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Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary
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To cite this article: R. Matthew Shockey (2010): What's Formal about Formal
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Inquiry,
Vol. 53, No. 6, 525–539, December 2010
R. MATTHEW SHOCKEY
What’s
R. Matthew
Formal
Shockey
about Formal Indication?
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I.
What is it to be a first-person singular entity, an “I” as such rather than just
the particular one I happen to be? In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger calls this, in a
short passage about Descartes, “the ontological question of the being of the
‘sum,’”2 and he implies that answering it is the chief aim of his analysis of
“Dasein”—his name for the kind of entity I am and you are, the entity who
says ‘sum.’ In order to pursue this analysis, Heidegger offers what he calls
“formal indications [formale Anzeigen]” of those fundamental aspects of
Dasein that we must begin by examining, on the basis of which its deeper
II.
While of great importance to an understanding of Heidegger, getting clear
on his method of formal indication promises to shed light on a number of
important issues about the first person, the demands it places on philosophi-
cal method, and the nature and possibility of transcendental philosophy. In
order to give some sense of this, and to frame certain possibilities for treating
the notion of formal indication, I begin with a look at part of a recent
exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and Cristina Lafont.5
At the heart of Heidegger’s early work is a distinction between entities
(Seienden) and that which determines entities as entities, being (Sein) – that
“on the basis of which [woraufhin]” entities are understood as what, how,
and whether they are.6 As do many, Lafont reads Heidegger as claiming that
all understanding depends on those conceptual schemes made up of the con-
tingent concepts of whatever natural, historically varying languages we
speak. In her particular version of this reading, she sees him as equating
being with linguistic conceptual schemes, so that “on the basis of which”
entities are understood is just whatever such scheme we happen to possess.7
And this equation entails, she argues, that there is no room in Heidegger’s
account of language and understanding for what has come to be called direct
reference, i.e., ostensive or demonstrative reference that picks out that which
is referred to directly, without being mediated or determined by whatever
linguistic concepts may happen to figure in any attendant or subsequent
descriptions of the referent. Heidegger is thus directly led into a “linguistic
idealism” that has no way of accounting for how the world provides
constraints on our beliefs about it. Lafont also argues that this picture of
What’s Formal about Formal Indication? 527
necessary or constitutive aspects of the one who does the indicating, which
aspects must be understood as standing apart from whatever particular
language she happens to speak.13 Since it is these necessary aspects of the
one who is reflexively indicated that, when explicated, are what Heidegger
equates with her being, this means he does not equate being with linguistic
conceptual scheme. Rather, being—the being of the one doing the indicating—is
brought to language without being initially determined by it. Formal indica-
tion, properly understood, is thus a method that presupposes the possibility of
the very sort of non-linguistic transcendentalism that Lafont says is incom-
patible with Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology.
III.
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The idea of formal indication was one Heidegger had been developing in his
lecture courses for several years before SZ. The contexts in which it comes
up vary, but most concern questions about how to offer a phenomenology of
life or lived experience or some aspect of it without ossifying or distorting
the phenomena in question—“stilling the stream” in Natorp’s famous
phrase. SZ, however, opens with an apparently different question: what is
the sense or meaning (Sinn) of being (Sein)? Because being is always the
being of that which is, entities, this is the question: what is it for an entity—
any entity—to be? The concern here is not obviously the same as the concern
with lived experience, but the connection may be readily shown. In lived
experience, entities are experienced and understood as being by the one who
is alive, and there are different ways she has of so understanding them. Some
are alive (in the way she is, or in other ways); some are merely physical;
many are useful; a few appear to be eternal; etc.14 To fully account for the
character of lived experience thus requires an account of the unity of the
ways of being of those entities that are experienced. What is perhaps distinctive
about SZ relative to the earlier lecture courses is its reversal of the priority of
questions: the question of being becomes primary, the examination of the
entity who encounters entities as being only a means to answering it. But it is
the means: to seek the meaning of being is to seek the unity of the understanding
of being, hence the unity of the being of the entity who understands.15
Heidegger’s name for the entity that experiences entities as being and
whose self-analysis must be the focus of the inquiry into being is, as noted,
Dasein, but the impersonality of the term (and the pronouns that go with it)
can induce us to forget that it is we, as individuals, who ask the question of
the meaning of being, and whose analysis promises to provide the answer.
The investigation of Dasein is, in other words, always an investigation of me
by me, one in which I inquire into my being, i.e., what it is to be the kind of
entity I am. Heidegger’s focus is, of course, on how to understand “am”
rather than “I”, for he sees focus on “I” as having typically led to it being
treated as an object present to the investigator in the manner of the objects
What’s Formal about Formal Indication? 529
of natural sciences, thus obscuring the fact of the identity between investigator
and investigated, and the practical (or, better, enactive) form this reflexive
self-relation must take. But this is not to say, as many do, that Heidegger is
trying to displace the “I” or subjectivity from the center of philosophy. He is
only concerned to guard against a particular ontological interpretation of
what it is to be a subject. And so his own investigations remain first-person
singular in form, for that is the form of the verb “am”. The question about
its sense or meaning can only properly be taken up by one who employs it.
IV.
But what exactly is it for me to take up this question of my being, of what I
mean when I say I am? If I ask myself (or someone asks me) what or who I
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am, the most natural answer is that I am (among other things) a philosophy
professor, an amateur cook and gardener, a recent parent, and an American.
I might also note that I am sometimes sad, sometimes happy; that I am par-
tially color blind and less than six feet tall; that I am planning to write a
book on Heidegger, go to the lake, and eat breakfast, though not in that
order or all at the same time; and, that as I set these words down, I am writing
a paper on formal indication. For me “I am” functions normally in all of
these assertions of who I am and what I am doing, feeling, planning etc. And
so, it would seem, I am constantly engaged with my being, in a quite
straightforward sense. Nevertheless, we don’t yet have in view what
Heidegger is after when he refers to our being, for what I have so far
expressed is my understanding of and engagement with my being me, the
particular individual I am.
To take a step towards my being in the sense Heidegger is concerned with,
note that one of the things I may say of myself is that I am able to reflexively
refer to myself and assert the things about myself that I just have. Call assertions
of what I am, am doing, etc., as offered in the previous paragraph first-order
assertions of my being. The assertion that I have an ability to make first-
order assertions is itself an assertion of a different sort than those first-order
assertions themselves, a second-order assertion that points to a common
capacity that I use each time I make a first-order one. This second-order
assertion that I have this capacity to assert is true no matter which particular
first-order assertions I make. Moreover, anyone who can make first-order
assertions can, if her attention were called to it, say she is able to make such
assertions about herself, even though they will be for the most part different
from mine and those of anyone else with the same capacity. In this sense, the
second-order assertion that I am able to make first-order assertions about
my being is a peculiar sort of claim about what constitutes me not just as me
but as a “me”. Unlike the first-order assertions that express what I under-
stand of myself as the particular self I am, the assertion that I have a capacity
for making such assertions expresses (part of) an understanding of myself as
530 R. Matthew Shockey
a certain general kind of entity, one with a general capacity for expressing its
self-understanding. Given the ontological aims of SZ, specifically the ana-
lytic of Dasein’s goal of saying what it is, in general, to be Dasein, it is obvi-
ously the understanding I have of myself in terms of such second-order,
general, constitutive features or capacities that are of interest. For, as noted
earlier, being is that “on the basis of which” entities are understood as entities,
and what the analytic of Dasein aims at (on its way to answering the Seins-
frage) is the basis of my own understanding of myself as the entity I am qua
understander, i.e., qua Dasein.
V.
The chief methodological question is now,16 how do we begin to get our con-
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beyond my ability to ask the question of my being, I can still look at the
question itself to see what it shows about me as the one asking it and let that
give a direction to any further analysis of what I am. So what exactly does
the question “what am I?” show about me ontologically? Three things (at
least): first, the question shows that to be the kind of entity I am is to be an
entity who has questioning as one of its possibilities; second, it shows that I
have among my possibilities a question about my being, which shows up in
the question as something that, even as I am unsure of it, I am able to ask
about and that I find myself concerned with; and third, it shows that I can
identify the question of my being as my question.
With this, it is, I hope, obvious where we have gotten to. Looking at the
form of the question “what am I?” (understood as “what is it to say I am?”)
leads to precisely those fundamental aspects of Dasein that Heidegger begins
the analytic of Dasein by formally indicating: mineness (Jemeinigkeit) and
existence (Existenz).20 For to recognize that I have a question about my being
shows that I am oriented towards my being, which orientation is the key
dimension of existence: “Dasein is an entity which, in its being, comports itself
understandingly towards that being. With this, the formal concept of existence
is indicated” (SZ, pp. 52–53). And to recognize the question of my being as
mine, and to see the question as reflecting my concern about my being, is to
recognize the essential mineness of what I am: “that being which is at issue for
[Dasein] in its very being is in each case mine [je meines]” (SZ, p. 42).21 And let
me emphasize: by virtue of the fact that these features are implicit in the question
“what am I?” they are thereby features of any entity who can find itself in a
position of asking that question. For that reason, mineness and existence must
be seen as constitutive, ontological features of any self-questioning entity.22
VI.
Formal indication has thus emerged as the technique for addressing those
aspects of what I am that are implicit in the act of raising the question of
532 R. Matthew Shockey
what I am.23 And with that we are now in a position to ask, in what sense is
the initial signaling or indicating of these basic, ontological aspects of me
qua Dasein formal? Prior to SZ, Heidegger is occasionally critical of the
unreflective use of, or appeal to, various kinds of formality on the part of
philosophers, and of the role often given to formal logic in metaphysics and
ontology. The choice to identify a key component of his own methodology
as formal may thus seem somewhat surprising. Unfortunately, his occa-
sional explanations of formal indication in his lecture courses mostly do
little to help the matter, for (with one exception I will touch on in a moment)
they are typically frustratingly vague and unsatisfying and do little to moti-
vate that particular choice of terminology.24 In interpreting SZ, this lack of
any truly clear explanation of what makes formal indication formal means
that we can only look to see what Heidegger actually does in that book if we
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called the form of Dasein, and I doubt any serious reader of Heidegger
would try. But what is crucial, and what I think is not sufficiently recognized
(or at least stressed), is that this formal analysis is a formal analysis that can
only be given by me as I take up the question of my own being and seek to
elucidate the constitution I have as the kind of entity I am. In one of the
more helpful passages on formal indication in his lecture courses, Heidegger
makes essentially this point. He describes what he sees as Descartes’ attempt
to move from the proposition “I exist so long as I am thinking” to one that
purges it of its indexicality in order to make it a ground for the deduction of
various other non-indexical, formal truths that treat the concept of thought
as defining a kind of substance. While Heidegger criticizes Descartes’
“formal-logical” move here, he at the same time suggests that “if, by con-
trast, one takes Descartes’ proposition in the sense of a formal indication, in
such a way that it is not taken directly (where it says nothing), but is related
to the respective [jeweilige], concrete instance of what it precisely means”—
i.e., the one uttering it—“then it has its legitimacy”.27 So the problem isn’t
with the formality per se, i.e., with the fact that Descartes offers a principle
that is necessary or universal (insofar as it holds of any thinker); the problem
is rather with the attempt to eliminate the proposition’s token-reflexivity
(and so the intrinsic self-relatedness of thought). Taking the proposition as a
formal indication thus preserves its formality but also holds on to its inelim-
inable first-personal character. If we take this as instructive for how to read
the many propositions about Dasein in SZ, we can see that what is import-
ant is precisely that we recognize all of these as universally assertable of
Dasein, but as meaningful only when asserted by, and so also derived by,
individual Dasein in reference to themselves.
VII.
The propositions that make up the analytic of Dasein in SZ may thus be seen
as forming an account of the constitutive ontological or transcendental form
534 R. Matthew Shockey
Notes
1. A version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Pacific Division of the American
Philosophical Association in Vancouver on April 11, 2009. I would like to thank my
commentator, Cecily Gonzalez, and the audience at the session there for helpful com-
ments. I would also like to thank Clark Remington, Clinton Tolley, Nate Zuckerman,
and two referees for this journal for their suggestions and criticisms, and Indiana University
South Bend for a Faculty Research Grant that facilitated its initial composition.
2. Heidegger (1993 [1927]), hereafter SZ, p. 46. Translations are based on Macquarrie and
Robinson’s but modified as needed.
3. So unexplicit is the importance of formal indication in SZ that Macquarrie and Robinson
basically missed the fact that it was a technical concept for Heidegger. Only after the earlier
lecture courses came to light did it become clear that this was an idea Heidegger had been
developing for some time. The role of formal indication in these has received a considerable
amount of scholarly attention in recent years; see in particular Kisiel’s landmark work (Kisiel
[1993]), in which may be found extensive references to Heidegger’s early discussions of formal
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indication. These early passages tend to be more suggestive than illuminating, however, thus
my own examination here deals little with the pre-SZ treatments of formal indication, focus-
ing instead on its functional role in SZ. In developing my understanding of formal indication,
I have found Dahlstrom (1994) and Streeter (1997) to be particularly helpful. Dahlstrom,
focusing on work prior to SZ, rightly calls attention to the reflexive and transformative
aspects of Heideggerian phenomenology and links these to the method of formal indication.
Streeter, in part building on Dahlstrom, explores formal indication in SZ in relation to Hus-
serl’s notion of indication and in connection with the general question of how Heidegger
understands truth and assertion. What I offer here may be seen, I believe, as buttressing his
(and Dahlstrom’s) reading. It goes beyond it in, among other ways, trying to offer motivation
for, and clarification of, Heidegger’s method without getting quite so caught up in
Heidegger’s own terminology and the larger issue of truth. I should also mention here the
general influence of Steven Crowell’s work on shaping my views about the place and import-
ance of subjectivity in Heidegger’s thought. The present paper is part of my alternative ver-
sion of how to “locate the first-person” in SZ, as the title of Crowell (2001) puts it.
4. Heidegger writes that “the transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that in it lies
the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation [Individuation]” (SZ, p. 38).
The method of formal indication as I present it here makes sense of this claim as follows:
it shows how I can understand my ontological constitution as both transcendental, so
constitutive of any entity of the same kind as me, and also how explicating my under-
standing of this constitution requires me to take up my own being, and so see myself as
the individual I am. To fully develop Heidegger’s understanding of individuation, how-
ever, would also require looking at his discussion of death, which I do not do here.
5. I am building here on Shockey (2008). Relevant works of Dreyfus and Lafont are
Dreyfus (1990), hereafter BITW; Dreyfus (2002), hereafter CCL; Lafont (2000), hereaf-
ter HLW; and Lafont (2002), hereafter R.
6. SZ, p. 6. This distinction between entities and the being of entities he came to call the
“ontological difference” (Heidegger (1975 [1927]), and it is the centerpiece of his early
thought.
7. HLW, passim.
8. Heidegger (1978 [1921/22]), p. 33. This text’s description of formal indication doesn’t
square with how the method is ultimately deployed in SZ. In the latter, what are for-
mally indicated are essential or constitutive features of Dasein—in a suitable understand-
ing of “essential”—rather than the “contingent features” Dreyfus describes. The 1921/22
passage, by contrast, describes formal indication as only aiming at, rather than starting
with, the essential, and as requiring an “appreciat[ion] of the non-essential” along the
way. The difficulty with the idea of essentiality here is, I believe, largely verbal, but it
536 R. Matthew Shockey
remains the case that there is no way of understanding what happens in SZ as fitting
Dreyfus’s account of beginning with the contingent to work towards the essential.
9. CCL, p. 192.
10. It is debatable whether such reference is as unmediated by linguistic concepts as Lafont
and Dreyfus both assume, but for the sake of argument I’ll concede that it is, and so for
that reason represents a serious challenge to conceptualist or descriptivist accounts of
reference.
11. As spelled out in BITW.
12. See R, pp. 231–32.
13. This suggests that there is, after all, a deep connection between Heidegger’s formal indi-
cation and direct reference à la Putnam and Kripke. Given that the latter has its proper
role in explaining what it is to take entities as objects in empirical, scientific contexts, this
connection might be taken as evidence that my reading of Heidegger must be off, given
that, as I have noted, he is quite emphatic that there is a fundamental distinction
between the way we relate to ourselves (even in philosophical theorizing) and the way we
relate to objects when studying them in empirical science. I can’t offer an adequate
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response to this worry here, but I think one can be given along the following lines: what-
ever differences there are between how we understand the relation between determinate
entity and ontological constitution in the case of us Dasein and that of any other entity,
it remains the case that Heidegger thinks all entities, including us, have ontological con-
stitutions. The distinction between entity and its constitution is just how he understands
the “ontological difference” between entity and being at this stage of his thought. But
that means that his question of the meaning (Sinn) of being is a question about just what
our univocal understanding of “ontological constitution” is. To even be able to raise and
pursue this question, however, presupposes that we can, in a single unitary act of under-
standing, grasp all the different ways of being (ontological constitutions) of entities. The
connection between formal indication and direct reference is grounded precisely in this
unity of understanding; it reflects the fact that, even as we understand the ways of being
of Dasein and objects of nature differently, we also understand that they are unified pre-
cisely in being entities with ontological constitutions.
14. This is far from an exhaustive list, nor are these meant to be exclusive of one another
(though they may be). Ultimately Heidegger thinks there are a few basic “regions” of
being (in his use of Husserl’s term), i.e., ways we have of understanding entities, but part
of the work of ontology is showing what these are.
15. Heidegger’s strategy is thus a recognizable descendant of earlier views that seek the
structure of what is in the structure of the understanding of what is. This at least partly
explains his focus in this period of his thought on figures in the rationalist and transcen-
dental traditions, where this approach finds its most obvious proponents, though it is
worth noting that it is also the approach of Locke and Hume, for whom limning the
understanding is as much the focus as for Descartes, Leibniz and Kant.
16. I here ignore what I am increasingly coming to think is a crucial but often neglected
aspect of Heidegger’s methodology, namely the place of mood (Stimmung) in it. At vari-
ous places he indicates that we can only have our ontological structures disclosed to us if
we are in a mood in which our concern with intra-worldly entities fades into the back-
ground. The chief example of such a mood that he offers in SZ is anxiety. So how do we
get into such a mood? And what does it take to cultivate it in a way that will allow us to
do ontology? I touch on these questions in relation to Heidegger’s comments about Des-
cartes’ method of doubt in §4 of Shockey (forthcoming), and I address them at greater
length in Shockey (under review-a).
17. Heidegger fairly consistently reserves the concepts of theme (Thema) and thematization
for that specifically philosophical form of linguistic expression in which the being of enti-
ties (or, at least, Dasein) is explicated. He also uses capital-I “Interpretation” to refer to
the results of philosophical thematization, distinguishing it from “Auslegung”, which
What’s Formal about Formal Indication? 537
designates any form of taking-as, even that of non-verbal behavior such as the using of
an object as a hammer to pound a nail. Hence the title of the First Part of SZ begins
“The Interpretation [Interpretation] of Dasein...”, and the first section of this, §9, is “The
Theme [Thema] of the Analytic of Dasein.”
18. SZ, p. 7. Note that there is a parallel between modes of care (Sorge) and those of sight
(Sicht): sight of the world is Umsicht, sight of others is Rücksicht and Nachsicht, and
sight of the self is Durchsichtigkeit. Once on the lookout for these terms, they can be seen
to pop up all over the place. As is clear from the present discussion, Durchsichtigkeit is
particularly important: almost from the outset of SZ Heidegger characterizes the task of
philosophy as rendering Dasein durchsichtig to itself. See Raffoul (1998), 187–92, for fur-
ther discussion of this.
19. It’s perhaps worth pointing out that the condition of adequacy I point to here does not
rule out the possibility of explanations of how self-referential entities came into a world
which didn’t once have them, as anyone committed to a naturalistic, Darwinian view of
life must think has happened. Nor does it deny that self-referential entities are shaped
by, or even brought into being by, cultural or linguistic forces. But the understanding of
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26. See my Shockey (in progress) for a detailed exploration of these structures and their
interconnections. John Haugeland, the primary influence on my work, has perhaps done
the most to explore them in all their complex interrelations, but his detailed interpretations
are as yet unpublished. See Boedeker (2001) for one of the few interpretations of
Heidegger that offers a detailed presentation of the various formal structures of the work
and their interrelations. I have quibbles with his specifics, but I am very much sympathetic
to his general effort to show the systematicity hidden within Heidegger’s terminological
thicket.
27. Heidegger (1994 [1923/24]), p. 250. See Shockey (forthcoming) §§3c and 4a for more
detailed discussion of this passage.
28. In Shockey (under review-b) I offer an account of how this “instantiation” works.
29. HLW passim.
30. Compare: it was in the nineteenth century when non-Euclidean geometry suddenly
emerged as a topic with a number of major mathematicians tackling it. The kinds of ques-
tions that led to it were, presumably, available at that point in a way they weren’t before.
But the mathematical entities that the new geometries referred to needn’t be understood as
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historically variant just because they only became accessible at a certain point in history.
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What’s Formal about Formal Indication? 539