Autonomy and Decentralization
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December
1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores
and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987
be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP
Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988
and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It
was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of
Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had
not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of
office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on
Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate
respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of
the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the
term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.
Reynaldo R. San Juan vs CSC, DBM, Cecilia Almajose
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
FACTS:
The position of Provincial Budget Officer for the Province of Rizal was left vacant on
March 22, 1988.
Provincial Governor, petitioner informed the Director of DBM that Ms. Dalisay Santos,
then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal, assumed offices as Acting PBO since
March 22, 1988 and requested the Director of DBM to endorse the appointment of Ms.
Santos to the position of PBO. DBM Regional Director found Cecilia Almajose, among the
nominees of the petitioner to be the most qualified and recommended to the DBM
Secretary the appointment of Almajose as PBO of Rizal, which the DBM USec signed the
appointment papers of Almajose as PBO.
Upon learning of Almajose’s appointment, petitioner wrote DBM Sec protesting against
the said appointment on the grounds that the DBM Usec is not legally authorized to
appoint the PBO, that Almajose lacks the required 3 yrs works experience as provided in
Local Budget Circular No. 31, and that under EO No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor,
not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend
nominees for the position of PBO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DBM has the power to appoint the PBO without violating the
principle of Local Autonomy.
RULING:
We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial
to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy but distinguished
presidential control to supervision:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)"
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and
circumscribed by statute.
Article II, S. 25, 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."
The 14 sections in Article X, on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but
give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
"Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units."
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the
nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return
the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements
and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him
on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government
issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints
filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of
his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two
terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other
in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
Humberto Basco vs Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power “to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD
1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned;
that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or
levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy
principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal protection clause” does
not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and
to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” which
has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general
legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over local
governments.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the
same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s
opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit
and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing
a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated
Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.
Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.
Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions,
local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to
a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that
to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first
place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No.
3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these
ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO,
respondents. G.R. No. 129093
FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation
of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s
permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on the ground that an
ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: “ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL
GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA”
As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the
Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and
all forms of gambling;(2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government’s
police power under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain that respondent’s lotto operation
is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were
sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the resolution is, in
effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature
itself had already declared lotto as legal. As for the allegation that no prior consultations
and approval were sought from the sangguninang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent
stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The
respondent judge, Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners
from implementing or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion for
reconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based thereon are valid
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian
are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local
government unit.
RULING:
The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the
“objection” of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the
local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement
expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is
part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which maybe contrary to that of
the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not
mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly
enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not
and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of
lotto.
As for the second issue, Court ruled that petitioners erred in declaring that
sections 2 (C) and 27 of RA 7160 apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets
around the country. From careful reading of said provisions, the Court find that these
apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a
particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national
government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national
government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Section 2
(c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
PIMENTEL, JR. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA, G.R. No. 195770 (2012)
FACTS:
 RESPONDENTS:
- 2007: the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of
the poor as target beneficiaries
- “Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino”: pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and
Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; municipalities of Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in
Misamis Occidental, Caraga Region; cities of Pasay and Caloocan upon the
release of the amount of P50M under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
issued by DBM
- DSWD (as the lead agency in implementing the program): issued
Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 setting the implementing
guidelines for the project renamed “Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program”
(4Ps)
- Also known as the CCTP, provides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet certain
human development goals (health assistance, educational assistance)
- After an assessment, a household beneficiary could receive from the
government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of
P15,000 under conditionalities
- Institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network amomng the
DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC and LGUs, identifying specific roles and
functions in order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of
the CCTP
- LGU as partner agency to make sure the availability of supply side on
health and education in target areas; prepare reports; coordinate with
various concerned gov’t agencies at the local level; hold meetings
1. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by DSWD with each participating LGU
outlines in detail the obligation of both parties during the intended five-year
implementation of the CCTP
2. Congress: provided funding under the GAA of 2008 (P298M+); increased to P5B in
2009; P10B in 2010; GAA of 2011 at P21B+
 PETITIONER PIMENTEL, JR et al:
- Joined by President of the Association of Brgy Captains of Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, and incumbent Brgy Captain of Brgy. Sta. Monica, QC, challenges before
 the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTp which
are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs.
- Admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for
the Philippines is with the legislature
- They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is being implemented,
primarily through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which
the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and
health care services have been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of RA 7160, in
relation to Section 25, Article II and Section 3, Article X of 1987 Constitution
- Giving DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the
manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be
complied with, instead of allocating the P21B CCTP budget directly to the LGUs
that would have enhanced its delivery of basic services, results in the
“recentralization” of basic gov’t functions, which is contrary to the precepts of
local autonomy and avowed policy of decentralization
ISSUE: Whether or not the CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA
2011 violates the Constitution in relation to Section 17 of the LGC by providing for
the recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of basic services
already devolved to the LGUs
 SUPREME COURT
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
CONCLUSION: NO. Petition is DISMISSED.
LAW:
 The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local
governments and even devotes a full article on the subject of local governance which
includes the following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
 In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that
would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the
attainment of national goals, Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested
upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities
EXCEPTION:
 While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services, thus: ‰
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by
the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other
special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are NOT covered under this Section, except in those cases
where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
 The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
 Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has NOT
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn,
economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting
for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
 AUTONOMY as DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION
- There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress
- The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts
in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
 AUTONOMY AS DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER
- involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments
[sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities

APPLICATION:
 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from
taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
 Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.
 Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the
provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an
intervention program formulated by the national government itself but
implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve the common
national goal development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment
upon the autonomy of local governments.
Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of
the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to
the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for
“hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30
million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department
provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-
called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government
funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power
of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the
GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under
the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should
be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund,
was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still
have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution
does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum
and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the
Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely
local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-
delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in
Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can
the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made
after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through
their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and
policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening
under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which
shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes
which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more
specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this
end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process
of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the
State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-
sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court
in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the
policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics
from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will
enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic.
This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in
purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such
political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the
pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against
the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives,
who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it
is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President
and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of
their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating
that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel
complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots
as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the
"abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the
Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to
enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting
the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-
enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the
following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of
personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall
development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters
and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to
the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In
particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional
Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF
and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and
given unto them on the sole account of their office.
Administrative Regions and Autonomous Regions
Abbas vs. COMELEC
Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734
Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and
Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao"
(Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC
from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally
be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates
the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation
of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces
where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory
Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in
paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the
approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The
provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of
the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It
may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall
be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated
in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a
majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority
in each of the constituent units, or both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18,
para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in
each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included
in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of
the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which
Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided
by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any
review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates
the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection
centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any
conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national
law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the
Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-
made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible
instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein
an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called
upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the
Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There
is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with
the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government
units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to
provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds
raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two
petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
Chiongbian vs Orbos
Chiongbian - Congressman in third district, South Cotabato; Orbos - Executive Secretary
Date of Promulgation: June 22, 1995
Ponente: Mendoza
Motion: Certiorari and Prohibition; Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court
Background
In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of
Commission on Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it. Purpose was to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.
Facts
The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(RA 6743) pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called
in some provinces which resulted to 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi Tawi) in favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM.
The RA says that those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in
their existing administrative regions provided, however, that the President may merge
the existing regions through administrative determination. President Cory then issued
the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferring provinces from
their existing region to another. The petitioners who are members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there is no
law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing
regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one
province under its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to
IX) is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the government.
The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to merge existing regions and cannot
be construed as reorganizing them.
Issue
W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in
character or executive as the respondents contend
● Petitioners: It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions
through administrative determination or at any rate provides no standard for the
exercise of the power delegated
● Respondents: No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or
provide the details of legislation because the Congress did not have the facility to provide
for them
Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED.
The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the
power to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972.
(RA5453)
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided
in the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in
the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power
to reorganize the Executive Department:“to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in
the government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for
accelerated social and economic development.”
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. Commission on Audit
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the
Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle
but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement
states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that
could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations
and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P.
Panel in drafting the Executive Order.
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed
into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating
the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing
the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional
Ruling:
The Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that petitioners’ are unfounded.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region
in the Cordilleras. Since such process will undoubtedly take time, the President saw it fit
to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region
created. At this time, the President was still exercising legislative powers as the First
Congress had not yet convened.
Based on Article X Section 18 of the Constitution (providing the basic structure of
government in the autonomous region), the Supreme Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did
not establish an autonomous regional government. The bodies created by E. O. No. 220
do not supplant the existing local governmental structure; nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that
brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government,
the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes and non-governmental organizations in a concerted
effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
region signed into law on October 23, 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval of the act
which completed the autonomous region-creating process outlined in the Constitution.
Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by
the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12
Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.
TOPIC: Powers and Functions of the President > Control of Executive Departments
DOCTRINE: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive
CASE Number (including date): G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003
CASE Name: DENR vs DENR Region 12 Employees
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS
• Petition for review assailing CA decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
and denial of motion for consideration.
• November 15, 1999 – Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a
Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato—Providing for the
Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the Regional and
Field Offices
o Sec 1. Realignment of Administrative Units. 1.6. The supervision of the
Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred from Region XI to XII
• Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction
• RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director
from transferring the offices
• DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that
o The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature.
o The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No.
429, which reorganized Region XII.
o The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in
the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
o Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in
Nature citing Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this
petition.
• RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their
Memorandum Order xxx for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further
ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.
• Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural errors: (1)
failure to submit a written explanation why personal service was not done on the
adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the material
dates when copies of the orders of the lower court were received; (4) failure to attach
certified true copy of the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration; (5) for
improper verification, the same being based on petitioners knowledge and belief, and (6)
wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal.
• Motion for Reconsideration denied.
• Hence this petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not (1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing
the same were valid;
2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
• (1) Yes:
o The ratio below answers this one lelz
• (2) Yes:
o The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
o In this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering
the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896 dated May 31, 2000 and
August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in Civil Case No 389, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the
Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Ordillo vs Comelec (192 SCRA 100)
Standard
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite
held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that
the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces
and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the
Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being
the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which
the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of
their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not
present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the
Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for
the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set
of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the
same small area.
Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections
573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government – Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The
law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio
Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme
Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he
averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is
a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No.
9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts.
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide
for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of
them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each
one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better access to
their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962
October 14, 2008
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented
by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present
geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which
voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the
power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described
the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring
“amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel
the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-
AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on
matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga
excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4
August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from
formally signing the MOA-AD.
Overview of the MOA-AD:
A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the
time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not
only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples
of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro
homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge
that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with
defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity
and commerce with foreign nations."
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro.37
B. TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region.38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the
ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A
and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on
different dates, years apart from each other.
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural
resources within its "internalwaters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from
the coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which
shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these
territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" shall exercise joint jurisdiction,
authority and management over all natural resources.Notably, the jurisdiction over the
internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."There is no similar provision on the
sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C. RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in
those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include
aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation
agreements.46
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central
Government. The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, etc. granted by the
Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.
D. GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and
monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD describes the
relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by
shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to
be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined
powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal
framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
Compact.
ISSUE:
Main Issue: WON the MOA-AD is constitutional?
RULING:
The MOA-AD is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the powers granted to the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE) exceeds those granted to local governments and even go beyond
those of the present ARMM. It cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and existing
laws.
Sub-issues:
Is the “associative” relationship envisioned between the GRP and BJE unconstitutional?
YES, the “associative” relationship between the GRP and the BJE is UNCONSTITUTIONAL
since the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that same
is on its way to independence and the concept of “association” is NOT RECOGNIZED
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
An ASSOCIATION is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish
durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a
state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence.
In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association:
• BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries,
the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in meetings
and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external defense
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an associative relationship with the national government.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than
the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Can the BJE be considered a state under international law?
YES, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention: permanent population, defined territory, government &
capacity to enter into relations with other state.
The BJE is a far MORE POWERFUL ENTITY than the ARMM recognized under the
Constitution. The spirit animating it RUNS COUNTER to national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.
Does the MOA-AD violate Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation of
Autonomous Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD violated Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation
of autonomous regions since the BJE is MORE OF A STATE than an autonomous region.
Even assuming that it can be covered by the term “autonomous region”, it would still be
contrary to the Constitution.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic
area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan and Tangkal are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another
plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted
for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Does the MOA-AD violate Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution on the Powers of
Autonomous Regions?
YES, the MOA-AD does not comply with Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
The MOA-AD would require an AMENDMENT that would EXPAND the powers granted to
autonomous regions under the Constitution.
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said
constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE
the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with
treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES
which states: The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations
with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings
do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
since only the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned
in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: The State
recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development. (Underscoring supplied) An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity
because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national
unity.
Is the MOA-AD consistent with statutory law (RA 9054 – Organic Act of ARMM and the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act)?
NO, besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also
INCONSISTENT with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. 9054 or the Organic
Act of ARMM and the IPRA.
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X,
Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the
Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes
between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
As used in this Organic Act, the phrase indigenous cultural community refers to Filipino
citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have
retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-ADs manner of delineating the ancestral
domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure.
By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations
in the agreed Schedules, [t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the
land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial
domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region.
Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as
illustrated in the following provisions thereof:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. The identification and delineation of ancestral
domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
b) Petition for Delineation. The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be
initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for
Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;
c) Delineation Proper. The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including
census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the
Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all
times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the
communities concerned;
d) Proof Required. Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of
elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to
the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the
concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:
1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial
grounds, sacred places and old villages;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered
into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;
5) Survey plans and sketch maps;
6) Anthropological data;
7) Genealogical surveys;
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting
grounds;
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers,
creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.
e) Preparation of Maps. On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based
thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map,
complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
landmarks embraced therein;
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. A complete copy of the preliminary
census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of
the NCIP;
g) Notice and Publication. A copy of each document, including a translation in the native
language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at
least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial
and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file
opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That
in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both
newspaper and radio station are not available;
h) Endorsement to NCIP. Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection
process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a
favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the
proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission
of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim
that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant
due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial
shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are
conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in
coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.
Effectivity of the Local Government Code
Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991
Petitioner: Felipe Evardone
Respondents: Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel Nival
Ponente: Padilla
Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the
position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after
proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a
petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the recommendation of
Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against
Evardone.
Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the
signing process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue 1: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was,
during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of
recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is
premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines
which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC. Pending the
enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains
operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws
not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of
1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will
take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new
Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in
the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that
Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional.
Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set
the date for the signing of said petition.
Issue 2: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the
petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of
Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry
Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of
such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to
know about the Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall
on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed
the petition for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12
July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the
scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was
undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in
good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by
Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern
Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive
Secretary there is no turning back the
clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the
right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and
elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public
office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people
holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers
and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent
mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are
the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same
electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing
process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in
Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and
local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII,
Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall
approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the
above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code