G.R. No.

157917 August 29, 2012

SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES TERESITA PHILIPPINE NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the COURT
OF APPEALS Respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro and Nanette Pereña to
transport their (Zarate’s) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereñas were owners of a
van being used for private school transport.
At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente Alfaro, while
the children were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short cut in order to avoid
traffic. The usual short cut was a railroad crossing of the Philippine National Railway (PNR).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway) was up
which means it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus. However, there was in fact
an oncoming train but Alfaro no longer saw the train as his view was already blocked by the bus
he was trying to overtake. The bus was able to cross unscathed but the van’s rear end was hit.
During the collision, Aaron, was thrown off the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head
was severed. He was only 15 years old.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away before the
collision because the van’s stereo was playing loudly.
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereñas (Alfaro became at-large). Their cause of action against
PNR was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of action against the Pereñas was based on breach
of contract of common carriage.
In their defense, the Pereñas invoked that as private carriers they were not negligent in
selecting Alfaro as their driver as they made sure that he had a driver’s license and that he was
not involved in any accident prior to his being hired. In short, they observed the diligence of a
good father in selecting their employee.
PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that the railroad crossing they placed there was not
meant for railroad crossing (really, that’s their defense!).
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In the decision of
the RTC and the CA, they awarded damages in favor of the Zarates for the loss of earning
capacity of their dead son.
The Pereñas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was merely a high
school student, hence, the award of such damages was merely speculative. They cited the case
of People vs Teehankee where the Supreme Court did not award damages for the loss of
earning capacity despite the fact that the victim there was enrolled in a pilot school.
ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the Pereñas is
untenable. Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is proper.
HELD: Yes, in both issues.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereñas are common carriers. They are not merely
private carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for school services or school
buses is not well settled as to whether or not they are private or common carriers – but they
were generally regarded as private carriers). Private transport for schools are common carriers.
The Pereñas, as the operators of a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting
passengers generally as a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
passengers over established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c)
transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas operated as
a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately
to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and
for a fee.
Being a common carrier, what is required of the Pereñas is not mere diligence of a good father.
What is specifically required from them by law is extraordinary diligence – a fact which they
failed to prove in court. Verily, their obligation as common carriers did not cease upon their
exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as their employee.
(It is recommended that you read the full text, the Supreme Court made an elaborate and
extensive definition of common and private carriers as well as their distinctions.)
Award of Damages for Aaron’s loss of earning capacity despite he being a high school student at
the time of his death
The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was of normal
health and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the computation of his earning
capacity was not on what he would have become. It was based on the current minimum wage.
The minimum wage was validly used because with his circumstances at the time of his death, it
is most certain that had he lived, he would at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he
starts working. This is not being speculative at all.
The Teehankee case was different because in that case, the reason why no damages were
awarded for loss of earning capacity was that the defendants there were already assuming that
the victim would indeed become a pilot – hence, that made the assumption speculative. But in
the case of Aaron, there was no speculation as to what he might be – but whatever he’ll
become, it is certain that he will at the least be earning minimum wage.
 G.R. No. L-2910 June 29, 1951
Manufacturers Life Insurance vs. Meer

J. Bengzon;

Facts: Manufacturer Life Insurance Company was engaged in such business in the Philippines
for more than five years before and including the year 1941. But due to war it closed the branch
office at Manila during 1942 up to 1945. Plaintiff issued a number of life insurance policies in
the Philippines containing stipulations known as non-forfeiture clauses.

Since the insured failed to pay from 1942 to 1946, the company applied the provision of the
automatic premium loan clauses; and the net amount of premiums so advanced or loaned
totaled P1,069,254.98. On this sum the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue assessed
P17,917.12. The assessment was made pursuant to section 255 of the NIRC which put taxes on
insurance premiums paid by money, notes, credits or any substitutes for money.

Manufacturer contended that when it made premium loans or premium advances by virtue of
the non-forfeiture clauses, it did not collect premiums within the meaning of the above sections
of the law, and therefore it is not amendable to the tax provided.

Issues:
1. Whether or not premium advances made by plaintiff-appellant under the automatic
premium loan clause of its policies are "premium collected" by the Company are
subject to tax –YES

2. Whether or not, in the application of the automatic premium loan clause of plaintiff-
appellant's policies, there is "payment in money, notes, credit, or any substitutes for
money"- YES

3. Whether or not the collection of the alleged deficiency premium taxes constitutes
double taxation-No

4. Whether the making of premium advances, granting for the sake of argument that it
amounted to collection of premiums, were done in Toronto, Canada, or in the
Philippines- No

5. Whether or not the fact that plaintiff-appellant was not doing business in the
Philippines during the period from January 1, 1942 to September 30, 1945,
inclusive, exempts it from payment of premium taxes corresponding to said period-
No
Held: Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. “A person secures a 20-years endowment policy for P5,000 from Manufacturers and pays an
annual premium of P250. He pays the first ten yearly premiums amounting to P2,500 and on
this amount plaintiff-appellant pays the taxes. Also, the cash value of said policy after the
payment of the 10th annual premium amounts to P1,000." When on the eleventh year the
annual premium fell due and the insured remitted no money within the grace period, the
insurer treated the premium then overdue as paid from the cash value, the amount being loan
to the policyholder who could discharge it at anytime with interest at 6 per cent. The insurance
contract, therefore, continued in force for the eleventh year.”

Under the circumstances described, did the insurer collect the amount of P250 as the annual
premium for the eleventh year on the said policy? In effect the Manufacturers Life Insurance
Co. loaned to the person P250 and the latter in turn paid with that sum the annual premium on
his policy. The Company therefore collected the premium for the eleventh year. "How could
there be such a collection when insurer becomes a creditor, acquires a lien on the policy and is
entitled to collect interest on the amount of the unpaid premiums?". Wittingly, the "premium"
and the "loan" have been interchanged in the argument. The insurer "became a creditor" of the
loan, but not of the premium that had already been paid. And it is entitled to collect interest on
the loan, not on the premium. The insured paid the premium for the eleventh; but in turn he
became a debtor of the company for the sum of P250. This debt he could repay either by later
remitting the money to the insurer or by letting the cash value compensate for it. The debt may
also be deducted from the amount of the policy should he die thereafter during the
continuance of the policy.

There was new credit for the advances made. True, the company could not sue the insured to
enforce that credit. But it has means of satisfaction out of the cash surrender value.
Here again it may be urged that if the credit is paid out of the cash surrender value, there were
no new funds added to the company's assets. Cash surrender value "as applied to life insurance
policy, is the amount of money the company agrees to pay to the holder of the policy if he
surrenders it and releases his claims upon it. The more premiums the insured has paid the
greater will be the surrender value; but the surrender value is always a lesser sum than the
total amount of premiums paid."

The cash value or cash surrender value is therefore an amount which the insurance company
holds in trust for the insured to be delivered to him upon demand. It is therefore a liability of
the company to the insured. Now then, when the company's credit for advances is paid out of
the cash value or cash surrender value, that value and the company's liability is thereby
dismissed. Consequently, the net assets of the insurance company increase.

2. The insurer agreed to consider the premium paid on the strength of the automatic loan. The
premium was paid by means of a "note" or "credit" or "other substitute for money" and the
taxes due because section 255 above quoted levies taxes according to the total premiums
collected by the insurer "whether such premiums are paid in money, notes, credits or any
substitutes for money.

3. There is no constitutional prohibition against double taxation. The total amount advanced
worth 1 million pesos had P158,666.63 which was repaid at the time of assessment notice.
Besides, the premiums paid and on which taxes had already been collected were those for the
ten years. The tax demanded is on the premium for the eleventh year.

4. Since the advances were done internationally, the petitioner contended that those payments
were not subject to local taxation. This can’t be sustained because the loans were made to
policyholders in the Philippines, who pay the premium in the Manila branch. Approving this
point would allow foreign insurers to evade the tax by requiring that premium payments shall
be made at their head offices. It is enough that the insurer is doing insurance business in the
Philippines, irrespective of the place of its establishment.

5. Even if its office was closed, it was operating by collecting premiums on its outstanding
policies, incurring the risks and/or enjoying the benefits, without withdrawing in economic
activity. Before the BIR, it never asserted that that it was not engaged in business in this
country during those years.
 [G.R. No. L-20060. April 30, 1968.]

LILIA DE JESUS-SEVILLA, Petitioner, v. THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The facts of this case are stated in the decision under review (C.T.A. Case No.
344):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The petitioner is a lawyer and a business-woman, who, sometime in June, 1954, was
introduced by one Rene Nieto to Jesus Sto. Tomas Cortes (Jes Cortes for short), now deceased,
a well-known operator and promoter of sports exhibitions and other entertainments in the
Philippines. On this meeting, Jes Cortes broached the subject of promoting the first bullfight
exhibitions in the Philippines and pictured to her its financial success. Because the staging of
bullfights requires a considerable amount of money, and not being in a position to raise the
capital, he proposed that petitioner undertake the raising of working capital for the venture to
which proposal the latter agreed.

"On August 20, 1954, the petitioner gave Jes Cortes a special power to enter into a contract
with the representatives of the bullfight troupe from Lisbon, Portugal (Exh. 1, p. 166, Vol. III, BIR
rec.). On August 26, 1954, Jes Cortes concluded personally and in his own name a bullfight
contract with David Rodriguez Barrote, representing Alfredo Da Silva Over 1 ha, Empresario and
Manager of the Portuguese Bullfight Troupe (Exh. A, pp. 51-56, CTA rec.).

"On October 10, 1954, Jes Cortes and the petitioner entered into a ‘Contract of Management,’
wherein the former was denominated as promoter and the latter as general manager of the
bullfight. Among others, the contract provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘That the said AGENT, as General Manager, shall arrange and provide a working capital for the
operations of the PROMOTER, by means of an overdraft or overdrafts in one or more of the
banking institutions of the City of Manila, in such sums as maybe, from time to time, necessary
and proper not to exceed in the sum total at any one time, the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, and does hereby warrant that said working capital shall be
available in said requisite sums, promising and agreeing, whenever necessary, to guarantee the
repayment of the said overdrafts unto the interested banking institutions the pledge of the
faith and credit of the said AGENT, to the entire satisfaction of the interested banking
institutions, or other creditors, if any.’ (Par. II, Exh. D, pp. 59, 60 CTA rec.).

"Subsequently, the petitioner entered into contracts (Exh. 5, pp. 156-157, Vol. III, BIR rec.) with
the Tabacalera granting the latter ‘exclusive right to use for the advertisement of its products
the bullfights which shall be held in Manila,’ and with Harry Lyons, Inc. for the construction by
the latter of the bullfight arena.

"On December 3, 1954, Jes Cortes secured from the Director of Lands a permit to occupy and
construct a bullfight arena in the Sunken Garden (Exh. H-7, p. 74, CTA rec.).

"There were actually seven (7) bullfight exhibitions held between December 31, 1954 to
February 6, 1955. Before, during and after the exhibitions were held, the petitioner kept the
books of accounts; caused the printing of handbills and tickets and the sale of the latter; and
employed the personnel needed for the operation of the bullfight venture. She also provided
the venture with a working capital in the total amount of P170,000.00.

"On the basis of the gross proceeds derived from the bullfight exhibitions, respondent
(Collector of Internal Revenue) assessed and demanded from petitioner the amount of
P111,056.84 as amusement tax and surcharge, plus P600.00 as compromise penalty for failure
to register the books of accounts with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Exh. 23, pp. 250-251,
Vol. I, BIR rec.).

"After request for reconsideration of the assessment and demand having been denied by
respondent (Exh. R, p. 88 CTA rec.), petitioner appealed (to the Court of Tax Appeals)."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On May 23, 1962 the Court of Tax Appeals affirmed, with costs against petitioner, the decision
of the Collector of Internal Revenue "except with respect to the sum of P600.00 sought to be
collected as compromise penalty." Hence this appeal.

There is no dispute as to the correctness of the amount of amusement tax sought to be

collected by Respondent. The sole issue for determination is whether or not petitioner maybe
properly considered the proprietor or operator of the bullfight exhibitions, thus making her
liable for the payment of the amusement tax under Section 260 of the National Internal
Revenue Code.

In denying her liability for the payment of the amusement tax demanded, petitioner contends
that the late Jes Cortes, instead of her, should be considered the operator or promoter. She
submits that being merely a financier or capitalist who furnished the necessary funds for the
staging of the bullfight exhibitions, she cannot be held liable for the payment of the amusement
tax due. In this connection, she invokes our ruling in the case of Blaquera v. Aldaba (L-10534,
March 30, 1960) to the effect that a "financier and capitalist" of a stage presentation cannot be
held liable for the payment of the amusement tax.

We believe that petitioner’s reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced. In that case, it was
conclusively shown that the financier’s only participation in the stage presentation was limited
to the giving of necessary funds — which really was in the nature of a loan — to the company
in-charge of the opera presentation with the understanding that the same would be returned
as soon as the company had funds. The instant case presents an entirely different working
arrangement. In addition to financing the bullfight exhibitions, petitioner assumed active
involvement in the agreed business venture. On August 20, 1954 she expressly gave Jes Cortes
authority — as embodied in the special power of attorney executed by petitioner in favor of Jes
Cortes — to enter into a contract with the representatives of the bullfight troupe to stage
several bullfight exhibitions in Manila. Six (6) days later, Jes Cortes executed and signed the
bullfight contract.

Admittedly, petitioner’s participation with respect to the staging of the bullfight exhibitions
became more involved after the bullfight contract was perfected. She acknowledged having
granted to Tabacalera the exclusive right to use the bullfights for advertisement of its products;
she likewise contracted the services of Harry Lyons, Inc. for the construction of the bullfight
arena. She took charge of the disbursements and gate receipts during the bullfight exhibitions
as well as the recording and keeping of the pertinent books of account. She was therefore more
than a mere financier or capitalist in the sense understood in the Blaquera v. Aldaba case
(supra).

Petitioner cites the provision of the Management Contract executed between her and Jes
Cortes on October 10, 1954, wherein she is referred to as AGENT and Cortes as PROMOTER. She
insists that if ever she attended actively to the details concerning the bullfight exhibitions, thus
making her an active financier, it was primarily in keeping with her new role as general manager
in-charge. She advances the view that Jes Cortes assumed personal responsibility as principal
when he signed the bullfight contract since under the terms thereof, the contemplated bullfight
exhibitions would be under the management, control and direction of the Second Party (Jes
Cortes), at such places and at such times as the Second Party may indicate without any
reference to her at all. Pursuing her argument further, petitioner says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After the contract (Exh.’A’) was executed, Jes Cortes showed the same to the petitioner,
informing the latter that he executed the same as principal because, in the meantime, he had
changed his mind and he wanted to be the principal himself, and the petitioner to be the
manager (t.s.n. p. 33, Sept. 29, 1958).

"Because of the change in the arrangement and in order to protect the large sum of money the
petitioner had already spent in preparation for the bullfight exhibitions, she finally agreed to
join Jes Cortes as manager, and so, on October 10, 1954, the petitioner signed the Contract of
Management (Exh.’D’) wherein the roles of the parties were reversed . . ." (Petitioner’s brief, p.
6)

On this score, we find petitioner’s argument without merit. As correctly noted by respondent,
in August of 1954 when Jes Cortes allegedly informed petitioner that he had entered into the
bullfight contract for his own account, petitioner had not yet invested any money in the
venture since it was only later — September 1, 1954 to be exact — that petitioner put up her
initial investment of P90,000. In other words, it is inaccurate to say that petitioner agreed to
the demands of Jes Cortes to protect her investment because at that time she had not yet
spent any significant amount. If there was any person who had valid reason to fear that the
proposed bullfight exhibitions might not materialize, it was Jes Cortes who must have thought
of the serious consequences should petitioner back out at that stage. Obviously it was for this
reason that Jes Cortes caused petitioner to sign the Management Contract, under which
petitioner’s financial support was assured and her right as investor well-protected. With these
facts in mind, the Management Contract could not have been intended to revoke the special
power of attorney; rather, the former was an added protection to the interests of both parties
since it gave petitioner sufficient security and protection of her working capital and, at the
same time, assured Jes Cortes of the availability of necessary funds. The use of the term
promoter in describing Jes Cortes under the Management Contract should not be given any
undue significance since under the set-up just described, promoter was conveniently used only
in the sense that Jes Cortes knew the practical aspects of the business better than petitioner
did.

In a further effort to avoid liability, petitioner points to the fact that it was Jes Cortes, not she,
who approved and signed the amusement tax return covering the bullfight exhibitions in
question and that the statement of income and expenses of the venture was signed by Jes
Cortes as promoter and operator. This fact can have very little persuasive effect, considering
that said documents were prepared and filed after petitioner had been assessed for
amusement taxes on January 21, 1955 in her capacity as operator and promoter. In fact, we see
in it a subtle attempt to render the collection of the amusement taxes due more difficult.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C . J., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
 337 SCRA 358 August 8, 2000;

PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs CA

Purisima, J:

FACTS: On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from the CIR for the payment of
deficiency amusement tax in the amount of P5,864,260.84 (including 75% surcharge and 25%
interest for 2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied by the CIR.
The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed the subsequent petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the CTA so the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s arguments:

- Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested with the local government and
not the national government. It argues that they should be included in the enumeration
provided by Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of 1973.
- Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 8-88 -- both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement
taxes -- should bind the government or that, if there is any revocation or modification of said
rule, the same should operate prospectively.
- Income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI should not be
subject to amusement taxes
- In case they are made liable to pay the deficiency amusement tax, they should not be
charged with the 75% surcharge.

ISSUES:
1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a local tax – NO
2. WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government – NO
3. WON income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI is subject to
amusement taxes - YES
4. WON the petitioner should be charged with amusement tax – YES

HELD:
1. Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the province can only impose a tax on
admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball
games is not therein included, as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended
PD 1456, wherein it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of . . . professional
basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%)
of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax.
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional
basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis , in
determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the
prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic
expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the
same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically
belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. Also, a
historical analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place professional
basketball games within the ambit of a national tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD
1959) shows a recognition that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a
national, and not a local, tax.
2. Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Memorandum Circular No. 8-
88, both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes cannot
bind the government. The government cannot be never be in estoppels, particularly in matters
involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by
public officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of the statute, and that the
Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.
3. PD 1456 provides that for the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts’
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. That
definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer
spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the
amusement place.
4. The issue on the payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue before the
respondent court so it must necessarily fail
 G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY,

Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which
has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the
tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots."

Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before
the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days,
Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before the RTC.

Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of
local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code, which provides
that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or
similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided.

The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section
140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and
entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper
remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of Benguet's assertion that resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the phrase
‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places"
under the LGC.

RULING: NO.

Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying
amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of
percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides
such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia,
and other places of amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among
those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement
taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to
these places hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ encompasses resorts,
swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the
former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons,
things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned."

Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of
something, typically an impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or
presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions
of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or
viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions
are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself
by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues
where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or
operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.