36 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
or commonality in what that subjective
world is. Subjective merely means that indi-
viduals in settings actively perceive those set-
tings and attach meanings to the patterning
of activities they experience. Numerous stud-
ies have shown that people do agree in their
perceptions of their situations and, further,
that different parties to a setting-such as
employees and customers-also converge in
their perceptions.
The study of climate has evolved over the
years from a molar, general perspective to a
more strategic focus, linking climate percep-
tions to a specific criterion of interest, such as
safety, innovation-or service. We have fo-
cused in this chapter on a climate for service
and the myriad organizational arrangements
necessary to create it. The many practices in
departments of human resources, marketing,
and operations all need to be in alignment
with a strategic focus on service. If safety or
innovation were the criteria of interest, the
same principles of climate creation would ap-
ply-namely, the strategic focus needs to be
clearly visible in organizational practices. It
is the strategic focus of organizational prac-
tices that determines a setting's climate.
Climate for service is unique given its visi-
bility t o both employees and customers. This
explicit recognition of the customer has
shaped research and offered directions for
practice in the area of climate for service. In
research, it has yielded linkage research that
shows the climate experiences of employees
are validated by the experiences of the cus-
tomers they serve. The shared perceptions of
employees and customers have also forged
points of integration between the two disci-
plines of organizational behavior and mar-
keting. So-called linkage research (Wiley,
1996) has become an important business,
providing organizations with information on
the issues requiring attention if customer sat-
isfaction is to be improved. In practice, in- Redirecting Research on Values in the Workplace
sights have evolved concerning how to design
human resources management practices
to create a climate for service that fits the ex-
pectations of a targeted market segment of
-- Richard Stackman, Craig C. Pinder,
customers. Additionally, it appears that the and Patrick EmConnor
climate for service is associated with cus-
tomer retention and the profits that derive
from it.
In sum, we have traced the evolution of cli-
mate for service from its roots in early climate
research to its more recent treatment as a
strategic focus. A summary lesson from these
years of study is that when climate is more
than an abstraction, its consequences for em-
ployees, customers, and overall organiza-
tional effectiveness are tangible and real. he concept of values has been cen- sons people work and why they behave in the
tral to the organizational sciences ways they do in their jobs (Posner & Munson,
and workplace relations for de- 1979; Sikula, 1971). Values are key determi-
(e.g., Blood, 1969; Brown, 1976; nants of attitudes, which in turn affect work-
or & Becker, 1975; Rosenberg, 1957; related (and all other) behavior (Becker &
interest in recent years. To consider val- Values also play a role in the decision-
'n the workplace is to probe the very rea- making processes of managers (Connor &
hor by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and by the Centre for Labour-Manage-
nt Studies, and to the third author by the Kaneko Foundation and Willamette University. We thank Lois Fearon for
dedicated library research during the early stages of the project. We are also grateful to Tom Knight, David
-- 37
38 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
Becker, 1994, 1995; Posner & Munson,
1979; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987a)as well as in
the organizational dissension activities of
workers (Graham, 1986). Alternatively, they
have been found to be related to prosocial be-
haviors at work (see McNeely & Meglino,
1992). At a more sociological level, societal
and corporate values have been cited as ma-
jor parameters in issues related to corporate
social responsibility, corporate ethics, and
similar concerns (Balazs, 1990). Finally, val-
ues (and differences among values) have been
studied a t the global level: Investigators have
examined and compared the typical value
structures of managers and worlrers from dif-
ferent countries as a means of understanding
the differential meanings of work and, in par-
ticular, the problems associated with cross-
cultural trade and business (e.g., England &
Lee, 1974; Hofstede, 198Oa; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987, 1990).
However, considering the extant research
o n values today, how much do we truly know
about values and the roles values play in indi-
vidual behavior? As Connor and Becker
(1994) have noted, scholars' understanding
of values-both in general and in the work-
place-has been compromised. This has oc-
curred, in part, through researchers' lax
operationalization of the values construct it-
self and through the proliferation of new in-
struments and questionnaires that are rarely
reconciled with earlier such instruments,
making " the accumulation of a coherent body
of knowledge virtually impossible.
With the exception of studies such as those
by Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) and Homer
and Kahle (1988),' most past research has
concentrated o n the effects of single values,
thereby neglecting the complex nature of
value structures (Homer & Kahle, 1988;
Schwartz, 1996b).Past research has also been
plagued by the use of value lists that fail to
cover the full range of values that are likely to
influence behavior, and by the failure to view
value svstems as integrated
" wholes that entail
trade-offs among competing value priorities
(Schwartz, 1994, 1996b).
Finally, researchers have tended to focus
their attention on the relationship between
attitudes and behavior-especially behavior
and behavior outcomes as influenced bv the
theory of reasoned action (see Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1980; Feather, 1992; Fishbein &
Aizen. 1975). There has been some debate as
, A
to how succ~ssfulthese studies have been, be-
cause, in part, researchers have been studying
behavior without a clear understanding of -
values and the roles values play in causing be-
havior (Feather, 1992; Homer & Kahle,
1988). Hence, even though values are both a
powerful explanation of and an influence on
human behavior, it remains a mystery how
values cause ureferences to be formed, and it is
even more mysterious how values cause indi-
viduals to act upon their preferences (Connor
& Becker, 1994; Homer & Kahle, 1988).
In this chapter, after first defining values,
we examine six issues that are integral to
these questions: value descriptiveness, the at-
tainment of value specificity and generaliza-
tion, the concept of a so-called central value
system, value stability and change, levels of
analysis and the anthropomorphism error,
and ethics.
VALUES DEFINED
Nearly two decades ago, Kilmann (1981) re-
viewed definitions of values published to that
time. The general sense of these definitions is
that values are objects, qualities, standards,
or conditions that satisfy or are perceived to
satisfy needs andlor that act as guides to hu-
man action. In much of the organizational lit-
erature dealing with values, the framework
and definition advanced by Rokeach (1969)
has been particularly popular: "an enduring
belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-
state of existence is personally and socially
preferable to alternative modes of conduct or
end-states" (p. 160). In Rokeach's concep-
tion, values entail attention to both means
(such as acts) and ends (such as outcomes of
Values Lost -- 3 9
tween values (in the ,general sense) and work
values-a concept that implies the existence
of particular sets of values that govern em-
ployee work behavior, in all of its forms.
Most conceptioils and definitions of work
values, per se, are consistent with most gen-
eral definitions of values in the broader sense,
but they focus o n work, work behavior, and
work-related outcomes (e.g., Wollack,
Goodale, Wijting & Smith, 1971). One typi-
ns toward specific objects and situ- cal definition is provided by Pine and Innis
ior is the manifestation of a per- (1987),who conceive of work values as "an
~nd~vidual's needs and prlorltles and conse-
quent personal disposit~onsand orientations
to work roles that have the perceived capac
~ t yto sat~sfythose needs and pr~orit~es"
(p. 280). A more recent d e f ~ n ~ t i o1snprovided
usly in a behavior or attitude (see by Nord, Brief, Atieh, and Doherty (1988):
"We deflne work values as the end states peo-
ple des~reand feel they ought to be able tore-
a l ~ z ethrough work~ng"(p. 2).
The controversy has to d o w ~ t hwhether
there is any benefit added-such as concep-
tual clar~ty,applled ~ n s ~ g h tor
s , scholarly utll-
~ t yof any sort-in d i s t ~ n g u ~ s h ~between
ng
values In general and values related to the
workplace. Sel~gmanand Katz (19961, who
studled the reordering of values wlth respect
to specific Issues (such as abort1011and the en-
vironment), argue that, on the one hand, the
t p a general value system 1s neces-
s t a b ~ l ~ of
sary to express the coherence of the self over
with attitudes and values succes- tlme and sltuatlons. However, the multiple-
value-system perspectrve (e.g., represented by
work values and fam~lyvalues) would sug-
gest that value systems are dynamic and that
the value system a person constructs In any
lication of values to concrete objects given situation is very much dependent o n the
tions, As for applicability, values are context in which he or she is asked to do so.
Consequently, value systems would be stable
in a particular context because they would be
flexibly attuned to context where these sys-
tems would be informed and influenced by
the general value system (Seligman & Katz,
es Versus W o r k Values 1996).
We return to this issue below and propose
a means of reconciling the two opposing
sides. For the sake of parsimony in the fol-
40 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
lowing sections, we refer only to values in our
discussion.
An issue of fundamental importance to the
study of values is that of descriptiveness and
how it trades off against parsimony.
Rokeach's (1973) early list of values com-
prised 1 8 "terminal" and 18 "instrumental"
values that purported to apply to the multi-
tude of roles and settings in which individu-
als may find themselves.' Since then, Schwartz
(1992,1994) and his colleagues (Prince-Gib-
son & Schwartz, 1998; Sagiv & Schwartz,
1995) have extended Rokeach's list by ex-
panding the number of value types, sharpen-
ing some of the definitions of value types, and
specifying the content of the values within
categories. Schwartz's work was instigated
by four questions germane to our present
concerns:
1. D o values form some uiliversal set of types?
2. Does the universal set include all types of
values to which individuals are likely to at-
tribute at least moderate importance as cri-
teria for evaluation?
3 . D o values have the same or similar mean-
ings among the differing groups of persons
under study?
4. Does a value structure exist such that there
are consistent conflicts and compatibilities
among values?
Schwartz (1992) derived and refined a list
of 56 specific values and a set of 1 0 value
types, specifying the dynamic structure of re-
lations among these value types. His work
has yielded a circular structure of wedges of
value types, suggesting that the pursuit of dif-
ferent value types can be compatible-or in-
compatible-depending on how close to-
gether the types are on the circular map that
represents his model. Any particular value
type tends to be associated with value types
that are adjacent to it on the map, whereas as-
Values Lost -- 41
sociations between types diminish as they are
separated on the circumference of the wheel
(Schwartz, 1992). Table 2.1 lists the value
types, with each described in terms of its cen-
tral goal (and followed, in parentheses, by
specific values that primarily represent it).
The circular model reflecting relationships
among the various types is shown in Figure
2.1, and the entire list of 56 separate values is
presented in Table 2.2. Table 2.3 presents the
36 instrumental and terminal values found in
Rokeach's (1973) Value Survey, enabling a
direct comparison of the two typologies as
well as an assessment of the degree to which
Schwartz's work has added descriptiveness
to that of Rokeach. Notwithstanding the ex-
tra descriptiveness and precision added by
Schwartz (1992) to Rokeach's (1973)
typology, we believe neither list is sufficiently
descriptive for an understanding of human
behavior in any specific role or setting (such
as an employee at work). That is, the values
identified by Rokeach and Schwartz may, in
many cases, be defined at levels that are sim-
ply too abstract to be of any descriptive, pre-
dictive, or even prescriptive use in work set-
tings.' Indeed, both lists can be compared to
that offered in the Organizational Culture
Profile (OCP; 07Reilly, Chatman, &
Caldwell, 1991),which is composed of state- ATTAINING SPECIFICITY
may apply to all situations, although
ments that represent both terminal and in- ecific values that constitute the value
strumental values (see Table2.4). Such a con- ould change. Because values are ex-
trast highlights the trade-off between in specific situations, much can be We propose here a model that incorporates
parsimony and descriptiveness. Although the from alternative methods that em- both value generality of the Rokeach or
OCP may offer more descriptiveness for spe- ues in concrete and varied everyday Schwartz variety and value specificity reflect-
cific purposes, such as organizational analy- ns, such as school, work, or family ing a high degree of work-related relevance.
sis, it lacks the parsimony offered by the s (Schwartz, 1992). Although such To do so, we adapt Schwab's (1980, 1999)
other two typologies. Hence, for example, ns are less likely to reveal basic uni- model of the relationship between concep-
Rokeach's shorter list is missing values that s, they are important for clarifying the tual alld operational levels in the conduct of
capture such OCP dimensions as fairness, ual and cultural differences that arise social science research.
confronting conflict directly, and working n values are expressed in specific judg- For Schwab (1980), it is critical that re-
in collaboration with others-specific val- and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992). We searchers' theoretical models and hypotheses
ues that may be useful in organizational e, therefore, that Scliwartz's typology relate independent and dependent variables
work. erve as a useful starting point for the at relatively abstract levels. At the same time,
Schwartz (1994) argues that researchers Y of values in work organizations. In the the models must be explicit about what is and
need to consider more specific details of a sit- me, we are left with this question: Is it is not to be included in the concepts involved.
uation when relating behaviors to general e somehow to reconcile the notion of At issue is the correspondence between the
values that are transsituational in nature. 1 values with that of so-called work concept, as it is defined, and the empirical (op-
Schwartz also aclinowledges that the value erational) indicatorjs) chosen. It is critical to
42 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
I I
Figure 2.1. Schwartz Structure of Value Systems
SOURCE: Schwartz (1992, p. 45). Reprinted by permission of Academic Press.
differentiate between concepts, which by na-
ture are relatively abstract, and the empiri-
cal indicators that are chosen to measure
them.
Wow might Schwab's model be relevant to
the issue of the descriptiveness of values for
the workplace? We propose that this model
might be adapted, or modified, through the
addition of a third, intermediate level of defi-
nition. That is, one could conceive of values,
per se, in the most abstract of terms, analo-
gous to Schwab's conceptual level (see Fig-
ure 2.2). It is at this level that Schwartz's
(1994)values list offers the most benefit. The
values are carefully defined, but certainly not
in operational terms; rather, they are defined
in abstract terms, making them quite porta-
ble, universal, and more or less pan-situa-
tional.
Values Lost -- 43
Conceptual Level Generally-defined value
Intermediate
i
k
(e.g. Freedom)
Situation-specific values
Definition (relating to
Next, if one were to consider a level of ab- Level generally-defined
straction that lies between Schwab's concep- value)
tual and operational levels, one would be
able to translate Schwartz's generally defined Operationalization Operationalizatioll of
values into terms that are relevant to particu- Level situation-specific
lar settings, such as the workplace. In this values (as generated
by questionnaires,
second level, the values would still be defined
interviews, and
nonoperationally, but in terms that make other empirical
particular sense to work, working, and work- tools)
place issues. Finally, at the "lowest" of the
three levels-the one that corresponds di- Figure 2.2. Modified Schwab Model
rectly with Scl~wab's operational level-- SOURCE: Based on Schwab (1980).
would be the values that are reflected in di-
rect, empirical terms, such as those that are
generated by questionnaires, interviews, or tual level (i.e., they would still have to pass
other empirical tools, such as the Survey of the test of construct validity), which in turn
Work Values (Wollack et al., 1971). These must pass the test of relevance to the general
operational measures would still have to be values at the most abstract level.
reconcilable upward to the second concep- By expanding Schwab's (1980, 1999)
two-level model into a three-level oue in this
44 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE Values Lost -- 45

The amoeba model also permits a n analy-

sis of changes in values within a single person
over time as well as the relative importance of
particular values across persons at a given
time. For example, one can imagine the
lengths of the various tentacles representing a
value such as "freedom" changing over time
as an individual goes through various life ex-
periences that affect how he or she thinks
about work, family, and other roles and con-
texts in life.
In summary, we do not suggest that there
is anything more to this representation than a
visual parallel; we imply neither metaphoric
nor literal similarity between amoebae and
value structures (see Bourgeois & Pinder,
1983; Pinder & Bourgeois, 1982). Instead,
we offer the amoeba model as one graphic
way to examine the relative strengths of val-
ues within and among people, over time and1
or in different settings of interest.

THE CONCEPT OF
A CENTRAL VALUE SYSTEM
. . . are activated in different social situa-
s" (p. 14).People adjust their valueprior-
manner, we believe that we can reconcile the entirely different terms when one's inte to their circumstances. They downgrade Rokeach (1973)defines a personal value sys
argument in favor of adopting parsimonious, in their activities in the general comm es made unattainable by their role op- tem as an "organization of principles and
general value sets (such as Schwartz's) with The measures would vary across settings, nities and constraints, and they up- rules to help one choose between alterna-
the alternative position that calls for assess- they would all be ultimately reconcilable at those that are attainable (Kohn & tives. resolve conflicts. and make decisions"
ing "work values." That is, so-called work the most abstract (Rokeach- or Schwartz- ler, 1983; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). (p. 14). The current management literature is
values, as measured, could be directly recon- like) levels. we can see that "freedom" is less impor- dominated by his view that this organization
ciled with values, as conceptualized. Such an approach also permits a look at the person portrayed when family re- is hierarchical, in which a personal value sys-
the comparative relevance of values across are at issue than it is to his or her work tem is conceptualized as consisting of a rank
situations. Again, consider the value "free- es and behavior. In this way, the ordering of individual values. As Rokeach
dom," which Rokeach (1973) equates with a portrays intraindividual differences notes in a work published shortly after his
Generalizing the Approach
"independence." Let us suppose that having ue importance because it conditions death, "A hierarchical conception directs our
We can broaden this approach by freedom-independence, autonomy, discre- ortance" on the forum or setting in- attention to the idea that although the num-
operationalizing the general values of the tion-in one's worlcplace is a matter of some ved. A different value (such as "ambi- ber of values that individuals and societies
Schwartz variety into terms that are specific in significance to a person. The imposition (or " ) would, at a given time, be represented possess is relatively limited, values are capa-
settings other than the workplace, such as a relaxing) of directive rules and procedures by amoeba of a different shape on the ble of being weighed and arranged agalnst
person's family or community relations. management therefore will likely speak di- rid. In fact, one could simultaneously one another to lead to a very large number of
Again, the problems of construct adequacy rectly to that value. Hence "freedom" is a rlmpose any number of "amoebae" (see permutations and combinations of value hi-
and deficiency must be addressed. A general highly salient value for that individual at e 2.4) onto a given grid at a given point erarchies" (Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989,
value such as "freedom" therefore may be work. On the other hand, this value may not e to reflect how different values array p. 775).
operationalized in one set of measures when be nearly as relevant in that person's life elves for a person in relative impor- We suggest that strict adherence to this
one is interested in people's work roles, but in within the family setting. That is, independ- ce-depending on the context in question. view may have limited the advancement of
46 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
Work Hfobbies
Figure 2.3. Amoeba Model: Freedom
scholars' understanding of values. Ravlin
and Meglino's (198713, 1989) work on the
transitivity of values, for example, has led
them to conclude that value hierarchies do
"seem to exist"; however, these hierarchies
are flexible when the values in question are of
equal or nearly equal importance.4 Thus a be-
Work Hobbies
- Freedom
- -.. Ambitrous
Figure 2.4. Amoeba Model: Freedom and
Ambitious
lief in the immutability of values with respect
to a particular rank order may be misguided.
In fact, Chusmir and Parker (1991) propose
that individuals may have two different hier-
archies of values, one for personal/family life
and another for work life.' In his research,
Schwartz (1992, 1994) has applied a rating,
not a ranking, method when studying values.
H e argues that rating does not force respon-
dents "to discriminate among equally impor-
tant values or to compare directly values they
mav, exuerience as incommensurable because
one expresses personal, and the other social,
goals" (Schwartz, 1994, p. 26).
If indeed different value hierarchies are sa-
lient for different situations, values would
seemingly vary in rank order when compared
across situations. We illustrated this uossibil-
ity earlier when we introduced the amoeba
model. Therefore, instead of comprising a
rank ordering, a person's value system may
be described as comprising a number of lev-
els, ranging from the most explicit to the
most basic. Borrowing from Hunt (1991,
pp. 220-224; see also Connor & Lake, 1994,
pp. 46-56), we liken a value system to a
peeled onion; this conception is shown in Fig-
ure 2.5.
Values depicted near the center of the fig-
ure are hypothesized to be more important
than those closer to the periphery; they are
nearer the "core" of the individual's being.
Instead of a rank ordering of one value rela-
tive to others, value systems may be concep-
tualized as an ordering of values sets in rela-
tion to other values sets. We believe that it is
not meaningful that one value is more impor-
tant than another in a rigid hierarchical
sense; rather, it is probable that there is a set
of core values for any individual that is
more important-more deeply held-than
another set of values. People feel strongly
about their central values (Feather, 1995). It
is these core values that allow us to speak of
a n individual's central value system, much as
some managers and organizational scientists
speak of an organization's core value system
(Chatman, 1991). Such a system is said to ex-
ist within an organization when a number of
things are done in the organization
ed by key actors operating in power-
important units and positions.6
further from the core. If values do
ge" in importance, then values would
from layer to layer, either outward or
ard. The value itself would not change,
Id. The relative clzangeability of individ-
values and the conditions under which
"movement" might occur are two sub-
that seem ripe for empirical examina-
a penalty for reordering their value prior-
(Seligman & Katz, 1996).
y reconciling previous views and debates in
e values literature pertaining to the follow-
g critical questions:
1. Are values arranged hierarchically within
2. Is the relative importance of a person's val-
3. Are some values more changeable than 0th-
4. Is it useful to think of values-in-context
(suchas in the concept of "worlivalues"),or
is it more appropriate to consider people's
values as general constructs that transcend
settings to influence attitudes and behav-
uggest that values ought to be consid-
sets, such that certain sets of values
ome more or less important in guiding a
son's attitudes and behavior depending
the context. It is reasonable to assume that
erent sets of values (as opposed to single
ues) will increase and decrease in relative
Values Lost -- 47
importance for an individual across time and
differing contexts. To illustrate these aagu-
ments, we have offered two heuristic devices,
one suggestive of an amoeba on a grid, the
other reflective of the multilayered structure
of an onion.
GEABHLITY OF VALUES
Two issues are central to the matter of the
changeability of values. The first pertains t o
the degree to which values in a society change
a t the aggregate level, over long periods of
time. The second concerns the natural, devel-
opmental alterations that occur in individu-
als' values as they age, mature, become edu-
cated, and experience life. We examine only
the latter issue here by asltiltg the question,
How stable or malleable are individuais' val-
ues?
According to Rokeach's (1973) theory,
confronting an individual with information
that is discordant with his or her values may
influence those values or lead the person to
alter them. As Rokeach and Grube (1979)
put it:
Long terin changes in human values can be
brought about as a result of a self-colzfrolz-
tation treatment in which individuals are
given feedback and interpretations con-
cerning their own and significant others'
values. . . . the awareness of such inconsis-
tencies arouses a state of self dissatisfac-
tion and, moreover, as one means of
reducing this negative affective state some
individuals will change their values to be-
come more consistent with self-concep-
tions. (p. 24)
To test this proposition, Rolceach and Grube
asked university students to rank Rokeach's
instrumental and terminal values in the man-
ner he usually employed in his research. Then
they asked students who possessed extremely
high and extremely low rankings for various
50 -- CULTURE AND CLIMATE
means for satisfying them, then institu-
tional values are socially shared represen-
tations of institutional goals and demands.
(P. 50)
H e then opined that it is the role of various so-
cietal institutions to instill particular values
or value sets among the citizenry, and that the
resultant value profile of a community re-
flects the comparative success of various insti-
tutions in inc~~lcating their respective values
among the people. There is a sort of value spe-
cialization within institutions (such as
churches, schools, and police). There is also a
degree of value sharing among them, such
that the values espoused by various institu-
tions-although they may compete for influ-
ence among the people-are, at the same
time, somewhat compatible and in harmony
with one another.
A logical error that many organizational
participants make is in antl~opomorphizing
the organizations in which they work or with
which they otherwise interact. Organizations
are thereby thought of as having, in some
sense, minds, memories, hearts, and other
distinguishing properties of Homo sapiens.
As a consequence, people speak of "loving"
the Vancouver Canucks (of the National
Hockey League), and employees of Harrod's
say they hope that Harrod's will "remember"
them when it is time for them to receive
raises.
Although it is true that organizations are
composed of people and can be defined as
systems of interactions and events linking
people (Katz & Kahn, 1978),it is a logical er-
ror-an error of composition-to attribute,
other than metaphorically, human properties
to aggregations of individuals such as groups,
organizations, and institutions. In short, orga-
nizations do not have minds, memories, or
hearts; they do not possess aspirations, loves,
or fears (Pinder, 1998).
Likewise, organizations do not possess
values or needs. Rather, key players in orga-
nizations, as individual human beings, pos-
sess values and needs, and sometimes the
most powerful of these people can influence
the goals and policies of their organizations
in directions that are consistent with their
own values and needs. In fact, in the work
quoted immediately above, Rokeach (1979)
describes five methods by which institutional
values can be measured. Four of these meth-
ods require a n assessment of the value struc-
tures of individual "gatelteepers" or "specla1
clients" related to the institutions in ques-
tion. In other words, although Rokeach
claims that aggregations of people have val-
ues, he recognizes that, operationally, one
must assess the values of key individual play-
ers to make sense of the concept.
We believe that there are several ontologi-
cal and epistemological problems with this
view and the research approach it requires.
First is the matter of determining whose indi-
vidual values are to be assessed and then ag-
gregated to yield a composite definition of
the "organization's values." Second is the is-
sue of how, arithmetically, such values or
value profiles (see Connor & Becker, 1975)
are to be aggregated. Third are the possible
ethical problems of (mis)leading lower par-
ticipants and interested outside parties (such
as customers, clients, and others) about the
"values of the organization," as if these val-
ues have the same qualities as those possessed
by individual persons (such as trustworthi-
ness, loyalty, and honesty). Attributing kind
or benevolent "values" to a more or less
loosely coupled social system can be irre-
sponsible.
Finally, there is a practical problem: In
general, it is logical to assume a degree of co-
herence or agreement among the value struc-
tures of a n organization's gatekeepers (or
elitegroups, as Hage & Dewar, 1973, refer to
them). It is possible that the perceptions of
values held by members of an organization
may vary by hierarchical level, such that peo-
ple nearer the top of the chart may believe in
and/or espouse values that are very different
from those held by people at the bottom. It is
also apparent that an organization's "cul-
ture" is made up of multiple cultures, varying
across functional, ethnic, age, and profes-
sional groups (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Hence
single individuals is, at best, a metaphori-
ng of individual-level problems and
ETHCAE ISSUES
egan our discussion by identifying a
er of values issues (e.g., value descrip-
ss and central value systems); not the
of these is a set of ethical concerns.
in broad limits, it seems that employers
Values Lost -- 5 1
assume that they have a right, as part of the
employment contract, t o attempt t o influence
the values of employees. Likewise, it seems
that employees often share that assumption,
tacitly a t least; they believe that their employ-
ers have the right to make them over in ways
that will increase managerial control as well
as employee uniformity and predictability.
In fact, some celebrated organizations
have been cited as especially effective in their
techniques of employee homogenization
(consider companies known for their particu-
larly strong cultures, such as IBM, Mary Kay,
and Disney). Likewise, the "boot camps" of
all military and quasi-military organizations
are prime examples (the U.S. Marine Corps is
especially proud of its effectiveness here). In a
less pronounced way, many colleges and
graduate schools employ Outward Bound
experiences and other forms of bonding ritu-
als early in the orientation of new students
for the sake of generating strong cultures and
uniformity in behavior and standards.
Meglino and his colleagues explicitly de-
fine organizational culture in terms of values
and the concept of strong culture in terms of
value congruence among organizational mem-
bers (see, e.g., Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins,
1989,1991). An organization is said t o have
a strong culture to the extent that there is a
high degree of consistency among its mem-
bers in terms of their shared belief structures,
values, and norms. "If there is no substantial
agreement that a limited set of values is im-
portant in a social unit, a strong culture can-
not be said to exist" (O'Reilly et al., 1991,
p. 493).
Such aggregate homogeneity among the
value structures of organizational actors has
long been thought to be a source of job satis-
faction, commitment, job proficiency, and
long tenure for employees (see Brown, 1976;
O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Mirable, 1992;
O'Reilly et al., 1991). In addition, value ho-
mogeneity among members enables manag-
ers to make safe assumptions about the likely
behaviors of their subordinates when first-
order control mechanisms (such as rules) or
second-order mechanisms (such as direct su-
JRE AND CLIMATE

3. Rokeach's values may also be too abstract to be of precise utility in

other particular settings, but our purpose here is to deal with values in the
workplace, so we limit our attention to that setting.
4. Transitivity is the axiom that states, If A is greater than B and B is
greater than C, then A is greater than C.
5. Chusmir and Parker (1991) found that male and female managers
reported strikingly similar work values, whereas their personal value rank-
i n g ~showed substantial differences.
6. We take issue in a later section with the concept of "organizational
values." Rules, Sensemaking, Formative
7. Because Armon's (1993) theoretical background is highly unusual
and rooted in moral philosophy, we do not provide complete details on her
theory base and methodology here. We refer interested readers to her origi-
Contexts, and Discourse in the
nal work.
8. The concept of "trust" is problematic at the time of this writing, for Gendering of Organizational Culture
these reasons (see Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).
9. Managerialism is an umbrella term used to refer to a range of man-
agerial techniques that go back decades, most of which have had as their -- Jean C. Helms Mills and Albert T. Mills
goals increased employee satisfaction and productivity, usually through
some form of work redesign or participation schemes. See Enteman (1993)
for an extensive discussion of the ideology of managerialism.

n this chapter we use organizational cul-
re as a heuristic for making sense of the
ndering of organizations (Mills &
ed, 1992).We argue, following the fem-
tion of gender as a cultural phenome-
akley, 1972), that the study of dis-
tory practices at work can benefit
holistic approach that takes into ac-
the interconnections among the vari-
rocesses and practices that character-
'cular entity. TOthis end, we offer an
'onal culture perspective as a useful
k for capturing the all-embracing
er of gender discrimination at work.
propose a rules approach to the study
anizational culture (Mills, 1988a,
1988b; Mills & Murgatroyd, 1991) as a per-
spective suited to the task of uncovering
gendered aspects of organizational realities.
We develop a detailed account of the rules
perspective to show how the approach can be
used to make sense of various aspects of gen-
der discrimination at work. We then discuss
some of the limitations of the rules approach
and review selected theoretical develop-
ments, specifically the work of Unger (1987),
Blaclcler (1992, 1993), and Weick (1995),
that may help to overcome those limitations.
We close the chapter with an outline of the
rules approach in practice and suggest ways
the approach may be applied to the problem
of gender discrimination.

OTE: Our sincere thanks to Mary Jo Hatch, Keith Markus, and Mark Peterson for comments on an
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