vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr.
Tagitis there and when he immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the
counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and never returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and other units through
phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance, to
identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint investigation with
CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite compliance to my
previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of directives for investigation and
directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order
to secure corroborative statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize efforts to establish clues on the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever
necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may
somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Police
Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis
considering that it is within their area of operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to
submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
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c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of the disappearance and the
action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ
PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is continuously intensifying the
conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken on the disappearance, the CA
directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS. 19 The CA subsequently set
three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As
planned, (1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with
Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga
City and other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of
Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’ disappearance. 22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the
sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the
Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu
that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away… more or less Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his … [personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in
Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells. 24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while
helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction.25 He
further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their
respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated
January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it is my own initial
conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic
Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the
scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the disappearance of the subject might be
due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as
well as to the Islamic student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them.
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It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed considering on [sic] the police and military
actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence
monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-
enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving
Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds:28
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(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON
AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or
disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO
admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of
the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three
(3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when
the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force
Tagitis’ claim that they already had an "all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis.
How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom
Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated post. Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since
this Court was made to understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military intelligence
information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between
P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this
court’s subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad elements of the CIDG had
abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to
locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her
information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This friend also told her that her
husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank
Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis." 31 The respondent
recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to
her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and
informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’ second wife, and they have been married for thirteen
years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife.33 She last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through
text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis
(Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007. 35 The
respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s disappearance
to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phone’s battery
did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phone’s battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col.
Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three
other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the
contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her
husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her
husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his
medication.38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her
husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her
meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the
morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately
proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information about the personal background of
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of
the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not
allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he
treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November
12, 2007.
523
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some points through phone
calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the
whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col.
Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me any information of the
whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in
Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police
of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my
husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his
connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan
located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer
Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.
Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find
my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has
an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential
report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK
and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These are the two information that I can
still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me that my husband is alive and he is in
the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently
took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts
to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the
respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report and that he showed them a
series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two other companions, namely,
Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of
Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial
investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he
was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also
told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them
exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite
what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted
to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in
Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54
On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt.
Pingay asked him to sign it.55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its]
contents."56
524
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondent’s testimony, particularly the
allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements
made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured
terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in good hands"
and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the
CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis
was in the custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity.60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian
asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not
for reading by others.62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because
"it was not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63 He
explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s)
responsible for his abduction.64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief
of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the
CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal
Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved
in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported
disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since
they were only assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office conducted any surveillance
on Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the
investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence
pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs.
Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less
than the military – an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to
the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It
also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was
involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as
"intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding
money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her
stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis
of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at
all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf
or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no
acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose
Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide
monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt.
Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the
Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that
the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent
discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence.74
THE COURT’S RULING
525
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated
Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his disappearance, and the respondent’s
source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a
victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting
the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding,
which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision
that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be
to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its
totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight
after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its
paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the
abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a
motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of
the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation
by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a
cause of action.
526
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule.
Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony.78 This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this
case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied
upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17
and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner
and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public
authorities undertook in relation with the reported disappearance. 79
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as
the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police
authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready
answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in
paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an
intriguing tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been
reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for
her petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should have
followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated
the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a
reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d),
given the respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than
satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition
forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a
proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what
"legally available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of
cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the actions and recourses taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The
following allegations of the respondent’s petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus
compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple
of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without
the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police
agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and
when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been]
abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr.
Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office
of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur,
who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
527
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking
their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also
to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying to the different
suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [respondent] has
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the
petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the
Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance
situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context
of the writ and enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and
Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories
"endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the
desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering
anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances
spread in Latin America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State
security forces in that continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice
saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political
brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the
phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In
general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete isolation for weeks or months
while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they
eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories,89 and 855 cases were recorded during the period of
martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former
President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this
number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former
President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58
reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a
528
total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human
Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92
surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007
to November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note
that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The
records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered
providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: 94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances… so initially also we have
to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of
killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and
disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but
also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the
disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature
of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead
focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an
elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the
component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws.99 The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal
and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to
enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme
Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature
and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the
Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court
can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court,
through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation
when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial
killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our
intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this
disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these
situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are
undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require.
The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of
the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action
against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
529
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.101 It does
not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to
information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double
form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are
deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most
cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution
expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary
disappearances," and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to
making appropriate recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). 104 This Declaration, for the first
time, provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested,
detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by
organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government,
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty,
which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6,
2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance107 and
that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state
of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense
punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the
society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the
fate and whereabouts of the victim are established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing
enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as
heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the
Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the
Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions
touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion." 112 Although no universal agreement has been
reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN itself that
issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance
cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,116 we held that:
530
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary international law that are binding on
all states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that
the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of
custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN
General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the
obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of international law. 121 We note the following in
these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-
American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice,
permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees."123 One of the
key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to
establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and
"when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal
jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have
enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be
criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the protection against enforced
disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for
the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of
torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective
remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey, 126where the ECHR found a
violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by
Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared person’s mother) to be a victim
of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR
also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in the
most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,128 which provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals." 129 We significantly note that in a
related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The
court further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since
their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote."
Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when
principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of
the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by
State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators
have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to
which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime
against humanity.131
531
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances
insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute, 133 the Philippines is still
merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other
international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC
has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance. 135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the
Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance
as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of
international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under
our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a disappearance: 136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative
or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR
includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that individuals also
have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights… The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing
532
appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law… Administrative mechanisms
are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and
effectivelythrough independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy.
[Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to
justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that those
responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under
either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary
killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a
matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity
(see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s
right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of
the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis
supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a prohibition on the State against
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably
quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must
equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over
that individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an
arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made effective on October 24, 2007.
Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition
of "enforced disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of
the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced
disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed

by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of
Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced
disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged – investigates enforced disappearances. Past
experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators.141 Experts note that abductors are well organized,
armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
533
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental authority. In many countries the
units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They
are generally directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any
interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where they subject them to
interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144 when we
acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as
no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an
enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation
or the progress of one that may have begun.145 The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez 146 that inherent to the
practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the
concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever
occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond
to requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have
fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in

Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to the
case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary
conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed or evade
responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual
preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo
Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary measures
expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
534
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations
omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive
proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo
proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence
to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced
disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its
objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct evidence that the government of Honduras was involved
in Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes
governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced disappearances
could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so
long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is
characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted under cover of public authority,
the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described
Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad
daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military
squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces. 155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness
who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had
spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the
courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we
cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective
counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot
be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the
proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must
follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our
rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse
cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows
the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is
determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
535
witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of
flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration
we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law."159Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: 160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the
ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion,
however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and testimony, as we shall
discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the
respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence,
direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed
under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col.
Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this
claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis
was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information about
the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in
Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondent’s testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those in charge of any records or
investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being abducted [sic] because he is
under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
536
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a military report, ma’am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma’am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am.162
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the
report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi
lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga
to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that they would deny it,
ma’am.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was abducted and held under
custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?

537
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was
reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or
PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was
abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen
talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of
medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us
that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m certain that it was typewritten. I’m not
sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us [sic] after the custodial
investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them information based on the input of an
unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that
Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.167
To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly
characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation
because he is allegedly ‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt.
Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a
high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed
or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out
relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not
on material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and
confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every
538
detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and
prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col.
Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been
under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen
talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s
testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece
of evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression
of this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. 171 For brevity, we shall
call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance
of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in
this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence
only implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as
Tagitis’ custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand (the informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the
petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate
dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the
special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for
constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences
in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the
evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the
available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the
general rules of evidence – taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful
to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank
and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay,
indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records
indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may
have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in
trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other
than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by
"burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the
available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps
that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an
enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State
reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially
in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No
evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion.
The respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence
exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga
yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col.
Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his
abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen
talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was
being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force
Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
539
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely
reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely
reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to
the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported
negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent
and thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER
Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-
returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to
do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the
previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt.
Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no
basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to
conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any
investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank
itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been
made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this
nature. These omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months
after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his
subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not
then questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and
what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance
of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied
that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs
through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo
police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired
about her husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture
they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to
searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a
"black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis,
too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results
or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities
undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence
that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some
government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this
conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they
already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be
a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of
the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,173the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced disappearance rulings. While the
facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey, 174 a case decided by ECHR. The European
tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was
abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against
Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a
person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the
apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility.
Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating
his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The
report included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused of
being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.
540
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as
applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," 175 specifies the PNP as
the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice
and assist in their prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of
the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered
as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of
Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government
completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA
may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for
further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this
Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this
Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this
Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report
due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to
undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from
the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material
facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct
of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG
investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a
plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent
PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from
the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full
report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly enforceable against,
whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of
contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying
attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not
standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
541
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
542
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the
constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves
the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No.
00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein
respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but
not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest
of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as
guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to
Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law
and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified
written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide
the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion
of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
543
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized
deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and
members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to
attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers
wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother,
Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He
was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and
face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de
la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized
brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers
who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo,
whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He
was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up.
On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally
arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw
several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The
soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered
none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and
treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was
tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction. 16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was
not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents.
During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and
hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some
parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then
subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next
day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see
if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the
window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking
through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked
where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him,
forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he
saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-
called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and
he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the
torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
544
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small
room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted
that eighteen people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a
kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by
their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When
asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their
body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and
mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went
to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and
Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished
house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were
brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He
was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made
to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man. 27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko...
sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo.
Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and
the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while
Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what
Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join
human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman,
Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the
vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the
medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the
military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and
yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were
getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. 33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he
should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the
men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three
unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was
removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a
detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In
545
one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and
was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. 36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino,
arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or
"commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and
should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to
instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson.
They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and
holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in
Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with
them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns.
Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and
kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man
doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his
house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of
his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and
chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees
brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng
silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang
bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na
binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong
pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga
bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi,
inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si
Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal,
narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
546
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na
raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told
respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could
farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel
(for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which
they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor
how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he
kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three.
Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no
television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m.,
Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the
highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together.
Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was
blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to
escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond
escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to
Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name
"Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One
time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also
brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.
Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they
passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic
medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases
where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first
asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were
consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he
followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the
Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado,
disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of
the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The
respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S.
Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija,
upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a
Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement
in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining
the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested
that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command
directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary
547
of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP
to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance...
Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff,
AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against
any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which
may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above
directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of
the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the
immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007,
addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio
Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994)
filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the
disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or
had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent
evidence that may be gathered in the process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994,
another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately
went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding
the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged
to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no
such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino. 51
548
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and
would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora,
Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his
Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de
la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and
a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the
alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular
investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the
abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on
May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt.
Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of
the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to
investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to
meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not
propound a single question to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day
to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May
30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over
to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1,
2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were
forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged
members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy.
Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction
of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only
implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the
Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan.
He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also
knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of
those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about
the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied
any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very
much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy.
and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident
when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his
549
mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his
father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko,
Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried
and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy.
Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason
why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they
implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution
(killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA
BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of
CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied
any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by
his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his
brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment,
San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having
been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident
which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed
him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he
considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and
disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis
to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy
Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction
as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with
the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any
intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named
respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment
and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz
and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26,
2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
550
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH
TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN
OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL
(MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was
"envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence
"representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many
Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which granted
judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning
the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the
necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial
review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables
courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for
the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular
needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task
of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What
began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision;
(4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights
derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole
551
gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have
chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. 87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the
judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the
Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in
several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its
roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better
remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners
and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to
the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition
treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the
evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95
552
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their
houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped
on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a
clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay
kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be
military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door
were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was
sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George.
Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the
elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness
might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at
the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command
bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without
due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr.,
member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the
abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from
their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of
the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished
house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there
where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the
house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to
join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any
rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others
being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to
take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a
direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established.
The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
553
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence
of their participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible
pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony
and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's
familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
"Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence,
among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case,
Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of
portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined
by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with
her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much
of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their
credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of
both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents
admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their
"movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of
Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim
that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to
security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an
"expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security
expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the
writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy
under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa
v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that
liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or being put under
"monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to
security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or
the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against
government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the
privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil.
637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2,
554
139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security.
Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights
is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right
is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in
life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." 122 In a broad sense, the right to security of
person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the
right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which
are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides
for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range
from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of
the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct
to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the
latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. 128 Physical injuries
inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity
or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim
to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims
of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had
physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
555
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was
found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have
been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an
effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity
of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under
general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the
Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to
liberty and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this
right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person
in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests
that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by
the government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human
Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the
right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In
other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from
those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view
that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of
the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been
dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to
be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant.
It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just
because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the
personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be
intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee
was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling
party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in
Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
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Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily
depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to
security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for
information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to
security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national
law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article
5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation
of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's
narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call
from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now
free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled
that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents'
captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his
affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to
their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and
torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among
others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to
their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because
respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat
such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents'
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection
to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben
Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the
six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation
when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their
statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or
neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy
directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a
competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery
and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to
be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
557
reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a
year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been
furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as
a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and
security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment
given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian)
who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics
of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the
production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In
the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name,
with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in
the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the
unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for
the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the
issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary
in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official
functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents
both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding
558
their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in
securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and
necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ
MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court;
Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari
and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del
Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine
National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu,
18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M.
Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John
Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813
of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed
land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons
numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections
of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they
are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key
issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245
to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch
that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the
Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner
in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through
a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime
in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot
in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio
Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff
Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a
result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the
disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards,
however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to
contain firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along
the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly
reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter
and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag,
560
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13);
hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of the property, being
indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'.
(Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs
sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the
plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted
therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of
Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants'
claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in
two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in
question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246
to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated
'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents.
These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding
armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April
19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as annexes to their position paper
were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred
that these structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the
instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006 6."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady
M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an
Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 - authorizing the
immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12
March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the
writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of
demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to
allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008. 12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three
remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings
and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this
561
land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the
land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two
houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect their property from
intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was
identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The
terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their
intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated
by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents
Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political
clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists
[introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants
are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired
men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below.
Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry
case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved
exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to
where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the
assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC
orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition")
for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present
petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at
the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was
filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months,
i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a
seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme
Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not
served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against
any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the
counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The
Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously
filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium
that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an
independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for
562
Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently
shows.17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before
this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the
orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this
date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA
refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF
JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of
Compliance19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is
attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF
THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is
attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not been resolved copy of the
MR is attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the
petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the
petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of
the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that
the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for
from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC
orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used,
constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the
combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of
the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and possibly with us will not save the
petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the
recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to
seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a
ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt."20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz -
did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The
MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as
petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par.
2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have
had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of
pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved;
the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion
interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
563
ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19,
par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level
courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was
patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for
having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo -
in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the
issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown
or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, 23that are essentially repeated
in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda,
supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal
acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard
against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the
disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the
security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a
certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."
564
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition
traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or
to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically
identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one
Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners'
factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after
examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of
violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still
pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving
a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of
the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing
the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect,
though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners'
present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and
failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of
the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the
ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ
of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo,
particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with
these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, 24 for the
effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed
criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of
amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security - the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or
that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion
in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal
case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
565
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of
the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the
homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the
petitioners with copy of the same;
[…]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report
pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an
investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other
than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the
purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in
order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its
body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
566
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU
CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47,
Regional Trial Court of Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG
in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE,
MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO. 317862 . The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking cognizance of
two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
records of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate
petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee,
Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all
petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-
636925 and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February 3, 1993, a similar petition
against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge
Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly
the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and
Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private
respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was
introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee
Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee
Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound
Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and
fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all his children, including those of
petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly
irrational act that piqued private respondents' curiosity, if not suspicion.7
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the
matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries
in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had
given birth for the 1st time, as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I, PARA I" which means "first
567
pregnancy, first live birth delivery" (refer to: MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY — Annex I). Also, the age of the mother when
she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG's age was then
already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of
MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any
rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother
as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is,
KEH SHIOK CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23
years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG
which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per
Hospital Record, the age of the mother was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only
mean that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO
LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it
will only mean that she have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per
Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is
only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's allegation, she was born at their house, and was later
admitted at Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and
that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957
to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old. However,
as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of
MARCELO's birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years
old, it is already impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per diagnosis, the
alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not
true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and
analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with
his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his 2nd
family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father
and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of
birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort
to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially
an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed. 9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners
(defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order,
the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this petition be set for hearing
on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City Hall of Manila.
568
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition
thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the
respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case
for hearing was published in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on February 20, 27, and March 6,
1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of the "Media Update"
published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had
been served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private
respondents, the Court holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take
cognizance of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their
recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the
legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3)
Respondents judges are allowing private respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their
undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions
below are part of a forum-shopping spree.13
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for
the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a completely different person. What private
respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate
wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners." 16 Petitioners thus label private respondents'
suits before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
xxx xxx xxx
As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a
particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding the
occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights. 17
xxx xxx xxx
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of
birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given
birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were
569
actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng
and petitioners.19
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs.
Valencia20 where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the
nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate" to
"illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected and the
true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case,
we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be
summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under Rule
108 are complied with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the
filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings."22 (Emphasis supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of
birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to
the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an
actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both
cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the
petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case below
to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano,
Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma
Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be
regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
570
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule
108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature.24 The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,26 where this Court
reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the application of
Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing
substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect of increasing or modifying
substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of
the lower court's order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latter's
record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the lower court
failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case as required
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of
what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as
well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
'legitimate' to 'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like
all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under
Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye
or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would
thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code."31 (italics supplied).
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be
an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the
correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."33(Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or
motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides.34 Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only
has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as
parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any
person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder
are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
571
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or
not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals37and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which
delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial
court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity
of their legal vows arising from the "non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In debunking the trial court's
ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for
any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the
only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial
ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28,
1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement
of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate
to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x .'
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code
cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from married to single and of their three children from
legitimate to illegitimate x x x '
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from "legitimate to
"illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings." 39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in
the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early
case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article
412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes
that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the
purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or mistake may be
corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our substantive and remedial
laws the implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the interested
parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in nature which
cannot cover cases involving controversial issues."41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic42 where the Court said that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1,
1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the
matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of
court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless
changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would
thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code."43 (Italics supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains
only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule,
substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong
572
Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and
cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without,
however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial
order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and "changed". In its ordinary sense, to correct means to
make or set right"; "to remove the faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute".45 The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register
may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407 and 408 of
the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty
Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.
This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear
contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be
attached to any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code,
to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without need
of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the
correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said,
perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what
exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from
that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now
embodies that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be
decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code
allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death. 48
Article 171 provides:
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the
following cases:
573
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del
Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to
cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another
alleged child of the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.50
We likewise held therein that:
"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision shows that it applies to
instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other
words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is
not the latter's child at all x x x. ''51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:
"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or
his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child
by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at
bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the
registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and February of 1993.54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the
special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the New Civil Code that
applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time
the right of action accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c)
574
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that
it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in
falsifying the entries in petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that
private respondents' right of action or right to sue accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989
that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this
case, petitioners' true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their
common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not
have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their
mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From
that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-
siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth records in 1989. Petitioners
base their position on the fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the
private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be acquired
by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against
them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as principal and against
defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate.57
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise
the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the
judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs
sought.59 Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners would reveal that
at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed
under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of
action in these Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against petitioners
and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which
seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of
action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for
partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from
their mother's estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and
contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
575
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40252 December 29, 1986
ANTONIO CHIAO BEN LIM, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V and the local civil registrar of the City of Cebu, respondents.
Eleno Andales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from two Orders 1 of the respondent judge dismissing a petition for the correction of an allegedly wrong entry in
the birth records of Kim Joseph describing him as a Chinese national instead of a Filipino citizen.
The petitioner had offered to prove the error through several pieces of evidence, among them an earlier birth certificate of Kim Joseph
describing him as a Filipino citizen, the birth certificates of his seven brothers and sisters all describing them as Filipinos, and a decision of the
Court of Appeals recognizing their grandfather as a Filipino citizen. 2
On opposition by the local civil registrar of Cebu, 3 however, the respondent judge dismissed the petition and sustained the contention that
only clerical errors were allowed to be corrected in the summary proceedings authorized under Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. Substantial issues like citizenship were not covered. In effect, it was held the petition was for a judicial declaration of
citizenship, which was not allowed under existing rules. 4
Article 412 of the Civil Code simply provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order."
In fairness to the respondent judge, there was abundant jurisprudence to lend support to his Orders at the time they were issued. Since then,
however, the strict doctrine announced in those cases has been relaxed, most recently in the case of Republic v. Valencia, 5 supported by
twelve members of this Court with only one other member not taking part.
In that case (arising, incidentally, also in Cebu City), there was a petition for the correction in the birth entries of two persons in the local civil
registry, specifically to change their citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino," their status as children from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," and
their mother's status from "married" to "single." The motion to dismiss filed by the local civil registrar having been denied, a full-blown trial
was held and the changes sought were thereafter ordered by the trial court. The Republic of the Philippines then came to this Court to
question the decision, invoking substantially the same grounds on which the Orders now being challenged were based.
In a well-reasoned and exhaustive decision, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez declared inter alia:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot
be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use
of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that 'the entries sought to be corrected
should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.
What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceedings 'Black's Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding' as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Platt v.
Magagnini, 187, p. 716, 718, 110 Was. 39).<äre||anº•1àw> 6
xxx xxx xxx
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded
therein.Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system. 7
xxx xxx xxx
576
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered, the suit or proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
registrar are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the
filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any persons
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary".There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the
entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually
took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. 8
In a number of earlier cases, the Court has ruled that the birth entry regarding a person's citizenship could not be changed under Rule 108 as
this would involve substantive rights that the rules of court could not "diminish, increase or modify" under the Constitution. 9
Thus, in Chua Wee v. Republic, 10 a unanimous Court declared that, "if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil
Code."
In Wong v. Republic, 11 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, expressed the view that Article 412, which Rule 108
was supposed to implement, "does not say that it applies only to noncontroversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in
nature," adding that "Article 412 contemplates all kinds of issues and all kinds of procedures." Justice Pacifico de Castro, in a dissenting
opinion, agreed with him and said (speaking also of Article 412) that "no prohibition may be seen from its express provision, nor by mere
implication, against correction of a substantial error as one affecting the status of a person." Amplifying on this view, he declared in another
dissenting opinion in Republic v. de la Cruz: 12
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere
harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because
Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous
clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does
not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. Upon a
consideration of this fact, it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry
of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
It is worth emphasing that proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in
a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, for as provided by Article 410 of the Civil Code, 'the books making up
the civil register and all documents relating thereto ... shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.' Hence, the status
as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status
577
but a mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. There is, therefore, no increase or diminution of
substantive right, as is the basis for holding that Rule 108 would be unconstitutional if held to allow ccrrection of more than mere
harmless and innocuous clerical errors.
The Valencia ruling has in effect adopted the above-stated views insofar as it now allows changes in the birth entry regarding a person's
citizenship as long as adversary proceedings are held. Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right
but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides
only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not
violate the Constitution. We note that in the case at bar the petition was dismissed outright without a trial being held, on the justification that
it was not permitted. In the light of the Valencia ruling, the Orders of the respondent judge must now be reversed, to give way to the
appropriate proceedings necessary to the resolution of the substantial issue raised by the petitioner. The records show that the publication
requirement has already been complied with. 13 The next step, therefore, is for the petitioner and all adverse and interested parties to be
given their day in court in a regular trial on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders are hereby set aside, and Special Proceeding No. 3596-R of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch V, is
reinstated for trial on the merits without delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
578
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner,
vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the
petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows, among
others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and
Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the
following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the
date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and
the boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The
petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida, praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live
Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be
deleted and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 –
Batangas City", be likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the time of the minor's birth were
not legally married; and the surname BORBON of petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of
this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of
the petitioner, at which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that all other persons having or
claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.1âwphi1.nêt
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the
Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, within which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the
Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear for
and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED."4
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as contained in the notice of hearing dated April
23, 1997 requiring that office to file their opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor
child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the
same time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning."5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name,
occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code),
authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES
CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of
BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground that
she was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in ITEM 14, respecting the name of the
579
informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to
establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order, which would authorize a change in the civil
status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by
petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic) dismissed." 6
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to
Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and
not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment. The OSG submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual
change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified and represented.8 Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit his comment on the petition despite
several notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing of respondent Borbon's comment and gave
due course to the petition.9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party,
it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.10 This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia11 where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the
procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.1âwphi1.nêt
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once in a week for three 93) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation
or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are—(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the
filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to—(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary'. xxx" 12
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as
they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of
hearing setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered
the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected
places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said hearing and all other persons having or
claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos
Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show
580
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all the
requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the
matter to oppose the same.1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the
petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
581
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit
open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel,
drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of
Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on
April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-
Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila,
for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
582
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged
that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal
basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-
105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
583
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the
sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the
proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the
use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
584
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his
age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status…
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various
aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis
supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. 29Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is
defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no
law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
585
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself
found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of
the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,
where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It
can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
586
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private
respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged
that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowing that she
did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence. However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976,
the City Court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's
authority to impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the
crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed,
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused
thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information
without prejudice to its being refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362
and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City
Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. Responding to
the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously
consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over the
criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed
reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of
city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in
which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding
P6,000.00 or both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the
offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense clearly fell within the
jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at
the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense
charged. 1 Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City
considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the
minimum penalty which a city court could impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying
Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . "
We do not believe so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable
under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal information. In People v.Purisima,2 the Court stressed that:
587
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is
settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by
the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for
the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment
provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court
must assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v.
Co Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the
basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense
charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5(Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and
circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter
jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction,
may, after trial, impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as
the evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting without
jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said
case, for the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, not a city or
municipal court. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its
medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose that more
onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October
1975). But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the
penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City. In
other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing
subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent
Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
588
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 123340 August 29, 2002
LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented by MIGUEL C.
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31,
19951 and its Resolution dated December 1, 1995.2 The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance the Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.
The Antecedent Facts
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of "Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document" before the Manila Regional
Trial Court.3 Petitioner executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she
was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not
reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994 acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In the same decision, the trial court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel
of land located in Bulacan.4
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial court’s ruling
on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stating:
"Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing
to show that the Office of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion for Reconsideration within the
reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Court’s decision dated January 17,
1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit."5
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994. The trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6,
1994, to wit:
"Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of
accused dated 22 April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED."6
Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the
trial court. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
February 7, 1994.
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
declared in part:
589
"Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:
"SEC. 10. Proof of Service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an
affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made
by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof
by the sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee."
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of
the person mailing and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case at bench, there was no such affidavit
or registry receipt when the motion was considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did."7
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s order of May 6, 1994 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:
"xxx, while there is merit in petitioner’s submission that the motion for reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the order dated 18
April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal
conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994,8 this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the
second motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more
legal competence to promulgate the same."9
Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil aspect of the case, to wit:
"x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
There was neither reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to the criminal action.
Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the
law on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property
because it is located in Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a civil liability arising from the
offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from
the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit."10
In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED." 11
In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 12
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-
54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53."
2. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO
RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING
A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN."
3. "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743."13
We grant the petition.
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be
served not only on the prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Moreover, if the trial court
590
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the
offended party of real property located in another province.
Absence of Proof of Service
The first issue is whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of
Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of service. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s finding that the City
Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on
February 10, 1994. Petitioner relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date of mailing of both
motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return
card which shows actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12,
1994 to appeal the decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a motion for
reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and not a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary
period of petitioner to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial court’s decision final and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as
the public prosecutor is concerned. The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal
defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such
motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.14
Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:
"SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. – No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice
thereof."15 (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an
empty formality deserving no judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:
"SEC. 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by
the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee." 16 (Emphasis supplied)
If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be
appended to the motion. Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a copy of the trial court’s decision of January 17, 1994 on
January 28, 1994. Within the reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a motion for
reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required
by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the
required proof of service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal
charge on reasonable doubt. This raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended
party who may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the public prosecutor if the offended party is not
represented by a private counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite
the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as he is concerned.
591
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for
reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party
appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a
situation, under the present Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for reconsideration. To fill
in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of
his pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is in addition to service on the public
prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party who was not
represented by a private counsel in the trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent on the matter, it
is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration
on the offended party.
Trial court’s jurisdiction over the civil aspect.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Petitioner asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is outside the trial
court’s territorial jurisdiction.
In upholding the trial court’s jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held:
"Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which
pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit."17
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over
the civil aspect of the criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. Third, the
court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.18 In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the
law has conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through falsification of a public document. The trial court
also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court also acquired
jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority.1âwphi1
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in
a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[E]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Article 104 of the same Code states that "civil liability x x x includes restitution."
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by the offended party. 19 In the instant case,
the offended party did not reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action. Although the trial court
acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability.20 Thus, the Manila
trial court had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals as to proof of service and the trial court’s jurisdiction on
the civil aspect, we remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on
the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
592
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988
RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30, 1983.
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section
of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for
the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order,
Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said
operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as
gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back
to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot
Cabilto.
On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40080.
While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January
16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in
performance of their duties.
Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of
First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 40080.
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. [Silvestre v. Military
Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799 (1967), 21 SCRA
717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil.
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706 (1965),13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v.
Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766 (1966),16 SCRA908).
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977,
published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6373-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No.
8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for
the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or
omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive
unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section 1.) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the
time G.R. No. 59 was published until the information in Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979, then said General Order No. 59
remained in force on said date.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela Cruz was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order.
593
But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense?
The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether
an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official
duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the
certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by
members of the AFP.
In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a copy of
Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto.
Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court
likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare
that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz.
The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-
martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect, the same having
been promulgated only in 1981.
Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited above applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another
action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, for appropriate action.
594
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143647 November 11, 2005
YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,** Respondent.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch
146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum of ₱424,000.00;
and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.3Sometime in July 1991, Yu,
accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,4 who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant
Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Parañaque. 5 Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric
Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.6 Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that the
scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).7 Believing Fukuzume’s representation
to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume.8 The initial agreed purchase price was ₱200,000.00.9 Yu gave
Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which eventually totaled ₱290,000.00, broken down as follows: ₱50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991;
₱20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991; ₱50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and, ₱170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.10 Fukuzume
admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount of ₱290,000.00.11 To support his claim that the aluminum
scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawa’s authorized
representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and
December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez. 12 At the time that
Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in
NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for ₱100,000.00 and the other for
₱34,000.00.13 However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the checks should
have been drawn is already closed.14 Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks bounced. 15 Fukuzume instead told
him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires
from NAPOCOR.16 On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power
Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in
their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.17 Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires
from the NAPOCOR compound.18 When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be
found.19 Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not
honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.20 NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated
December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer
connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.21Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to
Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him.22 Fukuzume promised to return Yu’s money.23 When Fukuzume
failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of ₱424,000.00 plus loss of profits. 24Subsequently, Yu
filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).25
In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of
Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and
Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng
to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount of ₱424,000.00 but the accused once
in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with
intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite
repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the
aforementioned amount of ₱424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.26
595
Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. 27 Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused
is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of ₱424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.28
Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.
On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty
imposed, thus:
… although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the minimum
penalty for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the
maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as the minimum, to
not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.29
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.30
Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY
EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY.31
We agree with Fukuzume’s contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA
ruled:
The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110,
Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellant’s
residence in Parañaque, appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of ₱50,000.00 for said transaction
was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime – that the offended party was
induced to part with his money because of the false pretense – occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the
instant case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 199432 and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was
subscribed on July 20, 1994.33
With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July
12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of ₱50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzume’s
contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of ₱50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latter’s
house. It is not disputed that Fukuzume’s house is located in Parañaque. Yu testified thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.
596
Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.
Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is completed.
Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A That was in 1991, sir.
COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.
A July 12, 1991, sir.
Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?
A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.
Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money?
A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.
Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date?
A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming
from Furukawa Eletric Company.
Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?
A Our first agreement was for ₱200,000.
Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?
A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs
to Furukawa Electric Company.
Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount of ₱50,000?
597
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
The complainant testified he gave ₱50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on that particular date.
A On July 12, I gave him ₱50,000 on that date.
Q Not ₱200,000?
A No, sir.34
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably
incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.35
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or
anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.36 Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,37 we held in the fairly
recent case of Macasaet vs. People38 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction
and to try the case and to render judgment.40
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as
defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his
money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.41
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on
April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu’s sworn statement or to prove
that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that
any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, ₱20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, ₱50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and ₱170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications
purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell
the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense
charged had been committed in Parañaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with the
intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the
said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume
the initial amount of ₱50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter’s house in Parañaque and,
by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
598
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he
received ₱50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part
of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary
investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. 42 In People vs.
Crispin,43 this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being
treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record
must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.44 Since neither prosecution
nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzume’s affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the
essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of
estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised
or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.45 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.46 While an exception to this
rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,47wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by
the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said
case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the
other issues raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083
is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
599
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by the
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the
following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance
business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the
petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of
private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the
amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by
respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila
has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private respondent separately
filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of
is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered
(See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it
must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in
criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission,
87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
600
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the Philippine with
principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among
whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn over
the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as
possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00 representing
payments of insurance premiums from customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said
amount, far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with intent
to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila,
Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of
the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its
principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused
damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have
still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
601
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal
Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu,
SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts
of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the
deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the
warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
602
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao
moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of
Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the
Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524
in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and
executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke
the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be
placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since
they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
603
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on
their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or
grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs.
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested.
In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending
review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. 6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as
when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his
trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is
not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case,
which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained
the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for
bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief
in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v.
Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus,
‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is
that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
604
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court
applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.
The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were
deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a
motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding
with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and
desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the
warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford
the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other
hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable
cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and
therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be
taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered
by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing
the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently
filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city.
Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this
Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before
the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to
Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity
when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact
remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the
ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
605
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence,
Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of
Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal
of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which
clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate
determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly
showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification.28
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification.
The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by
personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under
Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause,
Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the
custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five
years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period
amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one
side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
606
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable
cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while
probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part
of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant
prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he
pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and
that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it
is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution’s evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two
(2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2)
murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed. 34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal,
who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of
Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that
case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as
there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value." 35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the
use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of
the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a
temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. 36 According to the petitioners, it was an error
for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed
607
to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction.
Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the
Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should
be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants
of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it
would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals,
and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not
merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of
probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges
therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of
probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to
petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which
were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the
Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is
NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of
the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of
the previous referral of respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues
of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001
Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount
of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot
be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
608
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince
us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto
within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten
(10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C.
Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
609
EN BANC
June 30, 1987
G.R. No. L-53373
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for
arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding
judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5,
1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the
petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining
the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally
resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of
the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:
ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for
dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the
drawer can only be civil and not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced
before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's
independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition
and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining
order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a
decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for
reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15
610
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside,
respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal
case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to
comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment
and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this
Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course
to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the
complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting
persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of
their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence
adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima faciecase. 22
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the
prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even
permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the
evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an
information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus,
a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the
defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not
investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a
criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or
city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to
affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the rase
be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice
will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice
who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case thereby defying
the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
611
The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the
presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines
even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for
then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he
may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
612
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE
ANADILLA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch I, dated 20
March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines, Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael
Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of
said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private
respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11
March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested
by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of
the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and there
being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby
DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is hereby
ordered lifted and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused from
their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and
sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted
Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further
prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could no
longer be contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974. 3 This
petition was thereupon filed before this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the
offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state the rule in regard to the
respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been filed in court. In said case, the issue
raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the
merits.
613
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the accused/respondent to the
Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition
was dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court, raising the issue previously stated
herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the
case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate
action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should
be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5
In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of
the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested that his material
witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite such manifestation of
the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether
a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of the complainant
or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his
own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be
dismissed. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
614
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144823 December 8, 2003
GRACIANO P. DELA CHICA, Municipal Mayor, and EVAN C. ACEVEDA, Municipal Engineer, Baco, Oriental Mindoro, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners Graciano P. Dela
Chica and Evan C. Aceveda are challenging two resolutions issued by the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25188, in
which petitioners stand charged for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The resolutions assailed are those dated April 14, 2000,1 which ordered the suspension pendente lite of petitioners
for a period of ninety days; and dated September 1, 2000,2 which denied petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and motion for reconsideration of
the suspension order.
The records show that in an information dated February 8, 1999, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charged petitioners before
the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, which reads, as follows:
That on November 28, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Baco, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused, Municipal Mayor Graciano P. Dela Chica and Municipal Engineer Evan C. Aceveda, of the Municipality of Baco, Oriental
Mindoro, while in the performance of their official functions, and taking advantage of the same, acting in conspiracy with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government by making revisions in the completion of the municipal
building without prior approval by the proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of ₱375,682.32, to the damage and injury of the
government, in the amount aforestated.3
On August 20, 1999, petitioners were arraigned and both entered a plea of not guilty. 4
Petitioners thereafter sought to question the sufficiency of the information by filing a motion for bill of particulars, praying that the
prosecution be directed to specify the persons referred to in the information as "proper authorities." This was, however, denied by the
Sandiganbayan, as it ruled that the arraignment had barred it from approving amendments beyond the matter of form.
On December 3, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to Section 13, R.A. No. 3019.5 Petitioners
thereafter filed an opposition thereto, on the ground that the information is invalid as not all the essential elements of the offense charged
were alleged therein, particularly the element of "evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence." 6
The Sandiganbayan handed down the first assailed resolution on April 14, 2000, ordering petitioners’ suspension pendente lite for 90 days.7 It
ruled that in its previous order denying petitioners’ motion for bill of particulars, it in effect upheld the sufficiency of the information, hence
the mandatory suspension pendent lite of petitioners is called for. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent court
denied in its subsequent resolution on September 1, 2000.8
Petitioners now allege that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned resolutions. Petitioners cite the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE INFORMATION ANNEX ‘C’ HEREOF, IS VALID.
B. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND [ACTED] WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE SUSPENSION OF PETITIONERS FOR NINETY (90) DAYS.
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT QUASHING [THE INFORMATION] ON [THE] GROUND OF [ITS] INVALIDITY AND LACK OF CAUSE
OF ACTION.9
These assigned errors boil down to one pivotal issue: the validity of the information under which petitioners stand charged.
Petitioners contend that respondent court wrongly ordered their suspension despite the patent defect of the information. They posit that the
failure to allege the essential element of "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" as defined by R.A. 3019
renders the information invalid, as it fails to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. At the same juncture, they seek
a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to restrain the respondent court from implementing its order of suspension.
615
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the facts alleged in the information clearly and sufficiently constituted the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. They contend that an information is valid as long as the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof are distinctly stated therein.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency has long been
settled.10 It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the information. 11 No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 12 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court requires, inter alia, that the information must state the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive of the
offense.13 Recently,14 this Court emphasized that the test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered.15 The law essentially requires this to enable the accused suitably to prepare his defense, as
he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 16
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated in the information must be determined by reference to the definitions and the
essentials of the specific crime.17 Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioners are charged, provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
In a number of cases,18 the elements of this offense have been broken down as follows:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public
positions;
(3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
(4) That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
A scrutiny of the information in this case discloses that petitioners are accused of the following acts, as stated in the pertinent portion of the
information:
….wilfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing] undue injury to the government by making revisions in the completion of the municipal building
without prior approval by the proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32, to the damage and injury of the government, in
the amount aforestated.
Evidently, the information failed to allege that petitioners, in causing undue injury to the government by revising the completion of the
municipal building without prior approval of the proper authorities, did the same through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence," an essential element of the crime charged. Neither did the information embody words which would have
characterized the elements, such as "partiality," or bias which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather
than as they are; "bad faith," which connotes not only bad judgment or negligence but also a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing; or
"gross negligence," which is negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons are concerned. 19
Respondents would, however, argue that Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, 20 does not require that the information be worded
in the terms of the statute defining the offense, as long as it enables a person of common understanding to know the offense being charged
and the court to pronounce judgment.
Respondents’ contention is untenable. It is not enough to allege that the acts were willfully, unlawfully or criminally caused without stating
that the same was done in a manner by which the accused could be held liable for the specific offense charged. This Court has ruled that in
616
order that one may be held criminally liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the accused which caused undue injury must have been
done with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. 21 This draws more significance considering that good faith and regularity are
always presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers.22 Therefore, manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence must be alleged with particularity in the information sufficiently to inform the accused of the charge against him and to enable the
court properly to render a decision.
Respondents, however, question petitioners’ right to raise the issue of the validity of the information at this stage, arguing that by entering a
plea of not guilty during the arraignment, petitioners had waived all possible objections to the sufficiency of the information.
The argument is without legal basis. It is true that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to
assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the information shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash.
Respondents, however, may have overlooked that the same section admits of certain exceptions, as when: (1) no offense was charged, (2) the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, (3) the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and (4) the accused would
be twice put to jeopardy.23 In the present case, given that the information failed sufficiently to charge the offense, petitioners are not
precluded from attacking its validity even after their arraignment.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds the information in the present case to be fatally defective. Where it is clear that the information
does not really charge an offense, the case against the accused must be dropped immediately.1avvphi1 There is no point in proceeding under
a defective information that can never be the basis of a valid conviction.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions dated April 14, 2000 and September 1, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan, 4th
Division, are hereby SET ASIDE. The February 8, 1999 information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed against petitioners Graciano P.
dela Chica and Evan C. Aceveda is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
617
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 120093 November 6, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DAVID GARCIA y QUITORIO, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant David Garcia was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having raped herein complainant Jackielyn Ong, 1 a minor, one
hundred eighty-three (183) times during the period from November, 1990 up to July 21, 1994, and was correspondingly sentenced to suffer
one hundred eighty-three (183) penalties of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify complainant in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In an information dated July 25, 1994, appellant Garcia was charged with the crime of multiple rape allegedly committed as follows:
That from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have multiple carnal knowledge of one
Jackielyn Ong, a minor about twelve (12) years old, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Complainant Jackielyn Ong and her younger brother, Darwin, had been abandoned by their mother since birth and when their father Danilo
Ong died, the latter's sister, Elizabeth Ong, took them under her care and custody. Jackielyn, who was born on June 3, 1982, was only eight
years old when she, together with Darwin and a stepbrother, Allan, were left to the care of herein appellant Garcia, who was then the live-in
partner of the victim's aforesaid aunt, when the latter left for the United States sometime in November, 1990. Appellant Garcia stayed with
the children in the house of Elizabeth Ong at Fontaine Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City.2
On that fateful day of November 1990, after Elizabeth Garcia had left for the airport, complainant, who was then playing with Darwin outside
the house, was called by appellant Garcia who told her to go upstairs. Once there, Garcia ordered her to remove her shirt and panty and, when
she refused, the former was the one who removed them. He made her lie on the bed and he then removed his pants and brief. Thereafter, he
climbed into the bed with her, spread her legs apart and inserted his private organ into hers. She felt pain when he forced himself upon her
and he was moving up and down. Jackielyn narrated that Garcia pulled out his organ when a whitish substance was discharged therefrom.
Then he ordered her to put back her shirt and panty. Later, complainant went back to play with her brother.
According to Jackielyn, from November, 1990 up to July 21, 1994, appellant Garcia raped her almost weekly.3 These incidents happened in all
the three places where they lived, that is, at Fontaine Street, East Bajac-Bajac, at 12th Street, Pag-asa, and at #40 14th Street, East Tapinac, all
in Olongapo
City.4 On July 21, 1994. Jacqueline was sleeping in bed beside her brother, Darwin, when appellant woke her up, asked her to lie down beside
him on the cushion inside the same room where he slept, and had intercourse with her.
Prosecution witness Angelito Ong testified that sometime in May, 1994. his sister Elizabeth Ong called to inform him that their brother in the
States met an accident, and he was requested to support and take care of the children because she would not be able to send them money in
the meantime. Thenceforth, the children would go to Angelito Ong's house for their food and other needs.
In the evening of July 22, 1994, Angelito was already becoming apprehensive because the children had not yet arrived to get their food. He
decided to go to the house where the children were staying but he only saw the children's bags there. The door of the house was locked, and
he found Jackielyn and Darwin at a nearby store. When he asked them why they did not get their food, they answered that the house was
locked and the key was with appellant Garcia. They likewise told him that Garcia scolded them and would not allow them to go out of the
house without the former's permission. Angelito told the children that just because they were getting their food from him, appellant had no
right to be angry at them.
Thereafter, Angelito asked Jackielyn if she was having an affair with appellant or if she had been abused by him. When Jackielyn refused to
answer and merely kept silent, Angelito took it as an admission that what he was asking her was true, so he brought Jackielyn to the Perpetual
Help Clinic for checkup.
It appears that Angelito had already harbored suspicion because sometime in June, 1994, Darwin told him that several times in the past,
although Jackielyn slept beside Darwin at night, the latter would wake up in the morning and see her sleeping beside appellant Garcia. At that
time, Angelito merely warned Jackielyn that it was not proper for her to be sleeping beside appellant because she was already a big girl. He did
not bother to confront appellant about it then because he did not want to appear invidious. Yet even before that, Angelito already thought it
odd and suspicious why appellant would not allow the children's relatives to go to their house.
618
Since the doctor at the Perpetual Help Clinic was not available, Angelito decided to bring the children home. Along the way, Angelito kept on
asking Jackielyn if she had been raped by appellant Garcia. At first, Jackielyn refused to answer, but due to Angelito's persistence and after
threatening her that he would eventually know once she is examined by a doctor, she finally admitted that she had been raped several times
by appellant. He then brought her to the Olongapo City General Hospital where Jackielyn was examined by Dr. Laila Patricio who thereafter
issued a medicolegal certificate.5
According to Dr. Patricio, the hymen of Jackielyn was no longer intact and, considering that there was no laceration, it was possible that there
had been sexual contact for more than five times. She discounted the probability that there had been only one or two contacts, or that the loss
of virginity was caused by biking, because otherwise there should have been a laceration. She likewise conducted a "spermatozoa
determination" to see if there had been sexual intercourse during the past 24 hours, but the result was negative, although she clarified that
the sperm normally stays in the vagina for 24 hours unless the woman washes herself very well. Jackielyn told her, during the medical
examination, that she had been raped by the husband of her aunt who was in the States.
From the hospital, Angelito and Jackielyn proceeded to the police station where they filed a complaint for rape 6against Garcia and later
executed their sworn statements.7 On the strength thereof, Garcia was apprehended in his house at 32 Jones Street, Olongapo City. At the
time of his arrest, no formal complaint had as yet been filed in court nor had a warrant of arrest been
issued.8
Appellant Garcia could only offer bare denials to the inculpatory testimonies of the victim and the prosecution witnesses that he raped
Jackielyn. He contends, however, that probably the reason why he was being falsely charged was because Elizabeth Ong's family was not
satisfied with the way he managed the house entrusted to him and the money being sent by Elizabeth for the support of the children. He
rationalizes that as the supposed guardian of the children and with the trust reposed in him by Elizabeth, he could not and would never do
such a thing to Jackielyn.
In his cross-examination, however, appellant Garcia admitted having sent a letter addressed to Elizabeth Ong and several others, dated August
24, 1994,9 wherein he disclosed that he and Jackielyn were having a relationship and that he was asking for forgiveness from Elizabeth for
what happened between him and Jackielyn.
The conviction of herein appellant is now being controverted and assailed essentially on two grounds, namely, that the information is
defective and that the trial court erred in relying on the credibility of the testimony of the victim. 10
I. Appellant avers that the information for multiple rape filed against him is defective for failure to state the exact dates and time when the
alleged acts of rape were committed since it was merely stated therein that the offense was committed "from November 1990 up to July 21,
1994." He asserts that each sexual act is a separate crime and, hence, must be proven to have been committed on a precise date and time.
The defense, in support of this argument, relies mainly on Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as revised, which provides:
Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
It invokes the early case of U. S. vs. Dichao11 wherein an order sustaining a demurrer to an information for failure to conform to the subscribed
form was upheld by the Court, in effect authorizing the outright dismissal of the case, on the ground that:
. . . The allegations of an information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform the defendant of the
date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed. Unless the accused is informed of the day, or about the day, he
may be, to an extent, deprived of the opportunity to defend himself.
While Section 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise
time of commission need not be stated in a complaint or information, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any
time before the filing thereof," this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged
crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing.
Where the exact date cannot be fixed, or where the prosecuting officer is not thoroughly satisfied that he can prove a precise date,
he should allege in the information that the crime was committed on or about a date named. Under such an allegation he is not
required to prove any precise date but may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. In
case of surprise the court may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary,
to meet the amendment.
In the case before us the statement of the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed is so indefinite and uncertain that
it does not give the accused the information required by law. To allege in an information that the accused committed rape on a
certain girl between October 1910 and August 1912, is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense . . .
Section 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not warrant such pleading. Its purpose is to permit the allegation of a date of the
commission of the crime as near to the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and when that has been
619
done any date may be proved which does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. It does not authorize the total
omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing.
Assuming that this is still good case law, reliance cannot be placed thereon by appellant since the dicta are not squarely applicable to the
present case due to factual differences. Taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining herein vis-a-vis the Dichao case, the
distinguishing factor which is immediately apparent is the existence of a motion to quash in that case as pointed out in the aforequoted
decision. There is no such motion in the case at bar, and this spells the big differences.
The rule is that at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the information12 on the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form.13 The failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds for a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty, and jeopardy.14
Perforce, a formal defect in the information not being one of the exceptions to the rule, appellant's failure to invoke the same through a
motion to quash is deemed to be a waiver of such objection and he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief on that ground. Moreover,
objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.15
At any rate, even laying aside procedural technicalities and assuming arguendo that appellant Garcia could validly raise this legal question
before us, we are still not inclined to apply the ruling in Dichao to the case now before us.
It may readily be inferred from the decision in Dichao that where there is such an indefinite allegation in the information as to the time of the
commission of the offense which would substantially prejudice the defense, a motion to quash the information may be granted and the case
dismissed without the benefit of an amendment. On the other hand, where there is a variance between the date of the commission of the
crime alleged in the information and that proved at the trial, and it is shown to the trial court that the accused is surprised thereby, and that by
reason thereof, he is unable to properly defend himself, the court may, in the exercise of sound discretion based on all the circumstances,
order the information amended so as to set forth the correct date. It may further grant an adjournment for such a length of time as will enable
the accused to prepare himself to meet the variance in date which was the cause of his surprise.
Apparently, that distinction was premised on the theory that the question on whether the allegations of the information are sufficiently
definite as to time, and the question which arises from a variance between the particulars of the indictment and the proof, are different in
nature and legal effect, and are decided on different principles.
It would then result that, on the basis of the foregoing disquisition in Dichao, an amendment will not be allowed, and the motion to quash
should instead be granted, where the information is, on its face, defective for failure to state with certainty when the offense was committed,
and such ambiguity is so gross as to deprive the accused of the opportunity to defend himself. For all intents and purposes, however, a strict
adherence thereto would no longer be a sound procedural practice, especially in criminal proceedings which bears the mandate on speedy
trial and wherein the availability of bills of particulars have over time been adopted and recognized.
We believe that the principle laid down in the more recent case of Rocaberte vs. People, et al.16 involving exactly the same issue, presents the
more logical and realistic interpretation of the rules. While the Court there adverted to the Dichao case, it nevertheless resorted to a less
restrictive application of the rules by disposing of the case in this wise:
A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a ground for a motion to quash
under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that
can be cured by amendment; instead, the court shall order the amendment to be made by stating the time with particularity.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a
motion for a bill of particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court of 1964.
xxx xxx xxx
From all that has been said, the conclusion should be clear. The information against petitioner Rocaberte is indeed seriously
defective. It places on him and his co-accused the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of
more than 2,500 days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more definite and particular
the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot
be maintained, the case must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the writ of certiorari prayed for is ISSUED ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the challenged
Orders of respondent Judge . . . , and DIRECTING the amendment of the information in said case by the prosecution within such time
as the respondent Judge may deem proper, failing which the criminal prosecution against the petitioner and his co-defendants shall
be dismissed (Emphasis supplied).
620
Conformably thereto, where the allegation in the information as to the date or time of the commission of the offense is so uncertain,
indefinite or ambiguous as to constitute a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, the proper disposition where a motion to quash is filed on that ground, is for the trial court to overrule the motion and order the
prosecution to amend the information by stating the date or time with particularity, within such period as the trial court may deem proper
under the circumstances.
This rule finds support in Section 4 of Rule 117 which provides that "if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made." Corollarily, Section 14 of Rule 110 states
that "the information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused."
In the event that the public prosecutor still fails to make the necessary amendment within the time allowed therefor by the court, only then
may the court order the dismissal of the case. Hence, if herein appellant Garcia had filed a motion to quash, the case would not require an
outright dismissal.
Furthermore, it bears stressing that Section 11 of Rule 110 does not require that the precise time when the offense was committed be stated
in the information, except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In rape cases, the date or time is not an essential element of the
crime and, therefore, need not be accurately stated.17
II. The second issue hinges on the credibility of complainant's testimony. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove multiple rape
and that the trial court erred in accepting in full complainant's testimony that she was raped every week during the period earlier stated. It is
averred that while complainant remembered the details of the first and last acts of rape, she failed to narrate with similar clarity the other acts
that allegedly transpired in the interim.
We are strongly convinced that, based on the testimonies of complainant and the prosecution witnesses, appellant Garcia is guilty as charged.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law for conviction of any criminal charge; only moral certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 18 Such requirement has been complied with in the case at bar with respect to the
criminal acts hereinafter specified. Besides, a prima facie case affords sufficient basis for conviction if not overcome by the evidence of the
accused.19
We have thoroughly examined the testimony of complainant Jackielyn Ong and we cannot but conclude that complainant, in spite of her youth
at the time she testified, was very candid, spontaneous and consistent in her testimony in court, both in the direct and cross-examination. Her
testimony is forthright, clear and free from serious contradictions. It is a basic rule, founded on reason and experience, that when the victim
testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.20 Thus, if her testimony meets the
test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. On this aspect, it is an accepted precept that testimonies of rape victims
who are young and of tender age are credible. Hence, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence.21
Nor have we chosen to merely rely on such doctrinal rules. Our conclusion further resulted from a painstaking analysis of the evidence on
record. The alleged inconsistency pointed out by appellant, to the effect that complainant remembered the details of the first and last acts of
rape but failed to expound on the other violations committed against her, is not sufficient to render her testimony doubtful. Such failure does
not necessarily detract from her credibility nor negate the commission of the rape. The testimony of a witness must be considered and
calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.22
Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an offense is not something which enhances one's life
experience as to be worth recalling or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the
victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind would prefer to forget. Thus, a rape victim is not and cannot be
expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience.23 With more reason must we have greater compassionate understanding
of herein complainant's plight who, at a very tender age, was mercilessly corrupted by a conscienceless human being with bestial desires.
The failure of complainant to immediately disclose the violations committed against her, and the fact that she went on to play with her brother
after the first rape incident, cannot be considered as absolutely unnatural and contrary to normal human behavior. It must be remembered
that the subject of appellant's lust is an innocent, naive and frail little girl of eight years, extremely ignorant of the ways of the world and of
men. One cannot and should not expect such a wisp of a girl to act like an adult or like a mature and experienced woman who would know
what to do under such difficult circumstances.24 In fact, her subsequent action is confirmatory of the unreasoning innocence of childhood
which in this case was mercilessly betrayed.
The alleged absence of resistance cannot likewise alter the condemnatory verdict against appellant. This Court has consistently held that rape
is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and this includes the moral kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative
term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. 25 It can be addressed to the mind as
well.26 Moreover, the intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the lustful demands of the accused,
something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter. 27
621
In the instant case, a clear situation bespeaking abuse of transient authority is established by the records. There can be no doubt that
appellant Garcia had a sort of moral dominance and influence over Jackielyn such that he could easily intimidate and force her to submit to his
satyric desires, considering that she was very young at that time and under his custody.28 Jackielyn was only eight years old when Garcia
started molesting her sexually. Appellant himself admitted that he was expected to take care of complainant and her brother, and to give them
guidance and advice. Hence, the victim could hardly be expected to use any discretion and discernment as to how she could resist the coercive
power of appellant.29
Jackielyn disclosed during her direct examination that she was afraid of appellant because sometimes he would get mad at her and beat
her.30 On cross-examination, she declared that she never confided to her older brother about the rape incidents because she feared that if she
did so, appellant might get angry and beat her.31 Her fear of appellant is vividly illustrated by the testimony of her uncle. Angelito Ong, about
that incident when the victim and her younger brother failed to get their food from his house and he found them in a nearby store because
they were locked out of the house by appellant.32 So great was the fear instilled by appellant in the victim's mind that she would rather go
hungry, which is an ordeal for young children, than incur his ire.
In sum, complainant's tender age and appellant's custodial control and domination over her, had rendered her so meek and subservient to his
needs and desires, thus becoming an easy prey to appellant's lecherous advances.33This psychological predicament, in the mind of the Court,
explains why the offended girl did not give any outcry or offer any resistance when she was being raped, 34 especially when she became inured
to the outrage repeatedly committed over a period of time and which sexual assaults were corroborated by medicolegal evidence.
Perhaps, though, the most convincing evidence that appellant Garcia committed the acts charged is his very own admission of having had
repeated carnal knowledge of the victim in a letter which he sent on August 24, 1994 from his place of detention to Elizabeth Ong, his live-in
partner and aunt of the victim, wherein he pleaded that he be given another chance and promised to change for the better. 35 The following
excerpts therefrom, to quote just a few, are indeed revealing and revolting:
. . . OO, tutuong may ng yari sa amin ni Jackylyn, Yon ay alam niya. Kayo mismo ang kumausap. Nitong May at June hanggang July 16,
1994. Yan ay inaamin ko pero hindi ko siya tinakot at ni rape. Alam ni Jackylyn yon . . . Una halikan lang muna siya panga ang nag-
umpisa. Ng umabot ng June bago magpasukan nitong 1994 lang kami lumag-pas sa hindi dapat. At siya pa nga ang nagsabi sa akin
dinadatnan na siya kaya mag-ingat kami at baka raw mabuntis ko siya. Di kako bahala ka ikaw ang babae. Mga 7 o 8 beses kami
naulit. Mula May, June, July 16, 1994. Tapos kako nga pa sa kanya bakit gustong-gusto mo na ginaganoon ko siya at anong dahilan.
Ang sabi niya ay wala. Kako hindi mo ba alam maraming magagalit at masasaktan. At saka kako hindi ka papayag ipaubaya ang
pinakamahalagang bagay na iniingatan ng babae. Bakit kako mahal mo ba ako sabi naman OO. . . Humihingi ako sa inyo ng isang
pagkakataon na ibalato na lang ninyo ang buhay ko kay Jackylyn . . . at Beth kung talagang mahal mo rin ako ay pabayaan mo na ang
kalayaan ko at sarili kay Jackylyn. . . Kaya humihingi ako sa inyong lima ng isa pang pagkakataon na panagutan si Jackylyn. . . At yong
ng yari samin ni Jackylyn ay kapwa namin kagustuhan. . . At hindi kunaman talaga ni rape. . . Handa kunaman panagutan. . . Kayo ang
pag-asa ko para sa kaligtasan ng buhay ko dahil sa paratang nayan. . . Kaya nakikiusap ako at humihingi ng awa ninyo at isang pag-
kakataon. . . .
If what appellant claims in his letter that he and Jackielyn were lovers is true, it is paradoxical that he never mentioned that in his testimony
nor did he present any evidence to prove such supposed relationship. His silence on the matter becomes highly suspect, considering that such
a defense was undeniably intended to possibly save the day for him. An elementary knowledge of human nature would expose his pretensions
as merely an afterthought on the part of appellant, in a desperate and vain attempt to exculpate himself from his shameless and heinous acts.
Besides, it is the height of incredibility that, as appellant would want to suggest in his aforestated letter, the initiative came from the victim
herself, this despite her age and the inbred modesty of a provincial lass. That would be stretching the imagination too far and insulting to the
intelligence and credulity of even an ordinary layman. It has never been shown, nor has an insinuation been made, that Jackielyn was a girl of
loose morals with the capacity to lure a much older man into such indiscretions over an incredible period of time.
In contrast, the defense relied solely on the testimony of appellant which, as earlier observed, leaves very much to be desired as it consists
mainly of bare and pharisaical denials. Time and again we have said that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense which becomes even weaker in the
face of the positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses. Appellant's denial constituted self-serving negative evidence which
can hardly be considered as overcoming a straightforward and creditworthy eyewitness account. As between positive and categorical
testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail, 36 especially given the
facts obtaining in this case.
III. Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes
committed in November, 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed in May and
June and on July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that
appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct
crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that
complainant was raped every week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the
required quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within
this category.
We are fully convinced, however, that appellant is guilty of statutory rape for the sexual act committed in November, 1990 when Jackielyn was
only eight years old. Sexual congress with a girl under twelve years of age is always rape although there might have been consent to the sexual
622
act. Being of such tender age, she is presumed not to have a will of her own. The law does not consider any kind of consent given by her as
voluntary.37
It has likewise been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that Jackielyn was raped by appellant on July 21, 1994. The evidence is
well-nigh conclusive that she was intimidated into submitting to appellant's libidinous craving and loathsome assault by reason of his authority
and predominance over her. Jackielyn may well have been over twelve years of age at that time, but what is the difference in mental fitness
and attitude between a twelve-year old girl and one who is twelve years and one month old?38
Finally, appellant's admission in his letter of August 24, 1994 that "it happened 7 or 8 times in May, June until July 16, 1994," which was never
explained away nor successfully refuted by the defense, should definitely be taken into consideration. It is said that although written
admissions have sometimes been treated as competent evidence under the head of one of the exceptions to hearsay evidence, yet they are
open to but few of the objections which may be urged against hearsay testimony. They are, it is true, declarations made out of court and
without sanction of an oath, yet they are statements, not of third persons, but of a party to the litigation; and, where they are offered against
him, it is only fair to presume, until the contrary is shown, that they are correct. Whatever a party voluntarily admits to be true, though the
admission be contrary to his interest, may reasonably be taken for the truth.39
No compelling reason exists in the case at bar to warrant the exclusion or disregard of these admissions of appellant. These are admissions
against his own interest which no sane or reasonable man would make if they were not true. He voluntarily and intelligently made and even
put them down in single-spaced handwriting on four full pages of legal size ruled pad. On top of that, he identified the same and testified
thereon, without any repudiation, in open court on January 13, 1995, thus converting such extrajudicial admissions into judicial admissions.
One might ask why, having been burned the first time, the offended girl did not thereafter stay away from appellant, thereby giving him other
opportunities to inflict his lust on her. The obvious explanation is that we are dealing here not with a worldly-wise woman but with a young
and innocent child of tender age whose acts were dominated more by fear than by reason.40 This is especially understandable in this case
where the victim is practically an orphan abandoned in the care of a stranger masquerading in the guise of a guardian, and who never felt a
sense of belonging except to such a stranger whom she wrongly believed had a familial concern for her, but whom she realized too late was
devilishly unworthy of her trust and respect.
IV. We now proceed to consider the proper imposable penalty on appellant in light of his proven criminal misdeeds consisting of ten acts of
rape. Having been charged with the simple crime of rape, each of which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, both the
trial court and the People's Tribune agree on that penalty to be imposed for each crime, although both contend that such penalty should be
imposed on 183 acts of rape. We have already explained that appellant can be convicted of only ten crimes of rape, but we have not answered
the unspoken question, since both the trial court and the Solicitor General have passed sub silentio thereover, on whether the ten convictions
we sustain should be for simple rape or for its qualified form under the circumstances stated in Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is true that the appellant has been charged with simple rape, that the court below found him guilty only of simple rape as charged, and that
no issue over the effect of the amendatory law has been raised. However, it is a long-settled rule in criminal procedure, which is now
enshrined in the Rules of
Court,41 that an appeal throws the criminal case open for review by the appellate court which may thereafter reverse the decision a quo, or
modify the same by reducing or increasing the penalty upon a concomitant modification of the findings on the nature of the crime committed
or the computation of the penalty therefor. Here, we are further confronted by the situation wherein the first crime of rape in 1990 of which
we find appellant guilty is covered by the original provisions of the Revised Penal Code, while the other nine crimes of rape committed in 1994
are governed by the amendatory provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, with circumstances necessitating higher penalties, and which took effect
on December 31, 1993.42
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender
is, inter alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed. The inevitable query, since the fact is mentioned in passing in the
records, is whether or not appellant is a guardian in the contemplation of this amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a
minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine crimes of rape committed by him in May and June, 1994 and on
July 16 and July 21, 1994.
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the
offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime.
In People vs. De la Cruz,43 it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on
civil procedure.
That holding was rationalized as follows:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte
agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos or tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun
los casos." Without passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary
623
absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government
that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor (legal guardian).
The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendment of Article 335 where he is
also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with
the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration
of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the
restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point44 that the formulators were not definitive on the
concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took
note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the
courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian. It was
assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the
guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendments by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian,
sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances. The
obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime
is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by
the higher penalty of death.45
Coming back to the categorization of the functions of appellant in relation to private complainant and her brother, we are not prepared to say
that, under the particular and peculiar facts obtaining in this case, the former sustained the relation of guardian to the latter, whether as a
natural or legal, or even de facto and, much less, judicial guardian. He cannot be a legal or natural guardian as that refers to parents, nor even
a guardian de son tort (sometimes referred to as a quasi-guardian or guardian by estoppel) since he did not on his own assume to act as a
guardian of, say, a foundling.46 The fact is that he is not related to and he did not even support the children as it was Elizabeth Ong, then later
her brother who provided the food, other necessities and instructions for the care of the children, and they have been living in Elizabeth's
house wherein appellant was in that respect merely a hanger-on and a freeloader. He was merely expected to carry out Elizabeth's directions,
and Elizabeth continued to be the guardian de facto of the children.
Appellant has not been proven to have exercised any valid act of patria potestas over complainant and her brother, unless we consider beating
and abusing them as within that concept. In fine, at the very most, appellant was only an unwilling custodian and caretaker, not unlike a
domestic majordomo or steward of the house and the children, and for which services he obtained free board and lodging. Ironically, that
amorphous role that he played in the lives of the children, and which enabled him to abuse them, offers him salvation from the death penalty
which he deserves. This is because the Court proceeds only under the dictates of the law and never under errant emotionalism or maudlin
sentimentality.
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation of the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses
upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in
appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary
powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by
Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same
enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of Jackielyn. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot
impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit
into that category.
One further observation, Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111
introduced amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of rape carrying the death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same
circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime of rape with
homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by
degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances which effect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The
original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
As earlier observed, Republic Act No. 7659 thereafter introduced seven more attendant circumstances the presence of any of which takes the
case out of the purview of simple rape, and effectively qualifies the same by increasing the penalty one degree higher through the imposition
624
of the death penalty. All these new attendant circumstances, just like those introduced by Republic Act No. 4111, partake of the nature of
qualifying circumstances, and not merely aggravating circumstances, on the same rationale already explained.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but
proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstance,47 since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded.48 Indeed, it would be a
denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with a
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
Recapitulating, the information filed against appellant charged only the felony of simple rape and no attendant qualifying circumstance,
specifically that of his being supposedly a guardian of the victim, was alleged. On this additional consideration, he cannot, therefore, be
punished with the penalty of death even assuming arguendo that he is such a guardian. Neither can that fact be considered to aggravate his
liability as the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.49
The end result, therefore, is that for the ten crimes of rape of which we declare him guilty, only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed. He must, however, be further held liable for the corresponding indemnity to the victim, as well as exemplary damages for each count
of rape.50
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant David Garcia y Quintorio is hereby declared guilty of
ten (10) felonies of simple rape and ordered to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each felony, subject to the provisions of Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code. He is further ordered to indemnify Jackielyn Ong in the sum of P50,000.00 for each of the ten (10) felonies of rape, to
pay her exemplary damages of P25,000.00 likewise for each of the ten (10) felonies of rape, and to pay the costs in all instances of this criminal
proceeding.
SO ORDERED.
625
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI), petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the order1 of
the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and thus
reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for
estafa2 against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent
Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a
complaint3 against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of
the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal
case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.4
On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order5 dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration6 of the order.
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order7 granting respondent's motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the
case.
Hence, this petition.8
The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiff's failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss
the case;9 and, (2) whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the
civil action.
The Court's Ruling
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-9110 of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 199411 by extending the requirement to all
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Villegas' failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the
time of filing, the requirement applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 12 Likewise, Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994, three days before April 1, 1994, the date of
effectivity of the circular.13
On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act
which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of
the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature.14
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."15 This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the
commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.16
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil
action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
626
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that —
"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been entered in the criminal action." [Emphasis supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act
or omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.17
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."18
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000
are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.19
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated February 21, 1997. 20
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
627
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174016 July 28, 2008
SEVERINO C. BALTAZAR, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact ARLENE C. BALTAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ARMANDO C. BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 451 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the (1) Decision2 dated 26 April
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88237 denying the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by herein petitioner Severino C.
Baltazar;3 and the (2) Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the appellate court in the same case denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated 30 July 2004,4 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 3042-M-2002 against private
respondent Armando Bautista.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:
At about 8:30 p.m. of 21 April 2002, in the province of Bulacan, a silver/gray colored car with Plate No. TNM-606, traveling from the direction
of Calumpit and going towards the direction of Pulilan Public Market, suddenly hit a pedicab.5 Because of the impact, the passengers of
the pedicab – Erlinda Baltazar and her son, Rolando Baltazar – were thrown out of the pedicab. Witnesses Cristobal Atienza and Louie Reyes
claimed in their respective sworn statements that after hitting the pedicab, they saw the car stop, maneuver into reverse, and run over the
hapless victims, before fleeing the crime scene. As a result, Erlinda Baltazar died while Rolando Baltazar suffered injuries and was brought to
Good Shepherd Hospital in Pulilan, Bulacan.
In the course of the investigation of the incident, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Simplicio Santos of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pulilan,
Bulacan, traced the ownership of the car which bumped the pedicab and discovered that the registered owner thereof was a certain Celso
Bautista, who had already sold the said vehicle to private respondent Armando Bautista. PO1 Santos then went to private respondent’s
residence where he recovered the car stained with blood.
Consequently, petitioner Severino C. Baltazar, one of the children of the deceased Erlinda Baltazar and brother of the injured Rolando Baltazar,
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan two separate criminal complaints against private respondent, one for the
Murder6 of Erlinda Baltazar and the other for Frustrated Murder for the injuries suffered by Rolando Baltazar. 7 It is petitioner’s complaint for
the Murder of his mother, Erlinda Baltazar, which is the focus of the present controversy.
Hon. Horacio Viola, Jr., Presiding Judge of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, and upon its
termination, issued his Resolution dated 23 July 20028 recommending, inter alia, the dismissal of the Murder charge against private
respondent in view of the admission of his nephew, Joel Santos, in a sworn statement, 9 that he was the one driving the car when the deadly
incident occurred.
The dispositive portion of the MTC Resolution reads:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the above cases for Murder and Frustrated Murder be dismissed and instead an
Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Frustrated Homicide be filed against Joel Santos as he admitted to be the
driver of the vehicle involved in the above case.10
The records of the cases were eventually transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for appropriate action.
Upon receipt of the case records by the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, petitioner prayed for and was granted by the said Office a
reinvestigation. By a Resolution dated 23 September 2002,11 the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan12 reversed the findings of Judge Viola, Jr. and
found probable cause to merit the indictment of private respondent for the murder of Erlinda Baltazar.13
The Information dated 21 October 2002 filed against private respondent states that:
The undersigned 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Armando C. Bautista @ Arman of the crime of murder, penalized under the provisions
of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
628
That on or about the 21st day of April, 2002, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill one Erlinda Cruz-Baltazar, with evident premeditation, treachery and with the
use of a Mitsubishi Sedan car with plate No. TNM-606, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously run over the said Erlinda Cruz-
Baltazar, thereby inflicting on her mortal injuries which directly caused her death. 14
It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3042-M-2002 and raffled to the sala of Hon. Judge Crisanto Concepcion, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.15
Acting on the said criminal case, Judge Concepcion issued an Order dated 14 November 2002 for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
private respondent:
The existence of probable cause having been fully determined from a personal evaluation of the facts as alleged in the information and its
supporting documents filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, justifying the arrest of accused, let the corresponding
warrant be issued for that purpose, the same to be indorsed to the Chief Inspector, PNP, Plaridel, Bulacan, the Bulacan PNP Provincial
Command, the Chief, PNP/CIDG, Malolos, Bulacan, and the Director, NBI, Pulilan, Bulacan, for service and implementation. 16
On 28 February 2003, private respondent filed a Motion for Reinvestigation before the RTC, Branch 12.17 The same was denied in the order of
the RTC dated 7 March 2003.18
On 23 May 2003, private respondent filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for Review of the Resolution dated 23 September
2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan finding probable cause that he committed the murder of Erlinda Baltazar. 19
About a year later, on 27 May 2004, on the strength of the warrant of arrest issued by the RTC, private respondent was apprehended and
detained pending trial.20
Private respondent was set to be arraigned on 15 June 2004. However, Judge Concepcion postponed the arraignment upon motion of private
respondent who invoked the pendency of his Petition for Review with the DOJ.21On 9 July 2004, private respondent’s rescheduled arraignment
again did not push through because he presented before the RTC a copy of the Resolution dated 8 July 2004, issued by Acting DOJ Secretary
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, reversing the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. The dispositive portion of the said DOJ Resolution
reads22:
All told, We are of the view and so hold that respondent could not be held criminally liable for murder or less serious physical injury as there
was no malice or intent to cause injury (dolo) to the victims. Neither can he be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide or less
serious physical injury as there was no sufficient proof of negligence (culpa). This is a case of accident, an exempting circumstance under
paragraph 4 Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Where the death of the deceased was due to an accident without any negligence on
the part of the driver of the automobile, there being no sufficient proof on record to establish the latter’s negligence, there is no criminal
liability (United States vs. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated September 23, 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is
hereby directed to immediately cause the withdrawal of the information for murder and less serious physical injury filed against respondent
Armando C. Bautista before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12 of Malolos, Bulacan and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.23
Pursuant to the afore-quoted DOJ Resolution, a Motion to Withdraw Information24 dated 28 July 2004 was filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor with the RTC and was granted by Judge Concepcion in an Order issued on 30 July 2004 25 based on the following ratiocination:
Acting on the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by 3rd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig, the regular public prosecutor
assigned to this Court, for the reason stated therein, there being no cogent reason to rule otherwise, considering further that the accused is a
detention prisoner in this case, the same is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the prosecution, the information for murder filed against herein accused is hereby considered withdrawn from
the docket of this Court.
Unless herein accused Armando c. Bautista @ Arman should be further detained for any valid cause or reason, the Provincial Jail Warden of
Bulacan is hereby directed to effect the immediate release from his detention in this case.
Let copies of this order be furnished the prosecution, the accused, his counsel, and the Provincial Jail Warden of Bulacan.26
A Motion for Reconsideration27 of the 30 July 2004 Order was filed by the private prosecutor, but Judge Concepcion denied the same in
another Order dated 23 November 2004.28 The RTC Order reads:
[A]fter reading the statements of the witnesses given to the police soon after the tragic accident occurred in the evening of April 21, 2002,
nothing was mentioned by the witnesses of the alleged intentional killing of the victim by running over her with the car of the accused. What
629
they said to the police was what appeared to be a simple case of criminal negligence in driving the car by the accused when said vehicle
bumped the pedicab occupied by the victims who were thrown out, resulting to the death of one of them, without the accused rendering any
help or assistance to them, but fleeing from the scene of the accident – a case of hit and run accident. Then later on one of these witnesses
executed an affidavit stating that the car, after bumping the pedicab of the victims, stopped and then moved backwards intentionally to run
over one of the victims who was killed as a result thereof. Such declaration is suspect of a mere afterthought to create a much graver offense
than a case of criminal negligence, the Court not hesitating to say that from the statement of the police investigator in his affidavit, he clearly
appears not an impartial police investigator but one who has expressed his bad opinions of the accused instead of giving an impartial report on
his findings as a police investigator. And the Court could not help but suspect that the police investigation was so made to create a capital
offense against the accused, maybe because the brother of the victim who died in the accident was a police officer himself by the name of
SPO3 Cruz. Another important factor in this case is the admission of one Joel Santos in his own affidavit to be the driver of the car when the
accident happened. Such admission under oath by Joel Santos should not have been ignored at all in finally resolving the case before filing it in
Court. This probably is the reason why the Department of Justice directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to immediately
cause the withdrawal of the information for murder and less serious physical injury filed against accused Armando C. Bautista.29
Petitioner thus filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88237, seeking the nullification and
setting aside of Judge Concepcion’s Order dated 30 July 2004 for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In a Decision dated 26 April 2006, the appellate court found that:
In granting the motion to dismiss, respondent Judge did not rely solely on the resolution of the acting Secretary of Justice. The Order dated
November 23, 2004 of respondent Judge granting the motion clearly demonstrates an independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence
or the lack thereof against accused Bautista. In other words, the dismissal of the case was shown to be based upon the Judge’s own individual
conviction that there was no viable case against accused Bautista. For in the said Order, the respondent Judge stated his reasons for respecting
the Secretary’s recommendation. Hence, it can be deduced that he had studied and evaluated the Acting Secretary’s recommendation as well
as the sworn statements or evidence submitted finding the absence of probable cause to hold accused Bautista criminally liable for Murder.
Therefore, contrary to the claim of the petitioner, public respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he granted the
withdrawal of Information for Murder filed against the private respondent considering that he made an independent assessment of the merits
of the motion and embodied the same in at least one of his assailed Orders as mandated by existing jurisprudence (Ark Travel Express, Inc. vs.
Abrogar, 410 SCRA 148, 158[2003]).
Anent the allegation of the petitioner that he was denied due process, We also agree with the OSG that same is without factual basis. Thus:
"An examination of the machine copy of the motion to withdraw information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which was marked as Annex ‘D’
clearly indicates that copy thereof was furnished to the parties concerned. Hence, the petitioner was notified [of the hearing] of said motion.
In fact, the petitioner appeared in court on the date of hearing of said motion on July 30, 2004 and argued for the denial of the withdrawal of
the information (Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari, pp. 4-5). Hence, when petitioner appeared in court and was able to contest/oppose said
motion, he was afforded the opportunity to be heard on a motion derogatory to his interest."30
Hence, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the challenged Orders of public
respondent Hon. Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED.31
In a Resolution dated 1 August 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of its 26 April 2006 Decision for lack of
merit.32
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari wherein petitioner raises the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE GRANTED THE PROSECUTION’S MOTION WITHOUT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION HIS EARLIER FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE, AND THAT THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD WERE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAN NOT BE PROPERLY RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
PETITIONER FILED BEFORE IT.33
Petitioner contends that Judge Concepcion correctly found in his Order dated 14 November 2002 that, based on the facts obtaining from the
records of the case, there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against private respondent. He further reasoned
that while there had been a supervening event, i.e., the issuance by the DOJ of its Resolution dated 8 July 2004 reversing and setting aside the
Resolution dated 23 September 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan and directing the immediate withdrawal of the information for
murder filed against private respondent before the RTC, Judge Concepcion still was the one in full control of the case. 34Petitioner insists that
Judge Concepcion committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Information against private respondent in his Order
dated 30 July 2004; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming said Order in its herein assailed Decision and Resolution dated 26 April
2006 and 1 August 2006, respectively.
We deny the Petition.

630
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 35 It is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person
of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. 36
The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor -- one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC are
concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the
public prosecutor.37 This broad prosecutorial power is, however, not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth
before the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent.
Thus, for crimes cognizable by the regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are usually conducted. 38 As defined under the law, a
preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 39
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to the parties.40
In People v. Inting,41 this Court aptly stated:
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination
of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trial – is the function of the prosecutor.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Section 1, Rule 11243 of the Revised Rules of Court, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation of a case
cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent therein is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is for the
purpose of securing the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; and to protect him from an open and public accusation
of a crime, as well as for the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial.44
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information against the respondent, he executes a certification at the
bottom of the Information that, from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not
binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused.45
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause for
issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor’s
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge in making his determination.46
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence
of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.471awphi1
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused, such as in the case at bar, is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. 48
A closer scrutiny of the substance of Judge Concepcion’s Order dated 30 July 2004 would reveal that he reversed his earlier finding of probable
cause in issuing a warrant of arrest and allowed the withdrawal of the Information against private respondent based on the following grounds:
(1) witnesses to the crime failed to categorically identify private respondent as the culprit; (2) private respondent’s nephew, Joel Santos,
voluntarily admitted in his affidavit that he was the one driving the car, which he borrowed from private respondent, and who accidentally hit
the pedicab which Erlinda Baltazar and Rolando Baltazar were riding; (3) private respondent could not be held criminally liable for murder as
there was no malice or intent to cause injury (dolo) to Erlinda Baltazar; and (4) this was just a simple case of criminal negligence or reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide or less serious physical injury. 49
631
Given the foregoing, Judge Concepcion’s Order dated 30 July 2004 granting the withdrawal of the Information for murder against private
respondent was not issued with grave abuse of discretion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as
would amount to "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law"
on the part of Judge Concepcion. To the contrary, Judge Concepcion came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for private
respondent to commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations, and evidence on record. 50
In Crespo v. Mogul,51 we held:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.52
We have likewise held that once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the
case, so much so that the information may not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed, the court may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must himself be
convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of
the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it
not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed
insufficiency.53
In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,54 this Court ruled that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or
reinvestigation from the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial court
nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial
court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused,
and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation, provided that such
grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez55 is timely:
It is . . . imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of
the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of
reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up
during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary
lives up to its mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
Petitioner’s arguments before the Court of Appeals can be reduced to the allegation that respondent Judge gravely erred in appreciating the
evidence presented; thus, he seriously abused his discretion, an act amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction - an error of jurisdiction, so
termed. An error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and which is correctible by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Concepcion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we hold that the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated 26 April 2006 and Resolution
dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88237 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
632
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 139120 July 31, 2003
SPS. FREDDIE & ELIZABETH WEBB, HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, GRAN JASON WEBB, JOANNA MARIE WEBB, MARYBETH WEBB-AGCAOILI, and
FRITZ GABRIEL WEBB, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MARIXI R. PRIETO, PATRICIO A. GARCIA, KARLA P. DELGADO, CARLOS F. RUFINO, MACARIO S. RUFINO, ISAGANI
YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., NILO B. PAUROM, PERGENTINO B. BANDAYREL,
GLORIA P. LARDIZABAL, CHRISTINE F. HERRERA, and LYNDA T. JUMILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The present petition for review on certiorari assails the February 8, 1999 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50267 which
dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
On October 13, 1995, spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb and their children Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Gran Jason Webb, Joanna Marie Webb,
Marybeth Webb-Agcaoili, and Fritz Gabriel Webb (petitioners) filed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint2 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-3485, against the members of the Board of Directors of Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), namely: Marixi R. Prieto,
Patricio A. Garcia, Karla P. Delgado, Carlos F. Rufino, and Macario S. Rufino; PDI Publisher Isagani Yambot; editor-in-chief Letty Jimenez-
Magsanoc; managing editor Jose Ma. D. Nolasco; news editor Artemio T. Engracia, Jr.; assistant news editor Nilo B. Paurom; city editor
Pergentino B. Bandayrel; circulation editor Gloria P. Lardizabal; and PDI reporters Christine F. Herrera and Lynda T. Jumilla, for publishing seven
alleged "false and defamatory news articles implicating petitioners in the Vizconde rape slay case and the purported 'cover-up' thereof."3
By their Joint Counter-Affidavit,4 the respondent-non-members of the PDI Board countered that the questioned news reports were not libelous
because:
1. They constitute true and fair reports on a matter of public interest and concern, hence, are privileged in nature and are
constitutionally protected;
2. The privileged nature of the publication destroys the presumption of malice;
3. Respondents did not act with malice;
4. The defense of privileged nature of the publication could be raised at the preliminary investigation stage;
5. The complaint is fatally defective or deficient, it being not supported by affidavits of third persons;
6. No damage or prejudice to complainants' reputation has been shown; and
7. Complainants failed to establish the basis of criminal liability of respondents who are not the writers of the questioned news
reports.5
By their Joint Counter-Affidavit,6 the respondent-members of the PDI Board of Directors adopted the Joint Counter-Affidavit of their co-
respondents, adding that, among other things, they are not included in the enumeration of persons criminally liable for libel under Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code.
After preliminary investigation, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, by Memorandum of February 5, 19967 which bears the imprimatur of the
City Prosecutor, dismissed the complaint against the respondent-members of the PDI Board of Directors as Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code is specific in stating that only "the person who shall publish or cause the publication or exhibition; the author or editor of a book or
pamphlet; the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper . . . shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein."
The City Prosecutor’s Office, however, found probable cause for two counts of libel against respondents Yambot, Jimenez-Magsanoc, Nolasco,
Engracia, Paurom, Bandayrel, Lardizabal and Herrera, and one count of libel against respondent Jumilla, arising from the publication in the PDI
of news reports entitled "Alabang Boys: A Passion for Basketball and Ecstasy"8 and "NBI Probers: Webb Papers Falsified."9
Informations for libel were accordingly filed against the non-members of the PDI Board before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
633
On petition for review by petitioners, the Secretary of Justice, by January 22, 1998 letter-resolution10 addressed to the Makati City Prosecutor,
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against the respondent-PDI members of the Board, and reversed the finding of probable cause against
all the other respondents. He accordingly directed the withdrawal of the informations filed against the non-members of the PDI Board.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration11 of the Secretary of Justice’s January 22, 1998 letter-resolution having been denied by letter-
resolution12 of August 26, 1998 addressed to petitioners’ counsel, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of February 8, 1999, the appellate court dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to timely file it, following Section
4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,13 which reads:
RULE 65
Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court x x x x If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time
after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, anchored on the following grounds:
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION BELOW, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD SANCTIONED THE PATENTLY ERRONEOUS EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION AND
MANIFEST DEPARTURE FROM ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE — THIS, MERELY UPON A MINOR TECHNICAL
ERROR WHEN CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE SHOULD HAVE HELD SWAY. THUS:
A. THE NEGLIGIBLE DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE PETITION WAS PURELY A TECHNICAL ERROR CAUSED BY EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
AND OVERSIGHT, WHICH IS FAR OUTWEIGHED BY THE INTERESTS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE COMPELLING THE ADMISSION AND
CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION BELOW.
B. CONSIDERING THAT VIRTUALLY THE SAME ISSUES BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES ARE IN ANY CASE ALSO RAISED IN CA-GR NO.
51135 BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THERE BEING NO PREJUDICE OR DAMAGE WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE RESULT TO THE
RESPONDENTS, THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PETITION AND THE CONSOLIDATION THEREOF WITH CA-GR NO. 51135 WOULD BE IN
ORDER TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AND PROMOTE THE EFFICIENT DISPOSITION OF CASES.
C. THE PETITION INVOLVES CONTUMACIOUS VIOLATIONS OF LIBEL LAW REPEATED SEVEN TIMES, WHICH THE STATE HAS THE
INTEREST, NAY THE DUTY, TO PROSECUTE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT OF THE LAW.
II
THE DISMISSED PETITION BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS OTHERWISE MERITORIOUS SINCE RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
PATENTLY COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE SEVEN CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS FOR LIBEL AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS. THUS:
A. IN CHARACTERIZING THE SEVEN NEWS REPORTS AS "QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION" UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF
ARTICLE 354 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, RESPONDENT SECRETARY ASSUMED WITHOUT ANY PROOF OR BASIS, THAT THE SEVEN
LIBELS COMPLAINED OF ARE ON AN "OFFICIAL PROCEEDING" OF THE NBI.
B. NEITHER IS THERE ANY PROOF OF THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 354 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AS WOULD RESULT IN THE NON-
APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE MANDATED IN EACH OF THE SEVEN LIBELS COMPLAINED OF.
C. UNDER APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, THE ABSENCE OF MALICE IN THE PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY
MATTERS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT THE LIBEL ARE MERE DEFENSES WHICH MUST BE PROVED "AT THE
TRIAL" AND DO NOT THEREFORE CONSTITUTE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR THE DISMISSAL OF A LIBEL AT THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION STAGE. THUS, RESPONDENT SECRETARY'S DECLARATION OF THE PURPORTED "LACK OF MALICE" IN THE
PUBLICATION OF THE ALLEGEDLY "PRIVILEGED LIBELS" CONSTITUTED AN UNJUSTIFIED EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS CLEARLY
BEYOND HIS VESTED AUTHORITY IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS.
D. THE COMPLAINT AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF LIBEL AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, WHICH PUBLIC RESPONDENT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY, AND ARBITRARILY REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE
(Underscoring supplied).
634
At the time petitioners’ petition for certiorari was filed before the appellate court and even up to the rendition of its assailed Resolution on
February 8, 1999, the rule in force was above-quoted Rule 65, Sec. 4. The petition at bar would then fail. The rule, however, was amended
during the pendency of the present case before this Court by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Further Amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure) which took effect on September 1, 2000. The 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is now reckoned from date of
receipt of the notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration or new trial if one was filed.14
The next "logical step" to take then would be for this Court to direct the appellate court to resolve the petition for certiorari on the merits.
Such step, however, would unduly prolong its disposition, hence, this Court shall now resolve the same. 15
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises
the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors, hence, has power of review over their resolutions. He may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.16
The power of review of the Secretary of Justice is also recognized under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor and its review. — x x x x If upon petition by a proper party under such Rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties x x x x
Once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, as in the present case, any disposition of the case — be it dismissal of the case, or
conviction or acquittal of the accused — rests on the sound discretion of the court. For although the prosecutor retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court17 which is
"the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case."
As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of
whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are, however, exceptions18 to this rule, none of which are obtaining in the
case now before us x x x x Since the Information has already been filed, the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case is the
Regional Trial Court as earlier discussed.19 (Underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is no showing that the public prosecutor has filed a motion to withdraw the informations before the trial court. The
trial judge has thus not been afforded the chance to pass upon any such motion to determine whether probable cause indeed does or does
not lie against the accused-non-members of the PDI Board.
With respect to the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the exclusion of the respondent-members of the PDI Board of Directors in the
information for libel: The records on hand do not show that petitioners have come up with prima facie evidence that respondent-members of
the Board actually caused or participated in the publication, or were "in some way directly responsible for the writing, editing or publishing" of
the alleged libelous articles.20 It is on this score that this Court finds that the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the dismissal of the
complaint against the respondent-members of the PDI Board was not attended with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
635
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1852 [OCA-IPI No. 03-1759-RTJ] June 3, 2004
WILFREDO M. TALAG, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE AMOR A. REYES, Regional Trial Court, Manila Branch 21, respondent.
DECISION
This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Amor A. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court, Manila for partiality, grave abuse of authority
and oppression in connection with Criminal Case No. 02-201852 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Talag."
The instant case arose when, on April 18, 2001, a certain Romeo Lacap filed a complaint against Wilfredo Talag, Leticia Talag and Kenneth
Bautista, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa occasioned by the dishonor of four checks.
On June 4, 2001, during the preliminary investigation, Wilfredo Talag, Leticia Talag, and Kenneth Bautista, submitted their counter-affidavits
denying any participation in the transaction allegedly perpetrated by them to defraud the complainant.
On December 15, 2001, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Estafa against herein
complainant and the dismissal of all the charges against Leticia Talag and Kenneth Bautista. The Information was filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-201852.
On May 7, 2002, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the City Prosecutor, praying for the dismissal of the
complaint against him for utter lack of merit. On even date, he filed an Omnibus Motion before the trial court: (1) to defer issuance of warrant
of arrest and/or to recall the same if already issued; and (2) to remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion
for reconsideration.
On May 31, 2002, complainant filed with the trial court a Very Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing Accused’s Omnibus Motion to defer issuance
of warrant of arrest and/or to remand case to the Office of the City Prosecutor pending review of the motion for reconsideration.
According to complainant, on June 11, 2002, he requested his counsel to determine whether the hearing for the pending motions had already
been set. To his consternation, he was told by his counsel that respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest without first
resolving the said motions.
Complainant immediately filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals challenging the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Court
of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the said warrant. Accordingly, respondent Judge issued
an Order on June 25, 2002, deferring the resolution of the Very Urgent Motion until after the expiration of the TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals. Thereafter, the petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit.
On August 20, 2002, complainant filed a motion for respondent Judge’s inhibition. Two days after, i.e., on August 22, respondent Judge issued
the assailed warrant of arrest against complainant. Meanwhile, complainant through counsel filed a Notice of Change of Address.
On September 30, 2002, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Consider Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the City Prosecutor
pending Review of the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Re-investigation and to Resolve the Same with Urgency. On October 2,
2002, he filed a Motion to Resolve Motion for Inhibition.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for inhibition and set the case for arraignment on December 11, 2002. Complainant claims that said
order never reached him or his counsel since it was sent by registered mail to his previous address at No. 1 Zaragosa Street, San Lorenzo
Village, Makati City, inspite of the Notice of Change Address which was filed as early as August 28, 2002.
Since complainant failed to attend his arraignment allegedly due to lack of notice, respondent Judge reset the same to January 22, 2003.
However, the second notice was again sent to the wrong address at Makati City, again resulting in complainant’s failure to attend his
arraignment. As a consequence, respondent judge issued a bench warrant of arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest and a Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. On February 28, 2003, an
order was issued by the respondent Judge which lifted the bench warrant but denied the motion for reconsideration.
On May 12, 2003, complainant filed a verified complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Judge with
partiality, grave abuse of authority and oppression allegedly committed in the following manner:
636
(1) Respondent Judge issued the warrant of arrest on May 23, 2003 despite complainant’s pending omnibus motion to defer issuance
of warrant of arrest or to recall the same if already issued and to remand case to Office of the City Prosecutor, and the very urgent
motion to set for hearing the omnibus motion;
(2) When the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals and a temporary restraining order was issued, respondent seemed to
have waited for the TRO to expire and for the dismissal of complainant’s petition before the Court of Appeals because she did not
resolve the motion for inhibition, and she immediately issued a warrant of arrest against him after said petition was dismissed.
(3) Respondent had a predisposition to deny the motions filed by complainant since, although she was in haste in issuing the warrant
of arrest, she nonetheless dilly-dallied in resolving the motions filed by complainant;
(4) Despite complainant’s notice for a change of address, respondent’s order of November 18, 2002, setting his arraignment on
December 11, 2002, was sent to his and counsel’s former address resulting in his failure to attend the arraignment;
(5) In the same way, the notice of the resetting of arraignment from December 11, 2002 to January 22, 2003, was again sent to the
wrong address, such that he was not notified of said scheduled arraignment. Such lack of notice however, did not stop respondent
Judge from issuing a bench warrant of arrest for his failure to appear on the scheduled arraignment;
(6) Although respondent Judge lifted the said bench warrant on February 28, 2003, she nevertheless denied complainant’s motion
for reconsideration relative to the Order dated November 2002 denying the motion for inhibition;
(7) Respondent Judge exhibited partiality and malevolent attitude when she did not only deny all remedies available to complainant
but also uttered hostile side-comments during hearings and even commented that complainant was overly fond of filing motions.1
In her comment, respondent Judge refuted the charges in this wise:
(1) She did not consider the omnibus motion dated May 7, 2002 filed by complainant because its notice of hearing was addressed to
the Public Prosecutor, for which reason, she issued the warrant of arrest on May 23, 2003;
(2) She issued the order dated June 25, 2002 deferring the resolution of complainant’s very urgent motion to set the case for hearing
in view of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 14, 2002, enjoining her from enforcing the warrant of arrest issued
against complainant;
(3) Since the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the complainant when the court received the motion to
set the case for trial filed by Asst. City Prosecutor, she again issued a warrant of arrest against complainant;
(4) Respondent’s issuance of warrant of arrest against complainant on May 23, 2002, despite the filing of the omnibus motion and
the motion to set the omnibus motion for hearing, was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated August 14, 2002,
dismissing complainant’s petition;
(5) Inasmuch as the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the complainant, respondent, after the Court of
Appeals denied complainant’s petition and lifted the 60-day TRO, ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against complainant;
(6) Since it was only on October 17, 2002 that the bail posted by complainant on September 26, 2002 for his provisional liberty
before the Executive Judge of RTC, Makati, was received by respondent court, she could not resolve the motion for inhibition
considering that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person;
(7) Complainant is to blame for the delay in the resolution of his motions because of his penchant in filing defective motions and for
not immediately submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court;
(8) The issuance of a warrant of arrest and confiscation of the bond of complainant on January 22, 2003 was in accordance with Sec.
21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure in view of complainant’s failure to appear despite notice to him and his
bondsman. The notice of change of address filed by complainant pertains to the change of address of his counsel and not to himself,
hence, court processes were sent to his "alleged" old address. Moreover, Produce Orders of the December 11, 2002 and January 22,
2003 settings were sent to complainant’s bondsman, but this notwithstanding, complainant’s bondsman failed to produce him in
court and it even filed a motion of extension of time to do so;
(9) Complainant’s claim of bias and partiality on the part of respondent in denying complainant’s motion for reconsideration and
motion to inhibit is baseless and unfounded considering that the assailed orders of the respondent were made on the basis of law
and facts of the case.2
On August 8, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
637
We have closely scrutinized the arguments of the contending parties and find the charges filed against respondent are baseless.
The Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was issued May 23, 2003. When complainant filed the omnibus motion
on May 7, 2002, the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. With the filing of Information, the trial court could then issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the
warrant was not only procedurally sound but it was even required considering that respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person
of complainant. Consequently, complainant’s charge that respondent Judge failed to act on the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest
warrant is untenable. Whether respondent correctly disregarded the omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is a judicial matter,
which is not a proper subject in an administrative proceeding. It bears noting that respondent court immediately deferred the execution of the
warrant of arrest upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of the TRO. Incidentally, although the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order, it eventually sustained the issuance by respondent of the arrest warrant and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
Neither can we ascribe partiality nor grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent for issuing anew an alias warrant after the expiration
of the Court of Appeals’ 60-day TRO. With the lifting of the retraining order, no legal obstacle was left for the issuance of the arrest warrant
and thus set in motion the stalled prosecutorial process by acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Complainant blames the respondent for his failure to appear at his arraignment because the notice was sent to the wrong address despite a
prior notice for change of address. A cursory reading of the notice of change of address will show that it pertains to the counsel’s residence,
not to the complainant’s. In view of this, it becomes reasonable for the court to assume that court processes could be sent to complainant’s
"old" and "unchanged" residence. As correctly pointed out by respondent Judge, the Produce Order of the December 11, 2002 and January 22,
2003 settings were sent to complainant’s bondsman. Hence, in accordance with Sec. 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, his bondsman
must produce him before the court on the given date and failing to do so; the bond was forfeited as it was.
On the matter of respondent’s denial of the motion for inhibition, suffice it to say that the issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit
himself is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1 of Rule 137, which provides for the rule on voluntary
inhibition and states: "a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reasons
other than those above-mentioned." Taking together all the acts and conduct of respondent Judge relative to complainant’s case, we believe
that she did not exhibit any bias or partiality to warrant her voluntarily inhibition from the case. Curiously, while complainant decries the
alleged respondent’s predilection for denying all his motions, he himself conceded that respondent Judge has done everything pursuant to law
and jurisprudence.3 Bias and partiality cannot be presumed, for in administrative proceedings no less than substantial proof is required. Apart
from bare allegations, there must be convincing evidence to show that respondent Judge is indeed biased and partial. In administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent Judge committed the act complained of rests on the complainant.4 Complainant failed to
discharge this burden.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to adopt the recommendation of the Court Administrator, and
accordingly, DISMISS the instant complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
638
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011 August 7, 2006
[formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2083-RTJ]
IMELDA S. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The facts that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative case, as culled from the rollo, follow:
Following the death in Cebu City of one Mark James Enriquez on July 21, 2003, Cebu City Prosecutor Jesus P. Feliciano filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu on July 23, 2003 an Information 1 charging Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, a certain Junjun, and nine Does with Murder.
Warrants for the arrest 2 of Sherwin Que a.k.a. Bungol, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe, Richard Doe, Arnold Doe, Dexter Doe, James Doe,
Robert Doe, and Arthur Doe were thereupon issued by the Executive Judge of the Cebu RTC.
On the invitation 3 of the 7th Regional Criminal Investigation and Detection Group Unit (CIDGU) at Camp Sotero Cabahug in Cebu City, Anthony
John Apura (Apura), accompanied by his father, repaired to said office on August 1, 2003.
An "Inquest Investigation" of Apura was conducted on August 2, 2003, a Saturday, by a prosecutor who recommended the impleading of
Apura as co-accused in the case. A warrant for Apura’s arrest was on even date issued by Judge Apolinario Taypin, Presiding Judge of Branch
12 of the Cebu RTC, who was on duty that day. 4Apura was immediately arrested and detained.
Apura assailed the legality of his arrest via a "Motion to Dismiss" the Information, which he filed on August 5, 2003 before Branch 24 of the
Cebu RTC to which the case was raffled.
By Order of August 13, 2003, Branch 24 Presiding Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., herein respondent, "believ[ing] that there [wa]s lack of
preliminary investigation," ordered the remand of the case against Apura to the Cebu City Prosecutor’s Office for preliminary investigation,
and ordered Apura’s release from custody on a bail of P20,000. Respondent’s said Order reads:
Accused-movant Anthony John Apura alleged in his Motion to Dismiss that his arrest was illegal because he [went] to the police station upon
invitation but immediately thereafter he was placed under custody of the police. His arrest does not fall under a warrantless arrest nor it is
within the purview of "hot pursuit" concept, considering that the subject incident happened on July 19, 2003 and he was placed under arrest
on August 2, 2003.
The Court believes that there is lack of preliminary investigation on the part of accused Anthony John Apura. The warrant of arrest issued on
July 24, 2003 on the basis of the original information filed on July 24, 2003 cannot be made as valid basis for the arrest of the accused Anthony
John Apura on August 2, 2003. The court notes that accused Anthony John Apura is not the certain "Junjun" mentioned in the original
Information.
What appalled the Court is the manner by which the accused was placed under custody. The actuation wherein a person is invited to the police
station for investigation and to place said person under detention when his appearance therein was only to explain his side thereof, is
foreboding.
WHEREFORE, short of declaring the arrest of movant illegal, and acting on the Motion to Dismiss, remand this case to the Cebu City
Prosecution Office for Prosecutor Jesus Feliciano to conduct preliminary investigation on Anthony John Apura and said accused is ordered
released from custody, being admitted to bail in the amount of PhP 20,000.000 in cash, pending preliminary investigation, pursuant to
Section 7 of Rule 112.
Furnish parties and counsels copy of this Order and Prosecutor Feliciano, who is directed to submit his preliminary investigation report sixty
(60) days from today. 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint filed on September 7, 2004 by petitioner Imelda S. Enriquez, the mother of the deceased
Mark James Enriquez, against respondent for knowingly rendering an unjust order and gross ignorance of the law and procedure for ordering
the release of Apura on bail without first conducting a hearing for the purpose.
639
To the complaint, respondent gives the following comment:
Respondent judge was trying to check the abuse committed by the State through its law enforcement agency upon the rights of an accused
person guaranteed to him by no less than the Constitution. The inquest proceedings which followed . . . the "invitation" was [sic] highly
irregular. The prosecutors knew this fact, which is why, during the hearing on the "Motion to Dismiss", they agreed for [sic] the remand of the
record for preliminary investigation.
Had he granted the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Apura because of
the illegal arrest, accused would be released just the same. Yet, to strike a balance of the possible abuse on the rights of accused and the effort
of the police at prosecution of crimes, respondent did not categorically declare the arrest illegal but allowed the accused to post cash bail bond
with an accompanying "hold-departure" order. At least, to get hold of the accused while preliminary investigation is conducted. 6 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
By Report dated October 4, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), finding that respondent violated Section 7, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reading:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution,
recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P21,000 for gross ignorance of the law. 7
By Resolution 8 dated December 14, 2005, this Court ordered the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed and submitted, within ten days from notice. Respondent responded in the affirmative in a
Manifestation 9 received on January 27, 2006 to which he attached additional papers in support of his case. On petitioner’s part, she also
responded in the affirmative by Manifestation 10received on January 31, 2006.
An application to bail from Murder, for which Apura was indicted on August 2, 2003 when it was a capital offense, 11now punishable by
reclusion perpetua, calls for a hearing, as called for under Section 8 of Rule 114 reading:
SEC. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody of the commission of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify. (Italics in the original),
in order to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. 12
In the case at bar, respondent ordered Apura to be released on bail, without conducting a prior hearing.
The lack of preliminary investigation, in light of the finding that Apura was not lawfully arrested without warrant, he having gone to the CIDGU
in response to its invitation, did not justify respondent’s disregard of the mandatory procedure governing the grant of bail.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the Amended Information. A preliminary investigation is a
proceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." 13 An inquest is "a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a
person was based on probable cause." 14
Where the penalty prescribed by law for an offense is at least four years, two months and one day of imprisonment without regard to the fine,
a preliminary investigation must be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for such offense. 15 The conduct of an inquest
investigation does not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information or complaint
involving any such offenses, except when the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant. 16
In the case at bar, the accused was not even arrested. He repaired to the CIDGU on its invitation. He should thus have been subjected to a
preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest investigation. 17
An Amended Information was subsequently filed, however, upon which a Warrant of Arrest was issued against Apura by Judge Taypin. By so
issuing a warrant, Judge Taypin is presumed to have , before issuing the warrant, previously regularly discharged his duty to personally
determine the existence of probable cause against the accused, as mandated by Section 6 of Rule 112, which provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
640
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
At all events, the absence of a preliminary investigation did not justify Apura’s release, the defect not having nullified the information and the
warrant of arrest against him. Thus this Court held in Larranaga v. CA: 18
We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center is legal in view of the information and the warrant
of arrest against him. The absence of a preliminary investigation will not justify petitioner’s release because such defect did not nullify the
information and the warrant of arrest against him. We ruled in Sanciangco, Jr. v. People: 19
The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct it or remand the case to the
inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. (Citation omitted)
In fine, respondent’s release on bail of Apura, without priorly conducting a hearing for the purpose, betrays his gross ignorance of the law, it
being settled that where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of observance thereof constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 20
Gross ignorance of the law may be punished with dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of
more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40.000. 21
This Court, however, appreciates as mitigating in respondent’s favor his issuance of a hold-departure order against the accused. 22 It is in this
light that it reduces the recommended penalty of fine to P15,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000) Pesos, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
641
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 138934-35 January 16, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases are before this Court for review from the decision,1 dated February 26, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City,
finding accused-appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to death and to pay private complainant Michelle
Darunday the amounts of P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant charged him with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against the latter's will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed in the dwelling of the said party
during nighttime while [she] was asleep inside her room.
Act contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with robbery with rape as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the
person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00,
belonging to said offended party and [on] the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the complainant Michelle Darunday y
Jintula, against her will, and inside her room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said offense was committed inside the dwelling of the offended party
and during nighttime the latter not having given provocation for the offense.
Act contrary to law.3
When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda, Erma Blanca,4 Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco,
Leo Asan, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies are as follows:
Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda testified that at around 8 o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1996, they and Mark Lucena were playing
inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon5 at No. 17 Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2,
Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go
home lest they would meet an accident. The man was later identified by Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda as accused-appellant.6
Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They
stayed in a bedroom on the ground floor. That same night, December 27, 1996, Teresa went to sleep at around 9:30 p.m., while Michelle and
Erma watched television for a while before going to bed. They slept beside each other on two beds placed side by side, with Teresa nearest the
wall, Michelle in the middle, and Erma on the other side.
While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent
identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He warned Erma not to shout or he would kill her. He then asked Erma where her
money was, and the latter pointed to the wall where she had hung the bag which contained her money. Michelle, who by then was already
awake, told Erma to give the man her money so he would leave. Erma gave the man P300.00, but the latter said to give him all her money. He
told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more, he would kill her. For this reason, Erma gave the rest of her money.
Afterwards, she was told to lie on her side facing the wall. The man then turned to Michelle and Teresa. Michelle gave him her money, but
Teresa said her money was in the other room. However, she was not allowed to leave the bedroom. The man was able to get P500.00 from
Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle.
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After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded
Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. He ordered her to take off her t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she
did not do as he commanded. He then went on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he had difficulty doing so, he
instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more to insert his penis, but again failed. The man then rose from the bed and took some soapy
water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelle's vagina. He finally succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Michelle felt great
pain and pleaded with the man to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only stopped after satisfying his lust.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping
her. She felt that his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough.
On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man's face because of the light coming from
the lamp post outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had panes through which the light filtered in.
After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the three women. He told Michelle that he used to make catcalls at
her and called her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his place but Michelle had ignored him. He told them that he was from Hinigaran,
but later took back his statement when Teresa told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near Hinigaran. Michelle then told him that
she worked at the City Engineer's Office and graduated from the Central Mindanao University. The man cussed when he learned that Michelle
was from Mindanao. As he spoke to Michelle, he leaned over the bed and mashed the breasts of Erma and Teresa.
After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his
companions and said it would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach
and then inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and returned to her a pair of
earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill
them.7
Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor of their house, toying with a flashlight, when he saw from his
bedroom window a man wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house. It was around 12:30 in the morning then. The man was
nibbling something. Mark saw the man jump over the fence. After 30 minutes, Mark went down from his room and told his parents what he
had seen. His parents then went out to check what had happened. Mark identified accused-appellant as the man he saw that night.8
Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their
neighbor, Tiyo Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the
boarding house, who in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked Michelle to describe the assailant,
but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around
the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at
Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to
the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of
Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 o'clock in the evening.9
PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly after the commission of the crime, also testified for the
prosecution. He said that the assailant was described to him as wearing long hair and having a rough projection on the back of his neck, small
eyes, a slim body, and a brown complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon, returned to the police station to
report the rape committed against her. Tancinco entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred Michelle to the Women's Desk.
In the morning of December 28, 1996, Tancinco returned to the boarding house. He found that the intruder was able to gain entry to the
house through the window of the bathroom. He noticed that the room beside those of the three women had been ransacked, with the
cabinets opened and the clothes in disarray.
The following day, on December 29, 1996, Tancinco went around Margarita Extension and learned about the children playing on the street
around the time the intruder entered the boarding house. He was told by Mark Esmeralda and Jason Joniega that they saw a man inside the
jeepney where they were playing at the time of the incident. Tancinco was likewise informed by Esmeralda that the person he saw inside the
jeepney was the same person he saw coming out of the boarding house later that night. According to Tancinco, the children said that they
could identify the man if he was shown to them. At around 8 o'clock that evening, Tancinco questioned a certain Tiyo Anong and Ramie about
the identity of the suspect. Ramie said that the description of the suspect fitted that of a worker at a café called Coffee Break Corner, about
two houses away from the boarding house.
Thus, on January 2, 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told
them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the café. When interviewed by Tancinco and his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that accused-
appellant was his helper and that the latter had gone home on December 27, 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon
went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 o'clock in the morning of January 3, 1997 and asked the assistance of
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the police there to locate accused-appellant. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the Pontevedra police to accompany
Tancinco and his companions. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the police station for
questioning.10
Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station. When accused-appellant was brought there, he saw Michelle and blushed.
Michelle looked at him and recognized him as the man who had robbed and raped her on December 27, 1996. Accused-appellant was asked to
take off his t-shirt. Michelle said that she just kept quiet while accused-appellant tried to talk to her. However, according to Tancinco, Michelle
confirmed to him that accused-appellant was the man who had attacked her, identifying him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the
back of his neck and his voice. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant had a short haircut. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station
for further investigation.11 Allan Aguillon took a picture of accused-appellant (Exh. F) at the Pontevedra police station.12
At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether accused-appellant
was the same person they saw on the night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person that
they had seen that night. They picked accused-appellant out of four people who were inside the jail cell.13
Michelle Darunday executed an affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, identifying accused-appellant as the person who had robbed and raped
her.14 She testified that she and her friends had gone to the Coffee Break Corner sometime in September or October 1996. On the way home,
she was approached by accused-appellant. He asked Michelle what her name was, and she gave it to him, albeit reluctantly. She usually passed
by the said café when going home and accused-appellant would often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl. Michelle had simply ignored
him and gone on her way.15
Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department, examined Michelle Darunday and made the following findings
and remarks:
1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the posterior fourchette.
2. New Lacerations noted on the hymenal ring on the following location 1 o'clock position, 3 o'clock position, and 9 o'clock position.
3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain.
4. Presently, patient with menstruation.
In my opinion, the patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains of pain upon urination) and possible Medical treatment if
necessary, for about 7 to 10 days. And if necessary, psychiatric evaluation & management is also recommended. 16
Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said there was penetration of the victim's vagina as shown by the fact that the hymenal rim had lacerations at
the 1, 3, and 9 o'clock positions. Since the edges of the lacerations were sharp, she concluded that these lacerations were less than a week old
at the time of the examination. According to Dr. Jocson, these were caused by abrasions due to force or pressure applied on the vaginal area.
When asked during cross-examination whether the victim had abrasions or contusions on her body at the time of her examination, Dr. Jocson
said that she could not remember. She could not remember either whether there was sperm in the victim's vagina when she examined the
latter. She said that no sperm specimen had been taken from the victim. She testified that it could not be determined how many times the
victim had previously engaged in sexual intercourse because this would depend on the elasticity of the victim's hymen. She opined, however,
that it would be less than 10 times in the case of the victim. Dr. Jocson stated it was possible the victim agreed to have sexual intercourse
voluntarily based on the lack of marks of violence on the latter, although it was also possible that she was merely forced to have sex because
she was threatened. On re-direct examination, she stated it was possible that seminal fluid was not found on the victim's private parts because
the victim was having her monthly period. She said the lacerations on the victim's vagina would result whether the sexual intercourse was
voluntary or involuntary on the part of the victim.17
Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod, testified that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution, which was
undated, was a faithful reproduction of what was written by Dr. Joy Ann Jocson on January 3, 1997 in the logbook. 18
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, accused-
appellant Anthony Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a different account of the events that led to the arrest of
accused-appellant. Their version is as follows:
Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on January 21, 1996. He said he started on August 6, 1996 as a dishwasher
and was later made cashier. Accused-appellant said that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 24, 1996, arriving
there at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Hinolan paid him P500.00, which he gave to his mother as his Christmas gift. He dropped by the house of
Aaron Lavilla. At 5:30 p.m., he returned to Coffee Break Corner in Bacolod City.
In the evening of December 26, 1996, accused-appellant asked permission from Hinolan to go home to Pontevedra to stay there until January
1997 as the restaurant would be closed anyway during this period. Hinolan gave accused-appellant his permission and paid the latter his salary
of P600.00 as well as a P200.00 bonus. Hence, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 27, 1996, accused-appellant took the bus home,
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arriving in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental an hour later. He went straight home to his mother and gave her P600.00, telling
her to use P400.00 for New Year's Day.19
Accused-appellant also saw Elias20 Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron Lavilla because a cockfight derby was being held that day in their
barangay. Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and found him at the basketball court. Aaron's mother asked accused-
appellant to help her bring to the cockpit some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accused-appellant obliged.
At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him to take care of his cocks. Accused-appellant asked Aaron Lavilla to go with him to the cockpit, but the
latter continued playing basketball and only proceeded to the cockpit after the game was finished. The derby ended at around 9 o'clock in the
evening.
At about 10 o'clock that night, accused-appellant and Aaron Lavilla went to the latter's house and slept there. The following day, December 28,
1996, accused-appellant helped Aaron Lavilla's mother with the household chores, cutting the grass and feeding the cocks. He stayed in
Barangay Miranda until January 3, 1997.21 Accused-appellant's testimony as to his whereabouts from December 27, 1996 to January 3, 1997
was corroborated by Elias Sombito22 and Aaron Lavilla.23
As to the circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino and Ricardo Villaspen testified that at around 11 o'clock in the
morning of January 3, 1997, three members of the Bacolod police, led by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, went to the headquarters of the Pontevedra
police to ask for help in locating a person named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental,
who was wanted in connection with a case for robbery with rape. Although Tancinco and his companions showed their mission order to
Gemarino, they did not show a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest. Nonetheless, Gemarino told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra police and
Ricardo Villaspen, the tanod commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the Bacolod policemen look for accused-appellant. The group left the
police station, although Tancinco's other companions, Michelle Darunday and Pacita Aguillon, stayed in the headquarters. 24
The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded to the house of accused-appellant in Barangay Miranda, but
the latter was not there. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game. After informing him that he was a suspect in a
robbery case, the group invited accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters.
Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police station. He testified that when accused-appellant, together with
Tancinco and his companions, arrived at the police station, he (Nestor Dojillo) followed them to the investigating room. Inside the room were
Michelle Darunday, three members of the Bacolod police, Villaspen, and Gemarino. Gemarino asked Michelle if she could identify accused-
appellant as her attacker, but the latter said that she could do so only if she could see a lump on his back. Gemarino told accused-appellant to
take off his t-shirt. When accused-appellant did as Gemarino ordered, Michelle looked at his back for identifying marks, while Allan Aguillon
took his photograph. Gemarino then asked Michelle whether accused-appellant was her attacker, but she replied that she was not sure
because the attacker was wearing a mask when she was raped. The Bacolod policemen requested Gemarino to allow them to bring accused-
appellant to Bacolod City as they still had some witnesses who could identify the suspect there. Accused-appellant was allowed to go with
them after Dojillo and Gemarino asked the Bacolod policemen not to harm him.25 Dojillo's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of
PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino,26 Ricardo Villaspen,27 and accused-appellant.28
Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to Bacolod City, PO3 Tancinco began beating him and hitting him with the butt of a
shotgun to force him to admit liability for the crime. Because accused-appellant refused to do so, he was taken by Tancinco and his
companions to a lodging house where he was subjected to torture. Accused-appellant was told to take off his clothes and to lie down. PO3
Tancinco and his companions then proceeded to hit him with a belt. Afterwards, they covered his mouth and took him to the bathroom.
Tancinco put a knife to his neck, telling him that he would be killed if he refused to admit that he was the culprit. As he continued to deny
liability for the crime, accused-appellant was subjected to further torture. Later on, the driver entered the room and brought with him a child,
whose head was covered, who was instructed to identify accused-appellant. The child, however, did not react upon seeing accused-appellant,
who was thus brought back to the headquarters where he was again maltreated. Accused-appellant said that he was left alone in his cell and
tied to a chair. He also said that at around 8 o'clock that evening, two of the complainants arrived and the police told them to identify accused-
appellant as their attacker. But these two complainants just kept looking at accused-appellant and even asked the policemen if he was the
suspect.
After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house so that he could be identified by another complainant. But this
complainant likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and longer hair. Accused-appellant was returned to
the police headquarters.
At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco talked to accused-appellant and told him that he would help him if accused-appellant confessed to the
crime. But accused-appellant again refused because he said he had not done anything wrong. The police then began beating him up again. PO3
Tancinco burnt accused-appellant's lips and tongue with a lighted cigarette.29
At around 12:00 noon of January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen, together with accused-appellant's grandfather, a certain Inspector
Tamayo, and reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit accused-appellant. They found him tied to a chair. When
they entered the cell, accused-appellant, thinking that they were members of the Bacolod police, held up his hands and asked for pity. The
visitors assured accused-appellant that they would not hurt him. Accused-appellant had a limp because his feet were injured. For this reason,
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Dojillo and his companions asked the Bacolod police to let them take accused-appellant to the hospital for treatment. Accused-appellant was
thus brought to the provincial hospital in Bacolod for x-ray and medical treatment. He was taken back to the police station thereafter.30
Lucila Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Regional Hospital (CLMMH), identified in court 31 the medical
certificate (Exh. 12) issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries sustained by accused-appellant, to wit:
# 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF T12.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.
# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA.
X-RAY # 280 dated January 6, 1997: SKULL APL: CHEST BUCKY RIGHT THIGH: APL: RIGHT AND LEFT FOOT APO.
"No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination."32
The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome33 Jayme, General Manager of Royal Express Transport, Inc., who testified that the last
bus trip from Kabankalan to Bacolod on December 27, 1996 left at 6 o'clock in the evening. The trip from Kabankalan to Barangay Miranda,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental would take one hour. On cross-examination, Jayme stated that the said bus would reach Bacolod City by 7:40
to 8:00 p.m. if it left Kabankalan at 6:00 p.m. His company's buses were not allowed to pick up passengers along the way to Bacolod City
because of the incidence of highway robbery. Jayme identified in court a certification (Exh. 12-a) he issued which stated that the last bus trip of
their company on December 27, 1996 was at 6:00 p.m.34
On February 26, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a thorough, painstaking and exhaustive review and examination of the
evidence adduced in this case, that the accused ANTHONY ESCORDIAL y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape, punished under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The commission of the crime was
attended by three aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, and
that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1, the accused is hereby sentenced to
the maximum penalty of DEATH.
He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00, representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED TO THE EFFECT THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN
NEVER BE THE ROBBER-RAPIST WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE DARUNDAY ON THAT FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, AS THE
FORMER (ESCORDIAL) DID NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES, CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST).
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND
HER WITNESSES FIT WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER IS THAT THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE
ASSAILANT EVER MADE BY ANYBODY PRIOR TO THE "WARRANTLESS ARREST" OF THE ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND SIGNED ONLY SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE ACCUSED
WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE BACOLOD POLICE.
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3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE
OF PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF MIRANDA AND THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF
PONTEVEDRA), AND RICARDO VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN PONTEVEDRA) TO THE EFFECT THAT
MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER IN PONTEVEDRA POLICE STATION.
4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES, TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE
PROSECUTION DURING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE LATTER'S SUBJECTION TO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
WITHOUT LETTING HIM KNOW OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN
A POLICE LINE UP DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS BEING LINED UP ONLY THE ACCUSED WAS HANDCUFFED.
6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY
WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT VERY EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
DOING THE SAME, GIVEN THE DISTANCE, THE INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE, IF NOT
DESTROY, THE CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION.
7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE FAILED TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO TO
BACOLOD THAT EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, DESPITE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, BY SIMPLY RELYING ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED TAKING A CARGO TRUCK FROM PONTEVEDRA TO BACOLOD.
8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON A WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT REFUTE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT
ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE ACQUAINTED WITH THE COMPLAINANT AND WHISTLED AT THE LATTER SEVERAL TIMES. 36
The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of the
evidence against him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
I. Alleged Violations of Accused-appellant's Constitutional Rights
A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions
had arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge.37 Art. III, §2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was watching a
game in a basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to commit a crime
when he was arrested by the police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would lead them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase "personal knowledge" in paragraph (b) has
been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which
means "an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
647
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officer making the arrest.38
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the
occurrence of the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they could not have "personal knowledge
of the facts and circumstances of the commission of the crime" so as to be justified in the belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime.
The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged against him during his arraignment on February
25, 1997 without questioning his warrantless arrest.39 He thus waived objection to the legality of his arrest.40 As this Court has held in another
case:
[The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the
charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings
void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the accused.41
B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel." He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent
and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from
him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellant's rights under this provision.1âwphi1.nêt
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him –
whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in
finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to
physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained
from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.
C. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police
officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station.
Although accused-appellant made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-
of-court identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark
Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest.42 However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had
been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."44 We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence
against him.45
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason
Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the
assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these
witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"46
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific
questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be
deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of these testimonies.47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant
inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction
648
of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof,49 it is admissible
as evidence against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is
another matter altogether.
II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character, qualities, and expertise of the assailant who robbed and raped
Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records are bereft of any description of the assailant made by these
prosecution witnesses prior to his arrest as the affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were executed only after his arrest; (3)
the testimonies of the defense witnesses, namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo, and Ricardo Villaspen, show that
Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant when the latter was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4) Tancinco's
testimony that Michelle Darunday properly identified accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said
witness had motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the identification of accused-appellant at the Bacolod police station was
tainted because only accused-appellant was handcuffed among the persons presented to the prosecution witnesses; and (5) it was highly
improbable for the prosecution witnesses to identify the assailant by face considering the distance, the intensity of light, and the
circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime.
A. Jason Joniega50 and Mark Esmeralda51 pointed to accused-appellant as the man they saw on the night of December 27, 1996 and the person
they identified inside a jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Erma Blanca, on the other hand, testified that she saw through her blindfold
accused-appellant raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in court as their assailant and as the man whom she saw inside
the jail cell at the Bacolod police station.52 Ma. Teresa Gellaver53 and Michelle Darunday54 identified accused-appellant as the suspect brought
before them at the Bacolod police station and the Pontevedra police station, respectively.
The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based
upon observations of the suspect other than the line-up identification.55 As held in United States v. Wade:56
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471,
488, 9 L ed 2d 441, 455, 83 S Ct 407, "'[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)." See also Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87 S
Ct 408. Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to
observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify
the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the test as laid down in that case.
1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailant's face was covered with cloth when he entered the room and that she was blindfolded when
she was raped.57 She could thus only see the assailant's eyes, which Michelle described as chinito (chinky),58 although she testified that she
could also identify his voice.59 Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she immediately recognized accused-
appellant as the assailant when she saw him at the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated:
PROS. CARDINAL:
Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any development of your case?
WITNESS:
That was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a suspect in the City Hall of Pontevedra.
PROS. CARDINAL:
Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra?
WITNESS:
My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators.
....
PROS. CARDINAL:
649
Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened?
WITNESS:
We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I was there in the room of the police sitting.
....
PROS. CARDINAL:
So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?
WITNESS:
I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then later the suspect arrived.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can you tell us what was the reaction of the suspect?
WITNESS:
When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me because I was behind the desk after the door, and then he
was so fresh saying that he was a good man, but when he saw me he blushed and moving his head asking, "Ano ang sala ko
sa imo? (What did I do to you?), I did not do anything." But when I looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure that he
was the man.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do anything, what was [your] reaction?
WITNESS:
I just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done anything, but the policeman said that his case is rape. Then,
he was asked to take off his t-shirt and I just looked at him and then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man for
investigation and while the policeman was recording, that suspect approached me and told me that, "You do not know
me.", and asked, "Do you know me?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
What was your reaction?
WITNESS:
I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, "You think you cannot be identified because you covered yourself?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
And then what did he answer?
WITNESS:
He just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our home.60
A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of accused-appellant by Michelle Darunday, has been held to be an
underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generat[ing] confidence where there was none, activat[ing] visual
imagination, and, all told, subvert[ing] their reliability as [an eyewitness]." 61 In these cases, Michelle knew that she was going to identify a
suspect when she went to Pontevedra. Upon seeing accused-appellant escorted by Tancinco and his colleagues in the Bacolod police, she
knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to identify. When accused-appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as to
what was expected of her. Further aggravating the situation were the reply of the policeman to accused-appellant's protestations of innocence
650
that he was being held for rape and Michelle's aunt's obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelle's immediate conclusion, therefore, that
accused-appellant was her attacker was understandable. As has been explained:
Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also increase the danger of suggestibility in a lineup
confrontation. Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a
lineup, the police have evidenced their belief that they have caught the criminal; witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish if
they cannot identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty. Moreover, the need to reduce
psychological discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around them. This desire to conform produces an increased need to
identify someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses
particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime. . . 62
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the apparent suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility
concerning the identity of accused-appellant. The possibility that her identification of accused-appellant was merely planted in her mind both
by the circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant determination to seek justice cannot be disregarded by this Court.
Michelle's identification of accused-appellant is further rendered dubious by the disparity between her description of her attacker and the
appearance of accused-appellant. In her affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, Michelle described her attacker as follows:
P - Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado nakita mo bala ang iya hitsura? (At the time that you were abused
by the suspect, did you see what he looked like?)
S - Wala, kay tungod nga may tabon ang akon mata, apang matandaan ko guid ang iya tingog, mata, ang iya malaka nga biguti,
ang structure sang iya lawas, ang supat sang iya kamot, ang iya bibig, ang madamo nga "kelloid" sa iya lawas kag ang iya baho. (No,
because I was blindfolded but I can remember his voice, his eyes, his thin mustache, his body structure, the smoothness of his hands,
his mouth, and the numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.)63
Michelle's affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her assailant when the latter was raping her. But, when she
testified in court, Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids on accused-appellant although she said that his skin was rough.64 This is
corroborated by the testimony of PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on the back of accused-appellant when he
tried to look for it.65 In fact, it would appear that accused-appellant had no such markings on his back but had only small patches which could
not even be readily seen.66
In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellant's appearance and Michelle's description of her attacker, the trial court dwelt on the
apparent roughness of accused-appellant's skin and the probability that Michelle might have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her
assailant.67 However, mere speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt required by law to be
established by the prosecution.68 Michelle Darunday was a civil engineer in the City Engineer's Office in Bacolod City. Considering her
educational attainment and professional status, it is improbable that she was mistaken as to what she felt on her attacker's back at the time
she was raped. A mere protrusion on the back of the neck of the assailant could not possibly have been mistaken for keloids.
Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of Michelle's identification is her lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant at the
Pontevedra police headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino,69 Ricardo Villaspen,70 and Nestor Dojillo71 testified that Michelle
failed to see any identifying marks on accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in pinpointing the latter as the culprit. With Gemarino
being a policeman, Villaspen a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay captain, these witnesses were all, in one form or another, connected
with law enforcement. The prosecution having failed to ascribe any ill motive on the part of these defense witnesses, who are without doubt
respectable members of the community, their testimonies that Michelle showed no reaction in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up in
Pontevedra police station deserve greater credence than the testimony of Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant was
her attacker. The defense evidence established that Tancinco was an abusive policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-appellant's
guilt and who had no compunction in doing whatever means necessary, legal or illegal, to ensure his conviction. We note further that the
testimonies of these defense witnesses coincide with Michelle's testimony that she kept quiet when she saw accused-appellant at the
Pontevedra police station on January 3, 1997. This being so, her reaction to the show-up at the Pontevedra police station upon seeing accused-
appellant, the man who supposedly raped her twice in an ignominious manner, is contrary to human nature.72 It may be that she was filled
with rage so that upon seeing accused-appellant she was unable to show any emotion. But it is equally possible that, as defense witnesses
Gemarino, Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not immediately recognize accused-appellant as her attacker and only pointed to him as
her assailant upon promptings by the police and her companions. "[W]here the circumstances shown to exist yield two (2) or more inferences,
one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence, while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court
must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction."73
For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and in-court identification of Michelle Darunday to be insufficient to establish
accused-appellant as the person who robbed and raped her and her companions on the night of December 27, 1996.
651
2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when he was raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-
appellant in open court as the person whom she saw that night.74 Certain circumstances in these cases lead us to believe, however, that Erma
Blanca did not really see the assailant and that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are:
First, the police blotter, dated December 28, 1996,75 prepared by PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, referred to an "unknown suspect" who allegedly
entered the boarding house of Pacita Aguillon and robbed Ma. Teresa Gellaver and Michelle Darunday. This casts doubt on Erma's credibility
because she testified that she had known accused-appellant for a long time prior to December 27, 1996. During her testimony, Erma claimed
that accused-appellant approached her and Michelle sometime in September or October 1996 to ask for the name of the latter. In addition,
Erma said she had seen accused-appellant whenever he passed by their boarding house or stayed in her Tiyo Anong's store nearby.76 It would
thus seem that Erma was familiar with accused-appellant. But, if she had actually seen him on that night of the robbery, why did she not report
this to the police immediately? Being a victim herself, Erma had every motive to reveal the identity of the robber that same night the crime
was committed. But she did not do so. We are therefore left with the conclusion that the police blotter referred to an unknown suspect
because the identity of the assailant had not been determined at the time the crime was reported to the police.
Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the Bacolod police when the latter sought accused-appellant in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. PO3 Tancinco testified that he took Michelle Darunday along with his other companions when they went to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental so that she could identify if the suspect was the person who had raped her. But Michelle admitted that she did not see the face of
the assailant. Erma Blanca, who claimed she recognized accused-appellant, was not taken along by the police to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. Why not? Why did they bring instead Michelle Darunday?
Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca77 was prepared on January 4, 1997, a day after the arrest of accused-appellant. This delay belies Erma's
claim that she saw the assailant through her blindfold on the night of the incident. For the normal reaction of one who actually witnessed a
crime and recognized the offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity.78 In these cases, the crime took place on
December 27, 1996, but Erma Blanca executed her affidavit only on January 4, 1997, more than a week after the occurrence of the crime.
Delay in reporting the crime or identifying the perpetrator thereof will not affect the credibility of the witness if it is sufficiently explained.79But
here, no explanation was given by the prosecution why Erma Blanca executed her affidavit one week after the crime took place and one day
after accused-appellant's arrest. The most likely explanation for such lapse is that Erma Blanca was used merely to corroborate what would
otherwise have been a weak claim on the part of Michelle Darunday. The same may be said of the testimonies of Jason Joniega and Mark
Esmeralda.
B. Accused-appellant's testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 27, 1996 is
corroborated by Aaron Lavilla,80 Elias Sombito,81 and Nestor Dojillo.82 Considering the improbabilities and uncertainties surrounding the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of alibi by accused-appellant deserves credence.83
To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. The
acquittal of accused-appellant is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-appellant guilty of robbery with rape and
sentencing him to death, is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is
ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention.1âwphi1.nêt
The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to the Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
652
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 141162-63 July 11, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ, LARRY PERIDAS and GERRY VENTURINA (at large), accused.
ERLINDA DELA CRUZ and LARRY PERIDAS, accused-appellants.
Before us is an appeal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, finding accused-appellant Larry Peridas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Case No. 828-M-98, and finding both accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry
Peridas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, in
Criminal Case No. 829-M-98.
Accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas, together with Gerry Venturina, were charged in the following informations:
Criminal Case No. 828-M-98
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused armed with bladed instrument and with intent to kill one Ysmael
Mananquil, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with the bladed instrument the said
Ysmael Mananquil y Aguilar, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to Law.1
Criminal Case No. 829-M-98
That on or about the 15th day of January, 1998, in the municipality of Pulilan, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take
steal, and carry away with them one (1) taxi car "KIA" bearing Plate No. PVS 468, belonging to one Alvin G. Sanchez, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner.
Contrary to Law.2
The two cases were consolidated. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty. Accused Gerry Venturina, on the
other hand, remained at large. After joint trial, judgment was rendered against accused-appellants, the dispositive portion3 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,
1. In Crim. Case No. 828-M-98
accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, while accused Larry Peridas is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the bereaved family of
victim Ysmael Mananquil the amount of P60,000.00 as compensatory damages and P75,000.00 as indemnity for the victim’s death.
2. In Crim. Case No. 829-M-98
accused Erlinda dela Cruz y Sanchez and Larry Peridas are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act
6539 otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua will all its accessory penalties.
The instant cases as against accused Gerry Venturina are hereby ordered sent to the files of ARCHIVED cases pending the arrest of
said accused. Accordingly, let a warrant of arrest be issued for his immediate apprehension to stand trial before this Court.
With costs.
653
SO ORDERED.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 15, 1998, at about 2:30 in the morning, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz and Larry Peridas went to the house of Meliton
Estrella in Poblacion, Plaridel, Bulacan on board a KIA Pride taxicab, which Dela Cruz drove. When they arrived at Estrella’s house, Dela Cruz
went inside to invite him to go with them, while Peridas stayed in the taxicab. When Estrella went out, he saw a man lying on the floor of the
taxicab whose head was being pinned down by Peridas’ foot. Afraid of being implicated, Estrella refused to go saying, "Ilayo ninyo ‘yan at baka
pati ako ay madamay."4 Accused-appellants left and proceeded to the house of accused Gerry Venturina in Baliuag, Bulacan. There they
stripped the taxicab of all its accessories.5
Later that day, at about 7:00 a.m., Peridas returned to Estrella’s house. Peridas told Estrella that he had killed the man and Venturina threw
away the body in Pulilan.6 Since his clothes were covered with bloodstains, he borrowed clothes from Estrella and asked him to burn his sando
and t-shirt. Estrella did not burn the bloodied clothes. Instead, he turned them over later to the National Bureau of Investigation Office in
Pulilan.
Peridas left to fetch the son of Dela Cruz. He returned to Estrella’s house at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. There, he waited for Dela Cruz, who
arrived at past twelve noon driving the same taxicab Estrella earlier saw. The license plate of the vehicle had been replaced from one bearing
the number: PVS 468 to one with the number: TAU 667.
Accused-appellants, together with Estrella and Dela Cruz’s son, boarded the taxicab and drove to Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Along the way, they
were flagged down at a checkpoint set up by the Traffic Command. Dela Cuz was unable to show her license and the vehicle’s registration, but
the police officers let them through after she told them that she is the wife of Gerry Venturina.
They stopped by Laur, Nueva Ecija to borrow money from a friend of Dela Cruz, after which they proceeded to Peridas’ house in Guimba. That
same night, Dela Cruz drove back to Plaridel. Before she left, Estrella tried to borrow money from Dela Cruz for his fare back to Plaridel but she
turned him down. So, Estrella had to stay in Guimba for three days until he was able to borrow money from Peridas on the pretext that he was
going to fetch Dela Cruz.
When Estrella arrived in Plaridel, he informed his elder sister about the incident. Together, they reported the matter to Capt. Ileto and SPO4
Ireneo Mauricio, then to NBI-Pulilan, where he turned over the sando and t-shirt which Peridas asked him to burn. The investigation led to the
recovery of the corpse of Ysmael Mananquil in Pulilan, Bulacan as well as the taxicab used by accused-appellants, which was found five meters
away from the residence of Dela Cruz. Eventually, accused-appellants Dela Cruz and Peridas were arrested.
In her defense, accused-appellants Erlinda Dela Cruz alleged that at 2:00 a.m. of January 15, 1998, she was asleep in her house in Ma. Lourdes
Subdivision, Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, together with her siblings, children and accused-appellant Larry Peridas. On January 16, 1998, she
stayed home to do her chores. On January 18, 1998, she stayed home in the morning and, in the evening, went to the Monte Carlo Videoke in
Baliuag where she worked. She claimed that during all this time, she never saw Meliton Estrella. 7
Accused-appellant Larry Peridas likewise testified that he was sleeping in the house of Dela Cruz on January 15, 1998, when the alleged crimes
took place. He stayed there for a few days and helped in the housework.8
One Reynaldo Trinidad corroborated accused-appellants’ testimonies that they were in Dela Cruz’s house on the date and time of the alleged
commission of the crimes.9
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment against accused-appellants. Hence, this appeal, which raises the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SO-CALLED INVESTIGATION OF THESE TWO CASES HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY MADE AND WRONGLY
EXECUTED.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDING JUDGE RELIED HEAVILY ON WITNESS MELITON ESTRELLA’S PERJURED TESTIMONY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE CASES.
IV
654
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENSE EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN GLOSSED OVER AND GIVEN SCANT CONSIDERATION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In their joint brief, accused-appellants allege that the following irregularities attended the investigation of the case, to wit: (1) that nothing was
done by the authorities from the time Capt. de Armas of Plaridel called that a cadaver was retrieved from Barangay Agnaya until January 22,
1998, when Inspector Ileto received information about a carnapping and murder incident; (2) that Meliton Estrella actually gave himself up for
his implication in the murder and carnapping; (3) that Inspector Ileto and SPO4 Mauricio did not conduct an investigation but merely relied on
the NBI report which was a complete falsehood; (4) that the subject taxicab, which was parked adjacent to the PNP Crime Laboratory, was not
subjected to physical and forensic investigation; (5) that the NBI and PNP committed shortcuts in pursuing the investigation; (6) that NBI Agent
Serafin Gil is not a lawyer and violated their rights under the Miranda doctrine; and (7) that Inspector Ileto is a graduate of Bulacan National
Agricultural School with no background in criminal investigation and intelligence.
The above arguments involve factual issues, the resolution of which require our re-evaluation of the trial court’s findings of facts. To do so,
however, will be an unnecessary deviation from the jurisprudential rule that conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
generally not disturbed by appellate courts. Trial courts are in a better position to decide the issues, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.10 The exception to this rule is where there is proof of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence that might have been overlooked, or its significance misinterpreted, by the trial court which, if properly
considered, could affect the result of the case.
After a meticulous review of the records, we find no compelling reason to depart from such rule.
The evidence on record show that, contrary to accused-appellants’ assertion, it was only on January 22, 1998 that SPO4 Ireneo Mauricio, Capt.
Ileto11 and NBI Agent Serafin Gil12 first came to know, through Meliton Estrella, about the carnapping of the taxicab, the killing of the driver
thereof and the subsequent dumping of the body somewhere in Pulilan. Acting on the information given by Estrella, they were able to recover
the subject vehicle at Dela Cruz’s house in Agnaya, Plaridel, Bulacan, and asked the family of Ysmael Mananquil to identify his decomposing
corpse.
Anent the claim that Dela Cruz was arrested without warrant, forced to sign a document, and detained for more or less 3 to 4 weeks,13 there is
no showing that she objected to the manner of her arrest and detention before she entered her plea and participated in the trial. Pertinent
hereto is our ruling in People v. Lopez,14 to wit:
[I]t is too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case
was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus
estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error.
Coming now to the sufficiency of proof of their guilt, accused-appellants contend that the testimony of Meliton Estrella was perjured; that the
evidence against them consisted of circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient to establish their guilt; and that the trial court merely
glossed over and gave scant consideration to the evidence they presented.
The contentions lack merit. We agree with the trial court’s findings that the testimony of prosecution witness Meliton Estrella was clear,
straightforward and devoid of any signs of artificiality. Moreover, no improper motive was imputed on Estrella who positively identified both
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the offense.15
Accused-appellants next assail the trial court’s reliance on circumstantial evidence. We have long held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction in criminal cases where there is more than one circumstance derived from the facts duly given and the combination of all is such
as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test for accepting circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is: the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with
the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.16
In the case at bar, the trial court based its judgment of conviction on the following established facts: that Dela Cruz and Peridas arrived in
Plaridel at 2:30 in the morning of January 15, 1998 on board a taxicab; that the accessories of the taxicab were removed and its license plate
was replaced; that accused-appellants were unable to produce the registration papers of the vehicle; that the subject vehicle was identified as
the one driven by Ysmael Mananquil before its loss on January 15, 1998; and that the missing taxicab was recovered by the police from Dela
Cruz.17
We find that the foregoing facts constitute an unbroken chain of events that undeniably point to the culpability of accused-appellants for
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The testimony of Meliton Estrella was corroborated by the testimony of SPO4 Mauricio, NBI Agent Serafin
Gil and Capt. Ileto. The testimony of the police officers carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
655
functions.18 Moreover, accused-appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act."19
The trial court convicted accused-appellant Larry Peridas only of homicide based on its finding of guilt due to Peridas’ admission to Meliton
Estrella that he had disposed of (tinapos) Manaquil, whose body was dumped in Pulilan, Bulacan, where it was later found by the police. Prior
to that, Estrella saw Peridas stepping on the head of Manaquil on the floor of the carnapped vehicle. In other words, it was Peridas who was
with the victim when the latter was last seen alive by Estrella.20 However, the allegations of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery as qualifying circumstances were not sufficiently established, thus the crime committed was only homicide.21
In Aballe v. People,22 we held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence
against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance
of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its
substance.
In the recent case of People v. Zuela,23 we ruled that an admission made to a private person is admissible in evidence against the declarant
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which states that the "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him."
In their defense, accused-appellants can only raise alibi and bare denial. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time. Furthermore, alibi
cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of accused-appellants. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi.
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.24
The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellants separately on the charges of carnapping and homicide, rather than qualified
carnapping or aggravated form of carnapping,25 as defined in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 7659, which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants were charged separately with the crimes of carnapping and murder. We cannot convict them of the
crime of qualified carnapping, which consists of the two crimes alleged in the two separate information, without impairing their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.26
However, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of carnapping, considering that the Information
neither alleged that the victim was killed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on occasion thereof, 27 or that the carnapping
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person. The crime alleged being only carnapping under the first clause of
R.A. 6539, Section 14, as amended, the proper penalty to be imposed must not be less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not
more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law28, if the offense is punished by a special law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same. Thus, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on
each of the accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months, as maximum.
On the other hand, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, the range of which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no modifying circumstance, we hereby sentence accused-appellant Larry
Peridas to a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum29
Finally, we reduce the award of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) ordered by the trial court as indemnity for the victim’s death to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), consistent with current jurisprudence.30
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 828-M-98,
finding accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition, said accused-appellant LARRY PERIDAS is ordered
to pay death indemnity to the heirs of Ysmael Mananquil in the amount of P50,000.00.
656
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 829-M-98, finding accused-appellants LARRY
PERIDAS and ERLINDA DELA CRUZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that said accused-appellants are sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
657
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 143704 March 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ALEX MANALLO, appellant.
CALLEJO, J.:
Spouses Romeo Nabor and Liliosa Napay and their nine-year old1 daughter Rosaldiza Nabor tenanted and lived in a coconut plantation located
in Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay. Rosaldiza helped in the household chores by washing the family's dirty laundry every Saturday at the
barangay reservoir. The route to the reservoir was uninhabited. Going there was quite a long trek. It usually took Rosaldiza fifteen minutes to
negotiate the grassy path from the reservoir to their house.
In 1989, Romeo engaged the services of Alex Manallo, as coconut gatherer.2 Alex helped the Nabor couple gather coconut produce once a
week.3 He was paid P150.0 per day for his services.
In the early morning of March 30, 1992, Liliosa left their house for the market. Rosaldiza went to the reservoir to wash her clothes bringing
with her a pail and a basin. She wore a t-shirt and a pair of short pants. After washing her clothes, Rosaldiza took a quick bath.4 At around
11:00 a.m. Rosaldiza , who was drenched all over, left the reservoir and trekked the same route in going home. On her way, Alex suddenly
appeared from the bushes and grabbed Rosaldiza from behind. Alex was completely naked. He covered her mouth and poked a knife on her
neck. Rosaldiza dropped the basin and the pail she was carrying and fought with Alex to extricate herself from his clutches. However, he was
too strong for her. Alex dragged her to a grassy portion, pulled her down and pinned her to the ground. 5 She cried and shouted for help, at the
same time, resisting Alex's advances. However, when Alex boxed Rosaldiza on her thighs and on her abdomen, she lost consciousness. When
she regained consciousness, Rosaldiza noticed that she was completely naked. She felt weak and tired. Her private parts and body ached all
over. She noticed semen in her vagina.6 Fearing for her life and completely devastated, she cried bitterly. Alex dressed up and warned her not
to tell her parents, brothers and sisters of the incident, otherwise, he would kill them all. Rosaldiza put on her clothes and ran home. By then,
Liliosa was already in the house. Rosaldiza related to her mother what had happened to her.7 Stunned by the revelation of her daughter, Liliosa
accompanied Rosaldiza to the house of the barangay captain, but the latter was out of the house. The distraught Liliosa and Rosaldiza
proceeded to the house of barangay kagawad Elesio Obal to whom they related that Alex had raped Rosaldiza. Liliosa, Rosaldiza and Elesio
boarded a tricycle and went to the Camilig Police Station8 where Liliosa and Rosaldiza had the incident reported in the police blotter.9 The trio
then proceeded to the Rural Health Unit of Camilig where Dr. Ma. Crispa Loria-Florece, the Municipal Health Officer, conducted a physical,
including pelvic and smear examination of Rosaldiza. Dr. Loria-Florece signed and issued a medico-legal certificate10 which reads:
*Physical findings:
- CONTUSSION – right cheek
- HEMATOMA – Distal 3rd, anterior aspect right thigh
I E findings:
- Hymen with fresh bleeding, lacerations at 3:00 o'clock, 5:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock, 8:00 o'clock positions.
- Cervix smooth, small and firm
- Adnexa (-)
- W/bloody & whitish stick mucous per examining
Finger
*Spec. exam: - cervix – pinkish w/whitish secretion at post fornix.
*Vaginal smear – With motile sperm cells.
According to Dr. Loria-Florece, the contusion and hematoma sustained by the victim in the right cheek and right thigh could have been caused
by fist blow or slapping of the victim. The fresh bleeding and multiple lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by sexual intercourse
or the entry of a hard object. Rosaldiza was still a virgin when the doctor examined her but lost her virginity about an hour from her
examination on the victim, since fresh hymenal bleeding usually stops in about one or two hours from laceration.
658
Rosaldiza and Liliosa went back to the police station and executed their respective sworn statements.
On April 27, 1992, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, charging Alex with rape, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on the 30th day of March 1992, at more or less 11:00 o'clock A.M. at Barangay Salugan, Camilig, Albay, the accused with lewd
design, armed with a knife, by means of violence and intimidation, poked the victim Rosaldiza Nabor Y Nebres with said knife and
when the victim resisted, slapped her rendering her unconscious, and while in that stae (sic) accused have carnal knowledge with
Rosaldiza N. Nabor, to the latter's damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
No bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of Alex. He filed, on May 8, 1992, a motion for bail with no specific date and time for the
hearing thereof.12 Upon the filing of said motion, the Executive Judge issued an order granting the motion and fixing his bail bond at
P50,000.00.13 On the same day, Alex posted a property bond which was immediately approved by the court.14 Alex was forthwith released
from detention.
At his arraignment on June 17, 1992, Alex, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. Trial was set on June 18, 1992.15 The
prosecution prayed the trial court to cancel the bond of Alex considering that his petition for bail was granted without due hearing. However,
the trial court held in abeyance resolution of the motion until after the prosecutor shall have presented its witnesses on June 18, 1992. The
trial court stated that the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution would be its evidence in Alex's petition for bail and trial on the merits.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court issued an order that Alex would remain free on his bond until June 22, 1992, the date set for the hearing on
his petition for bail. However, Alex failed to attend the trial on said date. The trial court issued and order for his arrest. However, Alex could no
longer be found at his address. It was only six years thereafter, or on January 22, 1998, that he was arrested.16
When Alex testified, he denied having sexually assaulted Rosaldiza on March 30, 1992. He claimed that they had been lovers engaging in
sexual intimacies for over a year even before March 30, 1992. He said that whenever they had sexual intercourse, he gave her P100.00 to
P150.00. He claimed that he came to know Rosaldiza in 1989 when he started working for the Nabors, and from that day on, they hit it off. He
was then 26 years old and Rosaldiza barely in her teens. He testified that Rosaldiza gave him special attention by personally serving him lunch
every time he gathered coconuts and she flirted with him. He, in turn, used to tease her by asking her to become his second wife. Every time
he needed a smoke, Rosaldiza bought cigarettes for him and always kept the change. He used to give Rosaldiza pocket money for her
schooling. Their relationship blossomed and in 1991 they started having sexual intercourse. Alex claimed that every time he gathered coconuts
in the landholding of the Nabors, he and Rosaldiza invariably had sexual intercourse either at Honrado's nipa hut or in the grassy wilderness.
Alex recalled that on March 27, 1992, at around 7:00 a.m., he left his house and played basketball at the nearby basketball court. After an
hour, he got thirsty and proceeded to the house of Laura. Thereat, Laura handed him water. While drinking water, Rosaldiza called him and
asked for P300.00 for a new pair of shoes. He told Rosaldiza that he would give the P300.00 at their usual tryst after his routine rounds of his
coconut plantation. Rosaldiza agreed. She then told Alex that she would first drop by her house to get some laundry clothes so that her
parents may not get suspicious. The two met at the agreed place. She demanded that Alex give her the P300.00 but Alex refused. He insisted
that they have sexual intercourse first. Rosaldiza agreed. However, after their sexual act, Alex still refused to give her P300.00, Rosaldiza got
furious. She warned Alex that she would tell her mother about their relationship. Alex pacified Rosaldiza by promising to give her the money
on Monday. He again sweet-talked Rosaldiza by assuring her that in case she got pregnant, he would leave his wife and they would settle in
Manila. After appeasing Rosaldiza, they respectively went home. When he arrived home, he ate his lunch and subsequently went to sleep. At
about 1:00 p.m. his wife woke him up and told him that four policemen were looking for him. He asked the policemen of their purpose and he
was told that a complaint for rape had been filed against him. He went with the policemen to the police station where he was placed under
arrest. He also told the court that when his wife Teresita visited him on that day, he admitted to her his relationship with Rosaldiza. He said
that after hearing his confession, his wife Teresita cried and got angry.17
Teresita Manallo testified that when she visited her husband, Alex, in his cell after his arrest, he confided to her that he had already admitted
the charge. She likewise testified that Alex had instructed her to talk to Liliosa and ask her forgiveness and if possible to settle the matter with
the Nabors. She claimed that on her way out of the municipal jail she chanced upon the Nabors and relayed to them the instructions of Alex.
However, the Nabors rejected the offer of settlement. Liliosa was resolute in filing a case against Alex.
On April 25, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision18 finding Alex guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Alex Manallo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by
using force and intimidation as defined and penalized under Art. 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to pay complainant P75,000.00 as indemnity , P50,000.00 as moral
damages and the costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Aggrieved by the decision, Alex appealed to this Court contending that:
659
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE BUT RATHER ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE"20
Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently weak. He argues that the decision of the trial court dwelt
mainly on the rationalization discrediting the evidence for the defense and that not much was said why it gave credence to the testimony of
the private complainant. He claims that even assuming that his testimony is unbelievable, as the trial court put it, that alone could not sustain
a verdict of conviction. He asserts that the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence and not relieved of the onus of proving
guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the weakness of the defense. 21
The contention of appellant does not persuade.
Even a cursory reading of the decision of the trial court will readily show that it convicted appellant of the crime charged in light of the
testimony of Rosaldiza and Dr. Loria-Florece and the physical evidence adduced by the prosecution:
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence adduced, the court finds that the accused did rape the complainant Rosaldiza Nabor on
March 30, 1992. The court finds the testimony of complainant Rosaldiza Nabor credible, natural, convincing and otherwise
consistent with human nature and the ordinary course of things. The conduct of Rosaldiza Nabor and the subsequent events that
transpired immediately after the alleged sexual assault credibly established the truth of her charge.
After the accused left her, she came home running and shouting for help because she was raped. Upon arrival at her house she
spontaneously told her mother, she was raped by the accused. They immediately reported to the barangay authorities, then to the
police.
The findings of Dr. Florece clearly supports complainant's story. She examined the complainant at 12:15 p.m. of March 30, 1992,
which was about one hour after the rape. The external physical examination showed a contusion on her right cheek and a hematoma
on her right thigh near the knee. These injuries is compatible with the complainant's testimony that she was slapped in her face and
boxed in her thigh by the accused as a result of which she lost consciousness.
The internal examination showed fresh bleeding hymenal lacerations at 3:00, 5:00, 6:00 and 8:00 o'clock positions, meaning these
lacerations were sustained about one or two hours before the examination because hymenal laceration stops bleeding after one or
two hours says Dr. Florece. There were lacerations because complainant was still a virgin according to Dr. Florece. The motile sperm
cells were moving and alive as found by Dr. Florece. These circumstances clearly show that the rape was committed on March 30,
1992 and that there was no such sexual intercourse on March 27, 2003. These lacerations also indicate that the penis was forcibly
inserted into the vagina. (People vs. Peñero, 276 SCRA 564)
Dr. Florece, found a contusion on the right cheek of complainant, a reddish coloration of the skin, slightly elevated or inflamed, a
hematoma on the right thigh near the knee, there was accumulation of clotted blood. The contusion on the right cheek and the
hematoma on the right thigh could have been caused by a fistic blow or by slapping. The hymenal fresh bleeding lacerations could
have been caused by a penis in a sexual intercourse about an hour and a half before her examination because hymenal laceration
stops in one to two hours. There were lacerations because the complainant was a virgin. The motile sperm cells found in the cervix
were alive indicating a recent sexual intercourse. All the foregoing facts and circumstances clearly and indubitably prove that
complainant Rosaldiza Nabor was raped by the accused Alex Manallo on March 30, 1992 at about 11:00 a.m.22
The trial court considered appellant's flight from the scene of the crime, his having jumped bail and for eluding arrest for six long years as
evidence of his guilt for the crime charged:
. …Besides, the flight of the accused in jumping bail and going into hiding for (6) years is evidence of his guilt. He would not have fled
if his story is true. The court noted that during the years that the accused was in hiding, the complainant was relentless in her efforts
to locate the accused so that he may be arrested. Complainant's demeanor in court showed insincerity. 23
Rosaldiza described how appellant waylaid her, forcibly dragged her to the grassy area, pinned her to the ground and when she resisted, he hit
her with his fist, rendering her unconscious and when she regained consciousness, she discovered that she had been deflowered by the
appellant, thus:
PROS. DE MESA:
Q Ms. Witness, are you the same Rosaldiza Nabon, the private complainant in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you on March 30, 1992 particularly in the morning of 11:00 o'clock more or less?
660
A I was on my way home coming from the water reservoir of our place where I washed our clothes, when suddenly a man who
came from nowhere poked a knife on me.
Q You said there suddenly appeared someone from nowhere who poked a knife on you, who is this somebody that you
mentioned?
A Alex Manallo, sir.
Q Is this Manallo that you mentioned is the same Alex Manallo, the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q This Alex Manallo that you mentioned who according to you is the same Alex Manallo who is the accused in this case, is he
present in this court?
A Yes, sir, he is here.
Q Can you point to him?
A That man, sir (witness pointing to a certain person inside the court room who upon being asked of his name, stood up and
identified himself as Alex Manallo).
Q Now, after the accused Manallo the accused in this case poked a knife on you, what happened next?
A When this Alex Manallo poked a knife from behind me I looked back and considering that I was then carrying a basin on my
right hand and a paile (sic) on my left hand I tried to free myself from his hold, however he was so strong that I could not free myself.
Q While you were striving yourself to be free from the hold of the accused what happened to the basin with the laundry clothes
and the pail, what happened
A It fell down.
Q And then what did you do?
A He told me that I should carry again the basin and the pail which was then I was carrying, after that he dragged me into the
grassy portion.
Q Did you carry the basin and the pail?
A Yes, because I was afraid.
Q And while carrying the basin and the pail you were being dragged?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what happened after you were dragged into the grassy portion, what happened next?
A The accused pushed me and delivered fistic blows to my thigh and then I became weak.
Q Now, after you were slapped and boxed by the accused which caused you to fall down and become weak, what happened
next?
A He delivered fistic blows on the stomach and at that time I became unconscious.
Q And did you ever regain your consciousness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that what happened next?
661
A He was still near my head.
Q What was he doing?
A He was dressing himself.
Q And what happened to you, what did you notice, if any?
A I was already naked.
Q And what did you do after you found yourself already naked?
A I just cried because I was very afraid because he might kill me.
Q And what did the accused do after you have regain your consciousness?
A He told me that I should not report the incident to my parents including my brothers and sisters. He said, "I am going to kill
you all because I have a 45.
Q And then, after he said that what did you do next?
A I dressed up myself.
Q And....?
A I proceeded home and he was left behind somewhere.
Q And then where did you go?
A To my house.
Q And you were walking or running?
A I was running.
Q When you reached home what did you do?
A I shouted for help to my mother, "Mama tabangan mo ako ta pigrape na ako", or if translated in english, "Mother help me
because I was raped." 24
Despite the threats of appellant to kill her and her family, Rosaldiza spontaneously reported to her mother the bestial assault on her by
appellant. As disclosed by the records, Rosaldiza constantly cried during her testimony. Her tears add poignancy and credibility to the rape
charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.25
On review, the Court find that the testimony of Rosaldiza bears the hallmarks of truth. It is consistent on material points. The rule is that when
a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions
in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit. It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the credibility of a rape
victim is augmented when she has no motive to testify against the appellant or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely
suggest that she could have been actuated by such motive.26
Rosaldiza's testimony is buttressed by the medico-legal findings of Dr. Florece. The fresh lacerations in Rosaldiza's hymen are the telling and
irrefutable, the best physical evidence of her defloration. The presence of motile sperm cells in the victim's violated organ affirms her charge
more than words and anger alone could prove.27 Her contusion on the right cheek and hematoma on the right thigh are ample proof of
struggle and resistance against rape. These physical evidence showing the use of brutal force on the victim when she was sexually assaulted
certainly speaks louder than words.28 In countless cases, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly inconceivable for a young
barrio lass, inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts,
subject herself to public trial and tarnish her family's honor and reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the
wrong committed against her.29
The trial court is correct in discounting the sweetheart defense of appellant. He failed to establish the existence of such relationship. Rosaldiza
specifically denied that appellant was ever her sweetheart. In People vs. Apostol,30 this court said that sweetheart defense is a much-abused
662
defense that rashly derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience. Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love
affair must be supported by convincing proof.31 He failed to discharge this burden. Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his wife,
there was no support to his claim that he and complainant were lovers. His sweetheart defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or tokens32 that such romantic relationship really existed. Even if we assumed, for the
nonce, that appellant and Rosaldiza were indeed lovers, this fact would not have precluded rape, as it did not necessarily mean there was
consent. A love affair would not have justified what appellant did – subjecting Rosaldiza to his carnal desires against her will. 33 No young
filipina of decent refute would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle still
holds true. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love.
Love is not a license for lust.34
The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, young ladies by custom and tradition act with
circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation remains untainted. 35 Even assuming arguendo that
the offended party was a girl of loose morals, as claimed by appellant, it is settled that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and
conviction for rape for even prostitutes can be rape victims36.
The case for the prosecution was even fortified by no less than the evidence of the appellant. His wife Teresita testified that he instructed her
to plead for Rosaldiza's forgiveness and for the settlement of the case, and in obedience to said instruction, Teresita did relay Alex's plea for
forgiveness and for an amicable settlement to Liliosa, the mother of the victim but that Liliosa turned down appellant's plea:
ATTY. MUÑOS :
Q And so when your mother-in-law came back from the municipal jail telling you that you'll be the one to go there because she
cannot stand her son being beaten by the policeman, what did you do?
A I went to the municipal jail of Camalig, sir.
Q And what was the time that you went to the municipal jail of Camalig?
A About 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when you arrived at the place, who were those person you saw in the municipal hall, if any?
A I proceeded first to Alex Manallo at the municipal jail of Camalig, sir.
Q And did you ask Alex Manallo anything why he was arrested?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did he tell you?
A Alex Manallo informed me that he already admitted the act, and instructed me to ask forgiveness from the mother for me, or
if not to settle the matter, sir.
Q Is that all you asked of him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask him something more?
A No more, sir. I already went out of the jail.
COURT to witness:
Wait.
Q When you said he admitted doing the act, to whom?
A He did not name, sir.
Q All right, when your husband told you that you ask forgiveness from the mother for me, who is that mother, who is that
person referred to as the mother that you are supposed to ask forgiveness for your husband?
663
A The mother of the complainant, sir.
Q And who is the complainant?
A Rosaldiza Nabor, sir. 37
In a case of similar factual backdrop, the Court considered a plea for forgiveness and for a settlement of the case as an implied admission of
guilt:
Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was dissolved by the overtures of his
parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were
testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Finally, despite the
unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives,
who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise," the accused dared not assign that finding
and conclusion as an error and his Appellant's Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the
decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and
ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would
ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel resentment
against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution upon (an offender). In People vs. Calimquim,
we stated:
The fact that appellant's mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon's father is an indication of guilt. (See People vs.
Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193). 38
This Court agrees with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of rape under Article 335 of Revised Penal Code as amended. The use by the
appellant of a knife to consummate the crime is a special aggravating circumstance which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. However, considering that the prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the award of damages, the trial court has correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages, an award that rests on the jural foundation
that the crime of rape necessarily brings with it shame, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation. 39
The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity should be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with this Court's ruling in People vs. Banela,40 that if the
crime of rape was committed before the effectivity Republic Act No. 765941, the amendatory law restoring death penalty, the civil indemnity to
be awarded to the offended party shall remain to be P50,000.00.
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25.000 should be awarded pursuant to our ruling in People vs. Catubig,42 that the award for
exemplary damages is justified pursuant to Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code. Since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly
weapon was attendant in the commission of the rape, the offended party is entitled to exemplary damages.
The Court cannot write finis to this case without making of record its concern and displeasure at the egregious procedural lapse of the trial
court in granting bail to appellant. It bears stressing that he was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Section 5, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 5. Burden of proof in Bail application. – At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by any person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial,
but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of
the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. (7a)43
The trial court as mandated, in resolving a motion or petition for bail, to do the following:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
664
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise,
the petition should be denied.44
In this case, the appellant filed his motion for bail on May 8, 1992. There was no specific date and time for the hearing of said motion. And yet,
on the same day that the motion was filed, the trial court granted the said motion and fixed the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the
appellant in the amount of P50,000.00 without any factual basis therefore stated in the order. Even when the public prosecutor prayed the
court on June 17, 1992, for the cancellation of the property bond of the appellant on the ground that the trial court granted his motion for bail
without even affording the prosecution a chance to be heard thereon and adduce its evidence in opposition thereto, the trial court held in
abeyance resolution thereof and even allowed the appellant to remain free on his bond in the amount of only P50,000.00. Patently, the
prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. In Go vs. Judge Bongolan, et. al.,45 this Court emphasized that:
A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the
people and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be balanced by a magistrate in the scale of
justice, hence, the necessity for hearing to guide his exercise of jurisdiction.46
The presiding judge of the trial court thus exposed his gross ignorance of the law. As a consequence, the appellant jumped bail and managed
to elude arrest for six years, to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Alex Manallo is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. He is ordered to pay to the victim Rosaldiza Nabor P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
665
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767 March 28, 2003
ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar, respondent.
RESOLUTION
The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose objection to a petition for bail will not dispense with the conduct
of a bail hearing.1 Neither may reliance to a previous order granting bail justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for
bail,2 more so where said order relied upon was issued without hearing and while the accused was at large.3
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against respondent judge stemmed from a murder case filed
against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death of Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on September 3,
1993, Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a preliminary investigation on the said murder
case, and thereafter issued the corresponding warrants of arrest. No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused who were at large since
the commission of the offense on August 29, 1993.
Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then
presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing,
and while the two were at large. Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided
by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion praying that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and that
both accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, accused Celso Docil filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that he be allowed to post bail on the grounds that – (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because he is charged
with murder allegedly committed at the time when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the Constitution; and that (2) both
the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor recommended P60,000.00 bail for his temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion.4 He explained that notwithstanding the suspension of the imposition of the
death penalty at the time the accused committed the offense, bail for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited
Section 13, Article III, of the Constitution which explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law." The respondent Judge added that contrary to the accused’s claim, there is nothing in the records
which show that bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions. Then, he filed a manifestation pointing out that on
page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his co-accused the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution five
(5) days within which to file a comment to the accused’s motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for reconsideration on the basis of a previous order
granting bail to the accused.5 He ratiocinated that on page 49 of the records, there indeed appears a final and executory order dated July 22,
1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to the accused, hence, the inevitable recourse is to grant
bail to accused Celso Docil.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative case against the respondent Judge for granting bail to accused Celso Docil
without conducting a bail hearing.
In his Comment,6 the respondent insisted that he committed no gross ignorance of the law or incompetence. He contended that the
prosecution is estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to accused Celso Docil because it questioned the said order issued by his
predecessor Judge only on February 4, 2000, or after six (6) years from the issuance thereof on July 22, 1994. He added that despite the five-
day period given to the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for reconsideration of the accused, warranting the presumption
that it has no objection to the accused’s petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent Judge be fined in an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.7
666
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings filed.8 On April 24, 2002, the respondent Judge manifested his conformity to the said Resolution. 9 The complainant’s
manifestation, on the other hand, was dispensed with by the Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion.10 Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. 11 It must be stressed
that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt
of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with
the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong.12
In Santos v. Ofilada,13 it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail
does not dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus –
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant
without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would
ascertain the strength of the State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail. Irrespective of respondent judge’s
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge
therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter
was not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail.
Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether
or not to grant bail.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of the prosecution to the order dated July 22,
1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the prosecution’s failure to file a comment to the accused’s motion for
reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible judge, he should have looked into
the real and hard facts of the case before him and ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. 14 To make things worse,
respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears to have been issued by his predecessor Judge
also without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge
should have known the basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.15
In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be
denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution.17 A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement.
Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt
of the accused.18
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecution’s motion praying that the accused be denied
bail, no hearing was conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accused’s guilt, he should have
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of
evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.19
667
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just
a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of
well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law.20
In Dericto v. Bautista,21 the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for granting bail without conducting a bail hearing. We
explained therein that although the Rules of Court authorize the investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority does not
include the outright granting of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in cases where the crime charged is punishable with
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And while it may be true that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused.
In Goodman v. De La Victoria,22 the erring Judge was found guilty of serious misconduct in office and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for
failing to conduct a bail hearing in the manner required by law. It was held that the brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before granting
bail did not constitute the hearing mandated by law, for such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the prosecution to guide respondent in
the proper determination of the petition.
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,23 the Court sustained the recommendation of the OCA to impose the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00
on the erring judge for granting bail without hearing to the accused in a rape case.
In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,24 the Court imposed the penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the investigating Judge for denying bail on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. In said case, the accused was arrested in the municipality presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that the latter
had the authority to grant bail and to order the release of the accused, even if the records of the case had been transmitted for review to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further noted therein that the respondent Judge was previously found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted bail to an accused charged with a capital offense.
In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on the Judges found to be grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting
or denying bail, to wit:
(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,25 where the respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114, Section 17(b), of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, granted bail to the accused in a criminal case which was then pending with another branch involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death;
(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,26 where the erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation
granted bail to the accused – (a) without jurisdiction and in violation of Rule 114, Section 17a, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the corresponding Information against the accused being pending with the Regional Trial Court; (b) without notice to the
prosecutor of the request to approve the bail bond in violation of Rule 114, Section 18; and (c) without conducting a bail hearing;
(3) Tabao v. Barataman,27 and Comia v. Antona,28 where the Judges concerned entertained an application for bail even though the
court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,29 where a Regional Trial Court Judge granted bail in a murder case without the requisite bail hearing.
The record shows that this is not the first administrative case of the respondent Judge. In a decision promulgated on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-
1627, he was found guilty of gross inefficiency for failure to resolve a civil case within the three-month reglementary period and consequently
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00. For this second infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
668
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526 February 2, 2004
JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA, complainant

vs.
JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES,* Municipal Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Jocelyn V. Grageda filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 dated January 18, 2000 charging Judge Nieto T.
Tresvalles, Municipal Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes, with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority relative to Criminal Case No. 5307
entitled People v. Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. for murder.
The facts that led to the filing of the complaint as summarized by Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia, are as follows:
The complainant in this administrative case was the wife of Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30 in the evening of November 24, 2000 in
Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes due to multiple stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a complaint charging Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for
the murder of Gil Grageda was filed for preliminary investigation with the Municipal Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Virac, Catanduanes,
presided by respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 5307.
After Criminal Case No. 5307 was filed in his court for preliminary investigation, Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles conducted a preliminary examination
on December 5, 2000. On the same day, December 5, 2000, he issued an Order which textually reads, as follows:
"After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Let therefore a warrant of arrest issue for his arrest. The bail bond of P30,000.00 is hereby
fixed for his provisional liberty on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.
"SO ORDERED."
The corresponding warrant for the arrest of Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. was issued on the same day, stating that the bail for the accused’s temporary
liberty was in the amount of P30,000.00.
The accused surrendered on December 11, 2000. The respondent Judge immediately issued an order committing the person of the accused
Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen to the Municipal Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Virac, Catanduanes. Also on the same
day, the accused, through counsel, filed a motion to strike out the testimony of witness Perlita Tablizo (wife of the accused) and to grant
accused bail.
The following day, December 12, 2000, the respondent Judge issued an Order releasing accused Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of
law after the latter posted a personal bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00.
In an Order dated February 28, 2001, the respondent transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which
contained a denial of the accused’s motion to strike out the testimony of Perlita Tablizo.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor thereafter conducted preliminary
investigation (I.S. No. 00-30), ultimately recommending the filing of an information for murder against Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. with the
aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicle, treachery and evident premeditation. No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty
of the accused.
Thereafter, an information charging Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, which is now
awaiting decision.2
The respondent was, thereafter, charged with gross ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bench, failure to conduct
himself in a manner that would justify his continued stay in the judiciary, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.3 According to the
complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 5307 without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact
that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive identification of the accused. The complainant also alleged that the amount
of P30,000.00 printed on the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent judge appeared to be "snowpaked," an indication that another entry
was previously made, possibly a "no bail recommendation." Furthermore, no counter-affidavit or answer was filed by the accused during the
preliminary investigation conducted by the respondent judge, and it took the police authorities seven days to arrest the accused after the
issuance of the warrant of arrest. Thus:
669
16. I hereby execute this Affidavit to respond to the call in (sic) to encouraging the public to report erring judges to the Supreme Court and not
to the media, as I am also very much concerned, not only of being a victim of injustice, but also of being prejudicial to [the] government’s
interest as a consequence of incompetence, gross ignorance, misconduct of the Presiding Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles of the Municipal Trial Court
of Virac, Catanduanes in the granting of bail to the accused, even when the evidence of his guilt was strong and without an Application for Bail,
considering that a Complaint for Murder was filed, and without an Order, to which the judge is to make as Summary of Evidence filed by the
complainant and her witnesses to immediately cut short his membership in the Bench, be terminated and dismissed from the judicial service
with forfeiture of all his benefits and leave credits with prejudice to his re-employment in any public office.4
In his Comment, the respondent admitted that no bail hearing was conducted in Criminal Case No. 5307, but reasoned that the evidence of the
guilt of the accused was not strong. According to the respondent, the matter of granting bail is an exercise of judgment, and that the accused
should not be denied his constitutional right to bail.
It is true that a hearing is necessary before an accused should be released on bail in cases where the granting of bail is discretionary on the
part of the judge. However, it is also equally true that in the exercise of his sound discretion and opinion, he is not also precluded in seeing to it
that the evidence of the prosecution is adduced in support for the denial of bail to the accused to guide the court on what to do on the matter.
But the public prosecutor failed during the hearing.5
The respondent also explained that a judge issuing a warrant of arrest is not an arresting officer. Thus, if it took seven days for the accused to
be arrested after the issuance of the warrant, it was no longer his concern.
In its Report6 dated June 19, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator opined that Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court make it
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense is granted bail, and that failure to do so
amounts to gross ignorance of the law. It was recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the
respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more
severely.
In a Resolution dated July 28, 2003, the Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia. Thereafter, the Executive Judge
submitted his Report and Recommendation dated November 6, 2003.
According to the Executive Judge, the actual implementation of a warrant of arrest is the responsibility of other functionaries of the
government. In fact, the respondent issued the warrant of arrest on December 5, 2000, only four days after the case was filed in his sala on
December 1, 2000. Thus, the respondent cannot be blamed in any wise if the accused was not arrested or held in custody prior to December
11, 2000.
According to the Executive Judge, the charge that no bail was really granted for the provisional liberty of the accused in the sum of P30,000
and that the said amount was merely superimposed on the warrant of arrest is not supported by the records. Since the respondent issued an
Order on December 5, 2000 fixing the bail at P30,000, the contention that no such order granting bail was issued is, likewise, devoid of merit.
Thus, the Executive Judge concluded, even assuming that there was such a superimposition on the warrant of arrest, the same was merely
made to conform to the said Order.
Anent the charge that the accused was not required to file a comment on the complaint, the Executive Judge found that no fault could be
attributed to the respondent on this regard, as it is the prerogative of the accused to submit any pleading in his defense. However, the
respondent judge failed to make any findings of facts and the law supporting his action as mandated by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
The Executive Judge also stated that at the time the respondent judge granted bail to the accused on December 5, 2000, no application for bail
had as yet been filed by the accused. Furthermore, no hearing was held to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution on the guilt of
the accused was strong or not.7 According to the Executive Judge, a hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of the facts set forth under Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea of bail. Thus, the grant of bail
without due hearing deprives the prosecution of procedural due process, a right to which it is equally entitled to as the defense. Thus:
The respondent Judge seeks to justify his grant of bail by claiming that "the testimonies of the witnesses will not warrant the charge of
murder." This claim, however, is belied by his own Order granting bail when he stated that "the Court believes that a prima facie case exists
that the crime charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof." The offense for which he found the accused to be
probably guilty of is "Murder," since it was "the crime charged" … The warrant of arrest issued by the respondent Judge designated the offense
as "Murder."…8
The Executive Judge agreed with the finding of the Court Administrator that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable for granting bail to an accused charged with murder without conducting the
requisite bail hearing.
The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows:
670
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt
is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable to testify.
The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-à-vis
the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society:
liberty on one hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules require the
judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.9
The respondent’s argument that a hearing is "only necessary if there is an application for admission to bail" is erroneous. As found by the
Executive Judge:
…[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any application for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5, 2000 aggravates matters.
To state the obvious, there was no occasion for the respondent Judge to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at that point in time as
the accused was not asking to be released on temporary liberty. The respondent Judge should have followed the straight and trodden path,
well-traveled by members of the bench, that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also be worth mentioning, in passing, that
the right to bail may be waived considering its personal nature. It arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact that the
respondent Judge already granted bail when the accused has not been arrested yet compounds the aggravation. 10
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must
first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must
be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.11 In this case, the respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to the accused. The prosecution was not even afforded an
opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with the Rules.
We likewise agree with the finding of the Executive Judge that the respondent’s claim of good faith will not exonerate him from administrative
liability.
The respondent Judge also argues in his Position Paper submitted to the undersigned Executive Judge that there is absolutely no evidence to
show that he was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in granting bail. As such, he argues that his act which was done in his
official capacity is not subject to disciplinary action. Unfortunately for the respondent Judge, it is already settled that when a judge grants bail
to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment without conducting the
required [bail] hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence. …12
In the recent case of Rosalia Docena-Caspe v. Judge Arnulfo O. Bagtas,13 the Court stressed the indispensable nature of a hearing in petitions
for bail, citing a plethora of cases,14 where judges were found to be grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures and were fined P20,000.00
therefor.
Moreover, the respondent judge failed to adhere to the mandate of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. – Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall
transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts and the law
supporting his action, together with the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his
release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the
resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
No such report on the findings of fact and law was made by the respondent. As found by the Executive Judge, the December 5, 2000 Order of
the respondent finding probable cause that the crime of murder was committed was made only for the purpose of issuing of a warrant of
arrest against the accused, thus:
It is apparent that the aforementioned finding was made only for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest, as at that time, the accused was
still at large. Strictly speaking, this was not yet a finding of any prima facie case upon which an Information charging the proper offense should
be filed in court. The respondent Judge was yet to issue a subpoena to the accused attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents as required under Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The accused has not yet submitted any counter-affidavit
or has waived the submission thereof. In other words, preliminary investigation was not yet terminated. Subsequently, however, the
respondent Judge never issued any other resolution on the result of the preliminary investigation he conducted up to the time he transmitted
the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The respondent Judge did not make any findings of facts and the law supporting his
action as mandated by Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, his original, premature finding of probable guilt made on December 5,
671
2000 was already his verdict on the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted. This cavalier disregard of procedural rules leaves much to be
desired.15
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how correctly and justly –
anything less than that is constitutive of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law, perhaps, grave misconduct. 16 In Celestina B. Corpuz
vs. Judge Orlando F. Siapno,17 we had the occasion to state, thus:
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.18
While the Executive Judge agreed that the respondent should be held administratively liable, it was recommended that he be merely
reprimanded, as "a balancing of the equities involved should tilt the scales in favor of the respondent for his loyalty, diligence and reliability."
Thus:
There are six (6) first level courts in the Province of Catanduanes. Of these, five (5) do not have incumbent judges. As the only judge in the first
level courts, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles has, for many years, been Acting Judge of all the other vacant courts which are scattered
throughout the island province, accessible only through dirt mountain roads. This necessarily entailed great sacrifices on the part of the
respondent Judge, not to mention that the extra remuneration given to Judges for sitting in vacant salas is a mere pittance. Inasmuch as this
administrative matter concerns the official acts of the respondent, equity demands that the bad be weighed together with the good.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned is inclined to adopt the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the
respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same act shall be
dealt with more severely. However, considering that the said respondent is in the twilight of his career with the Judiciary, as his compulsory
retirement is scheduled in January of the coming year which is barely two (2) months away, and considering further that the respondent Judge
did the yeoman’s job of single-handedly operating the judicial machinery in the Province of Catanduanes for many years as the only first level
court Judge in the entire province, it is the respectful recommendation of the undersigned that respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be
instead only REPRIMANDED. …19
The records show that the respondent judge compulsorily retired on January 22, 2004, having served thirty-four years in the judiciary. Under
the circumstances, the Court finds that a fine of P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
672
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1419 December 27, 2002
EDUARDO M. MARTINEZ, SR. and RUPERTO G. MARCELO, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Branch 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Meralco Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (MVHAI) is composed of employees of the Meralco Electric Company residing in Meralco
Village Phase I, a residential subdivision located in Lias, Marilao, Bulacan. The MVHAI was the donee of a vacant lot located in the periphery of
Meycauayan, Bulacan and adjacent to Marilao, Bulacan, identified as Lot 22, Block 16. The said lot has an area of 7,504 square meters and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 225920. The MVHAI used the said lot for basketball games of the homeowners and their
dependents and for other sports activities. The MVHAI since then paid the realty taxes thereon. Among the members of the MVHAI were
Ruperto Marcelo and his wife Lucita Marcelo, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and Engineer Eduardo Martinez, Sr.
On April 10, 1998, at about 2:00 p.m., Bernabe Antonio, his sister Lita Antonio and others caused the construction of a barbed wire and coco
lumber perimeter fence on a portion of the lot. Martinez had the incident recorded in the Meycauayan Police Station blotter. Antonio and his
sister continued the construction in the morning of the next day. Martinez again reported the incident to the police authorities. The MVHAI
secured a certification from the municipal engineer that there was no building permit for the construction of the fence. On April 14, 1999,
Martinez, in behalf of MVHAI, filed a criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 99-1454, against Bernabe Antonio, Lita Antonio, Ric Faustino and
Danilo Corteza for violation of Republic Act No. 7279 with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
On April 22, 1999, the homeowners circulated open letters calling the attention of the police authorities and other municipal officials to and
complaining against the incursion of Bernabe Antonio, his sister and others into the lot. Obtaining no immediate relief from the police
authorities and municipal officials, the homeowners gathered together on May 6, 1999, at around 4:00 p.m., and confronted Antonio. They
demanded that he demolish his perimeter fence. Antonio refused, claiming that he inherited the property where he constructed the fence
from his deceased grandfather, Ceferino Antonio. Forthwith, the homeowners themselves demolished the fence. Antonio reported the
incident to the police authorities and on May 10, 1999, he executed a sworn statement complaining against Martinez, Marcelo and the other
homeowners for the demolition of his perimeter fence. On the same day, a criminal complaint for malicious mischief was filed by Antonio with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan presided by Judge Orlando C. Paguio. The case was entitled People vs. Eduardo
Martinez, Sr., et al. and docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-28365. The complaint therein reads:
"That on the 6th day of May 1999, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon more or less in Brgy. Pandayan, Municipality of Meycauayan,
Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, motivated by anger, with deliberate intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously strike and destroy the house and barb wire owned by one CEFERINO ANTONIO represented by BERNABE ANTONIO Y
JURADO, which cause damages to said house and barb wire in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned complainant on the aforesaid amount." 1
The preliminary examination was set on June 2, 1999 but was reset to June 25, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. However, before the examination
commenced, Marcelo filed a motion for inhibition alleging inter alia that, on several occasions, Judge Paguio commented that the accused
before the MTC took the law unto their hands when the perimeter fence of Antonio was demolished causing damage to the latter. Martinez
joined the motion of Marcelo for the inhibition of Judge Paguio.
On June 3, 1999, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 99-1454 finding probable cause against Bernardo Antonio,
et al. for violation of Republic Act 7279 and filed an Information against respondents therein with the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan presided
by Judge Paguio for said crime. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-52953.
On September 15, 1999, Judge Paguio issued an Order denying the motion for inhibition filed by Marcelo and Martinez in Criminal Case No. 99-
28365. He denied having declared during the proceedings on June 2, 1999 that Martinez, Marcelo and the other homeowners took the law
unto their own hands. Judge Paguio set the arraignment and pre-trial on September 23, 1999 at 8:00 a.m. On September 21, 1999, subpoenae
were issued by the clerk of court for the arraignment of Marcelo and Martinez and for pre-trial. Marcelo and Martinez received their copies of
the subpoenae only in the afternoon of September 22, 1999.
The case was called on September 23, 1999 for the arraignment of Martinez and Marcelo. Martinez appeared without counsel and explained
to the court that because he received the subpoena only in the afternoon of the previous day, he was unable to contact his counsel. Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Lucita Marcelo made a special appearance for her husband Marcelo, praying that the arraignment of the accused be
cancelled. She insisted that in her copy of the court calendar of cases for the day, Criminal Case No. 99-28365 was not included. The judge
denied the motion for a resetting but allowed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marcelo to assist her husband during his arraignment and
673
appointed a counsel de oficio for Martinez. The two (2) were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The court then called the case for pre-
trial but Martinez and Marcelo prayed for a continuance to enable them to contact their respective counsels.
In the meantime, Martinez and Marcelo filed a petition for injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, entitled Eduardo
Martinez, Sr., et al. vs. Hon. Orlando C. Paguio, et al. and docketed as Civil Case No. 08-M-2000. They sought to enjoin Judge Paguio from
further taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 99-28365. However, on January 31, 2000, Martinez and Marcelo filed a notice of withdrawal of
petition. The RTC issued an order on the same date, dismissing the petition conformably with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In February 2000, the MVHAI filed a complaint against Antonio and the Estate of Ceferino Antonio, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-M-2000, for
quieting of title with the RTC of Bulacan, praying that after due proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment:
1. Quieting the title or removing the cloud over the title or interest of the plaintiff over property covered by TCT No. T-225920 and
the Deed of Donation dated April 29, 1997.
2. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of:
2.1 P320,000.00 by way of actual compensatory damages;
2.2 P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
2.3 P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and P1,000.00 per appearance as appearance fee.
3. Granting such other relief as may be just and equitable."2
Martinez and Marcelo forthwith filed a motion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case No. 99-28365 on the ground of a prejudicial question
in Civil Case No. 89-M-2000.
During the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 99-28365 before Judge Paguio on March 2, 2000, the private prosecutor manifested to the court
that accused Martinez and Marcelo had not yet posted any bail bond and prayed that the court fix the bail bond for each of the said accused.
On the same date, the court issued an order fixing the bail bond at P10,000.00 each for Martinez and Marcelo and gave them until 12:00 noon
on said date to post their respective bonds. The judge also issued an addendum order denying the motion to suspend proceedings filed by
Martinez and Marcelo and setting the trial of the case on its merits on March 23 and 30, 2000. When Martinez and Marcelo failed to post their
bail bonds, the court issued a warrant for their arrest. On March 3, 2000, Martinez and Marcelo filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
March 2, 2000 Order of the MTC and for the quashal of the warrant of arrest issued by said court. They contended that the imposable penalty
for the crime is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period and hence there was no need for them to post bail bonds. Moreover, under
the Rules on Summary Procedure and Republic Act 6036, they were not required to post bail.
On April 15, 2000, Martinez and Marcelo filed an administrative complaint against Judge Paguio with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), docketed as A.M. MTJ-02-1419, charging him with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and gross partiality, alleging
inter alia that:
(a) Instead of requiring Antonio to establish a prima facie case against Martinez and Marcelo for malicious mischief as required by
the Rules on Summary Procedure, the Judge required them to refute Antonio's baseless claim of ownership over the property;
(b) Judge Paguio had prejudged the case against them in favor of Antonio by declaring during the proceedings that they took the law
unto their own hands, causing damage to Antonio;
(c) Judge Paguio insisted on the arraignment of Martinez and Marcelo on September 25, 1999 although the case was not scheduled
on said date; and they received the subpoenae only a day before the said arraignment;
(d) Martinez and Marcelo were ordered by Judge Paguio to post bail even though they were not required to do the same under the
Rules on Summary Procedure.
In his unsigned comment, Judge Paguio averred that he could not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law in the absence of findings of bad
faith, dishonesty or corruption. He asserts that his actions in Criminal Case No. 99-28365 were above board and in accordance with the rules.
According to him, for gross abuse of authority to exist, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner. He vehemently denied
that he was biased in favor of Mr. Antonio. He insists that all his actuations were designed to render speedy and inexpensive disposition of
cases filed before his court.
674
The Court directed the OCA to conduct an investigation of the complaint. The Court Administrator submitted his report which states thus:
"EVALUATION:
xxx
A careful perusal of the records reveals that respondent Judge manifested a lack of mastery of the provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary
Procedure. In an Order dated 2 March 2000, he directed:
'It appearing from the record of this case that all the accused have not yet posted their bail. In view thereof, and upon manifestation by the
private prosecutor Atty. Ernesto Fernandez, let the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) each be posted by the accused EDUARDO
MARTINEZ, ET AL. for their provisional liberty, immediately until 12:00 noon.'
In a similar case, Agunda vs. Judge Tresvalles, AM No. MTJ-99-1236, 25 November 1999, 319 SCRA 134, this Court noted that the requirement
for the accused to post bail is part of the regular procedure, not the revised rules on Summary Procedure. The Court declared:
We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator. The records clearly show inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law and
impropriety on the part of respondent judge.
First. He failed to determine that the criminal case before him was governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, as a result of which
he applied the regular procedure and required the accused to post bail. It took respondent judge four months from the date of the filing of the
information on September 25, 1997 to January 26, 1998 to determine that, after all, the case was subject to the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure and order a copy of the complaint and the affidavits to be served on the accused so that they could file their counter affidavit.
Meanwhile, he required them to post bail when, under the Rules on Summary Procedure, this is no longer necessary considering that the
charge against them was simply malicious mischief.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the
case shall be governed by this Rule.
A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rules on Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.
Although the said provision states that 'patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the [Rule on Summary Procedure] is a
ground for disciplinary action,' the provision cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to apply the rule is deliberate or malicious.
Otherwise, the policy of the law to provide for the expeditious and summary disposition of cases covered by it could easily be frustrated.
Hence, requiring judges to make the determination of the applicability of the rules on summary procedure upon the filing of the case is the
only guarantee that the policy of the law will be fully realized. " 3
The Court Administrator further stated that complainants failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate their other charges against Judge
Paguio. He noted that Judge Paguio could properly exercise his discretion in deciding complainants' motion for inhibition in Criminal Case No.
99-28365, since the grounds raised by them did not automatically disqualify the judge from sitting on the case, under the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court Administrator pointed out that with regard to the motions/petitions submitted by complainants but subsequently denied by
Judge Paguio, complainants may still avail themselves of judicial remedies other than the filing of an administrative complaint for grave abuse
of authority against the judge.4
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator. Irrefragably, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 99-28365 were covered by the Rules
on Summary Procedure. Section 16, Rule 19 of said rule provides:
"SEC. 16. Arrest of accused. – The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the
person arrested shall either be on bail or recognizance by responsible citizen acceptable to the court." 5
In this case, there was never an instance when Martinez and Marcelo failed to appear before the MTC when so required by Judge Paguio.
There was thus no legal basis for Judge Paguio to require Martinez and Marcelo to post bail and order their arrest when they failed to post bail.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 6036 provides that bail is not generally required for violation of municipal or city ordinances or for criminal
offenses when the prescribed penalty is not higher than arresto mayor and/or a fine of P2,000.00 or both. In the recent case of Agunday vs.
Tresvalles,6 the Court held that in a charge of simple malicious mischief which is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, bail is no longer
necessary.
While ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment absent any bad faith or malice, they nonetheless
have obligation to keep abreast of all basic laws and principles.7 The claim of good faith and absence of malice in glaring instances of
675
incompetence and ineptitude does not abate a judge's consequent liability. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
know and to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 8
As to the two other charges of grave abuse of authority and gross partiality, this Court agrees with the findings and adopts the
recommendation of the OCA, thus:
"Anent, the other charges, complainants failed to provide sufficient evidence to hold respondent Judge liable. The matter of inhibition of
judges rests on his own discretion and cannot be touched by the Court unless he is disqualified in accordance with the Rules of Court. As
regards respondent Judge's denial of the other motions/petitions submitted by complainants, there are judicial remedies available for them
and not the instant administrative complaint.
There was not enough evidence to prove that respondent Judge is biased in favor of the private complainant and his counsel. As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not basis for disqualification of a
judge on grounds of bias and prejudice (citation omitted)."9
In Abdula vs. Guiani,10 we ruled that the Court has to be shown acts and conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can declare respondent judge to be biased and partial in favor of a party. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is not
enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. 11
Parenthetically, Judge Paguio had been found administratively guilty in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1335, entitled Yolanda Floro, complainant, vs. Judge
Orlando C. Paguio, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent,12 and fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for his delay in
deciding a case. Records also reveal that respondent judge had compulsory retired last February 26, 2002. 13
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Judge Orlando C. Paguio of Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay a fine in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) to be
deducted from his withheld retirement benefits. The charges of grave abuse of authority and gross partiality are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
676
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65228 February 18, 1985
JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR., ETC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. MELECIO B. BORJA, ET AL., respondents.
PLANA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog (Criminal
Case No. 83-184).
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest, petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not
strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution witnesses, of his previous statement naming petitioner as the
assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years, entitled as such to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code which would make the murder charge against him non-capital.
After a hearing during which the retracting witness (del Rosario) presented by petitioner made another turn-about and declared against the
latter, respondent Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for bail on the finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and his
minority was not proved. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his minority had been proved by his birth certificate
which was attached to the memorandum in support of his motion for bail, showing that he was born on February 26, 1967, that his minority
had never been challenged by the fiscal, and that the offense charged, as regards petitioner, is not capital because even if convicted, he could
not be sentenced to death because of his minority. Again, attached to the motion for reconsideration was a duly certified copy of petitioner's
birth certificate. The Fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong, but did not contest the minority of
petitioner.
In his order of September 21, 1983, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration.
Failing in his bid for bail, petitioner then filed a motion with the lower court praying that he be placed in the care and custody of the Ministry
of Social Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) which
provides:
Care of Youthful Offender Held for Examination or Trial. — A youthful offender held for physical and mental examination or
trial or pending appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall from time to time (sic) of his arrest be committed to the care of the
Department of Social Welfare or the local rehabilitation center or a detention home in the province or city which shall be
responsible for his appearance in court whenever required: Provided, That in the absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the venue of the trial, the provincial, city and municipal jail shall provide quarters for
youthful offenders separate from other detainees. The court may, in its discretion upon recommendation of the
Department of Social Welfare or other agency or agencies authorized by the Court, release a youthful offender on
recognizance. to the custody of his parents or other suitable person who shall be responsible for his appearance whenever
required.
On September 22, 1983, respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Explaining the denial later, he said that the quoted Article 191
is not applicable since it could be invoked only where the minor is charged with a bailable offense, as could be gleaned from the phrase "if
unable to furnish bail."
On September 22, 1983, the NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted its report, copy of which was sent to the City Fiscal of Naga. It found
that it was the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not the petitioner, who killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. When the murder
case was next called for hearing on October 19, 1983, the defense unilaterally moved orally that the trial of petitioner be reset in order to give
the City Fiscal more time to study the NBI report, but the motion was denied as dilatory. Again, on November 2, 1983, petitioner unilaterally
filed with the trial court a formal Motion for Reinvestigation praying "that the proceedings be suspended and that the City Fiscal of Naga be
ordered to reinvestigate this case." It does not appear what action, if any, the court has taken on this motion. Neither does it appear that the
City Fiscal of Naga has taken any move to reinvestigate the case.
Against this factual backdrop, petitioner has filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, with two supplementary petitions, seeking
the release of petitioner on bail or his transfer to the custody of the MSSD pending trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No. 603. In view of the
aforesaid NBI report, the petition also seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondent Judge to remand the case to the City
Fiscal of Naga for reinvestigation.
The first question to be resolved is whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
677
Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties." (Article IV, Section 18.) Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of right before conviction, unless the accused is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.
The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and attended by two aggravating circumstances: evident premeditation and
nocturnity. Punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.
The petitioner however submits that even assuming that the evidence of guilt against him is strong, the charge of murder, as to him who is
only 16 years old, cannot be capital because the death penalty cannot be imposed on account of his minority which entitles him to a penalty
reduction of one degree. In effect, under petitioner's submission, the test to determine whether the offense charged is capital, is the penalty
to be actually imposed on him in view of the attendant circumstances.
Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, a capital offense is "an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death." It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with reference to
which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the Constitution or the law
speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of
the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the
judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would
defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial.
Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it follows that, if convicted, he would be
given "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law," which effectively rules out the death penalty.
The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious
reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the
accused has been established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
But respondent judge claims that petitioner has not proved his minority. This is inaccurate. In his motion for bail, petitioner alleged that he was
a minor of 16 and this averment was never challenged by the prosecution. Subsequently, in his memorandum in support of the motion for bail,
petitioner attached a copy of his birth certificate. And finally, after respondent Judge had denied the motion for bail, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, attaching thereto a certified true copy of his birth certificate. Respondents Judge however refused to take cognizance of
petitioner's unchallenged minority allegedly because the certificate of birth was not offered in evidence. This was error because evidence of
petitioner's minority was already a part of the record of the case. It was properly filed in support of a motion. It would be a needless formality
to offer it in evidence. Respondent Judge therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion in disregarding it.
Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or
partly on oral testimony or depositions. (Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 7.)
It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right, which makes it unnecessary to decide whether he, being a minor, is entitled to
be placed pending trial in the care and custody of the MSSD pursuant to Article 191 of P.D. No. 603.
Turning to the reinvestigation aspect of the petition, the plea therefor must be addressed to the City Fiscal of Naga, who has direction and
control of the criminal prosecution and who is the primary official called upon to evaluate the evidence, ascertain the existence of a prima
facie case and determine who should be criminally indicted. In case of unjustified refusal by the City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation, the
proper recourse is to appeal to the Minister of Justice who exercises control and supervision over fiscals.
WHEREFORE, the orders of respondent Judge denying bail to petitioner are set aside. In the interest of dispatch, bail for petitioner is fixed at
P15,000.00 and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval by the trial judge, unless petitioner is held for some other
cause. The petition for mandamus to compel reinvestigation of the case is denied. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
678
EN BANC
A.M. No. 99-8-126-MTC September 22, 1999
ISSUANCE OF HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER OF JUDGE LUISITO T. ADAOAG, MTC, Camiling, Tarlac.
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the indorsement, dated March 31, 1999, of the Secretary of Justice concerning a "hold-departure" order issued on January 29,
1999 by Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, Municipal Trial Court, Camiling, Tarlac, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-131 and 98-132, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Nestor Umagat y Campos." The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the fact that the order in question is contrary to Circular No.
39-97, dated June 19, 1997, of this Court.1âwphi1.nêt
Indeed, the said circular limits the authority to issue hold departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction. It provides the following guidelines on the issuance of hold departure orders:
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure Orders resulting in inconvenience to the parties
affected, the same being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel and to
ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders which are issued contain complete and accurate information, the
following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall furnish the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the
Department of Justice with a copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest available
means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following information:
a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date

and place of birth and the place of last residence of the person
against whom a Hold-Departure Order has been issued or
whose departure from the country has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in

which the Hold-Departure Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a

Hold-Departure Order has been issued or whose departure
from the country has been enjoined should also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has been dismissed,
the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the
cancellation of the Hold-Departure Order issued. The courts concerned shall furnish
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration with a copy each
of the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the order of dismissal twenty-four (24)
hours from the time of promulgation/issuance and through the fastest available
means of transmittal.
679
All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs with their respective lists of active Hold-
Departure Orders are hereby directed to conduct an inventory of the Hold-Departure Orders included in the said lists and
inform the government agencies concerned of the status of the Orders involved.
In his comment, Judge Adaoag admits his mistake and pleads ignorance of the circular. He explains:
1. The order of the court dated January 29, 1999 is a mere request from the Commission on Immigration to issue a Hold
Departure Order;
2. The questioned order was issued in two criminal cases within the Jurisdiction of the Court and was issued with malice
towards none and in the interest of the state upon motion of the Department of Justice thru its Assistant Prosecutor
Venancio Ovejera, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac, Tarlac;
3. The court was misled into believing that the court could issue an order requesting the Bureau of Immigration for a Hold
Departure Order because the motion for the issuance of a hold departure order was filed and prayed for by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor at Tarlac, Tarlac;
4. The court has no copy of Circular No. 39-97 and upon research, it found out for the first time that Hold Departure Orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
How about criminal cases within the exclusive Jurisdiction of first level courts?
Rest assured that from this moment and thereafter, the court will no longer issue such order.
The Code of Judicial Conduct 1 enjoins judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." They can live up to their duties
only by diligent effort to keep themselves abreast of developments in our legal system. The process of learning the law is a never ending and
ceaseless one. In two recent cases 2 involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand on the offending judges. Hence,
the same penalty should be imposed on Judge Adaoag.
WHEREFORE, Judge Luisito T. Adaoag is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
680
EN BANC
G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Chas A. McDonough, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The complaint alleged:
That on or about September 15, 1910, and before the filing of this complaint, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Tan
Teng did willfully, unlawfully and criminally, and employing force, lie and have carnal intercourse with a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl
7 years of age.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the defendant guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as
defined and punished under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months and 11 days
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of error in this court:
I. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance from the body of the
accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical
condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal disease produced by contact with a sick man.
III. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
IV. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
From an examination of the record it appears that the offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of
September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen
were gambling had been in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva Pacomio, on the day in question, after
having taken a bath, returned to her room; that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she
gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon
hers, and remained in that position for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that
the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what
happened upon the morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of
Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first. later
he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to violate her.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman
who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting
from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same.
The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years
her testimony should not be given credit. The lower court, after carefully examining her with reference to her ability to understand the nature
of an oath, held that she had sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and credit.
With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur. The defense in the lower court attempted to show that
the venereal disease of gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described in the present case, and called
medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the contention. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question said:
We shall not pursue the refinement of speculation as to whether or not this disease might, in exceptional cases, arise from other
carnal contact. The medical experts, as well as the books, agree that in ordinary cases it arises from that cause, and if this was an
exceptional one, we think it was incumbent upon the defense to bring it within the exception.
681
The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon hers for some moments. The defendant was found to be
suffering from gonorrhea. The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have been communicated from him to her by the
contact described. Believing as we do the story told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was suffering
was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof, however, that Oliva constructed said obnoxious disease from the
defendant is not necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth of Oliva's declaration.
The defendant attempted to prove in the lower court that the prosecution was brought for the purpose of compelling him to pay to the sister
of Oliva a certain sum of money.
The defendant testifed and brought other Chinamen to support his declaration, that the sister of Oliva threatened to have him prosecuted if
he did not pay her the sum of P60. It seems impossible to believe that the sister, after having become convinced that Oliva had been outraged
in the manner described above, would consider for a moment a settlement for the paltry sum of P60. Honest women do not consent to the
violation of their bodies nor those of their near relatives, for the filthy consideration of mere money.
In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance
taken from his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. Judge Lobingier, in discussing that question in
his sentence, said:
The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found on his
person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken
from the person of a thief.
The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the examination was made by competent medical authority
and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been
found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose
of using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had furnished
evidence of the commission of a crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof.
No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be
used against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
The question presented by the defendant below and repeated in his first assignment of error is not a new question, either to the courts or
authors. In the case of Holt vs. U.S. (218 U.S., 245), Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this question, said:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The
objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover
we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether voluntarily
or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.
The question which we are discussing was also discussed by the supreme court of the State of New Jersey, in the case of State vs. Miller (71
N.J. law Reports, 527). In that case the court said, speaking through its chancellor:
It was not erroneous to permit the physician of the jail in which the accused was confined, to testify to wounds observed by him on
the back of the hands of the accused, although he also testified that he had the accused removed to a room in another part of the
jail and divested of his clothing. The observation made by the witness of the wounds on the hands and testified to by him, was in no
sense a compelling of the accused to be a witness against himself. If the removal of the clothes had been forcible and the wounds
had been thus exposed, it seems that the evidence of their character and appearance would not have been objectionable.
In that case also (State vs. Miller) the defendant was required to place his hand upon the wall of the house where the crime was committed,
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not his hand would have produced the bloody print. The court said, in discussing that question:
It was not erroneous to permit evidence of the coincidence between the hand of the accused and the bloody prints of a hand upon
the wall of the house where the crime was committed, the hand of the accused having been placed thereon at the request of
persons who were with him in the house.
It may be added that a section of the wall containing the blood prints was produced before the jury and the testimony of such comparison was
like that held to be proper in another case decided by the supreme court of New Jersey in the case of Johnson vs. State (30 Vroom, N.J. Law
Reports, 271). The defendant caused the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand before the jury, and the witnesses who had observed shoe
prints in the sand at the place of the commission of the crime were permitted to compare them with what the had observed at that place.
In that case also the clothing of the defendant was used as evidence against him.
682
To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony of a physician or a medical expert who had been appointed
to make observations of a person who plead insanity as a defense, where such medical testimony was against necessarily use the person of the
defendant for the purpose of making such examination. (People vs. Agustin, 199 N.Y., 446.) The doctrine contended for by the appellants
would also prevent the courts from making an examination of the body of the defendant where serious personal injuries were alleged to have
been received by him. The right of the courts in such cases to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body has been established by a long
line of decisions.
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised, then it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of
the evidential articles — a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, .
. . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.)
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for
the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y.,
119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his
identity. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily features by
the court or by witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a witness
— it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.
As was said by Judge Lobingier:
The accused was not compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact that an object found upon his
body was examined seems no more to infringe the rule invoked than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief.
The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary department of the Government from examining the body of
persons who are supposed to have some contagious disease.
We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from the venereal disease, as above stated, and that through his
brutal conduct said disease was communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a case like the present it is always difficult to secure positive and direct
proof. Such crimes as the present are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. In cases of rape the courts of law require corroborative
proof, for the reason that such crimes are generally committed in secret. In the present case, taking into account the number and credibility of
the witnesses, their interest and attitude on the witness stand, their manner of testifying and the general circumstances surrounding the
witnesses, including the fact that both parties were found to be suffering from a common disease, we are of the opinion that the defendant
did, on or about the 15th of September, 1910, have such relations as above described with the said Oliva Pacomio, which under the provisions
of article 439 of the Penal Code makes him guilty of the crime of "abusos deshonestos," and taking into consideration the fact that the crime
which the defendant committed was done in the house where Oliva Pacomio was living, we are of the opinion that the maximum penalty of
the law should be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for by law is six years of prision correccional. Therefore let a judgment be entered
modifying the sentence of the lower court and sentencing the defendant to be imprisoned for a period of six years of prision correccional, and
to pay the costs. So ordered.
683
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123161 June 18, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
LIBERATO "DUKDUK" SOLAMILLO and JULIAN SOLAMILLO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated September 20, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Isabela, Basilan, in Criminal Case No.
2099 declaring Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and Julian Solamillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. They were also adjudged to pay Aleli P. Guiroy, the daughter of the victim,
Alexander Guiroy, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fee and ₱500.00 as costs.
On March 23, 1994, an Information2 was filed with the said trial court charging brothers Liberato "Dukduk" and Julian Solamillo, appellants,
together with Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie "Angel" Trumata, with the crime of robbery with homicide, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1994, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Aguada Barangay, Municipality of
Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, bakawan wood and wooden stool, conspiring and
confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill and by means
of force and violence upon person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, club and hack at the person of Alexander
Guiroy, proprietor of Liberty Bakery and Grocery, thereby inflicting hack wounds and bodily injuries on the different parts of the body of the
latter, which caused his instantaneous death. That taking advantage that the victim, Alexander Guiroy, was already dead, and with intent to
gain, the said accused forcibly took, stole and carted away the following described property belonging to the said Alexander Guiroy; viz., cash
money equivalent to four-day income amounting to more or less ₱20,000.00, wristwatch "Seiko Diver" worth ₱3,000.00 and a wallet colored
black, to the damages and prejudice of the legal heirs of the deceased Alexander Guiroy in the total amount of ₱23,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment with the assistance of counsel, appellant Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and Edgardo Ebarle pleaded not guilty, while
appellant Julian Solamillo entered a plea of guilty.3 Eddie Trumata was not arraigned as he has been at large.
The prosecution filed a motion praying that Edgardo Ebarle be discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. However, he died
before he could testify.4
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Aleli P. Guiroy, Dr. Teresita L. Dans, Emmanuel Guiroy, SPO4 Pedro Oreta,
and PO3 Celso Tan Sanchez. Their testimonies are summarized below.
The victim owned the Liberty Bakery and Grocery located at Rizal Avenue, Isabela, Basilan. His employees were appellant Julian Solamillo,
Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie Trumata, who lived together in the bakery.5
On March 2, 1994, Edgardo Ebarle, Eddie Trumata and appellants were at the bakery. Aleli Guiroy, the victim’s daughter, saw them when she
arrived at around 5:00 p.m. until she left at 6:10 p.m.6
The next morning, Aleli returned to the bakery but was unable to open the doors. She sought help from her uncle, Lorenzo Guiroy who, in turn,
asked Warlito Gonoz to accompany her back to the bakery. When Warlito peeped through a window, he saw the victim lying on the floor.
Immediately, they reported the matter to the police. 7
PO3 Celso Tan Sanchez arrived and found the victim’s dead body, a wooden stool, a bolo and a piece of bakawan(firewood), all with blood.
The table drawers were open and the bakery was in disarray.8 Aleli informed PO3 Sanchez that her father’s ₱20,000.00, wallet and Seiko watch
were missing.9
Dr. Teresita Dans examined the victim’s body. She confirmed her Post-Mortem Report10 that the victim suffered 21 incised wounds, multiple
contusion-hematoma and multiple abrasions which caused his death. According to her, the incised wounds were probably caused by a knife or
bolo, while the multiple hematoma, contusions, and abrasions were caused by a blunt instrument, like a piece of wood or pipe. 11
Aleli testified that she spent more than ₱20,000.00 for the funeral of her father.12
684
On March 4, 1994, or two days after the incident, the police of Lamitan, the neighboring town of Basilan, informed Emmanuel Guiroy, the
victim’s brother, that they have apprehended Edgardo Ebarle. Forthwith, Emmanuel and SPO4 Pedro Oreta went to Lamitan. There the police
turned over Edgardo to SPO4 Oreta. While on their way back to Isabela, Edgardo told Emmanuel that Eddie Trumata and appellants assaulted
the victim, pulled him to the table and hit his head.13
On March 6, 1994, or four days after the incident, SPO4 Oreta arrested appellant Liberato Solamillo in Zamboanga City. While he was being
investigated at the police station, SPO4 Oreta noticed that he was wearing a watch. Emmanuel confirmed that it belonged to the victim. SPO4
Oreta then asked appellant to open his traveling bag and found therein the victim’s missing wallet and money amounting to ₱48.00. 14
Upon the other hand, appellants, and their brother Melanio Solamillo have a different story to tell.
On March 2, 1994, the day of the incident, at around 4:00 p.m., Liberato visited his brother Julian at the victim’s bakery. After about one hour,
Liberato went to Melanio’s house.15 Meanwhile, at past 6:30 p.m., Julian started preparing the flour needed for baking, while Edgardo Ebarle
and Eddie Trumata cooked their supper. But before they could eat, the victim scolded Edgardo and Eddie for creating a mess in the bakery. He
continued scolding the two as he sat down to feed his cat. Suddenly, Julian saw Eddie hitting the victim’s head with a piece of bakawancausing
the latter to fall. He managed to get up and exchanged blows with Eddie. At this point, Edgardo got a bolo and attacked the victim. Julian could
not intervene because Eddie threatened to kill him if he would do so.16
After beating the victim, Eddie and Edgardo ransacked the drawers and took the money. They then asked Julian to leave. But before he could
do so, he managed to take ₱995.00 from the money scattered on the floor. Eddie and Edgardo headed off to Lamitan, Basilan, 17 while Julian
passed by Zamboanga City on his way to Dumaguete City where he intended to surrender. While in Zamboanga City, he met his brother
Liberato, who was then looking for him. Thereafter, Julian proceeded to Dumaguete City. Liberato was supposed to head back to Isabela but
was forced to spend the night in Zamboanga City because he missed the boat.18
The next day, March 6, Melanio accompanied Emmanuel Guiroy and SPO4 Oreta to Zamboanga to look for both appellants. On the same day,
Liberato was arrested.19 While he was being interrogated at the Tetuan, Zamboanga Police Sub-Station, SPO4 Oreta showed him a wallet, a
watch and some money, stating that these are evidence against him. Liberato immediately denied having knowledge about the said items.
Then, he was turned over to the Isabela police.20
Meanwhile, Julian surrendered to the police in Bacong, Dumaguete where he was detained until he was turned over to the Isabela police.21 He
pleaded guilty during the arraignment because a policeman named Bayabos threatened to kill him.22
On September 20, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused, Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and Julian Solamillo GUILTY as principals beyond
the shadow of any doubt of committing the crime of Robbery with Homicide as charged in the Information, which crime is defined and
penalized under Art. 248 (should be Art. 294) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 6 (should be Sec. 9) of Republic Act No. 7659, the
commission of which was attended by the following circumstances, to wit:
1. Committed by a band, there were four (4) persons who committed the offense. (par. 6, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code);
2. Committed with evident premeditation. (par. 13, Art. 14, supra);
3. Committed by treachery. (par. 16, Art. 14, supra); and
4. Committed with deliberate cruelty, considering that the victim suffered twenty-one (21) hack and stab-wounds and contusion and
abrasions on different parts of his body.
"Without any mitigating circumstances to offset any of them, (this court) hereby sentences both and each of them to suffer the extreme
penalty of DEATH and to pay the following damages to Miss Aleli Guiroy who in her youthful years has lost her father, upon whom her future
security depends, to wit:
1. ₱500,000.00 as moral damages;
2. ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and
4. ₱500.00 as judicial costs.
"x x x
685
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
Appellants Liberato and Julian Solamillo, in their brief, contend that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and in imposing upon them the death penalty.24
We disagree.
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants on the basis of the chain of circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution, thus:
1. Edgardo Ebarle, Eddie Trumata, and appellant Julian Solamillo worked and lived in the bakery owned by the victim. The other
appellant, Liberato Solamillo, was also at the bakery in the afternoon of March 2, 1994. The following day, the victim was found
dead;
2. After the commission of the crime, all four accused fled: Edgardo and Eddie to Lamitan, Basilan; Julian to Dumaguete City; and
Liberato to Zamboanga City;
3. When Liberato was arrested in Zamboanga City, the victim’s wristwatch and wallet were found in his possession; and
4. Julian admitted that immediately after the victim was killed, he picked up ₱995.00 scattered on the bakery floor after Eddie and
Edgardo ransacked the drawers containing money.25
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as long as: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.26 Thus, facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.27 These facts and circumstances are present here and constitute
sufficient evidence which warrants the conviction of both appellants.
Liberato denied having the victim’s personal effects in his possession, insisting that he saw these items for the first time when he was being
interrogated.28
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
"x x x
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; x x x"
We find that Liberato failed to overcome this presumption. He could not provide a satisfactory explanation why the victim’s belongings were in
his possession. Moreover, he could not show any ill motive on the part of SPO4 Oreta that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against
him. SPO4 Oreta enjoys the presumption that he has regularly performed his official duty.29 Liberato likewise failed to overthrow this
presumption.
We find untenable Liberato’s explanation that he went to Zamboanga City after the commission of the crime to look for his brother Julian.
True, flight per se cannot prove the guilt of an accused, but if the same is considered in the light of other circumstances, it may be deemed as a
strong indication of guilt.30 His flight to Zamboanga City when linked with his presence at the bakery, the crime scene, and his possession of the
victim’s effects upon his arrest, strongly indicate his participation in the commission of the crime. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the
circumstances taken together point to the fair and logical conclusion that appellant Liberato Solamillo is guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
For his part, appellant Julian Solamillo maintains that the trial court erred in disregarding his tacit withdrawal of his guilty plea. He claims that
policeman Bayabos threatened to kill him if he will plead not guilty.
Section 5, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "(a)t any time before the judgment of conviction
becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty." The tenor of the
quoted provision is clear. There should be a categorical declaration from the accused that he is withdrawing his plea of guilty and substituting
it with a plea of not guilty.
There is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or that he, in any manner, manifested
unequivocally that he was withdrawing his plea. He contends though that he made such manifestation when he testified on April 26, 1995,
thus:
686
"Q Mr. Witness, from what you testified before this Court, you want to impress this Court that your only participation is the robbing or taking
of the money that was scattered on the store of Mr. Guiroy on March 2, 1994. Then why did you plead guilty to the offense during the
arraignment?
A I pleaded guilty because while I was in the police station, I was instructed to plead guilty and if I will not plead guilty I will be killed. I have a
lawyer, but he will not sleep with me in the police station. That is the reason why I pleaded guilty here.
Q You mentioned of threat, can you mention a police who threatened you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A Bayabos."31
The above testimony is not a positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any
unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not assume that he was withdrawing his original plea. Furthermore, by appellant’s own
admission, he went to Dumaguete City with the intention of surrendering to the authorities. This belies his contention that he was threatened
into entering a guilty plea for if he was truly innocent, why is it that his first instinct was to surrender?
Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it, such fact does not operate to automatically
exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. 32
In the instant case, the trial court, in determining the guilt of appellant Julian Solamillo, relied on the extensive evidence of the contending
parties, not merely on his plea of guilty. Indeed his conviction can be sustained based on independent evidence other than his plea. Thus,
whether or not his plea of guilty was improvidently made is inconsequential for the simple reason that his conviction was based on other
evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged.33
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not against persons, the prosecution has to
firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the
property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. 34
In this case, the prosecution amply established the said elements. Appellant Julian Solamillo’s contention that he cannot be held liable for
homicide because he only took money but did not participate in the victim’s killing is untenable. What is essential in robbery with homicide is
that there is a direct relation and intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. 35
In his own testimony, appellant Julian Solamillo placed himself squarely at the crime scene when the victim was attacked:
"Q: So what happened at the time this Guiroy was scolding this Eddie Trumata and Edgardo Ebarle?
A After that, Mr. Guiroy fed his cat and he was murmuring and talking so many words while feeding his cat.
Q What was his position?
A He was sitting.
Q While he was sitting and feeding the cat and still murmuring to the two, what happened?
A Eddie hit him.
Q Hit him with his fist or what?
A With a piece of bakawan.
xxx
Q After he was hit on the head, what happened to Mr. Guiroy?
687
A He fell.
Q What happened next when he was already there down?
A Guiroy stood up and there was an exchange of blows with Trumata.
Q While they were exchanging blows with Trumata, what did this Edgardo Ebarle do?
A Edgardo Ebarle got a bolo and hacked Mr. Guiroy.
Q Can you still recall how many times he hacked Mr. Guiroy?
A I don’t remember anymore because I don’t know what to do at that time.
Q After mauling or the hitting of the bakawan and bolo of Mr. Guiroy, what happened to Mr. Guiroy?
A He died."36
While Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie Trumata were attacking the victim, appellant Julian Solamillo did nothing nor sought help to stop them.
Instead, he admitted taking some of the money:
"Q You said they took money, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where did they take the money? From where?
A From the drawer.
Q What about you?
A I was able to get or pick-up money scattered on the floor.
Q Why did you pick-up the money?
A Because I don’t have money for my fare and because I was told by them that, ‘You will escape because you will be included in this incident.’
Q How much money did you get?
A ₱995.00.
Q You just picked the money according to you?
A I just picked it up on the floor because the money were scattered on the floor."37
The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery shall also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or
not they actually participated in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 38
Appellant Julian Solamillo justifies his taking the money because he needed it for his fare.1âwphi1 Such an excuse is ridiculous and self-serving.
By his own account, Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie Trumata were the ones who killed the victim. If this were so, why did he leave the bakery
immediately after the incident? And why did he proceed to Dumaguete City to surrender? His conduct is certainly inconsistent with rational
human behavior. For, if he were really guilt-free, he should have reported the incident to the authorities instead of taking the money and
fleeing to Dumaguete City.
Julian insists that he did not participate in killing the victim and that he could not have prevented it since the other accused threatened to kill
him if he interfered.39 But he failed to show that the threat was of such character as to leave him no opportunity for escape or to prevent the
homicide. Accordingly and considering his self-admitted participation in the robbery, he is liable for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
688
However, the trial court erred in appreciating against appellants the aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed: (a) by a band;
(b) with evident premeditation; (c) with deliberate cruelty; and (d) with treachery.
The trial court declared that the crime was committed by a band "because there were four (4) persons who committed the
offense."40 Paragraph 6, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
"Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. – The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx
6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the offense.
"Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been
committed by a band."
This aggravating circumstance requires that there should be at least four persons who commit the crime, all of whom should be armed. Even if
there are four offenders, but only three or less are armed, it is not a band. Here, there is no evidence that all four accused were armed at the
time of the perpetration of the crime. Hence, this circumstance cannot be appreciated against the appellants.
For evident premeditation to be considered as an aggravating circumstance, it must be shown that the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal plan. 41 The requisites of evident premeditation are:
(1) the time the accused decided to commit the crime;
(2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act.42
When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
cannot be considered.43 Here, we cannot discern from the records the presence of the foregoing essential element.
The trial court held that the crime was committed with deliberate cruelty "considering that the victim suffered twenty-one (21) hack and stab-
wounds, contusions and abrasions on the different parts of his body." The number of wounds is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty
as an aggravating circumstance.44 The mere fact that wounds in excess of what is necessary to cause death were inflicted upon the body of the
victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty.45 It is necessary to show that the accused intentionally and
deliberately increased the victim's suffering. In this case, there is no evidence showing appellants’ intent to commit such cruelty.
Furthermore, in People vs. Lobitania,46 we held that "treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. Inasmuch as robbery with
homicide is a crime against property and not against persons, treachery cannot be validly considered x x x."
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the prescribed penalty for robbery with homicide is
composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper
penalty to be imposed upon appellants Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and Julian Solamillo is reclusion perpetua.47
Regarding damages, the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to the victim’s heirs. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of
damages.48
As to Aleli Guiroy’s claim that she spent ₱20,000.00 for her father’s funeral expenses and that there was at least ₱20,000.00 in the bakery’s
secret compartment when the robbery occurred, we find the same unsubstantiated. In People vs. Abrazaldo,49 we ruled that to be entitled to
the award of actual damages, "it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party." While the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the
claim for funeral expenses, however, we are aware that funeral expenses were incurred by the family of the deceased.
Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.50 In Abrazaldo, we computed temperate damages at ₱25,000.00, or one-half of the current
indemnity ex delicto, which is fixed at ₱50,000.00. We award the same in this case.
As for the award of ₱200,000.00 as exemplary damages, we find the same to be unjustified. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of civil liability may be imposed only when the crime was committed with one or more
689
aggravating circumstances. Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged, no exemplary
damages may be awarded. And since there are no exemplary damages, the award of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fee is also deleted.
As to the trial court’s award of moral damages in the amount of ₱500,000.00, we find the same to be excessive. In similar cases,51 we awarded
the victim’s heirs the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. For verily, moral damages are not intended to enrich the victim’s heirs; rather
they are awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings. 52
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Isabela, Basilan, in Criminal Case No. 2099, is AFFIRMED but with modification.
Appellants Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and Julian Solamillo are found GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are ordered to pay the heirs of the late Alexander Guiroy (a) ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity;
(b) ₱50,000.00, as moral damages; and (c) ₱25,000.00, as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
690
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 141336 June 29, 2004
RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, PEDRITO REYES, REMEDIOS MARASIGAN, BAYANI ANASTACIO, RUMULADO BAWASANTA, JOSE ENRIQUEZ, NELSON
GABUTERO, JOSE GENILO, JR., JOSE LEYNES and ALFONSO UMALI, JR., petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH DIVISION and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN/SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
DECISION
On April 8, 1997, petitioners Rodolfo G. Valencia, Pedrito Reyes, Remedios Marasigan, Bayani Anastacio, Rumulado Bawasanta, Jose Enriquez,
Nelson Gabutero, Jose Genilo, Jr., Jose Leynes and Alfonso Umali were charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) in relation to Section 3 (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in an Information which reads:
That on or about January 12, 1994 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rodolfo G. Valencia, then Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro, Pedrito A.
Reyes, then Vice-Governor and Presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, Bayani Anastacio, Romualdo
J. Bawasanta, Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Cesareo M. Cueto, Violeta D. Dakis, Jose A. Enriquez, Nelson B. Cabutero, Jose G. Genilo,
Jr., Jose C. Leynes, Dante A. Manao, Remedios E. Marasigan, all members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro, and
Alfonso V. Umali, Jr., then Provincial Administrator, all of whom are public officials of the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro,
while in the performance of their official and/or administrative functions, and acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
conspiring and confederating with private accused Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza, and mutually helping one another , did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally give said accused Alfredo M. Atienza unwarranted benefit, privilege and advantage by entering
into a grossly disadvantageous contract of loan, whereby the provincial funds of Oriental Mindoro in the sum of P2,500,000.00 was
given to Alfredo M. Atienza to finance the cost of repair, operation and maintenance of his vessel, thereby causing the provincial
government of Oriental Mindoro damage and undue injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 23624.
On April 11, 1997, petitioners filed a "Motion Seeking an Order to Allow Accused to File with the Ombudsman Motion for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest."2 This was followed by a "Motion to Quash" filed by petitioner
Valencia on April 14, 1997.3
The prosecution manifested that it had no objection to a reinvestigation of the case. Hence, on October 23, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioners’ motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. 4
On March 23, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution wherein Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto and
Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil approved the recommendation of Special Prosecution Officer II Manuel A. Corpuz that the
motion for reinvestigation be denied but that the complaint as against Emmanuel B. Buenaventura, Violeta A. Daquis and Damte A. Manzo be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. However, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against all accused on the ground that their liability is civil in nature. 5
Accordingly, the prosecution filed an Amended Information.6
Petitioners filed with the Sandibangayan a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman,7 which was denied in the first assailed Resolution dated June 23, 1999.8
In the meantime, petitioners learned that in the administrative case against them docketed as OMB-ADM-1-96-0316, which involved the same
subject matter as the criminal case, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint against them after finding that the contract of loan was entered
into in pursuance of the police power of the local chief executive.9 Invoking this Resolution, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated June 23, 1999 and/or Motion to Resolve Motion to Quash Information.10 In the second assailed
Resolution dated September 27, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.11
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, based on the following grounds:
Respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the information
or in not granting the Motion to Quash information despite the fact that:
691
a) Respondent ombudsman had already dismissed the administrative case against the petitioners regarding the same
subject matter of the criminal case against the petitioners;
b) The facts alleged in the information have already become moot and academic and no longer constitute an offense;
c) No satisfactory reason was given by the respondent Ombudsman in delaying inordinately (close to three [3] years) the
filing of the information against the petitioners.
Similarly, respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the Resolution dated
September 27, 1999 in holding that the dismissal of the administrative case against all the petitioners is not determinative of the
outcome of the criminal case despite the facts following:
a) The subject matter in both criminal and administrative cases against the same petitioners are one and the same;
b) The degree of proof in criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whereas, in administrative case the proof
required is only substantial evidence; and
c) Two of the reviewing prosecutors, namely: Deputy Prosecutor Roberto Kallos and Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo
held in the Joint Resolution dated March 23, 1999 that the criminal case against the petitioners should be dismissed, and
they both concurred with the findings of GIO I Medwin Dizon, Dir. Angel Mayoralgo, Jr., and Hon. Assistant Ombudsman
Abelardo Aportadera, Jr., in their Resolution dated October 8, 1996, which recommended the dismissal of the case as they
found that the contract of loan entered into by the petitioners with a certain Alfredo Atienza was in pursuance of the
General Welfare Clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code.12
In a Minute Resolution dated January 31, 2000, the petition was dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.13
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 as well as a Supplemental thereto.15 The respondents were required to comment on the
Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement.16 The prosecution filed a Comment on the petition for certiorari.17 Thereafter, petitioners
filed their Reply.18
In the meantime, on May 29, 2000, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued enjoining respondents "from further proceeding with the pre-
trial and trial in Criminal Case No. 23624 entitled ‘People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo G. Valencia, et al.,’ scheduled [on] May 22, 23, 24 and
25, 2000 and from acting on the motion to suspend petitioners pendente lite."19
On November 27, 2000, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was granted and the petition was reinstated.20
The petition lacks merit.
The grounds on which a complaint or information may be quashed are:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.21
692
Save where the Rules expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash, the general rule is that in the hearing of such
motion only such facts as are alleged in the information, and those admitted by the prosecutor, should be taken into account in the resolution
thereof. Matters of defense can not be produced during the hearing of such motions, except where the rules expressly permit, such as
extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. 22 Otherwise put, facts which constitute the defense of the accused against the
charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion
to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense. 23
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or
any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.
The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. 24
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered.25 However, inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the presentation
thereof.26 In the early case of People v. Navarro,27 we held:
Prima facie, the facts charged are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified by others appearing to be
additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people’s representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted by
him as amendments to the same information. It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion
the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not
described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go
beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But
we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be
sufficiently reiterated that such official’s role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are
justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the
interest of a speedy administration of justice.
It should be stressed, however, that for a case to fall under the exception, it is essential that there be no objection from the
prosecution. Thus, the above rule does not apply where the prosecution objected to the presentation of extraneous facts and even
opposed the motion to quash.28
In the case at bar, petitioners are charged with violation of Section 3 (e), in relation to 3 (g), of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx x x x.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx x x x.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
xxx xxx x x x.
The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action has caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or has given any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.29
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (g) are:
693
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. He enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3. The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.30
A careful scrutiny of the Information shows that all the above elements are averred therein. It sufficiently alleges that petitioners are public
officials discharging official or administrative functions who, in evident bad faith and with manifest partiality, entered into a grossly
disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government with a private person which gives the latter unwarranted benefit and advantage.
Petitioners invoke the earlier Resolution of the Ombudsman which recommended the dismissal of the case against them. There, the Graft
Investigation Officer opined that the contract of loan extended by petitioners to Engr. Alfredo M. Atienza for the repair, maintenance and
operation of the latter’s motor vessel was necessary for the transportation needs of the inhabitants of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, which
had just suffered three successive typhoons. The loan of provincial funds was supposedly extended by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Oriental Mindoro under Section 46831 of R.A. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), pursuant to the General Welfare provision
embodied in Section 16 thereof, which states:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
As enunciated above, however, the Resolution must be established as their defense during the trial. It was not even offered and admitted as
evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It was merely attached to petitioners’ "Supplemental Pleading in Support of Motion to Quash
Information."32 Furthermore, the Resolution does not bear the approval of the Ombudsman.33
In any event, the Ombudsman subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reinvestigation. The fact that Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo and Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioners is of no moment, especially
since the same Special Prosecutor and Deputy Special Prosecutor signed the Comment filed before this Court wherein they extensively argued
against the instant petition. The continuing objection and opposition of the prosecution to petitioners’ motion to quash the Information
removes this case from the exception to the above-cited rule that in the determination of whether the facts alleged constitute an offense, only
the allegations in the Information, whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted, should be considered.
Indeed, the findings of the Graft Investigation Officer are contradicted by the following disquisition by the Ombudsman in the Resolution
finding probable cause to charge petitioners, to wit:
The subject loan does not fall within the context of the "general welfare clause" under Section 16 of the Local Government Code. The
loan in question was more inclined to promote the personal or business interest of Engr. Atienza rather than to boost the common
welfare of the people in Mindoro. In the "credit agreement" itself, while the problem of transport system was addressed in passing
under its "whereas clause" (introductory part) of the said contract, however, the same was not mentioned in the body of the said
agreement. There is no provision in the contract to obligate Engr. Atienza towards the improvement of transport service for the
people of Oriental Mindoro. In short, it is not clear in the said agreement that Engr. Atienza is mandated to render transport service
for the general welfare of the people in Mindoro. x x x xxx x x x.
xxx xxx x x x.
As embodied in the credit agreement, the purpose of the loan being stated therein was to finance the cost of the repair, operation
and maintenance of Atienza’s vessel. This in essence is indeed a private affair. It suits Atienza’s personal aggrandizement. In
synthesis, the subject loan has the attributes of a private interest as opposed to public purpose. Consequently the subject loan does
not rhyme with the requirement that "government funds shall be used/spent strictly for public purpose." x x x xxx x x x.34
In the final analysis, the conflicting findings of the Ombudsman boil down to issues of fact which, however, are not within our province to
resolve. As has been oft-repeated, this Court is not a trier of facts.35 This is a matter best left to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the same subject matter should
operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability
differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored
principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.36
694
Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were reelected to office.
Indeed, a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The
rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and
character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation
of his past misdeeds.37
However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office, thus:
The ruling, therefore, that – "when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge
of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any" – refers only to an
action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character
than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a
person or group of persons but to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which
enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar as a
public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.38
There is, thus, no reason for the Sandiganbayan to quash the Information against petitioners on the basis solely of the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against them.
Finally, petitioners invoke the ruling in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,39 where this Court dismissed the criminal cases against petitioner for the
inordinate delay of three years in the conduct of preliminary investigations which violated his right to due process and the constitutional
guarantee of speedy disposition of cases. In the case at bar, petitioners allege that while the letter-complaint against them was dated March
10, 1994, the Ombudsman resolved to file the Information against them three years later, on February 14, 1997, and in fact the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan on April 8, 1997.
By way of explanation for the perceived delay, the Special Prosecutor, in his Comment to the petition, enumerated the chronology of events
beginning from the receipt of the letter-complaint to the filing of the Information. It appears therefrom that in most cases the extended
periods of time were devoted to verifications and investigations, first by the National Bureau of Investigation and then by the Ombudsman.
Within the Office of the Ombudsman, the complaint had to undergo separate investigations by the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau and the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau. During the preliminary investigation itself, petitioners sought extensions of time before they
filed their counter-affidavits.
Thus, the ruling in Tatad does not apply here. In that case, the delay was exacerbated by the fact that the charges against petitioner were
found to be politically motivated. In the case at bar, there is no indication that the complaint against petitioners was filed to serve political
ends. Neither is the delay vexatious, capricious or oppressive. On the contrary, what appears is that the prosecutors exercised extreme care in
verifying, evaluating and assessing the charges against petitioners before making a finding of probable cause.
For certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion, 40 or more specifically, that it exercised its
power arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility; and such exercise was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform it or to act in contemplation of law.41 Petitioners failed in this respect.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on May
16, 2000 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to conduct proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23624 with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
695
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 143618-41 July 30, 2002
BENJAMIN "Kokoy" ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER II
EVELYN TAGOBA LUCERO, respondents.
DECISION
Previous to this case, petitioner instituted a petition docketed as G.R. No. 105248, entitled, "Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Petitioner, versus
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Respondents."1 He assailed therein, among others,
the validity of twenty-four informations which the PCGG filed against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, more specifically
for failure to file his statements of assets and liabilities covering the years 1962 to 1985 when he was in the government service. The cases
were filed with the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429. He argued that PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin, who
conducted the preliminary investigation, had no authority to do so.
On May 16, 1995, a Decision was rendered in said case declaring the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG invalid, based on the
following findings:
Now, the crimes ascribed to Romualdez (failure to file his annual statements of assets and liabilities) do not "relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth"
amassed by him. No such relation may be perceived in the indictments themselves, which in fact merely state that there was no justifiable
cause for Romualdez’s refusal or failure to file his annual statements. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan itself made the finding that the cases
against Romualdez did not refer to acquisition of wealth under a crony status, but "solely ** (to) his bare physical non-compliance with his
mechanical duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities over a period of twenty-four (24) years **;" and that the omissions have no
bearing on Civil Case No. 0035 against Romualdez involving transactions in which he "allegedly took advantage of his relationship with the
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos." These considerations also call for rejection of the Solicitor General’s theory that Romualdez’s "non-
filing of statements of assets and liabilities ** (was) a means of concealing ** (his) assets and frustrating the efforts of the Government to
determine the actual value or extent of ** (his) wealth."
The Court therefore declares invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of
failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses. 2
While the preliminary investigation was invalid, we ruled that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
informations much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, we held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioner. However, the Sandiganbayan was directed to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429, and to require the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation of
the charges against petitioner.
In compliance with the said decision, the Sandiganbayan, on November 13, 1995, issued a resolution giving petitioner fifteen days from receipt
thereof within which to submit his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence, furnishing copies thereof to the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan
also gave the PCGG the same period to file a reply affidavit or pleading if it so desired. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was
directed to conduct the reinvestigation.3
At that time, however, petitioner was still in exile abroad. Naturally, he failed to submit the required counter-affidavits. He returned to the
Philippines only on April 27, 2000, after which he voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and posted the required bail bond.
On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan gave Special Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero ten days within which to submit the result of any reinvestigation
she may have undertaken.4 Prosecutor Lucero informed the Sandiganbayan that she has set a clarificatory hearing on June 2, 2000, and moved
for a thirty-day extension to submit the results of the reinvestigation.5
Prosecutor Lucero sent notice of the clarificatory hearing to Atty. Jesus Borromeo, on behalf of petitioner. The latter immediately went to
Prosecutor Lucero’s office to inform her that he was not the counsel for petitioner in these particular cases, although he represented
petitioner in other cases pending before different divisions of the Sandiganbayan. The scheduled hearing on June 2, 2000 was cancelled for
non-appearance of petitioner and counsel.
In the meantime, petitioner, through Atty. Otilia Dimayuga-Molo, filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 2, 2000 a Motion to Quash the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.6 He argued therein that the PCGG Commissioner who filed the informations had no
authority to do so.
696
On June 6, 2000, petitioner received at his address in Tacloban City a notice from Prosecutor Taguba of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on
June 9, 2000.7
The Motion to Quash was heard by the Sandiganbayan on June 8, 2000, one day before the clarificatory hearing. Without granting the
prosecution time to oppose the motion, the Presiding Justice, in open court, denied the Motion to Quash and terminated the preliminary
investigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. Furthermore, the Presiding Justice set the arraignment of petitioner on June 26, 2000.
On June 23, 2000, petitioner was able to obtain a written copy of the order dated June 8, 2000 denying his Motion to Quash and setting his
arraignment on June 26, 2000.8 Petitioner likewise received another order dated June 8, 2000, denying his oral motion for reconsideration.9
The arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000 was reset to July 28, 2000.10
On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed the instant petition, seeking to annul the assailed orders dated June 8, 2000 and to prohibit the Sandiganbayan
from implementing the same. Petitioner further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
enjoining his arraignment on July 28, 2000.
In a resolution dated July 17, 2000, respondents were required to comment and the parties were directed to maintain the status quo
ante prevailing at the time of filing of the petition.11
The petition is anchored on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FILED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 13406-13429
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE PCGG COMMISSIONER WHO FILED SAID INFORMATIONS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO;
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT COMPLYING WITH THE DIRECTIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ROMUALDEZ CASE THAT IT SHOULD ORDER
THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT A PROPER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
III. THE PETITION WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS THAT SHOULD COME FROM AN IMPARTIAL AND COLDLY NEUTRAL JUDGE.
RESPONDENT PREJUDGED THE ISSUES WHEN IT DICTATED IN OPEN COURT THE LENGTHY ORDER OF JUNE 8, 2000, DENYING
OUTRIGHT THE MOTION TO QUASH AND ISSUING ANOTHER ORDER ON THE SAME DATE DENYING AN ALLEGED ORAL MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.12
Respondents counter that the first issue raised by petitioner has already been resolved in G.R. No. 105248, thus:
The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not however affect the jurisdiction of the Trial Court which may have taken
cognizance of the information. The controlling principles are set out by a well known authority now sitting in the Court, in his work
entitled "Remedial Law Compendium," as follows:
"**. Any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made before entry of the plea (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July 11,
1986) and the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand the case for preliminary investigation (People vs. Casiano, L-15309,
Feb. 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1960; Zacarias vs. Cruz, L-25899, Nov. 29, 1969; People vs. Abejuela, L-29715, Mar. 31,
1971; Sanciangco, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 12830, Mar. 24, 1987). The refusal of the court to remand the case for preliminary investigation
can be controlled by certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial (Bandiala vs. CFI, L-24652, Sept. 30, 1970).**."
As regards proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, another author observes that:
"Since absence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information (Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court),
proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case remanded to the Ombudsman, for him or
the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation (Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187, 201; Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349;
Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, 149 SCRA 1, 3-4).
The principle was applied despite the fact that trial on the merits had begun and the prosecution had already presented four witnesses. The
trial was ordered suspended pending the preliminary investigation (Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992)."
Considering that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation "did not impair the validity of the informations or otherwise render it
defective, ** (m)uch less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court **," the only effect, to repeat, being the imposition on the latter of the
obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation," it follows that all acts done by the Court
prior thereto must be accorded validity and effect, subject to the outcome of the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted. The
dispositions thus made by respondent Sandiganbayan, i.e., its refusal to recall and quash the warrants of arrest or to modify the conditions laid
down by it for petitioner's cash bond; and its confiscation of the cash deposit of petitioner for violation by the latter of the conditions thereof,
697
cannot be regarded as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or so whimsical, capricious or oppressive or so utterly without
foundation as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.13
The above-quoted ruling is based on our earlier decisions in the cited cases of Luciano v. Mariano,14 Ilagan v. Enrile,15 Sanciangco, Jr. v.
People16 and Go v. Court of Appeals.17 In these cases, what was assailed was the lack of proper preliminary investigation before the filing of the
informations. The informations therein were filed by the proper officer albeit without conducting the requisite preliminary investigation. The
case at bar, on the other hand, differs in that the officer who filed the informations against petitioner, PCGG Commissioner Villarin, was not
authorized to do so.
This defect invoked by petitioner is one of the grounds for filing a motion to quash, to wit:
Grounds. --- The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx x x x.
xxx xxx x x x18
What was assailed in G.R. No. 105248 was the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to quash the warrants and modify the conditions of the bail bond, as
well as its confiscation of the cash deposit. While we ruled therein that the PCGG Commissioner had no authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation, we did not squarely rule on his lack of authority to file the informations. The issue before the Court was the invalidity of the
preliminary investigation and its consequences.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Sandiganbayan, argues that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy against the denial of a
motion to quash. He cites the cases of Quiñon v. Sandiganbayan19 and Raro v. Sandiganbayan.20 That, however, is the general rule, from which
there are known exceptions. In both cases, we qualified the rule by stating that "[i]t is only where there are special circumstances clearly
demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition may exceptionally be allowed."21
There are such special circumstances in the case at bar. Indeed, it would be a gross infringement of petitioner’s right to due process, not to
mention an utter waste of time and judicial resources, if trial is allowed to proceed only to be nullified by the higher courts later on upon the
ground that the charges were filed by a person who had no authority to file the same.
An information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the
court.22
As can be clearly gleaned, it is the prosecutor, not the PCGG, who subscribes and files the information. In cases before the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecutor is the Ombudsman. As we have held, the crimes charged against petitioner do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth, over which
the PCGG had no jurisdiction.
All trial courts, the Sandiganbayan included, are reminded that they should take all the necessary measures guaranteeing procedural due
process from the inception of custodial investigation up to rendition of judgment.23They are not to turn a blind eye to procedural irregularities
which transpired before the criminal case reached the court. The validity and sufficiency of the information are important.24
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan25 where the wording of
the certification in the information was found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez,26 where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.
In fact, where an information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, it is subject to quashal. More particularly, the information
may be quashed where the officer who filed it had no authority to do so.27
At all stages of the proceedings leading to his trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure
prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the Constitution. In the same way that the reading of the
information to the accused during arraignment is not a useless formality,28 so is the validity of the information being read not an idle
ceremony.
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly processes of law. 29 In all criminal cases, the judge
should follow the step-by-step procedure required by the Rules. The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the
life or liberty except that of the guilty.30
The case of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan31 is directly in point:
698
Consequently, the amended information that was filed against petitioner did not fall under the category of criminal actions for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth filed against a member of the family of President Marcos, relatives, subordinates or close associates who took advantage of
their office or authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
What the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Public respondent PCGG does not pretend that the
President assigned to it this particular case against the petitioner for investigation and prosecution in accordance with Section 2(b) of
Executive Order No. 1.
Moreover, an examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG, as well as the affidavits, counter-affidavits and exhibits submitted at
the preliminary investigation show that there is no evidence at all that this alleged violation is crony-related, committed by petitioner by
taking advantage of his public office, and was committed in relation with the ill-gotten wealth being sought to be recovered as
aforestated. There is, therefore, no evidence in the hands of the respondent PCGG to justify the amendment of the information.
Indeed, the said amendment appears to be an afterthought to make it fall under the type of offenses respondent PCGG may investigate and
prosecute under the law. It is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the
same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment. Another preliminary investigation must be undertaken and thereafter, based
on evidence adduced, a new information should be filed.
Consequently all the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case including the filing of the information and amended information with
the respondent court should be struck down.32
Recently, we ruled that the infirmity in the information caused by lack of authority of the officer signing it cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence or even by express consent. A new information must be filed by the proper officer. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer, among other requisites, which confers jurisdiction on the court over the
person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first
information would not be a bar in petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.33
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that
the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioner’s right was violated when the preliminary
investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our
directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.
The Sandiganbayan contends that petitioner waived his right to a proper preliminary investigation. This is untenable.1âwphi1 The records
show that petitioner was unable to attend the clarificatory hearings on June 2 and 5, 2000 simply due to lack of notice. Prosecutor Lucero
herself admits that Atty. Borromeo, to whom she initially served notice of the hearing, did not represent petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos.
13406-13429. Effectively, petitioner was only notified of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on June 9, 2000. That setting, however, no longer
materialized because the day before, the Sandiganbayan prematurely terminated the reinvestigation.
Finally, petitioner charges the Sandiganbayan with having prejudged the cases and deprived him of his right to due process. Considering the
defective nature of the informations in the criminal cases below, there is no more need to pass upon this last assignment of error. The
Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the informations against petitioner. In the exercise of their
discretion, all courts are admonished to uphold the law and procedure and to do what is fair and just. 34 The Sandiganbayan failed in this
regard.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan dated June 8, 2000 are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
699
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153176 March 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, In her capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 19, of the City of Naga and SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J:
For determination in this petition is a question in procedural law - - - whether an information filed by a state prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor should be dismissed after the accused has entered
his plea under the information.
Petitioner comes before us with a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to declare as null
and void the Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 dated February 26, 20021 and April 3, 20022 which dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction the case of People vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No.
8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Act," in an information which reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as proprietor of
Saballegue Printing Press with business address at 16 San Mateo St., Peñafrancia Ave., Naga City for Violation of Section 22(a) in relation to
Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:
That on or about February 1990 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction of SSS Naga Branch
and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, while being the proprietor of Saballegue Printing Press, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due for his employee
to the SSS in the amount of SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (₱6,533.00), Philippine Currency, representing SSS and EC
premiums for the period from January 1990 to December 1999 (n.i.), and the 3% penalty per month for late remittance in the amount of
ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE PESOS and 28/100 (₱11,143.28) computed as of 15 March 2000, despite lawful demands by
letter in violation of the above-cited provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22 June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO

State Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS Cases in Region V3
The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required investigation in this case has been conducted by the undersigned Special Prosecutor in accordance with law
and under oath as officer of the court, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense has been committed, that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and that the filing of the information is with the prior authority and approval of the Regional State Prosecutor. 4
The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. On
September 24, 2001, accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial.5 Three days thereafter, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss6 on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court.7
The People, through State Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an opposition,8 against which the accused filed a rejoinder.9The People filed a reply to
the rejoinder10 on December 21, 2001. A rejoinder to the reply11 was filed by the accused on January 21, 2002.
700
After considering the arguments raised, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss in its first questioned Order dated February 26, 2002, to
wit:
After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in
accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, thus:
‘Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.’
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius.
The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the defendant’s plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings (People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs. Ibañez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on lack of authority of the officer who filed the information and on jurisdiction at the
same time, pertinent portions run as follows:
The defendant had pleaded to the information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections
to the information. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by
express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Now, the objection to the respondent’s actuations goes to the very foundations of jurisdiction. It is a
valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity of the nature noted in the information cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of all
SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to other than
the City Prosecutor. The Court finds this contention to be devoid of merit. The Regional State Prosecutor is not the alter ego of the Secretary of
Justice but a mere subordinate official and if ever the former files cases, it is by virtue of a delegated authority by the Secretary of Justice.
Potestas delegada non potesta delegare (sic) – what has been delegated cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state prosecutor also attached a memorandum dated June 22, 2001 by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan
addressed to Provincial Prosecutor and City Prosecutors of Region V directing them to inhibit and to append the following NOTATION after the
certification in the Information for filing.
NOTATION: The herein City/Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting from this case and the Special Prosecution Team on SSS Cases in Region V is
authorized to dispose of the case without my approval in view of the request for inhibition of the SSS Regional Manager as granted by the
Regional State Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information, however, would readily show that nowhere in the Information has the City Prosecutor of Naga City appended the
above-quoted notation/inhibition. At most, the authority of the special prosecutor is only for the conduct of preliminary investigations and the
prosecution of cases after they are filed. The Court, however, believes that the filing of this Information must be in conformity with the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 4 of Rule 112.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and for lack of jurisdiction, the Court hereby resolves to DISMISS this case without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the People contending that as a special prosecutor designated by the regional state prosecutor to
handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file the information involving violations of the SSS law without
need of prior approval from the city prosecutor. 13 Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño14 and Secretary
Hernando Perez15 were offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentino’s authority to file the information was recognized. In
response, the defense pointed out in its opposition that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a
mere scrap of paper. 16
On April 3, 2002, respondent judge issued the second questioned Order which reads:
701
Acting upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, Special Prosecutor on SSS cases in Region V, and it
appearing that the same has failed to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the
same is hereby DENIED for being a mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the People through Regional State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan and State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner
attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge, viz: 18
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE DISMISSED THE INFORMATION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUPPORTING FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE DELIBERATELY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF THE
PROSECUTION WITHOUT THE REQUIRED SUFFICIENCY OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE WORD "MAY" IN SEC. 4, RULE 112 OF THE RULES
OF COURT IS NOT MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE JUDICIALLY KNOWN INHIBITION OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR AND THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN INTERFERING WITH THE PURELY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF FILING AN
INFORMATION BY RULING ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE FILING OFFICER TO FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment19 in compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated September 23, 2002.20 It opines
that the dismissal of the information is mandated under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends that:21 1) the instant petition was filed out of time; 2) the special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information; and 3) the City Prosecutor did not expressly inhibit
himself from handling SSS cases nor signing the information.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues. Respondent contends that the motion for reconsideration filed on April 1, 2002 is late because it
was filed eighteen days after March 14, 2002, the date when petitioner received the first questioned order. Respondent has overlooked that
the 15th day after March 14 is a Good Friday. Hence, petitioner’s last day to file the motion for reconsideration was on the next working day
after Good Friday, April 1.22
Next, respondent argues that having been considered as a mere scrap of paper, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner did not toll
the running of the reglementary period. Respondent, however, erroneously assumes that the present case is an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45. As stated at the outset, this is an original petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is clear. It provides that "(a) pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the
reglementary period of appeal." (emphases supplied) Hence, the same provision has no application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt of the second questioned Order and not the receipt of the first. Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by En Banc
Resolution A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1, 2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed.-- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)- day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records, petitioner received the first questioned order dated February 26, 2002 on March 14, 2002. 23 A motion for
reconsideration was timely filed on April 1, 200224 which was dismissed for lack of notice of hearing in an Order dated April 3, 2002.25 This
second questioned order was received by petitioner on April 11, 2002.26 A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari was filed on April 18, 2002.27 A motion for leave to file and admit the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on May
29, 2002.28Having been filed within the reglementary period, petitioner’s motion for leave to file the instant petition was granted in this
Court’s Resolution dated July 15, 2002.29
We now come to the other issue: whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending view that the approval of the city or provincial prosecutor is no longer required. It is contended that the
Regional State Prosecutor has already directed the city or provincial prosecutor to inhibit from handling SSS cases. 30 Petitioner cites the letter
of Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan to SSS Regional Director in Naga City dated June 6, 199731 and copies of Regional Orders No.
702
97-024-A32 and 2001-03333 dated July 14, 1997 and September 28, 2001, respectively, showing the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino
as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.34 and Sanchez v. Demetriou, et
al.35 to prop up its contention that given the designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino, the city prosecutor need not participate in the filing
and prosecution of the information in the case at bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the powers of a Regional State Prosecutor are as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State Prosecution Office: Functions of Regional State Prosecutor. - The Regional State Prosecutor shall, under the control
of the Secretary of Justice, have the following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans, programs, memoranda, orders, circulars and rules and regulations of the Department of Justice relative
to the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate administrative supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and
cities comprised within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising within the region.
d) With respect to his regional office and the offices of the provincial and city fiscals within his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of subordinate officers and employees as may be necessary; and approve transfers of subordinate
personnel within the jurisdiction of the regional office.
2) Investigate administrative complaints against fiscals and other prosecuting officers within his region and submit his
recommendation thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall, after review thereof, submit the appropriate
recommendation to the Office of the President: Provided, that where the Secretary of Justice finds insufficient grounds for
the filing of charges, he may render a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative complaints against subordinate personnel of the region and submit his recommendations
thereon to the Secretary of Justice who shall have the authority to render decision thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative supervision is limited to "the authority of the department or its equivalent to generally oversee the operations of
such agencies and to insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities;
or require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of
official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them."36 This is distinguished from the power of "supervision and control" which
includes the authority "to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance
of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs." 37
The Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no
power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence,
the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In those cases, the special prosecutors were acting under the directive of the
Secretary of Justice. They were appointed in accordance with law. Nowhere in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional state prosecutor granted the
power to appoint a special prosecutor armed with the authority to file an information without the prior written authority or approval of the
city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275 provides the manner by which special prosecutors are appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. - Whenever the exigencies of the service require the creation of positions of additional counsel to assist provincial
and city fiscals in the discharge of their duties, positions of Special Counsels may be created by any province or city, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, and with salaries chargeable against provincial or city funds. The Secretary of Justice shall appoint said Special
Counsels, upon recommendation of the provincial or city fiscal and regional state prosecutors concerned, either on permanent or temporary
basis.
Special Counsel shall be appointed from members of the bar and shall be allowed not more than the salary rate provided in this Decree for the
lowest rank or grade of assistant fiscal in the province or city where assigned. (emphases supplied)
Under Department Order No. 318,38 "Defining the authority, duties and responsibilities of regional state prosecutors," then Acting Secretary of
Justice Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the appointed regional state prosecutors (which included Regional State Prosecutor Turingan for Region V)
to, among others, "(i)nvestigate and/or prosecute, upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice, specific criminal cases filed within the region."
(emphasis supplied)
703
In the case at bar, there is no pretense that a directive was issued by the Secretary of Justice to Regional State Prosecutor Turingan to
investigate and/or prosecute SSS cases filed within his territorial jurisdiction. A bare reading of the alleged letter of commendation by then
Secretary Hernando Perez would show that it does not amount to a directive or even a recognition of this authority. In fact, while the letter of
Secretary Perez commends the efforts of Regional State Prosecutor Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, it also negates his authority
to prosecute them. Secretary Perez called the Regional State Prosecutor’s attention to DOJ Circular No. 27, series of 2001, which states that all
important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. 39 Thus, Regional State Prosecutor Turingan
cannot be considered a special prosecutor within the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word "may" is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such
instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word "may" is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We
agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word "may" should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the
Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word "may" is mandatory. It states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. – x x x
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such
action. (emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor should have been obtained, we shall now
resolve the more important issue: whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an
information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to
paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.—The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion,
shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz:
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied)
704
Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a
defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss
based on this ground. As basis, they cite the case of Villa v. Ibañez, et al.40 where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an information before he filed a motion to quash, and it is contended that by his plea he waived all objections
to the informations. The contention is correct as far as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by
express provision of section 10 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court (now Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions
of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. Now, the objection to the respondent’s actuations goes to the very
foundation of the jurisdiction. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the
court over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.41 (emphasis supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for the principle that lack of authority on the part of the filing officer prevents the court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law while jurisdiction over the case is invested by the act of plaintiff and
attaches upon the filing of the complaint or information.42 Hence, while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, like a violation
of the SSS Law, it does not acquire jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of the information.
In the United States, an information has been held as a jurisdictional requirement upon which a defendant stands trial. Thus, it has been ruled
that in the absence of probable cause, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the criminal offense.43 In our jurisdiction, we have similarly held that:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter
of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by appellant, the moment such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction over the
crime, and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, from which time the right and power of the court to try the
accused attaches. (citations omitted) It is not for the defendant to exercise that choice, which is lodged upon those who may validly file or
subscribe to the complaint or information under sections 2 and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. 44 (emphasis supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be useful in resolving the issue at hand. In that case, Atty. Abelardo Subido, Chief of the Division of Investigation in
the Office of the Mayor of Manila, was appointed by the Secretary of Justice as special counsel to assist the City Fiscal of Manila in the cases
involving city government officials or employees. Pursuant to his appointment, Atty. Subido filed an information against Pedro Villa for
falsification of a payroll. Atty. Subido’s authority to file the information was challenged on the ground that he was disqualified for appointment
under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. — The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the
same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General.45
We held, viz:
Appointments by the Secretary of Justice in virtue of the foregoing provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, were upheld in
Lo Cham vs. Ocampo et al., 44 Official Gazette, 458, and Go Cam et al., vs. Gatmaitan et al., (47 Official Gazette, 5092). But in those cases, the
appointees were officials or employees in one or another of the bureaus or offices under the Department of Justice, and were rightly
considered subordinates in the office of the Secretary of Justice within the meaning of section 1686, ante.
The case at bar does not come within the rationale of the above decisions. Attorney Subido is a regular officer or employee in the Department
of Interior, more particularly in the City Mayor’s office. For this reason, he belongs to the class of persons disqualified for appointment to the
post of special counsel.
That to be eligible as special counsel to aid a fiscal the appointee must be either an employee or officer in the Department of Justice is so
manifest from a bare reading of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as to preclude construction. And the limitation of the range
of choice in the appointment or designation is not without reason.
The obvious reason is to have appointed only lawyers over whom the Secretary of Justice can exercise exclusive and absolute power of
supervision. An appointee from a branch of the government outside the Department of Justice would owe obedience to, and be subject to
orders by, mutually independent superiors having, possibly, antagonistic interests. Referring particularly to the case at hand for illustration,
Attorney Subido could be recalled or his time and attention be required elsewhere by the Secretary of Interior or the City Mayor while he was
discharging his duties as public prosecutor, and the Secretary of Justice would be helpless to stop such recall or interference. An eventuality or
state of affairs so undesirable, not to say detrimental to the public service and specially the administration of justice, the Legislature wisely
intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951 Villa ruling is not confined to instances where the person who filed the information is disqualified from being a
special prosecutor under Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, but has been extended to various cases where the
information was filed by an unauthorized officer as in the case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 46 the Court held that it is a
705
fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor
resurrected by amendment. In that case, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) conducted an investigation and filed an
information with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr. charging him with graft and corruption. The petitioner sought to quash
the information on the ground that the crime charged did not constitute a "Marcos crony related crime" over which the PCGG had authority to
investigate and file an information. The Court found that the crime alleged in the information was not among those which PCGG was
authorized to investigate under Executive Orders No. 1 and 14 of then President Corazon Aquino and ruled that the information was null and
void. Of similar import is Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, et al.47 where we ruled that the information having been filed by an unauthorized party
(the PCGG), the information was fatally flawed. We noted that this defect is not a mere remediable defect of form, but a defect that could not
be cured.1awphi1.net
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et al.,48 we also reiterated the Villa ruling. The accused in that case was apprehended in Mabalacat, Pampanga for
illegal possession of firearms and was brought to Angeles City where the headquarters of the arresting officers was located. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information in the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. We invalidated the information filed by the City
Prosecutor because he had no territorial jurisdiction, as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga and his territorial jurisdiction was
only in Angeles City. We held that an information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another.49 Otherwise, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.50 It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. The accused’s plea to an
information may be a waiver of all formal objections to the said information but not when there is want of jurisdiction. Questions relating to
lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing
it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.51
Despite modifications of the provisions on unauthorized filing of information contained in the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure under which
Villa was decided, the 1951 Villa ruling continues to be the prevailing case law on the matter.52
The 1940 Rules of Court provided in Rule 113, Section 10 that, if the defendant fails to move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads thereto, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash except (1) "when the complaint or
information does not charge an offense" or (2) "the court is without jurisdiction of the same." (emphasis ours) Among the enumerated
grounds for a motion to quash under Section 2 of the same Rule was "(t)hat the fiscal has no authority to file the information." With only the
above two exceptions provided by the 1940 Rules, the Court nevertheless made the Villa ruling that if the filing officer lacks authority to file
the information, jurisdiction is not conferred on the court and this infirmity cannot be cured by silence or waiver, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was amended in 1964. With only minimal changes introduced, the 1964 Rules of Court contained provisions on
unauthorized filing of information similar to the above provisions of the 1940 Rules. 53
Then came the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lack of authority of the officer who filed the information was also a ground for a motion to
quash under these rules. The 1985 Rules also provided for waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash under Rule 117, Section 8, but
enumerated the following exceptions to the waiver: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (c) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) the
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. Apparently, the want of
jurisdiction under the 1985 Rules refers to jurisdiction over the offense and the person, and not over the case as in Villa where the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case for lack of authority of the officer who filed the information. Still, despite the enumeration, the Court
continued to apply the Villa ruling as shown in the afore-cited Cruz and Cudia cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in 2000. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for lack of authority of the filing officer as
among the grounds for a motion to quash and the waiver of these grounds. Similar to the 1985 Rules, the Revised Rules enumerate the
exceptions from the waiver, namely: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (d) that the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. Under the regime of the 2000 Revised Rules, we reiterated the Villa ruling in the above-cited Romualdez case. With the enumeration
of the four exceptions, which was almost a replica of the enumeration in the 1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did not intend to abandon Villa. The
Villa ruling subsisted alongside the enumerated exceptions under the 1985 Rules, and it remains to do so under the enumerated exceptions
under the 2000 Rules. Neither the Rationale of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules of Court evinces any intent to abandon the doctrine enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor
for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The respondent court’s orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are
AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new information by an authorized officer.
SO ORDERED.
706
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 136264 May 28, 2004
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICENTE Q. ROXAS, IRENE AGBADA-CRUZ, SIXTO AGBADA CRUZ, MERCEDES ARISTORENAS and ROMEO
GOMEZ and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) dated November 13, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 43884, denying Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac’s petition for certiorari and ruling that the Regional Trial Court (Branch 227) of
Quezon City (RTC for brevity) was correct in denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information charging petitioner with falsification of
public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
The antecedent facts as borne out by the records of the case are accurately narrated in the CA Decision dated November 13, 1998, thus:
An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed
against petitioner along with some others. That information reads:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses LOURDES ANGELES, ESTRELLA MAPA, ATTY. PONCIANO R. GUPIT, and
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT (under Article 172, first and last
paragraph in relation to Article 171 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of 1986, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit the act of falsification of
public documents, by then and there falsifying or causing the falsification of the following documents, to wit:
(a) Certification dated March 10, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Fernando Dizon, Record
Management Analyst of the Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila;
(b) Report dated May 5, 1986 purportedly signed by a certain Jose Mariano, Chief Record Management
Division of Bureau of Land, Central Office, Manila; and
(c) Sales Certificate and Deed of Assignment allegedly issued by the Bureau of Land in favor of Lourdes
Angeles; that despite the fact that said accused knew all the time that said documents are fake and
spurious used the same in the Petition for Reconstitution of Records of the technical description of Lots
Nos. 755, 777, 778 and 783 of the Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. 14, Decree No. 667, GLRO Record
No. 5975 and the issuance of Title thereto filed by Estrella Mapa over and involving the aforesaid lots in
Land Registration Case docketed as LRC Case No. 3369 (86) before Branch 99, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City and that by virtue of said falsification and the use of the same as evidence in Court
Honorable Presiding Judge Godofredo Asuncion issued an order dated June 30, 1986 granting said
petition, and pursuant thereto the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. 348156, 348291 and 348292 in the name of Estrella Mapa thereby embracing and/or
encroaching the portions of the properties belonging to Romeo D. Gomez, Sixto Agbada, Irene Agbada-
Cruz and Mercedes Aristorenas whose properties were embraced and included in the said Transfer
Certificates of Titles and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer who filed the
information had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned.
By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T. Dayaw of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to whose sala Criminal
Case No. Q-91-18037 was raffled, holding that the "grant or denial of Motion to Dismiss whether the accused is arraigned or not is
discretionary on the part of the Court," it citing People vs. IAC, L-66939-41, January 10, 1987, granted the petitioner’s motion to
quash upon the second ground. Accordingly, the information was quashed.
707
More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on October 19, 1993, the Quezon
City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of public documents
docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989. The Informations arose from the questioned acts of
falsification subject of the earlier quashed information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037.
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the informations were raffled a motion for the quashal
thereof on the ground of double jeopardy, citing Section 3(h) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the same offenses and
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996, public respondent, Judge Vicente Q. Roxas of Branch 227 of the RTC of Quezon City to
which the two (2) informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually lodged, held that the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
49988 involved a different document as that involved in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 which had already been quashed. Resolution
of the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49989 was stayed pending the submission by petitioner of the
documents required by the court a quo. Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-49988 and ordered petitioner’s arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in double jeopardy. 2
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which denied his petition stating in its Decision that since the Information in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037, on petitioner’s motion, was quashed on the ground that more than one offense was charged pursuant to Sec. 3
(e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court,3 he is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another Information for an offense included
in the charge subject of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037.4
Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors of the CA, to wit:
I. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in disregarding the legal doctrine that THERE IS DOUBLE JEOPARDY, in the case now
pending before Respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas;
II. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not adhering to the decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court, as well as to
applicable jurisprudence on the matter;
III. That the Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in not taking into account that based on the "Manifestation and Motion (To Grant
Petition) In Lieu of Comment" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the ORDER of dismissal of Honorable Judge Benigno T.
Dayaw in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 on August 23, 1991 has become final and executory; and
IV. That the Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals ERRED in concluding that an ORDER sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense, as it has no legal basis.5
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that petitioner, by filing the motion to quash and refusing to withdraw it
after he was arraigned, is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy, as his motion to quash constituted his express consent for
the dismissal of the information. However, the OSG advances the view that the criminal case against herein petitioner may be dismissed for
the inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing the proper information, which is a violation of the
accused’s constitutional right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of cases.
Private respondent complainant Irene Agbada-Cruz, in turn, submits that the Court of Appeals committed no error since the dismissal or
quashal of an information is not a bar to another prosecution except when the motion to quash is based on the ground that (1) the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished or that (2) the accused has previously been convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of
the offense charged, pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception. - An order sustaining the motion to
quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 3,
sub-sections (f) and (h) of this Rule.
Section 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
(c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
708
(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses;
(f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense
charged. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private respondent Cruz argues that since the previous information was quashed on the ground of duplicity of offenses charged, the
subsequent filing of a proper information is, therefore, not barred.
In their Memorandum, private respondents-complainants Romeo Gomez and Mercedes Aristorenas contend that (1) jeopardy does not attach
where the dismissal of the information was effected at the instance of the accused; and (2) there was no violation of petitioner’s right to a
speedy disposition of his case since he never raised this issue in the trial court nor in the appellate court, hence, his silence should be
interpreted as a waiver of said right to a speedy trial.
The issues boil down to (1) whether or not the prosecution of petitioner under the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988
would constitute double jeopardy, considering that when the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was previously quashed, he had
already been arraigned, and (2) whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been violated.
With regard to the first issue, we are in accord with the ruling of the CA that not all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at
bench. In People vs. Tac-An,6 we enumerated the elements that must exist for double jeopardy to be invoked, to wit:
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment? We answer in the affirmative. In People vs. Bugayong,7 we ruled that when an appellant
fails to file a motion to quash within the time prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, he is thus deemed to have waived the
defect in the Information. In People vs. Manalili,8 we held that an accused, who fails to object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous
information, may be found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements
of such component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an accused be informed of the nature of the
offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused,
because of such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during trial.
The validity of the information having been established, we go on to examine whether the other requisites for double jeopardy to attach are
present. In the present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court and petitioner, as the accused, had already been
arraigned therein, entering a valid plea of not guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent, is not present.
It should be noted that the termination of Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was upon motion of petitioner who, on April 1, 1991, filed with the
court an Urgent Motion to Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23, 1991. In Sta. Rita vs. Court of Appeals,9 we held that the
reinstatement of criminal cases against the accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by
the trial court had been effected at his own instance when the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous
criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly
given his consent to such dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the
dismissal be without accused’s express consent, is not present.
As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations docketed as Q-93-49988 and Q-93-49989 constitutes a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases,10 we rule in the
negative. We are not convinced by the OSG’s assertion that the cases of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan11 or Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman,12 are
applicable to the case before us. We see differently. There is no factual similarity between this case before us and the cases
of Tatad and Angchangco.
In the Tatad case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the termination of the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October
25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985. The Court found that "political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
709
prosecutorial process"13 against then Secretary Francisco S. Tatad. In the Angchangco case, the criminal complaints remained pending in the
Office of the Ombudsman for more than six years despite the respondent’s numerous motions for early resolution and the respondent, who
had been retired, was being unreasonably deprived of the fruits of his retirement because of the still unresolved criminal complaints against
him. In both cases, we ruled that the period of time that elapsed for the resolution of the cases against the petitioners therein was deemed a
violation of the accused’s right to a speedy disposition of cases against them.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is
no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper informations,
unlike in the Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an unreasonably long time. Thus, the
circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases justifying the "radical relief" granted by us in said cases are not existent in the
present case.
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan14 where we held that:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the
determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of the
delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional
guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we shall examine how such aforementioned factors affected herein petitioner’s right.
As to the length of delay, it is established that the prosecution did not take any action on petitioner’s case for two years. From the time that
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the prosecution failed to effect the very simple remedy of filing two separate
informations against petitioner until October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the refiling of the proper informations. However, the
prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain the circumstances that may have caused such delay precisely because petitioner never
raised the issue of the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the case. There is nothing on record to show what happened during the
two-year lull before the filing of the proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that the
delay was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and therefore, a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he raised in
assailing the subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to light
the issue on petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case, and only when the case was brought to the appellate court on certiorari. Even
in this petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Again, it was only the OSG that
presented such issue to us in the Brief for the State which was only then adopted by petitioner through a Manifestation dated August 3, 1999.
We are not convinced that the filing of the informations against petitioner after two years was an unreasonable delay. Petitioner himself did
not really believe that there was any violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him.
The case which is more in point with the present one before us is Dela Peña vs. Sandiganbayan15 where we ruled that petitioner therein, for
failing to assert their right to a speedy disposition of their cases, was deemed to have waived such right and thus, not entitled to the "radical
relief" granted by the Court in the cases of Tatad and Angchangco. The factual circumstances surrounding herein petitioner’s case do not
demonstrate that there was any violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued pursuant to our Resolution dated January
17, 2000 is hereby LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 227) is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with
petitioner’s arraignment in Criminal Case No. Q-93-49988.
SO ORDERED.
710
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180299 January 31, 2008
LYNDON D. BOISER, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari2 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated June 5, 2007 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP.
No. 02368.3
The main issue in this case is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC which denied petitioner's
omnibus motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Based on the findings of the CA, the pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 2004, three (3) Informations were filed against petitioner, charging him with acts of lasciviousness, other acts of child abuse, and
rape4 of minor AAA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tagbilaran, Bohol.
On June 11, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion praying that a hearing be conducted to determine the existence of probable cause and to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him. On June 16, 2004, private respondent filed an Opposition thereto.
On June, 18, 2004, the family court issued three (3) separate Orders in the three (3) criminal cases, directing the prosecution to submit
additional evidence on the cases along with the transcript of proceedings during the preliminary investigation. On June 20, 2004, the
prosecutor filed a Manifestation saying that the prosecution had no additional evidence to present and that due to the non-availability of a
stenographer who could take down notes during the preliminary investigation on April 28, 2004 and May 7, 2004, he personally took down
notes, and submitted certified photocopies of the same to the court. On July 2, 2004, the family court directed the City Prosecution Office in
Tagbilaran City to complete the preliminary investigation in a regular manner with duly recorded proceedings attended by a stenographer. On
August 4, 2004, a Reinvestigation Report was submitted by the prosecutor maintaining the existence of probable cause in the three cases.
On August 9, 2004, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Determination of Probable Cause. On September 10, 2004, the family court issued
three (3) separate Orders finding probable cause against petitioner in the three (3) cases, issued a warrant of arrest against him and fixed the
corresponding bail for each case. On November 19 and 24, 2004, petitioner filed Motions to Inhibit the judge of Branch 1 from hearing the 3
cases. The judge acceded. Thereafter, the cases were raffled to Branch 2 of the same court. On March 1, 2005, petitioner again filed a Motion
to Inhibit the judge of Branch 2. The same was granted and the case was raffled to Branch 4 of the same court. Then again, petitioner filed a
Motion to Inhibit the Judge of Branch 4. The three (3) cases were then raffled to Branch 49 of the said court.
On August 19, 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the three (3) Informations to which private respondent filed an Opposition.
On June 30, 2006, Branch 49 issued a Joint Order denying the aforesaid motion. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner citing
absence of probable cause and lack of jurisdiction over his person as grounds in support of his motion. However, upon the request of private
respondent's parents, the Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from hearing the three (3) cases. Finally, the cases were raffled to Branch 3 of
the RTC of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge Venancio J. Amila (Judge Amila).
On November 6, 2006, the lower court issued an Omnibus Order denying petitioner's omnibus motion for reconsideration to quash the
informations. On November 22, 2006, petitioner filed anew an Urgent Omnibus Motion to Quash. On November 30, 2006, the RTC issued an
Order denying the second omnibus motion to quash, and set the arraignment on December 15, 2006. A day before the arraignment, petitioner
filed a Second Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash.
On December 15, 2006, petitioner reminded Judge Amila of his second omnibus motion for reconsideration. Judge Amila, in open court,
denied for lack of merit the second omnibus motion for reconsideration. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea for the 3 cases.
Accordingly, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner for each of the 3 criminal cases.
On January 2, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari5 before the CA claiming that the family court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the orders denying his omnibus motions to quash the informations.
On June 5, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision6 affirming the Orders of the RTC. In denying the petition, the CA ratiocinated that it cannot
reverse the RTC orders because: (1) an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and not appealable; and (2) the petitioner failed to
positively prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in the issuance of the assailed orders. The fallo of the Decision reads:
711
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed orders of the respondent judge are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.7
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which the CA denied in a Resolution 8 dated September 19, 2007.
On November 16, 2007, petitioner filed the instant case raising the following arguments:
The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided [a] question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has
decided it in a way not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court:
That the Honorable Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court.9
We resolve to deny the petition.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy against an order denying a motion to quash. The accused should instead go to
trial, without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.10 Based on the findings of the investigating prosecutor and of the
trial judge, probable cause exists to indict petitioner for the 3 offenses. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the investigating
prosecutor or any other officer authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and
determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.11
It is obvious to this Court that petitioner's insistent filing of numerous motions to inhibit the judge hearing the 3 criminal cases and of motions
to quash is a ploy to delay the proceedings, a reprehensible tactic that impedes the orderly administration of justice. If he is truly innocent,
petitioner should bravely go to trial and prove his defense. After all, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.12
As to the allegation of petitioner that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over his person, this issue has been rendered moot and academic
with petitioner's arraignment in the 3 cases and his taking part in the proceedings therein.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
712
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141646 February 28, 2003
PABLO CONDRADA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ARNULFO C. BUGTAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch
2, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 dated September 29, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, which upheld the reinstatement of the criminal case for rape against petitioner Pablo Condrada, and its
Resolution2 dated January 14, 2000 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with rape in Criminal Case No. 10770 presently pending before the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2. When
he was arraigned on February 26, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
On March 31, 1999, the date set by the trial court for the initial hearing, the prosecution moved that the same be postponed due to the
absence of the complainant and her witnesses. The hearing was reset on April 29, 1999.
On April 29, 1999, the prosecution again moved to postpone the hearing due to the absence of the complainant and her witnesses. Petitioner
objected to the motion on the ground that his right to speedy trial was being violated by such postponements. The trial court granted the
prosecution’s motion and reset the hearing on May 31, 1999. It also directed that the subpoenae to the complainant and her witnesses be
coursed through the National Bureau of Investigation which handled the investigation of the case.
During the hearing on May 31, 1999, the prosecution requested for another postponement. Petitioner moved for at least a temporary
dismissal of the case. The prosecution manifested that it would not object to a temporary dismissal. Thus, on the same date, the trial court
issued an order temporarily dismissing the case.3
On June 22, 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reinstatement and/or Revival of Criminal Case No. 10770. Appended to said motion was
the affidavit of private complainant that the subpoenae sent to her for the trial of the case did not reach her because in the meantime she had
transferred her residence.1awphi1.nét
The trial court set the hearing on the motion for reinstatement on June 25, 1999. Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the revival or
reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy. On September 29, 1999, the Court issued a resolution reinstating the said case
and reiterating the issuance of a warrant of arrest for petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution insisting that the reinstatement of the case will place him in double jeopardy.
On January 14, 2000, the court issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner. Consequently, Criminal Case No.
10770 is still pending before the trial court.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition on February 1, 2000. He claims that Criminal Case No. 10770 cannot be revived because the
dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 is permanent in character, having been made in consideration of his right to speedy trial.4 1a\^/phi1.net
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the case was dismissed not because petitioner’s right to speedy trial has been violated
by the postponements of the trial on several instances, but because petitioner through counsel moved that the case be dismissed at least even
temporarily to which the public prosecutor interposed no objection.5 The Solicitor General points out that the prosecution moved for the
postponement of the trial several times in good faith and for valid reasons.6 He likewise argues that the revival of the case does not place the
petitioner twice in jeopardy for the same offense because the dismissal of the case on May 31, 1999 was made at petitioner’s instance.7
The issues for resolution are (1) Whether or not the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 by the trial court in its Order of June 25, 1999 is
permanent in character so as to operate as an acquittal of the petitioner for the crime charged; and (2) Whether or not the reinstatement of
Criminal Case No. 10770 places the petitioner in double jeopardy.
There is no merit in the petition.
A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal
of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to the prosecution’s failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of
713
unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy disposition or trial of the case against him. In contrast, a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes
final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense8 within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised
Rules of Court.
In the present case, it is clear from the records that the dismissal ordered by the trial court on May 31, 1999 was a temporary dismissal of the
case, and not a permanent dismissal on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated by the delay in the
prosecution of the said case. The trial court apparently denied petitioner’s motion to have Criminal Case No. 10770 dismissed on the ground of
his right to speedy trial when despite said motion made in open court on April 29, 1999, it ordered the resetting of the hearing of the case on
May 31, 1999. In subsequently granting petitioner’s request for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999, the trial court
expressly stated that the same was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of the temporary dismissal. The trial court
explained:
… The defense, however, moved for, at least a temporary dismissal of the case, to which the government prosecutor acceded provided the
same is temporary. Thus, as prayed for by the defense, the court on May 31, 1999 issued an order dismissing the case temporarily subject to
its reinstatement and/or revival within a period of thirty (30) days; otherwise, if the case is not revived within the aforesaid period, the case
would be considered dismissed permanently.9
Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 10770 on May 31, 1999 was provisional or temporary, without
prejudice to the revival thereof within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Thus, the Court finds that the reinstatement thereof on June 25,
1999 did not place petitioner in double jeopardy.1awphi1.nét
The proscription against double jeopardy10 presupposes that an accused has been previously charged with an offense, and the case against him
is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following
requisites must be present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) the
arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination
of the case against him without his express consent. However, there are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach
even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge
against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy trial. 11
Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770 because as earlier stated, said
case was provisionally dismissed by the trial court upon his motion. Thus, the requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the
consent of the accused is not present in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforecited exceptions. The prosecution had not
yet presented evidence at the time the case was dismissed on May 31, 1999. Moreover, as previously explained, said dismissal was temporary
in nature, as the case was subject to reinstatement within thirty days from the date of dismissal. Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of
the trial court in allowing the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10770.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
714
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON
RESOLUTION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.2 The said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacson's Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with
application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or
the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al." pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
(1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about
4:00 A.M. that day.3
(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang
members was a "rub-out" or summary execution and not a shootout.4
(3) In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others, that he was part of a composite police team called the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Command (NCRC) and
headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by
Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. Delos Reyes
claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gang's safe house in Superville
Subdivision, Parañaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and
brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were
shot to death by elements of ABRITFG.5
(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos
Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the time they were
killed in Commonwealth Avenue.6
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were
arrested in Superville Subdivision.7
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman
against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the
same officers and personnel.8
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel
was headed by Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blancaflor. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution
recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause.
(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and
Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20, 1995, the review panel
reversed the Blancaflor resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers
and personnel of ABRITFG.9
(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as
principals.10 The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048;
Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case
No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053; Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055; Sherwin
Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
715
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended
Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal
to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 11
(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal
cases as none of the "principal" accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing
Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court.12
(12) The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249
took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in Section 2 of R. A.
No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal,
accomplice or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in
any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval.13
(13) In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,14 respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered
the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that
the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No.
8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez
recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora,15 Leonora Amora,16 Nenita Alap-ap,17 Imelda Montero,18Margarita
Redillas,19 Carmelita Elcamel20 and Rolando Siplon21 also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer
interested to prosecute these cases.22
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to (1)
make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of
the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22,
199923 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their
stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as
witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyer's League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution
witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her
affidavit.24
(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution25 dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd,
with the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. There is no more
evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-
cited, there is no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open and public accusation. It is time to
write finis to these cases and lay to rest the ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved--- the accused, the
prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike--- may get on with their lives.
The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999)
where the Supreme Court said that the general rule is that 'if the Information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence,
because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial', and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception
to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.'
This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
accused or to hold them for trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby ordered dismissed."
716
SO ORDERED."26
(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu
and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement,
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend
the investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.27
(21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their constitutional right against double jeopardy, filed a petition for
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933
and raffled to Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.28
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an Order29 dated June 5, 2001, viz:
"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and
without any recorded arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal was a direct consequence of
the finding of the Quezon City RTC that no probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein and
to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put the case in a different perspective since
the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is the
complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of
PNP Chief Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit "B") together with the sworn statements of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2"
and "3" - supportive of the refiling of the case (Exhibit "9").
xxx xxx xxx
Above considered, this Court finds petitioners have not preliminarily established that they have a right to be preserved pending
hearing on the injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED."30
(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The new Informations
charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent Lacson and his twenty-five (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari 31 against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of
Justice, the PNP Chief, State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the People of the Philippines. The said
petition was amended to implead as additional party-respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in
which the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed.32
(25) The Second Amended Petition33 dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
"The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as
they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued, and the
invalidity of the new Informations for Murder filed against petitioners and others, all in defiance of law and jurisprudence as shown
by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic by
concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 by the QC RTC was not final and executory, hence [i]
the complaints therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner's arraignment while the case had not yet been remanded to the QC
RTC and while the Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-2048] was void, notwithstanding that
the only issue in the TRO application was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as defined in S1 and S3, Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter file new Informations
on June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679-Q-99-81689 on the basis of affidavits filed after
said cases were dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule 117, cases similar to those filed against the
petitioner and others (where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be revived after two (2) years
from the date the dismissal order was issued.
717
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken
by respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in
insisting that a valid complaint was filed in clear violation of the Rules and case law thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner
had shown that an inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to file his counter-affidavit without which his indictment for
a non-bailable offense is assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes."34
(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also filed with the RTC-QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent Lacson, however,
filed a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. 35
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any
proceeding or hearing in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112.36
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as "provisional dismissal," and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 as
mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against
the respondent, viz:
"In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of [the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the
cases presently sought to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the dismissed cases. The present
controversy, being one involving "provisional dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the prescriptive
period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said
provision is couched in clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from
the DOJ's issuance of subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more than two (2) years after the
issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City's Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived.
Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such efforts to revive the criminal cases are now definitely
barred by the two-year prescriptive period provided therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioner,
PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings conducted by
respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Panfilo M. Lacson, et al." and filed
before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L. Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."37
The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the filing of the eleven (11) informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of
some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.- A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived."
Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue
due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the
cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-
year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent.
It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is
beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that
718
the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only
presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a
witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the
three (3)38 other victims, namely: Meleubren Soronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show whether they were
notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge
Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the prosecutors from
reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of
respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not
tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson
and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for
respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to
entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals
where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against
him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended
parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. To be sure, there is a statement in the
Decision of the appellate court to the effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were notified of the
hearing x x x."39 It is doubtful whether this finding is supported by the records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's finding
that only seven (7) of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are
being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date
of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various offended parties or from the
date of the effectivity of the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline.
The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar.
In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is
not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined.
Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to
adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed
facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC - Quezon City, Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the
respondent Lacson can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the
basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
should be dismissed or not. Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against the respondent Lacson.
Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
SO ORDERED.
719
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 147650-52 October 16, 2003

vs.
RODOLFO S. PEPITO, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
RODOLFO S. PEPITO was found guilty by the court a quo of three (3) counts of rape perpetrated against his own daughter Jelyn. For each
count, he was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify Jelyn ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.1 This
case is now before us on automatic review pursuant to law.
The prosecution built its case around the testimonies of five (5) witnesses: private complainant Jelyn Pepito, Medical Officer Dr. Efraim
Collado, DSWD Social Worker Lilibeth Santos-Palinis, accused’s maternal half-brother Joseph Francisco, and accused’s younger sister Jocelyn
Bueno. Culled from their testimonies, Jelyn’s calvary started when she was eight (8) years old. Born on 22 August 1980 2 Jelyn is the eldest of
seven (7) children of the accused Rodolfo S. Pepito and his wife Thelma Pepito. She lived with her parents, her three (3) brothers and three (3)
sisters in Barangay Balani, Sen. Ninoy Aquino, Sultan Kudarat. 3 They had a farm in Kalibuhan, Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, which served as their
family homestead.
Jelyn only reached Grade V. She was not able to finish her elementary education. Since she was eight (8) her father had already been molesting
her, kissing her and playing with her breasts and private parts.4 This episode in her life was known to her mother who chose to ignore it out of
fear of her father. He would threaten both of them with a gun.5 It was only when Jelyn was nearing her fifteenth (15th) birthday that her father
finally consummated his sexual assault on her which continued until 30 August 1997.
In her supplemental sworn statement,6 Jelyn declared that of the many times her father abused her she could only remember vividly three (3)
instances: on 26 July 1995 when she was raped by her father for the first time; on 9 June 1996 when she was raped during the birthday of her
youngest sister Jemayde;7 and, on 30 August 1997 being the last time her father raped her.
Jelyn was only fourteen (14) when her father first sexually abused her. It happened in the evening of 26 July 1995 when her brothers Rino,
Ronillo, Romy and sisters Jovelyn and Jonavie were sleeping with her inside their room in Barangay Balani, Sen. Ninoy Aquino, Sultan Kudarat,
while her youngest sister Jemayde slept with their mother in another room. Jelyn was awakened when she felt somebody, whom she later
recognized to be her father, touched her breasts and private parts. Jelyn struggled and tried to awaken her brothers and sisters but the
accused pushed them away from her and warned her not to move. He pinned down her hands and knees, covered her mouth with his hands
and threatened to kill her when she attempted to shout.8 Thereupon, he ordered her to remove her underwear. When she refused he boxed
her in the abdomen. After removing her underwear and short pants, he mounted her and inserted his penis by force into her vagina. Jelyn felt
pain. The accused simultaneously massaged and sucked her breasts and made a push and pull movement above her for about five (5)
minutes.9 After satisfying his lust, he got up and went to the other room to sleep with her mother. The following morning Jelyn confided to her
mother what happened to her the night before. But her mother did not react accordingly for fear that the accused might kill them.10
On 9 June 1996, birthday of Jelyn’s younger sister Jemayde, the accused again sexually assaulted Jelyn who was then sleeping in the same
room with her brothers Ronillo and Romy and sisters Jovelyn and Jonavie. Somebody turned off the light and entered the room. It was her
father. He raised her T-shirt, removed her underwear and short pants, touched her breasts and private parts, spread her legs, mounted her
and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. She resisted but her father held her on both hands. Jelyn again felt pain as her father did the
push and pull movement on top of her.11 He warned her not to shout. With his gun, she could no longer resist him.12 After the accused was
through with her, he returned to the other room which he shared with her mother. The following morning Jelyn tried to tell her mother again
about the incident, but because of fear her mother could only advise her not to inform anybody about what happened to her. 13
In the evening of 30 August 1997, after coming from a four (4)-hour trip by foot to plant corn in Kalibuhan, Palimbang, with her mother and
sister Jemayde, another incident happened.14 While sleeping beside her sister on the floor of their hut and about half a meter away from her
mother, her father who was sleeping with her mother moved to her (Jelyn) side and without her consent removed her long pants and
underwear. She pushed him away but he boxed her. It was so strong that it caused her to bump a post which rendered her unconscious. But
before she blacked out, Jelyn was able to wake Jemayde up who bit and kicked their father who was in the act of sexually abusing Jelyn.
Before appellant could satisfy his lust, Jelyn regained consciousness.1awphi1.nét Their mother incidentally woke up and saw what he was
doing to their daughter. Jelyn’s mother attempted to come to her side but the accused threatened her with his gun. Her mother could not do
anything. Her sister asked the accused what he was doing to Jelyn and he said that he was riding ("sakay-sakay") Jelyn. After his lechery, the
accused lay down beside Jelyn but her mother pushed him and positioned herself between them. Jelyn was not able to sleep due to body pains
caused by her father. But she had to keep the matter to herself because she was afraid of her father.15
720
Sometime in November 1997 Jelyn’s uncle, Joseph Francisco, maternal half-brother of her father and who frequently visited them in their
house in Barangay Balani, noticed that Jelyn looked pale and oftentimes nauseated. Joseph found out later on through a "hilot" summoned by
his grandmother that Jelyn was pregnant. He brought Jelyn to the Quijano Clinic in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, for pregnancy test16 and the
result confirmed her pregnancy. On 6 December 1997 Jelyn confided to her uncle the sexual abuses she suffered in the hands of her own
father.17
Joseph brought Jelyn back to Barangay Balani. On 11 December 1997 he entrusted her to her aunt Jocelyn Bueno, his half-sister. Forthwith
they reported the sexual assaults to the Municipal Police of Sen. Ninoy Aquino and had them entered in the police blotter. Jocelyn revealed to
the police that her brother, the accused, had even attempted to sexually assault her when she was still single although she was able to repulse
him.
The accused was arrested on 16 December 1997.18 Eventually, the appropriate Information was filed against him in the Regional Trial Court of
Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, for multiple rape.19
Dr. Efraim Collado, Medical Officer V of the Municipal Health Office of the Municipality of Tacurong, testified that he examined Jelyn on 9
January 1998 and found that Jelyn was approximately in her sixteenth (16th) week of gestation. No further internal examination was necessary
to prove the presence of lacerations as Dr. Collado felt that this was immaterial considering that the victim was already pregnant.20
On 16 January 1998 her aunt Jocelyn Bueno brought Jelyn to the DSWD because her mother tried to convince them to withdraw the case and
abort the pregnancy.21 Jelyn and her aunt were met and admitted by Social Worker Lilibeth Santos-Palinis through Social Worker Melba
Souribio of Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.
On 24 March 1998 while under the custody of the DSWD, Jelyn gave birth to Angelo Ernesto Pepito who died the following day. According to
Social Worker Santos-Palinis, Jelyn’s mother was not supportive of the case against the accused.22
During the arraignment on 25 September 1998, the trial court made the observation that the cases to be filed against the accused should be as
many as there were incidents of rape committed instead simply of multiple rape. Thus, the prosecution moved to defer the arraignment of the
accused in order to conduct further inquiry for the filing of the proper informations. Accordingly, the Information for multiple rape against the
accused was amended to conform to the evidence. An amended Information (Crim. Case No. 2491) 23 and two (2) additional Informations for
rape (Crim. Case Nos. 2528 and 2529)24 were filed against the accused.
On 2 December 1998 the accused pleaded not guilty to each of the charges against him. On motion of the prosecution and the defense, a joint
pre-trial and trial of the cases was granted. At the pre-trial, the defense admitted that private complainant Jelyn Pepito was the daughter of
the accused Rodolfo S. Pepito and that Jelyn Pepito was only fifteen (15) years old when she was first raped by her father.
For the defense, only the accused Rodolfo S. Pepito and his wife Thelma testified. Rodolfo raised the defense of denial and alibi plus the fact
that he could not sexually abuse his own daughter. He averred that for five (5) years since 1992 he lived in Sitio Puting Bato, Kalibuhan,
Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, while his family was left behind in Barangay Balani. He visited his family once or twice a year during the fiesta on 10
January and the rice festival on 10 October. He confirmed the fact that it would take four (4) hours by walking to reach Barangay Balani from
Kalibuhan, a distance of some thirteen (13) kilometers.1^vvphi1.net
On the dates of the rapes charged against him, the accused claimed he was working in his farm. On 26 July 1995 he was in Kalibuhan and was
not able to visit his family in Banali during said month. On 9 June 1996 he was also in Kalibuhan working in his farm. On 30 August 1997 he was
still in Kalibuhan but his wife, together with their children Jelyn, Ronillo, Romy, Jovelyn and Jemayde and some of his nephews and nieces, was
there with him to celebrate Ronillo’s birthday. The party started at six o’clock in the evening and ended at midnight. He asserted that he could
not have raped Jelyn at that time for there were many people with them and some of them even slept in their hut. He also maintained that his
wife was not afraid of him. On the contrary, it was she who would chase him with a bolo every time she got mad at him. Furthermore, he
claimed that his sister Jocelyn Bueno only concocted the rape tales as she harbored a grudge against him. When Bueno saw him at the police
station after his arrest, she boxed and struck him on his shoulders shouting "because of my long grudge against you, I had already taken
revenge against you."25
Thelma Pepito, mother of Jelyn, testified that on 26 July 1995 and 9 June 1996 she and her seven (7) children were in Barangay Balani while
her husband was in Kalibuhan working in their farm. Thus, her husband could not have raped Jelyn. On 30 August 1997 she went to Kalibuhan
with Jelyn, Ronillo, Jovelyn and Jemayde to celebrate the birthday of Ronillo. Their children, including Jelyn, slept in their farmhouse. Her
husband did not and could not have sexually abused Jelyn "because we were many in our house at that time." Thelma vehemently denied
having been told by Jelyn that her father had raped her or that she had witnessed her husband sexually abusing Jelyn. She likewise declared
that she was not afraid of her husband because it was even she who would run after him with a bolo.26
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Jelyn anew. She declared that the accused was in their house in Barangay Balani on 26 July 1995 and
stayed there for a week. On 9 June 1996 the accused was again in Barangay Balani and remained there for a week. Further, on 30 August 1997
she was in Kalibuhan to celebrate her brother Ronillo’s birthday. It was true that there were visitors who attended the party but they all went
home soon after.27
721
On 15 December 2000 the trial court found the accused Rodolfo Pepito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape committed
against his minor daughter Jelyn and sentenced him to death for each count.
Appellant Pepito now contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of three (3) counts of rape as charged in three (3) separate
Informations despite the existence of some form of consent on the part of the victim which necessarily created reasonable doubt on his guilt.
He likewise claims that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.1awphi1.nét
In his first assigned error, appellant harps on the lack of resistance and struggle exerted by the private complainant during the three (3)
occasions she was supposedly abused. He avers that he was able to succeed in placing himself on top of Jelyn considering that as shown in the
first and second incidents of rape, there was no tenacious objection on her part. He asseverates further that Jelyn could have kicked him or
kept on struggling until such time that he would desist from his sexual assault or she could have shouted for help so that her brothers and
sisters would be awakened. Her comportment showed a passive rather than determined resistance. Furthermore, he states that this is
contrary to the rule that the offended party in rape cases must put up some resistance to protect her chastity, not only at the initial stage of
the assault but during all the time that the dastardly act is being done to her. He gauges such actuation as tantamount to consent, thus making
his conviction for three (3) counts of rape erroneous.
We are not persuaded. Such theory of appellant is unavailing, as it is belied by the testimony of Jelyn that she struggled against his sexual
advances by trying to shout and attempting to awaken her siblings who were with her in the room. Undoubtedly, such resistance negates
consent. Besides, it is highly inconceivable that Jelyn would simply yield to the bestial desires of her own father had not her resistance been
overpowered. Contrary to appellant’s contention, failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s
submission to his criminal acts considering that he was her father who has great moral ascendancy over her.
Resistance is not an element of rape and the absence thereof is not tantamount to consent.28 Threat or intimidation employed by rapists
against their victims, especially when they are minors (in this case the rapist’s own minor daughter) is such as to easily force the latter into
submission. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter yields herself
against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety.29
In the case at bar, it is convincing that a girl below the age of eighteen (18), especially one in Jelyn’s circumstances, would perceive the threats
on her to be especially intimidating. Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim and, being subjective, its presence cannot be tested by
any hard-and-fast rule but should instead be viewed in light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime.30 In any event, it is worthy to note that appellant exercised moral ascendancy over her. He was her father and the man of the house.
Thus, it was not hard for him to frighten her and for her to easily give in.
In review of rape cases, we have been guided by certain precepts. First, an accusation of rape can be made with facility. It may be difficult to
prove, but it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove. Second, the complainant’s testimony must be scrutinized
with extreme caution. This principle finds its basis in the very nature of the crime where usually only two (2) persons are involved. Third, the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.31
We have delved through the records of the case, especially Jelyn’s testimony, and we find no reason to doubt that she was telling the truth
when she declared that her father had raped her. No young girl, indeed, would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands
of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were
other than an earnest desire to seek justice.32 This holds true especially where the complainant is a minor, whose testimony deserves full
credence. And such credibility is definitely strengthened when the accusing finger is pointed at a close relative. 33 The court need only to
establish the credibility of the victim.
Moreover, it has been shown that Jelyn was trembling and in tears during her direct and cross-examinations. Such display of raw emotions
indicates the pain and humiliation that she felt as she recounted the details of her sordid experience.34 The fact that Jelyn’s own mother
testified in the accused’s defense does not render her tale any less true. In fact, under the circumstances, her mother should be condemned
for assuming such stance to the prejudice of her own innocent minor daughter. It is a sad reality of life that some mothers actually choose to
suffer in silence with their daughters rather than risk embarrassment of public trial and, for those in the marginalized sector, risk losing their
means of support when their breadwinner husbands land in jail.35
Further, appellant’s imputation of ill motive on his sister Jocelyn Bueno is an act of utter futility. That his sister who has a long standing
animosity toward him allegedly fabricated the rape charges thus making false Jelyn’s accusations, is his futile attempt at exculpation. This
shows his despair for a credible defense. Family resentment, revenge or feud has never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the
testimony of a complainant for rape,36especially a minor like Jelyn, who remained steadfast in her testimony that she was repeatedly sexually
abused. All told, the trial court observed that the testimony of Jelyn was given in a convincing manner and duly corroborated by the events
which followed after she was raped. We see no reason to depart from these findings.
That appellant could not defile his own seed and ravish her on three (3) different occasions in the presence of his family is a refutation which is
both dubious and egotistic. Appellant’s denial is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, hence deserves no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.37
722
Contrary to appellant’s contention, rape is not rendered impossible simply because the siblings of the victim who were with her in that small
room were not awakened during its commission. Lust has no regard for time and place. Likewise, there is no rule that rape can only be
committed in seclusion.1ªvvphi1.nét In fact, rape has been done even in places where people gather or when there are other occupants in the
same room or where other members of the family are also sleeping. Moreover, young children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and they
are not easily awakened by adult exertions, gyrations or suspirations in the night.38
Likewise, the alibi of appellant that he was farming in Kalibuhan and was not able to visit his family at the alleged date of the first and second
incidents is puerile. For his alibi to prosper, he must not only prove his presence at another place at the time of the commission of the offense,
but he must demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.39 Since Barangay Banali is just a four (4)-hour walk from Kalibuhan appellant was not so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
In his second assigned error, appellant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing him to death. Article 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 11 of RA 7659, provides inter alia that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant thereto, the qualifying circumstances of relationship
and minority must concur. Both qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial. As these
circumstances raise the penalty of the crime to death, extreme care must be exercised in their evaluation. 40
On this point, the trial court is correct. The Informations alleged both the minority of the victim and her relationship with appellant. The pre-
trial order showed that relationship was duly established with appellant admitting categorically that he is the father of Jelyn. The minority of
Jelyn was likewise established when the defense admitted the fact that Jelyn was raped when she was only fifteen (15) years of age.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 118 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, after the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control
the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Pre-trial in criminal cases is now mandatory. The purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve
the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by
appellant therein must be given weight.
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty. The relationship of appellant to the victim and her minority was
sufficiently alleged and proved. While no birth certificate or any official document was presented to prove Jelyn’s age, we uphold the trial
court’s appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of minority. As previously stated, the defense made admissions during the pre-trial that the
victim was the appellant’s daughter and that she was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of rape. Further, Jelyn’s declaration as to her date
of birth in her affidavit coupled with the accused’s admission during trial that Jelyn was born on 22 August 1980 sufficiently established her
minority. Hence, a birth certificate or any other official document is no longer necessary to establish the minority of the victim since the same
was admitted during the pre-trial, and never disputed, by the accused.
As to damages, while the trial court awarded ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, it failed to grant civil
indemnity which is mandatory upon a finding of rape. Civil indemnity is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages, which
is based on different jural foundations. Indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without
need of further evidence other than the fact of rape.41 In line with recent jurisprudence, an award of ₱75,000.00 is proper when rape is in its
qualified form.42 We affirm the award of moral damages which is also given without need of proof other than the commission of rape but
should be increased to ₱75,000.00.43 We likewise affirm the award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages because of the duly established
circumstance of relationship44 and to deter fathers with pervert tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon their young
daughters.45
Three (3) members of this Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray that RA
7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding appellant RODOLFO S. PEPITO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
Qualified Rape in Crim. Cases Nos. 2528, 2529 and 2491 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in each case is AFFIRMED. The award of
damages is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For each count of qualified rape, appellant is directed to pay Jelyn Pepito ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to Her Excellency, the President of the Philippines, for the possible exercise of her
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
723
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146790 August 22, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOVITO SITAO alias "Beto," accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision,1 dated October 31, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, in Criminal
Case No. 9930-99, finding the accused-appellant, Jovito Sitao, guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In an Information dated September 20, 1999, accused-appellant Jovito Sitao alias "Beto" was charged with the crime of rape committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of July, 1999 at midnight, at Purok 12, barangay Tongantongan, municipality of Valencia, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, prompted by lewd design, with threats with the use
of a handgun and intimidation on the person of JOVY SITAO, a fourteen (14) year-old minor and accused’s daughter, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally undress, kiss and touch the private parts of the latter, place himself on top of JOVY SITAO, forcibly insert his
penis into the vagina and have sexual intercourse with JOVY SITAO, against her will, to the damage and prejudice of JOVY SITAO in such
amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 7659 as amended by R.A. 8353.
City of Malaybalay, September 20, 1999."2
On October 19, 1999, the accused-appellant was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty.3 Thereafter, a pre-trial was held, and the following facts
were stipulated by the parties, viz:
"1. That the private complainant, Jovy Sitao, is the daughter of the accused and was only fourteen years old at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense.
2. That private complainant, Jovy Sitao, was medically examined by Dr. Joselyn M. Baeyens of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital on July 28,
1999, whose findings, as indicated in the Medical Certificate (hereby marked as Exhibit "A"), are true and correct."4
Jovy Sitao was presented as the lone witness for the prosecution. According to her, she was born on February 15, 1985, and the accused-
appellant is her father.5 At the age of three (3), she was taken by her maternal grandparents to live in Wao, Lanao del Sur. They transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City in 1998. The following year, Jovy was sent back by her grandmother to her parents in Purok 12, Barangay Tongan-tongan,
Valencia, Bukidnon, to study at the Batangan Elementary School. She enrolled as a grade IV student in the said school.6
On July 19, 1999, Jovy’s mother went to Wao, Lanao del Sur to get a school card, leaving Jovy and her eight (8) siblings at home with their
father, the accused-appellant. At about 9:00 in the evening, Jovy was ordered by the accused-appellant to sleep in the sala (living room) with
her younger brother. Apparently, Jovy’s parents sleep in the sala with her two younger brothers, while the rest of her siblings sleep in the
bedroom. When Jovy expressed her desire to sleep in the bedroom, the accused-appellant became angry, and was about to scold her when his
friends suddenly arrived for a drinking session. While the accused-appellant was drinking liquor with his friends, Jovy went to the bedroom and
slept.7
After the drinking session, the accused-appellant repaired to the bedroom and angrily woke Jovy up. He fired his gun towards the floor and
said, "Why are you sleeping there when you are suppose to sleep in the sala?"8 Terrified, Jovy went to sleep in the sala.
At about midnight, Jovy was awakened by the accused-appellant, saying, "Ne, I’ll find out whether you are still a virgin or not."9 The accused-
appellant inserted his fingers into Jovy’s vagina. Thereafter, he undressed the victim and removed his own short pants. The accused-appellant
then began inserting his penis into the victim’s vagina. The process was painful but she kept silent because the accused-appellant had his
gun.10 After having sexual intercourse with her, the accused-appellant left without a word. Jovy could only cry.
The following day, Jovy revealed to her mother, who just arrived from Wao, Lanao del Sur, her violent deflowering. She also told her mother
that her younger sister, Juvelyn, was also forced by their father to have sex with him. But Jovy’s mother refused to believe her; worse, she
again left for Wao, leaving Jovy and her siblings with the accused-appellant.
724
Out of fear, Jovy decided to leave their house and ask for help from a barangay kagawad. The kagawad accompanied her to the police station
of Valencia, Bukidnon, where they reported the incident. Later, Jovy was examined at the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital of Malaybalay City by
Dr. Joselyn M. Baeyens who had the following findings, to wit:
"- Old hymenal laceration at 3’0 9’0 11’0 o’clock.
- Admits 2 finger[s] with ease.
- Vaginal Smear - Gram Staining
- No Spermatozoa."11
The accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial. He admitted that Jovy is his daughter, and that at the time of his testimony, Jovy was
fifteen (15) years old.12 He denied staying in the same house with Jovy after she was taken by her grandparents to live with them in Wao,
Lanao del Sur. He last saw her in 1998, before she was brought by her grandparents to live in Cagayan de Oro City. Later, he was informed by
his brother-in-law that Jovy was working there as a household helper. He denied that Jovy enrolled as a grade IV student at the Batangan
Elementary School. 13
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment dated October 31, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is entered finding accused Jovito Sitao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against her
(sic) own daughter under eighteen (18) years of age in violation of the pertinent provision of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, and he is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. He is further ordered to indemnify his victim
Jovy Sitao the sum of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED."14
Hence, this appeal where the accused-appellant raises the following assignments of error:
"I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE REAL AGE OF THE VICTIM.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF P75,000.00 AS CIVIL INDEMNITY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF THE QUALIFIED
CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM."15
The appeal is meritorious.
The accused-appellant does not question his conviction of the crime of rape. He only assails the imposition of the death penalty by the trial
court in light of the provision of R.A. No. 8353, viz:
"ART. 266-B. Penalties.—xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxx xxx x x x"16
The accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim on the basis of
the latter’s testimony alone and without any documentary or corroborating testimonial evidence. The Solicitor-General, on the other hand,
contends that the minority of the victim was proven through her testimony and the testimony of the accused-appellant himself.
In prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established. 17 Qualifying circumstances must be proved with
equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself, otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form.18
725
As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must
be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.19 Proof of age of the victim cannot consist merely of her testimony.20 In the case
of People vs. Tabanggay,21 we held, viz:
"…[J]urisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree
of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the
Court relative to the rape of minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be independent evidence
proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial of the accused.22 A duly
certified certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant’s age, or some other official document or record such as a school record,
has been recognized as competent evidence.23
In the instant case, we find insufficient the bare testimony of private complainants and their mother as to their ages as well as their kinship to
the appellant. xxx [W]e cannot agree with the solicitor general that appellant’s admission of his relationship with his victims would suffice.
Elementary is the doctrine that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, including the qualifying
circumstances. In sum, the death penalty cannot be imposed."24 (emphasis supplied)1âwphi1
In the cases of People vs. Agravante25 and People vs. Veloso,26 we ruled that the testimony of the victim as to her age, even if corroborated by
that of her father, is not sufficient proof of her minority. In this case at bar, the concurrent testimonies of the victim and the accused-appellant
as to the victim’s age fall short of the required proof of the qualifying circumstance.
Neither can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the victim’s age be considered sufficient proof of minority. Circumstances that qualify a
crime and increases its penalty to death cannot be the subject of stipulation. An accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty
of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death.
Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the circumstance which would qualify the crime of rape, the penalty of death imposed upon the
accused-appellant by the trial court must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, we reduce the award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. The amount of P75,000.00 is awarded only where the
crime of rape was effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present law.27 The
award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In rape cases, the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence,
entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof.28
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 31, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, in Criminal Case
No. 9930-99, finding accused-appellant Jovito Sitao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of incestuous rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
726
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 143689-91 November 12, 2002
SIXTO M. BAYAS and ERNESTO T. MATUDAY, petitioners,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel be unilaterally withdrawn before the commencement of the trial? To
this main issue, the answer is "No." Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless for good
cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to stipulate facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the stipulations,
the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that they may be placed at a disadvantage during the trial.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for the setting aside of the April 28, 2000[1] and the May 26,
2000[2] Orders of the Sandiganbayan[3] (SBN) in Criminal Case Nos. 25280-82. The first Order denied petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents,[4] while the second denied reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
On May 6, 1999, three Informations[6] were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to
Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the
Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.
During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled "not guilty." The pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was
cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999, because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared.[7] On November 5,
1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly "suffering from the flu." Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero.
They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon all other
matters that still remained to be resolved.[8]
On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," which had been duly signed by the two accused
(herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero. It is reproduced hereunder:
"JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS
"COME NOW the accused, counsel for the accused and the Prosecution, by and through the undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of
the Special Prosecutor, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully aver: THAT -
"1. After a conference the Defense and the Prosecution admitted the following facts as follows:
"a. Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor and accused Sixto Bayas was and [is] still the Municipal
Treasurer and designated Municipal Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the period relevant to this case;
"b. Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00.
"2. The Prosecution and Defense jointly admit the following documents as their respective documentary exhibits x x x ([with]
reservation to mark additional exhibits during the trial of the case) as follows:
‘For the
Prosecution Common Exhibits
Exhibits for the Defense
Description
‘A’
‘1’
COA Report dated February 29, 1996
727
‘B’
‘2’
COA Memorandum Dated September 25, 1996
‘C’
‘3’
Page of journal entry of the Office of the Municipal Accountant
‘D’
‘4’
Resolution No. 138 of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Kabayan Benguet carried on August 15, 1996
‘E’
‘5’
Transcript of the [S]tenographic Notes taken during the closed door session of the Sangguniang Bayan[,] Kabayan, Benguet on August 15, 1996
at 1:50 P.M.
‘F’
‘6’
Result of the Statement of Investigation conducted On March 24, 1997
‘For Criminal Cases Nos. 25280-25281
‘G’
‘7’
Undated disbursement Voucher No. 401-9505186 For the payment of Mobilization fee for the various Projects at Kabayan, Benguet For
P510,000.00
‘H’
‘8’
Check No. 60915S-1 for P510,000.00 dated May 4, 1995 signed by both Accused Mayor Matuday and Treasurer Bayas
‘H-1’
‘8-a’
Dorsal portion of Check No. 60915 S-1
‘H-1-a’
‘8-a-1’
Signature of accused Mayor Matuday at the Dorsal portion of Check No. 60915- S-1
‘Criminal Cases Nos. 25282-25280
‘I’
‘a’
Check No. 609177 for P55,000.00 dated June 28, 1995 signed by Mayor Matuday and Treasurer Bayas
‘I-1’
‘9-a’
Dorsal portion of Check No. 609177
‘I-1-a’
‘9-a-1’
Signature of Yolanda Millanes
‘I-1-b’
‘9-a-2’
Signature of Mayor Matuday
‘J’
‘10’
Undated Disbursement Voucher for P55,000.00
"3. The Defense shall present at least four witness while the Prosecution opts not to present any witness considering that Defense
admitted all the documentary evidence of the Prosecution.
"Quezon City, December 10, 1999.
(signed) (signed)
ATTY. JOSE M. MOLINTAS ATTY. EVELYN TAGUBA LUCERO
Counsel for Accused Ombudsman Prosecutor II
(signed) (signed)
SIXTO BAYAS ERNESTO MATUDAY
Accused Accused"9
On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty. Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for
February 14, 2000. However, on February 7, 2000, he moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion was granted by the anti-graft
court in an Order dated February 14, 2000. In the same Order, the pretrial was rescheduled for March 31, 2000, to give the accused ample
time to employ a new counsel.
728
On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M. Cinco, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the
amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to "8-a". They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan justified its denial of petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents in this wise:
"x x x. [For] the fact that there [was] express statement from Atty. Rogelio A. Cortes this morning that neither fraud nor any other mistake of a
serious character vitiated the consent of the parties when they affixed their conformity to the stipulations of facts, the reason put forth by the
accused or movant’s counsel at this time, is that if these stipulations were to remain, then the accused might as well not present any evidence
on the entire accusation against him as this will already be supported by the evidence on record. While the court, indeed, sees this as a
possibility, that, by itself, is not a ground for withdrawing any stipulation freely and knowingly made and given."[10]
In the second assailed Order, the anti-graft court denied reconsideration and reiterated its previous stand, as follows:
"x x x. The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial
order; in fact, an accused can plead guilty if he so desires or make admissions as he deems appropriate and truthful, even if in the mind of the
new counsel, it gave very few opportunities to present contesting evidence."[11]
It then added that "the pre-trial order shall remain. The admissions therein contained can be used in this case and for whatever purpose the
Rules on Evidence will allow."
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
"I
Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, considering the relevant facts and applicable laws and rules.
"II
Whether or not the denial by respondent Sandiganbayan of the withdrawal of the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents would result in
manifest injustice and impairment of the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
"III
Whether or not there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents from the
respondent Sandiganbayan."[13]
Plainly put, the issue raised by petitioners is whether they may be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents.
Main Issue:
Withdrawal from the Joint Stipulation
Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after
the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. We are not persuaded.
Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure
mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or
settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog
court dockets.
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause.[14] They should be enforced especially when they are not
false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy.[15] When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who
validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue
influence;[16] or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case.[17] Moreover, the power to relieve
a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on
appeal.[18]
Validity of the Joint Stipulations
729
While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that these were false or misleading or were obtained
through force or fraud. On the contrary, they do not dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake vitiated their
and their counsel’s consent to the signing of these stipulations. They even admitted, in answer to its query, that they had freely given their
consent.
Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the blame on the alleged incompetence of their former counsel.
They claim that, in agreeing to the Joint Stipulation, he failed to consider their legal interests.
To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact -- not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because
of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it.[19]
Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of
a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence
committed by the counsel.[20]
Presumption of Innocence
In their effort to withdraw from the Joint Stipulation, petitioners argue that the two questioned items impair their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent, violate their right against self-incrimination, and deny them due process in the sense that the trial would be a "useless
formality, an idle ceremony."[21]
Other than by generalized argumentation, petitioners have not convinced us that the aforementioned constitutional rights would be violated.
True, the old Rules of Court frowned upon stipulations of facts in criminal cases because of a perceived danger -- that by the mere expedient of
stipulating with the defense counsel the elements of the crime charged, the prosecution would relieve itself of its duty to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.[22] However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The
amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. [23]
The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. In a case involving illegal possession of firearms,[24] the
prosecution and the defense stipulated the fact that the accused had been found in possession of a gun without the required permit or license.
In People v. Bocar,[25] the Court considered as valid the admission by the accused of the existence of certain affidavits and exhibits, which the
prosecution had presented to dispense with oral testimonies on the matter contained therein. In People v. Hernandez,[26] which involved
illegal recruitment, the Court upheld the joint stipulation that the accused had not been licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency to recruit workers for overseas jobs.
There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver,
which recognizes that "x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and
without detriment to the community at large."[27]
In the present case, the Joint Stipulation made by the prosecution and petitioners was a waiver of the right to present evidence on the facts
and the documents freely admitted by them. There could have been no impairment of petitioners’ right to be presumed innocent, right to due
process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Necessity of a Pretrial Order
Petitioners further contend that the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a pretrial order to make pretrial stipulations binding. We do not
agree.
Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:
"Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. -- All agreements or admissions made or entered [into] during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing
and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to
in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court."[28]
Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the
agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned
in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary
merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.[29] Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.[30] If the accused are allowed to plead guilty
730
under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under
appropriate circumstances.
There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that the SBN could not fully act on the matter,
not through its fault, but because of the continued absence of petitioners’ counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended completion
of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation because he was absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be
re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.
Therefore, under these circumstances, the SBN cannot be faulted for its failure to approve expressly the stipulations. It had the opportunity to
rule on the matter only when the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia L. Cinco, moved to withdraw their stipulations. In its first
assailed Order, the SBN upheld their validity, thereby effectively approving the submitted Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. The assent
of the court to agreements of the parties, assisted by their counsel, is assumed until they indicate a dissent.[31] Thus, the stipulations freely
made by the latter are to be respected as their true will and intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case, especially if the anti-
graft court has not struck them down for being violative of the law.
Role of Lawyers in Pretrials
Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. It is therefore important that the parties take active roles in the
proceedings. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial
and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.[32]
Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not
be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure
to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that
their clients fully assented to.[33]
The records reveal that the parties were the ones who volunteered to make the Joint Stipulation of the facts of the case. Thus, the anti-graft
court can rightfully expect that both parties arrived upon it with fairness and honesty. Therefore, petitioners may not assail it on the mere
ground that it would allegedly put the accused at a disadvantage. Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple
expedient of passing the blame on the previous counsel, who had supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client.
If we allow parties to renege on stipulations they validly entered into during the course of pretrial proceedings, there would be no end to
litigations.[34] Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however, that
they are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties -- assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice[35] -- is more significant than that of acquitting their client,[36] rightly or wrongly.
We stress that candor in all dealings is the very essence of membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are obliged to observe rules of
procedure in good faith, not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.[37] They should realize that the earlier they dispose of their cases,
especially at the pretrial stage, the better for them. In doing so, they can now concentrate and work more efficiently on their other cases.[38]
Grave Abuse of Discretion
As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised
with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.[39] There is "grave abuse of discretion" where "a power is exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion
of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law."[40]
Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the
stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into. Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-graft court for
failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence
of petitioners’ counsel.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
731
EN BANC
G.R. No. 126029 March 27, 2003

vs.
REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG, INOCENCIO PASCUA, LITO OCTAC and LOCIL CUI @ GINALYN CUYOS,accused,
REY SUNGA, RAMIL LANSANG and INOCENCIO PASCUA, appellants.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly
and in a straightforward manner and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought;1 otherwise, it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the prosecution and the fate
of the accused.
On July 12, 1994, the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan (Jocelyn), a minor and a high school student of Palawan Integrated National School, (PINS),
was found at a coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
The hunt for the possible killers of Jocelyn was swift, several arrests having been made in a span of days, followed by the conduct of the
requisite preliminary investigation by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City which culminated in the filing before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City of the information for rape with homicide against the suspects. The case was raffled to
Branch 48 of the court.
Accused in the Information were Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos
as accomplice the accusatory portion of the information dated September 6, 1994 reads as follows:
xxx
That on or about June 29, 1994 in the afternoon, at Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pinning down one JOCELYN TAN, a minor,
fifteen (15) years of age, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion
of said rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime, the herein accused in furtherance of the conspiracy
together with LOCIL CUI, a minor, acting with discernment and who cooperated in the execution of the offense as ACCOMPLICE, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill,
treacherously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly stabbing and smashing a stone on her
head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death shortly
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
x x x.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11984.
Upon arraignment all the accused pleaded not guilty.
On September 26, 1994, the accused through counsel filed a petition for bail, 3 underscoring the weakness of the People’s evidence, there
being no direct evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in his resolution4 for their indictment. Hearings on the bail
petition were conducted in the course of which the prosecution, after presenting several witnesses, filed on October 18, 1994 a motion to
discharge5 accused Locil Cui (Locil) to be a state witness, averring therein that the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with,
and submitting her sworn statement6 which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime. The respective counsels for the other accused
opposed the motion, insisting that it could only be filed during trial on the merits and that Locil’s testimony was not absolutely necessary.7 By
Order of October 20, 1994,8 the trial court deferred the resolution of the bail petition until after the prosecution had rested its case, but it
granted the motion to discharge Locil.
The accused assailed the discharge of Locil via a petition for certiorari and prohibition9 before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the trial of the case.10 The TRO lapsed, however, without a preliminary
injunction being issued, hence, the trial of the case resumed.
732
Through state witness Locil, then 14 years old and an elementary school dropout who had been living away from her parents and using the
alias "Ginalyn Cuyos"11 to evade, by her own account,12 her mother and aunt who were looking for her after she got pregnant (the pregnancy
was later aborted), the prosecution established the following version:
At about 2:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994, Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" from the Social Security System (SSS) Office in
Puerto Princesa City. Already on board the tricycle was a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the face and who invited Locil for a
joy ride.13 Upon instruction of the lesbian, the tricycle driver, whom she did not know but whom she later identified and who answered to the
name Rey Sunga (Sunga), repaired to the Mendoza Park.
At the Mendoza Park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was dressed in a PINS uniform. The lesbian, together with
Jocelyn, then joined Locil aboard the tricycle which was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the meantime left.
Still aboard the tricycle, the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City and on reaching a forested area,
Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her to a
nearby "buho" clumps. There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken off by Lansang. As she lay face up
with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua, Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her vagina and
"seemed to be pumping."14
After Lansang, Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who was not known to Locil and whom the latter
described as one who has "chinky" or "narrow eyes," later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.15
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled against her malefactors. 16
After Pascua satisfied his lust, Sunga, with a sharp bladed weapon, stabbed the abdomen of the motionless Jocelyn, drawing her to rise to a
sitting position and clutch her abdomen. Sunga then passed on the bladed weapon to Lansang who smashed Jocelyn’s head with an irregularly
shaped stone, causing her to fall to the ground lifeless. Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the
tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper,
leaving Jocelyn’s body behind.17
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she heard the voice of someone from inside the tricycle warning her to keep
mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil then repaired to her boarding house. Until she was arrested
following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyn’s corpse, she did not report the incident to anyone. 18
The other prosecution witnesses provided testimonies pertaining to circumstances after the fact.
Oscar Devilleres, a garbage truck driver, recalled that he was on his way home in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao at 12:30 a. m. of June 30,
1994, a day after the incident, when from a distance of about 30 meters, he saw Lansang walking back and forth and appearing restless near
the coffee plantation in Jacana, Barangay Bancao-Bancao where Jocelyn’s body was later found on July 12, 1994. Although it was then
nighttime, Devilleres had a good look at Lansang due to the illumination provided by the electric light post under which Lansang was
situated.19
Igleceria Gabinete, a resident of Jacana, declared that she was among those who saw the mutilated body of Jocelyn in the morning of July 12,
1994 at a coffee plantation near her place; that in the afternoon of that date and while tending her sari-sari store, a tricycle arrived with three
men on board, one of whom, Lito Octac (Octac) alighted, leaving the two inside the tricycle who seemed to be hiding their faces; that one of
those two men inside the tricycle inquired from her whether the discovered corpse, that of Jocelyn, was from Barangay Caroray; that the
following day, she reported to the police about the three suspicious looking men who went to her store; and that two days later, she was
made to, as she did, identify Lansang at the police station as one of the men who went to her store in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 and
inquired as to Jocelyn’s corpse.20
Galahad Tan (Tan), Jocelyn’s father, recounted as follows: During the wake of his daughter at the Sampaton Funeral Parlor, at 1:30 a. m. of July
14, 1994 (15th day following the incident), Lansang arrived and told him as follows: "Total tayo ay magkaisang barangay lang ay ayosin natin
itong kaso at magtulungan na lang, mayroon na akong alam na makakapagturo kung sino and may kagagawan sa krimen. Huwag na lang
nating sabihin sa mga polis." When he asked Lansang who he was referring to, Lansang replied that he would return. Lansang did not return,
however, prompting Tan to relay to law enforcers the statements of Lansang, his neighbor who was courting Jocelyn at the time and with
whose family his own family was in good terms.21
Testifying on the autopsy she conducted on Jocelyn, Dr. Ma. Carla Gallego - Vigonte (Dr. Vigonte) affirmed the following findings in her
report22 dated July 12, 1994:
POST-MORTEM FINDINGS
1. The cadaver was seen in advanced stage of decomposition.
733
2. Depressed fracture noted at the frontal bone of the skull about 2 cm anterior to the bregma, measuring 2.5 cm in width and 3.5
cm in length, with a rounded hole at its right side with irregular edges measuring 4 cm x 5 cm in diameter; with a linear fracture
about 2 cm in length extending from the depressed fracture up to the bregma; linear fracture about 3 cm in length along the coronal
suture, right side, extending from the hole to the bregma.
3. Multiple linear fracture with lengths ranging from 2 cm to 5 cm, noted at the lambdoid suture, about 2 cm right side of the
lambda, extending to the right side of the occipital and parietal bones of the skull.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH: Intracranial Hemorrhage secondary to multiple fractures of the skull.
Dr. Vigonte opined that a blunt object or instrument like a hard wood or a rock caused the injury noted in post-mortem finding no. 2 which
was fatal, it being a deep wound in the skull affecting its inner organ and lacerating the tissues of the brain, thus causing hemorrhage; that for
said fatal wound, the assailant was probably at Jocelyn’s left side; that for the injury in post-mortem finding no. 3, the attacker was at the back
of Jocelyn; and that in light of the multiple injuries, there were more than one perpetrator.23 Dr. Vigonte was, however, unable to determine
whether Jocelyn was also raped.24
The prosecution adduced documentary evidence consisting mainly of two supposed extrajudicial confessions made by Sunga.
In a sworn statement (Exhibit "A")25 dated July 18, 1994 which was executed before SPO2 Jose P. Janoras (SPO2 Janoras), Sunga made the
following disclosures:
At about 10:00 a. m. of the day of the incident, June 29, 1994, as he was then at work as a tricycle dispatcher, Lansang arrived in a tricycle
bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan" and invited him to accompany him in fetching Jocelyn at the PINS. He obliged and just before reaching their
destination, Locil boarded the tricycle. At the gate of the school, Lansang talked to Jocelyn who was then wearing the school uniform after
which the two boarded the tricycle which he (Sunga) drove to a spot at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao St. in the Puerto Princesa City
proper where the four of them (Sunga, Lansang, Locil and Jocelyn) transferred to an "owner’s jeep" brought by Octac alias "Toto." The group
then proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan at around 10:30 a. m. and at a forested area in Sitio Tagaud, everyone alighted except for
Octac. Lansang then forcibly undressed Jocelyn and raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil watched. After consummating his carnal desire,
Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2" x 2" piece of wood on her head and successively on different parts of her body. When Jocelyn was already dead,
Locil also whacked Jocelyn’s body many times. The group then headed back to the city proper, leaving Jocelyn’s remains at the scene of the
crime.
In accordance with their previous agreement, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil returned to Barangay Irawan aboard a jeep driven by Octac four
days after June 29, 1994 and took Jocelyn’s body for the purpose of bringing it to Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao in accordance with
Lansang’s wish. On their way to Bancao-Bancao, Locil inserted a cigarette into the corpse’s mouth – "…. pinasigarilyo ni [Locil] ang bangkay
upang ikubli sa maaaring makakita ang tunay na kaanyuan ni Jocelyn Tan."26 At Barangay Bancao-Bancao, he (Sunga), Lansang and Locil
carried the victim’s body and left the same at a coffee plantation fifty meters away from Jacana Road while Octac served as a lookout by the
roadside. On their return to the city, the four parted ways at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Lacao Street. He (Sunga) then drove the tricycle
with the marking "Ryan-Ryan" with Locil aboard while Lansang and Octac remained together at the jeep.27
The above sworn statement bears Sunga’s signature and that of his assisting counsel, Atty. Agustin Rocamora (Atty. Rocamora), Puerto
Princesa City Legal Officer.
Testifying as to the investigation he conducted upon Sunga, SPO2 Janoras recalled that he was on duty at the Puerto Princesa City police
precinct in the morning of July 18, 1994 when SPO4 Boy Pantollano and patrolman Bolos arrived together with Sunga. The two brought Sunga
inside a room and asked him questions pertaining to Jocelyn’s death and after about thirty minutes, Sunga was presented before him (SPO2
Janoras) for investigation. He initially asked Sunga whether he knew anything about Jocelyn’s death and Sunga replied affirmatively, prompting
him to inform him of his rights under custodial interrogation. After Sunga signified his desire to avail of the services of a lawyer, Sunga chose
Atty. Rocamora to be his counsel from among the names of lawyers mentioned by him (SPO2 Janoras). He thereupon fetched Atty. Rocamora
from his residence. Atty. Rocamora briefly conferred with Sunga, asking him if he wanted to give a confession and informing him of the
consequences thereof. Thereafter, the investigation proceeded with Sunga voluntarily giving his answers to questions he (SPO2 Janoras)
propounded at the end of which investigation Sunga and Atty. Rocamora affixed their respective signatures on the recorded statement.28
The execution of Exhibit "A" was, during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court,29 affirmed by Sunga. Apart from
acknowledging its contents, Sunga answered the investigating judge’s other queries as he implicated Lansang, Locil and Octac in the killing of
Jocelyn. This time, however, he alleged that not only Lansang but also Octac raped Jocelyn, adding that he merely held Jocelyn’s hand.30
Subsequently or on August 3, 1994, Sunga executed another sworn statement (Exhibit "I") 31 before Special Investigator Reynaldo O. Abordo of
the Puerto Princesa office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Exhibit "I" varied in a number of respects from Exhibit "A." In Exhibit
"I," Sunga declared that in the morning of June 28, 1994 he already had an agreement with Lansang to fetch Jocelyn from her school on the
following day; that at 8:00 a. m. of the following day, June 29, 1994, he, together with Lansang, Lito Octa (should be Octac) and a certain Jun
left Mendoza Park and proceeded to Irawan after asking Locil, one Bing Manila, and a certain Josie to fetch Jocelyn at her school; that Jun
drove the tricycle back to the city proper and he transported their female companions including Jocelyn to Irawan; that at Irawan, Lansang
raped the struggling Jocelyn whose hands were then held by Josie; that after Lansang and Jun raped Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head twice
734
in accordance with his plan to kill her which plan was known to him (Sunga), Locil, Octac and Jun; that at 1:30 a. m. of June 30, 1994, Lansang,
Sunga, Octa and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyn’s corpse and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take
part in the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansang’s promise to give him P500.00. Exhibit "I" embodied a waiver
by Sunga of his right to counsel.32
The prosecution evidence with respect to Jocelyn’s family’s incurring of the amount of P11,000.00 for Jocelyn’s funeral expenses was admitted
by the defense.33
Upon the other hand, all the accused proffered alibi.
Accused-appellant Sunga, who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having anything to do with the rape and
killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at
Mendoza Park. While he acknowledged knowing Octac and Pascua, he denied being in their company on June 29, 1994 or in Lansang’s.34
Confronted with his sworn statement-Exhibit "A," Sunga explained the circumstances behind his execution thereof as follows: After having
been arrested without a warrant by the police in the evening of July 15, 1994 at the corner of Rizal and Valencia streets while "picking up
passengers," he was brought to the police station where he was subjected to violence and intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and a certain Ka
Ronnie to coerce him to "pinpoint to anybody", and he involuntarily did. After being mauled and kicked, he was made to appear before police
investigator Janoras on that same night of July 15, 1994 during which he signed the second and third pages of a three paged affidavit
embodying his questioned extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel and under threats and intimidation from SPO2
Pantollano. He was later brought on July 18, 1994 to the Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession after which Atty.
Agustin Rocamora also signed the same.35
As to his other sworn statement-Exhibit "I" executed before the NBI, Sunga initially affirmed having given the answers to questions
propounded therein by the NBI Investigator and having executed the "confession" for the purpose of applying to become a state witness in the
case.36 He subsequently retracted his acknowledgement of Exhibit "I" as his own confession.37 While he admitted having participated in the
preliminary investigation at the MTCC of Puerto Princesa City, he could not remember having given most of the statements he made therein.38
The defense presented other witnesses.
Joel Esquela Mayo (Mayo), an employee of Puerto Princesa City’s crime watchdog "Bantay Puerto," declared that in the morning of July 14,
1994 he and a co-employee Miguel Abrina (Abrina) were at Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao upon orders from their superior to be on the
lookout for the possible return thereto of the perpetrators behind Jocelyn’s killing; seeing Locil uneasy as she alighted from a tricycle, they
approached and asked her how she was related to Jocelyn to which she replied that she was a friend; then Locil brought the two to the very
spot where Jocelyn’s remains were found and while there she acted as if she was looking for something; Locil later commented that it was
there that Jocelyn and she had a fight; and Locil was subsequently apprehended by the police. 39
Abrina substantially corroborated Mayo’s story.40
Another witness, Orlando Lacsamana (Lacsamana), a detainee at the Puerto Princesa City jail, testified that while he was conversing with Locil,
also a detainee, on August 15, 1994, they saw Lansang being brought inside. Lacsamana asked Locil if she knew Lansang but she denied having
known Lansang or having been her companion.41
Detention prisoners John Pulga (Pulga) and Jerry Galgarin (Galgarin) as well as Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) personnel Joel
Rabanal (Rabanal) and SPO2 Conrado Guzman Rafael (SPO2 Rafael) testified as to Locil’s failure to correctly identify Lansang on separate
occasions.
Thus detention prisoner Pulga narrated that on July 21, 1994, he was made to form part of a police line-up together with three other
detainees; and that when Locil was asked by the police to identify who among them was Lansang, she pointed to him (Pulga) whom she called
Ramil Lansang.42
Corroborating Pulga’s testimony was BJMP personnel Rabanal who brought out Pulga and the three others for the police line-up, he too
alleging that Locil indeed pointed to Pulga as Lansang.43
Detention prisoner Galgarin, who was detained at the 263rd Mobile Post of the Philippine National Police on July 23, 1994, declared that he
saw Locil arrive in a police car after which Lansang and three other detainees were made to stand in a police line-up; and that when Locil was
asked to identify Lansang, she said he was not there. 44
SPO2 Rafael testified that while he was on duty in the aforesaid PNP Mobile Post on August 23, 1994, Locil hesitated to identify Lansang even
after the police assured her not to be afraid.45
Accused-appellant Pascua disclaimed knowledge of anyone of his co-accused prior to the June 29, 1994 incident. He denied having anything to
do with the killing or rape of Jocelyn and branded Locil’s account as a lie. He claimed that he was staying with his uncle Victor de Felipe at 27 E.
735
Burgos St., Puerto Princesa City from April to July 14, 1994; that while he was driving the tricycle with the marking "Ryan-Ryan" for a living, he
returned it to its owner on June 27, 1994 due to engine trouble and never drove it again; that at about 8:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he,
together with his uncle Victor De Felipe and a carpenter, went to San Pedro also in Puerto Princesa City where he helped in recovering
materials from De Felipe’s demolished house thereat for use in the latter’s other residence at Burgos St.; and that he was at San Pedro until
4:00 p. m. of the same day.46
Continuing, Pascua declared that on July 14, 1994, he left for his stepfather’s home at Barangay Burirao of the town of Narra where he was, on
July 23, 1994, arrested without a warrant by the police on suspicion that he might have been involved in the subject crime, he having driven
for sometime the tricycle bearing the marking "Ryan-Ryan;" that the apprehending policemen sought his cooperation so he could be utilized as
a witness against Lansang, even offering him a P100,000.00 reward and his exclusion from the criminal information, but he refused for he
knew nothing about the crime; that inside a small room at the police station in the city, he again refused to obey SPO4 Pantollano’s order for
him to say certain things about the crime, thereby infuriating Pantollano who threatened to implicate him; that while still under detention on
July 24, 1994, he was brought before Locil for identification purposes but Locil denied knowing him; and that he did not go into hiding after
June 29, 1994 for he took up a farming course at the Palawan National Agricultural College (PNAC).47
Victor De Felipe corroborated his accused nephew’s testimony as to his whereabouts on June 29, 1994 and his returning the tricycle two days
before the incident.48 Felix Mayor, De Felipe’s carpenter, confirmed Pascua’s being with him and De Felipe the whole day of June 29, 1994 at
Barangay San Pedro to retrieve building materials from De Felipe’s demolished house in the said place. 49
The testimony of witness Espiridion Labotoy was dispensed with when the prosecution admitted its corroboration of Pascua’s allegation that
the latter returned the tricycle to its owner on June 27, 1994.50
Filomena Pascua-Tesorio also corroborated her nephew Pascua’s claim that Locil did not identify him as one of those who wronged Jocelyn.
And she added that during her visit to Pascua at the police station on July 24, 1994, she asked Locil if she was acquainted with Pascua and she
replied in the negative, saying it was her first time to see Pascua.51
Cesar Batin (Batin), an instructor at PNAC, attested that Pascua was enrolled at PNAC Abo-Abo Center in Brooke’s point on July 18, 1994 but
that he attended classes for only about a week and resumed his studies on August 16, 1994 until October 11, 1994. Batin affirmed the
certification he issued as to Pascua’s school attendance.52
Pascua’s mother Teodora Española testified that she accompanied her arrested son when he was brought by the police to Puerto Princesa City
on July 23, 1994 and confirmed that the policemen offered Pascua a reward in exchange for his admitting responsibility for the crime but that
she rebuffed them.53
Lito Octac, also clinging to alibi, alleged that on the day of the incident he was working at Pambato Forwarder loading cargoes and pieces of
baggage, in support of which he presented an entry (Exhibit "9")54 in his employer’s logbook showing that he reported for work from 1:00 to
5:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994.55
Lansang, who operated a pump boat that ferried passengers from Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan where his parents reside, to
Barangay Bahile, Puerto Princesa City and vice-versa, declared as follows: At about 8:30 a. m. of June 29, 1994, he met his sister Gloria Negosa
in her office at the Philippine Ports Authority for the purpose of borrowing from her P3,000.00 which he would use to buy pieces of plywood
and paint for his boat. His sister, however, directed him to get the money from his mother who happened to be at her office at the time and
who received two PCIB checks both dated June 29, 1994 payable to cash, one in the amount of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos, and another
in the amount of Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen (P9,616.00) pesos from Gloria. Shortly after, he and his mother went to the PCI Bank
where he, instead of his mother who did not have any identification card and Community Tax Certificate, did the encashing (at 9:53 a. m.) of
the checks- (Exhibits "12" and "12-A"). The two left the bank and proceeded to the Palawan Poultry store from which they purchased fertilizer.
Thereafter, they bought plywood and paint at the Unico Merchandising.56 (An official receipt dated June 6, 1994 of P2,206 representing the
purchase price of the goods was marked as Exhibit "11".)57
Continuing, Lansang declared that while his mother left to make her other purchases, he remained at the Unico Merchandising until 12:00
noon when he went to the house of his brothers-in-law to pick up her mother’s goods. At the said house, he briefly met a resident thereof
named Ariel Bactad and then took his mother’s goods. He loaded all their purchases in a jeep bound for Barangay Bahile from which point they
were to be transported via a pump boat to his parent’s home in Barangay Caruray. As his mother no longer showed up, he was constrained to
accompany his cargo aboard the jeep which departed at 1:00 p. m. and reached Barangay Bahile at 3:00 p. m. of the same day, June 29, 1994.
At Barangay Bahile, he loaded the goods into his boat with the help of the boat driver, Arnel Tulonghari. He then took lunch at the carinderia
of a certain Jerry (or Jerico) Rufano where he waited in vain for two hours for his mother to come to Barangay Bahile. At 5:00 p. m. of June 29,
1994, Rufano drove him to Barangay Salvacion where he got a jeepney ride on his way home to the city proper, arriving there at about 8:30 p.
m. still of the same day.58
Lansang further declared that he had never been to Barangay Irawan or to Jacana in Barangay Bancao-Bancao. While he admitted that he,
together with one Joel Egaña, went to the Sampaton Funeral Parlor in the evening of July 13, 1994 to condole with the Tans, he denied having
told Tan that he (Lansang) knew somebody who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime. He likewise denied asking Tan to refrain from
seeking the assistance of law enforcers, he having merely informed Tan that Sunga, with whom (he) Lansang got to be acquainted earlier that
736
same evening, knew Jocelyn. Finally, Lansang disclaimed having been Jocelyn’s suitor for he had a live-in partner named Mary Ann Dineros
whom he intended to marry but could not do so due to his indictment in the case at bar.59
Witnesses Jerry Rufano, Arnel Tulonghari and Ariel Bactad corroborated pertinent parts of Lansang’s testimony as to his whereabouts and
activities on June 29, 1994.60
Joel Egaña also affirmed having accompanied Lansang to Sampaton Funeral parlor on the night of July 13, 1994.61
Melisa P. Mateo, on the other hand, testified that as a bank teller of PCI Bank, she received and processed for encashment the two checks
(Exhibit "12")62 from Lansang at almost 10:00 a. m. of June 29, 1994, which checks as well as Lansang’s signatures and hers and other
inscriptions thereon she identified.63
Edgardo Caisip declared that he was the driver of the jeepney which Lansang rode on together with his cargo for a trip from the city proper to
Barangay Bahile from 1:00 to 3:00 p. m. of June 29, 1994. Caisip added that he already knew Lansang before that time, the Lansangs having
been his usual passengers.64
Finally, Freddie Gallego, a barangay councilor of Barangay Caruray, claimed that Lansang was with him in the afternoon of July 12, 1994 on the
occasion of a birthday party in the said barangay.65
By decision of March 7, 1996, the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each
to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused REY SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principals of the crime charged and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of DEATH. Accused INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR., is also
found GUILTY as principal of the crime of Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused
RAMIL LANSANG, REY SUNGA and INOCENCIO PASCUA, JR. are jointly and severally liable to indemnify the heirs of Jocelyn Tan the
sum of P150,000.00 as moral, actual and compensatory damages with all the accessory penalties provided for the law and to pay the
costs.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused LITO OCTAC beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
It appearing that Lito Octac is detained and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos is still under the custody of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City
their release are hereby ordered unless held for other lawful cause or causes.
The City Jail Warden of Puerto Princesa City and Chief of Jimmy Carbonell of Puerto Princesa City, are hereby ordered to transfer
immediately the bodies of accused REY SUNGA and RAMIL LANSANG to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pending
review by the Supreme Court of this decision.
SO ORDERED.66
Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Sunga, Lansang and Pascua filed their respective appeal briefs.
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Solicitor General prays for the affirmance of Sunga and Lansang’s conviction and the modification of Pascua’s
conviction such that he be also convicted for rape with homicide and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death.
The issues in the case boil down to:
(1) Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in accordance with law; and
(2) Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
After examining the record of the proceedings prior to the trial court’s questioned issuance of the order discharging Locil to become, as she
did, a state witness, this Court is satisfied that there was nothing irregular therewith. Her discharge was ordered in the course of what
originally were hearings on the petition of the accused for bail and after the prosecution had presented several of its witnesses and submitted
Locil’s sworn statement. Contrary to accused’s counsels’ argument that a motion for discharge could only be filed during trial on the merits, it
could be done at any stage of the proceedings, and discharge can be effected from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts
to offer any evidence.67
737
From the records, it appears that the following conditions for Locil’s discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court were
satisfied:
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;
3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed except his testimony;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
It is undisputed that at the start of the trial, the prosecution did not have direct evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to establish the culpability
of the accused.
Based on Locil’s sworn statement, she was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn. Her testimony was thus indispensable. That
she did not appear to be the most guilty among the accused and that she had not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude were
shown, as was the susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the time of her discharge in view of the other evidence in the
hands of the prosecution.
That the trial court ordered Locil’s discharge a day before the scheduled hearing on the motion for her discharge is of no moment. The
requirement of "a hearing in support of the discharge" had been substantially complied with when the trial court, during the hearings on the
bail petition, already received evidence from the prosecutionincluding Locil’s sworn statement and also heard in open court the defense’s
arguments in opposition thereto. A hearing did take place but interspersed with the hearings on the bail petition. So long as the trial court was
able to receive evidence for and against the discharge, its subsequent order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion.68
In fine, even if Locil’s discharge failed to comply with all the requirements embodied in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony
would not, for that sole reason, be discarded or disregarded for, in the discharge of a co-defendant, the trial court may reasonably be expected
to commit error which is not reversible, the underlying principle being that it does not affect the competency and quality of testimony of the
discharged defendant.69
From the prosecution evidence, the testimony of the erstwhile accused-turned state witness Locil is the most pivotal, for it is
an eyewitness’ account of what transpired before and at the time of Jocelyn’s death. Her testimony is the only direct evidence identifying
appellants and relating in detail their specific overt acts.
Yet like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locil’s statements hook, line and sinker because in the assessment of the
testimony of a co-accused-turned state witness, the same must be received with great caution and must be carefully scrutinized.70
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-
accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the
commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points71 by unimpeachable testimony and strong
circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.72
Was Locil’s testimony corroborated in its material points by the prosecution’s other evidence? If in the affirmative, was the corroborative
evidence unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances to such an extent that Locil’s trustworthiness becomes manifest?
Appellant Sunga’s two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they referred to statements of fact which did not
directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he was charged, 73 could have lent
corroborative support to Locil’s testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary, however, to the trial court’s
ruling, this Court finds Sunga’s admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not only against him but also against his co-accused appellants.
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain
silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot afford the services
of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these rights.74
The right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit "A" - admission before the police on the ground that the counsel who
assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
In People v. Bandula,75 this Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent counsel for the accused in custodial investigations cannot be a
special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the
accused. A legal officer of the city, like Atty. Rocamora, provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the city in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of peace and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who
unquestionably cannot represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest. 76 That Sunga chose him to be his
counsel, even if true, did not render his admission admissible. Being of a very low educational attainment, 77Sunga could not have possibly
738
known the ramifications of his choice of a city legal officer to be his counsel. The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional
rights during custodial interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have been discharged.
Notatu dignum is the fact that nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard Sunga’s rights and interests,
especially that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have
related the extent of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station. This Court is thus constrained to rely on the
following verbatim testimony of SPO2 Janoras which described how Atty. Rocamora assisted Sunga during the investigation:
ATTY. ENRIQUEZ (Defense Counsel) -
Q: Did not Atty. Rocamora warn you, as the investigator, that simply he is invoking his client’s right to remain silent? Did not
Atty. Rocamora first confer with the accused Rey Sunga prior to the investigation?
A: They conversed.
Q: You said a while ago that immediately upon your arrival you already started the investigation. And now you are claiming that
they had a conversation first. Which is correct?
A: They conversed for a very short while because everybody was already there. I was on my typewriter and they were seated just
very near me (Emphasis supplied.)78
xxx
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel) -
Q: And you informed Atty. Rocamora that allegedly Mr. Rey Sunga wanted to confess his alleged participation in the commission
of the offense, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so upon arrival at the police station it did not take Atty. Rocamora a long time to confer with Rey Sunga before the
alleged investigation started, as you said 6:00 o’clock in the morning?
A: Yes, sir. It did not take long because they were already ready (Emphasis supplied.)79
xxx
COURT -
Q: Who propounded the questions to accused Rey Sunga?
A: I was the one, Your Honor.
Q: And who gave the answers?
A: Rey Sunga was the one answering me, Your Honor.
Continue.
PROSECUTOR GONZALES -
Q: And what, if any, did Atty. Agustin Rocamora do, if any, at the time these questions were being asked Rey Sunga?
A: He instructed Rey Sunga to just answer the questions, sir (Emphasis supplied.)80
xxx
From the foregoing testimony of SPO2 Janoras, it can be gathered that Atty. Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and
options prior to giving his (Sunga’s) admission. Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the admission
from Sunga.
739
Moreover, that Sunga was first questioned by SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos before he was investigated by SPO2 Janoras does not
escape the attention of this Court. Although Sunga failed to present evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered in the hands
of SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by his side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions
about Jocelyn’s death. At that point, Sunga was already under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Custodial investigation is the stage "where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements (Italics in the original; Emphasis supplied.).81 Under such circumstances, this Court cannot but entertain serious misgivings as to the
admission Sunga subsequently gave to SPO2 Janoras.
Like Exhibit "A," Sunga’s second extrajudicial admission-Exhibit "I" is inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel to assist him when he
executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto Princesa City. Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such admission in
connection with his desire to apply as state witness which admission he later repudiated, this does not make Exhibit "I" admissible. Sunga was
at the time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing in jail since his arrest in mid-July 1994. His desire to regain his
freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once due to his conviction for another crime. His admission which was done without
the benefit of counsel consisted of answers to questions propounded by the investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral declaration
of his participation in the crime. To this Court, these conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere pervading that of a custodial investigation
and necessitating the assistance of a competent and independent counsel of Sunga’s choice as a matter of right but which he had none.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent
assistance of an independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible.82 Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had
been voluntarily given, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.83
The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel as contained in his sworn statement-Exhibit "I" was not a valid waiver for, on its face, it was
executed not in the presence of counsel, contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution.84
Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and his waiver of the right to have one being invalid, his statement-
Exhibit "I" is inadmissible.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court whereby he expressly acknowledged having
executed Exhibit "A" and affirmed the contents thereof did not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which could be used
against him and his co-appellants. Neither could his other statements in such proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be utilized to
establish his and the other appellants’ guilt. For in that preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively denied of his essential right to
counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed Sunga’s counsel de officio but just like the assistance he extended during the execution of Exhibit "A,"
Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of Sunga’s cause. While Sunga was being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for
answers which could and did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection to shield his client from the damning nature
thereof.
The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process.85 The preliminary
investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation
will be subjected to no less than the State’s processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for
criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter’s
lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga’s rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel.
The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and
objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.86 As in People v.
Abano87 where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her
counsel, this Court will not admit Sunga’s. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on material points of Sunga’s and
Locil’s accounts of the incident.
As for the rest of the prosecution evidence, it fails to corroborate Locil’s testimony. The declarations of witnesses Tan, Devilleres and Gabinete
can in no way enhance the veracity of the essential, material aspects of Locil’s account for they relate not to the crime itself but to events
thereafter.
Tan’s testimony that Lansang informed him that he knew someone who could reveal the identity of Jocelyn’s assailants and that Lansang
suggested to him to no longer report to the police does not at all constitute incriminating evidence, for there was no admission, express or
implied, by Lansang of any wrongdoing or criminal participation on his part. Besides, why would Lansang suggest to Tan not to report to the
police when the police early on had its hands full in trying to solve the crime.
Dr. Vigonte’s affirmation of her finding of a fatal injury on Jocelyn’s head is supportive only of the fact that the victim was hit with something
on her head which caused her death, but this by no means is evidence that appellants inflicted said fatal injury.
As for the circumstances testified to by the other witnesses, they do not, by and in themselves, rise to the level of circumstantial evidence
which warrant appellants’ conviction.
740
In the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence lead to no other
logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.88 The circumstances that Lansang was seen on June 30, 1994, a day after the incident,
walking back and forth and appearing restless near the place where Jocelyn’s body was eventually found; that Lansang was in the company of
Octac and inquired, the day after Jocelyn’s body was discovered on July 12, 1994, if Jocelyn was from Barangay Caruray; that Lansang told
Jocelyn’s father that he knew someone who could pinpoint those responsible for the crime; and that Jocelyn was fatally hit on the head by a
blunt object are too fragile to lead to the inference that Lansang and his co-appellants are liable for Jocelyn’s rape and slaying. These
circumstances in the scheme of things are not indubitable pieces of evidence of a person’s commission of a crime for they are susceptible of
explanations which do not necessarily speak of guilt or culpability.
Standing alone and uncorroborated, can Locil’s testimony serve as a basis for appellants’ conviction? As an exception to the general rule on the
requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and
full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.89 An exhaustive review of the transcript of
stenographic notes of Locil’s testimony reveals, however, that the manner by which she related it was punctuated with marks of tentativeness,
uncertainty and indecisiveness which the trial court unfortunately failed to take note of in its decision on review.
Consider the following portions of her testimony, quoted verbatim:
COURT:
Q Do you know the name of the woman who died?
A Jocelyn Tan
ATTY. GACOTT [Private Prosecutor]:
Maybe we can use the sound system.
ATTY. GACOTT:
Q: Miss Witness, you said that you are fourteen years old. How come that you are 14 years old?
A: (Witness handing a document to counsel.)
(To the Court:)
Your Honor, the witness handed to me a birth certificate.
ATTY. CRUZAT (Defense Counsel): We are requesting for the witness to speak loud and not merely hand over certain documents.
COURT: Instruct the witness to speak louder. (Emphasis supplied.)90
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: Miss Witness, how many times did you attain your Grade I schooling?
A: Three times.
Q: What about your Grade II schooling?
A: Two years.
Q: How about your Grade III schooling?
A: One year.
ATTY. CRUZAT: I am already tired of requesting this Honorable Court to instruct the witness to speak quite louder. She is just
whispering to the interpreter.
741
COURT: You speak louder (Emphasis supplied.)91
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: Now, Miss Witness, where were you last June 29, 1994 at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon?
A: In Mendoza.
COURT -
Q: What is that Mendoza?
A: Mendoza Park.
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: During that date, do you remember any unusual thing that happened to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could you please relate to this Honorable Court what happened during that date?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CRUZAT: I may be compelled to ask this Honorable Court for a coercive authority to declare her in contempt for repeatedly
disobeying the instruction of the Court for her to speak louder.
COURT: You speak louder, otherwise you will be cited in contempt of court.
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.92
xxx
ATTY. GACOTT -
Q: You mean to say, Miss Witness, that this Tomboy that you are referring to went upstairs of Mendoza Park, and once there she
talked to the woman sitting there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know the name of that woman?
A: No, sir.
Q: After getting near to that woman, what did they do after that?
A: They talked, sir.
Q: Then what happened next?
ATTY. CRUZAT: This woman does not speak quite loud, Your Honor.
COURT: You talk louder (Emphasis supplied.)93
xxx
742
A scrutiny of her testimony likewise reveals a strain of improbability ingrained therein. To recapitulate, Locil claimed that on June 29, 1994 she
boarded a tricycle bearing a lesbian who invited her for a joyride, proceeded to the Mendoza Park and picked up Jocelyn, whom she was not
acquainted with, then brought by the same tricycle to Irawan where the latter was raped and brutally murdered. In other words, she wanted
to convey that she was deliberately brought by appellants with them on June 29, 1994 to the place where they were to carry out, which they
did, their abominable acts against Jocelyn. This strikes this Court as improbable if not bizarre. For it is contrary to human nature and
experience for those who undertake the commission of a crime to bring a spectator thereof. A criminal would certainly take steps to evade
detection or discovery of his criminal act, to keep it from being witnessed or known by others who might later turn against him. Yet, from
Locil’s testimony, appellants took the trouble of bringing her to the locus criminis so she could bear witness to a horrible crime which
appellants carried out with evident secrecy in a remote, uninhabited place in Puerto Princesa City.
That appellants required Locil’s presence at the time and place of the crime only to threaten her later against divulging what she had
witnessed thus defies comprehension.
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 94
This Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one who, in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home
and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her
mother and aunt?
Locil’s testimony on how appellants put her in a position to have direct knowledge of their malevolent acts despite taking measures to conceal
their deeds fails to inspire belief and must, therefore, be discredited.
A serious question too abounds on Locil’s identification of appellant Pascua as one of those who raped Jocelyn. She described Pascua, the man
who according to her raped the victim after appellants Lansang and Sunga did, as having, among other things, singkit (chinky) eyes. But as
Pascua did not have singkit eyes, even the trial court was prompted to ask her if she was sure that the third person who raped Jocelyn
had singkit eyes.95 Thus, with the court’s approval, the defense made it of record that Pascua did not have chinky eyes, contrary to Locil’s
description of him.96
The aforementioned observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her testimony, the improbability
with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua’s eyes to match
the latter’s actual physical feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. This Court
thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency, that of
straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellants’ conviction.
In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely
when the prosecution’s case is weak that the defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. 97 It bears
noting that the alibi proffered by appellants, especially that by Lansang, had been corroborated.
In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants’ alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants’
presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio
Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause the IMMEDIATE RELEASE of the appellants from custody, unless they are being
held for some other lawful cause, and to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision of the date appellants were
actually released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
743
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568 February 15, 2001
HON. ROBERT Z. BARBERS, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, JUANITO DE GUZMAN and LUCIO MARGALLO IV, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for alleged violation of Article 204 (Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment) of the Revised Penal Code,
section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and sections 4(b) and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713, filed against respondent judge in connection with his
acquittal of the accused LAWRENCE WANG y CHEN in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992.
On April 10, 1997, complainants ROBERT Z. BARBERS,1 JUANITO DE GUZMAN and LUCIO MARGALLO IV filed a joint complaint-affidavit with the
Office of the Ombudsman charging respondent Judge PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., of allegedly violating Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code,
section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2 and section 4, subsections (b) and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713.3 Considering the Evaluation
Report4 with recommendation of its Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, the Office of the Ombudsman endorsed5the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator on May 9, 1997. It was pointed out in said Evaluation Report "that respondent is primarily accused of
Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment."
The administrative complaint stemmed from the acquittal by respondent judge of Lawrence Wang, a Hong Kong national who was
apprehended by elements of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime or PARAC, DILG, in Malate, Manila in the early morning of May
17, 1996, the particulars of which are described in the complainants' Joint Complaint-Affidavit6 dated April 1, 1997, as follows:
At about 7 p.m. on May 16, 1996, members of the PARAC led by P/Sr. Insp. Lucio Margallo, IV effected the arrest of SPO1 VERGEL DE
DIOS, ROBERTO ANOBLING and RESTITUTO ARELLANO during an entrapment operation. This trio then called on their cohorts to bring
in additional batch of shabu. After four (4) hours, or at about 11 p.m. of May 16, 1996, PIO REDENTOR TECH and JOSEPH JUNIO
arrived to deliver 150 grams of shabu. Tech and Junio were likewise arrested at 11 p.m. while they were delivering the shabu to de
Dios and company. When interrogated Tech and Junio disclosed that a big transaction of shabu was about to be made at an
apartment along Maria Orosa St., Malate, Manila. They also admitted that they worked for Lawrence Wang. Accordingly, the PARAC
immediately proceeded to said place and conducted surveillance or stake-out operations. After three (3) hours, or about 2:10 a.m. of
the following day, May 17, 1996, the PARAC agents saw a man, previously described by TECH as Wang and identified by a police
asset, coming out of the aforesaid apartment and walking towards a parked BMW car. After Wang had opened the trunk
compartment of the car, the PARAC agents approached Wang and confronted him to ascertain his identity. P/Sr. Insp. Margallo also
prevented Wang from closing the trunk. They then saw the bags of shabu inside the trunk. A further search yielded cash amount
of P650,000.00 in small denominations, one (1) mechanical scale and one (1) electronic scale and two (2) unlicensed firearms,
namely: (1) AMT automatic pistol, cal. 380/9mm and (2) Daewoo automatic pistol, cal. 9mm. Accordingly, the accused was arrested.
In all, three (3) arrests were effected, one after the other, during the late hours of May 16 and the wee hours of May 17, 1996, a time
span of only seven (7) hours.
Three (3) related informations7 were then filed against Wang, which were consolidated in Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC, for
brevity) of Manila, presided by the respondent judge. The charges were docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (for violation of section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended), Criminal Case No. 96-149991(for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 [Illegal Possession of Firearms]), and Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (for violation of COMELEC Resolution 2828 in
relation to Republic Act No. 7166 [COMELEC Gun Ban]).
Prior to his arraignment, Wang filed a motion for preliminary investigation dated June 11, 1996 which was granted by the trial court in an
Order dated June 27, 1996. During the preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, Wang denied that illegal drugs or unlicensed firearms
were found in his possession. The cases were later remanded to the trial court after Assistant City Prosecutor Michaela M. Cua submitted a
Resolution dated August 22, 1996 finding probable cause against Wang. Fearing that his objection to his warrantless arrest and search would
be waived by his entering a plea, Wang through counsel filed a Manifestation on November 7, 1996 making of record his continuing objection
to his warrantless arrest and praying that the trial court enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf. Acting on Wang's Manifestation, respondent
judge entered a plea of "not guilty" for Wang as reflected in his Order of November 8, 1996.
During the trial, the prosecution presented and offered the testimonies of Insp. Cielito Coronel and Reynaldo Cristobal of the PARAC team who
arrested Wang, and Felicisima Francisco, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who conducted laboratory tests to
determine if the confiscated substance was indeed "shabu", a prohibited drug.
During the hearing on December 6, 1996, the prosecution formally rested its case. In turn, the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a
Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the defense's motion in an Order of the same date and gave Wang a period of twenty-five (25)
days from receipt thereof within which to file a Demurrer to Evidence, and the prosecution a similar period to file its opposition thereto. An
undated Demurrer to Evidence was then filed by Wang through counsel on January 9, 1997.
744
Subsequently, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad filed a "Manifestation with Motion" stating that the prosecution is resting its case
against the accused, Wang, insofar as Criminal Case No. 96-149990 only was concerned but excluding the two (2) remaining cases for illegal
possession of firearms and violation of the COMELEC gun ban, wherein the prosecution claimed it has not yet rested. Consequently, in an
Order dated January 14, 1997, the trial court set further hearings on the two (2) remaining cases on January 21, February 5, 11 and 12, 1997.
On March 13, 1997, respondent judge issued a Resolution granting Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting Wang in the said three (3)
closely related cases. Respondent judge declared therein and made the finding that:
xxx xxx xxx
The threshold issue raised by accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless arrest and search were lawful as
argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement to another. None of these
circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not
committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that
he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol [sic] that the accused had in his
possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not
give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pants' side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting
officers had no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in
possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine that were found and seized from the
car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver's seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the
banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent judge then issued on the same day an Order dated March 13, 1997 setting the promulgation of his aforequoted Resolution on
March 20, 1997.
On the day before the scheduled promulgation, SPO3 Cristobal claimed that he received a telephone call from a person claiming to be the
branch clerk of court of RTC Manila, Branch 18. The caller, according to Cristobal, instructed him to bring to court the next day the money
confiscated from Wang. Cristobal complied.
After the Resolution of March 13, 1997 was promulgated by the trial court, Cristobal was presented with a special power-of-attorney8 dated
February 12, 1997 executed by Wang authorizing his counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, to receive the confiscated money. Cristobal handed over the
money to Atty. Oliver Lozano, but he first required Atty. Lozano to accomplish a receipt written on the special power-of-attorney itself.
Not satisfied with Wang's acquittal, petitioners Barbers et. al., filed the said Joint Complaint-Affidavit against respondent judge before the
Office of the Ombudsman. They also filed an administrative complaint against the trial prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor Edad, for alleged
gross neglect of duty in his handling of the Wang cases. However, on September 6, 1999, the Department of Justice issued its Resolution
dismissing the administrative complaint against Edad for lack of merit.
After the said Joint Complaint-Affidavit of the complainants (herein petitioners) against respondent judge was endorsed by the Ombudsman to
the Office of the Court Administrator, this Court required the respondent to comment thereon. After its receipt of the respondent's comment
strongly denying and disputing the administrative charges against him and upon the recommendation of OCA, this Court referred the matter to
the then Court of Appeals Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Consuelo Ynares-Santiago for investigation and report. On
September 7, 1998, she submitted her Report recommending that respondent judge be reprimanded and meted a fine equivalent to six (6)
months salary. Her findings were adopted by the Office of the Court Administrator, per its Memorandum 9 of December 2, 1999, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The conduct of respondent, given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case, leaves much to be desired vis-à-vis these legal yardsticks.
The abruptness and inordinate haste in which he dismissed the charges against the accused gave rise to the suspicion that he
railroaded the proceedings to favor the accused.
745
The records show that two members of the team which arrested Lawrence Wang, namely P/Insp. Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo
Cristobal were the only witnesses who testified on the facts regarding the warrantless arrest and seizure. The principal witness and
leader of the team, P/Sr. Insp. Lucio Margallo IV, who more than anybody else has the personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the arrest of Wang was never presented as a witness. It must be pointed out in this regard that Margallo, as leader of
the arresting team could have clarified the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Wang and the seizure of the drugs, firearms and
cash found in the car especially the highly contentious issue of whether or not the trunk of the car which contained the "shabu" was
already open with said prohibited drug in plain view when he and his team members approached. The record, however, discloses
that after the prosecutor handling the cases conferred with respondent, thereafter, Margallo's testimony was dispensed with on the
dubious ground that it would merely be corroborative. xxx
The record also reveals that Margallo received only one subpoena to appear in Crim. Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act) on December 6, 1996 xxx. Unfortunately, he was not able to attend because he was on leave at the time xxx and only
learned about the hearing after December 6, 1996 xxx. Curiously, no other summons were served on him to testify despite his
instructions to SPO3 Cristobal to manifest in Court that he be subpoenaed to testify xxx. As in Crim. Case No. 96-149990, he also
received only one (1) subpoena in the other cases but the reason therefor was for the Evidence Custodian namely, SPO3 Cristobal
who was under him, to bring the confiscated items in court xxx. The only other time he received a subpoena was when he was
required to attend the scheduled hearing on March 20, 1997 and he was not aware that said notice requiring his presence on said
date was already for the promulgation of the order granting the demurrer to evidence xxx.
The Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence dismissing all three (3) cases against Wang is likewise anchored on infirm legal
moorings.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiate (sic) after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
motion of the accused with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such
motion without the express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution."
The rule is not applicable if the prosecution has not yet rested its case xxx.
In this case, despite the statement in the resolution in question as well as respondent's claims to the contrary,
there is ample evidence on record that the prosecution had not yet rested its case in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-
149991 and 96-149992 xxx. Particularly revealing on this point is the "Manifestation With Motion to Set Above-
Entitled Cases for Further Hearing and For Issuance of Subpoena to Prosecution Witnesses" xxx which avers that:
"THE PEOPLE THRU THE UNDERSIGNED TRIAL PROSECUTOR, to this Honorable Court most respectfully manifests
that he rested his case only in so far (sic) as the case of R.A. 6425 is concerned, and not as regards the charge for
violation of P.D. L866 (sic) (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and the case of COMELEC Resolution No. 2828 (Crim. Case
No. 96-149992);
WHEREFORE, the prosecution respectfully moves this Honorable Court:
1. To set Crim. Case Nos. 96-149991-92, for violation of P.D. 1866 and COMELEC Resolution 2828, respectively for
further hearing to enable the prosecution to present its evidence;
xxx xxx xxx
A circumspect scrutiny of the demurrer to evidence itself xxx will show that the same can only pertain to Criminal Case No.
96-149990 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act considering that it was filed on January 9, 1997 and the prosecution
had not yet rested in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992. In fact, in an Order dated January 14, 1997 xxx,
respondent set hearings for the two (2) cases on January 21, February 5, 11 and 12, 1997. It is interesting to note in this
regard that no demurrer to evidence was filed after the prosecution had rested its case in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149991
and 96-149992. Neither was the prior demurrer filed on January 9, 1997 subsequently amended to include these two
cases. Despite all these facts, respondent judge still proceeded to dismiss all three (3) charges against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the factual events surrounding the turnover of the confiscated articles which oddly enough, with the
exception of the firearms, were not marked in evidence xxx only increases the dubiousness of the proceedings. As has been
746
stated earlier, complainants were unaware, upon being served with notice to appear on March 20, 1996 that a Resolution
dismissing all three (3) cases on the basis of the undated demurrer to evidence would be promulgated xxx. Indeed, the
document served by the process server made no mention of the fact that the cases were already submitted for resolution
and that the same would be promulgated on said date xxx. In fact, SPO3 Cristobal who was Evidence Custodian of the
PARAC-DILG was not served a subpoena commanding his presence on March 20, 1997. xxx Instead, he received a
telephone call on March 19, 1997 from a person who identified herself as the Branch Clerk of respondent judge's sala
instructing him to bring the confiscated money to court the next day xxx. Thus, upon appearing the next day, he was
surprised to learn that there would be a promulgation. xxx
During the proceedings held March 20, 1997, SPO3 Cristobal was handed a Special Power of Attorney xxx dated February
12, 1997 executed by the accused authorizing his counsel to receive the confiscated money in his behalf xxx. As a
precaution, Cristobal made a handwritten receipt on the said document which he required said counsel to sign xxx. The
date of the execution of the Special Power of Attorney which was more than a month prior to the promulgation of the
resolution only fueled Cristobal's suspicion that the proceedings were already rigged in Wang's favor xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The factual finding of respondent judge that the "shabu" was not in plain view when the accused was arrested
becomes open to question in the light of the evidence on record that the compartment of the car containing the
"shabu" was actually already open and the accused attempted to close the same but was prevented from doing
so by the arresting officers xxx much more so taking into consideration the fact that P/Sr. Insp. Margallo, the
principal witness for the prosecution who could have shed light on the circumstances of the arrest and seizure,
was not given the change (sic) to testify. Considering that the accused is a highly controversial character on
account of his notoriety as a big-time drug lord not to mention the widespread media attention attracted by the
case, respondent judge should have proceeded with more caution and circumspection in the handling thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
However, there is an important aspect to this case which was heretofore not considered. The respondent judge's Resolution in question dated
March 13, 1997 is one of acquittal. It is well-settled that acquittal in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its promulgation;
accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. 10 When the Investigating Justice submitted her
Report dated September 7, 1998, the questioned Resolution of respondent judge acquitting Wang was already the subject of a pending
petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587)11 which was filed with this Court. It appeared that after the State received a copy of the said
Resolution of respondent judge on March 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion" on April 3, 1997 with
this Court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days (or until May 4, 1997, a Sunday) within which to file a petition for review on certiorari.
The motion was granted by the First Division of this Court in a Resolution dated May 7, 1997. The said petition for review on certiorari (G.R.
No. 128587) which was filed on May 5, 1997 by the Solicitor General together with the Department of Justice, is still pending in this Court.
Following established doctrine, the pendency of the appeal is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint.12 It has
also been held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have
gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists. 13 Differently expounded in another case,
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e.,
error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal.
The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and
exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
xxxx Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and disposition they may make in
the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges
are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a
judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the
part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
xxxx14
747
The administrative case at bar involves an acquittal on an accused by the respondent judge in three (3) closely related criminal cases which
were earlier consolidated in the court presided by respondent judge. As a rule, acquittal is immediately final and executory. Consequently, in
view of the pendency in this Court (First Division) of the petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587), supra, we may not, ordinarily,
review here the said judgment of acquittal in those three (3) criminal cases, the inquiry in this administrative case being limited to the issue of
whether the respondent judge is liable for the charges brought against him.15 However, to resolve those charges in the administrative case, it
is indispensable that we consider the respondent Judge's subject Resolution dated March 13, 1997 granting accused Wang's Demurrer to
Evidence and acquitting the latter in the closely related Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992.1âwphi1.nêt
In appealing Wang's acquittal, the State is relying on a recognized exception to the general rule in that where the assailed judgment is void, no
double jeopardy results from the re-filing of the criminal case.16 In view of the pendency of the said appeal, we should, ordinarily, be
constrained from resolving the charge of violation of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
However, in this administrative case, justice demands that we resolve the basic issue relative to the legality or illegality of Wang's warrantless
arrest and search, and the issue on the admissibility of the bags of "shabu," scales and unlicensed firearms which were confiscated during the
warrantless search. These are the very same issues being litigated in the said appeal.17Meanwhile, there is as yet no definitive pronouncement
by this Court in G.R. No. 128587, supra, whether respondent's Resolution of acquittal of Wang is patently erroneous. The jurisprudential rule is
that pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature.18
Nevertheless, the foregoing considerations do not prevent us from ruling upon the remaining charges brought against respondent judge. The
first involves an alleged violation of section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides:
Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
The other charge is for the alleged violation of section 4, subsections (b) and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, viz.:
Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as
standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Professionalism.—Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue advantage.
(c) Justness and sincerity.—Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at
all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their
office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to
positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent judge's alleged transgressions consist principally of: (a) resolving the Demurrer to Evidence when the prosecution had not yet
allegedly rested in all three (3) criminal cases; (b) dismissing all three (3) criminal cases when the Demurrer to Evidence allegedly referred only
to Criminal Case No. 96-149990 relative to the drug charges; and (c) propounding questions during the clarificatory hearing which revealed his
alleged partiality in favor of the accused. After reviewing the records, we find scant evidence to support the charges as well as the adverse
conclusions of the Honorable Investigator.
A close scrutiny of the record does not support the conclusion of the Investigator that respondent judge prematurely resolved the Demurrer to
Evidence without giving the prosecution ample opportunity to prove its three (3) cases which were earlier consolidated. The governing rule
then, Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure19 provides that:
748
Demurrer to evidence.—After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied)
During the hearing held on December 6, 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad stated that he was resting the People's case.20 It was
at this time that the defense asked for, and was given, leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. Perhaps belatedly realizing that it had
rested prematurely, the prosecution filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Set Above-Entitled Cases for Further Hearing and For the Issuance
of Subpoenas to Prosecution Witnesses"21 on December 19, 1996. Respondent judge, in an Order dated January 14, 199722 granted that
motion and set the two (2) remaining cases (Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992) for further hearings. This fact belies the petitioners'
claim that they were denied their day in court. Significantly, during the hearing held on February 11, 1997, the prosecution rested in all the
three (3) cases for the second time,23 including Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992. The prosecution was even able to file an
opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence. The record shows that the proceedings were astened when the defense filed a Manifestation on
February 10, 1997 that it was admitting the existence of the firearms and the lack of license therefor. Hence, there was not even a need to
amend the Demurrer to Evidence inasmuch as the Demurrer to Evidence, as worded, clearly prayed for the dismissal of all the three (3)
cases, namely, Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992.
Neither do we discern any impropriety when respondent judge resolved to dismiss all the three (3) criminal cases filed against Wang.
Petitioners claim that the Demurrer to Evidence could apply only to Criminal Case No. 96-149990 inasmuch as (1) the State has rested allegedly
only in that case, and (2) the docket number stated on the first page of the Demurrer to Evidence referred only to Criminal Case No. 96-
149990. That claim is erroneous. Even if the caption of the Demurrer to Evidence stated only Criminal Case No. 96-149990, a plain reading of
the entireDemurrer to Evidence leaves no doubt that it also covered Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992. The principal argument of
the defense in those three (3) criminal cases is that Wang was arrested illegally, without a warrant, under circumstances not falling within
recognized exceptions.24 Accordingly, the accompanying search and seizure which yielded the prohibited articles is also illegal and invalid.
Pursuant to constitutional dictates,25 said articles are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree." That defense is
unequivocally set forth in the Demurrer to Evidence. The caption of the Demurrer to Evidence which indicated only Criminal Case No. 96-
149990 is not controlling because the body and prayer of the Demurrer to Evidence refer to all the three (3) closely related cases.
Anent the charge that respondent judge displayed bias and partiality during the trial when he asked numerous clarificatory questions, we note
that the participation of respondent judge in the conduct of the trial was not by itself condemnable. He could not be expected to remain an
impassive and remote presence during the proceedings, prohibited from asking questions when proper and necessary, yet all these were done
without necessarily transgressing the boundaries of impartiality decreed by judicial ethics. The mere fact that the presiding judge asked
clarificatory questions during the trial does not make him a biased judge. 26 "He must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions to
witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth."27Differently stated, "questions to clarify points and to elicit
additional relevant evidence are not improper. The judge being the arbiter may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite
and prevent unnecessary waste of time."28 The pronouncement of this Court in United States v. Hudieres29 is illuminating as when it was made
in 1914:
The first assignment of error has its basis in the claim of counsel that the trial judge went to unjustifiable lengths in examining some
of the witnesses called for the defense. It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole proceedings that the only object of the
trial judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible to get at the truth as to the facts which the witnesses
were testifying. The right of a trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which
presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this
jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted
a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact
upon which the judgment in the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees that the degree of credit which he is to give
the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question that in the exercise of
a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. The questions asked by the trial judge in the case at bar were in our opinion entirely
proper, their only purpose being to clarify certain obscure phases of the case; and while we are inclined to agree with counsel that
some of the observations of the trial judge in the course of his examination might well have been omitted, there is no reason
whatever to believe that the substantial rights of the defendants were in anywise prejudiced thereby.
The transcript of the clarificatory hearing held on February 26, 1997 is reproduced below to show that the tenor of respondent judge's
clarificatory questions, though numerous did not really create the impression that respondent judge was biased or that he has practically
taken the cudgels for the defense.
xxx xxx xxx
THE COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q: You, SPO3 Cristobal, were a member of the police operatives that effected the arrest of the accused in this case?
749
A: Yes, sir.
Q: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has gathered that prior to the arrest of the
accused there were three 3) men that your team arrested. One of whom is a police officer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: SPO2 Vergel De Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When were they arrested?
A; May 16 on or about 7:00 (interrupted)
Q: P.M.?
A: P.M., your Honor.
Q: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from them?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men you were able to discover that Redentor Tech and Joseph Junio were
the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment [based] in your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two men, Redentor Tech and Joseph
Junio?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was on the evening of what date?
A: May 16. The same (interrupted)
Q: The same date? The same evening?
A: Same evening. About 11:00 p.m.
Q: These two men, Redentor and Joseph they were also investigated by your team?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You were present when they were investigated?
A: I was the one who investigated them.
Q: This Redentor, he claimed that he was the talent manager of Glenmore Modelling Agency?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you also stated that the agency was own (sic) by the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man, Joseph? Did he also say that he was an employee of the accused?
750
A: He told me that he is a gym instructor.
Q: So he was not working for the accused?
A: He is also working for the accused.
Q: As a gym instructor?
A: Yes.
Q: You mean to say that the gym is also own (sic) by the accused?
A: He teaches aerobic.
Q: In what establishment?
A: In Glenmore.
Q: In Glenmore?
A: Yes. sir.
Q: These two, Redentor and Joseph at the time of the arrest they were in the xxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact they were in xxx to you the three men which were previously arrested?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the time of the arrest?
A: Yes, sir. They refuse (sic) to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it
May 16 or May 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
Q: So it was on the following morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he tell you where the delivery of the shabu was to be made?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, sir.
Q: You said that your team decided to see the accused to ask him to shed light regarding the drug trafficking activities of
Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Your Honor. That is our initial purpose.
Q: To ask him to shed light?
A: Yes, sir.
751
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter concerning the arrest of these
two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that led
to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
Q: So you were suspecting the accused as being involved?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the drug transaction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You also testified that you and your team proceeded to Maria Orosa apartment somewhere in Ermita?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that apartment was pinpointed to you by Redentor as the place where the accused could be found?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you arrived at the apartment you did not enter the apartment?
A: We conducted a stake out.
Q: You waited outside?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why? You were expecting the accused to come out from the apartment?
A: Because of the parked BMW which was described by Redentor as the one used by the accused.
Q: So there was a BMW car parked in front (sic) of the apartment?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was described as the car being used by the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was (sic) Redentor and Joseph with your team when you proceeded to the apartment?
A: Initially they were with us but the rest of the members of the team brought them to our office.
Q: So when the accused came out from the apartment, Redentor and Joseph were no longer with your team?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, you stated or testified that when the accused came out from the apartment, he was identified by your team. Who
identified the accused?
A: We have in our company an asset who knows the accused.
Q: When the accused was identified to your team as the employer mentioned by Redentor you immediately held him
surrounded?
A: Not immediately. We watched what they were about to do.
752
Q: And what was the accused doing when you saw him coming out from the apartment?
A: They were two. One is supposed to be the driver.
Q: So he has a male companion?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: They were walking together when they came out from the apartment?
A: The driver, sir, is already beside the car.
Q: I see. So the driver was waiting inside the car?
A: Not inside. Outside.
Q: Outside of the car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But near the car?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You narrated to this court when you saw the accused coming out from the apartment walking where was the bound? To what
direction was he walking? Towards the car?
A: Towards the car.
Q: Alright. From the apartment where he came out to the place where the car was parked, what was the distance? How many
meters?
A: A distance of more or less 15 to 20 meters.
Q: What did you observe while the accused was walking from the apartment to his car which has a distance of about 15 to 20
meters? What did you observe in the nature of the accused while he was walking towards his car?
A: The accused stopped beside the car. He talked with the driver, supposed to be the driver and they talked for a while.
Q: So he walked on the left side of the car. Where (stop) in what portion of the car did he approached the driver?
A: Left side, sir.
Q: Left side?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: And you saw him talked with the driver?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what happened?
A: After they talked, we saw them open the compartment of the car.
753
Q: At this time your team were observing at the distance?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the distance?
A: More or less 15 to 20 meters. We were in a concealed place.
Q: And you were concealed. You could not be seen by the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened when you saw the accused and his driver open the trunk of the car?
A: It was Capt. Margallo and Police Inspector Colonel approached them and upon seeing them I also went out of my hiding place
and the accused was accosted.
Q: So that was the time when you and your team accosted the accused when the trunk of his car was open?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after you accosted the accused, what did you do?
A: It was Capt. Margallo and I who prevented them from closing the compartment.
Q: The trunk?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What transpired when you approached the accused at that point? When you and your (stop) what is the rank of this Coronel?
A Capt. Margallo. Sr. Inspector Lucio Margallo.
Q: No. No. Yes. He was the one that approached the accused?
A: And Lt. Coronel.
Q: And Police Inspector Coronel?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you were also nearby?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who talked with the accused?
A: It was Capt. Margallo.
Q: What did he tell to the accused?
A: I was not able to get what they are talking because I immediately told them that there were shabu at the compartment.
Q: Who made that statement?
A: I was the one who told them that there were shabu in the compartment.
Q: You told the accused?
754
A: No. I told Capt. Margallo that there were shabu inside the compartment of the car.
Q: Now, in your declaration and from that of the Coronel the accused was frisked?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And from the pocket of the pants of the accused was taken a back-up pistol?
A: No, sir. I believe it was a Daewoo caliber pistol.
Q: Daewoo? The one that was taken from the possession of the accused?
A: The AMT back up pistol was handed to me by Capt. Margallo.
Q: Yes. From whom it was taken?
A: It was taken from the accused.
Q: Correct. So when the accused was frisked what gun was taken from him and it was discovered inside the pocket of his pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which one occurred first? The bodily search of the accused or the search of the trunk or (sic) the car?
A: I could say it was simultaneously being conducted (sic).
Q: At the same time?
A: Yes, Your Honor because they were here while I was at the back.
Q: So while you and your othermembers (sic) of the team were searching the trunk of the car, Police Inspector Coronel and
another officer, Capt. Margallo were subjecting the accused to bodily searched?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you immediately discovered the shabu inside the trunk?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there was another gun that was taken from the car and that is underneath the driver's seat?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a gun?
A: No, sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when he was bodily searched?
A: Yes, sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards the car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, sir.
755
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from searching his car?
A: No, sir.30
xxx xxx xxx
The above-quoted questions propounded by respondent judge were necessary for the purpose of determining and clarifying the basis for
resolving the all important issue of the legality or illegality of the warrantless arrest of Wang and the warrantless search of the latter's car.
Herein respondent judge's aforequoted questions contrast favorably against instances in other cases wherein it was clearly shown that the
judges therein displayed bias against a party litigant. Thus, there is a case where the questions asked of a witness by the judge therein were
adversarial, malicious and hostile in character.31 There is another case where the sheer volume of questions asked by the judge therein tended
to be leading, misleading, if not baseless and hypothetical.32 It has also been held that clarificatory questions asked by the trial court must not
amount to confrontation, probing and insinuation, which are characteristics of a cross-examination.33
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint.34 All
told, complainants herein failed to discharge that burden. Besides, the charges, subject of the administrative case against respondent judge,
which were indorsed by the Office of the Ombudsman to the OCA on May 9, 199735 also appear to be premature in view of the filing on May 5,
1997 and pendency in this Court of the petition for review on certiorari, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen and Hon.
Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc.", docketed as G.R. No. 128587, supra, (see note no. 10). It has been held that the pendency of an appeal from a
questioned judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature.36 Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, the filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct the actions of a judge.37
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
756
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192799 October 24, 2012
ROLEX RODRIGUEZ y OLAYRES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED DOMECQ SPIRITS AND WINES, represented by ALLIED DOMECQ PHILS., INC., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner assails the March 2, 2010 Decision1 and June 29, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789, which affirmed the April 14, 2009 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24 in Manila, denying due
course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal in Criminal Case No. 02-206499.
The RTC convicted petitioner for Unfair Competition penalized under Sections 155, 168, 160 in relation to Sec. 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, and sentenced him to serve imprisonment of two (2) years, to pay a fine of PhP 50, 000 and
actual damages of PhP 75,000.
The pertinent factual antecedents are undisputed.
After promulgation of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 02-206499 convicting him for unfair competition, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the RTC on the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period to appeal. Fourteen (14) days after receipt of the RTC
Order denying his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. 4 Thus, the denial of his Notice of Appeal on the ground of
its being filed out of time under Sec. 6, Rule 122, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Before the RTC, the CA and now here, petitioner was
unwavering in his assertion of the applicability of the "fresh period rule" as laid down in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. 5
The rationale of the "fresh period rule" is:
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.6
Neypes elucidates that the "fresh period rule" applies to appeals under Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTC) and Rule
41 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA or this Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the RTCs to the CA); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to this Court).7A scrutiny of the said rules, however, reveals that the "fresh period rule" enunciated
in Neypes need NOT apply to Rules 42, 43 and 45 as there is no interruption in the 15-day reglementary period to appeal. It is explicit in Rules
42, 43 and 45 that the appellant or petitioner is accorded a fresh period of 15 days from the notice of the decision, award, judgment, final
order or resolution or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed.8
The pivotal question is whether the "fresh period rule" is applicable to appeals from conviction in criminal cases governed by Sec. 6 of Rule 122
which pertinently provides:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the
final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period
begins to run. (Emphasis supplied.)
While Neypes was silent on the applicability of the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases, the issue was squarely addressed in Yu v. Tatad,9 which
expanded the scope of the doctrine in Neypes to criminal cases in appeals of conviction under Sec. 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.1âwphi1 Thus, the Court held in Yu:
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the
period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x. 10
757
xxxx
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall
effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a
criminal case—a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be
prejudiced.
We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason.1âwphi1 Over time, courts have recognized with
almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law—Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum
est in lege.
Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions,
with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than
the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.11 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a judgment
of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted
from receipt of such denial within which to file his or her notice of appeal.
Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same statutory privilege as
litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new
trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of
civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases—under the spirit and rationale in Neypes—greater leeway in filing an appeal
through the "fresh period rule," with more reason that it should equally grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accused’s
"sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."12
Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner seasonably filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from January 19, 2009, the date of receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April 14, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 24 in Manila and the assailed March 2,
2010 Decision and June 29, 2010 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 108789 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Notice of Appeal of
petitioner Rolex Rodriguez y Olayres dated January 29, 2009 is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Let the case records be elevated by the RTC to the
CA for the review of petitioner’s appeal with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
758
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168773 October 27, 2006
ELIZA ABUAN, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 and
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D, convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Antecedents
A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan charging Abuan with violating R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. On May 8, 1998, she filed a motion to quash the criminal complaint, praying that pending the resolution of her motion, she be
allowed to post bail without waiving her right to question her arrest and assail Search Warrant No. 98-62.4 The public prosecutor conformed to
the motion. Thus, the motion was granted and bail was fixed at P60,000.00.5
The MTC found probable cause against Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and recommended the filing
of an Information against her. It ordered the elevation of the records to the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 12, 1998, an Amended Information was filed in the RTC of Dagupan City, charging Abuan with violating Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about 8:45 o’clock in the morning of May 6, 1998 at Brgy, Lasip, [M]unicipality of Calasiao, [P]rovince of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously has in her possession, custody and control of the following to wit:
Fifty seven (57) small heat-sealed plastic sachets of met[h]aphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 5.67grams.
one (1) roll aluminum foil and assorted plastic (luminous) sachets.
without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Art. III, Section 16 of R.A. 6425, as amended.6
During the arraignment on November 12, 1998, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 7During the pre-trial on
November 19, 1998, Abuan rejected the prosecution’s proposal for her to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, and that, in the
enforcement thereof, 57 sachets of shabu were found in her house and later confiscated by the policemen. 8 She maintained that the warrant
was invalid and that any material allegedly confiscated from her house was inadmissible in evidence.
The court set the initial presentation of evidence by the prosecution on December 3, 1998. However, on said date, accused filed a Motion to
Suppress Evidence, alleging that there was no probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62; the applicant, Cesar Ramos, had
no personal knowledge of his claim that she had in her possession methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia;
Marissa Gorospe was a fictitious person, and her testimony was fabricated to convince the Executive Judge to make a finding of probable
cause required for the issuance of a search warrant; and the Executive Judge failed to ask searching questions and elicit from "Gorospe" the
particularity of the alleged paraphernalia in Abuan’s possession. Abuan asserted that since the search warrant is void, whatever evidence was
discovered as a result of the search conducted based on the warrant was inadmissible in evidence. 9
Instead of allowing the accused to present her evidence in support of her motion, the court declared that any such evidence may be adduced
at the trial.10
The Case for the Prosecution

759
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 5, 1998, SPO2 Marcelino Gamboa and SPO2 Beliguer de Vera of the Calasiao Police Station received information
from a confidential informant that Abuan was conducting illegal drug activities in her house at Barangay Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Acting on
the said information, Gamboa and de Vera conducted surveillance-monitoring operations on her residence, three times for more than an hour.
They saw more or less 20 people who were coming in and out of Abuan’s house. According to the informant, these people were drug
addicts,11and Abuan was a known drug pusher.12 On the same day, the officers, through SPO3 Cesar Ramos, applied for a warrant13 with
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos of the RTC in Lingayen, Pangasinan, to search the house of Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale, aluminum foil, and burner.
The application was docketed as Search Warrant No. 98-62. To establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, Ramos presented
their informant, Marissa Gorospe, who was subjected to searching questions by the Executive Judge. 14
Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan. She knew Abuan because they were employed as dealers
of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan was a prominent personality in Barangay Lasip.15 Her unnumbered house is a green bungalow-type, cemented and
decorated with ornamental plants up front. She visited Abuan in her house at least three to four times a week. 16 She first came upon the drugs
in Abuan’s house when the latter invited her to a "jamming" and drinking session. She refused because she had to go home
to BarangaySapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan, a place of considerable distance from Calasiao.17 Abuan then suggested that they use
the shabu that she kept inside her bedroom instead. Abuan kept a substantial amount of shabu in her house and sold it.18 The informant
further narrated that several people, including teenagers, arrived in the house of Abuan and bought the substance.19 During her visits, she
observed that Abuan placed shabu inside plastic bags. She also saw weighing scales and paraphernalias used in sniffing shabu. Being a mother
herself, she did not want teenagers and her children to become drug addicts.20 Gorospe identified and affirmed the truth of the contents of
her deposition.21
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search Warrant No. 98-62 which reads:
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath thru searching questions on the applicant, SPO3 Cesar
A. Ramos, PNP, and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is in possession without any authority
to do so in violation of R.A. 6425 of the following:
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
Tooter
Weighing Scale
Aluminum Foil
Burner
which she keeps and conceals in her house premises at Brgy. Lasip, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which should be seized and brought to the
undersigned.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search at any time of the day or night and take possession of the above-
described properties and bring them to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid only for ten (10) days from its issuance, thereafter, the same shall be void.22
On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed of Col. Fidel Posadas, Major Froilan Perez, SPO2 Gamboa, SPO2 Madrid, SPO2 de Vera, PO2
Tomelden, PO2 Rosario, PO3 Ubando, PO1 Moyano and PO3 Vallo went to BarangayLasip to enforce the search warrant. However, before
proceeding to Abuan’s residence, the policemen invited Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag and Kagawad Miguel Garcia of Barangay Lasip
to witness the search.
Upon arriving at the premises, Officers De Vera, Gamboa and Garcia and Mangaliag entered the house; the rest of the policemen remained
outside. Mangaliag introduced the police officers to Abuan who presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her. Abuan read the warrant and
permitted the officers to conduct the search.23
De Vera, Mangaliag, Gamboa and Garcia entered the bedroom and found 57 sachets of suspected shabu, one roll of aluminum foil and
assorted luminous plastic sachets in the drawer just beside Abuan’s bed. 24 The police officers confiscated all these and brought them, along
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with Abuan, to the police station where an inventory of the items was made. Mangaliag and Garcia affixed their signatures on the
inventory/receipt,25 but Abuan refused to sign it.26
The police officers prepared a certification of orderly search which Garcia and Mangaliag also signed. Abuan likewise refused to sign the
certification.27 The police officers requested the PNP Crime Laboratory Unit of Lingayen, Pangasinan to conduct a laboratory examination on
the confiscated substance.28 According to the laboratory examination conducted by P/Supt. Theresa Ann Bugayong CID, Regional Chief
Chemist, the 57 sachets of the suspected shabu weighing 5.67 grams gave positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug.29
After presenting its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence Search Warrant No. 98-62, the Receipt of the Property Seized, the Physical
Science Report and the articles confiscated from Abuan’s house.30 However, Abuan objected to the admission of the search warrant and the
articles confiscated based thereon on the ground that the warrant was issued without probable cause.31 The court admitted the documentary
evidence of the prosecution subject to the comment or objection interposed by accused and the eventual determination of their probative
weight.32
The Case for the Accused
Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. Her parents and her sister Corazon Bernadette sent her money from Canada once or twice a
month to support her and her daughters. It was her father who spent for the education of her daughters. 33 She was married to Crispin Abuan,
a policeman, but they separated in 1997.34 She did not know any person by the name of Marissa Gorospe. She did not work for Avon
Cosmetics nor used any of its products.35
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her two daughters, 21-year old Ediliza Go and 9-year old Mae Liza Abuan.36 They were still in
bed inside their room. Suddenly, four armed men barged into their house and declared a raid.37 About eight to ten others were outside her
house. She inquired if they had a search warrant but she was not shown any.38 The men searched her house for about 10 to 15 minutes and
turned up with nothing.39Some of the men went out of the house and boarded a jeepney. The men outside again went into the bedroom and
came out with "powder placed in a plastic."40 At this instance, Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag was brought to the scene and was shown
the "powder substance" recovered from her bedroom. She refused to sign the inventory and receipt of the property seized and the
certification of orderly search. However, Mangaliag signed the same.41
She declared that the sachets/substances which the policemen claimed to have found in her house were merely "planted" to implicate her.
The raid as well as the charge against her were instigated by her brother Arsenio Tana, who was enraged when she refused his demand to
entrust the properties of the family to the care of his son. It appears that Tana carried out his threat to have her house raided since the
policemen did come to her house on May 6, 1998.42 Her brother was by the gate of her house at the time of the raid.
Abuan also testified that, during the raid, she saw Tana talking to the police officers who arrested her. Abuan also declared that the money
kept inside a box in her room amounting to P25,000.00 (US$1,100.00) given by her sister Corazon Bernardino had gone missing after the
raid.43 She did not file any charge for the loss of her money because she was scared. She did not know who took it.
Barangay Captain Robert Calachan of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan and Mercedes Carvajal, an employee of Avon Cosmetics in
Dagupan holding the position of team leader, testified for accused.
Calachan declared that he was born in Barangay Sapang and never left the place. He was familiar with the residents of the small
barangay.44 He issued a certification45 stating that "as per record of this barangay, a certain Marissa Gorospe is not a resident of
this barangay." Before he signed the certification, he inquired from the barangay members if they knew a Marissa Gorospe, and he was told
that no one by that name was a transient.46
Carvajal, for her part, testified that, based on the certification dated November 12, 1998 of Dagupan City Avon Branch Manager Gigi dela Rosa,
"Marissa Gorospe is not a registered dealer of Avon Dagupan Branch based on our records." She did not know any Avon Cosmetics employee
or dealer named Marissa Gorospe in Pangasinan. She further testified that she had been a team leader/dealer of Avon Cosmetics for 21 years
already, and that Abuan was not such a dealer/employee. On cross-examination, she declared that she was a team leader of Avon Cosmetics
(Dagupan Branch), and thus had no participation in the preparation of the certification of Gigi dela Rosa and was not in a position to know if
the certification was correct.
On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty of the charge. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 15 (sic), Article 6425, she is hereby sentenced
to suffer an imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of
PRISION CORRECTIONAL.
The prohibited drug and paraphernalia seized from the accused are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and should be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.
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SO ORDERED.47
The trial court declared that the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera should be accorded great weight and credence as they
testified positively regarding what transpired during the raid. In contrast, the testimony of accused was self-serving, negative and feeble. She
failed to prove that it was her brother who manipulated the unfortunate events. Neither was she able to prove ill motive on the part of the
police officers who conducted a search in her house; hence, the presumption is that they regularly performed their duties. The failure of the
accused to present her two daughters as witnesses amounted to suppression of evidence, giving rise to the presumption that if they had been
presented, their testimonies would be adverse to her.
On the issue of the validity of the search warrant, the court ruled that there was probable cause for its issuance. The proceedings conducted
by the Execute Judge relative to the application of the police for a search warrant, its issuance and implementation were valid, regular, and in
accordance with the requirements of the law and Constitution. 48 The trial court declared that Gorospe may have lied about her address and
being a dealer of Avon Cosmetics; however, it does not necessarily mean that she was a fictitious person. It explained that Gorospe may have
lied "a little" in order to conceal herself for her protection, but the rest of her testimony constituted sufficient evidence of probable cause.
Abuan filed her motion for reconsideration dated April 16, 2001, which the court denied in an Order49 dated May 10, 2001. She appealed the
decision to the CA, where she averred that:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE ALLEGED SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA AS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED THEREBY DISREGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHOBITION AGAINST "FRUITS" OF THE
POISONOUS TREE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE
GLARING DISCREPANCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES.
Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62. "Marissa Gorospe" is a fictitious
person whose alleged testimony is fabricated and was used by the police officers to convince the Executive Judge that there was probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant when, in fact, there was none. The Executive Judge failed to ask Gorospe searching questions.
Consequently, Search Warrant No. 98-62 is void and the substances and paraphernalia confiscated by the policemen are inadmissible in
evidence. She further claimed that the testimonies of De Vera and Gamboa were pockmarked with inconsistencies and as such, the trial court
should not have given them probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the trial court merely confirmed Executive Judge Ramos’ finding of probable
cause. Besides, appellant failed to file a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 98-62, hence, was estopped from assailing it and the search and
seizure conducted thereafter. The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Demaisip v. Court of Appeals.50 It likewise claimed that the
inconsistencies adverted to by appellant pertained merely to collateral matters and were not determinative of her guilt or innocence. As
gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses could not prevail over the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated March 28, 1001 in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.51
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of Abuan’s guilt for the crime charged. The alleged
discrepancies in the testimonies of Gamboa and de Vera were peripheral matters. Moreover, Abuan’s failure to assail the legality of the search
and seizure conducted by the policemen before her arraignment was equivalent to a waiver of her right to assail the search warrant. The CA
cited the ruling of this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.52
Abuan filed a motion for reconsideration,53 reiterating her argument that the search warrant is not valid. She also argued that she did not
waive her right to assail the validity of the search warrant at her arraignment and during the trial. She maintained that the CA should not rely
on the evaluation by the RTC of the witnesses’ credibility, and that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were on
material relevant details.
The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution54 dated May 26, 2005 on its finding that no new and substantial matter was presented
to warrant reconsideration thereof.55
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In the instant petition, Abuan, now petitioner, asserts that
I
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID DESPITE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY
THE CONSTITUTION.
II
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEEMED WAIVED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT.
III
THE CA ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM THE PETITIONER AS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.
IV
THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER.
Petitioner avers that the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge was void because the circumstances leading to its issuance were not
based on probable cause but on mere fabrications. She points out that according to Gorospe, she became acquainted with petitioner and
visited her in her house because of their employment with Avon Cosmetics. However, considering that she and Gorospe were never employed
by Avon Cosmetics and were not even acquainted, such testimony is false. Thus, the search warrant should be declared invalid as it is based on
the testimony of a fictitious person, a "planted witness" with a fabricated testimony and, consequently, any evidence discovered on the basis
thereof should be suppressed and excluded in accordance with Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner points out that with the
inadmissibility of the shabu and other paraphernalia, the appellate court should have acquitted her of the charges by reason of the
prosecution’s failure to prove the commission of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to suppress the search warrant throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court.
She rejected the prosecution’s offer to admit the validity of the search warrant and even filed a motion to suppress the search. She was thus
not proscribed from filing her motion to suppress the search warrant even after the arraignment.
In its Comment,57 the OSG maintains that the search warrant is valid. It insists that the CA correctly ruled that the requisites of a valid search
warrant were present, noting that the Executive Judge conducted searching questions and answers on the person of Marissa Gorospe. It
asserts that, in applying for a search warrant, a police officer need not possess personal knowledge regarding an illegal activity; it is the witness
who should possess such personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath probable cause may be established. In this case, it was
Gorospe who narrated, under oath and before the judge, her personal knowledge of (petitioner’s) criminal activities. 58
The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever objections she had regarding the validity of the search warrant. It points out that
she never questioned the warrant before the court which issued the same, never questioned nor moved for the quashal of the warrant before
her arraignment. And while petitioner was allowed to present evidence on the alleged invalidity of the search warrant, this did not cure her
omission or inaction in raising the issue at the proper time.
In her Reply,59 petitioner declares that a close scrutiny of the judge’s investigation of Gorospe would reveal that her personal circumstances
are pivotal in her acquisition of personal knowledge regarding the alleged possession of shabu by petitioner. If these personal circumstances
are fabricated, then such "personal knowledge" regarding the possession bears no credit.
Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the OSG, she did not waive her right to question the validity of the warrant.
She could not have done any better under the circumstances at that time because all the evidence against Gorospe was made known and
available to her only after her arraignment.
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold issues: (a) whether petitioner waived her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62
and the admissibility of the substances and paraphernalia and other articles confiscated from her house based on said warrant; and (b)
whether the prosecution adduced evidence to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended.
Petitioner Did not Waive Her Right to File a Motion
To Quash Search Warrant No. 98-62 and for the
Suppression of the Evidence Seized by the Police Officers
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. – A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to
suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if
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such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court.
The Court ruled in the Malaloan case that the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress the resolution of the court not on the motion to quash the search warrant and
to suppress evidence shall be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 60 A motion to quash a search warrant may be
based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in
the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.61 Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides that the court may hear the motion, as follows:
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by
the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
In the present case, petitioner reserved her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 when she filed her motion for bail in the RTC. The
public prosecutor conformed to the motion. During pre-trial in the RTC, petitioner rejected the prosecution’s proposal for her to admit the
validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, insisting that it was void. In her motion to suppress, petitioner averred that the search warrant is void for
the following reasons: lack of probable cause; failure of the Executive Judge to ask searching questions on Gorospe; and the evidence seized by
the police officers on the basis of the search warrant are inadmissible in evidence. She likewise prayed that the search warrant be nullified, and
that the evidence seized by the policemen on the basis of said warrant be suppressed.62
Petitioner was ready to adduce evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared that this should be done during the trial. Petitioner
thus no longer assailed the ruling of the trial court and opted to adduce her evidence at the trial. She likewise objected to the admission of the
search warrant and the evidence confiscated by the police officers after the search was conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court
admitted the same and she objected thereto. It cannot, therefore, be said that petitioner waived her right to assail the search warrant and
object to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her house.
On the second issue, the trial court’s ruling (which the appellate court affirmed) that the prosecution adduced evidence to prove petitioner’s
guilt of crime charged beyond reasonable doubt is correct.
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 reads:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
The elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are as follows: (a) the accused was in possession of the regulated drugs; (b)
the accused was fully and consciously aware of being in possession of the regulated drug; and (c) the accused had no legal authority to possess
the regulated drug.63 Possession may be actual or constructive. In order to establish constructive possession, the People must prove that
petitioner had dominion or control on either the substance or the premises where found. 64 The State must prove adequate nexus between the
accused and the prohibited substance.65 Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facieevidence of knowledge or aminus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is shifted
to petitioner to explain the absence of aminus possidendi.66
We agree with the trial court’s finding that, indeed, petitioner had in her possession and control 57 small, heat-sealed sachets of shabu
weighing 5.67 gm when Search Warrant No. 98-62 was served on her. As testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the police officers, in
the presence of Garcia and Mangaliag, found the said substances in a drawer in her bedroom. Petitioner likewise failed to present any legal
authority to justify her possession of the regulated drug found in her bedroom.
The mere denial by petitioner of the crime charged and her bare claim of being the victim of a frame-up by de Vera and Gamboa cannot
prevail over the positive and steadfast testimonies of the police officers. Their testimonies were corroborated by the inventory/receipt of
property, stating that, indeed, 57 small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 5.67 grams
were found in a drawer in petitioner’s bedroom. The police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in good faith, in accordance
with law. Absent any clear and convincing evidence that such officers had ill or improper motive or were not performing their duties, their
testimonies with respect to the surveillance operation, the implementation of search warrant, and the seizure of the regulated drug in the
house of petitioner must be accorded full faith and credence. 67 Like alibi, the defense of denial and frame-up had been invariably viewed by
the courts with disfavor. Denial is a negative of self-serving defense, while frame-up is as easily concocted and is a common and standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.68 For the defense of frame-up to prosper, the evidence must be
clear and convincing.69
It bears stressing that the policemen saw to it that the search of petitioner’s house was conducted with the assistance and in the presence
of Barangay Captain Mangaliag and Kagawad Garcia. They testified that the regulated drugs confiscated by the policemen were found in the
searched premises. Petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the policemen and the barangay officials had any improper
motive to frame her and falsely ascribe to her the crime of violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
764
Except for her bare testimony, petitioner failed to prove that her brother Arsenio Tana instigated the policemen to secure Search Warrant No.
98-62, conducted a search in her house, "planted" the drugs in her bedroom and stole money from her. Petitioner failed to make such a claim
when she was arrested and brought to the MTC for preliminary investigation. She also failed to file any criminal complaint against the
policemen and her brother Arsenio Tana for filing the fabricated charge against her and for "planting" evidence in her house. It was only when
she testified in her defense in the trial court that she alleged, for the first time, that the charge against her was instigated by her brother, in
cahoots with the policemen. We quote with approval the disquisitions of the OSG on this matter:
SECOND: The police officers who testified had not proven bad or ill motive to testify against accused.
The suspicion of accused that it was her brother who manipulated the events in her life is unsubstantiated and too far-fetched to
happen and is, therefore, unbelievable.
The presumption, therefore, is that said police officers performed their official duties regularly (People v. Cuachon, 238 SCRA 540).
THIRD: The testimony of accused is too self-serving. It is uncorroborated.
According to her, the intrusion into her house by the police was witnessed by her two daughter (sic). However, she did not present
them as witnesses.
In the case of her daughter Ediliza, she was already twenty years old at the time so that she was already mature for all legal intents
and purposes. In the case of her daughter Mae Liza, who was nine years old, there was no reason why she could not articulate what
she personally saw and experienced, if what she would be made to state was true.
The inability of the said accused, therefore, to present her two daughters is tantamount to a suppression of evidence, thus raising
the presumption that if they were presented, their testimonies would have been adverse to her.
Furthermore, it has been [the] consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that a plain denial or negative testimony, if unsubstantiated by
a clear and convincing testimony, cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses (People v. Amaguin, 229
SCRA 155).
FOURTH: The other defense of accused is that it was unlikely for her to have engaged in pushing or peddling drugs for a living
because she had to set a good example of decent living for the sake of her two beautiful daughters and good neighbors.
Furthermore, she did not have financial problems which could have pushed her into the drug business because her sister Corazon
Bernardino had been regularly sending her money.
The aforecited unlikelihood perceived by accused could not prevail over the affirmative testimonies of policemen Gamboa and de
Vera who positively declared that they found 57 sachets of shabu in her room.70
Search Warrant No. 98-62
Is Valid; the Articles, Paraphernalia and Regulated
Drugs Found in Petitioner’s Bedroom and Confiscated
by the Police Officers are Admissible in Evidence
We agree with the ruling of the CA affirming, on appeal, the findings of the trial court that based on the deposition and testimony of Gorospe,
there was probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62 for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 71
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerate the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, thus:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
765
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant, record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally
by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.72
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Reasonable minds may
differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However,
great deference is to be accorded to the Judge’s determination.73 The affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is
presumed to be valid.74
Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by Judges in a common-sense and realistic fashion. They are
normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate specificity have no place in
this area.75 The Judge in determining probable cause is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and
rigid formula,76 and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. 77 Probable cause exists if a practical, common-sense
evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair possibility that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location.78 There must be a
factual showing sufficient to comprise probable cause of particular facts and circumstances so as to allow the Judge to make an independent
evaluation of the matter. It is sufficient if the information put forth in the affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent are
believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant/deponent as true.79 Sufficient information must be presented to allow a Judge to determine
probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated contention of others.
The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause but only to determine
whether there is substantial evidence in the records supporting the Judge’s decision to issue the search warrant. 80 The reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the Judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, 81 and once ascertained that the Judge had
substantial basis for concluding that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing, the determination of probable cause must be upheld.
In the absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the
affiants/deponent before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions. 82
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be
quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in
said affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such evidence must focus on the state of
mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation. 83 The requirement that a search warrant
not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use deliberately falsehood
allegations to demonstrate probable cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that the ploy succeeded.84 However,
innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And
even if the police officer or government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his or her
affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for
lack of probable cause.85
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a resident or transient of Barangay Sapang, even if true and credible, is not at all
material or necessary to the determination of probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of Avon Cosmetics as of May 5,
1998 may be relevant to the issue of whether there was factual basis for the finding of probable cause by the Executive Judge against
petitioner; however, petitioner’s evidence to prove his claim is tenuous and does not warrant the quashal of Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the
suppression of the evidence seized after the enforcement of the search warrant.
The evidence petitioner presented to disprove the testimony of Gorospe that they were dealers of Avon Cosmetics are her (petitioner’s)
testimony and that of Carvajal. The certification purportedly signed by dela Rosa, the Branch Manager of Avon Cosmetics Dagupan Branch, is
hearsay because she did not testify. Carvajal admitted that she was not in a position to confirm the veracity of the contents of the certification:
PROSECUTOR JAIME DOJILLO
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
q What is your position at Dagupan Avon Cosmetics?
a Team Leader, Sir.

766
q Do you have any participation in the preparation of this certification?
a None, Sir.
q So, you had not in position to know the truth of this certification, hence, you were not the one who prepared the same?
a Yes, Sir.86
Carvajal was merely one of many team leaders of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan City. She did not testify nor did petitioner adduce evidence that
Gorospe was not such a dealer in places other than Dagupan City or Pangasinan for that matter. In fine, petitioner failed to adduce competent
and credible evidence that Gorospe was not a dealer of Avon products in the branches of Avon Cosmetics other than Pangasinan. Other than
the denial of petitioner and the testimony of Carvajal, petitioner failed to present evidence that she was not a dealer of Avon Cosmetics. On
the other hand, the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge was corroborated by the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de
Vera.
In the present case, the Executive Judge found probable cause after conducting the requisite searching questions on Gorospe for violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The trial court reviewed the testimony of Gorospe before the Executive Judge87 and
confirmed that, indeed, there was probable cause against petitioner for violation of said crime. The finding of the Executive Judge was
corroborated by the testimony of police officers de Vera and Gamboa, who, in their surveillance operation, partially confirmed Gorospe’s claim
that, indeed, people had been going to the house of petitioner to buy shabu. The findings of the trial court were, in turn, affirmed by the CA.
The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of
substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. In this case, petitioner
failed to establish any such circumstance.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioner possessed 5.67 gm of methamphetamine hydrochloride and sentenced her to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. The
penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is incorrect. As the Court ruled in People v. Tira:88
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of possession of a regulated drug, less than 200
grams, in this case, shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of the
offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is only 1.001 grams, the imposable penalty for the
crime is prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum, for violation of Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.89
The penalty imposed in the Tira case is the correct penalty, which should likewise be imposed against petitioner herein.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to penalty. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor in its medium period as minimum to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
767
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170425 April 23, 2012
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Petitioner,
vs.
RIZZA G. MENDOZA, CARLITO LEE, GRESHIELA G. COMPENDIO, RAUL RIVERA, REY BELTRAN, REX ALMOJUELA, LINDA P. CAPALUNGAN,
HILDA R. RONQUILLO, MA. LODA CALMA, TERESITA P. ALMOJUELA, RUFINA ABAD and AMADOR A. PASTRANA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the institution of an action for prohibition and injunction filed by the affected party in one court, seeking to enjoin the use of
evidence seized under a search warrant issued by another court.
The Facts and the Case
On March 26, 2001 the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63, for the
issuance of a search warrant covering documents and articles found at the offices of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. The NBI alleged that these documents and articles were being used to a) violate Republic Act 8799, also
known as the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), and b) commit estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 1 The court granted the
application.
Acting on the search warrant, NBI and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) agents searched the offices mentioned and seized the described
documents and articles from them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) against respondents
Rizza Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma. Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera, Rey Beltran, Rex Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo, Ma. Loda
Calma, and Teresita Almojuela (Mendoza, et al.) for violation of Sections 24.1 (b) (iii), 26, and 28 of the SRC. 2
On July 11, 2001 Mendoza, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction against the NBI and the SEC before the RTC of Muntinlupa.3They alleged that, three months after the search and
seizure, the NBI and the SEC had not turned over the seized articles to the Makati RTC that issued the search warrant.4 This omission, they said,
violated Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,5 which required the officers who conducted the seizure to immediately turn
over the seized items to the issuing court.
The Muntinlupa petition sought to prevent the SEC and the NBI from using the seized articles in prosecuting Mendoza, et al. and the DOJ from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of their case, using the same.6 They feared that the seized articles may have already been
tampered with, altered, or augmented by those responsible for seizing them.7 Essentially, Mendoza, et al.’s action is one for the suppression of
evidence whose seizure had become illegal for failure to turn them over to the issuing court.
Opposing the petition, the SEC, the NBI, and the DOJ (the three agencies) averred that injunction may not be issued to protect contingent
rights or enjoin criminal prosecution. They pointed out that Mendoza, et al. should have exhausted administrative remedies available to them
at the DOJ. Further, the three agencies maintained that Mendoza, et al.’s petition for prohibition should have been lodged with the Court of
Appeals (CA).8
Simultaneous with the action before the Muntinlupa RTC, on July 11, 2001 two of the respondents who did not join that action, Pastrana and
Abad, filed with the Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject search warrant for having been issued in connection with several offenses when
the Rules of Criminal Procedure9 require its issuance for only one specific offense.
On July 19, 2001 the Muntinlupa RTC issued a TRO against the three agencies,10 enjoining them from using the seized articles in proceeding
against Mendoza, et al. On July 31, 2001 respondents Pastrana and Abad asked for leave to intervene in the civil case in the Muntinlupa RTC,
which leave was granted on August 8, 2001. On the following day, August 9, 2001, having assumed as true the uncontroverted allegations in
the petition before it, the Muntinlupa RTC replaced the TRO it issued with a writ of preliminary injunction 11 subject to the final outcome of the
proceedings before the Makati RTC.12
On August 23, 2001 the three agencies moved for reconsideration of the Muntinlupa RTC’s orders granting the intervention and the
preliminary injunction. They also moved on September 13, 2001 to dismiss the action. On January 15, 2002 that court issued an omnibus
order, denying their motions for reconsideration and to dismiss.13This prompted the three agencies to file a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA, seeking to annul the Muntinlupa RTC’s orders of August 8, 2001, August 9, 2001, and January 15, 2002. 14
During the pendency of the case before the CA, however, or on May 10, 2002 the Makati RTC rendered a decision nullifying the search warrant
it issued and declaring the documents and articles seized under it inadmissible in evidence. The Makati RTC also directed the SEC and the NBI
to return the seized items to respondents Pastrana and Abad.15
768
For some reason, the CA did not mention the Makati RTC order and did not dismiss the petition before it on ground of mootness. On March 24,
2004 it rendered judgment, denied the three agencies’ petition, and affirmed the orders of the Muntinlupa RTC. The CA ruled, among other
things, that Mendoza, et al.’s action before the Muntinlupa RTC was proper and distinct from that which respondents Pastrana and Abad filed
with the Makati RTC.16 The three agencies moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same on November 10, 2005.17 Undaunted, they
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue Presented
The issues raised in this petition have essentially been rendered moot and academic by the Makati RTC’s decision, which quashed the search
warrant it issued and declared the items seized under it inadmissible in evidence. Still, one issue—whether or not the CA erred in holding that
the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.’s injunction action—needs to be resolved in the interest of setting the matter
aright and providing a lesson for the future.
The CA held that the proceedings before the Makati RTC and the Muntinlupa RTC are separate and distinct. The object of the motion to quash
search warrant, here filed by respondents Pastrana and Abad with the Makati RTC, the issuing court, was to test the validity of its issuance,
given that the warrant was made to cover several offenses rather than just one as the rules provide.18 On the other hand, the object of the
Muntinlupa injunction case is to prevent the three agencies from using the seized articles in any criminal proceeding against Mendoza, et al.
considering the SEC and the NBI’s failure to immediately turn over the seized articles to the court that issued the warrant as the rules
require.19
But Section 14 of Rule 126 is clear. Questions concerning both 1) the issuance of the search warrant and 2) the suppression of evidence seized
under it are matters that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal action has in the meantime been filed
in court. Thus:
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to
suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal
action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed
to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (Emphasis
supplied)
Although passed off as a petition for injunction, the action that Mendoza, et al. filed with the Muntinlupa RTC, the object of which is to
prohibit the three agencies from using the items seized under the search warrant, is actually an action to suppress their use as evidence.
Consequently, Mendoza, et al. should have filed it with the Makati RTC that issued such warrant.
It might be pointed out of course that since Mendoza, et al. were not parties to the issuance of the search warrant, they had no standing to
question the same or seek the suppression of evidence taken under it. Consequently, since they had reasons for questioning government use
of the seized items against them, they had the right to bring the injunction action before the Muntinlupa RTC where they resided.
But the rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It
is not correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized
under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation of his right
by another. The Court clearly explained in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 the nature of a search warrant proceeding.
[A] search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any
person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and
made necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings. While an
application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime.
It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police
power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.1âwphi1
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere private rights. It concerns
the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the
furtherance of public prosecution.21
Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the
Makati RTC a motion to suppress the use of the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI to immediately turn
these over to the issuing court. The issuing court is the right forum for such motion given that no criminal action had as yet been filed against
Mendoza, et al. in some other court.
769
Parenthetically, it appears from its investigation report that the SEC kept the seized documents and articles for months rather than
immediately turn them over to the Makati RTC.22 Justifying its action, the SEC said that it still needed to study the seized items.23 Evidently, it
wanted to use them to build up a case against the respondents, unmindful of its duty to first turn them over to the court. Clearly, SEC’s
arbitrary action compromised the integrity of the seized documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 24, 2004 and its resolution dated November 10, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP 70212 and ORDERS the dismissal of the action for prohibition and injunction that respondents Rizza Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma.
Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera, Rey Beltran, Rex Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo, Ma. Loda Calma, Teresita Almojuela, Rufina
Abad and Amador Pastrana filed with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case 01-206 for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the same.
SO ORDERED.
770
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133892 August 12, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOVITO LLAVORE Y BARRIENTOS, JOEL LOBATON Y ORETA, RODOLFO FUENTES Y CASTILLO (At Large) and DANIEL GUILLERO Y
ALVAREZ, 1accused.
JOVITO LLAVORE Y BARRIENTOS, JOEL LOBATON Y ORETA1 and DANIEL GUILLERO Y ALVAREZ,2accused-appellants.
VITUG, J.:
Jovito Llavore y Barrientos a.k.a. Boy, Joel Lobaton y Oreta a.k.a. Imbong, Rodolfo Fuentes y Castillo a.k.a. Nene, Daniel Guillero y Alvarez a.k.a.
Moran and one "Galoy" Longno were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, in an information that averred:
"That on or about 6:30 in the afternoon of May 23, 1991 at the reclamation area, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with
treachery, evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
kill with the use of firearm and knives one Danilo Malata, a tricycle driver, in order to rob, steal and take away with intent of gain and
without the consent and against the will of the owner the motor tricycle belonging to Erna Tancinco which cost more or less
P53,000.00 and inflicting upon the person of Danilo Malata, the following wounds, to wit:
– Stabbed wound, immediately below the left nipple; 2 cm. in length, 7 cm. depth projecting upward;
– Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, about 4 cm. from the midline; 4 cm. in length with omentum protruding outward;
– Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, midclavicular line; 2 cm. in length with omentum protruding outward;
– Stabbed wound, through and through, deltoid area; 3 cm. in length, left upper arm;
– Stabbed wound, through and through, 2 cm. in length, left upper arm about 8 cm. below the upper wound;
– Stabbed wound, through and through, posterior chest, left postaxillary line; 4 cm. in length with exit at the left axilla;
– Stabbed wound, left elbow, superficial; 4 cm. in length;
which directly caused the death of the said victim Danilo Malata, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim in the
amount, to wit:
1. P30,000.00 – as indemnity for the death of the victim;
2. P144,000.00 – as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such amount to be fixed by the court."3
Jovito Llavore and his co-accused, Joel Lobaton and Rodolfo Fuentes, entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment. Fuentes thereafter
escaped from prison. Daniel Guillero was later arrested and, when arraigned, also pleaded not guilty. "Galoy" Longno remained at large.
The case for the prosecution. -
On 23 May 1991, about six-thirty in the afternoon, Danilo Malata was found dead in a reclamation area along Hitalon Bridge in Cadiz City.
Malata was last seen alive driving a tricycle4 belonging to his sister Erna Malata-Tancinco and her husband Hernani Tancinco. At around five-
fifteen on the afternoon of 30 July 1991, a unit of the Cadiz City Philippine National Police (PNP) apprehended Joel Lobaton and Perlito
Pastrano in connection with another attempted robbery case involving a tricycle owned by a certain Francisco Gerongan. During the
investigation conducted by SPO3 Jerry Montecino and SPO3 Sofronio Neri, Lobaton confessed that he, along with Jovito Llavore, Daniel
Guillero, Rodolfo Fuentes, and "Galoy" Longno, had killed Danilo Malata and took away the latter’s tricycle which they then brought it to the
house of LLavore.
On 31 July 1991, police officers saw Llavore driving a tricycle along Gustilo Boulevard in Cadiz City. When confronted, Llavore voluntarily went
with the officers to the police station using the tricycle.5 While Llavore was being interrogated by SPO3 Neri, SPO3 Montecino, and SPO3 Tayco
in the presence of Hernani Tancinco, the latter observed that the top cover of the tricycle was identical with the top cover of his tricycle which
Malata was driving at the time he was killed. Llavore admitted his involvement in the crime. SPO3 Belcezar Javier and Tancinco thereupon
proceeded to the house of Llavore in Crossing, Cadiz City. At the backyard of the house, they saw a maroon-colored tricycle without its top
cover.6 Tancinco immediately recognized the same to be his tricycle based on its windshield, cover of the side wheel, and its decorations.
When the maroon paint of the tricycle’s sidecar was scraped, the vehicle showed an orange paint which was its original paint. Tancinco
identified the markings he placed on the top cover of his tricycle like the hole where he inserted a wire and a brace of 3/8 steel bar. Some
parts of the tricycle had been removed. The tricycle’s motorcycle was still painted red, although the motor and chassis number had been
defaced. Tancinco pointed to other distinguishing marks on the motorcycle of his tricycle such as the welding marks on the hub, the two
uneven holes on the fender where he had attached a break light, the spline of the original transmission which was replaced with a shorter one,
the epoxy steel on the leaking tank, and the cut steel on the fork.
771
SPO3 Javier repaired to Talisay and invited Rodolfo Fuentes for questioning. Fuentes executed an affidavit, dated 5 August 1991, 7 at the police
precinct. In a sworn confession, dated 12 August 1991,8 taken by SPO3 Sofronio Neri in the presence of one SPO3 Melzasar Tayco, Fuentes,
with the assistance of Atty. Reginaldo Conol, admitted his participation in stabbing Malata to death and then bringing the tricycle to the house
of Llavore. SPO3 Javier said Fuentes tagged Lobaton, Guillero, and Longno as being his companions.
Dr. Joy Gladys T. Guanzon conducted a postmortem examination on the body of Danilo Malata. The autopsy report, dated 24 May 1991,
contained the following findings:
"– Stabbed wound, immediately below the left nipple; 2 cm. in length, 7 cm. in depth projecting upward;
"– Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, about 4 cm. from the midline; 4 cm. in length with omentum protruding outward;
"– Stabbed wound, left subcostal area, midclavicular line; 2 cm. in length with omentum protruding outward;
"– Stabbed wound, through and through, deltoid area; 3 cm. in length, left upper arm;
"– Stabbed wound, through and through, 2 cm. in length, left upper arm about 8 cm. below the upper wound;
"– Stabbed wound, through and through, posterior chest, left postaxillary line; 4 cm. in length with exit at the left axilla;
"– Stabbed wound, left elbow, superficial; 4 cm. in length.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiac Tamponade and pneumo-hemothorax secondary to multiple stabbed wounds."
Dr. Guanzon testified that the stabbed wounds were caused by a sharp bladed instrument. The stabbed wound immediately below the left
nipple, "2 cm. in length and 7 cm. in depth projecting upward," was fatal.
The version of the defense. -
In seeking an exoneration of those indicted for the crime, the defense anchored itself on denial and alibi.
Jovito Llavore, a tricycle driver by occupation, testified that he was the owner of a tricycle which Rodolfo Fuentes borrowed sometime during
the first week of July 1991. When Fuentes returned the tricycle, its top cover had been damaged. At about six o’clock on the morning of 23 July
1991, Llavore was in Cadiz City plying his usual route when Fuentes went to his house and left a tricycle with his wife. Llavore presumed that
the tricycle belonged to Fuentes and that it was intended to secure the latter’s debt of P2,400.00. At noontime of 28 July 1991, when he and
his wife were not home, Fuentes came to their house and took back the tricycle. When the tricycle was returned to him later in the day, he
noticed that the top cover of his tricycle had been replaced with the top cover of the tricycle earlier brought by Fuentes. The tricycle which he
thought belonged to Fuentes happened to be the same tricycle recovered from his house by the police officers on 31 July 1991. Llavore denied
knowing at that time Daniel Guillero and "Galoy" Longno but admitted being acquainted with Rodolfo Fuentes, who used to borrow his tricycle
in transporting lumber, and with Joel Lobaton, a former student in Hiyang-Hiyang Elementary School in 1984, who worked in the lumber
business of Nestor Lobaton. LLavore disclaimed any participation in the killing of Danilo Malata when he, together with Fuentes and Lobaton,
underwent an investigation conducted on 31 July 1991 by the police. He claimed that at around five o’clock on the afternoon of 23 May 1991,
he and his wife were buying some goods at the public market in Cadiz City from where, about an hour later, they went back home and stayed
in the house up to seven o’clock in the evening. LLavore stated that he was confined on 31 July 1991 without any warrant of arrest and was
released only the following morning. He was later asked to go with police officers SPO1 Rogelino Caniedo, SPO3 Montecino, PO3 Santiago
Solatorio, PO2 Mario Jarina, PO3 Remy Tio, PO3 Zaldy Esperancilla, and SPO1 Regulus Blancaflor and one "cafgu" to Hacienda El Paso. The
place was about two kilometers away from his father's house where some missing parts of the tricycle, placed in a sack, were recovered.
Thereupon, Llavore was again arrested.
Nilda Llavore, the wife of Jovito Llavore, corroborated the latter’s testimony. She added that her husband did not leave the house after dinner
and that they went to bed soon thereafter.
Daniel Guillero stated that he, his wife and the latter’s parents were residing at Hacienda Lau-ang, Barangay Luna, in Cadiz City. He denied any
involvement in the crime with which he was charged and said that, on 23 May 1991, he was a watchman at the hacienda of one Dr. Diez where
he reported for work from six o’clock to eleven o’clock in the morning and then from one o’clock to five o’clock in the afternoon. From work,
he went home, had dinner at seven o’clock in the evening and did not leave the house. Guillero denied knowing Rodolfo Fuentes, Joel Lobaton,
and "Galoy" Longno.
Joel Lobaton testified that during the months of May and July 1991, he was staying in Villa Barbas, Cadiz City, and working in the lumber
business of his brother Nestor Lobaton in Sto. Niño Village, Cadiz City. At about five-fifteen on the morning of 31 July 1991, he was with one
Perlito Pastrana when they were arrested somewhere in Crossing, Cadiz City, in connection with the attempted robbery of a tricycle belonging
to one Francisco Gerongan. The police officers recovered from each of them a knife. Lobaton denied having been acquainted with "Galoy"
Longno or Daniel Guillero but knew LLavore, his former teacher in Hiyang-Hiyang Elementary School, and Rodolfo Fuentes who used to deliver
lumber in Sto. Niño Village. He negated any involvement in the crime and asserted that between seven o’clock to eleven o’clock on the
morning of 23 May 1991, he and Perlito Pastrana were busy cutting coconut trees in Barangay Mabini, Cadiz City. After partaking of lunch, they
resumed their work up to six o’clock that afternoon.
The decision under review. -
On 27 February 1997, the court a quo rendered its decision10 finding Jovito Llavore y Barrientos and his co-accused guilty of robbery with
homicide. The trial court held:
772
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused, JOVITO LLAVORE Y BARRIENTOS alias `Boy’ (detained), JOEL
LOBATON Y ORETA alias `Imbong’ (detained), RODOLFO FUENTES Y CASTILLO alias `Nene’ (Escapee and in absentia), and DANIEL
GUILLERO Y ALVAREZ (detained) all GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of `Robbery with Homicide’ as charged in the
Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA including its accessory penalties as provided
for by law.
"With respect to accused alias `Galoy Longno’ (at-large) not having been arrested and arraigned, the case against him is hereby
ordered ARCHIVED and shall be automatically revived upon his arrest.
"The accused are further ordered jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Danilo Malata the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the latter, and in addition to pay jointly and severally Hernani Tancinco the sum of P53,000.00 as indemnity for the value of
the motorcycle without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines.
"The accused being detained are entitled to the full credit of their preventive detention as per R.A. No. 6127.
"The Jail Warden of the BJMP, Silay City, PNP in the case of accused Jovito Llavore and the Jail Warden of the BJMP, Cadiz City PNP
for accused Joel Lobaton y Oreta alias `Imbong’ and accused Daniel Guillero y Alvarez are all hereby ordered to commit all the said
accused to the National Penitentiary for Service of their sentence as per Supreme Court Circular No. 4-92-A dated April 20, 1992.
"Let an alias Warrant of Arrest be immediately issued against accused Rodolfo Fuentes (Escapee) for his immediate arrest, and the
officer-in-charge of the Warrant and Subpoena Section of the PNP, Cadiz City is hereby directed to explain within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy of this decision why up to the present the said two (2) accused have not been arrested despite the lapse of more
than six (6) months after the issuance of the alias Warrant of Arrest against alias `Galoy’ Longno (at-large) and the accused Rodolfo
Fuentes from the time of the latter’s escape from jail.
"Let copies of this Decision be furnished the officer-in-charge of the Warrant and Subpoena Section of the PNP, Cadiz City and the
private complainant in accordance with Supreme Court Circular No. 7-92 dated October 12, 1992."11
Jovito Llavore, along with his co-accused Joel Lobaton and Daniel Guillero, appealed from the decision; Lobaton and Guillero, however, later
withdrew their respective appeals.
Appellant Llavore contends that the trial court has erred (1) in convicting him of robbery with homicide despite the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of his co-accused Rodolfo Fuentes; (2) in not declaring the arrest of appellant as illegal and the seizure of the tricycle
by the police officers as a ground for its inadmissibility in evidence; and (3) in rejecting the claim of appellant that he did not know the identity
of his co-accused.
Llavore maintains that the extrajudicial confession of Fuentes implicating him (Llavore) and his co-accused should not be made the basis for his
conviction as being merely hearsay. The Office of the Solicitor General, echoing the argument of appellant, explains that indeed the trial court
should not have considered against Llavore the extrajudicial confession of Fuentes. The Court agrees. Fuentes has not been presented to the
witness stand, and there can be no way of being assured on the veracity of his statements. Most importantly, Llavore has not been accorded
an opportunity to conduct a cross-examination; the law grants him that right.
A review of the evidence on record, nevertheless, would still warrant an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The crime of
robbery with homicide, penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, requires proof that (a) the taking of personal property is
done through violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is done
with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) the commission of homicide (in its generic sense) occurs on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof.12There must be an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing but, once shown, it matters not whether both
crimes be committed at the same time or one be prior or subsequent to the other.13
Admittedly, there is no eyewitness to the commission of the crime; a conviction can thus only rest on circumstantial evidence. Rule 133,
Section 4, of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if - (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt,14 and facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence can well
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may not too infrequently even surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.15
In this case, the circumstances established, in the considered view of the Court, would adequately support the finding of guilt pronounced by
the trial court. (1) On 23 May 1991, the tricycle belonging to Hernani Tancinco was stolen; (2) the tricycle was later found in the house of
appellant Llavore, and no satisfactory reason was given to explain his possession thereof;16 (3) some parts of the vehicle had been removed,
changed, or replaced and the motor and chassis number had been defaced; (4) on the occasion of the unlawful taking of the property, Danilo
Malata, then driving the tricycle, was stabbed to death; (5) the postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Guanzon on 24 May 1991 showed
seven stabbed wounds on different parts of the victim’s body; and (6) a sack containing the missing parts of the tricycle were found about two
kilometers away from the house of appellant’s father in HaciendaEl Paso.
773
The bare denial of appellant and his defense of alibi cannot overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Denial by itself is an
intrinsically weak defense.17 Neither can the claim of alibi be given weight. For alibi to prosper, not only must the person invoking it prove
being in another place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it would have been impossible for him to be at the crime scene
at the appointed time.18 Appellant himself has confirmed that the public market in Cadiz City where he claims to have been with his wife is
only about five meters away from the scene of the crime, i.e., the reclamation area in Hitalon Bridge, Cadiz City. The house of appellant, upon
the other hand, is within the same barangay where the killing has occurred.
Appellant would assail the legality of his arrest and the consequent seizure of the subject tricycle solely on the basis of the inadmissible
extrajudicial confession of Fuentes. The argument would be non sequitur. In any event, any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an
arrest or its consequences should be made before an entry of plea in the arraignment; otherwise, the objection would be deemed
waived.19 The records would show that on 01 October 1991, appellant and the other accused, Lobaton and Fuentes, entered a plea of not
guilty20 without assailing the validity of his arrest.21 Indeed, on 25 November 1991, appellant filed a "Motion to Admit Accused to
Bail"22 setting the hearing of the motion on 29 November 1991. The trial court required the prosecution to file its comment on the
motion.23 After the prosecution submitted its opposition,24 the trial court later granted the motion of appellant and required him to post a bail
bond in the amount of P80,000.00 for his provisional liberty.25 Appellant posted a property bond amounting to P80,000.00, secured by two
parcels of land26 which the trial court approved.27Appellant filed an "Entry of Appearance with Motion for Postponement."28 After the
prosecution had rested its case, appellant filed two "Motions with Express Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence," one by the Public
Attorney’s Office and the other by his private counsel.29 He even opposed the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits.30 After the trial court had
denied his earlier motion,31 appellant participated in the trial of the case by testifying in his own behalf and by presenting other witnesses as
evidence for the defense. It would, therefore, be much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after the accused was
arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.32
Appellant contends that he has been falsely implicated by persons who are not even known to him. Given the circumstances heretofore
narrated, that, too, would be hard to believe. In any case, it is not necessary in crimes of this nature that the co-perpetrators have known each
other. What should instead matter would be the evidence of his participation in the commission of the crime and the weight that is aptly due
to it.
The trial court ordered appellant, together with the two other accused, Joel Lobaton and Daniel Guillero, to jointly and severally pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Danilo Malata and awarded P53,000 to Hernani Tancinco for the value of the tricycle. The
award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim is in keeping with the prevailing jurisprudence. 33 In addition to the
indemnity, appellant Llavore should now also be ordered to pay P50,000.00 moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.34 The
award of P53,000.00 to Hernani Tancinco representing the value of the stolen tricycle cannot be sustained; the records would show that in a
receipt, dated 31 July 1991,35 Erna M. Tancinco, wife of Hernani Tancinco, executed a receipt in the presence of two witnesses 36 which
acknowledged the return of the vehicle from the Office of the I & I Section of the Cadiz City Police Station.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, finding appellant Jovito Llavore y Barrientos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its
accessory penalties, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, said appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim Danilo Malata the amount of P50,000.00 moral damages. The award by the trial court of P53,000.00 to Hernani
Tancinco insofar as appellant is concerned must be, as it is hereby, DELETED for lack of basis. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
774
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137366 November 27, 2003
People of the Philippines, appellee,

vs.
Romeo Mole y Santos, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, finding appellant Romeo Mole y Santos guilty of the crime of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The accusatory portion of the Information2 charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EMERITA
REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent.
On motion of the prosecution, the accusatory portion was later amended to read:
That on or about the 13th day of April, 1997 in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EMERITA
REYES Y TAMAYO, against her will and consent, while dizzy or otherwise unconscious. (Emphasis supplied.)
Culled from the documentary and the testimonial evidence for the prosecution consisting of the testimonies of the following witnesses, to wit:
private complainant Emerita Reyes (Emerita); Aurea Villena, the Medico-Legal Officer from the National Bureau of Investigation; SPO4 Lilia R.
Hogar, the police investigator; and Wildredo Reyes, the husband of Emerita, are the following:
On April 11, 1997, the then 34-year old Emerita, her husband Wilfredo and their three children consulted appellant, Romeo Mole, an albularyo
(quack doctor), in the latter’s house, they having been experiencing itchiness all over their bodies. Appellant, diagnosing the Reyeses to be
victims of kulam (witchcraft), asked for and was given ₱935.00 for the purchase of 17 black candles which he needed to insulate them from the
spell. Appellant asked them to return the next day for treatment. 3
As advised, the Reyeses returned to appellant’s house the next day, April 12, 1997. On appellant’s instructions, the Reyeses removed their
clothes upon which appellant massaged their bodies one at a time with cotton dipped in oil. 4
After the "treatment," the Reyeses repaired home, accompanied by appellant who brought with him two black candles. Upon reaching the
Reyeses’ house, appellant lit the candles and placed one at the main door and another near the door of the kitchen. He then invited Emerita’s
husband Wilfredo to drink gin while waiting for the candles to burn out. After three shots, Wilfredo became dizzy and passed out. Appellant
thereupon brought Wilfredo to the only bedroom of the house and blew something on his (Wilfredo’s) chest.5
At about 11:00 p.m., appellant left the Reyeses’ residence after asking for and receiving the amount of ₱350.00 representing payment for his
services.6
Emerita then went to sleep. At about 12:00 midnight, however, she heard someone knock at the main door. Clad in a duster, she opened the
door and saw appellant who was looking for her youngest son, he saying that "the sorcerer will take and kill him" and to save him (the son),
appellant needed ₱2,500.00. Panicky and crying, Emerita immediately gave the said amount to appellant who thereafter went to the bedroom
and sprinkled a pungent liquid on Wilfredo and their three children. Appellant also sprinkled the same liquid on Emerita, blew something on
her chest and, while looking at her eyes, mumbled as if in prayer at which point Emerita instantly felt weak and dizzy.7
Appellant then dragged Emerita to the kitchen, laid her on the floor and removed her underwear. She felt appellant, who was naked from the
waist down, lie on top of her. While she wanted to resist she was too weak and dizzy and eventually lost consciousness. 8
Before losing consciousness, however, Emerita felt something heavy on her breast as appellant lay on top of her.9
When Emerita regained consciousness, appellant had left and her entire body, including her vagina, was aching. She was later to declare in the
course of her testimony in court, when asked why her vagina was aching, that appellant "raped" her.10
775
The next morning, or on April 13, 1997, Emerita, without the knowledge of her husband, reported her experience to the police. 11 Her husband,
however, was informed by a neighbor that Emerita went to the police station, prompting him to follow her. On arrival at the police station, he
was unable to talk to his wife, and it was only on her return home at around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. of that day that Emerita related to him the
incidents that occurred the night before, albeit he could not remember if Emerita ever mentioned to him that she became unconscious,
because there have been a lot of things which then occupied his mind.12
On April 14, 1997, Emerita was physically examined by Dr. Aurea Villena who found multiple lacerations on her hymen which are secondary to
child birth13 and noted the following:
1. No extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen, reduced to myrtiformis.14
At the witness stand, the doctor disclosed that the seminology examination conducted on Emerita yielded negative result, and that there was
no medical basis to conclude that she had been subjected to sexual abuse.15
From the Final Investigation Report16 of SPO4 Lilia Hogar to whom the case was referred for investigation, the following datum appears:
xxx
07. Suspect ROMEO MOLE when apprised of his constitutional rights admitted raping EMERITA and also told the same admission to the PRESS
people who interviewed him.
xxx
SPO4 Hogar’s testimony in court was dispensed with after the prosecution stipulated that appellant was investigated and "gave the statement
to her."17
Appellant on the other hand denied the accusation. He claims that it was his wife Adoracion Mole, not him, who treated Emerita; that both
Emerita and Wilfredo were awake when he returned to their house on the night of April 13, 1997; that he merely fell asleep on the Reyeses’
sofa in the living room; and that when he awoke at around 8:00 the following morning, Wilfredo even offered him breakfast which he turned
down as it was already late. He, however, admitted that there is no reason why Emerita would file a complaint for rape against him.18
Appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his wife Adoracion Mole.19
Giving weight to the testimony of Emerita and relying on Romeo’s verbal admission to SPO4 Hogar of having raped the victim, as reflected in
the aforementioned datum in the Final Investigation Report, the trial court convicted appellant of rape by the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Romeo Mole y Santos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Accordingly, accused Romeo Mole y
Santos is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to INDEMNIFY private complainant Emerita Reyes y Tamayo in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.20
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors to the trial court:
1. . . . In deciding the case by mere confusion or supposition, and in failing to consider certain unrebutted substantial matters of facts
tending to show the non-occurrence or at least a doubtful occurrence of rape.
2. . . . In failing to apply the rule that in case of doubt, the same must be resolved in favor of the accused.21
In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the
only logical and inevitable conclusion.22
And the credibility of the private complainant is of vital importance for, in view of the peculiar nature of rape, conviction or acquittal rests
entirely upon her.23 It has thus become doctrine that the accused may be convicted even solely on the basis of the victim’s testimony provided
that the testimony is clear, credible, convincing, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points.24
Although the findings of trial courts are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, 25 inconsistencies in the testimony of Emerita put
serious doubts on her claim of rape, compelling this Court to reverse appellant’s conviction.
776
Thus, on direct examination, she related that appellant, who was naked from waist down, lay on top of her after removing her underwear,
whereupon she lost consciousness; and that after she regained consciousness, her entire body, including her vagina, was aching. She thus
concluded that she was raped:
Q You mean Madam Witness that after your panty was removed and accused was able to l[ay] you down [o]n the floor you lost consciousness
and you don’t remember anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q Prior [to] you[r] los[s of] consciousness, what was the accused doing [to] you that you could remember?
A I just felt that there was something heavy on my breast, sir.
xxx
Q What was the condition of your body when you regained consciousness?
A I felt pain all over my body, sir.
Q What particular portion of your body was aching or suffering from pain?
A My whole body and also my vagina, sir.
Q Do you know of any reason why your vagina is aching?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He raped me, sir.26 (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, Emerita gave the following account:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q You testified Madam Witness on direct examinatio[n] that the last time you were conscious that you felt that the accused was on top of you,
is that correct?
A Yes, sir.1âwphi1
Q You also testified that you lost consciousness and that when you regained consciousnes[s] the accused ha[d] left already, am I right, Madam
Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, my question, Madam Witness, when did you lose your consciousness?
A When he was halfway [with] what he was doing to me, Sir.
Q Are you referring to the . . .[m]ashing of your breast and kissing of your lips, Madam Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
xxx
Q Miss Witness, can you possibly tell the Honorabl[e] Court if there was actual penetration of the sexual organ of the accused to you?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
777
COURT
Q Why do you know that there was [f]ull penetratio[n] Madam Witness?
A Because Your Honor, when I regained consciousnes[s] and he already left the house, I felt that my vagina was somewhat forced and it was
very painful, Sir.
xxx
Q Why do you know that he was able to have sexual intercourse with you?
WITNESS
A Because my organ was wet, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
When, also on during cross-examination, she was questioned by the trial court, she gave the following statement:
COURT
Q What was that thing that he did which you felt the accused was doing to you?
WITNESS
A I felt that he put his sexual organ on top of my body, Sir.
COURT
Q On top of your body?
[Q] Where did the accused plac[e] his sexual organ, Madam Witness?
[WITNESS]
[A] On my vagina, Sir.28 (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony of Emerita prompted the defense to propound the following question which elicited the following answer:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q Madam Witness, you made several inconsistent statements during your direct examination that you lost consciousness and that you learned
that you were raped after you regained consciousness. Likewise, when asked by this Honorable Court when you came to know that you were
raped, you also said that you learned that you were raped because when you woke up, your sexual organ was painful and when you were
finally asked when for the first time you c[a]me to know that you were raped, you changed your testimony that you felt that the accused
inserted his sex organ into your vagina, which is which now, Madam Witness?
A I lost consciousness after he was finished having sexual intercourse with me, Sir.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When asked to clarify her statements, Emerita did not give categorical answers:
ATTY. OLIVA
Q When the accus[ed] was holding your breast and kissing your lips, in the middle of that, you lost consciousness, Madam Witness?
A I felt what he was doing to me but because my body was very weak, I tried to move my head around so he could not kiss me, Sir.30
xxx
COURT
Q When [did] you know that your organ was wet?

778
WITNESS
A When he was gone already, Sir.
COURT
Q In other words, you only came to know tha[t] there was sexual intercourse after the accused has already left the premises[,] is that correct?
WITNESS
A No, Your Honor, because when he dragged me, I already felt weak and dizzy but I felt all those things that he did to me.31 (Underscoring
supplied)
Emerita’s vacillating account of the incident failed to stand the test of consistency. This Court is thus put on guard as to the veracity of her
claim. For while minor inconsistencies do not detract from the actual fact of rape,32 those in Emerita’s testimony may not be considered minor
for they relate to the fact of commission of the offense charged.
A woman raped in a state of unconsciousness would not be able to narrate her defloration during that state, and her violation may be proved
indirectly by other evidence.33 Whereas, a woman fully conscious at the time of rape need only testify in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remain consistent in her testimony to convict the accused.34
While this Court has held in numerous rape cases that no person would subject herself to a rape trial given the attendant embarrassment of a
medical examination and the stigma of a sexual assault unless the accusation be true,35 it is gathered from those cases that the victim was able
to clearly and categorically impute the crime on the offender.
In the case at bar, save for Emerita’s inconsistent testimonies as noted above, there is no other evidence showing that appellant did have
carnal knowledge with her.
The testimony of Wilfredo merely dwelt on events that occurred before and after the alleged rape, while the result of the medical examination
showed no physical manifestations of sexual intercourse. While Dr. Villena did not rule out the possibility of sexual intercourse, her testimony
could hardly be characterized as consistent and unwavering, having first ruled out the possibility of sexual intercourse, only to later retract
upon being scrutinized by the trial court.36
As for the trial court’s reliance on the investigative report-Exhibit "E" of SPO4 Lilia Hogar in this wise:
Incidentally, the defense did not interpose any objection to the admission of Exhibit "E", the Investigation report. SPO4 Lilia Hogar, the
Investigator-on-Case, stated in the said report that ROMEO, when interviewed by the media people admitted raping EMERITA, 37
the same report showing that appellant admitted having raped Emerita is inadmissible in evidence. The admission was not in writing and there
is no showing that appellant was assisted by a competent and independent counsel of his choice when he made such statement in accordance
with Section 2 (d)38 of Republic Act 743839 in relation to Section 12 (1) Article III of the Constitution. 40
The failure of the prosecution to establish appellant Mole’s guilt for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable for the lesser crime of
acts of lasciviousness. The records clearly show that appellant lay on top of the victim, mashed her breasts and kissed her lips, acts from which
appellant’s lewd design was evident. Although the information filed was for the crime of rape, appellant can be convicted of acts of
lasciviousness because the latter is necessarily included in rape.41
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances alleged in the information or proven during trial, the penalty of prision
correccional42 shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant must suffer the penalty of Six (6)
Months of arresto mayor as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the July 15, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Romeo Mole y Santos is
CONVICTED of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto mayor
as minimum, to Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
779
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 144293 December 4, 2002
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of
competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during
the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10, 2000 Decision1 and August 4, 2000 Resolution2 of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
and, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;] (b) suffer all
the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco San Juan, in the total amount of Fifty
Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the costs."3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information4 dated August 5, 1991. However, the anti-graft
court issued an Order5 dated October 14, 1991, noting that "besides the allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused
while he was ‘taking advantage of his official position,’ nothing else is in the Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands,
nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged."
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts to vest the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an Amended Information,6 still charging petitioner with murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The
accusatory portion reads as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at
the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction,
taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously
placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the
safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him,
said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby
causing the death of Francisco San Juan."7
During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte,8 pled not guilty.9 After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found
him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayan’s narration of the facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2 Percival A.
Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
"1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, ‘Caridad’) declared that she is the wife of Francisco San Juan (hereinafter
‘Francisco’), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
780
"Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an unidentified woman came and told her
that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately called up her sister-in-law before rushing to Jacinto
Street where the gruesome incident allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people were milling around, and Caridad saw the
lifeless body of Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
"Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 o’clock a.m. when she reached the place of the subject incident. At that point in
time, she was not even allowed by the police to touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of Francisco. Caridad,
expectedly, was crying and one of her aunts advised her to go home.
"Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the
woman actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
"Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station, where she gave her written
statement before police investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, ‘Halili’).
"Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that he was eventually buried at the
Lumban Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial
and other incidental expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
"On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house and that she did not hear any
gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 o’clock a.m. Caridad also admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband.
"On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two gunshot wounds - one on the
upper right temple and the other on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated that she was told that the wounds were the
entry and the exit points. She also told the Court that her husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and
that she found some bruises on his knees.
"Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera,
and some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps which were used to block the
street during school days for the protection and safety of the school children.
"2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, ‘CACALDA’) declared that he is a policeman assigned at the Lumban Police
Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
"Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 o’clock a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer
recall, reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda responded by going to the
scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of
Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when
[SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived.
"Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and
killed Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he eventually saw accused Ladiana already
inside the jail of the police station and thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police authority.
"Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the responding policeman who went to the
scene of the incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written statement in relation to the subject incident.
"On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an investigator of the police station. He also
testified that he did not witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar.
"Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told him that accused Ladiana had
already left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladiana’a house but was told that he had already
gone to the police station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked
inside the jail. He also saw a stab wound on accused Ladiana’s right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he
sustained the said injury.
"3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, ‘Javan’) declared that he is a physician and the Municipal Health Officer of
Lumban, Laguna.
"Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and that he had prepared
the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto. Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior
views of the body of Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver.
The marking ‘Gunshot wound A’ is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches
781
behind the left ear. The marking ‘Gunshot wound B’ is the point of exit of ‘Gunshot wound A’, which is two (2) centimeters
in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and one (1) inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is
another gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as ‘Gunshot wound C’ and ‘Gunshot wound D’,
respectively. ‘Gunshot wound D’ is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left cheek, three
and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while ‘Gunshot wound C’ is one (1) centimeter in diameter and found
at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the adam’s apple.
"According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted ‘Gunshot wound A’. As regards ‘Gunshot
wound C’, the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches away.
"Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination. However, judging from the size
of the wound and the point of entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
"On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that ‘Gunshot wound A’ could have been fired first because the
trajectory is on the same level so much so that the assailant and the victim could have been both standing. Javan inferred
that ‘Gunshot wound C’ could have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both
wounds are fatal in nature.
"4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, ‘Gabinete’) declared that he is a police officer and a resident of No. 4055 Villa
Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
"The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the
group of policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying along
the road. Additionally, the defense admitted the existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3,
1990 in the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
"5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, ‘Cortez’) declared that he is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
"Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship,
authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and
sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on
Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused
Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.
"However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint
which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the
face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified
himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.
"After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
"On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution.
"On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16,
1995, claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed
to show that the accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are
allegedly hearsay in character, considering that the supposed eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never
presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the
identity of the person who caused said death.
"On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer
appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Court’s resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the
admission of the prosecution’s documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
"On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate
to sustain a conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he
asked for time to file a written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the
case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
"Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it
opted not to file any."10 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
782
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo
held that his Counter-Affidavit,11 in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death,12 may be used as
evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the
execution of the Counter-Affidavit.13 In short, it ruled that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the
victim. However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only. 14
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
"I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide even in
the absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the
prosecutor who had administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
"II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence of the accused and his right against self-incrimination on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted
by the counsel of the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
"III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the Sandiganbayan in its decision as
similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was
not assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was under custodial investigation.
"IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the Order of August 23, 1996 denying the
Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of
Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
"V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which fact was admitted by the
prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the guilt of the accused."16
In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he executed during the preliminary
investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion
for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit17 submitted by petitioner during the
preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his argument, he cites the
Constitution thus:
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." 18
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-judicial confessions or
admissions obtained during custodial investigations.19 Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in custodial
interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons."20
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.21
783
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial
investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.22
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial
investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation.23 It explained as follows:
"His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the
criminal case in court (or the public prosecutor’s office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court (or the public prosecutor’s office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under ‘custodial interrogation’ laid down by
the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under ‘custodial interrogation.’"24
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his
constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation.
Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not
at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor -- unquestionably possess
rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever
imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4) while
testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are
being prosecuted.25
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of petitioner’s Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only
an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an
acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. 26Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by
the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a
confession.27
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking him. We quote
the pertinent portion:
"[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang
hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi
ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;"28
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it
with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the public prosecutor to justify his
actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily
submitted and originally relied upon in his defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party may also establish
that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the
true state of facts.29 Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In
addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden
of showing a mistake.30
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the authorship, the authenticity or the
voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan:
784
"PJ GARCHITORENA
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your client who took the oath before the
Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the counter-
affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor."31
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that, in the
conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latter’s negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the former are deprived of their day in court.32 Also, clients, being bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result
of the litigation might have been different had their lawyers proceeded differently. 33 A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the
sufficiency and the relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces
of evidence, or the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a new
trial, unless the counsel’s incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case. 34
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter
incurred no criminal liability therefor.35 Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for
the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 36
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument
deserves scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as
evidence against him.37 The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the theory of self-defense, because this
argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and
unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioner’s claim that the anti-graft court "miserably failed to give equal effect or treatment to all the allegations found
therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately and without reasonable basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring
without sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused." 38
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of
proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. 39 It cannot be entertained if it is
uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is also doubtful.40 The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan. 41
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in the law.42Had petitioner been more
vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a quo,
he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to
present any evidence at all.43 So, we do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any other circumstance that eliminates
criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission of the killing.44 Upholding this principle does not in any
way violate his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his
innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. 45As far as he is concerned,
homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution
evidence including the Certificate of Death,46 the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination47 and the Medico-Legal Findings.48 The intent to kill
is likewise presumed from the fact of death.49
Second Issue:
785
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. He brands
this denial as legally and constitutionally wrong.50
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court.51 And, unless there is grave abuse amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial court’s resolution may not be disturbed. 52
Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor, implores this Court to consider his
voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he
had surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident.53To buttress his argument, he contends that the "main reason for his
voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim
after he was attacked by the latter."54 It goes without saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-
Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2)
the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. 55 To be sufficient, the
surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either
because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching
for and capturing them.56
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution
witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not
actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that
he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing.1âwphi1
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any
desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered.57 In the absence of sufficient and
convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner’s
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
786

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EN BANC

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005

HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

a. actual damages, as follows:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:

Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA’s disquisition:

G.R. No. 147058 March 10, 2006

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., Petitioner,

(1) To plaintiff Serafin S. Osabel:

P200,000.00 – moral damages

20,000.00 – nominal damages

20,000.00 – temperate damages

20,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages

P150,000.00 – moral damages

25,000.00 – nominal damages

25,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages

P100,000.00 – moral damages

20,000.00 – nominal damages

20,000.00 – exemplary or corrective damages 24

Petitioner’s argument of lack of cause of action likewise cannot stand.

G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989

LUIS JOSEPH, petitioner

Jose M. Castillo for petitioner.

Arturo Z. Sioson for private respondent, Patrocinio Perez.

Cipriano B. Farrales for private respondents except P. Perez.

The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2

We find the present recourse devoid of merit.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

xxx xxx xxx

A cause of action is defined as:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

G.R. No. 131719 May 25, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

II. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

Sec. 10, pars. 1 & 2.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The Respondent Has Locus Standi

The Assailed Order and Writ of

Preliminary Injunction Is Mooted

G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986

SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner,

Jesus Yray for petitioner.

Teodoro Almase for respondents.