Ethic-s, Rel~tivilinz,dnd the Self

10.Kant alsc-Irnadc it clear that his reasoning was ncst merely circular or analytic;
he provided a "transcendental, synthetic'>prof that sfiouid persuade us that reason
does not entail freedom, and that both are necessary for morality to be possible.
11. Since this Tmth is indeterminate, vatid confrontations between Western ethical
theories will continue to tegitirnatety criticize rival theories only on the grounds of
togical consistency, practical applicability, intuitive andior conceptual plausibihty,
and the like, There is just no way to finally resofve PEX, for it ultimatety depends on
the first principle tliat is validated by onc's moral intuitions,
12. After Descartes, vixzually every branch of philosophy adopted an abstract con-
cept of self; ethics was not atone in doing so,
13,James Rachels claims that such an "impanial" point of view is fundamental to
any good ethicat theory, Calling it the "impartiality requirement" of moral reason, he
states that "almost every imponant theory of morality irictudes the idea of impanial-
ity, The basic idea is that each individual's interests are equally important: from within
the rnorat point of vie- ti-tcrc are no "rivileged"ersons; every life has equal value."
(See The Elements of iVoral Philoscaphj~,2nd ed, [New York: McGraw-Hill, 19931, p.
12.) 1 agree with Rachels, but 1 would qualigy liis statement by saying that it applies
specificatfy to Western ethics after l2escartes.
14, The rnoralty agnostic view will seern the rnost reasonable, however, to tlie per-
son whose inntitions arc not swayed strongly enough, one way or the other.
15. The paradox is resolved because indeterminacy of Moral Truth does not make it
false but only unprovable,
16. The same point can be made to explain why the "paradox of ethics" is a paradox
and not a contradiction,
17, This is not to say that we in the West are unable to vatue what Confucius was
t q i n g to say, Xn "The Tmth in Relativism" (in RehttvGnz: Cogaitive dnd Mordl, ed.
Michael Krausz and Jack Meiland), Wiliiiarns mentions a problem that he terms "in-
coinmensurable exclusivity," a kind of "limiting case" of exclusivity between conflict-
ing ethical systems. In tliis case, S1 and S2 do ncse just produce different conclusiotis to
the same question; their consequences arc incomparable. Hence a holder of S1 is theo-
retically precluded from "going over" to S2 in any sensible fashion, and vice versa.
Presumably; the difference between ethical systems would be so extreme that one
could not even begin to identify with the values, conscquenccs, and so on rcfiectcd in
the other system, There would still have to be a "locus of incornmensurabi1ity" in
order far one to identify that C1 and 6 2 are indeed incomparable. And the questicsn
remains as to whether such incommensurabilily is possible, since it seems to depend
on a kind of cognitive relativism that moral relativism simpliciter does not entail. Iln-
portant for our purposes, however, is the fact that, even though Conhci-trs offered a
very difffcrent kind of ethic, we can identify with what he said and can value it pre-
cisely for offering a diflcrenr way of thinking about human interaction, In essence,
then, we are not "going over" to Confucian ethics so much as "bringing it over" to
our own way of thinking, WCare thcrcfore enriching Western ethics by appreciating-
and perhaps even applying-, different (but not irrcornme~~surable) ethical system.
18, There arc other morally relevant concepts that could be discussed in connection
with Confucian philosophy-for example, te, o r "moral" power, and yz, a r appropri-
ate conduct. For the purposes of this chapter, however, li and jerz are sufficient to