Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 15



FACTS: In 1955, Sheryl Oabel began working with Maranaw Hotels in one of the latter’s hotel branches.
In 1996, Maranaw Hotels contracted the services of Manila Resource Development Corporation
(MANRED), a manpower service provider. Maranaw Hotels transferred Oabel to MANRED. Oable later
filed a petition for regularization against MANRED and MANRED thereafter dismissed her. Oabel filed a
labor case against Maranaw Hotels, MANRED intervened deporting itself as the real employer of Oabel.
She lost in the labor arbiter but the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. Maranaw Hotels appealed
before the Court of Appeals but the latter court dismissed the petition because apparently Maranaw
Hotels failed to append the board resolution authorizing their counsel to file said petition before the
Court of Appeals. Maranaw Hotels filed a Motion for Reconsideration with an appended Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping and board resolution but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition filed by Maranaw Hotels should prosper.

HELD: No. There is no substantial compliance in this case. The filing of a subsequent MFR appended by
the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and the board resolution did not cure the defect. It negates the
very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the
pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties as the one
before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.

A lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.
Specific authorization could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors
that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make his
actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.

22. Vda de Melencio vs. CA

FACTS: The subject property is a 30,351 square meter parcel of land particularly denominated as Lot No.
3368, located at Suba-babas, Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, and part of total area of 30,777 square
meters covered by TCT No. 20626 in in the name of the late petitioner Go Kim Chuan. The entire
property was originally owned by Esteban Bonghanoy who had only one child, Juana Bonghanoy-
Amodia, mother of the late Leoncia Modia and petitioner Amodias. The entire property was brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. However, the title thereto was lost during the Second World

On July 10, 1964, the Amodias allegedly executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale whereby they extra-judicially settled the estate of Esteban Bonghanoy and conveyed the
subject property to respondent Aznar Brothers Realty Company for a consideration of P10,200.00. On
August 10, 1964, the said Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered under Act 3344 as there was no title on file at the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City.
Thereafter, AZNAR made some improvements and constructed a beach house thereon.
On February 18 1989, petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale,
conveying the subject property in favor of Go Kim Chuan for and in consideration of P70,000.00. Aznar
then filed a case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation
of TCT No. 20626 alleging that the sale to Go Kim CHuan was an invalid second sale.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid certification and verification by only one of the plaintiffs.

HELD: Yes, the Court reiterated the ruling in the case of Iglesia Ni Cristo, 505 SCRA 828, that
Commonality of interest is material and crucial to relaxation of the Rules. The Rules may be reasonably
and liberally construed to avoid a patent denial of substantial justice, because it cannot be denied, that
the ends of justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits - after all parties are
given full opportunity to ventile their causes and defenses - rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections.

The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The general
rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of
them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum
shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions merely underscored its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.

23. Sheker vs. Estate of Alice

FACTS: Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a
holographic will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court
issued an order for all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan
Joseph Sheker filed a contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of
his commission as an agent for selling some properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements
for expenses he incurred.

Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging among others that the money claim filed
by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only
for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated
NOT by Alan Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice
Sheker’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated
to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditor’s motion for claims which is to be recognized
and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion,
its office is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the
progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is
confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to
the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.

24. Five Star Bus Company vs. CA

FACTS: One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned by Five
Star Bus Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil action for
damages against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years by reason of
the bus company’s lawyer’s repeated request to reset the hearing of the case. Until the trial court issued
an order which considered the case submitted for resolution. The bus company’s lawyer filed for a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The bus company’s lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the latter
court summarily dismissed the petition because said petition’s affidavit of non-forum shopping was not
signed by the plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was signed by the lawyer. The lawyer
explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was in a haste to submit the petition at the
earliest possible time in order to protect his client’s interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.

HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-forum
shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91 has its
roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum shopping has
been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts
and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration
of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is substantial
compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?

It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In
the case at bar however, the reasons provided by Five Star’s lawyer are flimsy and frail. Further, the case
has been dragging on for years and such delay is mostly attributed to Five Star’s lawyer.
25. Docena vs. Lopesura

FACTS: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of
the land based on the occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders
and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that
the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and
that the certification of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition questioning the writ of
demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery brought against the spouses and is clearly
intended for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of
Samar whereas the petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum
shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the certification in his behalf and that of his wife is
too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a
case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife
and their residence is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code,
the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an
act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

56. Biaco vs. PCRB

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the
respondent bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage
in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of
the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent
bank through counsel sent him a written demand,however, proved futile. Respondent bank filed a
complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and
Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the spouses. Petitioner
sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others, that the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any
explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision invoking that
judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of

HELD: No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1)
by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law;
or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB
undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an
action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient
that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

57. E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd vs. Benito

FACTS: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch
offices at Parañaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent
executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain
parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the
construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any
dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private respondent, as
plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before
the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few
unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with
the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated address at
Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon
defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa
Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy
of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service
of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in
its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14
RoC upon whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order
denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not
liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and
that the new provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general
manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director.
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.

HELD: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and
exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues
that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Under the new Rules, service of summons upon
an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general
manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer"
instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

58. Litton Mills, Inc. vs. CA

59. Signetics Corp. vs. CA

FACTS: Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics
Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over a
piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages,
accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the transfer of title
and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on the leased land, before
the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease
contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to withdraw
these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. Service of summons was made on
Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US
PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Piñas, Metro
Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM) Pacific Corporation,
Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics
through TEAM Pacific Corporation. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court and the rule laid
down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v. Del Rosario and Pelington to the effect that the fact of doing
business in the Philippines should first be established in order that summons could be validly made and
jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the
complaint as an activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which
the petitioner insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign
corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the
HELD: YES. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and
correctness of the allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in
order to hasten a peremptory escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be
served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its "resident agent designated in
accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section 14, refers to its general
meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. The allegations in the complaint have thus been
able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the
Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself. The rule is that,
a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts
for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in Philippine courts for acts done against
a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that,
in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a
matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not
exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice) for effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in
rem or in personam.

60. Jose vs. Boyon

FACTS: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents to compel them to
facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a
summons to respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed. Meanwhile,
petitioners filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication
and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were declared in default and as a
consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence ex parte.
Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution
issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of
the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion
on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the
respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration and
the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution of the controverted judgment which the
judge granted. Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that the
trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

HELD: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where the action is in personam
and the defendant is in the Philippines. However, extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing
itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation
or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an
action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has
consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam. Hence, summons
by publication cannot be validly served.

96. Alpine Lending Investors vs. Corpuz

FACTS: A complaint for replevin was filed by respondent against Alpine Lending Investors (Alpine) and
Zenaida Lipata. The complaint alleges that Zenaida was respondents’ former neighbor who pretended to
help respondent in securing a Garage Franchise from the Land Transportation Office (LTO). Zenaida then
used respondents registration papers and mortgaged the vehicle to Alpine. Thereafter, Zenaida
disappeared with the vehicle. The LTO showed respondent the Chattel Mortgage Contract bearing her
forged signature. Forthwith, respondent informed Alpine about the spurious mortgage and demanded
the release of her vehicle. Alpine promised to comply with her request on condition that Zenaida should
first be charged criminally. Respondent then caused the filing with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City complaints for falsification of private document and estafa against Zenaida. Alpine when
informed, still refused to turn over the vehicle to her. Instead of filing an answer to respondents
complaint, Alpine submitted to the RTC a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is not a juridical
person, hence, not a proper party in the case. The RTC denied Alpines motion to dismiss. RTC denied
Alpine’s MR and then directed respondent to file her amended complaint within ten (10) days. However,
respondent filed her Amended Complaint with an accompanying Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
two (2) days late. RTC admitted the amended complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Expunge respondents
motion to admit amended complaint on the ground that the latter motion was not accompanied by a
notice of hearing. RTC denied Alpine’s motion to expunge for lack of merit. Alpine moved for a
reconsideration, but this was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting respondent’s amended complaint.

HELD: The trial court was correct in admitting respondent’s amended complaint.
As earlier mentioned, what petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to dismiss, not
an answer. Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of
Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in
Civil Case No. C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Court’s ruling in Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring
Co., considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the
trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words,
the trial courts duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should
not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint. It has always been the policy of this Court to
be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings in order that the real controversies between or among
the parties may be presented and cases be decided on the merits without delay.

97. de Dios vs. Bristol Laboratories

98. Fortune Motors vs. CA

FACTS: In 1981, Joseph Chua and Edgar Rodrigueza executed separate surety agreements in favor of
Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation to cover obligations incurred by Fortune Motors whether they be
enforced or thereafter made (from the time of said surety contracts). In 1982, Fortune Motors secured
cars from Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO) via trust receipts and drafts made by
CARCO. These were assigned to Filinvest Credit Corporation. Later Filinvest, when the obligation
matured, demanded payment from Fortune Motor as well as from Chua and Rodrigueza. No payment
was made. A case was filed. Rodrigueza averred that the surety agreement was void because when it
was signed in 1981, the principal obligation (1982) did not yet exist.

ISSUE: Whether or not the surety agreement is void.

HELD: No. Future obligations can be covered by a surety. Comprehensive or continuing surety
agreements are in fact quite commonplace in present day financial and commercial practice. A bank or
financing company which anticipates entering into a series of credit transactions with a particular
company, commonly requires the projected principal debtor to execute a continuing surety agreement
along with its sureties. By executing such an agreement, the principal places itself in a position to enter
into the projected series of transactions with its creditor; with such suretyship agreement, there would
be no need to execute a separate surety contract or bond for each financing or credit accommodation
extended to the principal debtor.

99. United Overseas Bank vs. Rosemoore Mining

FACTS: Rosemoore Mining & Development Corporation (Hereon Rosemoor) in order to secure a credit
facility amounting to 80Million executed a mortgage agreement with United Overseas Bank Phils.
(Hereon Bank) which covered six (6) parcels of land all registered under Rosemoor. Rosemoor defaulted
which caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. The bank was the highest bidder in all of
the properties. Hence the filing of the case by Rosemoor before the Manila RTC and Malolos RTC. (The
issue of the case, filing of 2 actions in 2 different courts).

Manila RTC: (Personal Action) Rosemoor filed an action to receive the remaining proceeds of the loan.
However, the bank filed a motion to dismiss the case because it contends Rosemoor is violating forum
shopping, having initiated a case in Malolos RTC. However the motion to dismiss was denied, likewise it
was dismissed by the CA holding that there was no forum shopping.
Malolos RTC: (Real Action) Rosemoor second action was filed her to restrain the foreclosure of the
properties mortgaged to secure the loan which was not due yet. As it here, the bank filed a motion to
dismiss the case due to violation of forum shopping but the likewise it was denied by the RTC and CA.

Issue: Whether the venue of the filing of the cases resulted to forum shopping.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rosemoor, and affirming the ruling of the lower courts that
there was no violation of forum shopping. The Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the
Bank from proceeding with the consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties
because the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. While the right
asserted in the Manila case is to receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is
to restrain the foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due. Moreover,
the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action affecting the title
of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or part thereof lies. The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action
involving as it does the enforcement of a contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City,
and the Bank, whose principal office is in Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff resides, or where the defendants or any of the
principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. It was subsequent to the filing of the Manila
case that Rosemoor and Dr. Pascual saw the need to secure a writ of injunction because the
consolidation of the titles to the mortgaged properties in favor of the Bank was in the offing. But then,
this action can only be commenced where the properties or a portion thereof, is located. Otherwise, the
petition for injunction would be dismissed for improper venue. Rosemoor, therefore, was warranted in
filing the Malolos case and cannot in turn be accused of forum-shopping.

100. Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. vs. CA

FACTS: Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a
Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The
Dealership Agreement contained a stipulation that “All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed
within the proper Courts of Quezon City”. Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of
Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and Metrobank for damages and breach of contracts, and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. Kubota filed two motions One for the dismissal
of the case on the ground of improper venue .The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing
its counsel was not available. The court issued an order allowing the issuance of preliminary injunction
and a motion denying the motion to dismiss on the reason that Umimasters’ place of business is in
Tacloban City while Kubota’s principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accord with the the Rules of
Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff.
Hence,the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota appealed both orders on the grounds they
were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the
CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid. The Court of Appeals
decided in favor of Kubota and it held that: “the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership
Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and
exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City.” Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for
reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulations in a contract has the effect of limiting the venue to a specified

HELD: No. The Polytrade doctrine was applied in the case at bar. This doctrine enunciated that as long as
the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to indicate that the agreed place alone
and none other is the venue of the action, the parties do not lose the option of choosing the venue.

136. Del Bros vs. CA

137. D.C. Crystal vs. Laya

138. Marcopper Mining vs. Garcia

139. Banez Electric Light vs. Abra Electric

140. Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank

FACTS: Samuel Mathay, et.al. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc. (CMI).Petitioners
filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. Petitioners alleged that in
violation of the Board resolution, the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the defendant
Bank in excess of what they were lawfully entitled, hence depriving the petitioners of their right to
subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities established under their respective "Pre-
Incorporation Agreements to Subscribe" to the capital stock and that the Articles of Incorporation were
fraudulently amended by the defendants. The complaint was dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground
that the class suit could not be maintained because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that
the plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the ruling, hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant action is a class suit.

HELD: The action at bar is not a class suit.

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are accordingly: (1) that the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and (2) that such persons be
so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the court. The statute requires that the
complaint should allege the existence of the necessary facts, the existence of a class and the number of
members in the said class so as to enable the court to determine whether the members of the said class
are so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all to court. The complaint in the instant case
failed to state the number of said CMI subscribing stockholders that the trial court could not infer nor
make sure that the parties are indeed so numerous that they cannot practically appear in court and that
the plaintiffs are representative of the other stockholders. The statute also requires that the subject-
matter of the controversy be of common interest to numerous persons. In the instant case, the interest
that appellants, plaintiffs and intervenors, and the CMI stockholders had in the subject matter of this
suit was several, not common or general in the sense required by the statute. Each one of the appellants
and the CMI stockholders had determinable interest; each one had a right, if any, only to his respective
portion of the stocks. No one of them had any right to, or any interest in, the stock to which another was

176. Bitanga vs.Pyramid Construction Engineering

FACTS: Pyramid filed with the RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages with application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the petitioner and wife Marilyn. Respondent
alleged in its Complaint that, it entered into an agreement with Macrogen Realty, of which Bitanga is the
President, to construct for the latter the Shoppers Gold Building located in Parañaque City. Respondent
commenced civil, structural, and architectural works on the construction project. However, Macrogen
failed to settle respondent’s progress billings. Petitioner, through his representatives and agents,
assured respondent that the outstanding account of Macrogen would be paid and relying on the
assurances made by petitioner, respondent continued the construction project. Later, respondent
suspended work on the construction project since the conditions that it imposed for the continuation
thereof, including payment of unsettled accounts, had not been complied with by Macrogen.
Respondent instituted with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a case for
arbitration against Macrogen Realty seeking payment by the latter of its unpaid billings and project
costs. Before the arbitration case could be set for trial, Pyramid and Macrogen entered into a
Compromise Agreement, with petitioner acting as signatory for and in behalf of Macrogen Realty. Under
the Compromise Agreement, Macrogen Realty agreed to pay respondent the total amount of
P6,000,000.00 by installments. Petitioner guaranteed the obligations of Macrogen Realty under the
Compromise Agreement by executing a Contract of Guaranty in favor of respondent, by virtue of which
he irrevocably and unconditionally guaranteed the full and complete payment of the principal amount
of liability of Macrogen. Upon joint motion of respondent and Macrogen Realty, the CIAC approved the
Compromise Agreement. Macrogen Realty failed and refused to pay all the monthly installments agreed
upon in the Compromise Agreement. Hence respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against Macrogen, which CIAC granted. The sheriff filed a return stating that he was unable to locate any
property of Macrogen Realty, except its bank deposit of P20,242.33, with the Planters Bank, Buendia
Branch. Respondent then made, a written demand on petitioner, as guarantor of Macrogen to pay the
liability or to point out available properties of the Macrogen within the Philippines sufficient to cover the
obligation guaranteed. It also made verbal demands on petitioner. Yet, respondent’s demands were left
unheeded. Petitioner filed with the RTC his Answer to respondent’s Complaint. As a special and
affirmative defense, petitioner argued that the benefit of excussion was still available to him as a
guarantor since he had set it up prior to any judgment against him. According to petitioner, respondent
failed to exhaust all legal remedies to collect from Macrogen the amount due under the Compromise
Agreement, considering that Macrogen Realty still had uncollected credits which were more than
enough to pay for the same. Given these premise, petitioner could not be held liable as guarantor.

ISSUE: WON petitioner cam avail of the benefit of excussion

HELD: No. Under a contract of guarantee, the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. The guarantor who pays for a
debtor, in turn, must be indemnified by the latter. However, the guarantor cannot be compelled to pay
the creditor unless the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor and resorted to all the legal
remedies against the debtor. This is what is otherwise known as the benefit of excussion.

Art. 2060. In order that the guarantor may make use of the benefit of excussion, he must set it up against
the creditor upon the latter’s demand for payment from him, and point out to the creditor available
property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt.

It must be stressed that despite having been served a demand letter at his office, petitioner still failed to
point out to the respondent properties of Macrogen Realty sufficient to cover its debt as required under
Article 2060 of the Civil Code. Such failure on petitioner’s part forecloses his right to set up the defense
of excussion.

177. Ontimare vs. Elep


178. Pineda vs. Heirs of Guevara

FACTS: The Guevara Heirs filed an action for the nullification of the certificates of title of a parcel of land
in Marikina. Defendants were the estate of the late Pedro Gonzales, Virginia Perez, Crisanta Perez,Jose
Perez, Roy Guadalupe, Lino Bucad and Florentino Pineda. According to the Guevara heirs, the
defendants illegally claimed ownership and possession over a certain portion of the property. Defendant
Pineda filed an answer with counterclaim, raising the defenses of lack of cause of action, prescription,
laches and estoppel. He averred that he was a buyer in good faith and had been in actual possession of
the land since 1970 initially as a lessor and subsequently as an owner. Defendants Virginia, Crisanta, and
Jose, all surnamed Perez, filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim and averred that their father,
Marcos Perez, purchased the property from the late Pedro Gonzales and had it declared in Perez’s name
for taxation purposes. The rest of the defendants, including the estate of Pedro Gonzales, also filed an
answerwith counterclaim, raising the same defenses of laches and prescription and res judicata. The late
Pedro Gonzales allegedly bought the property from the Municipality of Marikinain a public bidding on 25
April 1966 and had allowed defendants to occupy the property.They asserted that the Guevara heirs
never actually occupied the property. On 4 December 1995, the RTC set the case for hearing as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed. During the hearing, the parties presented oral arguments and were
directed to file their memoranda. After submission of memoranda, the RTC issued an Order dated 7 May
1996, dismissing the action on the ground of laches. The Guevara heirs appealed the order of dismissal,
claiming the denial of their right to due process. CA set aside the RTC’s decision reinstating the action.
The appellate court ruled that a complaint cannot be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court based on laches since laches is not one of the grounds enumerated under said provision. Although
the RTC order of dismissal did not rule on the other affirmative defenses raised by petitioners in the
answer, such as lack of causeof action, prescription and res judicata, the Court of Appeals discussed
them and ruled that none of these affirmative defenses raised were present to warrant the dismissal of
the action.

ISSUES: (I) Whether or not the appeal of the heirs of Guevara was improperly elevated to the Court of
Appeals since, according to them, it raised a pure question of law; and
(II) Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the action on the ground of laches without
conducting trial on the merits.

RULING: On the first issue, Petitioner Pineda had ample opportunity to raise before the Court of Appeals
the objection on the improper mode of appeal taken by the heirs ofGuevara. This, he failed to do. The
issue of improper appeal was raised only in Pineda’smotion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
Decision. Hence, this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this issue. For an issue
cannot be raised forthe first time on appeal.
On the second issue, in reversing the RTC’s order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals held that "laches
could not be a ground to dismiss the complaint as it is not enumerated under Rule 16, Section 1." This is
not entirely correct.

Under paragraph (h) thereof, where a claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, the same may be raised in a motion to dismiss.

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred. Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual
determination by the trial court.

179. Manufacturers Hanover Trust vs. Guerrero

FACTS: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against Hanover and/or Chemical Bank
(Bank) with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of damages for:
a.Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank
b.A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification problems
c.Unauthorized conversion of his account
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law, and such law
does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (PSJ), contending that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages
only. The “Walden Affidavit” was presented by the Bank to support its Motion for PSJ. The RTC and CA
denied the Bank’s Motion for PSJ, stating that the Walden Affidavit does not serve as proof of the New
York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its Motion.

ISSUE: Whether the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied
upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ.

HELD: NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The SC denied the
Bank’s petition for lack of merit. The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public
documents defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and 24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be followed in
proving foreign law.

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.

180. Evadel and Development vs. Soriano

FACTS: Respondent-spouses as sellers, entered into a “Contract to Sell” with petitioner as buyer over a
parcel of land which is part of a huge tract of land known as the Imus Estate. Upon payment of the first
installment, the petitioners introduced improvements thereon and fenced off the property with
concrete walls. Thereafter, the respondents discovered that the area fenced off by the petitioners
exceeded the area subject of the contract by 2,450 square meters. A complaint for accion
reinvindicatoria was filed by respondents against petitioner. The trial court, by way of a summary
judgment, ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue regarding petitioner’s good faith or bad faith as a builder should have
been peremptorily disposed of by the trial court.

HELD: The petitioner admitted in its Amended Answer that the lot in dispute is covered by the TCT of
respondents. With this admission, petitioner can no longer claim that it was a builder in good faith.
Moreover petitioner, as a real estate developer is presumed to be experienced in business and ought to
have sufficient technical expertise to correctly determine the metes and bounds of the land it acquires.