Policarpio v.
Salamat the latter to deliver to said defendant the
FACTS: In a duly probated last will and testament of one
Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership of a
fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz
while its usufruct to the children of her cousins Antonio
Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The
fishpond is situated at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and
Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen, namely:
Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria,
Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio
Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion,
Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez.
On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz, the naked
owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the
fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to
one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them
proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them.
During the term of the lease, however, three of the
usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio
M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so, upon their death,
both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries
claimed the shares corresponding to the deceased
usufructuaries in the amount of P10,714.26. Because of
these conflicting claims, the lessee withheld said
amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving
usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego
de Dios who, after executing the contract of lease, came
to know of the existing conflicting claims, and not
knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee
was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part
of the usufruct of the property. So on November 15,
1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for
interpleader against both the naked owner and surviving
usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate
their conflicting claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense
that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la
Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares
corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries
inasmuch as the usufruct in their favor was automatically
extinguished by death and became merged with the
naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere
to the theory that since the usufructuaries were instituted
simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the
death of the three usufructuaries did not extinguish the
usufruct, hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled
to receive the shares corresponding to the deceased
usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of
the last usufructuary.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision upon the
submission of their respective memoranda considering
that the issue involved was purely legal in nature, and on
March 29, 1963, the trial court rendered decision the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to
the sum of P10,714.25 representing the shares
of the three deceased usufructuaries in the lease
rental due from plaintiff Gil Policarpio, ordering
aforesaid amount; and likewise declaring said
defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to share with
the eleven usufructuaries in the proceeds of the
lease contract executed by them with plaintiff
Batas Riego de Dios, ordering the latter to
deliver to him such amount as would be
equivalent to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their own
costs and expenses of litigation.
The surviving usufructuaries took the present
appeal. 1äwphï1.ñët
ISSUE: Whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of
the fishpond in question are the ones entitled to the fruits
that would have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries
HELD: Yes. Appellants argue that it is the surviving
usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of
the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code
which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor of several
persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be
extinguished until the death of the last survivor." On the
other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct
can endure if constituted in favor of a natural person is
the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is
extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a
contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil
Code). Hence, appellee argues, when the three
usufructuaries died, their usufructuary rights were
extinguished and whatever rights they had to the fruits
reverted to the naked owner.
If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of
the three usufructuaries has the effect of consolidating
their rights with that of the naked owner were correct,
Article 611 of the Civil Code would be superfluous,
because Article 603 already provides that the death of
the usufructuary extinguishes the usufruct unless the
contrary appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause
a partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the
provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that
the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the death of
the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot,
therefore, be entertained.
The well-known Spanish commentators on the
counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above which
implicitly provides that the share of a usufructuary who
dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the
surviving usufructuaries, also uphold the view we here
express.
It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on
the subject are unanimous that there is accretion among
usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time
when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct.
The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a
last will and testament and the testator makes a contrary
provision. Here there is none. On the contrary, the
testatrix constituted the usufruct in favor of the children
of her three cousins with the particular injunction that
they are the only ones to enjoy the same as long as they
live, from which it can be implied that, should any of
them die, the share of the latter shall accrue to the
surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear.
They do not admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The
eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby declared to
be entitled to the shares of the three deceased
usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary, appellees Gil
P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby
ordered to pay to them the money withheld by them
respectively representing the shares of the deceased
usufructuaries. No costs.
Torres v. Lopez
FACTS: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed
his last will and testament, in the second clause of which
he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all
my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator,
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared
incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed
under the care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as
guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the
will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died;
and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25,
1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F.
Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian,
and no such accounts had been presented by him at the
time of his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and
nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and
after having been contested, has been admitted to
probate by judicial determination.
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should
begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect
declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near
relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when
made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final
accounts of the latter have been approved. This
provision is of undoubted application to the situation
before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas
Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any
general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity
due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward
existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining
the right of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that
accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same
inheritance or the same portion thereof without special
designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the
persons so called dies before the testator or renounces
the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the
case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez
and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares. In
addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also
disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been
alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982)
is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand;
and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have
received in conjunction with her father if he had been
alive and qualified to take, but also the half which
pertained to him. There was no error whatever,
therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz
Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that
there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to
the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F.
Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant,
Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of
the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to
article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared,
among other things, that a will may be valid even though
the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our
attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is
declared, among other things, that legal succession
takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon
these provisions an argument is planted conducting to
the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was
valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals
named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and
that as a consequence Margarita Lopez’s entitled to
inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellee clearly has the
better right
HELD: Yes. We are the opinion that this contention is
untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better
right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty
of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as
possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict
between two provisions the more general is to be
considered as being limited by the more specific. As
between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the
former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does,
with the general topic of intestate succession while the
latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions
under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict,
therefore, the provisions of the former article must be
considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3
of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by
the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It
is true that the same express qualification is not found in
subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood,
in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by
which the more specific is held to control the general.
Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible
means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to
this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent
proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can
only occur when accretion is impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact
that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate
succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified
to succeed (incapaz de suceder), while, under the last
provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs
when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is
disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de
recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity
to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended
that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to
bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. We are
of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon
so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code,
and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez
was subject was not a general disability to succeed but
an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a
consideration which makes a case for accretion rather
than for intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have
expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the
conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to
portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or
disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of
the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being
limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by
provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession
(Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 4th ed.,
vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp.
372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says
Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs
or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the
making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or
legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition be
not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise
incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)

In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has

always existed both in the civil and in the common law a
certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild
presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as
is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption
against it, — a presumption which has its basis in the
supposed intention of the testator.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will

wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and
only executor. It was also provided therein that he was
married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

Petitioner Sofia filed for the probate of the will but the
legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will
was procured through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage with the
petitioner.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the

testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the
will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of
the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art.
739 and 1028.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic

validity of a will

HELD: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that

the court's area of inquiry is limited to the examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This
general rule is however not inflexible and absolute.
Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will
itself admitted on its face the relationship between the
testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but

the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to
remand the nullified provision in a separate action for
that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court
does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a

donation made between persons guilty of
adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under
Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.