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Article history: This research proposes a proactive modelling approach that combines Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM)
Received 5 January 2015 and Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Principally, the suggested model helps
Received in revised form 24 February 2015 predicting and eliminating the root causes behind the frequently repeating deficiencies on board ships.
Accepted 11 March 2015
Supported with qualitative simulations, the HFACS–FCM model is demonstrated on a fire related
deficiency sample database. The findings indicate that the root causes of a fire related deficiency on board
ship might be revealed in various levels such as unsafe acts, pre-conditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
Keywords:
supervision, and organization influences. Considering the determined root causes and their priorities,
Ship safety management
Root cause analysis
the Safe Ship System Mechanism (SSSM), Safe Ship Operation Mechanism (SSOM), and Safe Ship
Fire prevention Execution Mechanism (SSEM) are constituted. Consequently, the paper has added value to both
FCM predicting the root causes and enhancing fire-fighting potential which provides reasonable contributions
HFACS to safety improvements at sea.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.03.007
0925-7535/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
26 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. The main objec- principles. Besides international conventions’ enforcement,
tive of the system is to improve safety level on board ships while Knudsen and Hassler (2011) believed that there are additional
preventing human injury, loss of life, and damage to marine efforts required to challenge with the main causes of the ship acci-
environment. According to recent amendments to the ISM Code, dents which have not been reduced to a desired ratio. Karahalios
identifying measures intended to prevent recurrence of deficien- et al. (2011) also conducted research to perform a cost-benefits
cies and near misses has become one of the core issues. It intro- analysis along with the maritime regulations. Furthermore,
duces a relatively new concept called preventive action planning, Schinas and Stefanakos (2012) investigated feasibility of the
which strictly requires detailed analysis in order to make environmental measurements defined within International
consistent decisions on actions to be taken (ISM Code, 2010). Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
There is no doubt that systematic analysis on causation is the most Human factor is another core topic in maritime safety studies.
essential aspect of preventive action practices along with the ship To find out the role of human element in safety at sea, Hee et al.
operations and management. (1999) conducted one of the pioneering researches on maritime
This study proposes a novel preventive action planning safety assessment. Furthermore, Hetherington et al. (2006) con-
approach to enhance fire safety measures on board ships. The rest cluded a research that reviews a number of studies to eliminate
of this paper is organized as follows: The current section discussed the human errors in ship accidents. As another study, Celik and
the significance of controlling and monitoring the fire related Er (2007) examined the potential role of design errors which trig-
deficiencies on board ships. Then, a wide range of maritime safety ger the human error in shipboard operations. To enhance human
literature is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the concep- factor analysis, HFACS was utilized in order to make quantitative
tual framework of the model which is based on combination of assessment of shipping accident (Celik and Cebi, 2009). To clarify
Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM) and The Human Factors Analysis the exact reasons, Wang et al. (2013) proposed a new method in
and Classification System (HFACS). To demonstrate the suggested order to enable accident causations. Recently, Akhtar and Utne
model, a case study concerning a fire related deficiency sample (2014) investigated human fatigue effects to bridge team manage-
database is analysed in Section 4. In the final section, the research ment demonstrated with ship grounding case.
outcomes and potential contributions through ship fire safety pre- Besides human element, technological improvements and mar-
paredness are extensively discussed. itime innovations are one of the significant aspects of maritime
safety. At system safety level, Tzannatos (2005) investigated
2. Literature review probable equipment failures and their effects in terms of reliability
monitoring of the Greek coastal passenger fleet. Moreover, Eide
2.1. Maritime literature review et al. (2007) developed an intelligent model to prevent oil spill as
another catastrophic event at sea. Beyond, Lun et al. (2008)
Maritime safety is a significantly important element of sustain- investigated the technological adoption to manage security
ability in world trade since maritime transportation has been car- enhancement especially in container transport. In a further study,
rying 80% of the global cargo (Asariotis et al., 2013). Furthermore, Lambrou et al. (2008) introduced the Intelligent Maritime
maritime transportation system has long been monitored by Environment (i-MARE) framework and technological platform for
International Maritime Organization (IMO), whose primary cargo shipping. Vanem and Ellis (2010) investigated the feasibility
purpose is to maintain comprehensive regulatory framework at of adapting a novel on board passenger monitoring and communi-
international level (Wieslaw, 2012) Shipping might be considered cation system based on RFID technology which provides a decision
as one of the most dangerous and global industries of the world. support in emergency situations. Similarly, LiPing et al. (2011) took
The shipping industry seeks for a modern and user friendly safety the advantage of the video surveillance technology for safe nav-
system since the maritime accidents might cause catastrophic con- igation. It can be clearly seen that new technologies have potential
sequences (Hetherington et al., 2006). Hence, the contribution to to enhance safety at sea; however, it is still a great deal to manage
safety at sea are highly expected and appreciated by maritime the gaps among regulation implementations, human element and
society. This section draws together a wide range of existing recent technologies in order to increase the overall utility of such
literature on a range of issues on maritime safety. These issues attempts in safety improvements.
involve the following four important aspects of maritime safety: Methodological approaches, as the fourth important aspect of
(i) regulatory framework, (ii) human factor, (iii) technological maritime safety, have been playing a key role in transforming
improvements and (iv) methodological approaches. operational data, facts, and figures into useful information along
From the regulatory framework perspective, various conven- with safety enhancement. With this purpose in mind, several
tions have been developed and adopted by IMO in order to pro- researchers, such as Rothblum (2000), O’Neil (2003), Darbra and
mote the safety, security, and environmental sensitiveness in Casal (2004), and Toffoli et al. (2005), have conducted statistical
shipping industry. However, the effects of the mentioned conven- analyses, especially, on accidents and their prevention. On the
tions on shipping industry have been argued and discussed by other hand Lee et al. (2001), Wang and Foinikis (2001), Wang
maritime researchers, rule-makers, and responsible executives. (2002), Lois et al. (2004) used formal safety assessment (FSA)
For instance, Vanem and Skjong (2006) criticized the regulation particularly supported with well-known techniques. Specifically,
requirements along with the evacuation procedures in which effec- Bayesian network modelling has been utilized in maritime safety
tive assessment is not possible to conduct. On the other hand, related studies (Antao et al., 2008; Trucco et al., 2008; Kelangath
Tzannatos and Kokotos (2009) investigated ship accident during et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013; Hänninen et al., 2014) in order to
the pre- and post- ISM period so as to assess the effectiveness of deal with the inherent uncertainty and complexity in maritime
the ISM Code. In addition, Knapp and Franses (2009) studied on safety problems. Moreover, various methods derived from fuzzy
the major international conventions regarding safety, pollution, set theory have been cited (Sii et al., 2001; Balmat et al., 2009,
search and rescue measures. To strength the safety related 2011; Abou, 2012; John et al., 2014) in maritime safety literature.
regulations, Celik (2009) proposed a systematic approach to evalu- There are also some hybrid quantified models (Celik and Cebi,
ate the compliance level of the ISM code with the ISO 9001:2000 to 2009; Celik et al., 2010; Pam et al., 2013; Akyuz and Celik,
adopt an integrated quality and safety management system. The 2014a,b; Karahalios, 2014; Wang et al., 2014) that provide satisfac-
study illustrated that safety management system implementations tory approaches to the specified operational problems in maritime
on board ships can be enhanced via quality management safety context.
O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41 27
Despite the various contributions at international level, the Questionnaire survey, documentary coding and interviews are
numbers of ship accidents or detention rates have still not reached the most common ways for this purpose. FCMs can be developed
their desired levels. Moreover, the number of maritime safety stud- for a single expert or a group of experts, where the latter has the
ies in the literature has been increasing at a relatively slow rate. benefit of improving the reliability of the final model (Yaman
Researchers will need to focus more on operational fieldworks and Polat, 2009). The aggregation of knowledge from multiple
and specific cases, as it appears to be the next phase of maritime experts is a relatively simple process in fuzzy cognitive mapping
safety studies. This paper, hence, attempts to investigate the root (Stach et al., 2005). Each expert describes every interconnection
causes of fire safety related deficiencies in order to provide an with linguistic variables (weights) which are later composed (e.g.
applicable proactive model for ship operation and management. by fuzzy arithmetic or defuzzification methods) to produce the
Considering both the theoretical and practical insights provided, combined map. Several procedures have been proposed for
this study makes valuable contributions to the maritime safety combining multiple FCM models into a single one (see e.g. Kosko,
literature. 1992; Stylios and Groumpos, 2000).
As the proposed model integrates Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping A FCM can be represented either as a graph, consisting of
(FCM) and The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System concepts (e.g. entities, states, or characteristics of the system)
(HFACS), the following sections introduce the theory of both and weighted interconnections between these concepts, or as an
methods. adjacency matrix, which has entries wij’s indicating the direct
relationship between concept i and concept j. Fig. 1 (Asan et al.,
2.2. Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 2011) illustrates a simple FCM consisting of five concepts Ci
(i = 1, . . ., 5) where wij represents the influence degree from cause
HFACS is initiated from Swiss Cheese Model by Reason (1990). Ci to effect Cj. FCM does not allow any direct connections between
HFACS is a comprehensive tool to analyse the human contribution a concept and itself, thus all wii elements equal to zero. All other wij
to catastrophic events, accidents, hazardous occurrences, and elements take values in [1, 1] and Papageorgiou (2011) explains
deficiencies. Basically, HFACS investigates active failures and latent the meaning of these values as;
conditions at four levels. Active failures are sets of inappropriate
actions by operators while latent conditions deal with the different wij>0 indicates a causal increase (i.e., Cj increases as Ci increases,
levels of organization (Chauvin et al., 2013). The described four and Cj decreases as Ci decreases).
levels in HFACS are (i) unsafe acts, (ii) pre-conditions for unsafe wij<0 indicates causal decrease (i.e., Cj decreases as Ci increases,
acts, (iii) unsafe supervision, and (iv) organization influences. If and Cj increases as Ci decreases).
the vulnerabilities in different levels cannot be controlled, the wij=0 indicates no causality.
occurrence probability of accidents might be arisen. HFACS was
first developed for the aviation accident investigation (Shappell Once the FCM is constructed it is used to perform qualitative
and Wiegmann, 2000, 2001). In the last decade, the HFACS model simulations in order to predict possible changes and to observe
was not only successfully applied in the aviation industry by whether the system converges toward a steady state. During the
Shappell et al. (2007), but also in the railway (Reinach and Viale, simulations a model can reach three possible states that are listed
2006) and mining industry (Patterson and Shappell, 2010). For below (Kosko, 1997):
instance, the study of Rothblum et al. (2002) was the pioneer scien-
tific research that aimed to investigate human factor in maritime A steady state where the output values are stabilizing at fixed
accidents. Celik and Cebi (2009) combined HFACS with fuzzy set numerical values.
theory in order to provide a quantitative approach to analyse a sin- A limit cycle behaviour where the concept values are falling in a
gle accident case with error distribution in accordance with the loop.
operational evidences given in accident reports. Recently, Akyuz A chaotic behaviour where concept values wanders forever
and Celik (2014a) used HFACS supported with cognitive mapping without apparent structure or order.
approach to confirm the dependencies between causation factors.
A more formal definition of the iterative procedure can be
2.3. Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) described as follows. The FCM should be first initialized. In other
words, the activation level of each concept takes a value based
Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping, advanced by Kosko (1986) from the on expert opinion about its current state or measurements from
classical cognitive mapping method, is an illustrative causative ðtÞ
the real system. Let each concept take its initial value as Ai , where
representation of complex systems and can be used to model and Ai is the value of concept i at step t, and simulated iteratively. Then
manipulate the dynamic behaviour of systems (Papakostas et al., the value of each concept in an iteration is calculated as
2008). Combining elements of fuzzy logic and neural networks, (Papageorgiou et al., 2009)
fuzzy cognitive mapping has been proven to be a promising
method for making inferences in cases with substantial uncer- 0 1
tainty, imprecision and vagueness (Vasantha Kandasamy and
B C
Smarandache, 2003; Tsadiras, 2008). Compared to expert systems, B Xn C
ðtþ1Þ B ðtÞ ðtÞ C
fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs) are relatively quicker and easier to Ai ¼ f BAi þ Aj wji C ð1Þ
B C
acquire knowledge (Papageorgiou and Stylios, 2008). FCMs have @ j ¼ 1; A
been successfully applied in a variety of scientific areas, such j–i
supervisory control systems (Stylios and Groumpos, 2000), dis-
tributed systems (Stylios et al., 1997), decision support system
ðtþ1Þ ðtÞ
(Tsadiras et al., 2003), organizational behaviour (Craiger et al., In Eq. (1), Ai is the value of concept at step (t + 1), Ai is the value
1996), medical informatics (Papageorgiou, 2011), marketing of concept at step (t), wji is the weight of interconnection between Cj
(Nasserzadeh et al., 2008) and risk analysis (Lazzerini and and Ci. f is the threshold function that reduces the result of the mul-
Mkrtchyan, 2011), among others. tiplication into a normalized range (within [0, 1] or [1, 1]). The
Most of the FCM models are constructed basically by expert most common activation functions are (Tsadiras, 2008): bivalent,
knowledge and experience in the operation of the system. trivalent, sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent.
28 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
Deficiency causation
(HFACS)
ANALYSIS
Ship fleet
Preventive action
planning
INTEGRATION
Fig. 1. A hypothetical FCM model and the corresponding adjacency matrix (Asan et al., 2011).
w23
w12 C2 C3
C1
3. Proposed model preventive action generation. The database source in the model,
gathered from ship operational level, might incorporate PSC
3.1. Framework inspections reports, company audits reports, near-miss reports,
hazardous occurrences reports, accident reports, and vetting sur-
Utilizing the HFACS and FCM model, a new framework on fire veys reports. Then, deficiency database are distributed to HFACS
safety related deficiency analysis is introduced. Conceptual frame- to ensure satisfactory deficiency causation where FCM technique
work of the proposed model is presented in Fig. 2. Principally, it highlights the relationships among the designated contributing
performs a great extent of proactive safety modelling through causes of fire related deficiencies on board ships. Considering the
deficiency causation, root cause identification, prioritization, and initial results, it is decided whether a contributing cause is a root
O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41 29
Data Collection
Identification of Causal Questionnaire Survey,
Relationships Linguistic Variables
a
Adjacency Matrix,
Outdegree, Indegree
Analysis
Impulse Index
b
Analysis of Direct Analysis of Indirect Inference through Reachability Matrix,
Normalization,
Relationships a Relationships b qualitative Simulations c
Outdgree, Indegree,
Impulse Index
c
List of List of FCM Simulation
Potential Potential Priorities Algorithm, What-
Root Causes Root Causes If Scenarios
cause or not. Finally, the integration phase enables preventive 3.2.1. Step 1: Identification of causal relationships
action adaptation at ship operational level. It is considered as a As previously explained, the causes (i.e. concepts in the fuzzy
phase to promote ship safety against fire related occurrences at cognitive map) are identified by reviewing diverse reports on
sea. fire related deficiencies and employing the human error
framework HFACS. In this step, the causal relationships between
3.2. Modelling causes of fire related deficiencies concepts are identified by providing domain experts ordered
pairs of concepts in a questionnaire format (see Fig. 4). This
Before preventive actions are suggested against deficiencies, it allows systematic examination of all relationships. Here, a
is crucial to identify the initiating causes of the current causal causal relationship is characterized with vagueness, since
chain that leads to fire related deficiencies on board ships. it represents the influence of one qualitative concept on another
Dealing with only a small number of these root causes will reason- one and will be determined using linguistic terms (Papageorgiou
ably prevent many of the undesirable deficiencies. In order to iden- and Stylios, 2008). In this way, an expert transforms his
tify root causes and their priorities, a fuzzy cognitive map is knowledge and experience on the behaviour of the system into
constructed and analysed as summarized below (see Fig. 3). a fuzzy weighted graph.
30 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
R
where denotes an algebraic integration. The transformed numeri-
cal values will be within the range [0, 1]. The same procedure is
applied to all the causal relationships among the n concepts of
the map.
q
q maxi¼1...n fodðiÞg odðiÞ Note that the iterative method applied here is not necessarily
NodðiÞ ¼ q ð7Þ
maxi¼1...n fodðiÞ g concerned about the structure, but the outcome, or inference of
the map (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004).
q
q maxi¼1...n fidðiÞg idðiÞ In order to prioritize the potential root causes, identified in Step
NidðiÞ ¼ q ð8Þ 3 and 4, simulations are performed for different initial state
maxi¼1...n fidðiÞ g
vectors. In each ‘‘what-if’’ scenario, only one particular concept
q q
where NodðiÞ and NidðiÞ denote the normalized outdegree and (i.e. cause) is activated by assigning a value of one to its activation
indegree values of concept i for the adjacency matrix raised to the level. In this way, it is possible to observe the changes in the
q q
qth power, respectively; and odðiÞ and idðiÞ denote the outdegree activation levels of other concepts throughout the simulation.
and indegree values of concept i for the adjacency matrix raised to The higher the number of concepts influenced (i.e. activated) in
the qth power, respectively. Thus, the total outdegree and indegree the early iterations by a particular concept, the more likely the
values of concept i can be calculated by the following expressions concept is a root cause.
!, Consequently, the decision on the final list of root causes is
X
Q
2
RodðiÞ ¼ odðiÞ þ NodðiÞ þ ... þ NodðiÞ
n1
=Q ¼ NodðiÞ
q
Q made by synthesizing the results of Step 3, 4 and 5. A case
q¼1 study on a set of fire related deficiency data is conducted in
Section 4.
ð9Þ
!,
X
Q
4. Case study
2 n1 q
RidðiÞ ¼ idðiÞ þ NidðiÞ þ ... þ NidðiÞ =Q ¼ NidðiÞ Q
q¼1
4.1. Fire related deficiency sample database
ð10Þ
where RodðiÞ and RidðiÞ denotes the total outdegree and total Supporting the fire related deficiency database, the research
indegree of concept i, respectively and indicate the reachability of tends to a great variety of maritime sources such as DNV’ annual
concept i. In fact, the multiplication process continues until the deficiency report (DNV, 2012), ABS’ Reducing the Port State
adjacency matrix is raised to a certain power ðQ Þ in which the con- Detention Factor report (ABS, 2012), Paris Mou’ Taking PSC to the
cepts’ order proves to be stable (for more detail see Godet, 1994). Next Level Annual report (Paris Mou, 2012), Tokyo Mou’ Annual
The resulting indicators are used to reveal potential root causes report on PSC (Tokyo MoU, 2013), and ClassNK’ annual report on
which might be assumed to be unimportant in the previous analysis PSC (ClassNK, 2013). The field investigation addressed the fre-
but play a leading role because of indirect relationships. For this quently encountered fire related deficiencies on board ships. The
purpose the concepts are examined according to the same rules specific deficiency items are categorized into twenty main groups
described in Step 3. given as follows:
1. Fire-dampers.
3.2.5. Step 5: Inference through qualitative simulations
2. Emergency fire pump.
Once the direct and indirect relationships are examined, the
3. Fire prevention.
fuzzy cognitive map is used to perform qualitative simulations to
4. Firefighting equipment and appliances.
capture the transmission of influence along all paths and to
5. Fire detection.
observe whether the system converges toward a steady state.
6. Fire doors within main vertical zone.
From the steady state calculation we can get an idea of the ranking
7. Fixed fire extinguishing installation.
and thereby of the overall priorities of the variables in relation to
8. Ready availability of firefighting equipment.
each other (Özesmi and Özesmi, 2004).
9. Ventilation.
The simulation process is initialized through assigning a value in
10. Inert gas system.
[0, 1] to the activation level of each concept, based on experts’ opin-
11. Division – main zones.
ion about a certain state. The value of zero indicates that a given
12. Main vertical zone.
concept is not present in the system at a particular iteration, while
13. Personal equipment.
the value of one suggests that a given concept is present to its maxi-
14. Means of control (opening, closure of skylights, pumps, etc.
mum degree (Papageorgiou and Kontogianni, 2012). In a particular
machinery spaces.
iteration, the value of each concept is determined by its previous
15. Jacketed piping system for high pressure fuel lines.
value and the preceding values of all concepts that exert influence
16. Fire control plan - all ships.
on it through non-zero relationships (Papageorgiou, 2011). This
17. International shore connection.
iterative process does not produce exact numerical values; instead
18. Main fire pumps.
it allows analysing the dynamic behaviour of the system.
19. Emergency Escape Breathing device (EEBD).
The FCM simulation algorithm originally developed by (Kosko,
20. Other firefighting equipment.
1988) utilizing Eq. (1) consists of the following five stages
(Papageorgiou and Kontogianni, 2012):
The inoperable fire dampers might lead to minor or major
deficiencies. The causes of the inoperable fire dampers are inade-
Stage 1. Define the initial vector A.
quate familiarization, poor maintenance, adjustment mechanical
Stage 2. Multiply the initial vector A and the matrix W.
parts, functional malfunctions, corrosion, sealing materials, flap
Stage 3. Update the resultant vector A at time step t + 1.
positions, installations, etc. Another system related deficiency
Stage 4. Consider the new vector Aðtþ1Þ as the initial vector in the on board ships is poor condition of emergency fire pump. In
next iteration. detail, starting failures, self-priming issues, loss of pressure, leak-
Stage 5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated until Aðtþ1Þ AðtÞ 6 e ¼ 0:001 ages, remote control interruptions, electrical shortages, malfunc-
(where e is a residual describing the minimum error difference tioned gauges, driven engine failures, fuel related matters are
among the subsequent concepts) or Aðtþ1Þ ¼ AðtÞ . AðtÞ will be the the reasons for such deficiency item. Fire prevention measures,
final vector. might cause ship detention, are highly critical aspect of the fire
32 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
safety on board ship. Furthermore, oil leaks and improper storage C19. Distributed storage of materials and spares on board ship.
of combustible materials have great potential to spread of fire. C20. Missing and wrong labelling on firefighting equipment and
The poor condition of fire-fighting equipment and appliances appliances.
are also the key reason of firefighting vulnerabilities at sea in C21. Violation of drugs and alcohol policies on board ship.
terms of leaking line and fire hose, certification incompliances,
incomplete firemen’s outfits, etc. PSC audits state number of Reviewing the fire related deficiency sample database, the possible
causes evidenced with disconnected or covered alarm systems, causes in ‘‘preconditions for unsafe acts level’’ are determined as
unavailable previous testing records. Marvellously, non-functional follows:
fire doors, keeping the fire doors in an open position, unautho- C22. Loss of situational awareness in fire safety on board.
rized cuts in fire zone boundaries, blocking the emergency escape C23. Misplaced motivation of crews on board.
routes might be observed as a result of substandard ship opera- C24. Impaired physiological states of crews on board.
tions. The fixed fire extinguishing installation, addressing in com- C25. Lack of familiarization about fire safety.
pany audits and vetting reports addressed especially empty or C26. Excessive self-confidence of crew members.
blocked fire boxes, expired fire extinguisher and breathing C27. Physical fatigues of crews on board.
apparatus. Beyond all these, quite a number of ventilation C28. Time constraints on crew members’ reaction in operational
deficiencies are reported with critical failures such as corrosion level.
related malfunctioning. The surveys also pointed out performance C29. Incompatible intelligence/aptitude of crews.
and condition matters in different equipment/system such as C30. Insufficient physical capability in emergency response and
inert gas system, personal protective equipment, control systems, actions.
international shore connection, main fire pumps and emergency C31. Failed to communicate among ship and shore based
escape breathing device. organization in emergency situations.
C32. Failed to coordinate the actions during the fire related
4.2. Deficiency causation (HFACS) emergency situations.
C33. Failed to conduct adequate operational planning and
Considering the four level of human factor such as unsafe acts, briefing.
pre-conditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organiza- C34. Failed to use all available firefighting resources.
tion influences, the next step is to determine causes leading to fire C35. Poor coordination of fire frightening equipment and
related deficiencies. Reviewing the fire related deficiency sample system.
database, the possible causes in ‘‘unsafe acts level’’ are determined C36. Lack of warnings and signals about fire safety.
as follows: C37. Increased concentration demands in fire related emer-
gency situations.
C1. Late responding to the sudden operational failure in critical C38. Poor safety attitudes of crew due to basic health problems
components of fire system. and illness.
C2. Misperception of fire related emergency situations C39. Impairment of crew due to drug, alcohol or medication.
complexity. C40. Other emotional overload of crews.
C3. Responding to emergency fire related situations in panic.
C4. Omitted step in fire safety related procedure. Reviewing the fire related deficiency sample database, the
C5. Neglected items in fire frightening equipment routine possible causes in ‘‘unsafe supervision level’’ are determined as
inspection checklist. follows:
C6. Failed to prioritize actions to be taken during firefighting C41. Failed to provide guidance’s about fire prevention system.
drills. C42. Failed to provide dynamic operational plans against fire
C7. Misunderstanding of fire safety procedures. situation on board.
C8. Unorganized responding to fire related emergency situation. C43. Failed to provide considerable level of supervision on
C9. Violated firefighting training and practice. board.
C10. Failed to fulfilment of designated responsibilities in fire C44. Failed to provide specific firefighting training along with
prevention. different scenario.
C11. Failed to properly use of firefighting equipment and C45. Failed to ensure about qualification of crews embarkation
appliances. on board ship.
C12. Failed to test and maintain standby arrangements of fire C46. Failed to continuously monitoring crew performance on
frightening alarm and equipment. board.
C13. Use of fire firefighting’s tool/equipment with a known C47. Failed to provide adequate audit time.
defect. C48. Ill-defined rules and responsibilities in fire safety plans.
C14. Incorrect placement of portable tools, equipment or mate- C49. Ignored crew resting hours.
rial in firefighting system. C50. Failed to update/revise documentation in fire safety plans.
C15. Lack of safety culture about the use of personnel protective C51. Failed to identify fire related hazards on board ship.
equipment. C52. Failed to initiate fire safety related corrective actions.
C16. Disable or remove safe guards, warning system or safety C53. Failed to report unsafe fire prevention tendencies.
devices. C54. Failed to comply with fire safety rules and regulations.
C17. Inappropriate team integration and discipline in C55. Failed to collect data and evidences about fire safety
firefighting. measurement.
C18. Lack of information due to poor emergency C56. Lack of conditions assessment program for firefighting
communication. equipment.
O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41 33
C57. Failure to correct repeating unsafe occurrences on board between two concepts the experts use the linguistic scale given
ship. in Fig. 5. Since the number of causes considered in our FCM model
C58. Lack of methodological tools and background to perform is very high (i.e. 78 distinct causes), it becomes a difficult and
technical safety analysis. tedious task for experts to answer all pairwise questions (i.e.
C59. Poor communication between supervisor and crew 78 ⁄ (78–1) = 6006) and the likelihood of the experts to introduce
members on board ship. erroneous data increases (Asan and Soyer, 2009). To overcome this
drawback and make the administration of the questionnaire more
Reviewing the fire related deficiency sample database, the possible manageable, the adjacency matrix is divided into 16 distinct
causes in ‘‘organizational influences level’’ are determined as regions with respect to the four levels in HFACS, as shown in
follows: Fig. 7. Seven different groups of experts from the academia and
C60. The integration problem of company safety policy into industry are, then, assigned to one or more of these regions consis-
operational level. tent with their area of expertise (see Fig. 7). These groups consists
C61. Poor design of ship fire system components. of (i) Maritime researchers (Group #1), (ii) Maritime stakeholders
C62. Ergonomic design errors in fire safety installations. (Group #2), (iii) Port state control officers (Group #3), (iv) Ship
C63. Lack of systematic personnel selection and recruitment management executives (Group #4), (v) Safety researchers
procedures. (Group #5), (vi) Industrial engineers (Group #6), and (vii)
C64. Lack of managerial skill in shore-based personnel. Experienced seagoing officers/engineers (Group #7). This approach
C65. Financial resourcing/budget constraints to timely meet not only reduces the number of questions for each group of
running/operational expenses. experts, it also improves the accuracy of judgments and the overall
C66. Insufficient scope of crew training program. efficiency.
C67. Ineffective promotion system for crews. Next, weights obtained from a group of experts are combined
C68. Purchasing of firefighting equipment and appliances in low using the Max operator to produce the overall linguistic weights
quality. and, thus, the group adjacency matrix. The overall linguistic
C69. High level of documentation bureaucracy. weights are then transformed to crisp values using the CoG
C70. Lack of policy to monitor the required revisions in safety defuzzification method. The calculations involved in the aggrega-
procedures. tion and defuzzification process regarding the impact of
C71. Inefficient fire safety communication planning. ‘‘Insufficient scope of crew training program (C66)’’ on ‘‘Failed to
C72. Fire control plans’ inconsistencies. provide specific firefighting training along with different scenarios
C73. Incorrect behaviour enforced by shipping companies. (C44)’’ in Region 15 are illustrated below. The linguistic weights
C74. Excessive time pressure due to improper operational obtained from two experts regarding this causal relationship are
scheduling. ‘‘moderately-strongly’’ and ‘‘strongly’’ (see Fig. 6). Thus, the CoG
C75. Lack of management tools to implement suitable preven- for the overall linguistic weight is calculated as follows
tive action planning on board. R 0:8 R 0:9 R1
ðz0:6Þ ðz1Þ
C76. Lack of effective system to determine adequate risk control 0:6 0:2
zdz þ 0:8
zdz þ 0:9 z0:8
0:2
zdz
z ¼ R 0:8 R 0:9
0:2
R ¼ 0:834
options on board. z0:6
dz þ ðz1Þ 1 z0:8
dz þ 0:9 0:2 dz
0:6 0:2 0:8 0:2
C77. Management review input data incompleteness.
C78. Lack of consistent improvement decisions and follow-up Note that, in this study, it is assumed that the experts have equal
actions in management review output. weights of credibility. The adjacency matrices (for only Region 15)
of both experts’ and the resulting matrix with crisp values are
4.3. Root cause analysis shown in Figs. 8–10, respectively.
In the following step, the direct relationships represented in the
In order to identify the initiating causes of the causal system aggregated adjacency matrix are examined. Using Eqs. (3) and (4),
described above, a fuzzy cognitive map is constructed and anal- the outdegree and indegree, in other words the cumulative
ysed. First, the causal relationships between concepts are specified strengths of connections entering and exiting the concepts are cal-
using a self-administered questionnaire where domain experts are culated. These values, which serve to identify the role of each con-
asked to indicate for each ordered pair of distinct concepts (Ci, Cj) cept in the system, are depicted in Fig. 11. For example, it can be
whether, ceteris paribus, a change in Ci has a significant impact suggested that the concepts C66, C73 and C74 are highly influential
on Cj. To express the degree of the causal relationship (weights) causes, while C8, C10 and C11 are highly dependent on the rest of
Fig. 7. The partitioned adjacency matrix and the assigned expert groups.
34 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
C41 C42 C43 C44 C45 C46 C47 C48 C49 C50 C51 C52 C53 C54 C55 C56 C57 C58 C59
C60 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C62 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C63 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8
C64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C65 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C66 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C67 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0
C68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C69 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C71 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0
C72 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C73 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.4
C74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C75 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C76 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C77 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C41 C42 C43 C44 C45 C46 C47 C48 C49 C50 C51 C52 C53 C54 C55 C56 C57 C58 C59
C60 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C62 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C63 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0
C64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C65 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C66 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C67 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0
C68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C69 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C71 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0
C72 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C73 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2
C74 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C75 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C76 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C77 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C78 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
the system. Since we are basically interested in identifying the where the concepts’ order proves to be stable. The outdegree and
potential root causes, concepts deserving this characteristic should indegree values in each resulting matrix ðq ¼ 1; . . . ; 6Þ are then
fulfil the rules provided in Eqs. (5a) and (5b). In this particular case, normalized to enable a comparison among the results of successive
the average outdegree taken over the entire concept set is found to powers. For example, the normalized values of C66 for q ¼ 2 are
be approximately 13.6. Accordingly, for concept i, if odðiÞ P 13:6 calculated using Eqs. (7) and (8) as follows
and IPIi P 2 then the concept will be considered as a potential root
maxi¼1...78 fodðiÞg odð66Þ2 33:3 342:3
cause. These rules are depicted in Fig. 11, where the dashed line Nodð66Þ2 ¼ 2
¼ ¼ 22:2
represents IPI ¼ 2 and the solid line represents the average outde- maxi¼1...78 fodðiÞ g 513:2
gree. For example, C66 is a potential root cause, since
odð66Þ ¼ 28:1, idð66Þ ¼ 4:8 and IPI66 ¼ 28:1=4:8 ¼ 5:85. Table 1 maxi¼1...78 fidðiÞg idð66Þ2 37:3 56:1
Nidð66Þ2 ¼ 2
¼ ¼ 4:2
summarizes the results of the direct relationships analysis. maxi¼1...78 fidðiÞ g 496:4
Finally, according to the direct relationship analysis the potential
root causes identified are C21, C26, C48, C49, C58, C62, C64, C66, Consequently, the total outdegree and indegree values of C66,
C67, C71, C72, C73, C74, and C75. which indicate the reachability of this concept, is calculated as
A similar classification is performed in the analysis of indirect follows
P
relationships. Here, the diffusion of causal impacts through reac- 6 q
q¼1 Nodð66Þ
tion paths and loops are considered to explore hidden root causes. Rodð66Þ ¼
To do this, the adjacency matrix is raised to successive powers. In 6
this study, the adjacency matrix is raised to the sixth power ðq ¼ 6Þ ¼ ð28:1 þ 22:2 þ 22:7 þ 22:4 þ 22:4 þ 22:4Þ=6 ¼ 23:4
O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41 35
C41 C42 C43 C44 C45 C46 C47 C48 C49 C50 C51 C52 C53 C54 C55 C56 C57 C58 C59
C60 0.834 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.166 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.933 0.0
C62 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.834 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0
C63 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.933 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.711
C64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.289 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
C65 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.289 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.289 0.7 0.0 0.0
C66 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.834 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.422 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0
C67 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.834
C68 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.166 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
C69 0.289 0.289 0.289 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.422 0.3 0.0 0.834 0.0 0.0 0.289 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.166 0.0 0.0
C70 0.0 0.166 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.166 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C71 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.933
C72 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C73 0.933 0.7 0.933 0.834 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.933 0.933 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.166
C74 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.166 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
C75 0.834 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.289 0.0 0.0 0.289 0.0 0.0
C76 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C77 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.166 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0
C78 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.166 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
P
6 q simulations is the number of concepts influenced in the early itera-
q¼1 Nidð66Þ
Ridð66Þ ¼ tions by a particular concept. Those concepts influencing a higher
6
number of concepts in the early iterations are supposed to be more
¼ ð4:8 þ 4:2 þ 3:8 þ 3:7 þ 3:7 þ 3:7Þ=6 ¼ 4:0 likely a root cause. Consequently, the decision on the final list of
root causes is made by synthesizing the results of Step 3, 4 and
The total outdegree and indegree values of the concepts are 5. The results are provided in Table 3. The priorities are determined
depicted in Fig. 12. To identify the potential root causes, the same
based on the averages of rank orders of the scenarios with respect
rules suggested in the direct relationships analysis are employed to iterations one and two. For example, the most influential root
here. In other words, those concepts fulfilling the rules
cause is ‘‘Incorrect behaviour enforced by shipping companies’’
RodðiÞ P 11:9 and IPIi P 2 are considered as potential root causes which activates 41 concepts in the first iteration and 77 concepts
(see Fig. 12). Table 2 summarizes the results of the indirect relation- in the second. Finally, the root causes listed according to their
ships analysis, where C48, C58, C64, C65, C66, C67, C71, C72, C73, priorities are C73, C74, C66, C48, C58, C64, C72, C21, C65, C62,
and C74 are labeled as potential root causes. Notice that C65 is C67, C71, C26, C75 and C49.
one hidden root cause which is supposed to be unimportant with
respect to the direct relationships. Therefore, comparing the results
of the two analyses can help to confirm the importance of certain
concepts as potential root causes and can reveal hidden root causes 4.4. Integration (preventive action planning)
which are previously thought to be unimportant but play a critical
role because of indirect impacts. The model clearly reveals the common root causes of fire
In the final step of root cause analysis, qualitative simulations related deficiencies based on their priorities stated as follows:
are performed to analyze the transmission of influence along all
paths and observe changes initiated by the root causes. These sim-
ulations give an idea of the overall priorities of potential root
causes determined in the previous two steps. In this study, 78
alternative what-if scenarios are considered for the simulation of
the causal system. In each scenario, a FCM is first initialized, i.e.
the activation level of each concept in the map takes on a value
in the set {0, 1} based on the choice of the concept to be analysed
ð0Þ
for its initiating role in the causal system. For example, A1 ¼ [0
0000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000001000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] represents the initial vector state where only
the concept ‘‘Insufficient scope of crew training program’’ is
activated/fired. Then the concepts are set free to interact according
to Eq. (1); here, the hyperbolic tangent is used as the threshold
function. The iterations are repeated until the t = 4, where
ðtþ1Þ ðtÞ
Ai Ai 6 e ¼ 0:000001 for all i. Fig. 13 depicts the dynamic
behaviour of the concepts for scenario 66, where only C66 is acti-
vated in the initial state.
The results of the 78 different scenarios suggest that the system
converges toward a steady state in maximum four iterations, and
in all scenarios only 25 causes reach an activation level of exact Fig. 11. Influence-dependence chart for direct relationships (dashed line represents
1 (the rest ends up between 0.98–0.99). A critical indicator in these IPI = 2, solid line represents
xod ¼ 13:6).
36 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
Table 1
Results of the analysis of direct relationships.
Cause odðiÞ idðiÞ IPIi odðiÞ P 13:6 IPIi P 2 Potential root cause
Table 1 (continued)
Cause odðiÞ idðiÞ IPIi odðiÞ P 13:6 IPIi P 2 Potential root cause
Table 2
Results of the analysis of indirect relationships.
Cause Rod(i) Rid(i) IPIi RodðiÞ P 11:9 IPIi P 2 Potential root cause
Table 2 (continued)
Cause Rod(i) Rid(i) IPIi RodðiÞ P 11:9 IPIi P 2 Potential root cause
Fig. 13. Results of the FCM simulation process for Scenario 66.
Table 3
Priorities of potential root causes.
Scenario Activated cause # of Activated concepts (>0.5) Rank order w.r.t. I1 Rank order w.r.t. I2 Priority
Iteration 1 (I1) Iteration 2 (I2) Iteration 3 (I3)
21 C21 29 65 77 4.5 10.5 8
26 C26 16 65 77 14 10.5 13
48 C48 29 72 77 4.5 6 4
49 C49 19 52 77 11 15 15
58 C58 22 74 77 8 5 5
62 C62 20 66 77 10 9 10
64 C64 17 77 77 12.5 1.5 6
65 C65 14 76 77 15 3.5 9
66 C66 35 71 77 2.5 7 3
67 C67 26 62 77 7 13.5 11
71 C71 21 62 77 9 13.5 12
72 C72 27 70 77 6 8 7
73 C73 41 77 77 1 1.5 1
74 C74 35 76 77 2.5 3.5 2
75 C75 17 63 77 12.5 12 14
established to control the time constraints on operational pro- address the mentioned issues, the SSOM should be supported with
cesses. Identification of suitable training items is another critical the following sub-systems: (i) safe operation verification system,
point of interest which can be supported by problem-based train- (ii) crew improvement program, (iii) safety regulation compliance
ing including regulatory amendments rather than traditional system.
safety trainings. The experienced operational safety cases should At the organizational level, the SSEM deals with governing the
be analysed and shared as critical lessons to be learned. The overall process of fire safety improvement at sea. The mechanism
motivating factors (i.e. resting hours’ compliance, fair promotion might require organizational redesign to avoid the incorrect
process, etc.) should be considered and systematically actualized organizational behaviour, ordinary policies and management
in order to increase the number of good practices on board. To practices. It is the most significant issue to be addressed. It might
40 O. Soner et al. / Safety Science 77 (2015) 25–41
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