Advincula vs.

Teodoro R 82 1 99 phil 413

Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular
administrator of his deceased wife’s estate. After he qualified as administrator, his
brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceased’s
will. Emilio o p p o s e d t h e p r o b a t e o f t h e w i l l o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t
t h e signature was not his wife’s and even if it was, the same was
procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law, Enrique Lacson,
prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu of
Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent,
incapable and unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to
the estate”. The court ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR but
the same was denied so he instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the
lower court’s order.
ISSUE:
WON

the lower court acted with GADLEJ in granting Lacson’s motion

HELD:
Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is
predicated on the fact that Lacson was named executor of the
deceased’s will. This provision, however cannot be enforced until the said
will is admitted to probate. The discovery of a will of the deceased does
not ipso facto
nullify letters of administration already issued or even
authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is “proved and
allowed by the court”. Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the
argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to
thedeceased’s estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argu
ment is untenable because from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a
stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be administrator of the estate
in the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit
to do so. Besides, Emilio as the surviving spouse if a forced heir of the
deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property a part from his share of the other half
thereof as heir of the deceased since “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership

ALFREDO G. BALUYUT
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACIONLOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT,
JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO

G.R. No. L-42088, May 7, 1976

FACTS:Soltero Baluyut died on January 6, 1975 at the age of 86, leaving
anestate valued at not less than Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew
AlfredoBaluyut filed before the CFI of Quezon City a verified petition for the
issuanceof letters of administration in his favor, alleging that Encarnacion
Lopez
Baluyut, Soltero’s widow, was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix
ofthe decedent’s estate. Believing that Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed
that
he be appointed as special administrator in the meantime. The CFI granted
Alfredo’s petition.
Mrs. Baluyut filed an opposition to the appointment. She claimed thatthe
allegation as to her mental incapacity was libelous, and that she wasunaware
that her husband executed a will. Finding that Mrs. Baluyut wasmentall
y qualified, the CFI cancelled Alfredo’s appointment. However, uponfiling of a
motion for reconsideration, Alfredo’s appointment was again
appointed as special administrator, together with Jose Espino, anacknowledged
natural child of Soltero.Mrs. Baluyut again countered, arguing that Jose
effectively rid Alfredo ofany interest in the estate of Soltero by exclusion, he
being a collateral relative.Alfredo naturally opposed, arguing that Jose was not
a natural child of thedecedent, at the same time insisting that Mrs. Baluyut
was incapable ofbecoming an administratrix, as declared by another court in a
separateguardianship proceeding.Based on the testimony of Mrs. Baluyut
herself, the probate courtterminated the appointment of Jose and Alfredo as
administrators and orderedthat the former be appointed as administratrix, due
to her preferential right tobe appointed as such. Letters of administration were
issued in her favor afterposting a Php20,000.00 bond. In appointing Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix,the court proceeded upon the assumption that as a
collateral relative, Alfredohad no interest in the estate of Soltero.Aggrieved,
Alfredo elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a specialcivil action for
certiorari.

SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioner Consolacion and respondent Remedios are the niece and granddaughter, respectively,
of the late Canuto. Canuto and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina and his brother
Victoriano, were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property,
known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA,
CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot
2. On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan[4] (“KASULATAN”). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot
2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized by Notary Public.
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. She later declared the
land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes On 4 February 1988,
REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual in the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for “Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate [of Title] and Damages.” REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINA’s last will and testament.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed
that the basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four
years from the registration of CONSOLACION’s title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19
years later on 4 February 1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is barred by prescription..

RULING:

Yes. The action is already barred by prescription. The four-year prescriptive period relied upon
by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is
to annul a voidable contract under Article 1391 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 1391 begins to run from the time of discovery of the mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek
to annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN as a voidable
contract. In fact, REMEDIOS admits the validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of land under
the KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of 1,335 meters is not
part of the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this excess area
from TCT No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently, REMEDIOS’
action is for “Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages.”[14]
REMEDIOS’ action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the
inclusion of the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In
effect, REMEDIOS asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters
through mistake or fraud and thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive
period is ten years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391. It is now
well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving
rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article
1144.[16] This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party
repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the
land. REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after
CONSOLACION registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968.
Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. As the Court
recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras, [18] — Following Caro, [19] we have
consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten
years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the
date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated
as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his
own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will
of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to

Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s
Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners,
Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or
forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in

Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such,
he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason
or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went
up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the
testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states
the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested
and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In
fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may
be authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the
same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of
the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be
in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall
be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.”