CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 1
Republic of the Philippines The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution above
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 22041 September 11, 1924
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and
injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District.
The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the
Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier,
Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez,
Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de
Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez,
Sergio Osmeña, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose
A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo
Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago
Lucero, all members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar,
Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante,
Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco
Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate
composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5, 1924,
depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the
first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as follows:
Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,
Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de
Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of
the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.
Alejandrino;
Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino
be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his prerogatives,
privileges and emoluments as such Senator during one
year from the first of January, nineteen hundred and
twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose
Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this
resolution be furnished said Governor-General for his
information.
quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for five
reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction
against the respondents enjoining them from executing the
resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate
null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to
issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the
respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the
petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all
of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting
them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of
his office, and from carrying the order of suspension, into effect.
By special appearance, the Attorney-General, in representation
of the respondents, has objected to the jurisdiction of the court,
and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not subsequently
embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that looking through
the form of the action to the substance, this is, in effect, a suit
instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the
Philippine Senate and certain of its official employees. May the
Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands by mandamus and
injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and
compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official
position? Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the
other interesting questions which have been raised and argued,
we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to
students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that
under our system of government, each of the three departments
is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another
department. The power to control is the power to abrogate and
the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department
may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to
enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper
constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended.
The courts must determine the validity of legislative enactments
as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised
to find the general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not
lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch,
for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there
where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the
courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was
right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
(Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R. C. L., 186, 187;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190; French vs.Senate
[1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett [1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex
parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698; State vs.Bolte [1889], 151
Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of Delegates [1904], 5 Porto
Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17
Colo., 156; State ex rel. Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R.

A., 582; People ex rel. Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229;
People ex rel. Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex
rel. La Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood
[1924], 45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced
are numerous and instructive. They are found among the
decisions of our own court, of the United States Supreme Court,
and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate to the
chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only necessary
to explain that the same rules which govern the relations of the
court to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the
courts to the legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject is Severino
vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original application
made in this court praying for a writ of mandamus to the
Governor-General to compel him to call a special election as
provided by law. The Attorney-General demurred to the petition
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the court, after an
elaborate discussion, reached the conclusion that "we have no
jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these
Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the
performance of any of his official acts." The demurrer was
accordingly sustained and the complaint dismissed. It is noted
that in this decision reliance was placed on the cases of
Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord ([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and
Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29 Mich., 320), which we will
now proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United States,
Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from
executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase
delivering the opinion of the court said the single point which
required consideration was this: Can the President be restrained
by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged
to be unconstitutional? He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the
Government; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by
the Judicial Department; though the acts of both, when
performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly
seen upon consideration of its possible consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for
allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is
needless to observe that the court is without power to
enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President
complies with the order of the court and refuses to
execute the Acts of Congress, is it not clear that a
collision may occur between the Executive and
Legislative Departments of the Government? May not
the House of Representatives impeach the President
for such refusal? And in that case could this court
interfere in behalf of the President, thus endangered by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 2
compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction
the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court
of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be
offered to the public wonder of an attempt by this court
to arrest proceedings in that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction
of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be
received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer
that, if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew
Johnson, as President, it may be granted against
Andrew Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is
plain that relief as against the execution of an Act of
Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its
execution by the President. . . .
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the
legal fraternity on account of being written by Judge Cooley,
related to an application for mandamus to the Governor to
compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute.
Judge Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been
carefully apportioned between three distinct
departments, which emanate alike from the people,
have their powers alike limited and defined by the
constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in
all respects independently of the others, and that what
are called the checks and balances of government
constitute each a restraint upon the rest. . . . But in each
of these cases the action of the department which
controls, modifies, or in any manner influences that of
another, is had strictly within its own sphere, and for
that reason gives no occasion for conflict, controversy
or jealousy. The Legislature in prescribing rules for the
courts, is acting within its proper province in making
laws, while the courts, in declining to enforce an
unconstitutional law, are in like manner acting within
their proper province, because they are only applying
that which is law to the controversies in which they are
called upon to give judgment. It is mainly by means of
these checks and balances that the officers of the
several departments are kept within their jurisdiction,
and if they are disregarded in any case, and power is
usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment,
and not by another department of the government
attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a superior
authority over that which by the constitution is its equal.

It has long been a maxim in this country that the
Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such
judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
Legislature could in like manner override executive
action also, the government would become only a
despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it
would be readily cancelled that no court can compel
the Legislature to make or to refrain from making laws,
or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any
action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made
ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these
cases the exemption of the one department from the
control of the other is not only implied in the framework
of government, but is indispensably necessary if any
useful apportionment of power is to exist.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the
relators that any other course than that which leaves
the head of the executive department to act
independently in the discharge of his duties might
possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to something
worse, should the courts undertake to enforce their
mandates and the executive refuse to obey. . . . And
while we should concede, if jurisdiction was plainly
vested in us, the inability to enforce our judgment
would be no sufficient reason for failing to pronounce
it, especially against an officer who would be presumed
ready and anxious in all cases to render obedience to
the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction is involved in
doubt it is not consistent with the dignity of the court to
pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with
impunity, nor with that of the executive to place him in
position where, in a matter within his own province, he
must act contrary to his judgment, or strand convicted
of a disregard of the laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns
specifically the right of the judiciary to control by mandamus the
action of the legislature. French vs. Senate of the State of
California, supra, was an original proceeding
in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected
senators of the state to compel the Senate of California to admit
them as members thereof. It was alleged that the petitioners had
been expelled without hearing or opportunity for defense. The
writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the opinion of the
court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest
force in favor of the pleader, they do not make a case
justifying the interposition of this court. Under our form
of government the judicial department has no power to
revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of their house thereof, taken
in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority,
State vs. Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 3
Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of
opinion by the United States Supreme Court. The record
discloses that it was the firm opinion of the late Chief Justice that
the court should not assume jurisdiction of the proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to state
that the principles laid down in some of the preceding authorities
have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said that the
fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the three
departments of the government are independent of each other.
"They are independent in so far as they proceed within their
legitimate province and perform the duties that the law requires;
yet it has never been held that the executive was the sole judge
of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the manner in which
duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in cases of dispute is
the judiciary, and to this extent at least the executive department
may be said to be dependent upon and subordinate to the
judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person to whom the writ
of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done,
by which the propriety of issuing a mandamus is to be
determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp. 926-927.) But these
were arguments which should have been presented years ago
in this court, and which when recently presented by counsel in
his argument for the petitioner in the case of Perfecto vs. Wood,
R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no favorable response from the
court. It is now too late to go back and revise previous decisions
and overturn them; in fact this would be not only impracticable
but impossible since at least two decision of the United States
Supreme Court seem to us to be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever hold
that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the
Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular action. If a
court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on the domain of
either of the other departments, it will be the end of popular
government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with
reference to the right of the Supreme Court to
issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we
would be justified in having our mandate run not against the
Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine
Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the
sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But
this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the
Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of
subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate.
The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the
Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act
independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as
requested, we might have the spectable presented of the court
ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing
officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the
Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The writ
of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears
that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to
execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich., 314;
Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing
difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that
does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of
policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a

power which it is its duty to exercise. But
certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it
will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be
awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should not
be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to
follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might
possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be
disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by
a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest
court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch of
a coordinate department, or between the Court and the Chief
Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The
Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to
represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine Legislature.
These senators and representatives "hold office until removed
by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs. 16, 17.) They
may not be removed by the Philippine Legislature. However, to
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is
granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an
elective member." (Organic Act, sec. 18.) Either House may thus
punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither
House may expel an appointive member for any reason. As to
whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the power to
"punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature
by the Constitution, or in the power to "remove," a power granted
to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear
that neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has
purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and
the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive
member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not
in all its long history suspended a member. And the reason is
obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the
outraged dignity of the House without depriving the constituency
of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise
vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the
constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy.
By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant is
silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified
expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the
Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than
that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which
conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in
the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs.
Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular
consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief
Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was
there announced is equally applicable to the instant
proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a correct
decision, it is inserted so that the vital question argued with so
much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so that there
may be at least an indication of the attitude of the court as a
restraining force, with respect to the checks and balances of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 4
government. The Supreme Court, out of respect for the Upper
House of a coordinate branch of the government, takes no
affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire system
suggests the thought that no action should be taken elsewhere
which would constitute, or even seem to constitute, disregard for
the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to
suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more,
yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason
that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion
to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be
said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy,
the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom
and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to
assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a querulous
censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of
legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have
grievances against the Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch
thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly
lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must
be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended
to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed without costs.
Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.
Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEÑA, J., concurring:
I agree with the dispositive part and the grounds and
considerations set forth in the decision about the want of
jurisdiction of this court to review the proceeding of the Senate.
But this court having no jurisdiction, the insinuation contained in
the decision that proceeding of the Senate was illegal seems to
me unnecessary and improper.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
Among the important questions presented by the petition and
demurrer in the present case, three may be mentioned:
First. Is the resolution in question legal or illegal?
Second. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction even to consider its
legality?
Third. Can the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
FIRST. Legality of the resolution

The Supreme Court is unanimous in its opinion that the
resolution, by which Jose Alejandrino was deprived of "all his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year" as an appointed senator, is an expulsion or removal of him
as such senator and therefore illegal and ultra vires for the
reason that the power of expulsion or removal of an appointed
senator is vested exclusively in the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. (Section 17 of the Jones Law — Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 — Public Laws, vol. 12 p. 243.)
By reason of the unanimous opinion upon that question, it
becomes unnecessary further to discuss it except to give the
particular reasons which induced my opinion. Said section 17
provides that: "Senators and representatives appointed by the
Governor-General shall hold office until removed by the
Governor-General." Section 18 provides, among other things,
that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member."
The petitioner is an appointive member of the Senate.
It will be noted from the two quotations just given, that the power
to expel a member of either branch of the Legislature, by the
Legislature, is limited to "elective members," while the power "to
punish members for disorderly behavior" applies to all members
whether elective or appointive. In view of the fact that neither
branch of the Legislature can expel an appointive member, can
either branch deprive such a member of all his "prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" under the
power "to punish for disorderly behavior"? It will be noted that
the law contains no definition of the "punishment" which may be
imposed for disorderly behavior. Considering, however, that
neither branch has the right to expel an appointive member,
certainly no one will contend that the punishment imposed for
disorderly behavior may amount to an expulsion. If the
punishment amounts to an expulsion then certainly the
Legislature has exceeded its authority and has encroached
upon the power of the executive, for the reason that the power
to expel belongs to the Governor-General.
We have, then, the question squarely presented, whether or not
a resolution of the Senate of the Philippine Islands which
deprives an appointed senator of all his "prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year" amounts
to an expulsion. If it does, then the resolution is illegal, null, and
void, and beyond the powers of the legislative department of the
Government and an unwarranted exercise of the powers which
belong to the Governor-General.
The said resolution not only deprives the petitioner of all his
"prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year" but also deprives the people of his district, composed of
about one million persons, of any representation or participation
in the legislative, affairs of the government for a period of one
year, — a right which is guaranteed to them under the
constitution. Such a result was certainly not contemplated by the
provisions of the Jones Law. Certainly the framers of the
constitution of the Philippine Islands never dreamed that when
the Legislature of the Philippine Islands was given the power to
"punish" its members for misbehavior, that such a power would
ever be used as a guise for "expelling" an appointive member.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 5
The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a
disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is
removed either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature,
a vacancy exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the
right to appoint, and the people of the district the right to fill the
vacancy by election, so that the people may again, under either
case, be represented. A "suspension" of a member, however,
does not create a vacancy, and the people of the district are
without a representative and the Governor-General cannot
appoint one and the people cannot elect one during the period
of suspension. They are without representation during that
period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed without
representation. If a member, under the power to punish, can be
suspended for one year, for the same reason he may be
suspended for ten or more years, thus depriving the Governor-
General of his right under the law, and the people of the district,
of a representative, and without a remedy in the premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the
power to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and if
the suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed member
may be removed, under the power to punish, by a mere majority,
while the law requires a two-thirds majority to remove an elective
member. In other words, if under the power to "punish," any
member of the Legislature, including an appointive member,
may be in effect removed, then an elective member may be
removed by a majority vote only thus encroaching upon the
power of the executive department of the government, as well
as violating the powers conferred upon the Legislature, because
the Legislature cannot remove an elective member except by
two-thirds majority.
It is strenuously argued by the respondent that the resolution
depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from his
office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use the
word "suspend" but does use the word "deprive." It provides that
the petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives, etc., for a
period of one year. If that word means anything it means that all
of the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of the petitioner
and the citizens whom he represents have been taken from him
and them. His prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
constitute his right to be a member of the Senate under his
appointment, his right to represent the people of his district, and
his right to exercise all the duties and to assume all the
responsibilities pertaining to his office. His emoluments
constitute his right to receive his salary and the benefits
pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be placed
upon his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and if he has
been deprived of them, then it must follow that they have been
removed from him, or that he has been removed from them. At
any rate, the resolution has separated the petitioner and the
people whom he represents and deprived them of all of their
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year; and, for all intents and purposes, he and the people whom
he represents, have been deprived of their prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments, and in effect, have been removed
from any participation in the legislative affairs of the government.
A great many cases have been studied on the question of
removal and suspension, and we are confident in the assertion
that the power to punish does not include the power to remove
or suspend. A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the
rights of an officer of all his prerogatives, privileges, and

emoluments, is in effect a deprivation or a removal from office
for the time mentioned in the order of suspension. It has been
held that a suspension from office for an indefinite time and
lasting for a period of six months, lost its temporary character,
ceased to be a suspension, and in effect became a removal from
such office. It was held, in the case of State vs. Chamber of
Commerce, that the suspension of a member was a qualified
expulsion, and that whether it was called a suspension or
expulsion or removal, it in effect disfranchised the person
suspended. In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was held that
a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite or indefinite
period is in effect a removal. In the case of Gregory vs. New
York, it was held that the power to remove an officer or punish
him does not include the power to suspend him temporarily from
his office. A mere suspension would not create a vacancy, and
the anomalous and unfortunate condition would exist of an
office, — an officer, — but no vacancy, and of no one whose
right and duty it was to execute the office. In the case of
Commonwealth vs. Barry, it was decided that to punish an
officer for "disorderly behavior" such misbehavior must be such
as affects the performance of his duties or the legal or ordinary
procedure of the body of which he is a member, and not
disorderly behavior which affects his character as a private
individual.
In this connection it may be noted that the alleged "misbehavior"
on the part of the petitioner was committed outside of the
legislative halls and at a time when there was no session of the
Senate; that said alleged "misbehavior" did not take place in or
near the Senate chamber, nor cause any disorder, disturbance,
annoyance, or impediment whatever to the orderly and dignified
procedure of any session of the Senate; that said "misbehavior"
did not interfere in any manner whatever with the honor, dignity,
and efficiency, nor with the orderly proceedings of the Senate;
that the petitioner did not know, at the time of the alleged
"misbehavior," that he had been admitted as a member of the
Philippine Senate. The question of his admission as a senator
had been under discussion for weeks theretofore.
Paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Constitution of the United States
provides that "each house may determined the rules of its
proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." That
provision of the Constitution of the United States is exactly the
language used in section 18 of the Jones Law, with the only
difference that the phrase "expel a member" in the Constitution
is changed in the Jones Law to "expel and elective member."
That provision of the Constitution of the United States has been
enforced for a period of about one hundred forty years. It will be
noted that said provision of the Constitution of the United States
contains two provisions: (a) to punish and (b) to expel.
An examination of the long history of the Congress of the United
States has been made for the purpose of ascertaining how that
august body has interpreted its powers under said provisions.
First, it may be said that the Congress of the United States is
perhaps as dignified a legislative body as that of any of the
states or territories of the United States. Its records have been
searched upon the question of its power to punish and remove
its members, and no case has been found — and it is believed
there are none — where Congress, under its power topunish,
has attempted to deprive a member of all his rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for anytime whatever,
although many cases of removal have been found under that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 6
power to remove. The power to punish for disorderly behavior
has never been exercised further than to impose a mere
reprimand. We regard the fact that the Congress of the United
States has never exercised its power, to punish for disorderly
behavior, by depriving a member of all of his rights, prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments, as strong proof that it did not
believe that its power to punish justified an order or resolution
depriving a member of all of his rights, prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments. Many cases might be cited showing
misbehavior of much more serious character than that charged
against the petitioner and where a reprimand only was imposed.
SECOND. Jurisdiction to consider question.
Whether or not the courts will take jurisdiction of any action
whatever to interfere with, direct or control the action of either
the executive or legislative departments of the government, is a
question which has been presented to the courts many times
since the leading case of Marbury vs. Madison was decided
([1803], 1 Cranch, [U. S.]., 137). In hundreds of cases which
have come before the courts since that time, the decisions have
been about equally divided. One line of decisions indicates that
the courts will never take jurisdiction to control, order, or direct
either the executive or legislative departments of the
government to perform or not to perform any particular act
expressly imposed upon or confined to them either by the
organic act or by statute. (Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4
Wall. [U. S.], 475; Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570; People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill.,
229; State vs. Governor, 22 La. Ann., 1; Rice vs. Governor, 27
Minn., 1; Vicksburg & Co. vs. Governor, 61 Miss., 102.)
The other line of decisions hold that the courts will take
jurisdiction to control, order and direct both the executive and
legislative departments of the government to do and to perform
what are generally termed purely ministerial duties imposed by
either the organic act or by statute. (Tennessee & Railway
Co. vs. Governor, 36 Ala., 371; Middleton vs. Governor, 30 Cal.,
596; State vs. Governor, 72 Ind., 567; State vs. Governor, 5
Ohio State, 528.)
It is here confidently asserted that a careful study of the first line
of decisions will show, that each case might have been decided
upon the ground that the duty, the performance of which was
sought to be coerced, was one which was either a discretionary
or official duty of the respondent, and that the doctrine relied
upon, as announced in said cases, was purely obiter dicta; that
each of the first line of cases might have been decided upon the
ground that the performance of the particular acts was entirely
within the discretion or official duty of the respondent and a
question confided solely to them.
From an examination of all of the cases upon the question
before us, the following rule of law is accepted as
the general rule:
"That the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the
government are distinct and independent, and neither is
responsible to the other for the performance of its duties, and
neither can enforce the performance of the duties of the other."
Exceptions or modifications of this general rule will be noted
later.

After a careful study of all the cases on the subject, we are of
the opinion that a fair summary of the power of the courts in the
premises may be stated under two heads as follows:
First. That the courts have jurisdiction to examine acts "actually"
taken by the executive or legislative departments of the
government when such acts affect the rights, privileges,
property, or lives of individuals.
Second. That the courts will not take jurisdiction to order,
coerce, or enjoin any act or acts of either the executive or
legislative departments of the government upon any question or
questions, the performance of which is confided by law to said
departments. The courts will not take jurisdiction until some
positive "action" is taken by the other coordinate departments of
the government.
With reference to the first proposition, we desire to say that,
while the courts hesitate, and rightfully so, to inquire into the
legality of the acts of the executive or legislative departments of
government, yet they are without discretionin the premises in
cases where it is alleged that a person is illegally deprived of his
life, liberty, or property by said departments. The law makes no
distinction with reference to the person or persons, or
departments or bureaus who are responsible for the illegal and
unlawful deprivation of the right of individuals in the state. The
mere fact that such alleged illegal deprivation of life, liberty or
property is caused by the chief executive or the legislative
department of the government, in the face of mandatory
provisions of the law, is no sufficient excuse or justification for a
refusal on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction for the
purpose of inquiring into such alleged illegal deprivation and to
make pronouncement thereon. Under the system of checks and
balances, by virtue of the existence of the different departments
of the government, in the Government of the United States and
its territories, it becomes the legal and bounded duty of the
courts to inquire into the legality, when called upon so to do, of
the acts of either of the other departments of the government
and to make pronouncements thereon. (Barcelon vs. Baker and
Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield,
16 Phil., 534 [228 U. S., 549]; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil., 41,
211 224; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; U. S. vs. Joson,
26 Phil., 1, 65; U. S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs.Board
of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil., 218.)
There is no more sacred duty of the courts, when a case is
presented to them in which the life, liberty, or property of the
citizens of the state are involved, than that of maintaining,
unimpaired, those securities for the personal rights of the
individuals of the state which have been guaranteed to them by
the organic law of the land and which have received for ages the
sanction of the jurists and the statesmen of the civilized nations
of the world. In such cases no narrow or illiberal construction
should be given to the language of the fundamental law of the
state. (Ex parte Lang, 85 U. S., 163.)
Since the Constitution of the Philippine Islands is intended for
the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments
of the government, and the judges are sworn to support its
provisions, they are not liberty to overlook or disregard its
command, and therefore when it is clear that a statute or
resolution of the Legislature transgresses the authority vested
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 7
by the Constitution in the Legislature, it is the duty of the courts
to declare the acts or resolutions unconstitutional, and from that
duty the courts cannot shrink without violating their oath of office.
(United States vs. Fisher, 2 Cranch [U. S.], 396; Darmouth
College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton [U. S.], 518;
Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheaton [U. S.], 1.)
The duty of the courts to declare a law or resolution
unconstitutional, in a proper case, cannot be declined and must
be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the
court. (Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S., 429.)
Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute or
resolution of the legislature is a judicial matter, the courts will not
decline to exercise jurisdiction upon the mere suggestion that
some action might be taken by the political agencies of the
government in disregard of the judgment of the court.
(McPherson vs. Blacker, 146 U. S., 869.)
The doctrine of the all omnipotent power of the legislature as
recognized by the Government of England, does not prevail in
the United States, and every law or resolution adopted by the
legislative department of the government must conform to the
constitution. When a statute or a resolution of the legislative
department exceeds the jurisdiction and powers of the
legislature, it is null and void.
The principle which permits courts to pronounce an act or
resolution of the legislature null and void, because it conflicts
with the provisions of the constitution, is a doctrine so well
established under constitutional governments that it seems
really unnecessary to discuss it here. It has been declared in
many cases that the power of the court to make
pronouncements upon the legality of acts or resolutions of the
legislative department, is the strongest barrier ever devised
against the tyrannies of political assemblies. The right to
construe the constitution and to apply it to particular laws or
resolution of the legislature must necessarily be lodged in some
department of the government to insure that practical sanction
to its mandates which are essential for the preservation of their
validity and force and the perpetuation of stable and orderly
government. The duty of the court to maintain the constitution
as the fundamental law of the state and to permit no one to
transgress its provisions, is imperative. Whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, it is the sworn duty of the courts
so to adjudge. Any other course would lead to the destruction of
the fundamental law of the state. It has been said by eminent
jurists and authorities that the judiciary should protect the rights
of the people with great care and jealousy, not only because it
is its sworn duty, but also because in times of great popular
excitement the courts are the last resort. (Gardner vs. Stephens,
2 Am. Rep., 700; State vs. Peel Splint Co., 17 L. R. A., 385;
Rathbone vs. Wirth, 34 L. R. A., 408; Wells vs. Mo. Railway Co.,
15 L. R. A., 847; State vs. Butler, 24 L. R. A., [N. S.], 744;
Sanders vs. Commonwealth, 111 Am. State Rep., 219;
State vs. Miller, 87 Ohio State, 12; Miller vs. Johnson, 15 L. R.
A., 524.)
The right and power of the courts to declare whether enactments
of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are
invalid, has always been considered a grave responsibility as
well as a solemn duty, and its exercise is, at all times, a matter
of much delicacy, for, apart from the necessity of avoiding
conflicts between coordinate branches of the government, it is
often difficult to determine whether such enactments are within

the powers granted to or possessed by the legislature. It has
also been said that the power of the courts to nullify acts of the
legislature, as being in violation of the constitution, is one of the
highest functions and authorities of the courts. (Nichol vs. Ames,
173 U. S., 509; People vs. Henning Co., 260 Ill., 554;
Edwards vs. Lesueur, 31 L. R. A., 815.)
The courts have no jurisdiction in matters of a purely political
nature which have been confided to the executive or legislative
department of the government, nor the power to interfere with
the duties of either of said departments, unless under special
circumstances and when it becomes necessary for the
protection of the rights, the life and the property of the individuals
of the state. (In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., 200; Luther vs. Borden, 7
Howard [U. S.], 1; Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. [U.
S.], 475.)
The jurisdiction of the courts over the acts of either of the other
departments is limited to cases where the acts of such
departments tend to deprive the citizens of their rights, liberties,
and property. To assume jurisdiction to control the exercise of
purely political rights, would be to invade the domain of the other
departments of the government. (Fletcher vs. Tutle, 151 Ill., 41.)
We do not desire to be understood, however, as holding that
even political rights are not a matter of judicial solicitude and
protection and that the appropriate judicial tribunal will not, in a
proper case, give a prompt and efficient protection to citizens.
(Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U. S., 346.)
In the case of Burnham vs. Morrissey (14 Gray [Mass.], 226),
Mr. Justice Hoar, later a United States Senator, said: "The
house of representatives is not the final judge of its own powers
and privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties of the
subject are concerned; but the legality of its action may be
examined and determined by this court. . . . Especially is it
competent and proper for this court to consider whether its
(legislature's) proceedings are in conformity with the constitution
and laws, because, living under a written constitution no branch
or department of the department is supreme; and it is the
province and duty of the judicial department to determine, in
cases regularly brought before them, whether the powers of any
branch of the government and even those of the legislature in
the enactment of laws (or resolutions), have been exercised in
conformity with the constitution; and if they have not been, to
treat their acts as null and void.
The house of representatives has the power, under the
constitution, to imprison for contempt; but this power is
limited to cases expressly provided for by the
constitution, or to cases where the power is necessarily
implied from those constitutional functions and duties,
to the proper performance of which it is essential. . . .
The doctrine of the omnipotence of either the executive or
legislative department of government has long since been
denied, and has no place under the American flag.
Of course, when a discretionary power is conferred, with the
right to act or not to act, and when the discretion is honestly
exercised and not abused, then the official or department is
relieved from personal responsibility; but when action is taken,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 8
and an individual of the state is thereby deprived, illegally, of his
life, liberty or property, his remedy to be restored to his rights is
properly submitted to the courts. In every case where the courts
are called upon to exercise their original jurisdiction to question
the illegality of action already taken by the legislative or
executive department of the government, they will not do so
upon a mere formal or colorable showing either as to the parties
or subject-matter. The courts will look through the form to
the real character or substance of the alleged illegal act.
(Wisconsin vs. Insurance Co., 127 U. S., 265;
Louisiana vs. Texas, 176 U. S., 1; Oklahoma vs. Railway Co.,
220 U. S., 277.)
A statute or a resolution of the legislative department of the
government which deprives a citizen of the rights guaranteed to
him by the Organic Law of the land is null and void.
(Harrison vs. Railway Co., 232 U. S., 318; Terral vs. Burke &
Co., 257 U. S., 529.)
Decision of the highest courts, without number, may be cited in
support of the rule "that all governmental officers, departments
or agencies are subject to judicial restraint when they act in
excess of their authority either statutory or constitutional, by
virtue of which citizens are deprived of their rights."
(Osborn vs. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton [U. S.], 739; Board of
Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; United States vs. Lee,
106 U. S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U. S., 311;
Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U. S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169
U. S., 466; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S., 123; Philadelphia
Co. vs. Stimson, 223 U. S., 605.)
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The three great departments of the government — the
executive, legislative, and judicial — were created for the
purpose of "checks and balances." Under the Organic Law of
the Philippine Islands the executive power of the states is
conferred upon the Governor-General. The legislative power is
vested in the Senate and House of Representatives. The judicial
power is vested in the courts. The three great branches of the
government are separate and distinct, but are coequal and
coordinate. Their powers have been carefully apportioned. The
legislature makes the laws, the courts construe them and
adjudge as to the rights of persons to life, liberty, and property
thereunder, while the executive department executes the laws
and the judgments of the courts. Each department, in its own
sphere, is in a sense independent. Each operates as a check or
restraint upon the other. The Acts of the legislative department
have to be presented to the executive department for its
approval. The executive department may disapprove the Acts of
the legislature if in its judgment they are not in conformity with
the organic law of the state or if in their enforcement they might
work a hardship upon the people. The judicial department is
authorized to construe and interpret the Acts of the legislature.
The judicial department is authorized to determine the validity of
the Acts of the legislature under the constitution. The executive
department may also set aside the judgments of the judicial
department and modify the action of the courts by the
interposition of its pardoning power. The legislative department
may also recall, modify, or annul decisions of the courts if in its
judgment the interpretation given to a law by the courts is not in
harmony with the general policy of the state, by the enactment
of a new law or by an amendment of the old, giving its such a

nondisputed meaning and interpretation as to clearly wipe out
the decisions of the judicial department.
Thus, we have the checks and balances known under the
American form of government. But in every case in which one
department controls, modifies, or influences the action of
another, it acts strictly within its own sphere, thus giving no
occasion for conflict and thus preserving the purpose of the
original scheme of a division of powers among the three great
coordinate branches of government, each operating as a
restraint upon the other, but still in harmony.
By the use of the power of veto and or pardoning, the executive
department may annul and set aside absolutely the action of
both the legislative and judicial departments. The legislative
department may, by adopting a new law or by amendment or by
passing a law over the veto of the executive department, annul,
recall, and set aside the action of both the executive and judicial
departments. But it must be observed that when the judicial
department inquires into an act of either the executive or
legislative departments for the purpose or determining the
legality of such acts, it is not because it desires to impose its
own opinions upon such departments nor to examine into the
wisdom or advisability of a particular act or statute, but simply
because said departments have acted in a way which is
forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and because the
will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is
paramount and must be obeyed even by the legislative and
executive departments. In pronouncing a statute of the
legislature illegal or an act of the executive department beyond
its powers, the courts are simply interpreting the meaning, force
and application o the fundamental law of the state.
If the doctrine that the different departments — executive,
legislative and judicial — are absolutely independent and one
can never interfere to control or restrain, modify or annul, the
action of the other, then the very purpose of the organization of
the three departments for "checks and balances" would be
defeated. (Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250;
U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil.,
218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs.Peñaranda, 37 Phil., 155; Central
Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 899; Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil.,
366; U. S. vs. Bull., 15 Phil., 7; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.,
322; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599;
Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 152, 170, 172.)
The following are among the leading cases in which the courts
have taken jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the legality
or illegality of acts, or orders or resolutions of the executive and
legislative departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —
(a) Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87),
where the action of the Governor-General was
pronounced legal;
(b) Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil.,
534; 228 U. S., 549) where the action of the Governor-
General was pronounced legal;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 9
(c) In re McCulloch Dick (38 Phil., 41, 62, 63, 109, 211,
244), where the action of the Governor-General was
pronounced legal;
(d) Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil., 322), where the
action of the Governor-General was pronounced
illegal.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the
Government —
(a) Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), where the
act of the legislative department was pronounced
illegal;
(b) Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168, 181, 199),
where the act of the one branch of the Congress of the
United States was held illegal.
Referring to the second "Summary of the Powers of the Courts"
above, it may be said that in this jurisdiction the doctrine is now
well established, that, until the executive or legislative
department has taken some steps or has acted upon some
question, the courts will neither undertake to compel action nor
to restrain action in said departments. It is only when said
departments have acted and their acts detrimentally affect the
interest of the citizen, that the courts will inquire into the legality
or constitutionality of such acts. (Barcelon vs. Baker and
Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield,
16 Phil., 534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322;
Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 208671; Abueva vs. Wood, 45
Phil., 612.)
The judicial department of the government will not attempt to
intervene or control or direct or command any action whatever
upon any subject which has been specifically confided by law to
the other departments, until they have taken some action which
tends to and does establish some theory or policy contrary to
the organic law of the land, or has deprived some citizen of his
life, liberty, property, or privilege granted to him by the organic
law. Under such facts, the judicial department is, under the law,
bound to take jurisdiction and to make pronouncements thereon.
In such cases it becomes the legal and bounden duty of the
courts to inquire into the legality or illegality of the acts of the
other departments of the government and to declare what the
law is and what the rights of the parties are. When such a case
is presented to the courts, its responsibility to the people of the
state, under the law, demands that a thorough investigation of
the facts be made and of the rights of the parties under the law,
and to make a pronouncement, without reference to the fact
whether or not the court have the proper machinery for the
purpose of enforcing their conclusions and judgments.
The following are among the cases holding that the courts will
not intervene for the purpose of compelling or directing any
action on the part of the executive or legislative departments of
the government with reference to any duty or obligation
specifically confided to said departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —

(a) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial
Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366;
(b) Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;
(c) Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
(d) Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570;
(e) People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the
Government —
Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.
In view of the foregoing arguments and citation of authorities and
inasmuch as the petitioner alleges that by an actor resolution of
the Senate of the Philippine Islands he has been deprived of his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for a period of one
year, which have been granted to him by the organic law of the
land, through the officers and employees of the Senate, we are
of the opinion, and so decide, that under such allegations the
court is not only justified, but authorized and compelled under
the duties and powers conferred upon it, to take jurisdiction of
the petition for the purpose of examining into the question
whether or not the petitioner has been deprived of any rights
granted to him under the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
Are the facts stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and do they justify the
court in taking jurisdiction of the case?
The petitioner alleges that he is a Senator of the Philippine
Islands legally appointed by the Governor-General under the
provisions of section 16 of the Jones Law; that by virtue of said
appointment he is given all the rights of a senator, with all the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments thereunto belonging;
that he has, as such senator, the right to continue to serve the
people of his district; that he has the right to be and act as a
member of the Senate until removed by the Governor-General;
that he has been deprived of the right to act as a senator and
has been removed as such senator by the respondents and
thereby deprived of a right conferred upon him by law and of all
of the rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
belonging to him as a citizen of the Philippine Islands and as a
member of the Senate; that the citizens of his district have been
deprived of their right to be represented and to participate in the
affairs of their government; that unless the said resolution of the
Senate be pronounced illegal, null, and void, he will be unable
to exercise the rights of a citizen and a senator and to enjoy the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments to him rightfully
belonging; that by becoming a member of the Senate he has not
lost his rights as a citizen; that he is still entitled to be protected
in all of his rights and privileges as a citizen under the law; that
the punishment imposed by said resolution is one created after
the alleged grounds for suspension had occurred; that the
punishment imposed is quasi-criminal; that no punishment for
his acts had been prescribed as is expressly provided under the
substantive law of the Philippine Islands; that the punishment
provided for in said resolution of the 5th day of February, 1924,
was ex post facto and is illegal and void under section 3 of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 10
Organic Law, in that his acts were pronounced to be illegal by
said resolution long after they had been committed; that the
respondents were without authority of law to remove him as a
member of the Senate; that the Governor-General only has the
authority to remove him; that the alleged acts for which he has
been suspended were not committed in or near the Senate
chamber; that they in no way tended to or did interfere with the
orderly procedure of the Senate and therefore cannot be
regarded as "disorderly behavior;" that the Senate has no right
or authority to suspend or remove one of its members for
disorderly behavior unless and until such disorderly behavior
tends to and does interfere with, hamper or impede the legal and
orderly procedure of the body; that while it requires a two-thirds
vote of the Senate to expel its elective members, he has
been removed, contrary to law, by the Senate, when the
Governor-General is the only authority who can remove him;
that if the Senate can remove him under the power to punish,
then an appointive member can be removed by a majority vote,
while it requires a two-thirds majority vote to remove an elective
member; and, for all of the foregoing reasons, the petitioner and
the people of his district have been deprived of their rights,
privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments by an actual
act or resolution of the Senate, which is contrary to law, and that
he is entitled to have a pronouncement of his rights made by the
courts and to be restored to his rights, prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments of which he has been so illegally deprived.
The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, the Organic Act
(Jones Law) provides: "That no law shall be enacted which
deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, or deny to person therein the equal protection of
the laws." That provision of law is equally binding upon each
department of government. "Due process of law" cannot be used
as a cloak for depriving a citizen of his rights when the procedure
is based upon a illegal or unconstitutional act or resolution.
Under the American form of government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial departments are coequal and co-
important. But it does not follow that the judiciary, the
constitutional duty of which is to declare and interpret the
supreme law of the land, has not the power to declare a law or
a resolution, passed by the legislature or either of its branches,
unconstitutional. The will of the people, as expressed in their
constitution, is the paramount law and controls every and each
department of the government. The judiciary, under its powers
to interpret the constitution and the laws, has the duty and the
right to declare what the will of the people is, as expressed in
the fundamental law of the land. Hence, where the acts of the
executive or legislative departments violate the will of the people
as expressed in the organic law of the land, it is the sworn duty
of the judiciary to interpret and to declare that the will of the
people and the right of a citizen has been violated and
transgressed.
While the imposition of a disciplinary measure by the legislature
or either branch thereof upon one of its members for an offense
committed against its dignity may be regarded as a matter of
internal concern only of that body, over which the other
departments may not exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the
separation established by the fundamental law, it does not follow
that the legislature, in imposing disciplinary measure, has not or
may not overstep its own powers as limited or defined by the
Organic Law. The legislative department of the government
cannot, under the guise of a resolution imposing disciplinary

measure, transgress the constitution, and when it does, its acts
cease to be a mere internal concern. Even the members of the
legislature have their rights under the constitution. They have
not lost the fundamental rights to their life, liberty, and privileges
as citizens by becoming members of the legislative department
of the government.
The argument of the respondents leads to the conclusion that
under their power to punish they may impose any punishment
which their wish, whim, prejudice, or caprice may dictate. That
contention will hardly withstand the scrutiny of modern
civilization.
The respondents defend upon the ground that they are
absolutely immune from judicial inquiry; that the courts have no
power or authority to inquire into the acts of the executive or
legislative branches of the government, however clear it may be
made to appear that such departments do not possess the
power or authority exercised. The fact is evidently overlooked by
them that the provision of the Jones Law above quoted is as
binding upon them as it is upon any department, bureau, or
person in the government. The provisions of the Jones Law, for
the security of the rights of the citizen, stand in the same
connection and upon the same ground as they do in regard to
his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that both were
intended to be enforced by the judicial department of the
government. As has been said, the writ of habeas corpus has
been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even his
life, against the exercise of unlawful authority on the part of the
executive and legislative branches of the government.
No man, individual, department, bureau, or officer in the
Philippine Islands, under the Jones Law, is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance
with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.
The Philippine Government is a government by law and not a
government by the whim or caprice of any individual or
department. It (the law) is the only supreme power in our system
of government; and every man who, by accepting an office by
appointment or election, participates in its function, is only the
more strongly bound to that supremacy (the law) and to observe
the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it (the law) gives. Courts of justice are
established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of
the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights and
controversies between them and the government, and the
dockets of the courts are not without cases containing
controversies of the latter class.
Shall it be said, in the face of the provisions of the Jones Law,
and of the acknowledged right of the judicial department of the
government to decide in proper cases, that statutes which have
been passed by both branches of the Legislature and approved
by the Governor-General are illegal and unconstitutional, and
that said department cannot give a remedy when the citizen has
been deprived of his life or property without lawful authority and
without due compensation, simply because the executive or
legislative department has ordered it? If that is the law in the
Philippines it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the
monarchies of Europe nor in any other government which has a
just claim to a well-regulated liberty and the protection of the
personal rights, privileges, life, and property of the individual.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 11
Can it be said that the judicial department of the government can
intervene in a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve a
citizen who has been imprisoned, illegally, and cannot take
jurisdiction in proper proceedings to consider the question
whether or not he has been deprived of his property even
though such deprivation has been brought about by an illegal
act or resolution of the Legislature, or by an order of the
executive department of the government? Here again we are of
the opinion that the question contains its own answer to the
average citizen.
We cannot give our assent to the doctrine that the Senate or
House of Representatives is the final judge of its own powers
and privileges, without restraint, especially in cases in which the
rights, privileges, emoluments, property, and liberties of a citizen
are concerned. The legality of their action may always be
examined and determined by the courts. Especially are the
courts competent, and it is proper for them to consider whether
the proceedings of the legislative department of the government
are in conformity with the laws and the constitution of the land,
because, living under a written constitution, no branch or
department of the government is supreme; and it is not only the
province, but the sworn duty, of the judicial department,
to determine in cases regularly brought before it, whether
the powers of any branch of the government, even those of the
legislature in the enactment of laws or resolutions, have been
exercised in conformity with the organic law of the land, if they
have not, to treat such acts or resolutions as null and void.
All of the foregoing arguments are intended to apply only to
cases in which some action has been taken, which illegally
deprives a citizen of his rights, privileges, prerogatives, and
emoluments. Nothing herein is intended to modify in the
slightest degree the decisions heretofore announced in the
cases of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board
of Occidental Negros, Perfecto vs. Wood, and Abueva vs.
Wood, above cited. In those cases the courts were called upon
to require one or both of the other two coordinate departments
to act in a particular way upon questions which were specially
confided to those departments, while in the present case the
courts are called upon to decide whether or not the action which
the legislative department of the government has taken is legal
and in conformity with the powers conferred by the organic law
of the land. A wide distinction must be made between requiring
a particular act to be done and a pronouncement upon the
legality of that act after it is performed. The courts will not require
the legislative department of the government to adopt a
particular law, but they are authorized and empowered, and it is
their sworn duty to pronounce a statute null and void after
adoption if the same is found to be contrary to the provisions of
the organic law of the land and beyond the powers of the
legislative department. This doctrine is amply exemplified in the
thousands of cases which have been brought before the courts
in petitions for habeas corpus where the petitioner alleged that
he has been imprisoned under an unconstitutional law and in
many, many cases where men have been deprived of their rights
and property by an illegal and unconstitutional act adopted by
the legislature. In the first class of cases mentioned, the courts
will never interfere in this jurisdiction to direct or coerce action,
while in the second class of cases the courts should always take
jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and making
pronouncements upon the legality and constitutionality of acts
actually taken.

In view of the facts and the law, we are compelled to decide that
we are justified, authorized, and, under our oath of office,
compelled to take jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the petitioner has been deprived,
illegally, of a right guaranteed to him under the Constitution and
laws of the Philippine Islands. In exercising the high authority
conferred upon us to pronounce valid or invalid a particular
resolution or statute of the legislature, we are only the
administrators of the public will as expressed in the fundamental
law of the land. If an act of the legislature is to be held illegal by
the courts, it is not because the judges have any control over the
legislature, but because the particular statute or resolution is
forbidden by the fundamental law of the land, and because the
will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is
paramount and must be obeyed by every citizen, even the
Legislature. In pronouncing a statute or resolution illegal, we are
simply interpreting the meaning, force, and application of the
fundamental law of the state. If a particular resolution or statute
of the legislature is within its constitutional power, it will be
sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its
enactment. If the resolution or statute covers a subject not
authorized by the fundamental law of the land, then the courts
are not only authorized but are compelled and justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise or
beneficient such resolution or statute may seem to be. The
courts will not measure their opinion with the opinion of the
legislative department, as expressed in the resolution or statute,
upon the question of the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a
particular law, but the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a
particular law must be tested by the provisions of the
fundamental law of the state. It is the sworn duty of the judicial
department of the government to determine the limits, under the
law and the constitution, of the authority of both the executive
and legislative departments.
THIRD. May the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
In the Government of the Philippine Islands no man is so high
that he is above the law. All the officers of the government, from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound
to obey it. It cannot be said, in view of the acknowledge right of
the judicial department of the government to pass upon the
constitutionality of statutes or resolutions of the legislative
department, that the courts cannot give a remedy to a citizen of
the state when he has been illegally deprived of his life, his
property, or his liberty by force, or by virtue of an unconstitutional
act or resolution of the legislative department. A contrary
conclusion would sanction a tyranny under the American flag,
which has no existence even in the monarchies nor in any other
government which has a just claim to a stable government, a
well-regulated liberty, and the protection of the personal rights
of individuals. Every department, every officer of the
government, and every individual, are equally bound by the
mandatory provisions of the fundamental law. When a citizen
under the American flag has been deprived of his life, his liberty,
or his property by an illegal statute or resolution, the official or
department so depriving him cannot say to the courts: "Stop
here, for the reason that I (we) have acted as a representative
of a different department of the government."
A pronouncement, by the highest tribunal of justice in the
Philippine Islands, that the resolution is ultra vires, illegal, and
void, we confidently believe, will be sufficient to cause an
immediate revocation of the same, and the adoption of a further
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 12
order to the effect that all persons affected by it will be restored
to their rights. We are confident in that belief, because we cannot
believe that the resolution was adopted out of a spirit of malice,
hatred, or revenge, but in the full belief that the law permitted it
as a disciplinary measure. We cannot believe that the honorable
senators who took part in its adoption intended to deprive any of
the citizens of their county of the constitutional right. We are
confident that the honorable senators recognize, as fully as the
courts do, that the constitution is the supreme law of the land
and is equally binding upon them as it is upon every citizen, high
or low, and upon every branch, bureau, or department of the
government. We are sure that the respondents will be among
the very first to openly criticize and vigorously denounce any
person, entity, or department within the Philippine Islands, who
should be guilty of the slightest disregard or disobedience to the
mandates of the constitution — the law of the people.
The majority opinion decides that the petitioner and the people
whom he represents have been illegally deprived of their rights,
but that he and they are without a remedy — damnum absque
injuria. To that doctrine we cannot give our assent.
The nightmare which runs through the majority opinion
concerning the impossibility of the execution of a judgment, is
hardly justified in a stable and well-organized government,
among a people who love peace and good order, who despise
disobedience to law and disloyalty to the constituted authorities.
The history of the Filipino people shows that they love peace,
good order, and will, with a spirit of alacrity, obey the law when
they once understand what the law is. We rest in the confident
faith that spirit still controls in the Philippine Islands. The remedy
prayed for should be granted in a modified form.
RESUME
1. The Organic Law (Jones Law) prohibits the removal of an
appointive senator by the Legislature.
2. The said resolution has the effect of a removal of an
appointive senator.
3. The resolution, therefore, is invalid, illegal, and void,
according to the unanimous opinion of the court.
4. The legislative power and procedure of the Senate must be
exercised in conformity with the Organic Law.
5. The courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the legality or
constitutionality of a law or resolution of the legislative
department, whenever a citizen alleges that he has been
deprived of his rights under such law or resolution.
6. The courts of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality of acts or resolutions or
procedure of the Senate.
7. The petition and demurrer present the question of the
constitutionality of said resolution, as well as the constitutional
power of the Senate to adopt it.

8. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, having
jurisdiction, its decree or order should afford relief from the effect
of said illegal resolution.
Therefore, the enforcement of the said illegal and void resolution
should be enjoined.
OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
With much of what is said in the majority opinion I am in entire
accord. I agree that the Senate in suspending the petitioner,
declaring his pay forfeited and depriving his senatorial district of
the representation granted by the Organic Act, exceeds its
powers and jurisdiction. I also concede that the courts will not,
by mandamus or other writs, attempt to control the exercise by
the other departments of the government of discretional or
executive powers or duties conferred upon them by the
constitution or by constitutional statutes. I further concede that
the courts will not interfere with acts of another department when
such acts are of a purely political and non-justiciable character.
But when the court holds, as it in effects does in this case, that
because the respondents are members of officers of another
department the courts have no power to restrain or prohibit them
from carrying into effect an unconstitutional and therefore void
act of that department, an act wholly outside of its province, and
which deprives a citizen of rights and privileges to which he, by
law, is entitled, I find myself unable to follow its reasoning or to
yield my assent to its conclusions.
Before entering upon a more extended discussion of the issues
in the case, it may be well to emphasize that there is here no
question as to the power of the Philippine Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior. That is conceded. But I
contend that the court may intervene to prevent the execution of
the penalty imposed if such penalty transcends the domain of
the Legislature and encroaches upon that of the Chief Executive
in direct violation of the Organic Act. I shall also maintain that
the assertion in the majority opinion to the effect that this, in
substance, is an action against the Senate as a body, is
erroneous.
The fundamental error into which the court has fallen is that it
has failed to note the distinction between acts within the
province of a department and those outside thereof; it confuses
entire absence of power with the alleged improper exercise of
legitimate powers. This distinction is obvious and very important.
Where a power or duty has been entrusted to the Chief
Executive by the Organic Act, this court will not, under the rule
laid down in the case of Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), attempt to
control or direct the exercise by him of that power or duty; he is
presumed to be the best judge of the time and the manner of its
exercise. For the same reason, the court will not undertake to
direct the exercise of the discretional powers of the legislative
department within its legitimate sphere. But it must necessarily
be otherwise where either department steps outside of its
province and arrogates to itself any of the constitutional powers
of the other. The doctrine of non-interference by the judiciary
with the other departments of the government rests primarily on
the ground that each department is presumed to possess
special qualifications and opportunities for the exercise of the
powers entrusted to it by the constitution. It follows that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 13
doctrine does not apply to cases where a department goes
beyond its legitimate sphere. This is, indeed, the first time any
court has ever held that in such cases there may be no judicial
interference. (Bailey on Mandamus, p. 926.)
That the court has overlooked this distinction is very apparent
from the fact that in all of the cases cited in support of its
conclusion, the acts complained of were within the province of
the respondents and that in none of them is there any question
of the encroachment by one department upon the domain of
another. It is very true that in some of the cases dicta are to be
found which, taken by themselves alone and without reference
to the context, may, at first sight, lead to the inference that the
separation of the various departments of the government is so
complete that the courts, under no circumstances, will
review any act of the Legislature or the Executive, irrespective
of its character, but when the cases where such dicta occur are
closely examined, this impression disappears and it becomes
obvious that the dicta have no reference to acts of clear
usurpation of powers.
Five of the cases cited relate to judicial review of the exercise of
the legislative powers. In the first of these cases, Hiss vs.
Bartlett ([1853], 69 Mass., 468), a habeas corpus proceeding, it
was held that the House of Representatives of Massachusetts
had the implied power to expel a member and that the reasons
for the expulsion, and the question whether a member was duly
heard before being expelled, could not be inquired into by the
courts.
French vs. Senate ([1905], 146 Cal., 604), was a proceeding
in mandamus. The Constitution of the State of California
expressly gives either house of the Legislature authority to expel
members by a two-thirds majority vote. The petitioners had been
so expelled from the Senate but alleged that it had been done
without due process of law and therefore asked that the Senate
be compelled to again admit them as members. The court
denied the writ holding that the judicial department had no power
"to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the Constitution."
State vs. Bolte ([1899], 151 Mo., 362), was a suit for a writ
of mandamus to compel the presiding officer and the secretary
of the State Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and its chief clerk, to take the necessary steps
to complete the enactment of a certain bill, it being alleged that
it had already passed both houses by a majority vote. The
petition was resisted on the ground that the presiding officer of
the Senate had ruled that the bill did not pass the Senate and
that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling. The court
held that the duty the performance of which it was sought to
enforce was one strictly within the line of the duties of the
presiding officer of the Senate and was not merely ministerial.
The writ was therefore denied.
The case of Ex-parte Echols ({[1886], 89 Ala., 698), was a
petition by one of the members of the State Legislature for a writ
of mandamus to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
to compel him to send a certain bill to the Senate. The Speaker
ruled that the bill had not passed the house with the requisite
majority of votes and therefore refused to certify it to the Senate.

The petition was denied, the court stating that it would not
"interfere with either of the coordinate departments of the
government in the legitimate exercise of their jurisdiction and
powers."
There is, as far as I can see, absolutely nothing in these cases
which can have any direct bearing on the present case. In two
of them the question before the court was the alleged abuse of
constitutional powers resting in the Legislature; the other three
were actions to compel the performance of duties entrusted by
law to the Legislature or its officers and which were not merely
ministerial. In all of them the Legislature operated within its own
domain.
The other cases cited to the same point in the majority opinion
are actions directed against chief executives. The two most
favorable to the majority of the court are Mississippi vs. Johnson
and Ord (4 Wall., 475) and Sutherland vs.Governor (29 Mich.,
320). The facts of the first case are stated in the majority opinion
and need not be restated here. But the portions quoted from the
decision in that case should be read in connection with the
following quotation from the same decision, which I think forms
its real basis:
The single point which requires consideration is this:
Can the President be restrained by injunction from
carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional?
It is assumed by the counsel of the State of Mississippi,
that the President, in the execution of the
Reconstruction Acts, is required to perform a mere
ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we think, a
confounding of the terms `ministerial' and `executive,'
which are by no means equivalent in import.
A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in
proper cases, be required of the head of the
department, by judicial process, is one in respect to
which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite
duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to
exist, and imposed by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Very different is the duty of the President in the
exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed, and among these laws the Acts named in the
bill. By the first of these Acts he is required to assign
generals to command in the several military districts,
and to detail sufficient military force to enable such
officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the
supplementary Act, other duties are imposed on the
several commanding generals, and these duties must
necessarily be performed under the supervision of the
President as Commander-in-Chief. The duty thus
imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial.
It is purely executive and political.
Considering the language here quoted, it is difficult to regard the
first paragraph of the quotation from the same decision in the
majority opinion as anything but dictum. In any event, if it is to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 14
be taken as authority for the proposition that the United States
Supreme Court may prevent officers or members of Congress
from carrying into effect an unconstitutional resolution, it is
definitely overruled by the decision in the case of Kilbourn vs.
Thompson(103 U. S., 168), in which the court held that an action
would lie against the Speaker and other officers of the House of
Representatives of Congress for attempting to carry into effect
an unconstitutional resolution of the house committing Kilbourn
to prison for contempt. The court further held that "the House of
Representatives (of Congress) is not the final judge of its own
power and privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties of
the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may be
examined and determined by this court."
The case of Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, is the leading case
in favor of the view that all official acts of the chief executive of
a State are executive as distinguished from ministerial and
therefore not subject to judicial review. The case represents the
extreme limit to which courts have gone in that direction and its
soundness has been questioned by most authorities on the
subject, but because of the high reputation of the writer of the
decision, Judge Cooley, it is, nevertheless, entitled to
consideration.
The case was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Governor of Michigan to issue a certificate of the completion of
the construction of the Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship
Canal. The statutes required the governor to issue the
certificate when he should be satisfied that the work had been
done in conformity with the law. The duty devolving upon the
governor was therefore clearly discretional and this was
recognized by the court, but Judge Cooley preferred to plant the
decision on additional and broader grounds, which may best be
stated in the language of the court:
. . . There is no very clear and palpable line of
distinction between those duties of the governor which
are political and those which are to be considered
ministerial merely; and if we should undertake to draw
one, and to declare that in all cases falling on one side
the line the governor was subject to judicial process,
and in all falling on the other he was independent of it,
we should open the doors to an endless train of
litigation, and the cases would be numerous in which
neither the governor nor the parties would be able to
determine whether his conclusion was, under the law,
to be final, and the courts would be appealed to by
every dissatisfied party to subject a coordinate
department of the government to their jurisdiction.
However desirable a power in the judiciary to interfere
in such cases might seem from the standpoint of
interested parties, it is manifest that harmony of action
between the executive and judicial departments would
be directly threatened, and that the exercise of such
power could only be justified on most imperative
reasons. Moreover, it is not customary in our
republican government to confer upon the governor
duties merely ministerial, and in the performance of
which he is to be left to no discretion whatever; and the
presumption in all cases must be, where a duty is
devolved upon the chief executive of the State rather
than upon an inferior officer, that it is so because this
superior judgment, discretion, and sense of
responsibility were confided in for a more accurate,

faithful, and discreet performance than could be relied
upon if the duty were devolved upon an officer chosen
for inferior duties. And if we concede that cases may
be pointed out in which it is manifest that the governor
is left to no discretion, the present is certainly not
among them, for here, by law, he is required to judge,
on a personal inspection of the work, and must give his
certificate on his own judgment, and not on that of any
other person, officer, or department.
We are not disposed, however, in the present case, to
attempt on any grounds to distinguish it from other
cases of executive duty with a view to lay down a
narrow rule which, while disposing of this motion, may
leave the grave question it presents to be presented
again and again in other cases which the ingenuity of
counsel may be able to distinguish in some minor
particulars from the one before us. If a broad general
principle underlies all these cases, and requires the
same decision in all, it would scarcely be respectful to
the governor, or consistent with our own sense of duty,
that we should seek to avoid its application and strive
to decide each in succession upon some narrow and
perhaps technical point peculiar to the special case, if
such might be discovered.
And that there is such a broad general principle seems
to us very plain. Our government is one whose powers
have been carefully apportioned among three distinct
departments, which emanate alike from the people,
have their powers alike limited and defined by the
constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent. One
makes the laws, another applies the laws in contested
cases, while the other must see that the laws are
executed. This division is accepted as a necessity in all
free governments, and the very apportionment of
power to one department is understood to be a
prohibition of its exercise by either of the others. The
executive is forbidden to exercise judicial power by the
same implication which forbids the courts to take upon
themselves his duties.
It is true that neither of the departments can operate in
all respects independently of the others, and that what
are called the checks and balances of government
constitute each a restraint upon the rest. The
legislature prescribes rules of action for the courts, and
in many particulars may increase or diminish their
jurisdiction; it also, in many cases, may prescribe rules
for executive action, and impose duties upon, or take
powers from the governor; while in turn the governor
may veto legislative acts, and the courts may declare
them void where they conflict with the constitution,
notwithstanding, after having been passed by the
legislature, they have received the governor's
approval. But in each of these cases the action of the
department which controls, modifies, or in any manner
influences that of another, is had strictly within its own
sphere, and for that reason gives no occasion for
conflict, controversy, or jealousy. The legislature in
prescribing rules for the courts, is acting within its
proper province in making laws, while the courts, in
declining to enforce an unconstitutional law, are in like
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 15
manner acting within their proper province, because
they are only applying that which is law to the
controversies in which they are called upon to give
judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks and
balances that the officers of the several departments
are kept within their jurisdiction, and if they are
disregarded in any case, and power is usurped or
abused, the remedy is by impeachment, and not by
another department of the government attempting to
correct the wrong by asserting a superior authority over
that which by the constitution is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the
legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such
judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
legislature could in like manner override executive
action also, the government would become only a
despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it
would be readily conceded that no court can compel
the legislature to make or to refrain from making laws,
or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any
action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made
ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these
cases the exemption of the one department from the
control of the other is not only implied in the framework
of government, but is indispensably necessary in any
useful apportionment of power is to exist.
In view of the fact that the duty to be performed was discretional
and therefore, by the concensus of judicial opinion, not subject
to judicial review, the extensive discussion of other grounds for
the decision lays it open to the same criticism as that frequently
voiced in regard to Chief Justice Marshall's dissertation in the
case of Murbury vs.Madison (1 Cranch, 137); namely, that it was
unnecessary to the decision of the case and therefore in the
nature of obiter dicta. It may also be noted that the courts of last
resort in the States of Alabama, California, Colorado, Kansas,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio
and Wyoming have allowed writs of mandamus to the governors
of their States for the performance of ministerial duties, without
bringing about any of the serious consequences predicted in
Sutherland vs. Governor, supra. These States seem to have
fared fully as well as the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesotta, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Texas which,
together with the Philippine Islands, have adopted the opposite
view.
But taking the decision in Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, at its
full face value, I am unable to see that it is determinative of the
present case. I readily concede that under the decisions of this
court all acts of the chief executive within the limits of his
jurisdiction are executive acts involving a measure of discretion
and may not be reviewed by the courts. It may also be conceded
that no court can compel the legislature as such to make or
refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command,
or "to take any action whatsoever though the duty to take it be
made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws." But that does
not mean that the courts may not restrain officers and individual
members of the legislature from carrying into effect an
unconstitutional resolution transcending the limits of the
legislative department and encroaching upon another. If that is

beyond the power of the courts, what will then become of the
checks and balances of which Judge Cooley speaks and which
are regarded fully as essential a feature of our system of
government as that of departmental distribution of powers?
Time forbids a full discussion of other decisions of courts in the
United States which adhere to the doctrine that the judiciary will
not interfere with the acts of the chief executive within the limits
of his jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that they all relate to acts
within the domain of the executive and that none of them has
any direct application to the present case.
But we are given to understand that by reason of its own
previous decisions this court stands committed to the doctrine
that it has no power to interfere with any act of the other
coordinate departments of the government whether they
transcend the limits of their jurisdiction or not.
A brief analysis of the decisions of this court upon the subject
will show that this is a misapprehension.
The first of these decisions is that in the case of Barcelon vs.
Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87), a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
conferred on the Governor-General the power to suspend the
writ whenever the public safety might require it in cases of
rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and the case involved the
question as to whether the courts may inquire into the legality of
an order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of
the writ. The court held that "whenever a statute gives
discretionary power to a person to be exercised by him upon his
own opinion on certain facts, such statute constitutes him the
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts;" and
that when the Governor-General, "with the approval of the
Philippine Commission declares that a state of rebellion,
insurrection, or invasion exists, this declaration or conclusion is
conclusive against the judicial department of the government."
The writ was therefore denied.
The leading case of Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366), was a
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General
to call a special election for the purpose of electing a municipal
president of the town of Silay, Occidental Negros, and to restrain
the provincial board of Occidental Negros from appointing a
municipal president during the pendency of the action. By
statute, the duty of calling a special election devolves upon the
Governor-General and the principal question presented for
consideration was whether the court had power to compel the
Governor-General to immediately perform such duty. The court
denied the writ holding that "where a duty is devolved upon the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, rather that upon an
inferior officer, it will be presumed to have been done because
his superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility
were confined in for a more accurate, faithful, and discreet
performance than could be relied upon if the duty were put upon
an officer chosen for inferior duties," and that the court would
not undertake to direct or control the exercise of such duty.
Incidentally, the court also stated that "the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands are far more comprehensive than those of State
governors of the United States;" and laid down the rule that "the
courts of the Philippine Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 16
by means of a writ of mandamus or injunction, with the
Governor-General as the head of the executive department in
the performance of any of his official acts."
In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil.,
534), the facts may be briefly stated as follows:
The Governor-General deported certain Chinese persons from
Manila to Amoy, China. The deportees subsequently returned to
Manila and brought an action in the Court of First Instance
against the Governor-General and certain police officials for
damages, alleging that the deportation was unlawful. The
defendants thereupon filed a petition in this court for a writ of
prohibition commanding the Judge of the Court of First Instance
to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in the case brought by the
deportees, the petitioners alleging that "the power to deport
foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a privative one of the
Governor-General and is not subject to judicial review." This
court granted the writ holding that "the Governor-General, acting
in his political and executive capacity, is invested with plenary
power to deport obnoxious aliens whose continued presence in
the territory is found by him to be injurious to the public interest,
and in the absence of express or prescribed rules as to the
method of deporting or expelling them, he may use such
methods as his official judgment and good conscience may
dictate;" that he could not be held liable in damages for the
exercise of such power and that the courts would not interfere.
Case R. G. No. 20867, Perfecto vs. Wood (not published in the
reports) involved exactly the same principles as Severino vs.
Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros, supra, except that the special election was to be called
for the purpose of filing a vacancy in the Senate. The majority
decision, signed by four justices, denied the petition on the same
grounds as those stated in the Severino case. Three justices
concurred in the result on the ground that the case had then
become a moot case.
The doctrine laid down in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield, supra, was followed in the case of In re McCulloch
Dick.
The case of Abueva vs. Wood (45 Phil., 612), was a petition for
a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Insular Auditor, the Executive Secretary of
the Independence Committee and the Secretary of the same
Committee to permit the petitioners to examine all vouchers and
documents in connection with disbursements and payments
made from the fund of the Independent Commission. The
petition was denied, the court stating:
. . . It may be asserted as a principle founded upon the
clearest legal reasoning that the legislature or
legislative officers, in so far as concerns their purely
legislative functions, are beyond the control of the
courts by the writ of mandamus. The legislative
department, being a coordinate and independent
branch of the government, its action within its own
sphere cannot be revised or controlled
by mandamus by the judicial department, without a
gross usurpation of power upon the part of the latter.
When the legislative department of the government

imposes upon its officers the performance of certain
duties which are not prohibited by the organic law of
the land, the performance, the nonperformance, or the
manner of the performance is under the direct control
of the legislature, and such officers are not subject to
the direction of the courts. . . .
The case of Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), was a
petition for a writ of prohibition commanding the respondent
Secretary of Justice to desist from carrying into effect the
provisions of Act No. 2941 requiring the Judges of the Courts of
First Instance to draw lots every five years for exchange of
districts. The court held that the Act constituted an
encroachment by the Legislature upon the Governor-General's
power of appointment and was therefore unconstitutional. The
writ was granted.
What is there in these cases which can serve as authority for the
theory that the courts may not interfere with the execution of acts
beyond the jurisdiction of the department sought to be
restrained? Absolutely nothing. The rather broad dictum in the
case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros, supra, that the courts of the Philippine
Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere with the head of the
executive department in the performance of any of his official
acts, must be considered in connection with the context and is
clearly limited to acts within the limits of his jurisdiction.
In Abueva vs. Wood, supra, the doctrine of noninterference with
the Legislature is carefully limited to "actions within its own
sphere" and "duties not prohibited by the organic law of the
land."
In the present case we are not dealing with an act of political
and nonjusticiable character, nor is there a question of
interference with the exercise of discretionary powers of duties
resting in the Legislature under the Organic Act. We are simply
called upon to prevent the carrying into effect of unconstitutional
and therefore, in a legal sense, nonexistent parts of a resolution
of one of the branches of the Legislature which, if executed, will
result in an encroachment upon the domain of another
department and deprive the petitioner of rights and privileges to
which he is by law entitled. There is no question as to the power
of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior, but
it must be insisted that the penalty shall not constitute a
usurpation of the powers of another department of the
government in violation of the Organic Act. It is agreed that as
long as the penalty does not expressly or impliedly violate that
Act, the courts will not interfere.
That the resolution is unconstitutional and void cannot be
seriously questioned and is conceded in the majority opinion,
but in order to bring the issue into clear relief, it may be well to
briefly state the reasons why it must be so held:
The Senate exercises delegated powers, all of which are
derived from the Organic Act. That Act provides for twenty-two
senators to be elected by the people and for two other senators
to be appointed by the Governor-General. In the language of the
Act, the appointive senators "shall hold office until removed by
the Governor-General." The Act further provides that "The
Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the
sole judges of the elections, returns and qualifications of their
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 17
elective member." It will be observed that no power to expel or
remove appointive members is conferred on the houses of the
Legislature, nor can such power be inferred or implied from the
statute, in view of the fact that it is expressly placed in the hands
of the Governor-General. The Act does not limit or qualify the
term "remove" and it therefore includes both temporary and
permanent removals.
An examination of the Senate resolution in question shows that
in effect it provides for a complete temporary removal of the
petitioner. It does not merely exclude him from the floor of the
Senate Chamber, but he is also "deprived of all his prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments as such senator," for the period of
one year. As far as he is concerned, his removal from office for
that period could not be made more complete. In attempting to
exercise the power of such removal, the Senate clearly
arrogated to itself powers which it does not possess and which,
under the Organic Act, rest in the Chief Executive. Its resolution
to that effect is consequent unconstitutional and void. As is the
case with an unconstitutional statute, it has, in the eyes of the
law, never existed.
We are therefore confronted with the facts that the petitioner is
a duly appointed senate; that he, as a matter of law, is not and
never has been removed or suspended from office; that he,
therefore, as such senate always has been, and still is, entitled
to all the prerogative, privileges, and emoluments of his office;
and that, nevertheless, certain officers and members of the
Senate, without any legal authority whatever, deprive him of
such prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, including his
salary. The Senate has nothing to do with the appointment of an
appointive senator and is not, as in the case of elective
members, the judge of his qualifications; when duly appointed,
the officers of the Senate are legally bound to recognize him as
a senator; they have no discretion in the matter and their duties
in regard thereto are purely ministerial.
In the circumstances, upon what legal principles is this court
precluded from granting the petitioner the relief he demands?
Why cannot, for instance, members of the Committee on
Accounts and the Paymaster of the Senate be directed to cause
to be paid to the petitioner the salary fixed by law?
Other courts have not hesitated to use the writ of mandamus to
compel performance of similar duties by officers of the
legislature. In Ex parte Pickett (24 Ala., 91), the writ was issued
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to compel him
to certify to the Comptroller of Public Accounts the amount to
which the petitioner was entitled as a member of the House for
mileage and per diem compensation. In State vs. Elder (31
Neb., 169), the writ was issued to compel the Speaker to open
and publish returns of the general election. In State vs. Moffitt (5
Ohio, 350), mandamus was held to lie to the Speaker of the
House to compel him to certify the election and appointment of
officers. In Wolfe vs. McCaull (76 Va., 87), the writ was issued
to compel the Keeper of the Rolls of the House of Delegates to
print and publish a bill passed by the Legislature and upon
request to furnish a copy thereof properly certified. (See also
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168; State vs. Gilchrist, 64
Fla., 41; People vs. Marton, 156 N. Y., 136.) As stated as the
outset, it is erroneously asserted in the majority opinion that this
action is, in substance, a suit against the Senate as a body. This
might be true if the act complained of was an act within the
jurisdiction of the Senate, but such is not the case here. A
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 18

practical illustration may, perhaps, make the point clear. Let us
suppose that a majority of the members of the Senate should
agree to commit a crime against another member and should
pass a senatorial resolution to that effect. Would that, in anything
but form, constitute a senatorial act? And suppose the same
members should proceed to carry the resolution into effect,
would not an action lie against such members and could that, in
substance, be regarded as an action against the Senate? The
questions answer themselves, and though in the present case
the illegal act does not constitute a crime, the analogy is,
nevertheless obvious; the distinction is one without a difference.
As has already been pointed out, the United States Supreme
Court has held that an action may, at the instances of the injured
party, be maintained against the presiding officer, as well as
other officers, of one of the houses of Congress for the execution
of an unconstitutional resolution. In the same case it is also
intimated that the action will lie against all members who take
direct part in the execution of such a resolution.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
usurp the powers of another branch, it may eventually lead
either to anarchy or to tyranny. A wrong has been committed for
which there is no other remedy but that there sought by the
petitioner, yet the court refuses to take jurisdiction on the
strength of alleged precedents which, as we have seen, in reality
have no bearing whatever upon the issues of the case. It is
hardly necessary to say that when men are deliberately denied
redress for wrongs, the temptation is strong for them to take the
law into their own hands and there is perhaps no more fruitful
source of popular unrest and disturbance.
I regret to see the decision find a place in our jurisprudence and
can only hope that it will not be followed by this court in the
future.
The demurrer to the petition should be overruled.

It may further be noted that though the prayer in the petition in Footnotes
this case does not expressly so state, the body of the petition
shows sufficiently that the remedy to be applied may not be the 1 Promulgated January 25, 1924, not reported.
same in regard to all of the defendants. The allegations seem
broad enough to cover both mandamus and prohibition and the
petition is not demurred to on that ground. It is also possible that
if evidence were permitted some of the defendants might be
absolved from the complaint.

It has been suggested that to entertain an action against a

coordinate department of the government would be an
unwarranted assertion of superiority on our part. I fail to see the
validity of this observation. This is not a question of departmental
superiority or inferiority. This court asserts no superiority for
itself; it only maintains the superiority of the law to which all of
us must yield obedience. The pronouncements of the court are
simply the voice of the law as understood by the court and are
not personal matters. Even if this action were brought against a
coordinate department as a body — which it is not — the court
would still be in duty bound to apply the law of the land to the
case and do its best to enforce that law irrespective of the rank
or importance of the parties.

In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that if

the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement might be the
cause of disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an
insult to the intelligence and patriotism of the defendants and I
feel sure that the fear thus expressed is entirely without
foundation. At least there has been no trouble of that kind in
other jurisdictions where writs have issued to officers or
members of the legislature. If courts perform their duties with
firmless, rectitude and moderation, regardless of personal or
political considerations, their decisions will be respected and
their orders and writs generally obeyed. It is usually when courts
fail in these respects, and thus prove unfaithful to their trust, that
their orders are disregarded and trouble ensues.

The decision of the court in the present case enjoys the

distinction of being without a precedent and of resting on no
sound legal prejudice of which I am aware. The arguments
advanced in its support are excuses and not reasons. If carried
to its logical conclusion, it may have far-reaching and serious
consequences. If one branch of the government may with
impunity, and with freedom from judicial intervention, freely

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE
L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO,
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL
B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity
as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San
Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted
to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of
his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said
members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding
in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to
require him to substantiate his charges against the President
with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the
pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House
of Representatives from the Second District of the
province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the
one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the
Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated
the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly
reports that under your unpopular administration the
free things they used to get from the government are
now for sale at premium prices. They say that even
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 19
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can
always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such
an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind
of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the
Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or
recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and
prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the
one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to contempt and
disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a
special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed
by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to
investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960,
and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to
substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require
him to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House. The special committee shall submit to the
House a report of its findings and recommendations
before the adjournment of the present special session
of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first,
the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his
allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House
provides that if other business has intervened after the member
had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the
majority decided to hear the matter further, and required
respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent
adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee
continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman
Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on
July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day—before closing its session—House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the
exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga,
Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the

power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to
the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18,
1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege
speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in
Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for
having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence
in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House,
suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious
disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and
by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960,
found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis
in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and
irresponsible charges against the President of the
Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960;
and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character
that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the
House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby
is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and
...
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1)
the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and
so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly
behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he
could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other business
before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the
additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country,
the provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that
"they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself
has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to
hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 20
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success"
for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come
to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed
and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the
question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York
was censured for using the following language on the floor of the
House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the
many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds'
Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds'
Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but
invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his
plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The
appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of
informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator
in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April
1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no
longer take action against me, he argues, because after my
speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken
up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59
was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according
to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous
consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended
the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts
or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the
period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to

actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States
has upheld such laws as against the contention that they
impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent
views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has
been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme
court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary
procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the
power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or
waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the
orderly con duct of business, and as security against
hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of
Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex
parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280;
Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N.
e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City
of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632;
Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186,
140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case
of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western
Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of
Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for
which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House
approved the resolution, despite the argument that other
business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2
Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the
Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have
been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a
coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation
of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has
been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 21
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. —
The principle is well established that the courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the
legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to
cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the
stated Senate is given the power to example a
member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am.
Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the
landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators
who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for
having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing,
nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere ,
explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial department
has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either
house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the
Constitution. It has been held by high authority that,
even in the absence of an express provision conferring
the power, every legislative body in which is vested the
general legislative power of the state
has the implied power to expel a member for any
cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett,
3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of
Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in
every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power
of self-protection, and that the legislative body must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which
may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no
provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise,
or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to
expel a member. These powers are functions of the
legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of
the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme.
An attempt by this court to direct or control the
legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of
the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative
functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which
in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation.
Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar:
the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction
to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as
subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible

course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort:
we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional
functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the
interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious
survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we
found the House of Representatives of the United States taking
the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks
upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or
breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action
against offenders, even after other business had been
considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to
suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator
Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office
for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the
that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course
of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement,
challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court
held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it
nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt
the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to
removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then
functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive
member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically
provided that "each house may punish its members for
disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the
word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor
General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without
restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion,
best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that
"suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that
vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer
particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the
duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the
Government of the United States or of the Governor-General,
who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature
had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones
Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers
and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by
the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the
Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give
the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as
already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator
for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the
Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 22
be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the
district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter
of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator;
yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to
commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition
intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task,
reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension
order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case
should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of
course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new
pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents,
ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause.
Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be
a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs.
Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important
questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express
at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed
relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby
dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by Congressman
Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either for declaratory
judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no original
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings, and
certiorari is available only against bodies exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee, being merely
fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.
I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to
invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of
prohibition against the committee, in so far as House Resolution
No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No. 175) constituted an
unlawful attempt to divest him of an immunity from censure or
punishment, an immunity vested under the very Rules of the
House of Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V,
provides as follows:

If it is requested that a Member be called to order for
words spoken in debate, the Member making such
request shall indicate the words excepted to, and they
shall be taken down in writing by the Secretary and
read aloud to the House; but the Member who uttered
them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the
censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other
business has intervened.
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had
delivered his speech and before the House adopted, fifteen days
later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent Committee
and empowering it to investigate and recommend proper action
in the case, the House had acted on other matters and debated
them. That being the case, the Congressman, even before the
resolution was adopted, had ceased to be answerable for the
words uttered by him in his privilege speech. By the express
wording of the Rules, he was no longer subject to censure or
disciplinary action by the House. Hence, the resolution, in so far
as it attempts to divest him of the immunity so acquired and
subject him to discipline and punishment, when he was
previously not so subject, violates the constitutional inhibition
against ex post facto legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and
175 are legally obnoxious and invalid on that score. The rule is
well established that a law which deprives an accused person of
any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its
passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-
A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp.
1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U. S. vs.Garfinkel,
69 F. Supp. 849).
The foregoing also answer the contention that since the
immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the
House could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules,
and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment
by implication. the right of the House to amend its Rules does
not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the petitioner of an
immunity he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is against
it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached when
the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of the
House only affected the procedure for dealing with that liability.
But whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. then
incurred was extinguished when the House thereafter
considered other business; and this extinction is a substantive
right that can not be subsequently torn away to his
disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs.
Parel, 44 Phil., 437 has ruled:
In regards to the point that the subject of prescription
of penalties and of penal actions pertains to remedial
and not substantive law, it is to be observed that in the
Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or
prescription of actions are invariably classified as
substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the
provisions for the prescription of criminal actions in the
Penal Code and not in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal.' This is in reality a more logical law. In
criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking, a
matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to
punish the crime and consequently, goes directly to the
substance of the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 23
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, that the
objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and
not statutes. In so far as the position of petitioner Osmeña is
concerned, the essential point is that he is being subjected to a
punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. And while
he was only meted out a suspension of privileges that
suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine,
which the House could have inflicted upon him had it been so
minded. Such punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of the
letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post
facto legislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was
inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The ex post
facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled, "can
not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is essentially
criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.] 1104, 1106;
Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules
is to protect the freedom of action of its members and to relieve
them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second
thought, as a result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or
pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without the immunity
so provided, no member of Congress can remain free from the
haunting fear that his most innocuous expressions may at any
time afterwards place him in jeopardy of punishment whenever
a majority, however transient, should feel that the shifting sands
of political expediency so demand. A rule designed to assure
that members of the House of the House may freely act as their
conscience and sense of duty should dictate complements the
parliamentary immunity from outside pressure enshrined in our
Constitution, and is certainly deserving of liberal interpretation
and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as
instances of disciplinary taken notwithstanding intervening
business, are not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by
Deschkler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of
Congressman Watson of Georgia involved
also printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds'
Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the debate immunity rule
afforded no defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks
was one of censure for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec.
1657); while the cases of Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex
Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds, sec.
1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the U. s.
House of Representatives as it stood before the 1880
amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the
Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the
following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):
This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a
semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Wilson) top the language of
that rule, as it settles the whole question:
62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in
debate, the person calling him to be order shall repeat
the words excerpted to —
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words
spoken in debate "and they shall be taken done in
writing at the Clerk's table; and no Member shall be

held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the
House, for words spoken, or other business has
intervened, after the words spoken, and before
exception to them shall have been taken.
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to order"
is "excepting to words spoken in debate." the second
part of the rule declares that a Member shall not be
held subject to censure for words spoken in debate if
other business has intervened after the words have
been spoken and before "exception" to them has been
taken. Exception to the words of the gentleman from
Iowa (Mr. Grinnell) was taken by the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Harding), the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also by the Speaker of
the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe
will show. The distinction is obvious between the two
parts of the rule. In the first part it speaks of a Member
excepting to language of another and having the words
taken down. In the last part of the rule it says he shall
not be censured thereafter unless exception to his
words were taken; but it omits to add as an condition
that words must also have been taken down. The
substantial point, indeed the only point, required in the
latter part of the rule is, that exception to the
objectionable words must have taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases and
the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily apparent.
As Rule 62 of the United States House of Representatives stood
before 1880, all that was required to preserve the disciplinary
power of the Hose was that exception should have been
taken to the remarks on the floor before further debate or other
business intervened. Under the rules of the Philippines House
of Representatives, however, the immunity becomes absolute if
other debate or business has taken place before the motion for
censure is made, whether or not exceptions or point of order
have been made to the remarks complained of at the time they
were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in
Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the
members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself
fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not,
as I have noted, include the right to retroactively amend the rules
so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained. And if
Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects of ex post
facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of Congress
should be deprived of the same protection. Surely membership
in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the liberties
enjoyed by the individual citizen.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. If may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraint or violate fundamental
rights and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitation all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate or even more
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 24
just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed., 324-
325.)
Court will not interfere with the action of the state
senate in reconsideration its vote on a resolution
submitting an amendment to the Constitution, where its
action was in compliance with its own rules, and there
was no constitutional provision to the contrary.
(Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963)
(Emphasis supplied.).
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel
the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter
it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and
nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has
been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues remain
so important as to require adjudication by this Court.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which
purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even the
Congress in the exercise of the power conferred upon it to
discipline its members, must follow the rules and regulation that
it had itself promulgated for its guidance and for that of its
members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmeña
delivered the speech declared by the House to constitutes a
disorderly conduct provides:
. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be held
to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the House
therefor, if further debate or other business has
intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7, Rules, House of
Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on
June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23,
1060 when the House created the committee that would
investigated him. For fully 15 days the House took up other
matters. All that was done, while the speech was being
delivered, was to have certains portions thereof deleted. I hold
that pursuant to its own Rules the House may no longer punish
Congressman Osmeña for the delivered fifteen days before.
The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish
Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except to
have some part of the speech deleted, show that the members
of the House did not consider Osmeña's speech a disorderly
conduct. The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña, which
came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is,
therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being made to
answer for an act, after the time during which he could be
punished therefor had lapsed.
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules
any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that the
House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental

principle of law that an amendment takes place only after its
approval, or, as in this case, to the extent of punishing an
offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed. Since the
rule, that a member can be punished only before other
proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time
Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may
not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority opinion that the rule
limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a speech to the
day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With due respect
to the majority, we do not think that it is merely a rule of
procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time in
which the House may take punitive action against an offending
member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to
punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is
substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be
ignored when invoked.
If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House
should observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a
member after the period for indictment and punishment had
already passed. Not because the subject of the Philippic is no
less than the Chief Magistrate of the nation should the rule of
the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is
based on the principle of separation of powers between the
three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition
that this Court should not interfere with the legislature in the
manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court
cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the law is when any
of its (the House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes the
law.
Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of
the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the rule
being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is being
violated in meting out punishment for his speech; we should not
shirk our responsibility to declare his rights under the rule simply
on the board excuse of separation of powers. Even the
legislature may not ignore the rule it has promulgated for the
government of the conduct of its members, and the fact that a
coordinate branches of the Government is involved, should not
deter us from performing our duty. We may not possess the
power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses to disregard
the same. In such case the members thereof stand before the
bar of public opinion to answer for their act in ignoring what they
themselves have approved as their norm of conduct.
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent
personally believe that vitreous attacks against the Chief
Executive, or any official or citizen for that matter, should be
condemned. But where the Rules, promulgated by the House
itself, fix the period during which punishment may be meted out,
said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be
prejudicated thereby. Only in that way may the supermacy of the
law be maintained.
Footnotes
1 These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the
views of petitioner.
2
Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 25
3
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189;
Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray. 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.
4Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are
merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the
orderly and convenient conduct of their own
proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870)
5
Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870.
6 South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649; 151
s. w. 515.
7 146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.
8Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William Willet,
Jr. of New York); par. 2498 (Louis v. Mc Fadden of
Pensylvania).
9
Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of
Representative by Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382.
10 the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of
the Philippines as large a control of their domestic
affairs as can be given them, without in the meantime
impairing the rights of sovereignty by the people of the
United States." (Preamble)
11Apart from the view that power to remove includes
the power to suspend asan incident. (Burnap vs. U. s.
252, U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693, 695.) This view is
distinguishable from Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil.,
175.(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we
need not explain this now. Enough to rely on
congressional inherent power.
12 See appendix par. VII, Cushing.
13
This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to
entertain original petitions for declaratory judgments,
and (b) availability of certiorari or prohibition against
respondents who are not exercising judicial or
ministerial functions (Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2).
14
See supra.
15 Phil., 83.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the
Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases filed against
her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of
employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator
Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioners request, came
up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed
the OSP to file the appropriate informations against
petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman
the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three
informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization
of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui
Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui
Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui @ Betty
Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao
Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se
Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang
Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping,
Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn
Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So
Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324 dated
April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified
aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified, thereby
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 26
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.[1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel,
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed,
respectively, No. 91-94555 and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need
for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan
granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her
physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in
court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that
petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment
on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her
cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before
the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698
and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued
a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order
deferring petitioners arraignment and the consideration of her
motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the
court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision
dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing
petitioners intention to accept a fellowship from the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving
the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case
and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to
inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the
same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens
whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby
supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously
omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed
the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners arraignment not later
than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended

informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32
informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution,
denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed
her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case
No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the
03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which
resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its
14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist
from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March
1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
amended informations, and from proceeding with her
arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his
disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R.
109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the
32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32
informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the
prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow
the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The
presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file
her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the
Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03 rd August
1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The
incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to
the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No.
123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the
motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996,
the Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the
motion under consideration and hereby suspends the accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take
effect immediately upon notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto
Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive
House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the
Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein
ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of
the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 27
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date
of implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry
of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the
time.[2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the
authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already
been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs.
Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of
the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer ---
may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld
by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service.[4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is
found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound
to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of
the preventive suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension.[7]

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to
decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that
the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which
he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of
the word office would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused. [8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not
automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information must
be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and
fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him,
e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or
the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13
of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information
on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of
his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is
charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right
to present a motion to quash the information on any other
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings
on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or
of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should
be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground
provided in Paragraph (a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In
other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the
criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an
inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of
the Revised Penal Code.[9]
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must
be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on
the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding
to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records an other evidence before the court could have a valid
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 28
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the
case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set
out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident
relating to petitioners case before the Sandiganbayan has been
brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been
called upon the resolve several other matters on the
subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in
Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of the
hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion
to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to
set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the
resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698 of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding
Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal
case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed
as filed the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, [14] petitioner
assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court
declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before
us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290;
G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed
to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and
the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of
action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not
charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of qualified aliens even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7
SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically
in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of
the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 29

(3) Those aliens were disqualified; government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
partiality in the execution of her official functions. capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains
to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the Court subscribes to the view[19] that unless an infringement of
offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[16] any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the
Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the
that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an
information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for
preventive suspension.
judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the
3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner
ranks under the Constitution which provides that each- prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or preventive suspension order.
expel a Member.A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.[17] Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No.
16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its raised by petitioner.
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the Court affirmed the order of WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, DISMISSED. No costs.
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on
the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled: SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Constitution which deals with the power of each House of JJ., concur.
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
[1]
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the Rollo, p. 96.
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a [2]
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from Rollo, p. 20.
the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for [3] 288 SCRA 328.
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
[4] At pp. 336-337.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be
deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress [5] Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan, 163 SCRA 163.
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim [6]
simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383.
albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, [7] At p. 386.
the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively [8]
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Segovia vs.
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal Sandiganbayan, supra.
affairs of either branch.
[9]
Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187; People vs. Albano, 163
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section SCRA 511, 517-519.
1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to
[10]
act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Resolution of the
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also Supreme Court in A.M. No. 00-05-03-SC, dated 03 October
in the determination of whether or not there has been a grave 2000, which became effective on 01 December 2000.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of [11] 205 SCRA 162.
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into [12] 217 SCRA 633.
any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 30

[13] 228 SCRA 214.

[14] G.R. No. 123792.
[15] Santiago vs. Garchitorena, Idem.
[16] At pp. 221-222.
[17] Section 16(3), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
[18] G.R. No. 118364, 08 August 1995.
[19]
Somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs.
De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, 289.

[G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002]
DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIV.)
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated FEB 5 2002.
G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno,
in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of
Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division,
House of Representatives, petitioners, vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan (First Division), respondent.)
The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari [1]cralaw is
whether of not the Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of court
the Speaker of the House of Representatives for refusing to
implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a
criminal case against a member of the House.
Petitioners seek the annulment of:
(1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division),[2]cralaw directing Speaker Jose de Venecia of the
House of Representatives, to implement the preventive
suspension of then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in
connection with Criminal Case No. 18857 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S.
Branzuela"; and
(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997, [3]cralaw also of the
Sandiganbayan, declaring Speaker de Venecia in contempt of
court for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order.
The facts are as follows:
On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case
No. 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a
"Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite."
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to
suspend the accused.But the Speaker did not comply.Thus, on
August 12, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at 8:00
o'clock in the morning, to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and
claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 31
as a body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116 adopted on
August 13, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now
assailed Resolution[4]cralaw declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine
of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court
in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan in G.R. No.
118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension provided
for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature
and purpose.It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as
a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid
Information.Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer
from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office.It is thus an incident
to the criminal proceedings before the court.On the other hand,
the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is
a House-imposed sanction against its members.It is, therefore,
a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline,
maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and
integrity.
Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., this Court en banc, through Justice Jose C. Vitug, held
that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019, thus:
"The order of suspension
prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. x x x.
"The suspension contemplated in
the above constitutional provision is a punitive
measure that is imposed upon a
determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. x x x.
"The doctrine of separation of
powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions.The maxim simply
recognizes that each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate,
branches of the government - the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary -
has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the
internal affairs of either
branch." (Emphasis ours)
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes,
Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This rendered moot and academic
the instant case.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 32

WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed

CLOSED and TERMINATED.(Quisumbing, J., no
part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business)

Endnotes:

[1]cralaw Under rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[2]cralaw
Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena,
and concurred in by Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario and
Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. (a special member, now a member of the
Supreme Court).

[3]cralawPenned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena,

and concurred in by Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario and
Edilberto G. Sandoval.

[4]cralaw Annex "B," ibid., pp. 48-67.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General
of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of
the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said
Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and
December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
— which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues,
used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers — bought foreign exchange for the importation of
urea and formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in
the production of said glues — and paid therefor the
aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May,
1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange
and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of
P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary
Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products,
petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of
P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central
Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the
refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass
in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord
with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act
No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General
subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank.
Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or
not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 33
payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not
be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as
"urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
time of reaction. This produce when applied in water
solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the
manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde",
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends,
however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615;
Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]).
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses
the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 34

tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the

President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in
the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons,
and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation
of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said
accused, conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign
country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125
kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine
currency; and that, then and there, the said accused,
also conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity
of opium and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the said
opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had
been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally
introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried
separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each
were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the
period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same penalties
were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to
pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his
appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five
assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the
many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but
their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court
erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 35
evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan
Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to
prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No.
2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was
not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1
of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted
that the last day of the special session was, under the Governor-
General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the
vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and
this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous
evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the
journals. These questions will be considered in the reversed
order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission
shall perform the duties which would properly be required of the
Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules
15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine
Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately
stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission
Journal for the ordinary and special sessions of the Third
Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was
approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission as
a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour of
midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner
Palma, the Commission, as a Chamber of the
Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among
other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall
keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be published . . .
." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the Assembly's
proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it
appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
existence of the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the
introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon
any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code also
provides that:
Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or
of any legislative body that may be provided for the

Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission
or the Philippine Legislature when there is in existence
a copy signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such Act and of the due enactment
thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the
exact question whether the courts may take judicial notice of the
legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that
such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the
question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited
therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases
make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914.
These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the
actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute
certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381),
published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the
date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may
go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining
the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and
explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this investigation
belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces
and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is
maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated,
adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and
that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by
extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that
the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence
as to the date of adjournment. In order to understand these
opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature and
character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood
to be that which proves or disproves "any matter in question or
to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is
that which establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.)
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention,
must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of
witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the
Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and
object the records of the Legislature are as important as those
of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of
the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel
in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's
clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so
until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters.
Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order
to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently
within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 36
Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as
here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared
with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or
absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of
public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and
unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be
taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and
the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation
less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many
contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively
trifling matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.],
1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel. Herron
vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up
the various cases upon this question; and, out of a
multitude of citations, not one is found in which any
court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of
the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to
be kept in each of its branches, on the question
whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for the
limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters have not
generally been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact
that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public
policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest
upon public memorials of the most permanent
character. They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time,
by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court cited
numerous decisions of the various states in the American Union
in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have been
unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule has
been in the least changed or modified when the legislative
journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government
and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in
that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that
the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.
This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to
go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing,
among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested
as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had
been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business
of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203
Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill of
lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio
Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed
"Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident
to the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and
the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the
warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number.
Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly

thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that shipments
of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been arriving in
Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose names were
not listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the nature
of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an investigation and
traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-five barrels to
Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs registry number
of the shipment, the entry number, and the serial number of each
barrel. It was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive
on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on the
morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived at that place,
the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's warehouse and joined
Beliso in the latter's office, where the two engaged in
conversation. Pons then left and shortly thereafter several of the
barrels arrived and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called
one of his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go
out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with the
vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels out of the
shipment of twenty-five and told Sese to load these five on the
cart and to deliver them to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General
Solano. This order was complied with by Sese and the barrels
delivered to Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their
investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs secret
service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that date before the
office was opened and awaited the arrival of Beliso. Sese was
found in the bodega and placed under arrest. The agents then
proceeded to separate the recent shipment from the other
merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the barrels by
the customs registry and entry numbers. Only twenty of the
twenty-five barrels could be found on Beliso's premises. Upon
being questioned or interrogated, Sese informed the customs
agents that the five missing barrels had been delivered by him
to Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The
agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General
Solano and here found the five missing barrels, which were
identified by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the
serial numbers. The five barrels were empty, the staves having
been sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each
corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were found
on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and
on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these
baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was
made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the initials
"J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to
ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle
General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and
from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented
by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was produced
by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the same was
signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After discovering these
facts they returned to the house of Beliso and selected three of
the twenty barrels and ordered them returned to the
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each was
found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of the barrel with
wooden cleats and securely nailed. Each large tin contained 75
small tins of opium. A comparison of the large tins taken out of
the three barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General
Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in every way
identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and warehouse
of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons, apparently unaware
that anything unusual was going on, arrived there and was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 37
placed under arrest, and taken to the office of Captain Hawkins,
chief of the customs secret service, and according to Hawkins,
voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling of the
opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins of opium found
at 144 Calle General Solano represented the entire importation.
Pons, being at the customhouse under arrest at the time the
three barrels were opened and the customs officers appearing
to be no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the
opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the barrels and
pointed out that the end of the barrel, which had the impression
of a bottle stamped in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing
the 195 tins of opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further
stated that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this
shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April
10, following the instructions given him by Beliso. On being
further questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been
partners in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144
Calle General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion
of Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and
that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous
importation of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a
previous shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs
agents then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard
several large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found
at 144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at
the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a
tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of
Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and
admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial
of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a
wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had
written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him (Garcia)
and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of Garcia.
According to Pons this letter arrived on the same steamer which
brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it
because he feared that it would compromise him. On being
asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing wine from
Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just arrived on
the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia
told me in this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of
wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto Lasarte, and
that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court
and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any
question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show
that the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood fried
named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this huge
smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty
imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the
decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila,
THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO
SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of
Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City
Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO,
FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO,
FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO
LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO
LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO
OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES,
JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their
capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D.
Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila,
etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia
and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The
Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House
Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act
Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the
City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten
and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as
Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 38
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21,
1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by
Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act
as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on
second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to
Section 11 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear
in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted
upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the
House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment,
which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the
Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved
by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter
signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it,
and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed
copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the
House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate
President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House
transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic
Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew
immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964
issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill
No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was
a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the
Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the
Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the
presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled
bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21,
1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the
Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which
his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate
and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had
signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a
message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially
withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had
been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it
would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law

what was not actually approved by the two Houses of
Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to
the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force
who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under
authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-
Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on
September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to
compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary,
the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police,
the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065
never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the
Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not
the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was
then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a
restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of
an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of
Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise
conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further
orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been
succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of
this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive
and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the
parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of
authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and
State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether
the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before
this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag,
et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1.
While the majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled
bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been
laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding
precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both
Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935)
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-
called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 39
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and
concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo
and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political
question which was not within the province of the judiciary in
view of the principle of separation of powers in our government.
The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the
ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if
a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that
respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in
by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction
to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically
that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section
313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in
the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure
appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the
"enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the
journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
or secretary, printed by their order; provided,
that in the case of acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is in existence a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly
approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy
of the approved bill.2 It has been held that this procedure is
merely a mode of authentication,3 to signify to the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly
approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of
approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has
passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided
for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or
not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence would
render the statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out,
would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto,
which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary6 There is less
reason to make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill
where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding
officers should sign the bill before it is submitted to the
President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution
required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision
was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was
considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another
case however, under the same circumstances, held that the
enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case

of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not
required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its
passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said
case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is
an official attestation by the two houses of
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It
is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that
a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form,
the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is
deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and
to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on
"the respect due to coequal and independent departments,"
which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation
is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records
of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof
of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding
officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does
contain the following provisions:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 40
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal
of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as
may in its judgment require secrecy; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior to
its passage, except when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate
enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers
of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation
of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the
approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that
"[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris,
supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it
clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed
both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that
there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of
the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue.
It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such
a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 41

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort
to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This
Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and
by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
6 Brown vs. Morris supra, at pp. 164-165.
7 Hammond vs. Lynch, 151 NW 81, 88.
8 Lynch vs. Hutchinson 76 NE 370.
9 143 U. S. 294, 303; 36 L. ed. 294.
10 Gray vs. Taylor, 113 P 588, 591, affirmed
in 227 U. S. 51, 57, 57 L. ed. 413, 416; Pelt
vs. Payne, 30 SW 426, 427.
11 Field vs. Clark, supra at p. 303; Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 13; Morales vs.
Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA
131, 134.
12 Article VI, Section 20(1). The 1973
Constitution similarly provides in Article VIII,
Section 20(1) that "(E)very bill passed by the
National Assembly shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the Prime Minister ... "

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied 13 See, for example, the decisions of this
and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT Court in Casco Phil. Chemical Co. vs.
DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER 347 and Morales vs. Subido, supra.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED
NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared
not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is
hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz

Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Amending Section 10 of R. A. No. 409

defining the powers and duties of the Vice-
Mayor.

2 See Rules of the House of Representatives,

Rules II (d) and IV(j) and Rules of the Senate;
Sections 3(e) and 6(h).

3 Brown vs. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160, 164.

4 Taylor vs. Wilson, 22 NW 119, 120.

5 See Annotations in 95 ALR 273.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondent.
Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person who
has served as captain in the police department of a city for at
least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree, is
qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question calls
for an interpretation of the following provisions of section 10 of
the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective
bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman
and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation
of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner
was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same
time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by
the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the
petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the
minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for
the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other
persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the
mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which
requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming
into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the
metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of
Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants
should possess.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 42
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand
that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified
applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of
police of the city. He contended that his service alone as captain
for more than three years in the Manila Police Department
qualified him for appointment. The demand was contained in a
letter which he wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The
mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused
to reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to
compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five
next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966
is, per his own phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning AND has served in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of
Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
OR
(3) has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and lieutenant
colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's insistence is that
he falls under the third class of persons qualified for appointment
as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act
"to place the local police service on a professional level," 1 and
contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one
who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the
other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from
patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of
professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still
we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as
additional qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of
the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement of
such additional qualification will best carry out that policy. The
fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that the
choice is between one who has served long and loyally in a city
police agency and another who, not having so served, has only
a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case. The
issue rather is whether, within the meaning and intendment of
the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have
educational qualification as shown by the possession of a
bachelor's degree.

The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the Act
which provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act have
rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a
provincial, city or municipal police agency although
they have not qualified in an appropriate civil service
examination are considered as civil service eligibles for
the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at least
five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is considered
a civil service eligible, so must a person be considered qualified
even though he does not possess a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it
fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the
statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's
lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment
of members of a police agency only. On the other hand, the
appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of
section 10, the last paragraph of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee
possesses the above educational qualification:
Provided, further, That in no case shall such
appointment extend beyond six months, except for a
valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service
Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to
compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of
a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of
civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the
contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service
eligible, may be provisionally appointed 2 chief of police
"[ p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the
possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in
addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a
bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of
Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or as
a captain in a city police department for at least three years,
would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a person who
has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law
considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police
or has been a captain in a city police agency for at least three
years. From this it is concluded that "the only logical equivalence
of these two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and
Police Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police Agency) is the
bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what
capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been
rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in
the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 43
conclusion that it is only in cases where the appointee's service
has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to
have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the
petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain
in a city police department for at least three years need not have
a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need not even
be a high school graduate. If such be the case would there still
be need for a person to be at least a high school graduate
provided he has had at least eight years of service as captain in
the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the
meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the
Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear. That
the purpose is to require both educational and service
qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is
evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill
6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section 12
of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966)
read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a
Police Agency. — No chief of a police agency of a
province or chartered city shall be appointed unless he
is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a
bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder
of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of
any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second
class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be
eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the
police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed
unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree
course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police
Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules, provided the appointee
possesses the above educational qualification but in no
case shall such appointment exceed beyond six
months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as
requiring both educational and service qualifications that the
following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the house
of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification
for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides
that the chief of a police agency of a province or a
chartered city should be at least a member of the
Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in
Police Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a four years'
college degree or holder of a bachelor's degree in
Police Administration or Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should object to
these minimum requirements; but I find such

requirement very rigid because it would not allow a
man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who rose
from the ranks. He became a corporal, a sergeant, a
police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go higher?
If he merited it, he should also be appointed chief of
police of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I
objected to this provision of the bill because it is a very
high qualification. However, somebody insisted that in
order to professionalize our police system and also to
attain a high standard of police efficiency, we must
have a chief of police who has a college degree. The
point which the gentleman is now raising was brought
up by one Member in the sense that a policeman who
rose from the ranks through serious hard work, even
after serving for fifteen or twenty years in the police
force, cannot become chief of police for lack of a
college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and
reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up
during the period of amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will
accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is
that because I made a number of proposed
amendments, I will not be ready to submit them
immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational
requirement contained in the bill that objections were expressed,
but while it was agreed to delete this requirement during the
period of amendment, no motion was ever presented to effect
the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization,
to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute
measure.5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act
owes its present form and substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the
meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any
high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the
capacity of captain for at least three years.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 44
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has
served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to
make the provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of captain
or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any
high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer in the
Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature
of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at least
a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner
finished the second year of the law course) could possibly
qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was
retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was made
by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and
painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the
possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the
President and found that the text of section 10 of the Act is as
set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears
on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the Senate
Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of
Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof
those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and
Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of Representatives,
and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill
theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act
must be deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on
the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States said
in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience
to the constitutional requirement that all bill which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill,
thus attested, receives his approval, its authentication
as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an
enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of
the house of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of

enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to co-equal and
independent department requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when
the two chambers of the legislature met in conference
committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with
exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its
presence in section 10 of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that —
except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher" — a high school graduate, no matter how long he
has served in a city police department, is not qualified for
appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served
as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years
irrespective of the branch of service where he served can be
Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the
Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of
Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he
was awarded three Presidential Awards, and was given the
Congressional Commendation — the highest award ever
conferred in the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to
concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in
the law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable
enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of
Congress and unless such enlargements are by it accepted
courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however much later wisdom may recomment the
inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often
involving a decided break with the past, and merely
carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the relatively
narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts
and the extent to which interpreting law is inescapably
making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law,
the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as
chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the
respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore
may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as
qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No
pronouncements as to costs.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 45
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., concurring:
As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the
Manila Police Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually
rose to his present position — that of Chief of the Detective
Bureau thereof — and holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be
reasonably expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police
Department. But the issue before us is not whether or not his
training and experience justify that expectation, but whether or
not, under and in accordance with the pertinent law, he is
qualified for appointment to such office to the extent that he is
entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of
mandamus compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service to include him in a list of eligible and qualified applicants
from which the mayor of the City of Manila might choose the
appointee who will fill the vacant position of Chief of Police of
the City of Manila.
Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) — which
controls the issue before us, reads as follows:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or
has served in the police department of any city with the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
The above legal provision may be construed as providing for two
different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a
bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning, and
(2) a high school degree, each of which is coupled with separate
and distinct service qualifications. Any one of the latter, joined
with either of the aforesaid academic requirements, would
qualify a person for appointment as Chief of a city police agency.
In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation would make the grade, in the same
manner as would another applicant with a similar bachelor's
degree who has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
etc.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 46

5
In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school graduate, See Committee Report 667.
the service qualification is not only different but is higher and
more exacting — for obvious reasons. 6Unpublished Journal of the Proceedings of August
25-26, 1966 of the Senate.
Petitioner, however, would construe and read the law as follows:
7 Of three copies of an enrolled bill signed into law, one
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police is kept in the Office of the President, a second one in
agency unless HE the Senate and a third one in the House of
Representatives. See Bernal, The Legislative Process,
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a 27 Phil. L.J. 507, 533 (1952).
recognized institution of learning AND has
8
served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines 78 Phil. 1 (1947) (overruled on other points in
OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov.
9, 1967).
(2) has served as chief of police with
9
exemplary record, OR 143 U.S. 647 (1891).

(3) has served in the police department of any
city with the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served
as officer in the Armed Forces for at least
eight years with the rank of captain and/or
higher.
10
Id. at 672.
111 Cong. Rec. No. 7 (special session, Aug. 27, 1966)
45.
12Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 534 (1947).

While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not unreasonable,

it falls short of showing that it is the true and correct meaning
and intent of the law aforesaid. This, in my opinion, must lead to
the conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus for the purpose stated in his petition because
to be entitled thereto he must show that, in relation to the matter
at issue, he has a clear enforceable right, on the one hand, and
that the respondent has an imperative legal duty to perform, on
the other. Because of this I am constrained to concur in the
result.

Footnotes

1 Sec. 2.

2 Section 24(c) of the Civil Service Act of 1959

provides: Provisional Appointment. — A provisional
appointment may be issued upon the prior
authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and the rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has
not qualified in an appropriate examination but who
otherwise meets the requirements for appointment to a
regular position in the competitive service, whenever a
vacancy occurs and the filling thereof is necessary in
the interest of the service and there is no appropriate
register of eligibles at the time of appointment."

3 Cong. R . No. 64, 156-57 (1966) (emphasis added).

4 See 1 Cong. Rec. No. 65, 28-36 (1966).


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554 October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit
association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of
the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and
taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting
Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of
the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the
Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently
enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic
Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30,
1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay, present Auditor General,
was substituted for Amable M. Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor
General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134 provided, inter
alia, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
P40,000.00 each; that of the Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing
their present compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per
annum for the Presiding officers and members, respectively, as
set in the Constitution). The section expressly provided that "the
salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act
provides "that the salary increase of the President of the Senate
and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take
effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen
and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1965,
to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the
following items for the House of Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to
December 29, 1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to
June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00
MEMBERS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 47
2. One hundred three Members of the House
of Representatives at P7,200 from July 1 to
December 29, 1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to
June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items
appear to be:
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . . P
16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . .
. 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642)
implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act
4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940,
that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive
only of traveling expenses to and from their respective
districts in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives, and to and from their places of
residence in the case of Senators, when attending
sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such,
increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators
elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic
Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written
protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines
summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the
Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law
involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the issue
by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought from the
Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition). Conformably to the
suggestion, the former Acting Auditor General endorsed the
PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of Justice on November 26,
1965; but on or before January, 1966, and before the Justice
Secretary could act, respondent Aguiluz, as former Acting
Auditor General, directed his representative in Congress,
respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment

of the increased salaries within the limits of the Appropriation
Act in force; hence the filing of the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of
personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of
showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the
House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the
answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with the
Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of the
Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand,
in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the
House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices
to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless
of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the
Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As
taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain officials
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, L-23326,
December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez, 56 Phil. 257; Pascual
vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405, December 29, 1960;
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24, 1965; Iloilo
Palay & Corn Planters Association vs. Feliciano, L-24022,
March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in 52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual
capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful expenditure
or waste of state funds is the minority doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House
of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since
the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing in
audit and the approval of the payment of the Representatives'
increased salaries, and not the collection or receipt thereof, only
respondent auditors were indispensable or proper parties
defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to
the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of the House
but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective? Or,
on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the
payment of the increased compensation to the members of the
House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration
of the term of those House members who approved the
increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of office
of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the
increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a legal
bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to
elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a
deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
Vol. 2, p. 867).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 48
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to "all
the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without
distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
"expiration of the full term" of the Senators and Representatives
that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the
plural, despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for
Senators and four for Representatives thereby rendering more
evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as
indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the
word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following
phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House",
underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office
of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
(whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired
before the increase in compensation can become operative.
Such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole,
accords in turn with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on
the shoulders of the entire Legislative body; responsibility
therefor is not apportionable between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as
reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p.
296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that
the Legislature should be bicameral in
form, initially recommended that the increase in the
compensation of legislators should not take effect until the
expiration of the term of office of all members of the Legislature
that approved the increase. The report of the committee read as
follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for their
services an annual compensation of four thousand
pesos including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances and exclusive of travelling expenses to and
from their respective residences when attending
sessions of the National Legislature, unless otherwise
fixed by law: Provided, That no increase in this yearly
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration
of the terms of office of all the Members of the
Legislature that approved such increase. (Emphasis
supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final
choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made
more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which
read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not take
effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the
Members of the National Assembly who may be
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (Aruego,
1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally approved
and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, provided that:

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940 amendments
to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed its present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the
plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first
proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934
Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause
has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of
the Legislature that approved the higher compensation, whether
the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to
circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its
adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that
if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had
intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the
Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all
the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the
members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction
without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the reason
for specifying the component chambers was rather the desire to
emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a bicameral
legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to the
Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the
words "of the" before "House" in the provision being considered,
and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House"
when it could have employed the shorter expression "of the
Senate and the House". It was grammatically correct to refer to
"the members of the Senate and (the members) of the House",
because the members of the Senate are not members of the
House. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House"
would imply that the members of the Senate also held
membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term of
office of the Senators, as well as that of the Representatives,
must all expire the Constitution would have spoken of the
"terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the Senate and of the
House", instead of using "term" in the singular (as the
Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI), has been already
considered. As previously observed, the use of the singular form
"term" precisely emphasizes that in the provision in question the
Constitution envisaged both legislative chambers as one single
unit, and this conclusion is reinforced by the expression
employed, "until the expiration of the full term of ALL the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of
the Senators before the effectivity of the increased
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 49
compensation would subject the present members of the House
of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the
Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered
whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the
1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original
limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay
of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before
an increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately
following an election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years
each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the
increase could become operative, because the original
Constitution required that the new emolument should operate
only after expiration of the term of assemblymen
elected subsequently to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5),
and an assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the
Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since
Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were
approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an
election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the original
restriction, because to the last year of the term of the approving
assemblymen the full 3-year term of their successors must be
added. Once again an identical period must elapse under the
1940 amendment: because one-third of the Senators are
elected every two years, so that just before a given election four
of the approving Senators' full six-year term still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen
elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the
1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after the
expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen elected
in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until December
30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present Constitution,
if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the participation of
Senators elected in 1963, the same would not be collectible until
December 30, 1969, since the said Senators' term would expire
on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original
Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation, not
in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new
compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four
years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in November
of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the increase) would end
in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is
approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the
elections in November of that year, the higher compensation
would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four years
later, because the most recently elected members of the Senate
would then be Senators chosen by the electors in November of
1963, and their term would not expire until December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the
original and the amended constitution can not be just due to
accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the
Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been
maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows
how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of

the present House to await the expiration of the term of the
Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in
compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under
the Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to
discourage the approval of increases of compensation just
before an election by legislators who can anticipate their
reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution
should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved
interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such
increased compensation may not be disbursed until December
30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966
Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased
compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is
hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to
authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even
prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of
Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are prohibited and
enjoined from approving and passing in audit any
disbursements of the increased compensation authorized by
Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No costs.
We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring
opinions of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring:
Fully concurring with the ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I
should like only to mention a few thoughts related to some points
contained therein.
As stated in the majority opinion, it is argued by respondents that
if it was intended that the increase should take effect at the same
time, the provision of the Constitution could have been phrased
as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Congress approving such increase.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 50
They maintain that in specifying "the Senate" and "the
House" instead of just using the words "the Congress" the body
obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the
Representatives and Senators under the legislature provided
for, would not necessarily coincide, the effective date of the
increased salary of the Representatives could also be different
from that of the Senators.
The fact that "Congress" is not used in the provision in question,
in my opinion, is rather an argument for the petitioner
herein. "Congress" is not used, obviously because after every
four years the Congress is dissolved. On the other hand, the
term of a member of the Senate, being six years, goes beyond
the duration of one Congress and extends to that of the next
Congress. In other words, while the term of the members of the
House of Representatives coincides with the lifetime of the
Congress, the term of a member of the Senate goes beyond the
existence of one Congress.
The Constitution, instead, uses (1) "Senate" and "House of
Representatives" and (2) adds "all" before "the
Members", clearly intending that no increase in the
compensation therein provided for shall take effect until after the
expiration of the term of the most junior among the members of
the Senate at the time the increase was approved. Precisely,
therefore, because the Constitution speaks
of "Senate" and "House of Representatives" instead
of "Congress", the prohibition against effectivity continues even
after the end of the Congress which approved the measure and,
which amounts to the same thing, even after the end of the term
of the members of the House of Representatives approving the
increase. In specifying "the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase", the Constitution leaves no doubt that
until after the condition is met as to the Senate, no increase in
the compensation laid down for Senators and Representatives
shall take effect.
It is also contended by respondents that the Constitution in
using "term" instead of "terms" shows the clear intention to
consider the "term" of the Senators independently from that of
the Representatives. The contention is untenable. The provision
clearly uses "term" in the general sense. For, otherwise, even in
referring to members of the Senate alone, it should have
used "terms" since the Senators had originally different terms of
office (two, four and six years), as provided for in Section 3 of
Article VI of the Constitution, a provision contemporaneous with
the one involved herein. Yet just the same, the Constitution uses
the would "term" (singular) to cover all these different terms of
office.
I am of the opinion therefore that no other course is open to the
Supreme Court in this case but to apply the provision of the
Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators and
Representatives by subjecting it to a period of waiting. To
forestall the view that the Supreme Court thereby offends equity,
because the other Constitutional officers — including the
members of said Court — are already receiving their increased
salaries under Republic Act No. 4134, suffice it to bear in mind
that it was within the hands of the legislators themselves if they
had so desired, to have provided that the salary increases of the
aforesaid other Constitution officers take effect at the same time
as their own. In other words, if they had thought it would be
inequitable to grant salary increases to others before they could

receive their own salary increase — an argument which, I am
glad to note, has not been advanced — they could have easily
provided that the salary increases therein given be effective
December 30, 1969, as in their case.
I consequently reiterate my concurrence.
ZALDIVAR, J., concurring:
During the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was approved,
and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the
President of the Philippines and became Republic Act No. 4134.
Section 1, paragraph A of Republic Act 4134 provides, among
others, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate and
of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be forty
thousand pesos, and that of the Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand pesos
each. The paragraph ends with this sentence: "The salary
increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution."
The pertinent provision of the Constitution as far as the
effectivity of any law increasing the compensation of the
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned reads as follows:
. . . No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. . . . (Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution)
Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190 was passed during the third
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, in 1964,
said bill was approved by the House of Representatives whose
members were elected in the elections of November, 1961 and
whose term of office would expire on December 29, 1965; and
by the Senate whose membership was composed of: eight
Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and whose term
would expire on December 29, 1965; eight Senators who were
elected in November, 1961 and whose term would expire on
December 29, 1967; and eight Senators who were elected in
November, 1963 whose term would expire on December 29,
1969.
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing the opinion of the Court in the
case now before Us, interpreting the effectivity clause in
paragraph A, Section 1 of Republic Act 4134 in relation to the
pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution,
herein-above quoted, says that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act 4134 for the Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives will not take effect until
December 30, 1969. I concur with this opinion because it will not
be until December 29, 1969 when the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
that approved the increase in 1964 would expire. And I also
agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642
(Appropriation Law for the fiscal year 1965-1966) authorizes the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 51
disbursement of the increased compensation for the Members
of the House of Representatives prior to December 30, 1960
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void..
My opinion in this regard is based upon a personal knowledge
of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our
present Constitution. It was the Second National Assembly
which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble
Member of the Second National Assembly, representing the
province of Antique.
The three important amendments that were incorporated in our
Constitution by the Second National Assembly in 1940 were the
provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a bicameral
legislature composed of a House of Representatives and a
Senate, to take the place of the then existing unicameral
legislature known as the National Assembly; (2) the change in
the term of the office of the President of the Philippines, and the
Vice-President, which formerly was for a period of six years, to
that of four years, with the proviso that no person shall serve as
President for more than eight consecutive years; and (3) the
creation of the Commission on Elections.
It is regrettable that the deliberations of the Second National
Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the Constitution were
mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the
discussions were not recorded. It was during the first special
sessions of the Second National Assembly in September, 1939
when discussions on proposed amendments to the Constitution
were held. It was only after the propose amendments had been
approved in caucuses when the amendments were embodied in
a resolution and submitted to the National Assembly in open
session. The amendments as approved in caucuses were
embodied in Resolution No. 38 and adopted on September 15,
1939. However, during the second regular sessions in 1940
Resolution No. 38 was amended by Resolution No. 73 which
was adopted on April 11, 1940. That is how the amendments
came to be known as the 1940 Amendments. Those
amendments were approved in a plebiscite that was held on
June 18, 1940.
I still have vivid recollections of the important points brought up
during the deliberations in caucus over proposed amendments
and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the influences
that worked, and the pressures that were brought to bear upon
the Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring about agreements on
very controversial matters and thus secure the insertion of the
desired amendments to the Constitution. The discussions on the
proposed amendments affecting the legislative branch of the
government were specially of interest to us then because we
were in some way personally affected, as most of us were
interested in running for reelection.
It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my recollections
of matters that were brought up during our caucuses then, but I
only wish to emphasize the fact that my concurring opinion in
the decision of the case now before Us has for its basis my
honest and best recollections of what had transpired, or what
had been expressed, during the caucuses held by the Members
of the Second National Assembly in the deliberations which later
brought about the 1940 amendments.

I distinctly remember that the proposed amendment to change
the legislature from unicameral to that of bicameral, just as the
proposal to change the term of office of the President from six
years without reelection to that of four years with one reelection,
at first met very strong oppositon by a considerable group of
Assemblymen. But somehow the opposition was finally
subdued, so to say. In the case of the legislature, the basic idea
of having two chambers of the legislature — one chamber
serving as a check to the other — was accepted. It was then
considered as a wise idea to have the Senate as the upper
chamber, to be composed of members who would be elected at
large, and it was expected that those who would be elected to
the Senate would be men of national prestige; prestigious
because of their known integrity, in their record and experience
as a public servant, or in their prominence as a successful
member of his profession. It was even said, then, that the
Senate would be a training ground for future Presidents of the
nation. And so, when it was agreed that a bicameral legislature
would be provided in the Constitution, the next matter that had
to be considered was the tenure of office of the members of each
of the two chambers of the legislature. As far as the terms of the
members of the lower chamber, to be known as the House of
Representatives, there was no disagreement over the idea that
their term be for a period of four years, to coincide with the term
of the President. But as far as the term of office of the members
of the upper chamber, to be known as the Senate, there was at
first a divergence of opinion. There was a group that supported
the idea that the term of the members of the upper chamber be
four years, similar to that of the House of Representatives, so
that in the national elections that would take place every four
years there would be elections for President, Vice-President,
and all the members of the Congress of the Philippines.
However, there was a very strong advocacy on the part of top
political leaders at that time that the Senate should be made a
continuing body, such that the complete membership of that
chamber should not be elected during the national elections that
would take place every four years.
Finally, it was agreed that the members of the Senate, which
was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would have a term
of six years, one-third of which number would be elected every
two years. The idea of having elections of one-third of the
membership of the Senate was adjusted to the situation that in
between two national elections there were the elections for local
officials. The question regarding the term of office of the
Members of the first Senate to be elected under the Constitution
as amended was settled by inserting a proviso that the first
senators elected should, in the manner provided by law, be
divided equally into three groups: the senators of the first group
to serve for a term of six years, those of the second group to
serve for a term of four years, and those of the third group for a
term of two years (Article VI, Section 3). And for the purposes of
the first elections under the amended Constitution
Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the National
Assembly providing, as far as the first Senate was concerned,
that "The Senate shall, within ten days after it shall have been
organized with the election of its President, determine by lot
which of the elected Senators shall belong to the group who
shall serve six years, which to the group who shall serve for four
years, and which to the group which shall serve for two years."
(Section 9, Com. Act No. 666)
When the matter regarding the compensation of the members
of both chambers came up for the deliberation, there were
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 52
proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than
the Members of the House of Representatives, and a number of
proposals were presented regarding the amount of
compensation that would be paid to the Senators or to the
Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the
subject of long discussions. It was finally agreed that the amount
of compensation for the Senators and for the Members of the
House of Representatives be the same, and it was fixed at
P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and other
emoluments, exclusive only of travelling expenses in going to
and returning from the sessions. There was an increase of
P2,200.00 over the P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of
the National Assembly were receiving at the time. It is thus seen
that in the matter of compensation the sense of the Members of
the Second National Assembly who amended the Constitution
in 1940 was to provide for an equal compensation for the
Members of the Senate and to the Members of the House of
Representatives.
When the matter regarding the increase in the compensation of
the Senators and of the Representatives came up for
consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen in
support of the idea that members of the Congress of the
Philippines may approve a law increasing their compensation,
but that no Member of the House of Representatives or of the
Senate that approved the law increasing the compensation
should receive the increased compensation during their term of
office when the increase was approved. I remember that the
question as to when the increase of compensation as approved
by the Members of the Congress of the Philippines should take
effect was the subject of a prolonged and heated discussion.
Many Members of the National Assembly wanted to continue
with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the original
Constitution that "No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of
the National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of
such increase." I have taken note that no less than eighteen
members of the Second National Assembly in 1940 were
members of the 1934 constitutional convention that drafted the
original Constitution, and it was this group of Assemblymen that
were zealous in maintaining the idea that one full term of a
member of the legislature subsequent to the approval of the
increase in compensation should be made to lapse before the
increase shall take effect. But this idea could not be insisted
upon because while that was feasible in the case of Members of
the National Assembly which was a unicameral body, that idea
could not be adopted in a bicameral body where the term of
office of the members of one chamber was not the same as that
of the members of the other chamber. I recall that it was finally
agreed to simply adopt the constitutional precept that no
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
receive any increase in compensation, as approved by the
House and the Senate of a particular Congress, before the
expiration of the term of all the members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate that approved the increase.
Inasmuch as the term of the Members of the House of
Representatives is shorter than that of the Senators, it was
understood that the expiration of the term of the Members of the
Senate that approved the increase should be awaited before the
increase in compensation would take effect. As finally worded
by the Committee on Style of the Assembly, and that Committee
on Style was headed by the illustrious and indefatigable
Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto, who later became a worthy
member of this Court, that constitutional precept which became

part of Section 14, Article VI of the amended Constitution was
worded as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
It should be noted that the above-quoted portion of Section 14,
Article VI of the Constitution talks of the "expiration of the full
term of all the Members" then followed by the words "of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." This proviso contemplates not the Representatives or
the Senators who voted in favor of the increase, but the Senate
and the House of Representatives as a body that approved the
increase. And so, because the understanding of the amending
Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of the increase should
take place after the expiration of the term of the Senators with
the longest term among the Members of the Senate that
approved the increase the constitutional proviso was so worded
"shall take effect until after the full term of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." It will be noted that this Section 14 starts with using
the words "Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives" in referring to the compensation to be received
by each. They are considered individually. But in the matter of
determining the time when the increase is to take effect they are
considered as collective by the use of the phrase "all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase." The use of the word all includes every
Member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives,
regardless of whether or not he or she voted affirmatively for the
increase. It is the House and the Senate that approved the
increase. And so because the effectiveness of the increase
depends on the expiration of the term of all the members of both
chambers it stands to reason that all the members of the two
chambers were taken into consideration, and because when the
increase was approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives there were members of the Senate whose term
of office was longer than that of some other Members of the
Senate and of the Members of the House of Representatives it
is the term of the Senators which was the longest that should
first expire before the increase should take effect. That is how I
understood then that portion of Section 14, Article VI of the
Constitution, and I sincerely believe that that was also how most
if not all of my colleagues understood it.
The question precisely was raised whether under that
constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of the
House of Representatives who are elected during the elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase by the Congress of
the Philippines could receive the increased compensation
inasmuch as the term of those Members of the House that had
approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it
was the understanding of the Members of the National
Assembly that those members of the House of Representatives
who would be elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase could not immediately receive the increased
compensation as approved during the preceding Congress; and
neither could the eight Senators who would be elected along
with those Representatives in the same elections. To allow
those newly elected Representatives and Senators to receive
the increased compensation would give rise to a situation
whereby the Members of the House of Representatives and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 53
eight Senators would be receiving a compensation higher than
that received by at least sixteen Members of the Senate,
including the President of the Senate, as the case might happen.
That would be inconsistent with the basic idea adopted by the
Members of the National Assembly that the compensation of the
Members of the House of Representatives and those of the
Senate should be the same; and it is only logical that when we
say that the compensation of the Members of the House and of
the Members of the Senate is the same, that compensation
should be the same not only in amount but also at the same time
within their respective terms of office.
It was envisaged by the Members of the National Assembly that
the salary increase, under the constitutional proviso now in
question, would become effective after the lapse of two years,
or four years, as the case may be, after the commencement of
the term of office of those Members of the House of
Representatives that are elected in the elections subsequent to
the approval of the increase. In the case of the lapse of four
years, which we have just stated, it would mean that it would be
the Members of the House of Representatives who would be
elected in the second elections subsequent to the approval of
the increase who would receive the increased compensation.
As I have stated, it was the sense of the Members of the Second
National Assembly that approved the constitutional amendment
in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for Members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate would take
effect only until after the expiration of the full term of the senators
who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase. It
is my recollection that the main idea of the Members of the
National Assembly in adopting the proviso in question was to
maintain the equality of the compensation of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate at all times.
Three situations were anticipated to happen by the amending
Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in question:
1. This is the first situation. Let us take the case of the First
Congress of the Philippines which was elected in November,
1941 already under the Constitution as amended in 1940. This
Congress was composed of a House of Representatives whose
members were elected for a term of 4 years, to expire on
December 29, 1945; and of a Senate composed of eight
Senators with a term of 6 years to expire on December 29, 1947;
eight senators with a term of 4 years to expire on December 29,
1945, and eight senators with a term of 2 years to expire on
December 29, 1943.
If a law increasing the compensation of Members of Congress
was passed during the sessions of 1942, supposing that there
was no war, the increase would take effect on December 30,
1947, after the expiration of the term of the eight senators who
were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who served for
a term of six years. The term of the eight senators who were
elected in 1941 and who would have served for only two years
would have expired on December 29, 1943; and the term of the
eight senators who would have served for four years would have
expired on December 29, 1945. The term (4 years) of the
Representatives who were elected in November, 1941 would
also have expired on December 29, 1945. But in November,
1943 elections for eight senators who would serve for a regular
term of 6 years would have taken place; and likewise elections

for a full House of Representatives and for another set of
senators to serve for a full term of six years would have taken
place in November, 1945. If the war did not upset the national
affairs a new Congress would have convened in January, 1946,
already composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate
whose members would all have been elected for a term of six
years each.
So, on December 30, 1947 when the increase in the
compensation would take effect, the increased compensation
would be uniformly enjoyed by all members of Congress
(Senators and Representatives alike) — those Senators who
were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections, and by the
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
the 1945 elections. Under that situation, the Members of the
House of Representatives who were elected in 1945 would have
waited for two years before they could receive the increased
compensation that was approved in the 1942 sessions of
Congress. And this is so, because it is on December 29, 1947,
when the six-year term of the eight Senators who were Members
of the Senate that approved the increased compensation in
1942 (along with the then existing House of Representatives)
had expired.
2. Now let us take the second situation. Let us take the case of
a Congress that is normally constituted. When I say "normally
constituted" I mean a Congress composed of a House of
Representatives whose members had been elected for a term
of four years, and a Senate that is composed of Members who
had each been elected for a term of six years, although at
different elections, as provided in the Constitution.
We make the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines
as an example. This Congress covered the period of four years
from January, 1954 to December, 1957, inclusive. During the
first two years (or two regular sessions) this Congress was
composed of the House of Representatives whose members
were elected in the elections of November, 1953 and whose
term would expire on December 29, 1957; and twenty-four
senators: eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose
term would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were
elected in November, 1951 and whose term would expire on
December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in November,
1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.
If a law increasing the salary is passed, say in the first regular
session of the Third Congress in May, 1954, then the increase
provided for in this law would take effect on December 30, 1959.
Why? Because that law was approved by the House of
Representatives (the term of whose members ended on
December 29, 1957) and by a Senate at least eight of whose
members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of
office would expire on December 29, 1959. That means that the
members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
the elections of November, 1957 (many of whom may be
members of the Third Congress who voted for the law in May,
1954) would have to wait for two years before they could receive
the increased compensation. In other words, beginning
December 30, 1959, the Members of the House of
Representatives and all the Members of the Senate (those
elected in the 1955, 1957 and 1959 elections) would all
be uniformly getting the increased salary.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 54
3. Let us take the third situation. We still use the Third Congress
of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. Let us suppose
that the law increasing the compensation was passed in the third
regular session of the Third Congress in May, 1956. This time
the Third Congress is composed of the same members of the
House of Representatives who were elected in November,
1953, but the Senate has a different composition. The Senate
would already be composed of eight new Senators who were
elected during the elections of November, 1955 and whose term
of office would expire on December 29, 1961, the remaining
eight Senators elected in 1953 and eight Senators who were
elected in 1951. If the law increasing the compensation is
passed during the regular session of 1956 this law would be
approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
that had eight new members whose term would expire on
December 29, 1961. Since the term of these new eight Senators
would expire on December 29, 1961, then the increased
compensation would take effect on December 30, 1961.
In November, 1957 there were elections and a new House of
Representatives was then elected, and the term of office of the
members of the new House would expire on December 29,
1961. Likewise, a new set of eight Senators were elected whose
term would expire on December 29, 1963. Those Members of
the House of Representatives who were elected in November,
1957, among whom perhaps were Representatives who voted
for the increase during the 1956 sessions, would not enjoy the
increased compensation because their term would expire on
December 29, 1961 — the very same date of the termination of
the term of the eight Senators who were elected in 1955 and
who were Members of the Senate that approved the increase
during the session of 1956. In this case the increased
compensation would be received by the Members of the House
of Representatives who were elected in the elections of
November, 1961, along with the Senators who were elected in
November, 1961 and the remaining Senators who were elected
in 1959 and 1957. They would all be receiving the same
compensation and at the same time while they are in office
during the term for which they were elected.
As far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the
situation as portrayed in this third case is the same situation as
that which was contemplated by the framers of the original
Constitution of 1935 when it was provided in the Constitution as
adopted that the increase in salary should not take effect "until
after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase." In the example we have given, the increase in
salaries of the Members of the House of Representatives which
was approved by the Members of the House in the third regular
session of the Third Congress did not take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of the Members of the House who were
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have
portrayed above. Republic Act 4134 was approved during the
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into law by the President
on June 20, 1964. As I have stated earlier, the increase provided
in this law was approved by the House of Representatives
whose members were elected in November, 1961, and whose
term of office expired on December 29, 1965; and by the Senate
composed of eight Senators who were elected in November,
1963 whose term would expire on December 29, 1969, eight

Senators who were elected in November, 1961 whose term
would expire on December 29, 1967, and eight Senators who
were elected in November, 1959 whose term had expired on
December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as the increase would take effect
at the expiration of the term of the Senators who were elected in
November, 1963 — which is on December 29, 1969 — the
Members of the present House of Representatives cannot
receive this increased compensation during their present term
of office. It will be the Members of the House of Representatives
who will be elected in November, 1969, along with the Senators
elected in 1965, 1967 and 1969, who will receive this increased
compensation. They will then all be receiving the same
compensation during the time that they are in office.
I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know them,
because I sincerely believe that the interpretation embodied in
the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, of the pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14
of our Constitution is in consonance with the facts and
circumstances as I remember them, and as I know them. As I
have stated at the early part of this concurring opinion, it is not
my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what
transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of what had
been agreed upon, by the Members of the Second National
Assembly during the deliberations which brought about the 1940
amendments to our Constitution. My perception and my memory
are as frail as those of any other human being, and I may have
incurred myself in error. It just happened that the facts and the
circumstances that I have herein narrated, as I remember them,
have engendered in my mind an opinion, nay a conviction, which
dovetails with the opinion of my illustrious colleague that has
penned the opinion for the majority of the Court in this case.
CASTRO J., concurring:
Republic Act 4134, increasing the salary of all the members of
Congress, was approved on June 20, 1964. In the light of the
constitutional prohibition or station embodied in section 14 of
article VI of the Constitution, when does such increase in salary
take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the members
of the House of Representatives, considering that the full term
of the members thereof who participated in the approval of the
salary increase has expired? Even if the full terms of all the
members of the Senate, as composed in 1964, have not
expired? Or shall effectivity be only on December 30, 1969, after
the expiration of the full term of the senators elected in 1963? .
I fully adhere to and support the position taken by my esteemed
brethren, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon and Calixto
Zaldivar. Their thorough going treatment of the issue effectively
exploits logical, historical and empirical considerations leading
quite inevitably to the firm conclusion that the salary increase
provided for by Congress in 1964 can take effect, for any and all
members of Congress, only after the expiration of the full term
of the senators elected in 1963, that is to say, only after
December 29, 1969.
There is, however, a vital aspect of the problem that, in my view,
requires not only projection but emphasis as well. This is the
language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or limitation
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 55
which by itself forcefully compels the very conclusion arrived at
by the majority of the Court.
We cannot overemphasize the essential role of language. It is
one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially of modern
thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual and
material experiences; but more than this he has the ability to
articulate, and through articulation he manages synthesis and
brings forth the creation and evolution of culture, literature,
science and law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say
what is meant and to mean what is said.
How, then, is the constitutional prohibition or limitation on
congressional salary increases stated? "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." This statement has
a literal message of striking clarity. The phrase "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect" establishes the character
of the provision as a prohibition or limitation, as can be seen
from the unqualified words "no increase". The words "until after
the expiration of the full term" impart the period of time during
which the prohibition or limitation operates, after which period
the increase in compensation can take effect. Whose full term
must first expire before the increase can take effect? It is the full
term "of the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." The immediate as
well as lasting impact of these words is that what must first
expire is the full term of the members of both houses of
Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of
the members of either house, nor yet the full term of the
members of the Senate or that of the members of the House of
Representatives.
The key word is the particle "and". "And" is a conjunction
pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with"
(Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
Language, p. 105); "along or together with," "added to or linked
to," used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause
with clause (Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 98). The
word "and" does not mean "or"; it is a conjunction used to denote
a joinder or union, "binding together relating the one to the other"
(See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).
As understood from the common and usual meaning of the
conjunction "and," the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the House of Representatives.
From the perspective of semantics, it is undeniably perceived
that those who framed the constitutional provision, when they
utilized the word "and," stated what they meant and meant what
they stated.
There is, to be sure, a specific rule of interpretation that would
allow "or" to be interchanged with "and," in which event a
negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the
exception rather than the general rule. The exception is resorted
to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the plain
intention of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the overall
context of the writing and/or from external factors. This does not
obtain in the provision under discussion. Indeed, a departure
from the general rule and a resort to the exception would pervert
section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of compensation of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 56

senators and the members of the House of Representatives. If

the expiration of the full term of the members of the Senate
would be considered as separable from the expiration of the full
term of the members of the House of Representatives, despite
the conjunction "and," then the result would be to allow members
of the House of Representatives to enjoy the increase in
compensation ahead of the senators, thereby producing a
disparity of compensation. Furthermore, if the framers of the
provision were concerned with the realities of the term of office
of the senators and that of the representatives, more than with
the reality of the parity of compensation, then they should have
staggered the effectivity of entitlement to the increased salary
and allowed the first group of senators elected after the approval
of the increase to enjoy such increase.

The prohibition or limitation may be stated elsewise: "The full

terms of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase must first expire
before an increase in compensation can take effect." Would the
literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?

The framers of the constitutional provision under discussion

certainly were not wanting of competent legal stylists. With such
more reason, then, must they be regarded as having achieved
a unity of intention, statement and meaning. These experienced
stylists could have so easily phrased the provision differently to
conform to a different intention. For example, it could have been:
". . . until after the expiration of the full term of all the members
of the Senate or of the House of Representatives approving
such increase, as the case may be." But this was not done, and
we cannot deviate from what able stylists have plainly stated in
plain language.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and

Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO,
Auditor, Congress of the Philippines, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms
the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman
whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969 and
qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty
years of government service is entitled to a retirement gratuity
based on the salary actually received by him as a member of
Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant petitioner's
contention that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress;
such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could
only by operative with incoming members of Congress whose
terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by
virtue of the Constitutional mandate that such salary increases
could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all
members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such
increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members
of Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such
salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way
of going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in
effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing
indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-
year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30,
1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No.
4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain
other officials of the national government" was enacted into law
and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The
salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00
per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases
"shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution." (section 1)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 57
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary
increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the
increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20,
1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate
in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides
that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969
elections and his term having expired on December 30, 1969,
filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided
for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or
elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a
treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor
as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never
received during his incumbency and which under this Court's
above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could become
operative only on December 30, 1969 with the expiration of the
full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20,
1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the
warrant, however, pending resolution by the Auditor General of
a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T.
Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired on
December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally
requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting
papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing
therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-
Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as
computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00 per
annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No. 4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due
course on January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General through
respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and furnished
him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the
Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of Congressman
Singson from the Auditor General's adverse decision disallowing
the claim for retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of
P32,000.00 per annum.
Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the
adverse decision of the Auditor General.

The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was
not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become
operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress "as provided by law" (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for
members of Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be
operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members
of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as
petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is
self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as
petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the
compensation they received "as provided by law" and the
Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose
terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of
an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of
office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in
effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted
by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As
stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar
case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson,
"(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would
lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly."3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not
escape notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman
(Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four
years of his government service, the herein claimant-retiree was
unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for Members of Congress precisely because of the
,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in
the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to
reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary
while still in the service, he would now be allowed to enjoy it
thereafter by virtue of his retirement."4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his
retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement
gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly
situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or
benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 58
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In
striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as
it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution,
this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a form
or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office" and
that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act,
which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately availablethereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
section 14 of the Constitution."6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o
allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his
claim were amply refuted by the Office of the President in
dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman
Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the untenability of
petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased
compensation of P32,000 is the rate of pay
prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr.
Singson's successor in office, while Mr.
Singson and his colleagues of the same term
are limited to the annual compensation of
P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute
his retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000
per annum after the expiration of his term of
office would effectively give him the benefits
of increased compensation to which he was
not entitled during his term, thereby violating
the constitutional prohibition against
increased compensation of legislators during
their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.)
which was presumably in the mind of
Congress when it stated in Republic Act No.
4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed
shall be in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial
pronouncement supports the proposition that,
as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started
simultaneously with the beginning of the term
of his successor and the effective rate of pay
of his successor and all incoming members of
Congress was already the new rate of
P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate of pay
that should be made the basis in computing
his retirement gratuity. Suffice it to say that
P7,200 per annum is Mr. Singson's
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 59

authorized compensation during his term of equivalent to one month's salary for every
office and, therefore, the rate of pay year of the first twenty years of service, plus
prescribed by law for him on his retirement, one and one-half month's salary for every
while P32,000 per annum is the allowable year of service over twenty but below thirty
compensation of incoming members of years and two month's salary for every year
Congress during their term and, hence, the over thirty years in case of employees based
rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their on the highest rate received and in case of
retirement. There is, then, no basis for elected officials on the rates of pay as
equating a constitutionally prohibited provided by law. ..."
compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory
prescribed rate of pay for his successor in 3 Rollo, p. 21.
computing his retirement gratuity.
4 Idem.
It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that
the new rate of pay (P32,000) authorized him
Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the 5 15 SCRA 479, 490-491 (Dec. 18, 1965).
instant case, not to compensate him for
services during the constitutionally prohibited 6 Emphasis supplied.
period, but would simply serve as basis for
computing his retirement gratuity for services 7 2nd Indorsement of June 29, 1971, Rollo,
rendered by him not only as a member of pp. 35-36.
Congress but in other branches of the
government as well. The foregoing contention
carries its own refutation. Retirement benefit
is compensation for services rendered
(PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since
Mr. Singson applied for retirement as an
"elected official," it is evident that he seeks
compensation not only for services rendered
in other branches of the Government but also
for his services as member of Congress using
P32,000, an amount prohibited for him but
allowed for his successor, in the computation
of his retirement gratuity."7

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ.,

concur.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 18 SCRA 300, 312 (Oct. 4, 1966); emphasis

supplied.

2 The pertinent text of the cited retirement law

reads: "(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to
any official or employee, appointive, or
elective, regardless of age and employment
status, who has rendered a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous. The benefit shall, in
addition to the return of his personal
contributions with interest compounded
monthly and the payment of the
corresponding employer's premiums,
described in subsection (a) of Section five
hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance
relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of
legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on
the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an
expression of popular will cannot be rendered
inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right
or interest not even the police power of the
State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing
his duties amounts to his suspension/removal
and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to
him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a
detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as
a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 60
equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when allowed
to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to
achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials
of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to
the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the
public mind that election or appointment to high government
office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of
general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from
the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater
is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily
addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; xxx.
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws

governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were
pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as
follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at
its sessions and in going to and returning from
the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment,
there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation
of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined
parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the
provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to the custody
of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next
session, otherwise such privilege shall cease
upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule
minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject
Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that
he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has
also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough
that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may
compel the attendance of absent Members in
such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 61
it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of
the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen
in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment
arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the
same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or
after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect
itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes
of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v.
Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in
criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the
complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration
if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate
which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded
fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to
perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants
arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call
from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to
attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he
initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify
his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the
States penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee
on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex,
Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of
Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and
treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at
the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in
Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant
commuted by chartered plane and private
vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at
the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise
allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-
volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and
2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his
own vehicle and driver in going to and from
the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the
clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center
in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him
or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court
is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members
of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other
force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to
freedom from arrest, however, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same. There
is likely to be no dissent from the proposition
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 62
that a legislator or a delegate can perform his
functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to
pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the
government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer
that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at
abuse of power. The presumption of course is
that the judiciary would remain independent.
It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a
virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the
concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his
duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any
other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided
with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing
Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills,
Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by
Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is
also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under
detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also
appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has
been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is
presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant
should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at
the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any
time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws." [6] This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction
that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant
as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has
to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also
be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance
of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives
of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain
peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class. [10]
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty;
coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise
of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the
restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place
to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and
will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 63
will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the
notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
nature, changes an individuals status in society. [16] Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving
the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-
entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these
demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the
accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office gives
priority to any other right or interest, including the police power
of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza,
JJ., concurs in the main and separate opinion.
[1] RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
[2] 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
[3] 19 Phil. 208, 212.
[4] Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
[5] 44 SCRA 37 [1972].
[6] Art. III, Sec. 1.
[7] Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
[8] Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
[9] See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p.
548.
[10] See
Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966];
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Dumlao v. Commission
on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on
Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
[11] Blacks Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
[12] 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing
US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140 F 2d 834, 839
and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.
[13] Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112
N.J.L. 429.
[14] Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.
[15] Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
[16] Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction
and Prisoners Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
[17] Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for
defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor
T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several
sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower
court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question
is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is
libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not
the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the
phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress
— used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 64
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication
to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either
as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee
thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the
trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned?
Addressed to the President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however
unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against
the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your
Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public
attention to certain vital information which, under the
present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans"
referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be
"an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this
end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that
Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the
Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National
Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter
says — are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their
control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos
Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS
(5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare
Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public
information Office, DND. To insure this control, the
"Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of
MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe,
he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent
Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while
Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose
Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col.
Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence,

Galvezon is considered a missing link in the
intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the
offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan
of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.
(Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter
lists, under the heading "other operational technique the
following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the
Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy
over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and
hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters only"
— to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling
Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951,
1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and
criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the
Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in
several branches of the Armed Forces with men
belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a
way as to give the impression that they reflect the
feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to
undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which
the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage,
although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to
future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by
trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty
parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a
speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an
effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and
gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas
be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced
absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National
Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no
Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano
be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the
various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the
chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies
mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering
that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen.
Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-
Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving
civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding
positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the
AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion
strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 65
the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify
themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the
planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to
support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons
therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be
noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools
of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory
to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as
such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as
"planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in
question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false
and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose
them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to
alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of
said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very
basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their
complaint that said communication is false, they could not have
possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage
a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners".
Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter
clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of
said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much
less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
ESCOLIN, J.:
The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor who was
elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP]
can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-governor who ran
for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can
continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to
the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the
province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections.
He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as
provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for
said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando
Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office
on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,
while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on
July 19, 1984 1 and since then he has discharged the functions
of said office.
On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor
of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July
25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office,
petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term
of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province
until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold
the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously
be an elected member of Parliament.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 66
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be
considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of
vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had
reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the
Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve
as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.
1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the
Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment
in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous.
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as
follows:
Section 10 A member of the National
Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not
hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet. ...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain
and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein
are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The
wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is
not within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest and
the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to
such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he
cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his holding of more than one office." 4 It is therefore
of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other
states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member
of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in
whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no exceptions
save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted
constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within
the purely parliamentary system of government no
incompatibility exists in the nature of the two offices under
consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common law,
the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than
the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no question that
petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas
Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In the
light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact
operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue
to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that
respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to
the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should
be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-
governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of
members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall,
upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 67

leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-
within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor
was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by
the following interchange between Assemblymen San Juan and
Davide during the deliberations on said legislation: Footnotes

MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the Footnotes

proposed amendment it would cover only
governors and members of the different 1 Exh. "7", Resp., p. 89, Rollo.
sanggunians? Mayor, governors?

2 Exh. "8", Resp., p. 90, Rollo.

MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors,
members of the various sanggunian or
barangay officials. A vice-governor is a 3 Sec. 1, Art. XIII, 1973 Constitution.
member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
4 42 Am. Jur. 926.
MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use
the word, "Local officials? 5 Sec. 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:

MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your
humble representation ...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we
include the vice-governor, the vice-mayors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members
of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They are
covered by the provision on members of
sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings,
February 20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-
governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting
within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally
legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section
204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads as
follows:
SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and
Privileges:
1] x x x
2] He shall:
a] Assume the office of the governor for the
unexpired term of the latter in the cases
provided for in Section 48, paragraph 1 6 of
this Code;
1] The vice-governor shall be an ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
with all the rights, duties and privileges of any
member thereof;
Section 205. Composition:
1] xxx
2] The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
composed of the governor, vice-governor,
elective members of said sanggunians, and
the president of the Katipunang
Panlalawigan, etc. ...
6 Section 48, par. 1, BP Blg. 337 reads:
Sec. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of
the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor — [1]
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a
governor, city or municipal mayor refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify; dies, or is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office, the vice-
governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as the
case may be, shall assume the office for the
unexpired term of the former.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No

costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO
P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO,
RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate
Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA,
JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
is poised against the Order of respondent Associate
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the
following dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private
corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following
were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group;
those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group
would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings,
docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences
of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel
for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 68
"appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC
was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition
was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited
Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez
did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out
that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock
of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent
Acero to qualify him to run for election as a
Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized
only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent
Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as
the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the
basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It
is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V.
Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale
of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No.
33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that
Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation
the Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor,
of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent
Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing
intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979,
resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the
SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.

No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall
appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be
interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene
in any cause or matter where he may be
called to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening
in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative
body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel.
Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although
he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing
ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them
"after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the
SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to
by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest
in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case
filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find
that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 69
... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need
do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire
a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general
legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent
the question of the constitutional prohibition against members of
the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy
before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution
of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case
No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana
and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
Footnotes
1 p. 23, Rollo.
2 p. 6, Ibid.
3 Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing
Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P. 1046.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 70

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

EN BANC thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
DANTE V. G.R. No. 175352 during his term without forfeiting his seat.
LIBAN, Neither shall he be appointed to any office
REYNALDO M. Present: which may have been created or the
BERNARDO, emoluments thereof increased during the
and PUNO, C.J., term for which he was elected.
SALVADOR M. QUISUMBING, Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the
VIARI, YNARES-SANTIAGO, PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petiti CARPIO, Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of
oners CORONA, Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
, CARPIO MORALES, automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores
CHICO-NAZARIO, v. Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national legislators lose
VELASCO, JR., their elective posts upon their appointment to another
NACHURA, government office.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no
PERALTA, and standing to file this petition which appears to be an action for
BERSAMIN, JJ. quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent
- versus - committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a
ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim
to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section
Promulgated: 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person
July 15, 2009 claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully
held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own
name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred
by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of
RICHARD J. Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced within one
GORDON, year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of office. In
Respondent. this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross
volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already
x--------------------------------------------- Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was
-----x elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in
2003 and re-elected in 2005.
DECISION
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated
CARPIO, J.: as a taxpayers suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a
constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they
The Case suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal
(respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being
diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to
The Facts restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in
wastage of public funds.
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and
Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the for declaratory relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since
Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman Trial Court.
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-
owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the
the Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. office nor an employment.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an
member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of action for quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief.
the Constitution, which reads: Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit
questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House respondent has been drawing his salaries and other
of Representatives may hold any other office compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his
or employment in the Government, or any office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over

this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which
is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution applies to the case
of respondent who is Chairman of the
PNRC and at the same time a Member of
the Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be
automatically removed as a Senator
pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally
institute this petition against
respondent.[4]
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the
PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for
quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against
individuals. An action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the
PNRC when he was elected as such during
the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC held on
February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is
hereto attached and made integral part hereof
as Annex A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 71
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of
the PNRC Board of Governors, during his
incumbency as a Member of the House of
Senate of the Congress of the Philippines,
having been elected as such during the
national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has
been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and
duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by
accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of
the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the
House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on
February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited
his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long
ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this Honorable
Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND
GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent
continues to act as such and still performs the powers, functions
and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, law and
jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to
falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of the
House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and other
compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due
only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and
irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino
people.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against
respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act
which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as
the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action
if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped
by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own
name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his
own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to
the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at
any stage.[6] In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be
entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners
have no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and
treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the
merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Functions

On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic
Act No. 95,[7] otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC
is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social
status, or political affiliation.[8] The PNRC provides six major
services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety
Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.[9]
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization
for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27
July 1929.[10] The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva,
Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a
convention by which the nations of the world
were invited to join together in diminishing, so
far lies within their power, the evils inherent in
war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the
world have ratified or adhered to the
subsequent revision of said convention,
namely the Convention of Geneva of July 29
[sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies
in the Field (referred to in this Charter as the
Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages
the establishment in each country of a voluntary
organization to assist in caring for the wounded and
sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for that
purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines
became an independent nation on July 4,
1946 and proclaimed its adherence to the
Geneva Red Cross Convention on
February 14, 1947, and by that action
indicated its desire to participate with the
nations of the world in mitigating the
suffering caused by war and to establish in
the Philippines a voluntary organization
for that purpose as contemplated by the
Geneva Red Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines
since 1917 a Charter of the American National
Red Cross which must be terminated in view
of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations
established in the other countries which have
ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross
Convention assist in promoting the health and
welfare of their people in peace and in war,
and through their mutual assistance and
cooperation directly and through their
international organizations promote better
understanding and sympathy among the
peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is
composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 72
Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies).
The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental
Principles:
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, born of a
desire to bring assistance without
discrimination to the wounded on the
battlefield, endeavors, in its international
and national capacity, to prevent and
alleviate human suffering wherever it may
be found. Its purpose is to protect life and
health and to ensure respect for the
human being. It promotes mutual
understanding, friendship, cooperation
and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality,
race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to
relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their
needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to
enjoy the confidence of all, the
Movement may not take sides in
hostilities or engage at any time in
controversies of a political, racial,
religious or ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is
independent. The National Societies,
while auxiliaries in the humanitarian
services of their governments and
subject to the laws of their respective
countries, must always maintain their
autonomy so that they may be able at
all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary
relief movement not prompted in any
manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red
Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It
must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status
and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each
other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of
reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a
member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to
uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement.
In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has
to be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the
Fundamental Principles of the Movement.[11]
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted
by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or
internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen
as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines
where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist
rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or
controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as
government personnel or as instruments of government policy.
Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC

volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded
in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be,
autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct its
activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The
PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that
implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the
trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a
National Red Cross Society.[12] It is imperative that the PNRC
must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the
State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and
independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the
government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and
does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions
from private individuals and private entities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as
provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary
organization, the Philippine National
Red Cross shall be financed primarily by
contributions obtained through
solicitation campaigns throughout the
year which shall be organized by the Board
of Governors and conducted by the
Chapters in their respective
jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns
shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations. (Emphasis
supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC
Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the
PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President
of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths
(4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the
President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended,
provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and
authority shall be vested in a Board of
Governors composed of thirty members, six of
whom shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected by
chapter delegates in biennial conventions and
the remaining six shall be selected by the
twenty-four members of the Board already
chosen. x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen
are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are
elected by the twenty-four members already chosen a select
group where the private sector members have three-fourths
majority.Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of
the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector
members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate
powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 73
officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC,
respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC
Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC
Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the
PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President
or by any subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President
appoints all officials and employees in the Executive branch
whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this
Section 16, the law may also authorize the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint
officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.[15] InRufino v. Endriga,[16] the Court
explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the
heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second
group refers to those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint. The third
group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-
ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers
in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested
in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it
in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson
of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson
of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also
authorize officers other than the heads of the agency,
commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the heads of the
specified offices, and in no other person. The word heads refers
to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to
their members, for several reasons.
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC.
Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission
or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch

since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us
to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
such, does not hold a government office or employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[17] the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive
branch. If an office is legally not under the control of the
President, then such office is not part of the Executive
branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,[18] the Court explained the
Presidents power of control over all government offices as
follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency
must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or
Judicial branches, or must belong to one of
the independent constitutional bodies, or must
be a quasi-judicial body or local government
unit. Otherwise, such government office,
entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches
of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent
constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body
nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the
Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, any agency not placed by law or order creating them
under any specific department falls under the Office of the
President.
Since the President exercises control over all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarily
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the
Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have
control of all executive . . . offices, Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one
performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control.
There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or
decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The power of control means the power to revise or reverse
the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch,
and exercises control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. There can be no instance under the Constitution
where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control
of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is
only one President vested with executive power exercising
control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the
Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is
a lost command whose existence is without any legal or
constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 74
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are
private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the
private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board
exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is
controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of
the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The
President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions
of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or
modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is
the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again
that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a
government office.
Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies
of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for proper
coordination with the public authorities, and the government
representatives may take part in decision-making within a
National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of
a National Societys active members must remain in a large
majority in a National Societys governing bodies.[19]
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The
vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of
the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a
PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the
year.[20] Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be
members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,[21] reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine
National Red Cross shall be open to the entire
population in the Philippines regardless of
citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine
National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign
shall entitle the contributor to membership for
one year and said contribution shall be
deductible in full for taxation purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and
privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case
of Camporedondo v. NLRC,[22] which ruled that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the
simple test used was whether the corporation was created by its
own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the
PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled
that it is a government corporation. However,
the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled
corporation refers to any agency

organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where
applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
one (51) percent of its capital
stock: Provided, That government-owned or
controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the Budget,
the Civil Service Commission, and the
Commission on Audit for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of their respective
powers, functions and responsibilities with
respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must
be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned
by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by
analogy at least a majority of the members must be government
officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as
discussed earlier, the government does not own or control
PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional
Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations
by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the
PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947.
Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar
provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a body
corporate and politic, thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the
Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist
the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in the
Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a
National Red Cross Society. The national
headquarters of this Corporation shall be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 75
located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[23] the Court explained the
constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general
framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of
corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law.
The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress
shall not, except by general
law, provide for
the formation, organization,
or regulation of private
corporations. Government-
owned or controlled
corporations may be
created or established by
special charters in the
interest of the common
good and subject to the test
of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the
creation of private corporations except by
general law applicable to all citizens. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to
ban private corporations created by special
charters, which historically gave certain
individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law
creating a private corporation with a
special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law
can qualify as private corporations. Under
existing laws, the general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation
of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to
create government-owned or controlled
corporations through special charters. Since
private corporations cannot have special
charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such
corporations are government-owned or
controlled.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 76

In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist government office or an office in a government-owned or
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes their controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC
Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
public property which were managed, operated by or under the corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the
control of the city, municipality or province before the assets Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local Water Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Appropriations Act,[25]the LWUA has a budget amounting Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
to P400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements. [26] There is no office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
private capital invested in the Local Water Districts. The purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7,
all come from the government, either through transfer of assets, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National
loans, subsidies or the income from such assets or funds. Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints powers.
all the board directors of the Local Water Districts. Furthermore,
the board directors and other personnel of the Local Water SO ORDERED.
Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws
and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are
considered government-owned or controlled corporations not
only because of their creation by special charter but also
because the government in fact owns and controls the Local ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Water Districts. Associate Justice
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created
through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water
Districts, the elements of government ownership and
control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the
PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered WE CONCUR:
a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of
the essential elements of ownership and control by the
government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However,
the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private REYNATO S. PUNO
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for Chief Justice
non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
and grants it corporate powers,[27] is void for being
unconstitutional. Thus, Sections
1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31]5,[32] 6,[33] 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,
[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

The other provisions[41] of the PNRC Charter remain valid as

they can be considered as a recognition by the State that the
unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus Associate Justice Associate Justice
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in
the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC Charter
implement the Philippine Governments treaty obligations under
Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized
as a National Society, the Society must be duly recognized by
the legal government of its country on the basis of the Geneva MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Conventions and of the national legislation as a voluntary aid Associate Justice Associate Justice
society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian
field.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 77

Conditions for Recognition of National

Societies

In order to be recognized in terms of Article 5,

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE paragraph 2 b) as a National Society, the
NACHURA CASTRO Society shall meet the following conditions:
Associate Justice Associate Justice
1. Be constituted on the territory of
an independent State where the
Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA in the Field is in force.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 2. Be the only National Red Cross or
Red Crescent Society of the said
State and be directed by a central
body which shall alone be competent
to represent it in its dealings with
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN other components of the Movement.
Associate Justice 3. Be duly recognized by the legal
government of its country on the
basis of the Geneva Conventions
CERTIFICATION and of the national legislation as a
voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify public authorities in the humanitarian
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in field.
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the 4. Have an autonomous status
opinion of the Court. which allows it to operation in
conformity with the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.
REYNATO S. PUNO 5. Use a name and distinctive
CHIEF JUSTICE emblem in conformity with the
Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols.
6. Be so organized as to be able to
[1]Respondent was elected as a Senator during the May 2004 fulfill the tasks defined in its own
elections. statutes, including the preparation in
[2]370 Phil. 901 (1999). peace time for its statutory tasks in
[3]G.R. No. 104732, 22 June 1993, 223 SCRA 568. case of armed conflicts.
[4]Rollo, p. 181.
7. Extend its activities to the entire territory of the State.
[5]Id. at 3-5. 8. Recruit its voluntary members and its staff without
[6]The Secretary of Justice Cuevas v. Atty. Bacal, 400 Phil. 1115
consideration of race, sex, class, religion or political
(2000); Garcia v. Perez, 188 Phil. 43 (1980). opinions.
[7]An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross, as 9. Adhere to the present Statutes, share in the fellowship which
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264. unites the components of the Movement and cooperate with
[8]PNRC Website,HYPERLINK them.
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec 10. Respect the Fundamental
tions.aspx" HYPERLINK Principles of the Movement and be
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec guided in its work by the
tions.aspx" http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/Str principles of international
ategicDirections.aspxHYPERLINK humanitarian law. (Emphasis
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec supplied)
[12] The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red
tions.aspx" (visited 25 March 2009).
[9]PNRC Website,HYPERLINK Crescent, ICRC Publication, p. 17.
[13]Although under Section 4(c) of the PNRC Charter, as
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec
tions.aspx" HYPERLINK amended, the PNRC is allotted one lottery draw yearly
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx"ht by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes for the support
tp://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx (visit of its disaster relief operations, in addition to its existing
ed 25 March 2009). lottery draws for the Blood Program, such allotments
[10]Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the are donations given to most charitable organizations.
[14]Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.
[11]Article 4 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and

Red Crescent Movement reads: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
ARTICLE 4 executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers

and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until after
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
[15] Endriga v. Rufino, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, 21 July
2006, 496 SCRA 13.
[16] Id. at 50-57.
[17] Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
[18] Supra note 15 at 63-65.
[19] See note 12 at 20.
[20] PNRC
Website, http://202.57.124.158/Site/PNRC/membershipInfo
.aspx#5 (visited 15 June 2009).
[21]Issued on 15 December 1977.
[22]Supra note 2.
[23]464 Phil. 439 (2004).
[24]Id. at 454-455.
[25]Republic Act No. 9524.
[26]DBM Website,HYPERLINK
"http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf" HYPER
LINK
"http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf" http://w
ww.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf (visited 25 June
2009).
[27]Section 36 of the Corporation Code enumerates the general
powers of a corporation:
SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity.
Every corporation incorporated under this
Code has the power and capacity:
1. To sue and be sued in its corporate name;
2. Of succession by its corporate name for the period of time
stated in the articles of incorporation and the certificate of
incorporation;
3. To adopt and use a corporate seal;
4. To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the
provisions of this Code;
5. To adopt by-laws, not contrary to law, morals or public policy,
and to amend or repeal the same in accordance with this
Code;
6. In case of stock corporations, to issue or sell stocks to
subscribers and to sell treasury stocks in accordance with
the provisions of this Code; and to admit members to the
corporation if it be a non-stock corporation;
7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease,
pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and
personal property, including securities and bonds of other
corporations, as the transaction of the lawful business of the
corporation may reasonably and necessarily require, subject
to the limitations prescribed by law and the Constitution;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 78
8. To adopt any plan of merger or consolidation as provided in
this Code;
9. To make reasonable donations, including those for the public
welfare or for hospital, charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or
similar purposes: Provided, That no corporation, domestic or
foreign, shall give donations in aid of any political party or
candidate or for purposes of partisan political activity;
10. To establish pension, retirement and other plans for the
benefit of its directors, trustees, officers and employees; and
11. To exercise such other powers as may be essential or
necessary to carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in
its articles of incorporation.
[28]SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the
voluntary organization officially designated to assist
the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to
perform such other duties as are inherent upon a
national Red Cross Society. The national
headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in
Metro Manila.
[29]SEC. 2. The name of this corporation shall be The Philippine
National Red Cross and by that name shall have
perpetual succession with the power to sue and be
sued; to own and hold such real and personal estate
as shall be deemed advisable and to accept bequests,
donations and contributions of property of all classes
for the purpose of this Corporation hereinafter set forth;
to adopt a seal and to alter and destroy the same at
pleasure; and to have the right to adopt and to use, in
carrying out its purposes hereinafter designated, as an
emblem and badge, a red Greek cross on a white
ground, the same as has been described in the
Geneva Conventions, and adopted by the several
nations ratifying or adhering thereto; to ordain and
establish by-laws and regulations not inconsistent with
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and
generally to do all such acts and things as may be
necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act
and promote the purposes of said organization; and
the corporation hereby created is designated as the
organization which is authorized to act in matters of
relief under said Convention. In accordance with the
Geneva Conventions, the issuance of the distinctive
Red Cross emblem to medical units and
establishments, personnel and materials neutralized in
time of war shall be left to the military authorities. The
red Greek cross on a white ground, as has been
described by the Geneva Conventions is not, and shall
not be construed as a religious symbol, and shall have
equal efficacy and applicability to persons of all faiths,
creeds and beliefs. The operational jurisdiction of the
Philippine National Red Cross shall be over the entire
territory of the Philippines.
[30]SEC. 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as
follows:
a. To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of the
armed forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit of
and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva
Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines
proclaimed its adherence;
b. For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to
perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as a result
of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the
said Convention;

c. To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with the
authorities of the armed forces as a medium of
communication between the people of the Republic of the
Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in
time of war, and to act in such matters between similar
national societies of other governments and the Government
and people and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the
Philippines;
d. To establish and maintain a system of national and
international relief in time of peace and in time of war and
apply the same in meeting the emergency needs caused by
typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural
disasters and to devise and carry on measures for
minimizing the suffering caused by such disasters;
e. To devise and promote such other services in time of peace
and in time of war as may be found desirable in improving
the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
f. To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or
resident of the Philippines a member of the Red Cross.
[31]SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the
preceding sub-paragraphs, the Philippine National Red
Cross shall:
a. Be authorized to secure loans from any financial institution
which shall not exceed its budget of the previous year.
[32]SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross
shall be open to the entire population in the Philippines
regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to the
Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund Campaign
shall entitle the contributor to membership for one year
and said contribution shall be deductible in full for
taxation purposes.
[33]SEC. 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested
in the Board of Governors composed of thirty
members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected
by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the
remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. At least one but
not more than three of the Presidential appointees shall
be chosen from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
a. The term of office of all members of the Board shall be four
years, including those appointed by the President of the
Philippines, renewable at the pleasure of the appointing
power or elective bodies.
b. Vacancies in the Board of Governors caused by death or
resignation shall be filled by election by the Board of
Governors at its next meeting, except that vacancies among
the Presidential appointees shall be filled by the President.
[34]SEC. 7. The President of the Philippines shall be the
Honorary President of the Philippine National Red
Cross. The officers shall consist of a Chairman, a Vice-
Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, a Counselor, an
Assistant Secretary and an Assistant Treasurer, all of
whom shall be elected by the Board of Governors from
among its membership for a term of two years and may
be re-elected. The election of officers shall take place
within sixty days after all the members of the Board of
Governors have been chosen and have qualified.
[35]SEC. 8. The Biennial meeting of chapter delegates shall be
held on such date and such place as may be specified
by the Board of Governors to elect members of the
Board of Governors and advice the Board of
Governors on the activities of the Philippine National
Red Cross; Provided, however, that during periods of
great emergency, the Board of Governors in its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 79
discretion may determine that the best interest of the
corporation shall be served by postponing such
biennial meeting.
[36]SEC. 9. The power to ordain, adopt and amend by-laws and
regulations shall be vested in the Board of Governors.
[37]SEC. 10. The members of the Board of Governors, as well as
the officers of the corporation, shall serve without
compensation. The compensation of the paid staff of
the corporation shall be determined by the Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Secretary
General.
[38]SEC. 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine
National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by
contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns
throughout the year which shall be organized by the
Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in
their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising
campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations.
[39]SEC. 12. The Board of Governors shall promulgate rules and
regulations for the organization of local units of the
Philippine National Red Cross to be known as
Chapters. Said rules and regulations shall fix the
relationship of the Chapters to the Corporation, define
their territorial jurisdictions, and determine the number
of delegates for each chapter based on population,
fund campaign potentials and service needs.
[40]SEC. 13. The Corporation shall, at the end of every calendar
year submit to the President of the Philippines an
annual report containing the activities of the
Corporation showing its financial condition, the receipts
and disbursements.
[41] The valid provisions are Sections 4(b) and (c), 14, 15,
16, and 17:
SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the
preceding sub-paragraphs, the Philippine National Red
Cross shall:
xxx
b. Be exempt from payment of all duties, taxes, fees,
and other charges of all kinds on all importations and
purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its
disaster relief work and other Red Cross services, and
in its benefits and fund raising drives all provisions of
law to the contrary notwithstanding.
c. Be allotted by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office one
lottery draw yearly for the support of its disaster relief
operations in addition to its existing lottery draws for the
Blood Program.
SEC. 14. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit, collect or
receive money, materials, or property of any kind by
falsely representing or pretending himself to be a
member, agent or representative of the Philippine
National Red Cross.
SEC. 15. The use of the name Red Cross is reserved
exclusively to the Philippine National Red Cross and
the use of the emblem of the red Greek cross on a
white ground is reserved exclusively to the Philippine
National Red Cross, medical services of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other medical
facilities or other institutions as may be authorized by
the Philippine National Red Cross as provided under
Article 44 of the Geneva Conventions. It shall be
unlawful for any other person or entity to use the words
Red Cross or Geneva Cross or to use the emblem of
the red Greek cross on a white ground or any
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 80

designation, sign, or insignia constituting an imitation

thereof for any purpose whatsoever.
SEC. 16. As used in this Decree, the term person shall include
any legal person, group, or legal entity whatsoever nature,
and any person violating any section of this Article shall,
upon conviction therefore be liable to a fin[e] of not less than
one thousand pesos or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court,
for each and every offense. In case the violation is
committed by a corporation or association, the penalty shall
devolve upon the president, director or any other officer
responsible for such violation.
SEC. 17. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA,
ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P.
GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA
R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY,
VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR,
BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS
M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT,
ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO
G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R.
VELOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside
the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February
12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the
petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent
Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate
Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres R.
Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E.
Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose Lina,
Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of
Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who
had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator
Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and
resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed
with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them
are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein.
Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, one of the
respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse
and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-
Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground.
Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the same
contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to
recuse and the motion for disqualification or inhibition.
Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments
were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter
afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 81
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily
inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No.
00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another
contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator
Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his
personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public
policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of
necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition of
the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both
practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so
as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members
of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section
24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would,
in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest
to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested
device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution.
We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution
itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to
be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial'
and 'legislative' components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal
correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 82

provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for
contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
(the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The
other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as SO ORDERED.
clearly mandates the participation in the same process of
decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme
Court. Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado JJ.,
concur.
Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an unmistakable Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.
indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial
election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent
of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the Separate Opinions

substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:
or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his
opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone of his opinion.
has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and
possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both
Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning
in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served.
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated compelled by certiorari.
to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants
in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members
of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member

of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself Separate Opinions
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain FELICIANO, J.:, concurring:
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way
I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his
of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
of his opinion.
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules
can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its
Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three
discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must
(3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and
therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 83

petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted concerning

the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral
Tribunals would appear to be substantially met and served.
This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not
compelled by certiorari.

Footnotes

1 Page 2, Resolution of public respondent

Tribunal of May 27, 1988; p. 25, Rollo.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,
MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J.
Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House
Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein?
May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the
House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century
ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated
to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two
branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as
well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as "an
attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest
branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political
confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head
ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the
accepted meaning of which is that 'where the matter involved is
left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity
or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or
executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial
cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded
against was either the President or Congress, or any of its
branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
especially when private rights are affected came to be
recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 84
showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority
is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to
what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily
then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain
whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the
mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is
judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by
an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases,
the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the
Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the
President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action
when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action,
as in this case. It is —
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested
in courts to enable them to administer justice according
to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the
power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy
properly before the court, to the determination of which
must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987,
Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the
following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election.
In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is
composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of
the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the
House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 85

organizations registered under the party-list system represented

2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman (formerly GAD, now NP)

Associate Justice
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence,
Supreme Court and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted
for decision in July, 1989.
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc
Associate Justice won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that
point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
Supreme Court reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts,
thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member the decision in the case.

Associate Justice
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Supreme Court
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court
Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
winner of the contest.
Congressman
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura
1st District revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in
Benguet LDP the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent
with truth and justice and self- respect," and to honor a
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that
they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the
Congressman contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting
1st District Palawan appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the
Tribunal.
LDP
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No.
25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
Congressman March 6, 1991.

2nd District Nueva Ecija On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc
decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman
LDP Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
Congressman organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco,
and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur
1st District Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only
inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete
LDP betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP,"
in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

Congressman
At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker
4th District Batangas Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from
the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the
LDP Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party
membership is a prerequisite.4
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the
Congressman Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the

Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March
13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral
Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13
March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind
the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr.
to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP
communication which is self-explanatory and copies of
which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge
Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be
relieved from their assignments in the HRET because —
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of
the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25),
previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to
be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even
if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation,
the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may
now be confidently expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which
would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early
as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the
Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the
finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at
least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now
with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 86
Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and
Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March
1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A.
Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E.
Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v.
Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also
the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation
has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with
membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to
preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional
body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that
the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is
being prevented at all costs. We believe that the
Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of
its constitutional function by factors which have nothing
to do with the merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the
provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal
found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to
the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution,
that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or
Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three (3) of the party having the
second largest number of votes: and a judicial
component consisting of three (3) justices from the
Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of
parties can dominate the legislative component in the
Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could
perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of the
Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of
non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in
the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision
by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v.
Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v.
Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.

But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of
the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well
ahead of the completion of the present congressional
term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask
to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership
in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same
day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The
resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received
at 9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives
that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it
had voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal
Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in
Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for
this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence
of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules
of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members
of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the
Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in
a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in
the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles
also manifested his intention to resign as a member of
the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino,
Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request
for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to
direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court
observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the
Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests
relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of Congress, all members of these
bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them
and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the
members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their
duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political parties but
as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 87
to further bolster the independence of the Tribunals,
the term of office of every member thereof should be
considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally terminated
except only by death, resignation, permanent disability,
or removal for valid cause, not including political
disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE
the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to
be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to
DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial
factors in the proceedings of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the
inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to
NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but
only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the
Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue
to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I
concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should
be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant
Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will
take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ.,
took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol,
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may
be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying
this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives
of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent
Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due
course, required the respondents to comment5 on the petition

within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from
reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of
Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to
replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the
withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of
said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the
House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the
petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that
nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation
by the political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission
on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power
to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation
of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially
changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion
from the political party;6 that a Tribunal member's term of office
is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a member of
the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed
from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified;8 and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura
from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP9 and the
decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative
Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond
the reach of judicial review.10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M.
Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action against
him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for
membership in the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition failed to
implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable
party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and
rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership in the
HRET.12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a
similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause
of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question
any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he
assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner
argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the
assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it
acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of its
decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an
indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure
that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the
ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give
recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 88
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from
the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner
explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of
the respondents in this case because after the House of
Representatives had announced the termination of
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the
Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an
election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse
of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the
answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the
main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members from each of
the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination
of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest member of
votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of
the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes,
aid it was impossible for any political party to control the voting
in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in
the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to
function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the
Senate and House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal
all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to
judge contests relating to the election and qualification
of members of the National Assembly is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House
were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the legislative
houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which
must be permitted to select their own employees, and
to supervise and control them, without any legislative
interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral
Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of
its authority, an independent organ; while composed of
a majority of members of the legislature it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ
created for the specific purpose of determining
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 89
contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as
sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved
undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong
and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as
we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of
the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that
these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will
distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and
the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of
the Constitution but they are not constitutional
creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either
the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral
Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then
subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional
restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the
ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will
still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating
since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not
separate departments of the government. Would that
ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments
because the separate departments are the legislative,
the executive and the judiciary; but they are
constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate
departments of government, I would like to know again
if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53
Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies
we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that
these electoral tribunals are independent from
Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration

and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate
proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are
independent although they are not a separate branch
of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies
with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on
Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral
tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals
are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the
wordings say: 'The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal.
'It is still the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House
Electoral Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal of
the House and tribunal of the Senate although they are
independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have
agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my
question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting in
both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam
President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we
discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice
Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral
tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case
of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case
No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance with law
and justice with complete detachment from an political
considerations. That is why I am asking now for the
record how we could achieve such detachment when
there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman,
while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the
proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will be
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 90
independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22,
1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET. —
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by
a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of
the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to
be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives
in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the
tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and
the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority
party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold
of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party"
and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave
abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as
"sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security
of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may

not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member
of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from
the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right
to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that
members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme
Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of
the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice,
was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter,
who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a
lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that
those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice
Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own
free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail
the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was
expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the
party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be
promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP
to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the
Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of
Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for
the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority
party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf
to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House
of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the
Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty
to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the
House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution
"even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the
Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in
Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for
a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc
of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of
the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We,
therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13,
1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 91
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays
for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the
election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member
of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to
his position as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated
March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A.
Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable
delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the
prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court,
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on
the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs
against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no
part.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House
of Representatives, assuming that said act were politically
motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do
so on the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII
of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the
House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its
nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement
to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture
which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine
of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for
this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with
the others each one deriving its authority directly from the
fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the
three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal
and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each
is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without
the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of
each other. That is to say, one department may not control or
even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence
does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in
one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in
authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in
them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. 3 In
other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of
the other where full discretionary authority has been delegated
by the Constitution to said department. That department alone,
to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise
it free from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever. 4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by
the judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial
review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the
House of Representatives withdrew and rended the nomination
of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter,
the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral Tribunal
was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed
of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to thwart the
promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him
(petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and which decision
would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not
only does the action of the House of Representatives violate the
independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 92
violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in
said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits
that the House of Representatives has the sole authority to
nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in
the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the
political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to
remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal
member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not,
Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative
term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political
affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member
of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of the
tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6)
members come from the members of the House chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the partylist
system.6 The House of Representatives has the power to
nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination
extended to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing the
House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House
has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to
appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives
to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my
mind, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A
withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where
such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of
the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be
recognized and respected, no matter how politically motivated it
might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned
with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question
that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act
is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do
what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives
should have done what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative
act done within the constitutional authority to the legislature? I
believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot
question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper
to change the Justices who sit as members of the House
Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be designated or
nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they
should vote — surely are matters that not merely concern
political action as far as members of the House are concerned,
but are the very essence of political action, if political life has any
connotation at all. To open courts of justice to such political
controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the
manifold disputes engendered by political manuevers and
skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 93

which in the long run could undermine and destroy their and democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long
independence. run be inimical to and destructive of democratic government
itself
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
exclusively to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province
of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts
as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and
common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate
the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too
so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the questions
to courts any authority to pass upon the validity of the decisions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a
powers. Indeed, it is to be understood that the three (3), political question and a question in which the Court can not
Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it intervene.
were, a Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the
Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court
better evidence of complete dependence than to subject the includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its authority on Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a principle of separation of powers.
doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the last word.
"10 (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal
was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last
division of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do,
own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This they risk their independence.
may be because the society is still unsure of what the best
division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the
existing one, or because the society has vacated its
decisionmaking function and special interest groups have
stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can
neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and
thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
Separate Opinions
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige
which is the Court's primarily source of power."11 PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman of Representatives, assuming that said act were politically
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of authority?
how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests
before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is so on the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII
done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
will always be politically motivated.
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike down the the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not government.
this court — who should ultimately judge the act when they cast
their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the power to
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the
institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last
House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its
analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a political
nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement
for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body
to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture
politic will result. It is the responsibility of the people and none
which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine
other, to remain ever vigilant about their government to the end
that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty

of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for
this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with
the others each one deriving its authority directly from the
fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the
three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal
and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each
is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without
the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent of
each other. That is to say, one department may not control or
even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence
does not, however, extend to the point that those in authority in
one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in
authority in the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in
them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. 3 In
other words, one department must not encroach upon nor
interfere with acts done within the constitutional competence of
the other where full discretionary authority has been delegated
by the Constitution to said department. That department alone,
to the exclusion of the others, has both right and duty to exercise
it free from any encroachment or interference of whomsoever.4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by
the judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial
review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the
House of Representatives withdrew and rended the nomination
of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP
members to join the said political party. As a result of this letter,
the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral Tribunal
was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed
of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to thwart the
promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him
(petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and which decision
would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not
only does the action of the House of Representatives violate the
independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it also
violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in
said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits
that the House of Representatives has the sole authority to
nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 94
the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the
political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to
remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal
member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not,
Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative
term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political
affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member
of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of the
tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6)
members come from the members of the House chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the partylist
system.6 The House of Representatives has the power to
nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination
extended to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing the
House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House
has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to
appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives
to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my
mind, necessarily include the power to remove said member. A
withdrawal of the nomination of a member of the Tribunal where
such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of
the political parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be
recognized and respected, no matter how politically motivated it
might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned
with power not with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question
that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act
is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do
what it has done and not whether the House of Representatives
should have done what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative
act done within the constitutional authority to the legislature? I
believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot
question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper
to change the Justices who sit as members of the House
Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be designated or
nominated as members of the electoral tribunal, how they
should vote — surely are matters that not merely concern
political action as far as members of the House are concerned,
but are the very essence of political action, if political life has any
connotation at all. To open courts of justice to such political
controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the
manifold disputes engendered by political manuevers and
skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena
which in the long run could undermine and destroy their
independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
exclusively to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 95

of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts
as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and
common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively
of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to invalidate
the principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand
so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the powers granted
to courts any authority to pass upon the validity of the decisions
of another 'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's'
powers. Indeed, it is to be understood that the three (3),
Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it
were, a Leibnizian monad, looking up to the Heaven of the
Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be
better evidence of complete dependence than to subject the
validity of the decision of one 'Department' as to its authority on
a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a
doctrine makes supreme the Department that has the last word.
"10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the
division of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its
own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This
may be because the society is still unsure of what the best
division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the
existing one, or because the society has vacated its
decisionmaking function and special interest groups have
stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can
neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and
thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige
which is the Court's primarily source of power."11
SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too
am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the questions
as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an act of
Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is a
political question and a question in which the Court can not
intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court
includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal
was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This
Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last
persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do,
they risk their independence.
Footnotes
1 Annex B, p. 29, Rollo.
2 Annex D, p. 34, Rollo.
3 Resolution No. 03-91 p. 35, Rollo.
4 Annex D-2 p. 36, Rollo.

Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in

5 The comments of the respondents were later treated
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman
as their answer ers to the petition to which the Court
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
gave due course.
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of
how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests
before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to 6 p. 53, Rollo.
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is
done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what 7 p. 93, Rollo.
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political
8 p. 94, Rollo.
branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and
will always be politically motivated.
9 p. 111, Rollo.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered
opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike down the 10 p. 99, Rollo.
legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not
this court — who should ultimately judge the act when they cast 11 p. 127, Rollo.
their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the power to
institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last
analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a political 12 p. 130, Rollo.
system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary
for any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body 13 p. 142, Rollo.
politic will result. It is the responsibility of the people and none
other, to remain ever vigilant about their government to the end 14 p. 150, Rollo.
that they can continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy. To leave this task to the Court, would in the long
run be inimical to and destructive of democratic government 15 5 p. 152, Rollo.
itself
16 p. 157, Rollo.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Padilla, J.:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 96

1 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56.

2 Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 338, 349.

3 Kilbourn vs. Thomson, 103 US 168, 25 L. ed. 177;

Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612.

4 Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada, et al. vs. Mariano

Jesus Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, 28 February
1957.

5 Neptali Gonzales, Philippine Political Law, 1966 ed.,

p. 102.

6 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

7 Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989,

172 SCRA 182.

8 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.

9 People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535.

10 delivered on occasion of the Oliver Wendell Homes

Lecture of 1958 and published in LEARNED HAND,
The Bill of Rights 4 (1958).

11 Philippines Strum, "The Supreme Court and

Political Questions" a study in judicial evasion, 1974
ed., p. 103.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002]
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE
DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their
official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,
respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L.
LOCSIN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he
who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the
people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections as Representative of the 4thlegislative district of Leyte.
The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her
insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of
the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the
land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto
directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and
Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of
the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the
oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name
of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin
for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and
exercising the said public office on the basis of a void
proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent
Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City
while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine
de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly
with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualification[1] against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting
votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract,
haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga
and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or
corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition are the
(a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,[2] Danilo D. Maglasang,[3] Cesar
A. Laurente;[4] (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and
Rogelio T. Salvera;[5] (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter
executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;[6] and (d)
Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and
surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and
surfaced through the intercession of the respondent.[7] The case
was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the
COMELECs Second Division.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 97
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued
an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on
the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of
Region VIII.[8] On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a
disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition
was remanded to the Regional Election Director for
investigation.[9]
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the
Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case.Consequently, petitioner was included in
the list of candidates for district representative and was voted
for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished,
respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed
a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent [herein petitioner] with the COMELEC Second
Division.[10] Respondent Locsin alleged that the evidence on
record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted
remains. She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the
disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic. A copy of the Motion
was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no
registry receipt was attached thereto.[11]
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent stating there is clear and convincing evidence
showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges
against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent. A
copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the
corresponding registry receipt was attached to the
pleading.[12] The records, however, do not show the date the
petitioner received the motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division issued an Ex-Parte Order[13] directing the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by
reason of the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification.[14] It also directed the Regional Election Director
to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the
Commission.[15] As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as
winner even though the final election results showed that he
garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsins 53,447
votes.[16]
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its
Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither
has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24,
2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for
his disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging
that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the
copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by
virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division
informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the
Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and
receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the
petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own

instance.[17] Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance,
repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities
of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his
authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He
attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B.
Borinaga;[18] (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the
Regular Session of Barangay Monterico;[19] (c) Affidavit of
Wilfredo A. Fiel;[20] (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A.
Fiel;[21] and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.[22]
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Suspension,[23] alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of
the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied
the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that
he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for
disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the
petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second
Division suspending his proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He
attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift
the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting
of a hearing on his Motion.[24]
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the
petitioners Motion and the parties were ordered to submit their
respective memoranda.[25] On June 4, 2001, petitioner
submitted his Memorandum[26] in support of his Motion assailing
the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he
was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no legal and
factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent
for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that
his proclamation as winning congressional candidate be
expediently made, even while the disqualification case against
him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the
following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of
certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T.
Gorre;[27] (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget
Officer;[28] (c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel,
City Engineer of Ormoc;[29](d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio
and Pepito Restituto;[30] and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio
Brion,[31] Igmedio Rita[32] and Gerardo Monteza.[33] Respondent
Locsins memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his
witnesses.[34]
Petitioners Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension,
however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001,
the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution[35] in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner
guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered
his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation
of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes
xxx. A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel
of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.[36]
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for
petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before
said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives stating
that MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of
FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
(53,447) votes representing the highest number of
votes legally cast in the legislative district for said
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 98
office.[37] Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June
18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the
COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration[38] from the
June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to
the Motion for Reconsideration.[39] Petitioner alleged in his
Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division
erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the
dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2)
in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in
violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the
immediate proclamation of the second highest vote getter.
Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208
filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration. [40]
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en
banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Proclamation,[41] docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the
validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered
only the second highest number of votes.Respondent Locsin
filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the
proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the election,
returns, and qualification of Locsin can only be taken
cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the
first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly
by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin
was valid because she received the highest number of valid
votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing
on the disqualification case because while the documentary
evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of
his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his
proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled
on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his
prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the
disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional
witnesses[43] which he claims would refute and substantially
belie the allegations of petitioners/intervenors witnesses. A
Reply,[44] Rejoinder[45] and Sur-Rejoinder[46]were respectively
filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for
declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for
resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a Resolution
penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24,
2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing
the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Codilla.[47] Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and
Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting
opinions[48] to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that
Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the
disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional
evidence presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality
of the evidence was clearly in petitioners favor. Equally worth
mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who
was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also

dissented and voted to grant Codillas motion for reconsideration
on the ground that [T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I
respect the electorates will. x x x. [49]
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L.
Benipayo issued a Vote and Opinion and Summary of
Votes reversing the resolution of the Second Division and
declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null
and void. The dispositive portion reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I
concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for
reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001,
disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to
GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as
null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification
resolution against Codilla, promulgated by the Commission
(Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for
Reconsideration of respondent-
movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.,
and to REVERSE the Resolution of
the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for
insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of
proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, having
been issued without hearing and
without any finding that the evidence
of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong
and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, for (t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of
votes, to the exclusion of
respondent and the concurrent
order for the Provincial Board of
Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the
candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the
Respondent the same being
violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated o
June 14, 2001, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are considered
stray and invalid said ruling being
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 99
issued on the basis of an
inapplicable decision, and contrary
to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte, upon the
finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner
Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte to
comply with its ministerial duty to
proclaim the candidate who
garnered the highest number of
votes in the elections for that
position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin,
upon the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative
of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth legislative
district of Leyte and, for this
purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the
Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and
guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of
respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino
M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null
and void the proclamation of losing
candidate Locsin, the proclamation
being violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission on
Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of
proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA
No. 01-208, having been issued
without hearing and without any
finding that the evidence of guilt of
petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus,
null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
for (t)he immediate proclamation of
the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of respondent and the
concurrent order for the provincial
Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the
candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the
Respondent the same being
violative of election laws,

established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
that the votes of respondent Codilla
are considered stray and
invalid said ruling being issued on
the basis of an inapplicable
decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte, upon the
finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner
Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte he (sic)
having garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections for
the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the
finality of this resolution, to vacate
the office of Representative of the
House of Representatives
representing the Fourth Legislative
district of Leyte and, for this
purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the
Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and
guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason,
Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-
208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable
consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of
nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No.
01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the
MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases; and the Resolution submitted by three
Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner
Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY
DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper
consultation with those who joined the majority. The Chairman
and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority
decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority
Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate
opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned
Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion
wrote an explanation on his vote.[50]
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a Vote of
Adoption signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.[51]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 100
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision
annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a Comment and
Manifestation[52] with the COMELEC en banc questioning the
procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In
addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an
opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and
Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of
respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed
office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House. [53]Relying
on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged
speech to the House during its regular session on September 4,
2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will
openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution
ordering her to vacate her position.[54]
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order[55] constituting the members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It
likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and proclaim the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the
district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate
of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member
of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to
the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the
highest number of votes cast in the district.[56] On the same day,
petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc
City.[57]
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of
Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia,
informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en
banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent
Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.[58] Petitioner also served
notice that I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which
position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf
of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and
(3) privileges intended for the position of Representative of the
fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including
all physical facilities and staff support. On the basis of this letter,
a Memorandum[59] dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal
Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr.,
for Speaker De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle
to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and
executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x.
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House
of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en
banc resolution on September 20, 2001,[60] no action was taken
by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner
sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which
sent a letter[61] addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia,
dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and
Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol,

requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the
matter in order that petitioner can avail of whatever remedy is
available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise
undecisive.
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter[62] dated
October 30, 2001, stating that:
We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are
inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified
the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE
Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall openly defy and
disobey the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that
implementing the decision would result in the spectacle of
having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional
seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively
deters the HOUSEs liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the
implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that
can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme
Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most
expeditiously. (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo
warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc which has become final and executory for
failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become
the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding
Officer, to implement the said resolution of the COMELEC en
banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General,
as official custodian of the records of the House, to formally
register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and
delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner
further contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and
unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the
COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of
public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to
assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte.
In his Comment,[63] public respondent Speaker De
Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the
implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely
a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of
discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it
affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in
the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty
on the House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that
unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,[64] public respondent Secretary-General
Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of respondent Locsin
during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before
the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the
Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official
acts in compliance with the opinions[65] rendered by House of
Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director
Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as
null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 101
also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member
of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and
cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,[66] alleged that the
Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives
for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot
issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative
department without grossly violating the principle of separation
of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should
be seated as a bona fide member of the House of
Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative
prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled by
mandamus.Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot
be directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General
because they do not have the authority to enforce and
implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending
before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath
of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and
remove a Member of the House of Representatives. Second, the
petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation
controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy.
It must first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the
questioned decision is actually a hodge-podge decision
because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC
disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her
qualification and eligibility has been categorically affirmed by the
HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against
her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled Paciano
Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin, on the ground that the
allegations stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition
for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was
filed late.[67]
In his Reply,[68] petitioner asserts that the remedy of
respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an
opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of
Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based
not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate
proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes;
that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-
proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P.
Blg. 881[69] and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that
respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality
of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to
the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and
implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a
ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power
of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as

Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative
power but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the
proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second
Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c)
assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the
ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner
Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I 001;
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find
that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for
the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during
the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of
respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402[70] sets the procedure for
disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz:
C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE
PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO
DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS
OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing
same grounds for disqualification, may be filed
any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to
Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of
voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties
against any candidate who in an action or protest
in which he is a party is declared by final decision
of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89,
95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 102
sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office.
xxxxxxxxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and
legal research fee of P20.00, the offices
concerned shall docket the petition and assign to
it a docket number which must be consecutive,
according to the order of receipt and must bear
the year and prefixed as SPA with the
corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e.
SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions,
the offices concerned shall issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from
receipt of summons within which to file his
verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to
Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In
lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit
their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidences including their position
paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10)
days from the date of the filing of the answer. The
hearing officer concerned shall submit to the
Clerk of the Commission through the fastest
means of communication, his findings, reports
and recommendations within five (5) days from
the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of
the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the
findings, reports and recommendation of the
hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case
consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to
a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall
after consultation, assign the same to a
member who shall pen the decision, within five
(5) days from the date of consultation.
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC,
through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the
respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the
petition for disqualification.Undoubtedly, this is to afford the
respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations
in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this
requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the
return of the summons together with the proof of service to the
Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been
completed, viz:
Rule 14. Summons
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Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by
personal service, the server shall give notice thereof, by

registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return
the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it,
accompanied with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall
be made in the manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the
Philippines.
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days
from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The hearing
officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his
findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from
the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together
with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for
his disqualification through the service of
summons nor of the Motions to suspend his
proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was
served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the
summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its
corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that
he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification
because he never received summons.[71] Petitioner claims that
prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC
Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of
Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never
summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his
disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and
the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by
personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23,
2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification
case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in
gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that
a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation
of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office. (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by
final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14,
2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing
on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections,
petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On
May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent
Motion for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. The Most
Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy
was served to the petitioner through registered mail.The records
reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such
service.[72] This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure
requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 103
Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the
movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before
the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good
cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice,
especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may
dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall
state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by
the Commission without proof of service of notice thereof,
except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the
rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
Respondents Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the
exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the
suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a
matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose
of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646[73] requires that the
suspension must be upon motion by the complainant or any
intervenor, viz:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the
trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the
petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service of the
Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap
of paper.[74] It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second
Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,[75] respondent
Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of
petitioners proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the
Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry
receipt[76] was attached evidencing service of the Second Most
Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the
petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the
COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given
any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very
same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The
petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent
Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a
copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can
suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidates guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC
Second Division did not make any specific finding that
evidence of petitioners guilt is strong. Its only basis in
suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is
the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission
(2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx

and considering the serious allegations in the petition,
hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte
to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until
further orders.[77] (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the
guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division
gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give
ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence in support of his defense in the
petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted
on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of section 6
of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC
to continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest. This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the
hearing and reception of evidencewithin ten (10) days from
the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and
recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the
hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an
oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were
allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not
acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the
petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the
affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the
affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective
memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted for the
hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked,
it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the
main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other
evidence which they may deem proper to present only on the
hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be
evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be
available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his
Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the
disqualification case against him. This submission was
sustained by the COMELEC en banc.Hence, the members of
the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the
additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that
the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More
specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of
the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only the incident
relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of
Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission
of the parties respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties
oral argument on the motion. This would explain the fact that
Codillas Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the
issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is,
however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 104
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the
filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the
Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other
Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity
to consider Codillas affidavits. This time, Codilla was able
to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of
evidentiary documents from both sides.[78](emphases
supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioners Memorandum
shows that he confined his arguments in support of his Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner
raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of
procedural due process, and consequently, the order
suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order
of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis;
and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the
purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.[79] He
urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress
hearing on the main disqualification case should the suspension
be lifted.[80]
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner is not
based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot
be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied
merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division
gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In
reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly
observed:
Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division)
made its decisions based mainly on the allegation of the
petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided
evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission
(Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified. [81]
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,
even without the evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to
prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged. [82]
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads:
Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official
functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding office
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the
following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate,
personally or through his instructions, must have given money
or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money
or other material consideration must be for the purpose of
influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged
that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution
of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and
influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for
him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:

[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period,
took advantage of his current elective position as City Mayor of
Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited
period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned
by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and
distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the
Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the
territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which
acts were executed without period, and clearly for the illicit
purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters
of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the
voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast
their votes for said respondent.[83]
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second
Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance, Cesar A.
Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump
trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings Ormoc City
Government extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the
riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla family. [84]
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint
Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned by the
City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the
road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then
scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks. [85]
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary
employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to check
and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo,
an employee of the City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to
Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the
sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but
Engr. Padayao said that its not a problem as it was Mayor
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is
owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand
and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla.[86]
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the
offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that on April
18, 2001, a white truck with the marking City Government of
Ormoc came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and
unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to
vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election.[87] His
statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the
supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for
the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same
could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin, [88] Alfredo
C. De la Pea,[89] Miguel P. Pandac,[90] Paquito Bregeldo,
Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,[91] Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,[92] Abner
Casas,[93] Rita Trangia,[94] and Judith Erispe[95] attached to
respondent Locsins Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the
Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses [96] of
respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged that the
petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay
San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area
where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are
extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification. More
importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to
disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 105
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed
other election offenses against the petitioner, particularly section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person
who gives, offers or promises money or anything
of value, gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant, public or private,
or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly
or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made
to any person, association, corporation, entity or
community in order to induce anyone or the public
in general, to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or
against any aspirant for the nomination or choice
of a candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
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(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust,
equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign.- Any
person who uses under any guise whatsoever
directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment,
vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia
owned by the government or by its political
subdivisions, agencies including government-
owned or controlled corporations, or by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election
campaign or for any partisan political activity x x
x.
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond
the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.[97] They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined
to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those
relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial
courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other
criminal cases.
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it
decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and
(o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the
petitioner and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of
the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of
the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the
opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15,
2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the
strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes received by
the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the
highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was
proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his
counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15,
2001[98] when everything was already fait accompli.
Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the
Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.
When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by
any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA
No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of
Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered
the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent
[herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is
null and void for being violative of due process and for want of
substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the
petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the
COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of
votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim
the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of
votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final,
hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered stray.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for
the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered
stray. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified
by final judgment during the election day and was voted for,
the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.[99] For in voting for a candidate who has not
been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the
people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of government.[100]
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar
considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 106
the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and
hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and
Resolutions reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary
actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special
reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or
resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days
in all other proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably
filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five
(5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and
after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or
proceedings, following its promulgation.
(emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,[101] issued in
relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the
Commission en banc or division, particularly on Special
Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on
the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action cases
(disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the
Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days
from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on
disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by
reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of
election laws and other analogous cases and on
the day of the election the resolution has not
become final and executory the BEI shall tally
and count the votes for such disqualified
candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on
nuisance candidates, particularly whether the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on
nuisance candidate, particularly where the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a

motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In
which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied
for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are
hereby modified or repealed.
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification
of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in
his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration
shall suspend the execution or implementation of the
resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
order or ruling. (emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be
proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin
which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.[102] In every election, the peoples choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all
times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into
office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast
in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in
his place.[103] In Domino v. COMELEC,[104] this Court ruled, viz:
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received that (sic)other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could
not be considered the first among the qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.
xxxxxxxxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an
office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a
declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case,
the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a
nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take
over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part
and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy
and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.[105]
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a
disqualification based on personal circumstances such as age,
residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election
offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later
disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 107
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated
because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such,
the votes cast in his favor should not be considered.[106]
This contention is without merit. In the recent case
of Trinidad v. COMELEC,[107] this Court ruled that the effect of
a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election,
based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the
place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested
the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en
banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She
maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because
she has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to
question her membership to the House of Representatives is the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation
was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC
Second Division erred thus:
(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the
dubious declaration of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses
for respondent Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of
its own rules of procedure and in directing
therein the immediate proclamation of the
second highest vote getter. (emphases
supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner
argued that the Second Divisions directive for the immediate
proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and
executory.[108] Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsins
proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without
doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the
issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was
filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even
without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on
the nullity of respondents proclamation because it was properly
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers
the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a
division, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to

expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for
reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
order or ruling.
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.-
The motion shall be verified and shall point out specifically the
findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling
which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary
to law, making express reference to the testimonial or
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to
Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period
to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon
the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order
or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter
certify the case to the Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set
Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification
thereof. (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of
the said Order of the Second Division.The said Order of the
Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for
the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant
case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and
having taken oath as representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility
should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[109]
We reject respondents contention.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 108
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division has not yet
been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of
respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,[110] even the HRET ruled that the
doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a
candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has
jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the
House of Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the
HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of
the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the election
and qualification of respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of
the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the
grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.[111] In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was
qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against
one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having
obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in
question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that
respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent
nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It
is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell
petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo
warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents
to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected
Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent
Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[112] For a petition for mandamus to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 109

[6]
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for Id., Annexes A-5 to A-6, pp. 12-13.
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely [7]
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and Id., Annexes B-1 to B-5, pp. 14-18.
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to [8] Id., p. 23.
warrant the grant thereof.
[9] Id., p. 21.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act
is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which [10] Id., pp. 24-26. From the Records, it appears that respondent
an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a Locsin did not file a separate Motion for Intervention.
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
[11]
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment Id., p. 26.
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law [12] Id., Registry Receipt No. 78660, p. 30.
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is [13] Id., pp. 36-40.
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
[14]
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of Id., p. 39.
official discretion or judgment.[113] [15] Id., pp. 39-40.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the [16] Id., p. 234.
registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of [17] Id., pp. 74-79.
Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
[18]
respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: Id., Annex 1, pp. 80-81.
petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin [19]
who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Id., Annex 1-A, p. 82.
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of [20] Id., Annex 2, pp. 83-84.
respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division [21] Id., Annex 2-A, pp. 122-123.
and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of
[22]
the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Id., Annex 3, pp. 124-125.
Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final [23] Id., pp. 41-46.
and executory.
[24]
Id., p. 47.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the [25] Id., p. 71.
COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on
[26]
the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be Id., pp. 211-233.
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to [27] Id., Annex 4, p. 281.
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
[28] Id., Annex 6, p. 283.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is
granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall [29] Id., Annex 7, p. 284.
administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA,
[30]
SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative Id., Annex 8, pp. 285-286.
district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall [31]
likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Id., Annex 9, p. 287.
Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken [32] Id., Annex 10, p. 288.
his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
[33] Id., Annex 11, p. 421.
SO ORDERED.
[34]
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Id., pp. 92-93.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria- [35]
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol II, pp. 6-20.
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. [36] Id., Annexes B and C, pp. 57-76.
Carpio, J., no part.
[37] Id., Annex D-1, p. 138.
[38] Id., pp. 23-41.
[39]
[1] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 1-7. Id., p. 87.
[2] [40] Id., pp. 174-192.
Id., Annex A-1, p. 8.
[41]
[3] Id., Annex A-2, p. 9. Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 1-14.
[42]
[4] Id., Annex A-4, p. 11. Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, pp. 163-165.
[5]
Id., Annex A-3, p. 10.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 110

[43] [68]
Id., pp. 166-173. Annex A contains the Affidavits of Edgardo Rollo, pp. 426-454.
Apuya, Carmelita Manongsong, Danilo Pingoy, [69]
Rolando Viovicente, and Samuel Antipuesto; Annex B Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3,
includes the Affidavits of Samuel Antipuesto, Pastora 1985.
Capuyan and Feliciano Apuya; Annex C consists of [70] Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing
Affidavits of Agripino Beltran, Taciana Beltran, Samuel and Reception of Evidence of Disqualification Cases
Antipuesto, Buenaventura Tasan, Rustico Alogbate, Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2001 National and
Pastora Capuyan, Feliciano Apuya, Ellen Pingoy and Local Elections, December 15, 2000.
Joel Ranolas; Annex D contains the Affidavits of
NoelGomez and Jovito Laurente; and Annex E [71] See petitioners Answer, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p.
contains the Affidavit of Roman Domasin. 74; Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, id., p.
[44]
42; Memorandum, id., p. 343; Motion for
Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 108-115. Reconsideration, id., vol. II, p. 24.
[45] Id., pp. 43-163. [72] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 26.
[46] Id., pp. 212-219. [73]
The Electoral Reform Law of 1987, January 5, 1988.
[47] Petition, Annex B-2; Rollo, pp. 149-159. [74] Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 562 (1971); Andra v. CA,
[48] Petition, Annexes B-4 and B-5; Rollo, pp. 162-179. 60 SCRA 379 (1979); Sembrano v. Ramirez, 166
SCRA 30 (1988).
[49] Rollo, pp. 40-44. [75] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 27.
[50] Petition, Annex B; Rollo, pp. 40-146. [76] Id., p. 30, Registry Receipt No. 78660.
[51] Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 147-148. [77] Id., pp. 36-40.
[52] Rollo, pp. 323-337. [78] Rollo, p. 89.
[53] Memorandum dated August 31, 2001; Rollo, pp. 403-407. [79] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 214-228.
[54] Petition, Annex D-1; Rollo, pp. 216-225. [80] Id., pp. 229-231.
[55] Id., Annex E; id., pp. 226-233. [81] Rollo, p. 89.
[56] Id., Annex A; id., p. 34. [82] Id., pp. 95-102.
[57] Id., Annex A-5; id., p. 39. [83] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 3.
[58] Id., Annex F; id., pp. 234-242. [84] Id., p. 11.
[59] Id., Annex H-1; id., pp. 245-249. [85] Id., p. 10.
[60] Id., Annex G; id., p. 243. [86] Id., p. 9.
[61] Id., Annex I; id., pp. 250-255. [87]
Id., p. 8.
[62] Id., Annex J; id., pp. 256-257. [88] Id., p. 304.
[63] Rollo, pp. 281-287. [89] Id., p. 306
[64] Id., pp. 382-401. [90] Id., p. 307.
[65] The first Memorandum of Chief Counsel Palicte III dated July [91]
22, 2001 was issued at the instance of Secretary Id., p. 310.
General Nazareno on the basis of a Memorandum [92] Id., p. 312.
issued by COMELEC Chairman Benipayo ordering the
investigation of the Provincial Board of Canvassers [93] Id., p. 313.
and the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte in
[94]
connection with the proclamation of respondent Id., p. 318.
Locsin, id., pp. 408-412. A second Memorandum [95] Id., p. 319.
reiterating his previous opinion was issued on August
31, 2001 pursuant to a request made by respondent [96] See Affidavits of Arnel Surillo, id., p. 308; Tolentino
Locsin relative to the COMELEC En Banc Resolution Denoy, id., p. 314; Jerome Ychon, id., p. 315;
of August 29, 2001, id., pp. 403-407. Benjamin Aparis, id., p. 316; and Rene
[66] Maurecio, id., p. 317.
Rollo, pp. 288-348.
[97]
[67] Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states: Section
Resolution dated October 18, 2001, HRET Case No. 01-
1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute
043; Annex 5, Comment of Respondent Locsin; Rollo,
Election Offenses.- The Commission shall have the
pp.377-379.
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 111

all election offenses punishable under the election laws

and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise
be provided by law.
[98] Copy of the facsimile message was attached to the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. See Records,
SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 57-76.
[99] Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989).
[100] Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996);
Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997).
[101] May 7, 2001.
[102] Labo v. COMELEC, supra; Abella v. COMELEC, 201
SCRA 253 (1991); Aquino v. COMELEC, supra.
[103] Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 546 (1994).
[104] 310 SCRA 546 (1999).
[105] Id., pp. 573-574 (citations omitted).
[106] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 87.
[107] 315 SCRA 175 (1999).
[108] Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 37.
[109] The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
[110] HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, 1 HRET 32-33.
[111] Rule 17, Revised Rules of HRET provides: Quo Warranto.-
A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of a Member of the House of Representatives
shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office, within ten (10) days after the proclamation
of the winner.
[112] Section 3 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[113] Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936); Lemi v. Valencia,
26 SCRA 203 (1968); Meralco Securities
Corp. v. Savellano, et al., 177 SCRA 804 (1982), as
cited in I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 714
(1997).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C.
PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA
M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V.
MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and
REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL
M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
DANTON Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R. BERATIO,
SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C.
PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA
M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT
BLAS F. OPLE, and Members, namely: SENATORS
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L. CAYETANO,
LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE, ROBERT Z.
BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG,
GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY,
JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA, RAUL S. ROCO,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE C. SOTTO III and
REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A. ASISTIO, EMILIO R.
ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO E. TAADA, MANUEL
M. GARCIA, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, ANTONIO
M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., PACIFICO M.
FAJARDO, ERNESTO F. HERRERA, NUR G.
JAAFAR, CARLOS M. PADILLA, ROGELIO M.
SARMIENTO and SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the composition of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for brevity)[2] and the
Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity). [3] Petitioners
pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize,
reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the HRET and
the CA to include party-list representatives in accordance with
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 112
be enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been
reorganized.
Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a
party-list system in the House of Representatives (House for
brevity), as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect.
The Act sought to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives, to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.[4]
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List
System Act, national elections were held which included, for the
first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups
and organizations whose nominees would become members of
the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA),
NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due
to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA
contingent[6] by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are
to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA.[7] From available
records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections
the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their

representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing
of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and
the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F.
Ople,[8] as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),[9] as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to
direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels
letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives.[10] On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B.
Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement[11] of even date, referred the
letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto
P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction
(with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the
HRET, its Chairman and Members,[12] and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members.[13]Petitioners contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET,[14] and 2.4 seats in the CA.[15] Petitioners charge that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution
of February 8, 2000,[16] the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a
motion[17] to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity
as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA.
The Court granted both motions and admitted the amended
petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength
of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in
his capacity as taxpayer and as a member of the CA. He was
joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA,
ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 113
officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members,[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list. xxx[19]
According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment,[20] at the time petitioners filed the instant petitions the
House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list
representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the
remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different
political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36
belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal
Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM,
Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1
representative was an independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment,[21] petitioners
alleged that, following the Solicitor Generals computation, the
LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the CA.
Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP
representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that
the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with
nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE
NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF
THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND
THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES
TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the
instant petitions are procedurally defective and substantially
lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:
It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the
pleading determine the existence of a cause of action. In the
instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one of
them was elected by a party or organization registered under the
party-list system as a Member of the HRET or CA to represent
said party or organization under the party-list system of the
House of Representatives.[22]
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in
the petitions under review, citing the following pronouncement
in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :[23]
Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of
the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor
significance, and the transcendental importance to the public of
the case demands that they be settled promptly and definitely
brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure.
Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is
misplaced. The procedural questions that petitioners want the
Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive
matters that are specifically provided for in the constitutional
provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution[24] explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who
would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution,[25] each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6
seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3
and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the House of Representatives who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in
the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices
of the Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the
House of Representatives who are to compose the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and
19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet for its
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 114
organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may deem
proper. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provides:
Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments.
Within thirty (30) days after both Houses of Congress shall have
organized themselves with the election of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall be
composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of
the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and the CA,
their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and
18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must
first show to the House that they possess the required numerical
strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if
the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution
on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET
and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to
this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary
before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this Court is
premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the
HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of
powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [27] Otherwise, the
doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees
fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House
may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the
CA. Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections,
the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the
available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time
simply refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even
up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the
primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the
House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues
presented by petitioners at this time.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 115

[5]
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional Erroneously cited in petitioners Amended Petitions as
question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the Association of Philippine Cooperatives.
following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must [6]
be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising the 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 19 states in part:
constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) Senate and House of Representatives shall have been
the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
to the final determination of the controversy.[29] xxx
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in [7]
Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 34, and Rollo of G.R. No.
the instant case have not alleged that they are entitled to, and 141490, p. 46.
have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA.
Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the [8] Rollo, of G.R. No. 141490, p. 18.
party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. As such,
[9]
they do not possess the personal and substantial interest Rollo, of G.R. No. 141489, p. 15.
required to confer them with locus standi. The party raising the [10] Ibid., p. 56.
constitutional issue must have such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete [11] Ibid., p. 58.
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
[12]
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional Ibid., p. 3.
questions.[30] [13] Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 3.
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of [14] Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 26.
action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of
Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the [15] Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 32.
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA
[16]
are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves. Ibid., p. 21.
[17]
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been Ibid., p. 23; Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 18.
rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a [18]
new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sections 17 and 18.
the House. The Court cannot now resolve the issue of [19] R.A. No. 7941, supra, see note 4.
proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on
the present composition of the House of Representatives as [20] Supra, see note 7.
presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May
[21]
14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the House Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 60, and Rollo of G.R. No.
has changed. In the absence of a proper petition assailing the 141490, p. 71.
present composition of the HRET and the CA, the instant [22] Supra, see note 7.
petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on the instant
petitions at this time would be tantamount to rendering an [23] 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction. [31]
[24] Supra, see note 18.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition
[25]
and mandamus are DISMISSED. Ibid.
[26]
SO ORDERED. Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326 (1993); Daza vs.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, [27] Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Mendoza, J., no part; a respondent in G.R. No. [28] Guingona, Jr. vs. CA, 292 SCRA 402 (1998).
141489.
[29]
Austria-Martinez,J., on leave. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
(2000); Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996);
Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 (1992); Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 (1991); People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937).
[1]
Erroneously cited in petitioners Petition for Prohibition,
[30]
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction, Rollo of G.R. No. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
141489, p. 3, as DIDAGEN Q. BUESER. [31] Supra, see note 28.
[2] Docketed as G.R. No. 141489.
[3] Docketed as G.R. NO. 141490.
[4]
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941, An Act Providing For the
Election Of Party-List Representatives Through The Party-List
System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN
THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in
the Commission on Appointments among the several political
parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng
Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the
KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen
and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House
of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby
swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their
former party to only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives
revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments
by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the
chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the
LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to
challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially
on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary
injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same
day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from
serving in the Commission on Appointments.4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot
be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his
election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the
House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly
registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by
the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 116
of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly
impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required
that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was
submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in
compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case
of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to
the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act
on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not
a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not
be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief
Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the
petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that
they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted
of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as
the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M.
Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative in
the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano
J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to

complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided
for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,
contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the
six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the
Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate,
the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and
could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents
contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an
internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the
Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of
filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so.
The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political
question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the election
of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-member and spokesman of the
party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ...
of the party having the second largest number
of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and
void. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to
be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate province of the judicial department
to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in
connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has
been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary
may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and
particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on
constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S.,
439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not
only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by
the parties herein."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 117
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was
made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or
legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments,
not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its
representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1,
of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly
impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be technically
correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's
removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable
obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one
thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the
petitioner is actually questioning the respondent's right to sit as
a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we
have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that
where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy
has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through
Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious
procedural objection was raised by five
members of the Court. It is their view that
respondent Commission on Elections not
being sought to be restrained from performing
any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request
for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the
remedial law standpoint, has much to
recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would
affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be
treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case:
"All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity

of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now
resolved.' It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the
national elections being barely six months
away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to
prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no
choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that
both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of
Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best,
therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper
disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961,
72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal
Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation
of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was
apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4
from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the
Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and
formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new
Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this
reorganization was the House representation in the Commission
on appointments where three of the Nacionalista congressmen
originally chosen were displaced by three of their party
colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected
by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his
place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the
rejection of his appointment was null and void because the
Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely
temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not
disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new
political group. Officially, they were still members of the
Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the
proportional representation of the political parties in the House
of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court
held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given
time, even if du to arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature, like the one that has
led to the formation of the so-called "Allied
Majority," does not suffice to authorize a
reorganization of the membership of the
Commission for said House. Otherwise the
Commission on Appointments may have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one
side to another in the House. The framers of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 118
our Constitution could not have intended to
thus place a constitutional organ, like the
Commission on Appointments, at the mercy
of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the
permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-
B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet
achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from
several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the
LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different
viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows
reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political
alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are
permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the
former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal
congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on
Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation
therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional
provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House, respectively, on the
basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN,"
necessarily connotes the authority of each
House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial
organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of
successful election protests against members
of a House, or of their expulsion from the
political party to which they belonged and/or
of their affiliation with another political party,
the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed,
the House is clothed with authority to declare
vacant the necessary number of seats in the
Commission on Appointments held by
members of said House belonging to the
political party adversely affected by the
change and then fill said vacancies in
conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the
petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the
Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to
considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to
repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the
LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political
realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he
insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-
called new coalesced
majority is actually the LDP
itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise
illegal and ineffectual,
because the LDP, not
being a duly registered
political party, is not
entitled to the "rights and
privileges granted by law to
political parties' (See. 160,
BP No. 881), and therefore
cannot legally claim the
right to be considered in
determining the required
proportional representation
of political parties in the
House of
Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind
Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on
Appointment only to political parties who are
duly registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged
against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on
Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its
First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the
LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the
wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must
now limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party
must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not
acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only
recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would
fall in such a category. That party was created in December
1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded
therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency
of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The
Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet
no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by
virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the
Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It
now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6
members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the
President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali
A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some
internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be
expected in any political organization, especially if it is
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 119
democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist
Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar
dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be
considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157
members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on
Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
"history only," should also be written off. The independents also
cannot be represented because they belong to no political party.
That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its
seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House
of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the
six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party
was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on
Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently,
the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one
seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that
the party must survive in a general congressional election, the
LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It
may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following
in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived
but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down
in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing
considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution.
Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
As for the alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party
respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same
may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that
the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed.
Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the
House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes
that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.
It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do
not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation
and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter,
leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the
Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved.
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly,
because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there
was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In
doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 120

agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely

discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves
betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary

restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court
holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member
of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume
his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cows, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 4 and 23.

2 Ibid, p. 87.

3 Id., pp. 7 and 34, Annex "F" of Petition.

4 Id., 52-53.

5 SCRA 1.

6 103 Phil. 1051.

7 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368;

Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603.

8 21 SCRA 774.

9 Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 12.

10 Consolidated Reply, p. 11; Ibid., p. 163.

11 SPP No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).

12 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The

Continuing Past, 1978 edition, pp. 181-187 &
188; Manuel Buenafe, Wartime Philippines,
1950 edition, p. 284,

13 The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna

Verano-Yap, who is now affiliated with the
Liberal Party.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 121

Republic of the Philippines PDP-Laban

SUPREME COURT 7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-
Manila Yap LP
8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial
EN BANC IND
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L.
Lobregat IND
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990 10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran,
Jr. LB/Unido/NP
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN 11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin
PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners, PDP-Laban/LB
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of (pp. 115-116, Rollo.)
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON.
FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor
Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments,
ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON.
ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng
JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R. Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a
IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN & Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House
HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on committees, including the House representation in the
Appointments for the House of Representatives of the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
Fernandez for petitioners. KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon.
L. Verano-Yap. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N.
Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion
of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the
election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political
diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis
Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong C. Singson, LDP, as follows:
Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique
M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the banner 1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero
of KAIBA. LDP
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco
LDP
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon 3. Hon. Rogaciano M.
nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Mercado LDP
Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out 4. Hon. Alawadin T.
of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Bandon, Jr. LDP
Commission on Appointments. They were: 5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan
LDP
1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP 6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial
(Liberal Party) LDP
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco 7. Hon. Maria Clara L.
LB-Panaghiusa Lobregat LDP
3. Hon. Rogaciano 8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran,
Mercado LB (Lakas ng Jr. LDP
Bayan) 9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin
4. Hon. Raul Daza LP LDP
5. Hon. Alawadin T. 10. Hon. Luis C. Singson
Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban LDP
6. Hon. Jose Cabochan

11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-
Yap LP
(p. 122, Rollo.)
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party,
the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which
may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction)
praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado,
Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to
enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election
to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members
of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of the twelve
to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions
thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties
or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the
respondents as representative of the minority was clearly invalid
(p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as
Minority member in the Commission because he was neither
nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties
in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in
the Commission on Appointments as a representative of the
Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other
congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of
Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the
members of the Commission on Appointments including
Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman
Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged: (1)
that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the
reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties, considering
the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115,
118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160
members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had
expressly renounced in writing their respective political party
affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15
Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo).i•t•c-aüslAfter its petition for
registration as a political party was granted on August 28, 1989
by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 122
November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP
become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that
as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the
minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced
Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on
Appointments.
Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that
the petitioner has no better light than those already selected, to
be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments
because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap
and eleven (11) other House members to the Commission on
Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and
(3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the Commission on
Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-
218, Rollo).
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the
petition as the issues involved may touch on the validity of its
organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the
LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs.
Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court (pp.
195-198, Rollo).
The issue here is whether the members of the House in the
Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives elected by each House on
the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case
of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI,
1987 Constitution.)
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the
respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed, not
because it raises a political question, which it does not, but
because the revision of the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled that
"the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution"
is justiciable, and, "even if the question were political in nature,
it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 123

1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine

whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government."

The composition of the House membership in the Commission

on Appointments was based on proportional representation of
the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the
LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent
(80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments
would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were
apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the
next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in
the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the
House membership in the Commission on Appointments was
done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as

petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the
Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even
if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone
member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than
1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one
of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To
be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on
Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of
the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at
least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and

congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the
Commission are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in
favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House

members in the Commission on Appointments should have
been nominated and elected by their respective political parties.
The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the
House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI
of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 124

Republic of the Philippines LDP 15 7.5 members

SUPREME COURT NPC 5 2.5 members
Manila LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
EN BANC
At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27,
1992, Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader
nominated, for and in his behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators
for membership in the Commission on Appointments, namely
G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992 Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople,
Sotto and Romulo. The nomination of the eight senators 2 was
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as Minority Floor
UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS- Leader, and Senator John Osmeña, in representation of the
NUCD), petitioners, NPC. To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino
vs. proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 3
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents. . . . 12 members to the Commission on
Appointments, eight coming from the LDP,
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in- two coming from NPC, one coming from the
intervention. Liberal Party, with the understanding that
there are strong reservations against this
proportion of these numbers so that if later on
CAMPOS, JR., J.: in action in the Supreme Court, if any party is
found to have an excess in representation,
and if any party is found to have a deficiency
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator in representation, that party will be entitled to
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting and assuming nominate and have elected by this body its
the position of members of the Commission on Appointments additional representatives.
and to prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio
Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and allowing
the respondent senators to sit as members thereof. The proposed compromise above stated was a
temporary arrangement and, inspite of the objections
of Senator Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the
As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the Commission on Appointments to be organized by the
Senate is composed of the following members or Senators election of its members, it was approved. The elected
representing the respective political affiliations: members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
LDP –– 15 senators
NPC –– 5 senators On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his
LAKAS-NUCD –– 3 behalf and in behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian
senators Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of a
LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1 writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President
senator Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as Alberto Romulo as the eight senator elected by the LDP, and
follow as: Wigberto E. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-
PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the
ground that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was
No. of senators of a political
violative of the rule of proportional representation, and that it is
party x 12 seats
the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent
–––––––––––––––––––––
with the Constitution, 4 to combine their fractional
–––––
representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete
Total no. of senators
one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their
elected
ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.

the resulting composition of the senate based on the

Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro the
rule of proportional representation of each political
creation of a Commission on Appointments and the allocation of
party with elected representatives in the Senate, is as
its membership, as follows:
follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on

Political Party/ Proportional
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve
Political Coalition Membership members of the House of
Representatives Representatives, elected by each house on

the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties or organizations
registered under the party list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within the
session days of the Congress from their
submission of all the members. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional
representation of the various political parties with elected
senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these political
parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission
on Appointments as stated in the first paragraph of this
decision.5 Each political party has a claim to an extra half seat,
and the election of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator
Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
majority is precisely questioned by the petitioners because,
according to them, it unduly increased the membership of LDP
and LP-PDP-LABAN in the commission and reduced the
membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC correspondingly. In
view of the conflicting claims of each of the political
parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a fractional
membership in the Commission on Appointments, the election
of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada has
become controversial and its validity questionable. Hence, this
petition. It has been established that the legality of filling up the
membership of the Commission on Appointments is a justiciable
issue and not a political question. 6
We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as
to the nature of the instant petition. There is no doubt that the
issues involved herein are constitutional in nature and are of vital
importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a
Commission on Appointments. Where constitutional issues are
properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural
questions acquire a relatively minor significance 7 and the
"transcendental importance to the public of the case demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside . . .
technicalities of procedure". 8
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant petition
may be regarded as one of prohibition 9 wherein the Senate is
claimed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it designated respondent Senator Romulo as eighth
member of the Commission on Appointments, upon nomination
by the LDP, and respondent Senator Tañada as LP nominee,
notwithstanding, that, in both instance, LDP and LP are each
entitled only to "half a member". In the alternative, the petition
may be regarded as one for mandamus, 10 in which it is claimed
that the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully excluded from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which each is
entitled. Considering the importance of the case at bar and in
keeping with the Court's duty under the Constitution to keep the
other branches of the government within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws of the land, this Court has decided to
brush aside legal technicalities of procedure and take
cognizance of this case.
The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as
follows:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 125
1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members
of the Commission on Appointments is in
accordance with the provision of Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
2) If said membership of the respondent
senators in the Commission is violative of the
Constitutional provision, did the respondent
Senate act in grave abuse of discretion in
electing the respondent Senators?
3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
majority, should a writ of prohibition enjoining,
prohibiting and restraining respondent
Senators from sitting as members of and
participating in the proceeding of the
Commission on Appointments be issued?
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the
mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP –– 7.5
NPC –– .5
LAKAS-NUCD –– 2.5
LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each
of them entitled to a fractional membership on the basis
of the rule on proportional representation of each of the
political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of
Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner
of application than as above. The problem is what to
do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one
other party's fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's
representation in the Commission on Appointments to
less than their proportional representation in the
Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18
because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation
to the LDP and reduced the representation of one
political party — either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the case
of Senator Lorenzo Tañada, 11 and the cases of Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the physical
impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional
membership must be rounded up into one senator; (b) being the
sole elected senator of his party, his party is entitled to be

represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having
been elected senator, rounding up into one full senator his
fractional membership is consistent with the provision and spirit
of the Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle
of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be
invoked as a precedent in support of incumbent Senator
Tañada's claim to a membership in the present Commission on
Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24
elected senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23
belonged to the Nacionalista Party, while Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, who belonged to the Citizen's Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of
the Commission on Appointments because he alone
represented the minority party. Had there been another senator
belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem
of who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition
party would have arisen. In the case of Senator Ponce Enrile,
there were two senators elected from the opposition party,
namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of
proportional representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the
opposition was entitled to full member (not a fractional
membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally nominated and
elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the
present case, if there were a political parties in the Senate, and
We follow Senators Tañada's claim that he is entitled to full
membership as lone representative of his party, We the anomaly
of having 13 senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve
(12) in the Commission on Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the
Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the
LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of
the same because it is not in compliance with the requirements
that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the resulting fractional membership of the
political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission
on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole
is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it
will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by
utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party,
who is deprived of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives
can by sheer force of number impose its will on the hapless
minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a
check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain
the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is
entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its
proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a
greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority,
who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its rightful
membership in the Commission.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 126
Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on
Appointments of any political party who succeeds in electing
members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators
so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission
on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case
of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a political party must have at least
two senators in the Senate to be able to have a representatives
in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less
than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the
Commission on Appointments. This applies to the respondent
Senator Tañada.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, political party or coalition
must have at least two duly elected senators
for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political
parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in
the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate
that the Commission on Appointments must
necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve
(12) members of the House of Representatives. What
the Constitution requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18,
the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members and in Section 19, the Commission shall
meet only while congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge
such powers and functions herein conferred upon it".
Implementing the above provisions of the Constitution,
Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission
on Appointments, provides as follows:
Sec. 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum:
The Commission shall meet at either the
session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman or
as the Commission may designate. The
presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided,
however, that at least four (4) of the members
constituting the quorum should come from
either house. . . .
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the
election and presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives in order that the
Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned
of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their
composition is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among
these are the Supreme
Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on
Election, 15 Commission on Audit. 16 They perform their
function so long and there is the required quorum, usually a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 127

majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments 1 Includes Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
may perform its functions and transact it s business even if only
ten (10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists. 2 Senator Alberto Romulo.

It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides for 3 T.S.N., Session of August 27, 1992, p. 29
equal membership from the Senate and the House of as Annex to Petitions
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments, the
senators on the one hand, and the representatives, on the other,
do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along party lines. 4 Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
Even if Senator Tañada would not be able sit in the Commission
on Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be represented 5 See page 2 of the Decision.
in the Commission by congressman Ponce Enrile who has
become a member of the LP. On the other hand, there is nothing 6 Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA 377
to stop any of the political party in order to fill up the two (1990).
vacancies resulting from this decision.

7 Daza vs. Sinson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989).

Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always
twelve (12) senators in the Commission on Appointments, the
instant situation cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard 8 Osmeña vs. Commission on Elections, 199
of the rule on proportional representation. The election of SCRA 750 ( 1991).
senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate 9 Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP majority
10 Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate
organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave
abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner 11 Tañada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by
reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely 12 Supra, note 6.
inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found
13 Section 4, Article VIII.
to exist.

14 Section 1 (1), Article IX-A.

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable
rules and jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, We
declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator 15 Section 1 (1), Article IX-C.
Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on
Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule 15 Section 1 (1), Article IX-D.
on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of
prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents
Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from assuming,
occupying and discharging the functions of members of the
Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist from
recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and
from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating
as members of said Commission.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo,
JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., is on leave,

Footnotes

EN BANC
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as President and in
representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LP), AND HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A.
ABAYA, HON. WAHAB M. AKBAR, HON. MARIA EVITA
R. ARAGO, HON. PROCESSO J. ALCALA, HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, HON. MARY MITZI
CAJAYON, HON. FREDENIL H. CASTRO, HON. GLENN
ANG CHONG, HON. SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, HON.
PAUL RUIZ DAZA, HON. ANTONIO A. DEL ROSARIO,
HON. CECILIA S. LUNA, HON. MANUEL M. MAMBA,
HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, HON. ALVIN
SANDOVAL, HON. LORENZO R. TAADA III, HON.
REYNALDO S. UY, HON. ALFONSO V. UMALI JR., HON.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,
Petitioners,
-versus-
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR. in his official capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, SR., in his official capacity as
Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives,
HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, in his official capacity as ex-
officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments,
ATTY. MA. GEMMA D. ASPIRAS, in her official capacity
as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, HON.
PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, HON. EDGARDO C.
ZIALCITA, HON. ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, HON. JOSE
CARLOS V. LACSON, HON. EILEEN R. ERMITA-BUHAIN,
HON. JOSE V. YAP, HON. RODOLFO T. ALBANO III,
HON. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, HON. CONRADO M.
ESTRELLA III, HON. RODOLFO OMPONG PLAZA, HON.
EMMYLOU J. TALIO-MENDOZA and HON. EMMANUEL
JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, in their individual official
capacities as elected members of the Commission on
Appointments,
Respondents.
x----------------------x
SENATOR MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate
President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the
Commission on Appointments, REPRESENTATIVE
PROSPERO NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 183055
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 128
x---------------------------------------------
- - - - - -x
G.R. No.
D E 180055
CISION
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
PUNO, C.J., In August 2007, the Senate and the House of
QUISUMBING,
Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Commission on Appointments (CA).
CARPIO, The contingent in the Senate to the CA was composed
CORONA,
of the following senators with their respective political parties:
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal PDP-Laban
VELASCO, JR., Sen. Joker Arroyo KAMPI
NACHURA, Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD
LEONARDO-DE Sen.
CASTRO,
Panfilo Lacson UNO
BRION,* Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP
PERALTA, andSen. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP
BERSAMIN, JJ. Sen. Loren Legarda NPC
Promulgated: Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD
Sen. Mar Roxas LP
July 31, 2009 Sen. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP
The members of the contingent of the House of
Representatives in the CA and their respective political
parties were as follows:
Rep. Prospero C. Nograles Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eduardo C. Zialcita Lakas-CMD
Rep. Abdullah D. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose Carlos V. Lacson Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eileen R. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose V. Yap Lakas-CMD
Rep. Rodolfo T. Albano III KAMPI
Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas KAMPI
Rep. Rodolfo Ompong G. Plaza NPC
Rep. Conrado M. Estrella NPC
Rep. Emmylou J. Talio-Mendoza NP
Rep. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva CIBAC Party
List
In the second week of August 2007, petitioners in
the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, went to respondent then
Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal
Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely said that
he would study their demand.[1]
During the session of the House of
Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner in
the first petition, Representative Taada, requested from the
House of Representatives leadership[2] one seat in the CA
for the Liberal Party.[3] To his request, Representative
Neptali Gonzales II[4] begged the indulgence of the Liberal
Party to allow the Legal Department to make a study on the
matter.[5]
In a separate move, Representative Taada, by
letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives the reconstitution
of the House contingent in the CA to include one seat for
the Liberal Party in compliance with the provision of Section
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 129

18, Article VI of the Constitution.[6] Representative Taada PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION ON

also brought the matter to the attention of then Speaker De APPOINTMENTS, OUSTING THE
Venecia, reiterating the position that since there were at AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO
least 20 members of the Liberal Party in the 14th Congress, USURPED, INTRUDED INTO AND
the party should be represented in the CA.[7] UNLAWFULLY HELD POSITIONS IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AND
As of October 15, 2007, however, no report or REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO
recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE
drawing Representative Taada to request a report or MEMBERS OF SAID
recommendation on the matter within three days.[8] COMMISSION.[11] (Italics in the original)

In reply, Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs

Bureau of the House of Representatives informed
Representative Taada that the department was constrained
to withhold the release of its legal opinion because the
handling lawyer was directed to secure documents
necessary to establish some of the members party
affiliations.[9]
Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of
the first petition by petitioner former Senator Franklin M.
Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, against then Speaker De Venecia,
Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his capacity as
Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives,
Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity as ex
officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D. Aspiras in
her capacity as Secretary of the CA, and the individual
members of the House of Representatives contingent to the
CA.[10] The petition in G.R. No. 180055 raises the following
issues:
a. WHETHER THE
LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST TWENTY
(20) MEMBERS WHO SIGNED HEREIN AS
PETITIONERS, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTITLED TO ONE (1) SEAT IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.
And it prays that this Court:
a. Immediately upon the filing of the
instant Petition, issue a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory
Injunction, enjoining all Respondents
and all persons under their direction,
authority, supervision, and control from
further proceeding with their actions
relating to the illegal and
unconstitutional constitution of the
Commission on Appointments and to
the unlawful exercise of its members
functions, contrary to the rule on
proportional representation of political
parties with respect to the House of
Representatives contingent in the said
Commission;
b. After careful consideration of the
merits of the case, render judgment
making the injunction permanent and
ordering Respondents and all persons
under their direction, authority,
supervision, and control;
xxxx

b. WHETHER THE c. Declare Respondents action in not

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners null
RESPONDENTS HAVE COMMITTED and void for being a direct violation of
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION Section 18, Article VI of the
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF Constitution;
JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN d. Declare the proceedings of the
CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED Commission on Appointments null and
PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY void, insofar as they violate the rule on
DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS proportional representation of political
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO ONE parties in said Commission;
(1) SEAT THEREIN.
e. Oust the affected respondents,
c. WHETHER AS A whoever they are, who usurped,
RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF intruded into and have unlawfully held
DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE HOUSE positions in the Commission on
OF REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDENTS, Appointments and
THE WRITS PRAYED FOR IN THIS
PETITION BE ISSUED NULLIFYING THE f. Require Respondents to alter,
CURRENT COMPOSITION OF THE reorganize, reconstitute and
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, reconfigure the composition of the
RESTRAINING THE CURRENT HOUSE OF Commission on Appointments in
REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS FROM accordance with proportional
SITTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE representation based on the actual
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 130

numbers of members belonging to duly III. THE PETITIONERS FAILED

accredited and registered political TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES
parties who were elected into office AVAILABLE TO THEM.[18]
during the last May 14, 2007 Elections
by, at the very least, respecting and IV. THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS
allowing Congressman Alfonso V. OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE
Umali, Jr. as the duly nominated AFFILIATION OF THE MEMBERS
Commission on Appointments NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A
member of the Liberal Party of the TRIAL.[19] (Emphasis in the original)
Philippines to sit therein as such.[12]

Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.

Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters of April 17, 2008
Aspiras filed their Comment[13] on December 6, 2007, to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles, claimed
moving for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds: that the composition of the Senate contingent in the CA
violated the constitutional requirement of proportional
I. THE POWER TO ELECT representation for the following reasons:
MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION 1. PMP has two representatives in the
ON APPOINTMENTS BELONGS TO CA although it only has two members
EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS in the Senate and thus [is] entitled only
PURSUANT TO THE to one (1) seat.
CONSTITUTION. AS SUCH, THE
PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT 2. KAMPI has only one (1) member in
THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS. the Senate and thus is not entitled to a
CA seat and yet it is represented in the
II. THE CONSTITUTION DOES CA.
NOT REQUIRE THAT THE
COMMISSION MUST HAVE 3. PRP has only one (1) member in the
COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN Senate and thus is not entitled to a CA
ORDER THAT IT CAN seat and yet it is represented in the CA.
FUNCTION. WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS THAT 4. If Senators Richard Gordon and
THERE MUST AT LEAST BE A Pilar Juliana Cayetano are
MAJORITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS Independents, then Sen. Gordon
OF THE COMMISSION FOR IT TO cannot be a member of the CA as
VALIDLY CONDUCT ITS Independents cannot be represented
PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT in the CA even though there will be
ITS BUSINESS.[14] (Emphasis in the three Independents in the CA.
original)
5. If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now
NP, he still can sit in the CA
Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative representing NP.[20]
Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition[15] on February
18, 2008, moving too for the dismissal of the petition on She also claimed that the composition of the House of
these grounds: Representatives contingent in the CA violated the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation for
I. THE ACTS COMPLAINED the following reasons:
OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WILL 1. Lakas-CMD currently has five (5)
JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF THE members in the Commission on
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF Appointments although it is entitled
MANDAMUS.[16] only to four (4) representatives and
thus [is] in excess of a member;
II. THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES
NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE 2. KAMPI currently has three (3)
NUMBER OF MEMBERS THAT members in the Commission on
WOULD ENTITLE THE PARTY TO A Appointments although it is entitled
SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON only to two (2) representatives and
APPOINTMENTS. IT IS, thus is excess of a member;
THEREFORE, NOT THE PROPER
PARTY TO INSTITUTE THE 3. Liberal Party is not represented in
INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO the Commission on Appointments
WARRANTO.[17] although it is entitled to one (1)
nominee; and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 131

4. Party-List CIBAC has a Committee on Rules and Resolutions. It was

representative in the Commission on my intention to have the Committee study and
Appointments although it only has two deliberate on the matter and to recommend
members in the House of what step/s to take on your request that all
Representatives and therefore [is] not actions of the Commission be held in
entitled to any seat.[21] abeyance x x x.

In view however, of your

Senator Madrigal thus requested the manifestation during the May 26, 2008
reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in the meeting of the CA Committee on Rules and
meantime, all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance as Resolutions, and of the written comment of
the same may be construed as illegal and Sen. Arroyo that If there is a complaint in the
unconstitutional.[22] election of a member or members, it shall be
addressed to the bodythat elected them,
By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal again namely the Senate and/or the House, I have
wrote Senator Villar as follows: given instructions to transmit the original
copies of your letters to the Senate Secretary
Today, I was advised that the for their immediate inclusion in the Order of
Committee on Budget and Management of Business of the Session of the Senate so that
Senator Mar Roxas has endorsed the ad your concerns may be addressed by the
interimappointment of Rolando G. Andaya as Senate in caucus and/or in
Secretary of the Department of Budget and plenary.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring
Management for approval by the CA in the supplied)
plenary. I believe it is imperative that the
serious constitutional questions that I have
raised be settled before the plenary acts on Undaunted, Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2,
this endorsement by the Committee on 2008 addressed to Senator Villar, reiterated her request that
Budget and Management. Otherwise, like all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the
Damocles sword, a specter of doubt reorganization of both the Senate and House of
continues to be raised on the validity of Representatives contingents.[28]
actions taken by the CA and its
committees.[23] Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008
the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining
Still later or on May 19, 2008, Senator Madrigal order/writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar in
sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring that she his capacity as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of
cannot in good conscience continue to participate in the the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA,[29] alleging that
proceedings of the CA, until such time as [she] get[s] a respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
response to [her] letters and until the constitutional issue of to lack or excess of jurisdiction
the CAs composition is resolved by the leadership of the
Commission,[24] and that without any such resolution, she A. . . . IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules against THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
every official whose confirmation would be submitted to the REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL
body for deliberation.[25] PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, by ON APPOINTMENTS;
letter-comment of May 26, 2008, opined that the CA has
neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who B. . . . IN CONTINUOUSLY
is elected by either House, and that any complaints about CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND
the election of a member or members should be addressed PROCEEDINGS ON THE
to the body that elected them.[26] APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Senator Madrigal as follows: COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE
PROHIBITED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT; and
xxxx
C. . . . IN FAILING, DESPITE
Noting your position that you will not REPEATED DEMANDS FROM
continue to participate in the proceedings of PETITIONER, TO RE-ORGANIZE
the CA until the constitutional issue of the CAs THE COMMISSION ON
composition is resolved by the leadership of APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE
the Commission x x x, the Secretary of the WITH THE MANDATED
Commission, upon my PROPORTIONAL PARTY
instructions, transmitted the same to the CA REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 132

CONSTITUTION, WHICH Petitioner has no standing to file [the]

REQUIREMENT MUST BE petition.
ENFORCED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.[30] (Emphasis in the original) II.

She thus prayed for the Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort. Each
1. . . . issu[ance of] a temporary House of Congress has the sole function
restraining order/a writ of preliminary of reconstituting or changing the
injunction to enjoin Respondents from composition of its own contingent to the
proceeding with their illegal and CA.
unlawful actions as officials and
members of the Commission on III.
Appointments which composition is
unconstitutional, pending resolution of Petitioner is estopped.
the instant Petition;
IV.
2. Declar[ation that] the composition of
the Commission on Appointments [is] Presumption of regularity in the conduct
null and void insofar as it violates the of official functions.
proportional party representation
requirement mandated by Article VI, V.
Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition
and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO are
3. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition not available to the
against respondents Senate President Petitioner.[34] (Emphasis in the
Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero original; underscoring supplied)
Nograles and Secretary Gemma
Aspiras to desist from further
proceeding with their illegal and In his Comment and Opposition[35] filed
unlawful actions as officers of the on September 3, 2008, Speaker Nograles proffered the
Commission on Appointments, the following arguments:
composition of which is null and void
for being violative of the proportional A. WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE
party representation requirement OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
under Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 PETITIONS HAVE ALREADY
Philippine Constitution; and BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC
UPON THE ELECTION OF
4. Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V.
commanding respondents Senate UMALI, JR., MEMBER OF THE
President Manuel Villar, Speaker LIBERAL PARTY, TO THE HOUSE
Prospero Nograles and Secretary CONTINGENT TO THE
Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and COMMISSION ON
reconstitute the Commission on APPOINTMENTS.[36]
Appointments in accordance with the
1987 Constitution.[31] B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE
The Court consolidated G.R. No. 180055[32] and OF DISCRETION THAT
G.R. No. 183055 on July 1, 2008. WILL JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION
OF JURISDICTION BY THE
Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, HONORABLE COURT AND THE
later filed on August 15, 2008 a Motion with Leave of Court GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
to Withdraw the Petition,[33] alleging that with the designation WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND
of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the Liberal Party PROHIBITION.[37]
as a member of the House of Representatives contingent in
the CA in replacement of Representative Eduardo M. Gullas C. THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO
of KAMPI, their petition had become moot and academic. SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE
HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE
In his Comment of August 19, 2008 on COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
the second petition, respondent Senator Villar proffered the RESTS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,
following arguments: WITH THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.[38]
I.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 133

D. CONSIDERING THE The Constitution

AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND expressly grants to the
JURISPRUDENCE, IT IS House of Representatives
SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR the prerogative, within
MADRIGAL HAS NO STANDING TO constitutionally defined
PURSUE THE INSTANT CASE. limits, to choose from
among its district and
E. THE PETITION IS NOT party-list representatives
ACCOMPANIED BY A those who may occupy the
VERIFICATION AND seats allotted to the House
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM in the HRET and the
SHOPPING AS REQUIRED BY RULE CA. Section 18, Article VI
65 SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND of the Constitution explicitly
SUPREME COURT confers on the Senate and
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. on the House the authority
28-91.(Emphasis and underscoring in to elect among their
the original) members those who would
fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for
The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed House members in the
been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party Commission on
member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as Appointments. Under
prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, each
As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. chamber exercises the
power to choose, within
Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained constitutionally defined
direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[39] Her limits, who among their
petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party members would occupy the
PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or allotted 6 seats of each
PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to chambers respective
confer on her/it locus standi. electoral tribunal.

Senator Madrigals primary recourse rests with the x x xx

respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse Thus, even
to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition assuming that party-list
to court.[40] Senator Villars invocation of said doctrine is thus representatives
well-taken, as is the following observation of Speaker comprise a sufficient
Nograles, citing Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of number and have agreed
Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[41] to designate common
nominees to the HRET
In order that the remedies of and the CA, their primary
Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed of, recourse clearly rests
there must be no appeal, nor any plain, with the House of
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary Representatives and not
course of law. this Court. Under Sections
17 and 18, Article VI of the
It is worth recalling that, in the Constitution, party-list
11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel representatives must first
advocated the allocation of a position in the show to the House that
Commission on Appointments for the Party- they possess the required
List Representatives. Just like the Petitioner strength to be entitled to
in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first seats in the HRET and the
wrote to the Senate President, requesting that CA. Only if the House fails
the Commission on Appointments be to comply with the directive
restructured to conform to the constitutional of the Constitution on
provision on proportional representation. xxx proportional representation
Without awaiting final determination of the of political parties in the
question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for HRET and the CA can the
Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme party-list representatives
Court. In the said case, the Honorable Court seek recourse to this Court
ruled: under its power of judicial
review. Under the
doctrine of primary
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 134

jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is
necessary before
petitioners may bring the REYNATO S. PUNO
instant case to the Chief Justice
court.Consequently,
petitioners direct
recourse to this Court is
premature.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Following the ruling in Pimentel, it
cannot be said that recourse was already had
in the House of Representatives. Furnishing a
copy of Petitioners letter to the Senate
President and to the Speaker of the House of ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Representatives does not constitute the Associate Justice Associate Justice
primary recourse required prior to the
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Further, it is the Members of the House
who claim to have been deprived of a seat in
the Commission on Appointments that must MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELA
first show to the House that they possess the Associate Justice Associate Justice
required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in the Commission on
Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel,
demanding seats in the Commission on
Appointments for Congressmen, who have
not even raised the issue of its present
composition in the House, is not Senator TERESITA J. LEONAR
Madrigals affair.[42] (Italics, underscoring, and ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
emphasis supplied by Representative Associate Justice
Nograles)

It bears noting that Senator Villar had already

transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigals letters toARTURO
the D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERAL
Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of BusinessAssociate
of Justice Associate Justice
the Session of the Senate to address her concerns. Senator
Madrigals filing of the secondpetition is thus premature.

Senator Madrigals suggestion that Senators Pilar LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be considered Associate Justice
independent senators such that the latter should not be
allowed to be a member of the CA,[43] and that Senator Alan
Peter Cayetano be considered a member of the NP such that
he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle his
party to one seat involves a determination of party
affiliations, a question of fact which the Court does not
resolve.
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to
Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055 is GRANTED. The
Petition is WITHDRAWN. The Petition in G.R. No. 183055 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby
is DISMISSED. certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
SO ORDERED. writer of the opinion of the Court.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 135

* On official leave.
[1] Vide rollo (G.R. No. 180055), pp. 23-24.
[2] Vide id. at 14.
[3] Ibid.
[4] In what capacity he replied to Representative Taada is not

mentioned in the rollo.

[5] Rollo (G.R. No. 180055), p. 14.
[6] Id. at 25.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Id. at 14-15.
[9] Id. at 53.
[10] Id. at 3-44.
[11] Id. at 26.
[12] Id. at 35-36.
[13] Id. at 69-77.
[14] Id. at 71, 73.
[15] Id. at 111-181.
[16] Id. at 113.
[17] Id. at 125.
[18] Id. at 133.
[19] Id. at 137.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 34-35.
[21] Id. at 37.
[22] Id. at 37-38.
[23] Id. at 39.
[24] Id. at 42.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Id. at 43.
[27] Id. at 44.
[28] Id. at 46.
[29] Id. at 3-29.
[30] Id. at 12.
[31] Id. at 26-27.
[32] Id. at 106.
[33] Id. at 245-257.
[34] Id. at 133.
[35] Id. at 158-184.
[36] Id. at 163.
[37] Id. at 164.
[38] Id. at 174.
[39] Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,

2006, 489 SCRA 160, 327.

[40] Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal, 441 Phil. 492, 503 (2002).

[41] Id. at 497-498, 500-503.
[42] Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 175-176.
[43] Id. at 18-19.

EN BANC
June 18, 1987
G.R. No. L-75697
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of
OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF
FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR
and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City
Treasurer.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his
own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly
referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on
October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15)
days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994
amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter
alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association,
Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and Distributors
Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures
Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the
case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that
intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their
rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened
by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors
were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out
in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 136
prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and
theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical
attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's
specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting
in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually
in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments
collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such
earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby
depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram
establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie
houses and theaters throughout the country, and
occasioned industry-wide displacement and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous
moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic
recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create
an environment conducive to growth and development
of all business industries, including the movie industry
which has an accumulated investment of about P3
Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of
videogram establishments will not only alleviate the
dire financial condition of the movie industry upon
which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers
depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and
at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled
distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing
of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and
present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of
the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution
for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-
being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have
called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and
copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying
the national economic recovery program, bold
emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch;
... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests
on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on
the gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject
matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise
by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him
by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it
were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that
the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if
all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2An
act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It
should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the
tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That
section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of
Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of
a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion
picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of
the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue
to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall
be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 137
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed
in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign
to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation 6 it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE
to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and
rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those
preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the
Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to
include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably
covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of
the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax
imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint
of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does
not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in
extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is
subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax,
the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but
also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that
earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million
per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user
tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make
available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement
tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-
owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the
entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden
on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed
uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the
motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement
of the state's police power.13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the
taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for
the promulgation of the DECREE by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that
"whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he
may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary
decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part
of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office
aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the
justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral
values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be
adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment"
of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of
the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still
pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution
of the question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE
contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in
Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit
the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the
power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation.
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be
made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the
authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed
and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being
"subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the
grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as
unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved
parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle.
An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which
"alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that
Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are
hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the
effectivity of this Decree within which to register with
and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the
videogram business and to register with the BOARD all
their inventories of videograms, including videotapes,
discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 138
variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram
found in the possession of any person engaged in the
videogram business without the required proof of
registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie
evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing
and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the
DECREE when the required proof of registration of any
videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature
of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case
of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence"
(People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing
1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the
"legislature may enact that when certain facts have
been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of
the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the
burden of proof provided there be a rational connection
between the facts proved and the ultimate facts
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof
of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common
experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that
there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is
non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is
violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima
facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only
after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is,
therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is
being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it
were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for
its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the
DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no
question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally
violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since
mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are
required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not
brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 139

contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in
many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the
necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These
considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter
of legislative concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there
ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The
attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity
which attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear violation
of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
5
Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
6 United States vs. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 1950,
cited in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p. 594.
7 People vs. Carlos, L-239, June 30, 1947, 78 Phil. 535.
8 U.S. vs. Sanchez, supra.
9
II Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations,
p. 986.
10 ibid., p. 987.
11 Magnano Co. vs. Hamilton, 292, U.S. 40.
12
Lutz vs. Araneta, L-7859, December 22, 1955, 98
Phil. 148, citing Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245.
13ibid., citing Great Atl. and Pacific Tea Co. vs.
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. vs.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs.
Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,4 L. Ed. 579.
14Cincinnati, W & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs
(1852) 1 Ohio St. 88.
15
G. R. No. L-40195, May 29, 1987.
16ibid., citing People vs. Mingoa, supra, See also U.S.
vs. Luling No. 11162, August 12, 1916,34 Phil. 725.

SO ORDERED. 17 Solicitor General's Comments, p. 102, Rollo.

Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, 18

Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and SCRA 424, 450-451.
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Section 19[1], Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section

26[l] Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

2Sumulong vs. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10,

1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero vs. Hon. Jose
Cabatuando, et al., L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962,6 SCRA
418.

3Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 III. 314, 8 ALR

466, 470.

4Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking

Corporation, No. 44257, November 22, 1938, 66 Phil.
483; Cordero vs. Cabatuando, et al., supra.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on
Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao
del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
— Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the
affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House
Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body
of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan,
Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,
Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are
separated from said municipalities and constituted into
a distinct and independent municipality of the same
province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton,
Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of
the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of
the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local
officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just
mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not
of Lanao del Sur.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 140
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its
resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which
are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration
of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790,
the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall
comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality
of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and
Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the
municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office
of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary,
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own
interpretation, declared that the statute "should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and
prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15,
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for
electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement
aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the
public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the
case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only
its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the

House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local
application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute
conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we
believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it
is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its
substance rather than its form should be considered,
and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept
in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the
disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected
by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the
Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers
two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 141
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two
provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial
limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results
of the definition of the boundary" of the municipality of Dianaton
and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in
Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of
the law." This posture — we must say — but emphasizes the
error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the
bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province
to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population
and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those
of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October
29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus.
For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act
Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional
upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8
thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus
created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled
that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating
said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who
shall run the affairs thereof" — which is "manifestly germane to
the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute
now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The
lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces
under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence
of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of
boundaries of the two provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is
drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There,
the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate
the Village of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon." The statute,
however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of
Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the
counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and
the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name
of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void
by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint
the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including
taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article
IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall
embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its
title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the
decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to
this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village
of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that
the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were
unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that
the words last quoted may, for that reason, be
disregarded as surplusage.

. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court
cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose
of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649,
39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to
"challenge the attention of those affected by the act to
its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan,
228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of
the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra:
"The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the
title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be
salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve
barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the
limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of
long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with
them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is
recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void,
as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature
would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed
that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . .
Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible,
and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 142
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any
purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the
court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended,
by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios in the
towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of
Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and
Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer
must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They
serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of
the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the
latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their
own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the
consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst
these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently
these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill
1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the
original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the
aggregate population is large; and the collective
income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not nine
barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is
so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter
enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in
Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to
a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it
fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios
would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what
with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent
municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with
the income to be derived in their community? How about the
peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?
This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing
questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to
answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on
separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an
undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was
created upon the basic considerations of progressive
community, large aggregate population and sufficient income,
we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton

with only nine — of the original twenty-one — barrios, with a seat
of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly
stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond
credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises.
Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we
may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a
Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-
one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town
at all, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out
that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null
and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by
respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic
Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that petitioner
is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it
violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill
be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on
whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired
by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang,
Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a
different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law
so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in
accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967
elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence.
He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer
to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and
continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He
may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may
express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel
that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of
a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others,
of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say
that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen
of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null
and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 143
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion
of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence these
few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the
creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao
del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of
such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such
statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another
province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of
nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the
most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial doubts about
its validity must be construed as not including the barrios,
located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao
del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1 This provision is similar
to those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is
aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-
rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular
matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the
insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. The construction must be reasonable and not
technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect without expressing each and every end and means
necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional
provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its
subject find expression in its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the
Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total
annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed
through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject
to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of
such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act.
Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being
that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the
provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with
taxation. While the case of Government vs. Hongkong &
Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices
against three, the present trend seems to be that the

constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as
indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad
Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed
by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions
beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5 up to
and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion
coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the
grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was
predicated was the violation of the above constitutional
provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives
was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c),
SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we
noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed
objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government
Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter
which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other
words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for
Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related
in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186
establishing the Government Service Insurance System and
which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its
members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that
there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus:
"we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision
with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic
Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that the
constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one
subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That
was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this
Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious for
their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged
erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation
from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from
persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling,
as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein
announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat,
several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were
included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That
itself would not have given rise to a constitutional question
considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by
Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What
justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to
make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in
Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created
municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 144
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be
construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities
outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet
the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to
the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality
from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction
assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in
basic principles underlying precedents, which if not precisely
controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v.
Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were
interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in
harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v.
Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302
of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance with
[the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above
principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our
constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10"In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction
which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language
of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in
conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not
hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention
of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the
Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of
Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of
one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on
examination it is found to rest on the contention that the
legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of
his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an
invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes "with
an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts
as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate jurist,
Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in
the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be
attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of
constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice
of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious
constitutional questions avoided by another." His opinion in the
Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone
and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal
statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of
their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United
States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . .
As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v.
Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The
prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963
decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an
interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation."
Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors "that
interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of
surviving the test of constitutionality."14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions
unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the language of
Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will
imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to construction
free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above
construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the
practical considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of
the Court.
Footnotes
1
Hereinafter referred to as Comelec.
2
Article VI, Sec. 21(1), Philippine Constitution.
3
Stiglitz vs. Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.
4Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I, No.
50, pp. 40-41.
5 Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 18. All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments."
6 Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108, 111-112;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1188-1190.
7 82 C.J.S. pp. 365, 370; emphasis supplied.
8 Emphasis ours.
9 Emphasis supplied.
10
Examples: Wilcox vs. Paddock, 31 NW 609, where
the statute entitled "An act making an appropriation of
state swamp lands to aid the county of Gratiot in
improving the channel of Maple river . . ." but the body
of the act affected another county other than Gratiot.
State vs. Burr, 238 P 585, the statute entitled
"An act to amend Secs. 4318 and 4327 of the
Codes of Montana relating to changing the
boundaries of Fergus and Judith Basin
countries" was rendered void because the
body of the act included the boundaries of
Petroleum county.
Atchison vs. Kearney County, 48 P 583,
where the title of the act purported to attach
Kearney county to Finney county the body of
the act attached it to Hamilton county.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 145
State vs. Nelson, 98 So. 715, the title of the
act purporting to alter or rearrange the
boundaries of Decatur city and the body of the
act which actually diminished the boundary
lines of the city were considered by the court
as dealing with incongruous matters. The
reading of the former would give no clear
suggestion that the latter would follow and be
made the subject of the act. Jackson, Clerk
vs. Sherrod, 92 So. 481; City of Ensley vs.
Simpson, 52 So. 61, cited.
Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368,
where the title gave notice that the entire
village of Fairview is annexed to Detroit when
the body affected only a portion.
11
Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2d. ed., p. 116.
12
Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44, 47-48, quoted
in Government vs. Springer (50 Phil. 259, 292;
emphasis supplied).
13McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., pp. 456-
464.
14 In the case of Fuqua vs. City of Mobile, 121 So. 696,
it was asserted that the portion of the statute excluding
a territory from Mobile which was not express in the title
"An act to alter and rearrange the boundary lines of the
city of Mobile in the state of Alabama" should be the
only portion invalidated. The court, using the test
whether or not after the objectionable feature is
stricken off there would still remain an act complete in
itself, sensible, capable of being executed, ruled that
there can be no segregation of that portion dealing with
the excluded territory from that dealing with additional
territory because these two matters are all embraced
and intermingled in one section dealing with the
corporate limits of the city.
In the case of Engle vs. Bonnie, 204 SW 2d
963, the statute involved was entitled "An Act
relating to cities". Section 4 thereof "requires
the creation of a municipality on petition of a
majority of voters or 500 voters." But some of
the provisions were germane to the title of the
law. This statute was declared void in toto.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled as
follows:
"The judgment declared only Section 4
[relative to the creation of a municipality on
petition of the voters] to be void and the
remainder valid. While some of the provisions
of the act are germane to the title, since they
deal with the classification of cities to be
created, they seem merely to harmonize other
sections of the statute which they amend with
a new creation of cities other than sixth class
towns. To remove only Section 4 would be
like taking the motor of an automobile which
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 146

leaves the machine of no use. We are quite
sure that these provisions would not have
been enacted without Section 4; hence, they
too must fall."
15Macias vs. The Commission on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 527: United States v. Standard Brewery,
251 US 210, 220, 64 L. ed. 229, 235, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep.
139; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co. 258 US 204, 217,
66 L. ed. 566, 572, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Bratton v.
Chandler, 260 US 110, 114, 67 L. ed. 157, 161, 43 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 43; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 US 375,
390, 68 L. ed. 748, 754, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391.

12
16Brooks vs. Hydorn, 42 NW 1122, 1123-1124; United States v. Rumely (1953), 345 US 41, 45.
Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368, 370.
13
United States v. National Dairy Product Corp. 373
US 29, 32.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting: 14 Ex parte Endo (1944), 323 US 283, 299-300.

1 15
Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1, Constitution. Chippewa Indians v. United States (1937), 301 US
358, 376.
2
Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (1938),
66 Phil. 483.

3 People vs. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil. 535.

4 66 Phil. 483.

5 73 Phil. (1942) 228.

6L-26511, October 29, 1960. The other cases that may

be cited follows People v. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil. 535;
Nuval v. de la Fuente (1953), 92 Phil. 1074; Ichong v.
Hernandez (1951), 101 Phil. 1155; Cordero v.
Cabatuando, L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962; Municipality of
Jose Panganiban v. Shell Company, L-18349, July 30,
1966.

7 L-23326, December 18, 1965.

8 86 Phil. 429 (1950).

987 Phil. 309 (1950), Cf . City of Manila v. Arellano

Law Colleges, Inc. (1950), 85 Phil. 663.

10 24 Phil. 37. Justice Carson who penned the opinion

cited Black on Interpretation of Laws to this effect:
"Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the
law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will
rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid
conflict with the constitution and give it full force and
effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If there
is doubt, or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislature, if the words or provisions of the statute are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two
or more constructions, that interpretation will be
adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary,
for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent impact of the language employed."

11 Lucas v. Alexander (1928). 279 US 573, 577-578,

citing United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H.
Co. 213 US 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 848, 849, 29

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III,
LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE
CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO
ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO
GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO,
NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES
SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ,
and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ
as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal
Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE,
BULACAN, respondents.
Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is
whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,
represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with
nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time
alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of
the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them
was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section
1.— Title of Ordinance.— This Ordinance shall be known and
may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of
Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. — Definitions of Terms — (a)
'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to
the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance.
(b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or
establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and
where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and
professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional hostesses'
or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed by any of
the establishments herein defined to entertain guests and
customers at their table or to dance with them. (d) 'Professional
dancer' shall include any woman who dances at any of the
establishments herein defined for a fee or remuneration paid
directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she
dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager,
administrator or any person who operates and is responsible for
the operation of any night club, cabaret or dance hall. Section 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 147
— Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal of Licenses,
Permits. — Being the principal cause in the decadence of
morality and because of their other adverse effects on this
community as explained above, no operator of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued
permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any
professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer
for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments.
The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said
persons and operators of said establishments shall include
prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.— Revocation of
Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to
operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now
in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked
upon the expiration of the thirty-day period given them as
provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth, the operation of
these establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality
shall be illegal. Section 5.— Penalty in case of violation. —
Violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or
a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion of the
Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the person
charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall be
liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6. — Separability
Clause.— If, for any reason, any section or provision of this
Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or
provision hereof shall be affected thereby. Section
7.— Repealing Clause.— All ordinance, resolutions, circulars,
memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Section
8.— Effectivity.— This Ordinance shall take effect immediately
upon its approval; provided, however, that operators of night
clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation including
professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional
dancers are given a period of thirty days from the approval
hereof within which to wind up their businesses and comply with
the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged follow:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no
authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due
process and the equal protection of the law, as the license
previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license
and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs,
has been transferred to the Department of Tourism." 6 The
cases were assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate
Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate Court, who issued a
restraining order on November 7, 1975. The answers were
thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: " 1. That the Municipal
Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit
the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs
invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos.
938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of
petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the
law, since property rights are subordinate to public interests. 3.

That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive
Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit
night clubs." 7 There was the admission of the following facts as
having been established: "l. That petitioners Vicente de la Cruz,
et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued
licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose
Torres III, since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960;
petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio
Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That petitioners had invested large sums
of money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-
lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other;
4. That the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not
allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and
to go out with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made
to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them
is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be
infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That
the crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in
other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on January 15, 1976 the
decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance
No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for
certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court
dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening
paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is
why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan,
stigmatized as it has been by innuendos of sexual titillation and
fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, had no alternative
except to order thru its legislative machinery, and even at the
risk of partial economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs
and/or cabarets. This in essence is also why this Court, obedient
to the mandates of good government, and cognizant of the
categorical imperatives of the current legal and social revolution,
hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the
Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders
heretofore issued in these two cases are therefore hereby rifted,
effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose of the grace
period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply to the
proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress." 9 This
Court is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and
for reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police
power is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed
ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general
terms as follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances
and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." 10 It is
practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of Municipal
Code.11 An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case
of United States v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 148
derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon
a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of
such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed
pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or
it will be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading case, United
States v. Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice
Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision was
applied, it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause
has two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk
of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.' It is a general
rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found
in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State." 15 If night clubs
were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two
leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation." 16 It is clear that in the guise of a police
regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal
or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms
of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those
therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938
as amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is
entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first
section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board
or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate
by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of
night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars,
saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places
of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19Then on May
21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely
"the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " 20 The title,
however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic
Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only
the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal

council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs.
If that were all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of
support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any
way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording
was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation,
not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by
petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the
prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a
constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof. " 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap
between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, 22 in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs, 23 to quote
from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or
enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional
infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the
former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather
than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of
a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government
Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the
Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph
of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of
the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by
law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for
the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace
and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are in
addition provisions that may have a bearing on the question now
before this Court. Thus the sangguniang bayanshall "(rr)
Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies,
tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe
restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which
shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the
Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without
infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality;
(ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and
sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment
and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses
and other forms of entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night
clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses
could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That
is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate
regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close
their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance,
would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 149
business. During such time, their employees would undergo a
period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome
can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible
to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for
the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a
municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a
deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus,
then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to
pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process
clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted
as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power
legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such
an Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that
character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary.
Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the
weight of its support to measures that can be characterized as
falling within that aspect of the police power. Reference is made
by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a
misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That
was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid
objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not
prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may
conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely
different case. What was involved is a measure not embraced
within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in the
aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity,
it was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such
a requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly
is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious
and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision
of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside,
and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality
of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent. No costs.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Plana, Escolin Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves his right to file a dissent.
De Castro, Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1 Municipal Mayor Matias Ramirez and
Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza.
2 Petition, 7. The other question raised was
the jurisdiction of a municipal council to
prohibit the operation of nightclubs, it being
alleged that the power of regulating tourist-
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 150

oriented businesses being granted to the then 20 Republic Act No. 979, Section 1.
Department, now Ministry, of Tourism.
21 Article VIII, Section 19, par. 1 of the
3 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975. Constitution.

4 Ibid. 22 Section 2238.

5 Vicente de la Cruz, et al. v. Matias Ramirez,
et al., and Teresita Calot, et al. v. The
Municipal Mayor, docketed as Civil Cases
Nos. 4755-M and 4756-M, respectively. On
November 21, 1975, the petition in one of the
above cases was amended to raise the
further issue of lack of authority of respondent
Municipal Officials to pass the ordinance in
question, since the power to license,
supervise and regulate night clubs has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended.
6 Petition, 7.
7 Ibid, 8.
8 Ibid, 8-9.
9 Decision, Annex A to Petition 1.
23 Otis v. Parker, 187 US 606 (1902).
24 Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
433. Separate opinion of Justice Makasiar.
De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March
12,1982,112 SCRA 294.
25 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983). Under
Section 234 of the Code it took effect one
month after its publication in the Official
Gazette. It was published in the issue of
February 14,1983.
26 Ibid, Section 149 (1) (a).
27 Ibid, Section 149 (1) (rr, ss and tt ).
28 L-24693, 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967.

10 Section 2238, Revised Administrative

Code of the Philippines (1917).

11 Act No. 82 (1901).

12 24 Phil. 165 (1913). Abendan is followed

in United States v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321
(1915); United States v. Gaspay, 33 Phil. 96
(1915) and Sarmiento v. Balderol, 112 Phil.
394 (1961).

13 Ibid, 168. Cf. United States v. Ten Yu, 24

Phil. 1 (1912); Case v. Board of Health, 24
Phil. 250 (1913).

14 39 Phil. 102 (1918).

15 Ibid, 109-110.

16 Ibid, 111. In Salaveria though the

ordinance penalizing the playing
of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal
holidays was declared as valid.

17 It was amended by Republic Act No. 979

and Republic Act No. 1224.

18 Title of Republic Act No. 938 as amended.

19 Republic Act No. 938, Section 1.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM,
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities
of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed
R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite
was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were
asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was
only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621
voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A.
No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of
the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after the
passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 151
representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A.
No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as
enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in
the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said
law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore,
since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in
the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI,
Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this
section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting
the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant
to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the
Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the
"one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative" (Article
VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional
mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for
the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section
49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A.
No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49
regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288
[1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that
general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had
been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496
[1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed
law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants
to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same
does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the
regular congressional processes, including due consideration by
the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 152
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must
contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present
limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250
members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No.
7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan
do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt
itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675,
petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have
been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as
the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved
in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law
has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of
creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or
party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora,
the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative
of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having
consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact
been diminished, which development could hardly be
considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 153

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ,
M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y.
AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E.
REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C.
MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S.
ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF
THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity
as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens
of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines,
and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the
outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied
upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM
DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING
THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO
THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND
PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED
TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE
PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN
APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE
AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
EXECUTIVE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 154
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING
TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER
AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court
resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for
the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory
opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit
for resolution or determination. He further contended that the
provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate,
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file
a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others,
that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a
need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until
developments arise to enable the parties to concretize their
respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder.
The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss,
setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution
of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant
petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars"
enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections
and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22,
1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and
the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private
respondents — both of whom have gone their
separate ways — could be a convenient
justification for dismissing the case. But there
are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The
more important purpose is to manifest in the
clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest
arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen
comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the
same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled

and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that we act then,
not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance
of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as
well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take
cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents'
motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new
Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held
on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And
while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent
reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves
scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of
petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional
actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds
which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer. Although there are some decisions
to the contrary, the prevailing view in the
United States is stated in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the
degree of interest essential
to give the requisite
standing to attack the
constitutionality of a in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional
statute, the general rule is
that not only persons
individually affected, but
also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and may
therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [ 11 Am.
Jur. 761, Emphasis
supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v.
Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers'
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 155
suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the
same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations
Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under
consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commis
ions may by law be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may
be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item
body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting
the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law,
thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers,
but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money
belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an
even greater temptation for misappropriation and
embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the
framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules
regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as
embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money
from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of
public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to
transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and
the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others,
were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all
these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by
petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the
President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for
the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for
budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system
as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on
the basis of development priorities but on political and personal
expediency." 5The contention of public respondents that
paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant
to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must
perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against
a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within
the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate
departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise
of its proper functions, and cannot directly or
indirectly, while acting within the limits of its
authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an
unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the Constitution, is not
conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions
the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments
subordinate to another, when exercising the
trust committed to it. The courts may declare
legislative enactments unconstitutional and
void in some cases, but not because the
judicial power is superior in degree or dignity
to the legislative. Being required to declare
what the law is in the cases which come
before them, they must enforce the
Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever
a legislative enactment comes in conflict with
it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the
legislative action, but to enforce the legislative
will, and it is only where they find that the
legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to
disregard its action; and in doing so, they only
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 156
do what every private citizen may do in
respect to the mandates of the courts when
the judges assumed to act and to render
judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In
exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will. If an act of the
legislature is held void, it is not because the
judges have any control over the legislative
power, but because the act is forbidden by the
Constitution, and because the will of the
people, which is therein declared, is
paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law." [Lindsay v.
Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v.
Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St.
544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am.
St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting
within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought
not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is
the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution;
Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was
adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court
has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a
provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be
constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot
therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not
acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the
economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the
Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision
which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this
sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared
null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 3, Rollo.

2 pp. 6-7, Rollo
3 p. 169, Rollo.
4 The relevant portions read as follows:
The Court developed, for its own governance
in the case confessedly within its jurisdiction,
a series of rules under which it has avoided
passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining because
to decide such questions "is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was
the thought tht, by means of a friendly suit, a
party beaten in the legislature could transfer
to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act."
Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143
U.S. 339, 345.
2. The Court will not "anticipate question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it." Liverpool. N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v.
Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39
... "It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case. 'Burton v. United States. 196 U.S. 283,
295.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration
Commissioners, supra.
4. The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can
be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
191; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,
538. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently
dismissed because the judgment can be
sustained on an independent state ground.
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 157
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of
a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler
v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v.
Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a public
official interested only in the performance of
his official duty will not be entertained..... In
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizenwho sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124,
U.S. 581 . . .
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress
is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.' Cromwell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62." [pp. 176-177, Rollo].
5 p. 14, Rollo.
* Casanovas vs. Hord 8 Phil. 125; McGirr vs.
Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Compania General de
Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility, 34 Phil.
136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883;
Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599; US vs.
Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil. 6; McDaniel vs.
Apacible, 44 Phil. 248; People vs. Pomar, 46
Phil. 440; Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676;
Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259;
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transp. Co., 57
Phil. 600: People vs. Linsangan; 62 Phil. 464;
People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corp. vs. Jose O. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People
vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; City of Baguio vs.
Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144; City of Cebu vs.
Nawasa, 107 Phil, 1112; Rutter vs. Esteban
93 Phil. 68.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 158